Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

L-75079 January 26, 1989 SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial) Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents. Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner. Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.

PARAS, J.: Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders of denial issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-83-22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature. It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied. These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City. Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the fact that private respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction complained of is not proper for a criminal action.

The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171). The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue. Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case for estafa. It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680). In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641). The information in the case at reads as follows: The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows: That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth under the laws of the Philippine with principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as insurance agent of said corporation, among whose duties were to remit collections due from customers thereat and to account for and turn over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or immediately upon demand, collected and received the amount of P368,850.00 representing payments of insurance premiums from customers, but herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so and with intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Country

Bankers Insurance Corporation in the amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo) Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place. The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo) Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction. Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila. Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012

DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante La. Jimenez (petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 20062 and June 28, 20073 in CAG.R. SP No. 96584, which dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. The Factual Antecedents The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency. On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.5 The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSIs articles of incorporation6 to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavits allegations.7 Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counteraffidavit. In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.

Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information.9 The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition10 and comment to the opposition, respectively. In an August 1, 2005 resolution,11 the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.12 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents. On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not. On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.15 On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC, in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.16 In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent Alamils motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it had already found probable cause against the respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order. On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial.18 On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the RTC.19 In a January 4, 2006 order,20 Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration and the petitioners motion to expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon. The RTC Rulings In its March 8, 2006 order,21 the RTC granted respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamils motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest. On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.22 On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutors conformity.23

In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutors conformity. On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.25 On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioners notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.26 On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.27 In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioners notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records. On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders. The CA Ruling In its November 23, 2006 resolution,29 the CA dismissed outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The CA denied30 the motion for reconsideration31 that followed. The Petition The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since he is the private complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the respondents illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice. The Case for the Respondents The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the power to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case. The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. Our Ruling The petition lacks merit. The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit."33 Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved.34 By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.35 When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.36 Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."37 In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides: SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added) The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases38 and continues to be the controlling doctrine. While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf39 (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case. In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.40

Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.41 Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.42 WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Acting Chief Justice Chairperson MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice CERTIFICATION I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Designated as Acting Chief Justice in lieu of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno per Special Order No. 1384 dated December 4, 2012.

Under Rule 45 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; rollo, pp. 10-43.

Penned by Associate Justice Elvi JohnS Asuncion, unJ concurred in by Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and CeliaC I .ibrea-I.eagogo; id at 48-50.
3

Penned by Associate Justice Jnse Catral Membza, and concurred in by Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and MariJlor Punzctlan-Castillo; id at 52.
4

Id. at 76-82.

Under Section 6(c), in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), effective July 15, 1995.
6

Rollo, pp. 57-63. Id. at 83-92. Id. at 104-108. Id. at 109-110. Id. at 111-116. Id. at 118-119. Id. Id. at 120-124. Id. at 125-129. Id. at 130-142. Id. at 143-148. Id. at 150-151. Id. at 152-171. Id. at 172-187. Id. at 189-191. Id. at 192-196. Id. at 197-207.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Id. at 209-212 Id. at 218. Id. at 219-220. Id. at 221-224. Id. at 225-229. Id. at 240-241. Supra note 2. Supra note 3. Rollo, pp. 242-247.

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

Per the October 12, 2009 Resolution, the Court dispensed with respondent Avgoustis comment to the petition since, as per the petitioners report, he could not be located; id. at 322323.
33

1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 3, Section 2.

34

Theodore and Nancy Ang, represented by Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron v. Spouses Alan and Em Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012; and Goco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010, 617 SCRA 397, 405.
35

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 171905, June 20, 2012; and Jelbert B. Galicto v. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.
36

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc., et al., supra;and Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981, 1000 (2001).
37

REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 110, Section 5.

38

Bureau of Customs v. Sherman, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 809; Ong v. Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 188; People of the Philippines v. Arturo F. Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 30, 2009; Heirs of Federico C. Delgado v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 184337, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 501; Cario v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688; Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa, 493 Phil. 85 (2005); Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208 (2000); Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 384 Phil. 322 (2000); Labaro v. Hon. Panay, 360 Phil. 102 (1998); People v. Judge Santiago, 255 Phil. 851 (1989); and City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Judge Espina, 248 Phil. 843 (1988).
39

Merciales v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 70 (2002).

40

See Minute Resolution, Carina L. Dacer, Sabina Dacer-Reyes, et al. v. Panfilo M. Lacson, G.R. No. 196209, June 8, 2011.
41

Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 377, 388, 390; and Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86792, March 21, 1990, 183 SCRA 464, 471.
42

Almviya v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 164170, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 267, 280; and Miranda v. Tuliao, supra at 391.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133289 December 23, 1999 LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA, JR., ELITERIO RUBIACO, VICTOR GASCON and CAESAR TALIA petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. CATALINO CASTAEDA, JR. in their capacity as Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, respondents.

BUENA, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to restrain the respondent Justices of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 24339 and from enforcing the warrants for the arrest of the accused named therein (herein petitioners) or to maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Accused Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and Caesar Talla were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos in an Information dated September 18, 1997. It was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan comprised of the Honorable Francis E. Garchitorena, Edilberto E. Sandoval, and Catalino Castaeda, Jr. The Information reads as follows: That on or about September 1, 1995, in the Municipality of Sanchez Mira, Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Eliterio Rubiaco, Caesar Talla, Vicente Gascon and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., armed with guns, conspiring together and helping one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation and without legal grounds or any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one Elmer Ramos from his residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle. CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 On November 10, 1997, the Court issued an order giving the prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili thirty (30) days within which to submit the amendment to the Information. The said order is quoted in full as follows: ORDER

This morning, the prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili appeared in response to this Court's Order of clarification on the propriety of proceeding with the Information as it stands. On her own, Prosecutor Agcaoili informed the Court that were inadequacies in the allegations in the Information for which reason she would beg leave to amend the same. The Court for its part expressed anxiety as to the Court's jurisdiction over the case considering that it was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the accusation was office related. For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given thirty (30) days within which to submit the amendment embodying whatever changes she believes are appropriate or necessary in order for the Information to effectively describe the offense herein charged. Within the same period, Prosecutor Agcaoili shall submit an expansion of the recommendation to file the instant Information against the accused before this Court indicating thereon the office related character of the accusation herein so that the Court might effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the same. SO ORDERED. 2 The prosecution on even date complied with the said order and filed an Amended Information, which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan in a resolution dated November 24, 1997. 3 The Amended Information thus reads: That on or about September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Licerio Antiporda, Jr., being the Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the exercise of his official duties as such and taking advantage of his position, ordered, confederated and conspired with Juan Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now deceased) and accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan, Vicente Gascon and Caesar Talla with the use of firearms, force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and abduct the victim Elmer Ramos without any authority of law from his residence at Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will, with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle and subsequently bring and detain him illegally at the residence of accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda, Jr. for more than five (5) days. CONTRARY TO LAW. 4 Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion dated November 16, 1997 praying that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred. 5 An order dated November 26, 1997 was penned by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili recommending the denial of the accused's Urgent Omnibus Motion 6 was approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on January 9, 1998. 7

The accused thereafter filed on March 5, 1998 a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued. 8 The same was denied in an order given in open court dated March 12, 1998 "on the ground that there was nothing in the Amended Information that was added to the original Information so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard separately in an investigation in the Amended Information. Additionally, the Court ruled that "since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court, the accused are not in a position to be heard on this matter at this time" (p. 245, Record)." 9 Subsequently, the accused filed on March 24, 1998 a Motion to Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. 10 On March 27, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order, to wit: The Motion to Quash filed in behalf of the accused by Atty. Orlando B. Consigna is ignored, it appearing that the accused have continually refused or otherwise failed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. At all events there is an Amended Information here which makes an adequate description of the position of the accused thus vesting this Court with the office related character of the offense of the accused. SO ORDERED. 11 A motion for reconsideration was filed on April 3, 1998 by the accused wherein it was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the appearance of their counsel during the scheduled hearing thereof amounted to their voluntary appearance and invested the court with jurisdiction over their persons. 12 The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused in its resolution dated April 24, 1998. 13 Hence, this petition filed by Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and Caesar Talla. The petitioners pose the following questions for the resolution of this Court. a) CAN THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION, SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRE SUCH JURISDICTION BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF AMENDING THE INFORMATION TO SUPPLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, JURISDICTIONAL FACTS NOT PREVIOUSLY AVERRED IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION? and b) COROLLARILY, CAN THE AMENDED INFORMATION BE ALLOWED WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANEW A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FOR THE GRAVER OFFENSE CHARGED THEREIN? The petition is devoid of merit.

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. 14 Sec. 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: xxx xxx xxx (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal jurisdiction. Criminal jurisdiction, as defined in the case of People vs. Mariano 15, is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it. The case of Arula vs. Espino 16 enumerates the requirements wherein a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case, to wit: To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requisites concur: (1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court. The petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because the original information did not allege that one of the petitioners, Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took advantage of his position as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan to order the kidnapping of Elmer Ramos. They likewise assert that lacking jurisdiction a court can not order the amendment of the information. In the same breath, they contend however that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused. They question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over their case yet they insist that said court acquired jurisdiction over their motion to quash. The petitioner can not have their cake and eat it too.

In the aforementioned case of Arula vs. Espino 17 it was quite clear that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and person, must concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case. It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the case. And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's authority. They cite the case of Layosa vs. Rodriguez 18 in support of their contention. For therein, it was ruled that the voluntary appearance of the accused at the pre-suspension hearing amounted to his submission to the court's jurisdiction even if no warrant of arrest has yet been issued. To counter this contention of the petitioners the prosecution adverted to case of de los Santos-Reyes vs.Montesa, Jr. 19 which was decided some 28 years after the Layosa case. In this more recent case, it was held that: . . . the accused . . . have no right to invoke the processes of the court since they have not been placed in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of their liberty by reason or as a consequence of the filling of the information. For the same reason, the court had no authority to act on the petition. We find that the case of Layosa and de los Santos-Reyes are not inconsistent with each other since both these cases discussed the rules on when a court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, i.e., either through the enforcement of warrants of arrest or their voluntary submission to the court. The only difference, we find, is that the de los Santos-Reyes case harped mainly on the warrant of arrest angle while the Layosa case dealt more on the issue of voluntary submission ruling, that the appearance at the hearing through a lawyer was a submission to the court's jurisdiction. Having discussed the third requirement we now come to the question of whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged. We answer in the negative. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 20 filed with the same court, it was they who "challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected, which is hereunder quoted, as follows: Respondents (petitioners herein) have thoroughly scanned the entire records of the instant case and no where is there any evidence to show that the Honorable Prosecution Office of the Province of Cagayan have been authorized by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman to conduct the Preliminary Investigation much less had the

former office been authorized to file the corresponding Information as the said case, if evidence warrants, fall exclusively with the jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan notwithstanding the presence of other public officers whose salary range is below 27 and notwithstanding the presence of persons who are not public officers. It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.21 We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information. Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides thus: Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. xxx xxx xxx Petitioner prayed that a reinvestigation be made in view of the Amended Information. We hold that the reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused's substantial rights would be impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped. It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 22 The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted. As an aside, an offense is considered committed in relation to office when it is intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. 23 In the case of Cunanan vs. Arceo, it was held that:

. . . the absence in the information filed on 5 April 1991 before Branch 46 of the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, of an allegation that petitioner had committed the offense charged in relation to his office is immaterial and easily remedied. Respondent RTC judges had forwarded petitioner's case to the Sandiganbayan, and the complete records transmitted thereto in accordance with the directions of this Court set out in the Asuncion case: ". . . As if it was originally filed with [the Sandiganbayan]." That Information may be amended at any time before arraignment before the Sandiganbayan, and indeed, by leave of court at any time before judgment is rendered by the Sandiganbayan considering that such an amendment would not affect the juridical nature of the offense charged (i.e. murder), the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, or the defenses that petitioner may assert before the Sandiganbayan. In other words, the amendment may be made before the Sandiganbayan without surprising the petitioner or prejudicing his substantive rights. 24 (Emphasis Supplied) WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Rollo, p. 91. 2 Annex "B"; Ibid., p. 22. 3 Ibid., p. 91. 4 Ibid., p. 25. 5 Ibid., p. 92. 6 Annex "D"; Ibid., p. 31. 7 Ibid., p. 33 8 Annex "C"; Ibid., p. 23. 9 Annex "A", Ibid., pp. 19-20. 10 Annex "F"; Ibid., p. 35. 11 Annex "G"; Ibid., p. 41. 12 Annex "H"; Ibid., p. 42.

13 Annex "A"; Ibid., p. 18. 14 Paramount Insurance Corporation vs. Japzon, 211 SCRA 879, 884-885. 15 71 SCRA 600. 16 28 SCRA 540, 567. 17 Ibid. 18 86 SCRA 300. 19 247 SCRA 85. 20 Annex D; Original Records, pp. 114-116. 21 Security Agency vs. De la Serna, 182 SCRA 472. 22 Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700. 23 People vs. Hon. Montejo, etc., et al., 108 Phil. 613. 24 Cunanan vs. Arceo, 242 SCRA 88, 97.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.: On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced. The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court. Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for comment. Responding to the Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having been previously consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be given due course.

After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court. Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time therefore, the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period. It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. 1 Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty which a city court could impose. The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . " We do not believe so. In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information. InPeople v. Purisima, 2 the Court stressed that: xxx xxx xxx . . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)

The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the following terms: xxx xxx xxx . . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co Hick 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330) 5 (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court. In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said: xxx xxx xxx . . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the reason already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal court. 7 (Emphasis supplied.) In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prison mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period). Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1 People v. Pegarum 58 Phil. 715 [1933]; People v. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 [1952]; People v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172 [1952]; Lee v. Presiding Judge, 145 SCRA 408 [1986]; Dela Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 838 [1988]. 2 69 SCRA 341 (1976). 3 69 SCRA at 347. 4 105 SCRA 547 (1981). 5 105 SCRA at 552-553. 6 Supra. 7 105 SCRA at 551-552.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 149995 September 28, 2007

ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001,1affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law". On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information which reads as follows: That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on account or for the value the check described below: Check No. Drawn Against : 326317PR : Asian Savings Bank Paseo de Roxas Branch

In the amount of : P590,000.00 Postdated Payable to : February 15, 1988 : Dr. Alex B. Carlos

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check when presented for payment within (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or make arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.2

On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioners non-apprehension despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.3 On June 27, 1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set aside4 after petitioner posted the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5 Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant.6 However, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.7 Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject check was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1, 1987.8 He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued sometime in February 1988,9 complainant knew that the same was not funded.10 After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23, 1997 a Decision11 finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads: Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as charged and sentences him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to indemnify the private complainant the sum of P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case until full payment. SO ORDERED. Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision intoto.12 Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioners "investment theory". In ruling against the existence of a partnership between them, the trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palanas General Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of petitioner.13 The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money does not necessarily amount to an investment of capital. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING

THE ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS REVERSALS. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT.14 The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit. It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action15 and not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 12916 which provides: Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter. xxxx Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment17 at the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court properly acquired

jurisdiction over the case.18The Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00. The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court"19 on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.20 The jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of the action by the filing of the Information and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in nature.21 After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioners conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private complainant but he did not comply with it.22 In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld private complainants claim that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan and rejected petitioners "investment theory". The issue as to whether the amount of the subject check represents the amount of the money loaned by private complainant to petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not generally disturb the findings of the lower court considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue since it had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial, which circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the present case, we see no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of the subject check was a loan and not an investment.23 Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. Since it was established that petitioner received money from private complainant in various amounts,24 petitioner cannot now claim that the checks were not issued for value.25

The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential suppliers is not a valid defense. In Cueme v. People,26 the Court held thus: The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense. The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibitacases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent are unavailing. The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed or deposited in a bank, produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose as well as the terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in the trading and banking communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction as to the kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. What is important is the fact that petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question and those checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment. Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.27 The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is likewise immaterial.1wphi1 Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first delivery of the check.28 In the case at bar, the Information alleged that the check was postdated February 15, 1988 although issued in or about September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified that the Checking Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued sometime in February 1988. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.29 In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of the subject check is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense that at the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the same would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid. Moreover, there is no merit in petitioners allegation that private complainant knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the subject check was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan hence, was intended to apply for account or for value. As such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when presented for payment.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may be imposed in lieu of imprisonment considering that the prosecution failed to prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time offender.30 Hence, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine ofP200,000.00 shall be imposed upon petitioner.31 WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six (6%) percent interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision, the amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%) interest, from finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00. SO ORDERED. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 22-27. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Marina L. Buzon.
2

Records, p. 1. Id. at 15. Id. at 20. Id. at 23-24. TSN, November 21, 1995, pp. 10-11. Records, pp. 63-64. Id. at 66; TSN, June 13, 1996, p. 11. TSN, April 29, 1997, p. 17. Id. at 12; Records, pp. 3-4. Records, pp. 111-112; penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos. Rollo, p. 27. TSN, September 9, 1997, p. 17; Records, p. 5. Id. at 11-12. Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 380, 387 (2003). THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980. B.P. Blg. 22, Sec. 1. See Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455, 470.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

The inferior courts were granted jurisdiction to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine.
20

People v. Velasco, 322 Phil. 146, 158-159 (1996).

21

Id. at 160. TSN, April 29, 1997, pp. 18-20; TSN, September 9, 1997, p. 16. See Cueme v. People, 390 Phil. 294, 302 (2000). TSN, April 29, 1997, p. 7; September 9, 1997, p. 6 . See Ongson v. People, G.R. No. 156169, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 656, 671-672. Supra at 303-304. Ruiz v. People, G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 476, 491-492. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, Sec. 191. Andaya v. People, G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 539, 558. Young v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140425, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 109, 121.

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine or imprisonment.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA, Respondents. DECISION PERALTA, J.: For this Court's resolution is a petition1 dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction. The facts follow. Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The Information reads: That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss3 dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution6 on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in the proper court. SO ORDERED. Thus, the present petition. Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,7 claiming that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office. In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante9 is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00). In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court

cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus: x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.11 P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12 P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x . Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier mentioned case, The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x.14 Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus: The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions.Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15 Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,17 that theInding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed: x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that: b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.18 Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,19 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that: The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled: x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.1avvphi1 Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses

themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held: In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense committed in relation to *an accuseds+ office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo[108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with *the accuseds+ respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x"21 Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,22 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.23 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics supplied.)24 With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,25 the issue as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity. WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case beREMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice ATTESTATION

Associate Justice

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Second Division, Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Designated additional members in lieu of Associate Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura and Jose Catral Mendoza, who are on official leave per Special Order Nos. 883 and 886, respectively, both dated September 1, 2010.
1

Rollo, pp. 28-55.

Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, ret. (Chairperson), with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez (members), (concurring), id. at 13-25.
3

Rollo, pp. 74-76. Id. at 78. Id. at 80-85. Id. at 13-25. 478 Phil. 506 (2004).

Rollo, pp. 91-98. G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 49. G. R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 238-240. Id., citing Presidential Decree No. 1486. Id., citing Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over: (a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379; (b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office. The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular courts. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees. Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a regular court but judgment therein has not yet been rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding,

10

11

12

but may be filed and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further, that, in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is first filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the regular courts of competent jurisdiction. Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the armed forces in the active service.
13

People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, supra note 9, citing Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 266 SCRA 379. (1996).
14

Emphasis supplied. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, supra note 9, at 59-60. (Emphasis supplied.) Supra note 7. Supra note 9.

15

16

17

18

Rodriguez, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 468 Phil. 374, 387 (2004), citing People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613 (1960).
19

G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298. G.R. No. 136806, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 498. Cunanan v. Arceo, G.R. No. 116615, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 88.

20

21

22

Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 287 (2004), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430, 448 (1996).
23

PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 94374, August 27, 1992, 213 SCRA 16, 26.
24

People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, supra note 9, at 62-65, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al., supra note 22, citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 443 (2001).
25

Supra note 9.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREAS, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION SERENO, J.: Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.1 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 20102 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011. Statement of the Facts and of the Case The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows: Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latters name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred: P20,000.00- Attorneys fees, P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax, P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp, P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses. Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When

confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money. To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.3 On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows: That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorneys fees and the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00. CONTRARY TO LAW.4 During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case. On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid. SO ORDERED.6 We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas and Trenas in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treas", under which he was accused in the Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8 On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision10 affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11 On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari12before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011. On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the following assignment of errors: 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION; 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13 On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that P 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence. As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she not Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus, the latters demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioners.

On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latters Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition. In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of P150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here. With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioners signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter. The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health. The Courts Ruling The Petition is impressed with merit. Review of Factual Findings While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows: (1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts; (7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.14 In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures. The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to where it was committed: Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax. As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.15 In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus: That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused Treas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes because the BIR

receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.16 For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in this wise: It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecutions evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hectors allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight. Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.17 The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts. Jurisdiction of the Trial Court The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,18 this Court explained: The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court ruled: More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the aboveenumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money. xxx From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied) In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows: That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)20 Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in part: 4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B",

5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C", 6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorneys fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x 7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21 Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.22 There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed: Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what happened next? A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to and she will work for the Deed of Sale. Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses? A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND. Q What was the amount quoted to you? A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND. Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND? A Yes, sir. Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR. Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND? A Yes, sir. Q Did he issue a receipt? A Yes, sir. Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it? A Yes, sir. Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treas issued to you? A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas. Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treas by you, what happened next? A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24 Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.26 It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential

ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.28 This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.29 As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner. At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioners conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides: Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.1wphi1 Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others kept by him. When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent.30 If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.31 Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand.32His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.33 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.34 In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to immediately return the amount of P 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 012409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE* Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes

Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No. 1174 dated January 9, 2012.
1

Fukuzume v. People, G.R. No. 143647, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 570, citing Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51 (1999).
2

Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Ricardo R. Rosario.
3

Rollo, p. 33; original citations omitted. Id. at 40. Id. at 52-58. Id. at 58. Id. at 59-66. Id. at 67-72. Id. at 73-74. Id. at 31-38. Id. at 39-40. Id. at 3-6. Id. at 14. Salcedo v. People, G.R. No. 137143, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 499. Rollo, pp. 55-56. Id. at 71. Id. at 36-37. G.R. No. 170298, 26 June 2007, 525 SCRA 735. Supre note 1. Rollo, p. 40. Id. at 41-42.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Salazar v. People of the Philippines, 480 Phil. 444 (2004). Records, pp. 260-262. Records, pp. 352-353. Supra; see also Rules of Court, Rule 118, Sec. 9 in relation to Sec. 3(b). Id.

23

24

25

26

27

Buaya v. Polo, 251 Phil. 422 (1989); Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, 11 September 2009, 599 SCRA 324.
28

Campanano v. Datuin, G.R. No. 172142, 17 October 2007, 536 SCRA 471. See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119000, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 367. Belleza v. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, 23 July 2009, 593 SCRA 549. Id.

29

30

31

32

Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 16.03; Barnachea v. Quiocho, A.C. No. 5925, 11March 2003, 399 SCRA 1.
33

Pentecostes v. Ibaez, 363 Phil. 624 (1999). Supra note 30. A.C. No. 4334, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 484.

34

35

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 119000 July 28, 1997 ROSA UY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 1 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, 2 finding the accused ROSA UY guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, inclusive, and acquitting her of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code in Crim. Case No. 84-32334. Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. During Rosa's employment she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. On 15 March 1982, a few months before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. In the meantime, she helped her husband manage their lumber business. The friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion continued. The two later agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional capital for the expansion of Rosa's lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. Various sums of money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been given by Consolacion for the business; however, because of the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever issued. Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with the funds contributed by Consolacion evidence by various receipts. But, unfortunately, the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the partnership documents were never processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The preceding events prompted Consolacion to file a complaint for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On 10 December 1984 an Information for estafa 3 and several other Informations 4 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner. The offenses were subsequently consolidated and tried jointly. Through Consolacion Leong and Alexander D. Bangit the prosecution tried to establish that petitioner Rosa Uy employed deceit in obtaining the amount of P500,000.00 from complainant with respect to

Crim. Case No. 84-32334. As regards Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, Alexander D. Bangit, manager of the Commercial Bank of Manila, Malabon Branch, where Rosa Uy maintained an account, testified on the following transactions with respect to the six (6) checks referred to in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32840 which were dishonored: CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR DISHONOR (1) 068604 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "G") (2) 068605 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "H") (3) 068603 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "F") (4) 068601 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "E") (5) 043122 3 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "A") (6) 068660 24 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "I") For her part, petitioner and her witnesses Fernando Abad and Antonio Sy maintained that no misrepresentation was committed and that the funds were utilized to construct the building in Bulacan, Bulacan. With respect to the issuance of the subject checks, petitioner did not deny their existence but averred that these were issued to evidence the investment of complainant in the proposed partnership between them. After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted petitioner of estafa but convicted her of the charges under B.P. Bldg. 22. 5 On appeal, respondent appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition for review on certiorari: (a) whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law, and (b) whether the checks had been issued on account or for value. 6 As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 and that assuming for the sake of argument that she raised the matter of

jurisdiction only upon appeal to respondent appellate court, still she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. 7 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 8 And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 9 In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.P. Blg. 22 were jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. She maintains that the evidence presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said evidence would only show that none of the essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent People of the Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand argues that even if there is no showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took place or the offense was committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and that the cases for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the estafa case. We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. 10 For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 11 Hence, it is incorrect for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied. In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a

different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that the principal place of business of the alleged partnership is located in Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense. Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or another, the same is still without merit. It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in Manila. As such, there would be no basis in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense. In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel. Respondent posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule. 12 After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum 13 before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot countenance the inadvertence committed by the court. Clearly, from the above-quoted law, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. 14 Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the jurisdiction of the court and hence, on the basis of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy case 15 in which respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner should be estopped. We nonetheless find the jurisprudence of the Sibonghanoy case not in point. In Calimlim v. Ramirez, 16 the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involvedSibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of nonwaivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the timehonored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. 17 In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 18 The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, we hold that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court maybe raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.19 WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, to have no jurisdiction over Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction when warranted. SO ORDERED. Padilla and Vitug, JJ., concur. Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., are on leave. Footnotes

1 CA-G.R. CR No. 13428, Decision penned by Justice Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros, concurred in by Justices Jesus M. Elbinias and Bernardo L. Salas. 2 Judge Benjamin P. Martinez presiding. 3 Crim. Case No. 84-32334; Records, pp. 1-2. 4 Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32240; id., p. 1. 5 Rollo, pp. 66-78, with the following disposition: 1. In Criminal Case No. 84-32334, on reasonable doubt, accused Rosa Uy is hereby acquitted of the charge of Estafa; 2. In Criminal Case Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, the court finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Accordingly, accused is hereby sentenced as follows: a. In Criminal Case No. 84-32335, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid; b. In Criminal Case No. 84-32336, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid; c. In Criminal Case No. 84-32337, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid; d. In Criminal Case No. 84-32338, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid; e. In Criminal Case No. 84-32339, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid; f. In Criminal Case No. 84-32340, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 6 Id., pp. 19-22. 7 U.S. v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376-378 (1913). 8 Colmenares v. Villar, No. L-27124, 29 May 1970, 33 SCRA 186. 9 People v. Galano, No. L-42925, 31 January 1977, 75 SCRA 193. 10 People v. Grospe, G.R. Nos. 74053-54, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 154. 11 Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 639. 12 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 13 Rollo, pp. 103-104. 14 Suy Sui v. People, 49 O.G. 967. 15 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, No. L-21450, 15 April 1968, 23 SCRA 29. 16 No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399; Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544, 27 October 1989, 145 SCRA 211. 17 People v. Eduarte, G.R. No. 88232, 26 February 1990, 182 SCRA 750, citing Calimlim v. Ramirez, No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 172142 October 17, 2007

DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR., Petitioner, vs. JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUIN, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Assailed via the instant Petition for Review is the Court of Appeals Decision2 of December 9, 2005 which set aside the August 20, 2004 Resolution3 of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing the petition for review filed by respondent Jose Antonio Datuin. On complaint for Estafa by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its president-herein petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr.,4 an Information for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed against respondent. After trial, respondent was convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71 of Pasig City by Decision of May 3, 1999.5 Respondents appeal before the Court of Appeals, and eventually with this Court, was dismissed and the decision became final and executory6 on October 24, 2003. Later claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation against him was "false, unfounded and malicious" in light of newly discovered (by respondent) evidence, respondent filed a complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent Persons, punishable under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City against petitioner and a certain Yasunobu Hirota.7 The pertinent portions of respondents complaint-affidavit read: I, JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUIN, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence and postal address at No. 1 Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, under oath, depose and state: xxxx 2. I was charged by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its President, Mr. David Campanano, Jr. with the crime of Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, by virtue of a criminal information filed against me by said prosecution office with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. x x x xxxx

5. In a decision dated May 3, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71, rendered a Decision convicting me (accused-complainant) of estafa x x x; xxxx 13. Meanwhile, sometime in July 15, 2003, I had my office rented, vacated the same, and had all of my things, including my attach case, all my records, and other personal belongings, transferred and brought to my house; that while I was sorting and classifying all my things, including the records, as well as those in the attach case, I found the CASH VOUCHER evidencing my cash payment of the two (2) roadrollers, Sakai brand, which I purchased from Mr. Yasonobu Hirota, representing Seishin International Corporation, in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos. The cash voucher was dated June 28, 1993, and it was signed by me and Mr. Hirota. A copy of the said cash voucher is hereto attached as ANNEX "H" hereof; 14. In light of this newly discovered evidence, the complaint of Seishin International Corporation[,] represented by Mr. David Campanano, Jr.[,] and the testimony of the latter in support of the complaint are false, unfounded and malicious because they imputed to me a crime of Estafa which in the first place I did not commit, as evidenced by the fact that the subject two (2) units of roadrollers, Sakai brand, subject of the criminal complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City by the corporation through Mr. Campanano, and the information filed in court, had been purchased by me in cash from the said corporation and had already been paid on June 28, 1993. While I testified also in court, my testimony arose from my having forgotten that I have already fully paid for the said two units of roadrollers, especially that I could not find the necessary document consisting of the cash voucher in support of my defense. I could not say that I have fully paid for the said units of roadrollers because at that time I was not in possession of any evidence or document to support my claim. 15. In filing the complaint for Estafa fully knowing that it was baseless and without factual or legal basis, Messrs. Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota should be criminally liable for the crime of Incriminating Innocent Persons punishable under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City9 dismissed respondents complaint for incriminating innocent person in this wise: It appearing that the case of estafa was filed in Pasig City, and the testimony given by respondent David Campaano, Jr. was also made in Pasig City, this office has no jurisdiction on the above-entitled complainant. Granting en arguendo that this office has jurisdiction over this case, the undersigned investigating prosecutor finds no basis to indict the respondents of the crime imputed to them for it is an established fact that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City finds merit in the estafa case filed by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its president, herein respondent David Campaano, Jr. In fact, the petition

for review, including the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by the herein complainant to [sic] the Honorable Supreme Court was denied for lack of merit and with an order of Entry of Final Judgment. As to the discovery of the alleged new evidence, the cash voucher, dated June 28, 1993[,] it is not this office that should determine the materiality or immateriality of it.10 (Underscoring supplied) By petition for review, respondent elevated the case to the DOJ which dismissed the petition outright by Resolution11 of August 20, 2004, holding that "[it] found no such error committed by the prosecutor that would justify the reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and evidence on the matter." Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by DOJ Resolution12 of April 11, 2005. The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the resolutions of the DOJ by Decision of December 9, 2005, thefallo of which reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course, and the assailed Resolutions of the Department of Justice are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is directed to be remanded to the City Prosecutors Office of Quezon City for further investigation.13 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Hence, the present petition, petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in the main: . . . IN RULING THAT THE COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER DAVID B. CAMPANANO EXECUTED IN QUEZON CITY ON NOVEMBER 30, 2003 AND NOT THE AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT JOSE ANTONIO DATUIN THAT [sic] IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY PROSECUTORS OFFICE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT DATUIN AGAINST PETITIONER INCRIMINATING AGAINST INNOCENT PERSONS. xxxx . . . IN RULING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT DATUIN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION SINCE THE COMPLAINTAFFIDAVIT APPEARS TO BE MERITORIOUS.14 (Underscoring supplied) The petition is impressed with merit. It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction;15 and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.16 For purposes of determining the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This is a fundamental principle, the purpose of which is not to compel the defendant to move to, and appear in, a different

court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.17 The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 28, 2003 does not allege that the crime charged or any of its essential ingredients was committed in Quezon City. The only reference to Quezon City in the complaintaffidavit is that it is where respondent resides.18 Respondents complaint-affidavit was thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals conclusion-basis of its reversal of the DOJ Resolutions that since petitioners November 20, 2003 Counter-Affidavit19 to respondents complaint for incriminating innocent person was executed in Quezon City, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of the case is thus erroneous. In any event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make out a clear probable cause of incriminating innocent person under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes "[a]ny person who, by any act not constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent person the commission of a crime." The crime known as incriminating innocent person has the following elements: (1) the offender performs an act; (2) by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime; and (3) such act does not constitute perjury.20 The pertinent portion of respondents complaint-affidavit reads: 14. In light of this newly discovered evidence, the complaint of Seishin International Corporation[,] represented by Mr. David Campanano, Jr.[,] and the testimony of the latter in support of the complaint are false, unfounded and malicious because they imputed to me a crime of Estafa which in the first place I did not commit, as evidenced by the fact that the subject two (2) units of roadrollers, Sakai brand, subject of the criminal complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City by the corporation through Mr. Campanano, and the information filed in court, had been purchased by me in cash from the said corporation and had already been paid on June 28, 1993. (Emphasis supplied) Article 363 does not, however, contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution someone prosecuting or instigating a criminal charge in court.21 It refers "to the acts of PLANTING evidence and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions."22 Apropos is the following ruling of this Court in Ventura v. Bernabe:23 Appellants do not pretend, neither have they alleged in their complaint that appellee has planted evidence against them.1wphi1 At the most, what appellee is alleged to have done is that he had filed the criminal complaint above-quoted against appellant Joaquina Ventura without justifiable cause or motive and had caused the same to be prosecuted, with him (appellee) testifying falsely as witness for the prosecution. These acts do not constitute incriminatory machination, particularly, because Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code punishing said crime expressly excludes perjury as a means of committing the same.

Evidently, petitioner may not, under respondents complaint-affidavit, be charged with the crime of incriminating innocent person under Article 363. Parenthetically, respondents conviction bars even the filing of a criminal case for false testimony against petitioner.24 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of December 9, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent for Incriminating Innocent Person filed against petitioner DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR. is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice WE CONCUR: LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

Footnotes

The Court of Appeals should not be impleaded as party in petitions filed with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2

Rollo, pp. 93-99. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer Delos Santos and Jose Reyes, Jr.
3

Id. at 77-78. Penned by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo. Sometimes spelled Campaano. Rollo, pp. 46 and 28. Id. at 94. Sometimes spelled Yasonobu. Rollo, pp. 27-31 exclusive of Annexes. Id. at 45-47. Id. at 46-47. Id. at 77. Id. at 79. Id. at 98. Id. at 11-12.

10

11

12

13

14

15

Fukuzume v. People, G.R. No. 143647, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 570, 580; Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 639, 648; Agustin v. Pamintuan, G.R. No. 164938, August 22, 2005, 467 SCRA 601, 609.
16

Vide: Agustin v. Pamintuan, supra. Beltran v. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149 (1954). Rollo, p. 27. Id. at 34-44. 2 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 15th ed., 2001, p. 985. Ventura v. Bernabe, No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 587, 594.

17

18

19

20

21

22

Vide: Buenaventura et al. v. Sto. Domingo and Ignacio, 103 Phil. 239, 244 (1958); Regalado, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, 1st ed., 2000, p. 662, citing Ventura v. Bernabe, supra; vide also People v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 236, 242 (1933) which ruled: "There is no doubt that the facts alleged in the informations above-quoted fall within the definition of the offense of "acusacion" or "denuncia falsa" which is contained in article 326 of the Codigo Penal, which was superseded on January 1, 1932, by the Revised Penal Code. xxxx Article 326 of the Codigo Penal does not appear in the Revised Penal Code, which contains no offense denominated "acusacion o denuncia falsa" or its equivalent. But the Solicitor-General contends that article 363 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed to embrace the crime of false accusation or complaint as formerly penalized under article 326 of the Codigo Penal. Article 363 in the Spanish text which is decisive is as follows, under the heading of "Asechanzas Inculpatorias": "ART. 363. Inculpacion de un inocente. El que, de cualquier manera que no constituyere falso testimonio, ejecutare un acto que tienda directamente a inculpar o imputar a un inocente la comision de un delito, sera castigado con la pena de arresto mayor." xxxx Comparing now article 363 of the Revised Penal Code with article 326 of the old Penal Code, it will be observed that under article 326 of the former Penal Code, the gravamen of the offense is the imputation itself when made before an administrative or judicial officer, whereas in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code the gravamen of the offense is performing an act which "tends directly" to such an imputation. Article 326 of the old Penal Code punishes false prosecutions whereas article 363 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any act which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution. xxxx x x x It seems the more reasonable and sensible interpretation to limit article 363 of the Revised Penal Code to acts of "planting" evidence and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecutions. xxxx It is to be noted that article 326 of the old Penal Code contains the provision that the accuser could be prosecuted only on the order of the court, when the court was convinced upon the trial of the principal cause that there was sufficient basis for a

charge of false accusation. Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code contains no such safeguard. If we extended said article by interpretation to administrative and judicial proceedings, it is apparent that we would open the door to a flood of prosecutions in cases where the defendants were acquitted. There is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended such a result." (Emphasis supplied)
23

Supra note 21 at 595. Regalado, supra note 22 at 365.

24

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 192466 September 7, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ALEJO TAROY y TARNATE, Appellant. DECISION ABAD, J.: Apart from the question of credibility of testimonies in a prosecution for rape, this case resolves the question of proof of the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. The Facts and the Case The public prosecutor charged Alejo Taroy y Tarnate (Taroy) with two counts of rape in Criminal Cases 02-CR-4671 and 02-CR-4672 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.1 DES2 was the eldest daughter of MILA3 by her first marriage. MILA married Taroy in 1997 upon the death of her first husband.4 The couple lived with MILAs children in Pucsusan Barangay, Itogon, Benguet, at the boundary of Baguio City.5 DES testified that she was alone in the house on August 10, 1997 doing some cleaning since her mother was at work and her two siblings were outside playing. When Taroy entered the house, he locked the door, closed the windows, removed his clothes, and ordered DES to remove hers. When she resisted, Taroy poked a knife at her head and forced her to submit to his bestial desires. Taroy warned her afterwards not to tell anyone about it, lest MILA and her siblings would suffer some harm. DES was 10 years old then.6 DES testified that Taroy sexually abused her again in September 1998. This time, he entered her room, locked the door, closed the windows, undressed himself, and ordered her to do the same. When she refused, Taroy pointed a knife at her. This compelled her to yield to him. Four years later or on November 1, 2002, when DES was 15, she told her aunt and MILA about what had happened between Taroy and her. They accompanied DES to the National Bureau of Investigation to complain. MILA and a certain Alumno testified that they later accompanied DES to the hospital for examination. MILA corroborated DES testimony regarding how she revealed to her and an aunt the details of the rape incidents. The doctor who examined DES testified that the latter had two narrow notches in her hymen at three oclock and five oclock positions. She explained that these notches or V-shaped or sharp

indentions over the hymenal edges suggested a history of previous blunt force or trauma possibly caused by the insertion of an erect male penis. For the defense, Taroy denied raping DES on the occasions mentioned. He averred that the testimony was a fabrication made upon the prodding of her aunt who disliked him. The RTC found Taroy guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to pay DES for each count: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.7 The RTC found the testimony of DES credible and worthy of belief. Taroy challenged the Benguet RTCs jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he having testified that their residence when the alleged offenses took place was in Pucsusan Barangay, Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that Taroys testimony that their residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he waived the jurisdictional requirement. On January 19, 2010 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.8 The CA gave weight to the RTCs assessment of DES credibility and found no evil motive in her. The CA also held that the prosecution has sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC through the testimony of MILA, DES, and Alumno. Taroy seeks his acquittal from this Court. The Issues Presented The issues presented to the Court are: 1. Whether or not the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases of rape against Taroy; and 2. Whether or not the prosecution has proved his guilt in the two cases beyond reasonable doubt. The Courts Rulings One. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of law.9 Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality, city, or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place.10 The Informations11 filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were committed in the victim and the offenders house in City Limit, Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial jurisdiction over the subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of MILA and DES as well as the affidavit of arrest12 point to this fact. Clearly, Taroys uncorroborated assertion that the subject offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief. Besides, he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad that had jurisdiction to hear the case.13 Taken altogether, that RTCs jurisdiction to hear the case is beyond dispute.

Two. What is necessary for the prosecution to ensure conviction is not absolute certainty but only moral certainty that the accused is guilty of the crime charged.14 Here, the prosecution has sufficiently proved the guilt of Taroy beyond reasonable doubt. DES testimony is worthy of belief, she having no ill-motive to fabricate what she said against her stepfather.1avvphil1 More, contrary to the claims of Taroy, there is nothing in the testimony of DES that would elicit suspicion as to the veracity of her story. For one thing, the fact that she did not shout for help or resist the sexual advances of Taroy does not disprove the fact that he raped her. Women who experience traumatic and terrifying experiences such as rape do not react in a uniform pattern of hysteria and breakdown. Lastly, there is nothing unusual for DES to remain in the family dwelling despite the incidents that had happened to her. She was just a child. Where else would she go except stay with her mother who happened to be married to the man who abused her? While we do affirm the guilt of Taroy for the crime of rape, we modify the award of exemplary damages in accordance with People v. Araojo.15 The prosecution has sufficiently established the relationship of Taroy to the victim, as well as the minority of DES necessitating the increase of the award of exemplary damages fromP25,000.00 to P30,000.00. WHEREFORE, this Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CRHC 03510 dated January 19, 2010 with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. SO ORDERED. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice WE CONCUR: PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Chairperson DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.* Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice Footnotes

Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, per Special Order 1076 dated September 6, 2011.
1

Branch 9.

Pursuant to Republic Act 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim, together with the real names of her immediate family members, is withheld and fictitious initials are used to represent her, both to protect her privacy (People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 421-426).
3

Id. Records, Vol. I, p. 99. Id. at 22 (TSN, July 1, 2003, p. 4). Id. at 5, Exhibit "A". Decision dated March 10, 2008, CA rollo, pp. 60-72. Docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC 03510.

Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 63, 71, citing People v. Casiano, 111 Phil. 73, 93 (1961).
10

See Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 15. Records, Vol. I, p. 1; Records, Vol. II, p. 1. Id. at 9. Id. at 15-16, Pre-Trial Order dated March 3, 2003. Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 2. G.R. No. 185203, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 295, 309.

11

12

13

14

15

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga and MANUEL PARULAN, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: A special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, dismissing Criminal Case No. 2800 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and Criminal Case No. 2813 for Estafa, for being "bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases." Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan. In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, he was charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22 for having issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86,071.20) in favor of SMC but which was dishonored for having been drawn against 'insufficient funds and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. In Criminal Case No. 2813 of the same Court, Respondent-accused was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC in payment of beer he had purchased, but which check was refused payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. The two cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and defense being the same for the two suits. Based on the facts and the evidence, Respondent Judge arrived at the following "Findings and Resolution:" From the welter of evidence adduced in these two , this Court is convinced that the two checks involved herein were issued and signed by the accused in connection with the beer purchases made by him on various occasions at the Guiguinto, sales office of SMC at Guiguinto, Bulacan and which checks he handed and delivered to the sales Supervisor

of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio, who holds office in that municipality. The Court finds it rather difficult to believe the claim and testimony of the accused that these checks which he admittedly signed and which he delivered to Mr. Cornelio in blank were filled up without his knowledge particularly the amounts appearing therein which in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2800 amounted to P86,071.20, and, in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2813, amounted to Pl1,918.80. The accused had been engaged in business for some time involving amounts that are quite considerable, and it is hard to believe that he will agree to this kind of arrangement which placed or exposed him to too much risks and uncertainties. But even as this Court is convinced that the accused had issued these checks to the representative of SMC on the occasions testified to in these cases by the witnesses for the prosecution which two checks were subsequently dishonored due to lack of funds resulting in damage to SMC, the offended party herein, this Court, after considering the totality of the evidence and the circumstances that attended the issuance of these two checks until they were both dishonored by the drawee bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan, has come to the conclusion that it is bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases. which he reasoned out, thus: Deceit and damage are the two essential elements that make up the offenses involving dishonored checks. And in order that this Court may have jurisdiction to try these cases, it must be established that both or any one of these elements composing the offenses charged must occur or take place within the area over which this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Here, however, it is clear that none of these elements took place or occurred within the jurisdictional area of this Court. As gleaned from the evidence, the two checks involved herein were issued by the accused at Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were delivered and handed to Supervisor Ruben Cornelio of San Miguel Corporation in his capacity as the representative of the company holding office in that municipality where the transactions of the accused with SMC took place. It was before Supervisor Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan that false assurances were made by the accused that the checks issued by him were good and backed by sufficient funds in his bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan, only to turn out later on that this was not so. The other element of damage pertaining to the offenses charged in these cases was inflicted on the offended party, the SMC, right at the moment the checks issued by the accused were dishonored by the Planters Development Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan which received them from the BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch for clearing purposes. The argument advanced by the prosecution in its memorandum filed herein that the two checks were deposited by SMC at the BPI, San Fernando, Branch, San Fernando, Pampanga, where it maintained its accounts after receiving these checks from its Guiguinto Sales Office which bank later on made the corresponding deductions from the account of SMC in the amounts covered by the dishonored checks upon receiving information that the checks so issued by the accused had been dishonored by the drawee bank at Santa Maria, Bulacan, is inconsequential. As earlier stated, the

element of damage was inflicted on the offended party herein right at the moment and at the place where the checks issued in its favor were dishonored which is in Santa Maria, Bulacan. Respondent Judge then decreed: WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing these cases for lack of jurisdiction. The bail bond posted by the accused in these cases are ordered cancelled. This Petition for certiorari challenges the dismissal of the two criminal cases on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that the order of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the merits, would subject Respondent-accused to double jeopardy. Upon the attendant facts and circumstances we uphold the Petition. The principal ground relied upon by Respondent Judge in dismissing the criminal cases is that deceit and damage, the two essential elements that make up the offenses involving dishonored checks, did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan where false assurances were given by Respondent-accused and where the checks he had issued were dishonored. The People maintain, on the other hand, that jurisdiction is properly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. At the outset, it should be pointed out, as the Solicitor General has aptly called attention to, that there are two dishonored checks involved, each the subject of different penal laws and with different basic elements: (1) On June 13, 1983, Respondent-accused issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check No. 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On July 8,1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the said check for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of the charge of Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in Criminal Case No. 2800 of the lower Court (hereafter, the Bouncing Checks Case). (2) On June 18, 1983, Respondent-accused likewise issued PDB Check No. 19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the spot sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn deposited the check with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On July 8,1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of

the prosecution for Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No, 2813 of the lower Court (briefly, the Estafa Case). In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense (U.S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil. 383-390) and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of that offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, Nos. L-63419, etc., December 18, 1986; 146 SCRA 323; Dingle vs. IAC, G.R. No. 75243, March 16, 1987,148 SCRA 595). The Anti-Bouncing Checks Law makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check a special offense punishable thereunder (Cruz vs. IAC, No. I,66327, May 28,1984,129 SCRA 490. Malice and intent in issuing the worthless check are immaterial, the offense being malum prohibitum (Que vs. People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 21, 1987). The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check, not the non-payment of an obligation (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, supra). A. With the distinction clarified, the threshold question is whether or not venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in the two cases. Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically provides: SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case will exclude the others (Tuzon vs. Cruz. No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). However, if an the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People vs. Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624). Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate places (People vs. Yabut, supra). In this case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan where the cheek was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place (See People vs. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court. For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered. "What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereat The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an

obligation" (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in People vs. Yabut, supra). For although the check was received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation of law to the payee, SMC. Said supervisor was not the person who could take the check as a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law, cited in People vs. Yabut,supra.) Thus, said representative had to forward the check to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, which was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat who, in turn, deposited it at the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. The element of deceit, therefore, took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, where the rubber check was legally issued and delivered so that jurisdiction could properly be laid upon the Court in that locality. The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the subject checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and residence of the payee. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725). An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is revocable (Ogden, Negotiable Instruments, 5th ed., at 107). And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law). Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto (Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, 3rd ed. at 57-59; Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law). Thus, the penalizing clause of the provision of Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: "By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check," Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery of the worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos, Bulacan, conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case. In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987).

Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below. B. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge, predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctable by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (City of Davao vs. Dept. of Labor, No. L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court nun and void. C. The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of Respondent Judge does not place Respondent-accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense (People vs. Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 835, 837). The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy. Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null and void, the proceedings before the Municipal Court have not been lawfully terminated. Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no double jeopardy. A continuation of the proceedings against the accused for serious physical injuries is in order. (People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 306, 308). In sum, Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the subject criminal case, venue having been properly laid. WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is hereby set aside and he is hereby ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTCMakati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas. The Antecedents Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads: That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.2 The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.4 The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.5 The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for reconsideration.6 The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner8 which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented. The Assailed RTC Decision In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held: *I+nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned*,+ the more recent case of *Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy+ (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.] xxxx x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati City.9 (emphasis ours) The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-

Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.10 The Petition The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City. The Issue The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court. The Courts Ruling We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners. Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.13 Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours] The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification. Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Information Charging Perjury Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.14 In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are: (a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. (c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.15 (emphasis ours) Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City. The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City: That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.16 We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information: [S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.17 (underscoring ours) Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City. Referral to the En Banc The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling. The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases? We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v. Caet18 which ruled: It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted] In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We ruled in Villanueva that Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made. The Crime of Perjury: A Background To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction. The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter. These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect.21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect.22

The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Caet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 5823 for the procedural aspect. Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads: Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed. This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 539224 and 539325 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.26 Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.27 In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was committed. As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by the act of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.28 The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the presentation was the act that consummated the crime. The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC29 interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors:30 Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718. It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The

provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours] With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides: The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours] in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath. As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC. In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information. The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities "where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue."31 To the Court, "whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement,"32 citing Caet as authority for its statement. The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration, forgetting

that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases. The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Caet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Caet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction. If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City. Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place.1wphi1 This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,34and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person. Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath

was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice (On Leave) MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO** Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice (On Leave) MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Footnotes

On official leave. On leave.

**

Dated April 28, 2010; rollo, pp. 137-143. Id. at 11. Id. at 29-37. Order dated March 26, 2009; rollo, pp. 55-56. Id. at 56. Order dated August 28, 2009, pp. 69-70. 30 Phil. 371 (1915). G.R. Nos. 173935-38, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 272. Rollo, pp. 142-143. Order dated June 9, 2010; id. at 154. G.R. Nos. 174168 and 179438, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 517. United States v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376 (1913). Parulan v. Reyes, 78 Phil 855 (1947).

10

11

12

13

14

Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455.
15

Monfort III v. Salvatierra, G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 447, 461. Supra note 2. Ibid. Supra note 7, at 378. G.R. No. 162187, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 495, 512.

16

17

18

19

20

300 U.S. 564 (1937). The perjury was based on a false testimony by the defendant at the hearing before the Senate Committee in Nebraska.
21

The Penal Code for the Philippines which took effect from July 19, 1887 to December 31, 1931.
22

Took effect on January 1, 1932. Entitled "The Law on Criminal Procedure" which took effect on April 23, 1900.

23

24

Every person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury.
25

The law refers to subornation of perjury. United States v. Concepcion, 13 Phil. 424 (1909). Id. at 428-429. People v. Cruz, et al., 197 Phil. 815 (1982). Ramon C. Aquino and Carolina Grio-Aquino, 2 The Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed. Id. at 301-302. Ilusorio v. Bildner, supra note 8, at 283. Id. at 284. Section 14, Rule 110. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

Section 15, Rule 110. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO, CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN DOES,respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and Special Attorney Juan A. Sison for petitioners. Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for respondent Erning Abano. Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadra for respondent Camilo Pilotin. Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo. Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor.

REYES, J.B.L., J.: Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20 July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province. In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several state prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed

in the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain persons named in the filed informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition, Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970. It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice. On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases. In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying this Court to set aside the order of denial of the transfer and to compel the respondent Court of First Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City. Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer. At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding with the trial of the cases until further orders. We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights

and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the Administration's preferences. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such intention; particularly since Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof, provides that the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First Instance should be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any executive arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to either tribunal. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226, issued on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V (People vs. Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of imperatively directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders heretofore mentioned. It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department Administrative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents herein should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered. This claim was buttressed by the affidavits of the injured parties and prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and 48-V and expressing their willingness to testify if the cases are heard outside of Ilocos Sur, where they can be free from tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus expressed can not be considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of the circumstances that the informations filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur show that of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still unidentified and at large; that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the province, being concededly the son of the Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in the criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to silence them; that it is not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter, that even if armed security escorts were to be provided, the same would be no guarantee against the possibility of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events have proved; that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that between 1 January and 31 May 1970 no less than 78 murders have been reported committed in said province, of which number only 21 were solved; and, finally, that the promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, was actively supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to petitioner's supplemental memorandum). This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses, who had on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the investigators in Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially

inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case. The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site can not be made, because it is a long standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands that one who commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376, and People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance in the Philippines is limited to certain well-defined territory and they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged with one offense committed outside of that limited territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of the Revised Rules of Court providing that "in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredient thereof took place." It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149, 150, that the purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents herein was "not to compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place." Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the court should have power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies, and to determine the most suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies of truth and impartial justice. In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule relied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice "summum jus, summa in juria." The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the trial to a site where the prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would be equivalent to railroading them into a conviction. Because regardless of the place where its evidence is to be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clearly lean in favor of the prosecution being given full opportunity to lay its case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for lack of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal. We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now before Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322).

One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. This authority was early recognized in England as inhering in the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century. The opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, said that, in this respect, "the law is clear and uniform as far back as it can be traced." And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully discussed, and all the judges appear to have agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525: There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and prosecutors, ... that where it appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the proper county, then this court ... has jurisdiction to take the case out of the proper county, as it is called, and to bring it into an indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to change the venue ... has been exercised by this court from a very early period. We have reported cases, where the doctrine is laid down in emphatic language; we have the practice of the Court of Queen's Bench in England independently of any practice of our own court ... The general jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to change the venue from one county to any other, cannot be the subject of doubt. This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of justice, exercised through writs of certiorari, has, according to the weight of authority, passed to the State Supreme Courts of the American Union. 1 InCochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page 436, it was held that the power to transfer the place of holding trials became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the independence of this country; and from that time forth, not only has the practice prevailed in the courts of England, but the power is now exercised by the Courts of very many if not all of our states, either by force of express statute or the adoption of the common law in the jurisprudence of the same. That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine courts admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the American pattern with the enactment of the first judicial organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Philippine Commission, then composed by a majority of able American lawyers, fully familiar with the institutions and traditions of the common law. In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court stated: And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports, numbers of cases might be cited wherein recourse has been had to the rules, principles and doctrines of the common law in ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the legislation enacted in and for the Philippine Islands since they passed under American sovereignty. Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after the establishment of Civil Government under American sovereignty, was the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136, "An Act providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands."

This Act in express terms abolished the then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance, and substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets out in general terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the new courts and their judges. The majority of the members of the body which enacted it were able American lawyers. The spirit with which it is informed, and indeed its very language and terminology would be unintelligible without some knowledge of the judicial systems of England and the United States. Its manifest purpose and object was to replace the old judicial system, with its incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system modeled in all its essential characteristics upon the judicial systems of the United States. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that any incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential principles and settled doctrines on which the new system rests, must be held to be abrogated by the law organizing the new system. While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that the framers' intent was to deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly upon this Supreme Court, the inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American courts under their common law heritage to transfer the place of trial of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice, by providing fair and impartial inquiry and adjudication. Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general authority from liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, upheld in the Alzua case as essentially inherent in the courts established by Act 136, even if not expressly provided for, the power to transfer the place of trials when so demanded by the interest of justice is equally essential and possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the words of this Court in the Alzua case just cited: The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which the doctrine is based are not less forceful and imperative in these Islands than in the countries from which the new judicial system was borrowed; and an examination of the reasons assigned ... leaves no room for doubt that a failure to recognize it as an incident to the new judicial system would materially impair its usefulness and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for which it was established. (21 Phil. 333-334) Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the law establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act No. 5179, in its Section 4, provides express legislative recognition of its existence: SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within their respective districts:Provided, however, that cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of the offense was committed. And provided further, that when the interest of justice so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province within the district ... (Emphasis supplied) Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged were committed, according to the informations; since the holding of the trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not be subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its

witnesses, for just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the motion to have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree that the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at the earlier available date. This arrangement would have the advantage that the same trial judge could later be authorized to hear the defense witnesses in Vigan, if circumstances so demanded. Furthermore, the adjudication of the case by a judge other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would remove any doubt or suspicion that the same was in any way influenced by the trial Judge's being beholden to the Crisologo family. The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said: ... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's power by technicalities that part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times in inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism. (Manila Railroad Co. v. AttorneyGeneral, 20 Phil. 523, 529 [1911]. Emphasis and paragraphing supplied.) In resume, this Court holds, and so rules: (1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases; (2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.

(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are granted; the order of the respondent Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July 1970, is sustained in so far as it holds that the Administrative Order No. 221 of the Department of Justice is not mandatory, but only directory; nevertheless, said order is declared in grave abuse of discretion and set aside in so far as it declines to transfer the trial of its cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to another court within the district; and said respondent Court is accordingly directed and ordered to remand the two criminal cases aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District for hearing of the evidence for the prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the earliest available date, and such other proceedings as the Circuit Criminal Court may determine in the interest of justice. The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their appearance at the trial and sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court for the Second Judicial District, in the same amount, and under the same terms and conditions as their present bail bonds, which will be replaced by those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision. No special pronouncement as to costs. Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., took no part. Villamor, J., reserves his vote. Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions FERNANDO, J., concurring: The learned and scholarly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes renders crystal-clear why the decision reached by this Court should be what it is. It is a manifestation of the jurist's art at its most exemplary. It belies the belief not infrequently given utterance that hard cases make bad law. The problem before us is unique and unprecedented as far as our previous decisions go. It calls for a resolution far-reaching in its consequences and far-flung in its implications. Fortunately for the administration of justice according to law, there is the recognition of power vested in this Court, in the past perhaps only imperfectly discerned but nonetheless in existence, to be utilized whenever there is need to do so. This is one such occasion. Even without resort then to precedents coming from jurisdictions after which our judicial system was patterned, the same result would have been reached. For only thus, to paraphrase Cardozo, would the flexibility and the creativeness of the judicial process assert themselves.

The opinion of Justice J.B.L., Reyes therefore calls for assent, which I readily yield. Nor does it seem inappropriate if it be stressed that the conclusion reached by the Court is solidly buttressed not only in law as history but likewise in law as logic and as social control. Hence this brief concurring opinion, which likewise will afford me the opportunity to give expression to the view that the Constitution and the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention of 1934-1935 point unerringly to the conclusion that this Court as the sole body vested with judicial power by the fundamental law itself is not devoid of supervisory authority over inferior courts. Necessarily the prerogative to transfer the venue of criminal prosecutions whenever there is a persuasive showing that there would be a failure of justice is therein included. On such an assumption, I do not feel called upon to inquire into any asserted authority, even if denominated administrative, of an alter egoof the Executive, the Secretary of Justice, over the lower courts. For my belief gets stronger with the years that it would be difficult to assert that such a competence, even as thus limited, is warranted under a Constitution based on the doctrine of separation of powers and necessarily committed to the principle of judicial independence. 1. We start with the grant by the Constitution of Judicial power to this Court and to such inferior courts as may be established by law. 1 Thus is conferred the authority to decide cases through the ascertainment of facts and the application of the law, involving many a time its interpretation. 2It connotes, in the language of the decision, "the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice. ...."3Where, as this did develop in this case, there is more than a probability of an impasse with the witnesses for the prosecution displaying the utmost reluctance to testify if the trial would be held in Vigan, entailing the risk that there be, again in the language of the opinion, "a mockery of the judicial process." 4it would appear undeniable, and we have so held today, that this Court is not to be denied the necessary competence to set matters right. It is not to fold its hands as if in helpless submission to a binding decree of Providence but must meet the problem squarely, possessed of power adequate to cope with such an exigency. In the same way that the two other coordinate departments, the Executive and Congress, being constitutional organs, can rely on the fundamental law to justify the exercise of certain prerogatives, 5 so may this Court, the only constitutional court, exercise supervision over all other judicial agencies thereafter legislatively created, appropriately termed by the Constitution as inferior courts. There would be a void in the framework of government thus established if there is no official body of a higher rank that can take the necessary steps to avoid a frustration of the exercise of judicial power. It is my firm conviction that neither the Presidency nor Congress can rightfully be entrusted with such a task. If it were thus, then the doctrine of separation of powers becomes a myth. Such an approach necessarily and logically compel the conclusion that the so called administrative supervision exercised by the Secretary of Justice is, to put it at its mildest, infected with the gravest doubts as to its constitutionality. There is no need to go that far to reach a decision in this case as is so aptly demonstrated in the opinion of the Court. What appears to me undisputed is that where the question partakes of a judicial character, only this Court can perform that function and trace its source to the Constitution itself. That is to free the Constitution from the reproach that a situation is left unprovided for. What is more, it assures the utmost respect for the principle that like the other two coordinate and co-equal branches, Court is likewise the recipient of power conferred by the Constitution itself. 6 2. So much for law from the standpoint of analytical jurisprudence of law as logic. If the matter be viewed from the approach found congenial by sociological jurists, law as one of the most effective forms of social control, the same conclusion appears to be inescapable. This is to examine legal institutions in terms of how they function. It certainly would be a blot on the administration of justice if by the

reluctance of witnesses to testify, based on what they consider to be a feeling that cannot be stigmatized under the circumstances as having no basis in reason, no trial could be had of a criminal case. It is a matter of great public interest that crime should not go unpunished. Of course, it is equally important that the rights of whoever is accused are duly safeguarded. Where as in this case an impasse is likely to occur, in itself an alarming symptom of a breakdown in the orderly legal processes, the loss of public confidence in the rule of law itself is incalculable. That is an eventuality which at all pains must be avoided. The only question is how. If the legal doctrine and principles, which under the system of legal norms followed must be grounded in the Constitution itself do not recognize such a competence in this Court, then for some all may well be lost. It would be unthinkable, again given the assumption, not entirely without basis, that the two other branches of the government cannot escape political considerations, to assume that either Congress or the Executive can be trusted to take care of such a situation. Nor would it do to leave such matters in the hands of the lower courts, unless whatever is decided by them is subject to correction and review by the only constitutional court, certainly vested with the needed supervisory authority. It would thus appear, if a breakdown in the legal system is to be averted, that the power of this Court is undeniable. There would seem to be no other way to avoid a serious disruption in the legal order. The above considerations necessarily lead me to yield a full concurrence with what has been so persuasively and ably put forth in the masterly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes. December 5, 1970 BARREDO, J., concurring: The accuracy of the technical bases as well as the unerring logic of the resolution of the various facets of this case evidence in the main opinion written by our erudite colleague Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes could not but impel the unanimous assent given thereto by the members of this Court. Indeed, I could give the best evidence of my full concurrence therein by merely signing the same without this separate opinion. I feel, however, that the impact of this decision is of such transcendental importance to the administration of justice in this country, particularly now when some sectors of our people make no secret of lingering doubts as to the fairness and impartiality by judicial actuations and decisions, that my duty as a member of this highest tribunal of the land calls for more than just the giving of my vote in favor thereof. I consider it incumbent upon me, since none of my brethren seems to be minded to do it, to project more emphatically certain relevant matters, the significance of which should go hand in hand with the resolution of the case itself. I can neither control nor conceal the feeling of full satisfaction that overwhelms me now, because I consider this decision as probably the first one of national importance, in a long time, that will receive universal and unqualified approval throughout the length and breath of this Republic. I am sure it will yield for our constitutional government as a whole and for the judiciary in particular a rich harvest of regained trust and confidence in the administration of justice. This decision is a great leap forward. We are shaking away from a long standing jurisprudential rule; We are casting aside technical procedural roadblocks; We are here and now proclaiming to all and sundry the plenitude, under the Constitution, of Our power and authority to "insure to (our people) and their posterity, the blessings of independence under a regime of justice" (Preamble of the Constitution) by holding that the "judicial power ... vested in ... (the) Supreme Court" necessarily carries with it the power to lay down procedures that will effectively and fully guarantee, as far as it is humanly possible to do so, that substantial justice shall not be

defeated thru technicalities of procedure; and what is most important today, as I view it, is that this is one decision the essence of which spells simple justice that will be plainly understood by the common man. In the clearest terms, this Court holds in effect in this decision that inspite of the traditional rule that a person charged with an offense may not be tried in a province outside of the one ill which the alleged offense or any essential ingredient thereof has been committed, it is the duty of the corresponding trial court, with the approval of the Supreme Court, to see to it that when the demands of justice require it, the venue is moved to another province wherein the circumstantial environment will insure a full disclosure of all material facts essential in the pursuit of truth and justice. Surely, the common man would not understand why the Supreme Court in whom the totality of judicial power is vested by the Constitution would not have the authority and the right, nay the duty, to prevent a trial from being held in a place where it would be nothing more than a farce and an empty show, the final chapter of which may have already been prewritten, even independently of the honesty and integrity of the presiding judge, because of external factors and forces that impede the witnesses from making a free and fearless exposition of what they know. I am exceedingly happy that by this decision, the common man will understand that neither the Constitution nor this Court will ever be found wanting in what is needed top render justice in its truest sense. Now, for some views of my own on the specific legal issues raised by the parties in their pleadings. The problem revolves around the power of the Secretary of the Department of Justice vis-a-vis the operation of the Circuit Criminal Courts created by Republic Act 5179. The People contends that by Administrative Order 258 and 271, Series of 1968 and Administrative Order No. 226, Series of 1970, of the Secretary of Justice, issued pursuant allegedly to Republic Act 5179, (presumably Section 8 thereof) the transfer of the criminal cases herein involved, Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District is legally justifiable. On the other hand, the defense submits that under the uniformly announced doctrine of this Court regarding the jurisdictional nature of the venue of criminal cases and principally because to give effect to the administrative orders aforementioned would be impairing the independence of the judiciary, the accused in aforesaid cases must be tried in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by the Court of First Instance in which, it is a fact, the case was filed on June 15, 1970, the very day Administrative Order No. 221 of the Secretary of Justice authorizing Judge Lino Anover of the Circuit Criminal Court to hold sessions in Vigan beginning July 1, 1970 was issued. It is my considered view that the less said about the intervention of the Department of Justice with the Circuit Criminal Courts by the issuance of Administrative Orders 258 and 274, Series of 1968 and worse Administrative Order No. 226, Series of 1970 the better, for I find absolutely no legal authority for the issuance of said Orders. The first two purportedly direct and instruct the judges of the various judicial districts of the Philippines as to how to apportion among themselves, together with the corresponding circuit criminal court judges, the cases falling within their concurrent jurisdiction. I feel very strongly that the distribution of the powers of government by the Constitution places, even in its broadest sense, everything that judges have to do that might in one way or another affect or be related to the ultimate disposition of the controversies and cases to be tried by them, including the distribution of the cases to be tried by them, entirely and exclusively with the judges themselves by common agreement among them, and so I hold that whatever be the import of Section 8 of Republic Act 5179 providing that "for administrative purposes, the Circuit Criminal Courts shall be under the supervision of the Department of Justice," the same cannot be considered as contemplating any intervention of the Secretary of Justice in the distribution of cases among judges. That the common impression and long standing practice on the matter are otherwise, cannot alter what, in my humble view, the Constitution ordains.

I take it that under Republic Act 5179, Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts with the limited concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of, try and decide only those cases enumerated in Section 1 of the Act. This is readily implied from Section 3 of the Act which says: SEC. 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. It is also my conviction that when Congress enacted Republic Act 5179, it was conscious of the existing doctrinal rule laid down by this Court, in Cunanan 1 that in criminal cases, venue is equivalent to territorial jurisdiction and precisely because of this consciousness and the knowledge that the nature of the crimes placed within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Courts is such that their successful prosecution might be impaired or obstructed by the doctrinal rule aforementioned that in Section 4 of the Act, Congress expressly provided that as a rule, "cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of the offense (sic) was committed" but "when the interest of justice so demands, with the prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province of the district." It is contended that these quoted provisions of Section 4 contemplate only those cases already in the Circuit Criminal Court. That may be so, but my view is that by the said provisions, Congress has precisely opened the door for the regular courts trying cases of the nature enumerated in the Act to shift those cases to the circuit criminal court in instances like the present wherein it appears quite evident that to maintain Vigan as the venue of the trials in question will defeat the ends of justice, for, after all, the circuit court is just another branch of the Court of First Instance, and once it is in the former court, then Section 4 may be easily applied. Moving of cases from one branch of a Court of First Instance to another branch thereof is neither new nor unusual when the judges concerned are agreed that such a step would best promote the interests of justice. In the light of this practice, commendable in its motivation, why cannot the transfer be made from the Court of First Instance to circuit criminal court? Indeed, this should not be treated as merely a matter of discretion; judges should feel bound to act accordingly, as a matter of duty, hence a negative action in the appropriate cases is ground forcertiorari or mandamus. In this connection, however, I must hasten to advert, that the interested parties should be duly heard on the matter and, in accordance with the spirit, if not the letter of the law, approval of the Supreme Court be secured. Apropos of all this discussion, I would like to make it clear that the rule invoked by the defense to the effect that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional in character has no foundation in any act of the legislature. There can be no question that jurisdiction is conferred only by law and that it is only venue that may be fixed by the Rules of Court because jurisdiction is substantive and venue is merely procedural. The rule the defense invokes is found only in a decision of this Court rendered way back in 1913. In Cunanan, supra, this Court held: "The jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands, in criminal cases, is limited to certain well-defined territory. They cannot take jurisdiction of persons charged with an offense alleged to have been committed outside of that limited territory." As can be noted, no provision of law is cited in support of the ruling. The reason is simple. There is no such law. In other words, whatever force such invoked ruling may have is no more than that of a construction given by this Court. I dare say that when a previous construction by this Court runs counter

to fundamental principles now separating the rule making power of the courts from the legislative faculty to define and apportion jurisdiction, it is best to lean in favor of recognizing the constitutional boundaries of our prerogatives when they are plain and the contrary cannot be implied. And since it was this Court that made the construction, there is nothing to stop Us from modifying the same, and inasmuch as Section 14, par. (a) of Rule 110 is purely a rule of venue, not legislated upon by Congress as a jurisdictional matter, Our power to change the same is unquestionable. I, therefore, reiterate my concurrence in the resolution of this point in the main opinion. Accordingly, I agree that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in not yielding to the suggested transfer of the cases in question to the circuit criminal court. Court trials and proceedings mean nothing unless the pronouncement and decisions of the courts merit the faith and trust of the parties in particular and the people in general. To the common man specially, the imperatives of justice administered by our courts are: (1) judge who can be trusted and (2) procedures that insulate the proceedings from all factors that may taint the ultimate outcome of litigations with doubt and skepticism. To my mind, it is not enough that a judge trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of acting in good faith, it is equally important that no circumstance attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of trustworthiness. It is thus clear that by Our decision in this case, We are not expressing any distrust as to the impartiality of respondent judge; it should be clearly understood, however, that it is possible for his decision to be unfair not because he has made it so, but because under the circumstances, the adulterated evidence before him leaves him no other alternative. May I say as I close that what is most striking in this decision is that it is a unanimous one, in spite of the fact that at first blush it appeared that there were formidable adverse precedents on our way. After long and careful deliberation and after viewing all its angles, factual and legal, when the time for voting came, there was no hesitation in the assent that all of us gave to the rationalizations and conclusions contained in the scholarly main opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes and the dispositive part of the decision, but by no means and in absolutely no degree did the public discussion generated by the peculiary circumstances and personages involved in this case ever influence any of Us, as such things, indeed, never will.

# Footnotes 1 56 Am. Jur. (Venue), pages 47-48, 50. For an exhaustive review of precedents, see Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Courts, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cas. 1067; Barry vs. Truax 99 NW 769, 65 LRA 762. FERNANDO, J., concurring: 1 According to the Constitution: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law." Art. VIII, Sec. 1. 2 Cf. City of Baguio v. de Leon, L-24756, Oct. 31, 1968, 25 SCRA 938; Vera v. Arca, L25721, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 351; Pecson Jose v. Santos, L-25510, Oct. 30, 1970. 3 Opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, p. 5, Editor's Note: p. 180 this volume).

4 Ibid. 5 Cf. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 (1939); Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939); Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950). 6 Cf. Debates in the Constitutional Convention with Delegate Jose P. Laurel explaining his draft proposal as found in V Laurel, ed., Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention pp. 724-731; 911-928. BARREDO, J., concurring: 1 26 Phil. 376.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING ABANO, defendants-appellants. RESOLUTION

AQUINO, J.: Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of the adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while hearing mass at the Vigan cathedral. Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate him. He could even be lynched or shot to death on the specious pretext that he was trying to escape. Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons. Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to "order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled. Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification for transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1wph1.t We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not merely the change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949 to another court.

According to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence against him is in the custody of the authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most convenient arrangement. WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City where it should be re-docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of the hearing. SO ORDERED. Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur. Antonio, J, took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-41313 November 6, 1975 ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES DUNUAN, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; MARIANO PACTIW, alias Bugbug; DULMOG ABLUYEN and ANGELINA ABLUYEN, respondents.. R E S O L U T I O N. AQUINO, J.: Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants accused of double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao Province (People vs. George Bayucca et al.). That case was filed in connection with an ambuscade which was perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue, Ifugao. As a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao was wounded and his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Up to this time the accused in that case have not been arraigned. . On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this Court a petition to transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of that province is a protege' of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and because their witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed that, as may be inferred from previous incidents recounted in the petition, their lives and the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The accused, George Bayucca was killed on October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as mayor of Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City). . The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of venue but he invited the Court's attention to the suggestion of Governor Lumauig that the case may be transferred to the proper court in Isabela in view of its proximity to Ifugao. . Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment disputed the correctness or truth of the grounds relied upon for the change of venue and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He said that, if there would be bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of the People of the Philippines. He said that the crime charged was not "committed personally against" Governor Lumauig. That statement is not correct since the governor is one of the victims mentioned in the information. .

Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan sent to the court a letter dated August 30, 1975 wherein he declined the services of Atty. Jose W. Diokno (who filed the instant petition for transfer of venue). In view of that disclosure, the petition herein should be regarded as having been filed only by Alipio Mondiguing. . The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522, 534, disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests filed by Crescencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan. In that case it was alleged that Judge Abad was a political leader of Governor Lumauig and was recommended to his present position by the Lumauig brothers. . The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified. A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. "The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime" (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, 562). . This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution). It "possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice" (People vs. Gutierrez, L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185). . A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was originally scheduled to be held (People vs. Pilotin Vincent Crisologo, movant, L-3537778, July 31, 1975). After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in Mondiguing's petition to support his request for a change of the place of trial, we have reached the conclusion that his petition is meritorious. In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio. . The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is that he be transferred from the Philippine Constabulary headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao to Camp Crame should be submitted for the consideration of the Circuit Criminal Court. . WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the transfer of the venue of Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao is granted. The said case should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District so that it may be heard in Baguio City. . SO ORDERED. . Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur. Fernando J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed DOES respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.: The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in the implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents, 4 the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 7 The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of seven persons

believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been released from detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds. On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision. The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.

1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes asponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established." 12Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of qqqts fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought. 2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 17These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19 WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of

the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs. Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur. Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes 1 According to Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution: "The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 2 According to Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution: All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required." 3 The name of the highly-experienced counsel Juan Hagad was included in the list of private prosecutors, but he did not sign the petition. 4 The private respondents are Francisco (Ecot) Garcia and Ricardo (Cadoy) Garcia. 5 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Roberto E. Soberano and Solicitor Roberto A. Abad. 6 Comment, 1-2. 7 Ibid, 2. 8 Ibid, 2-4. 9 Resolution of the Court dated March 5, 1981. 10 Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. 11 L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172. 12 Ibid, 180. 13 Comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 9. 14 Comment of respondent Florendo Baliscao, erroneously entitled Rejoinder to the Petition, 1.

15 Comment of respondent Pablo Sola, erroneously entitled Opposition of respondent Mayor Pablo Sola, 1. 16 L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522. 17 Ibid, 524. 18 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1933). 19 Cf. Inocencio v. Alconcel, G. R. No. 55658, February 5, 1981.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-20687 April 30, 1966

MAXIMINO VALDEPEAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. Jose F. Aquirre for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General A. A. Narra and Solicitor O. R. Ramirez for respondent. CONCEPCION, J.: Appeal by petitioner Maximino Valdepeas from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3) months and twenty-five (25) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify Ester Ulsano in the sum of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The only question raised by petitioner is whether "the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision of the trial court, dated June 30, 1960, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense of abduction with consent". The pertinent facts are: On January 25, 1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan, a criminal complaint,1 duly subscribed and sworn to by both, charging petitioner Maximino Valdepeas with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After due preliminary investigation, the second stage of which was waived by Valdepeas, the justice of the peace of Piat found that there was probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the court of first instance of Cagayan2 in which the corresponding information for forcible abduction with rape3 was filed.4 In due course, said court of first instance rendered judgment5 finding petitioner guilty as charged and sentencing him accordingly.6 On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals7 modified the decision of the court of first instance, convicted him of abduction with consent and meted out to him the penalty set forth in the opening paragraph of this decision.1wph1.t A motion for reconsideration and new trial having been filed by petitioner contesting the finding, made by the Court of Appeals, to the effect that complainant was below 18 years of age at the time of the occurrence, said Court 8 granted the motion, set aside its aforementioned decision and remanded the case to the court a quofor the reception of additional evidence on said issue. After a retrial, the court of first instance rendered another decision,9 reiterating said finding of the Court of Appeals, as well as its

judgment 10 of conviction for abduction with consent and the penalty imposed therein. Petitioner appealed again to the Court of Appeals 11which 12 affirmed that of the court of first instance 13 with costs against the petitioner. Again petitioner filed 14a motion for reconsideration based, for the first time, upon the ground that "the lower court had no jurisdiction over the person of appellant and over the subject matter of the action, with respect to the offense of abduction with consent." Upon denial of the motion, 15 petitioner interposed the present appeal by certiorari. Petitioner's theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed by either Ester Ulsano or her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, and that, accordingly, the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent and had, therefore, no authority to convict him of said crime. We find no merit in this pretense. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 16 In the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, although brought before the bar of justice as early as January 25, 1956, first, before the then justice of the peace court of Piat, then before the court of first instance of Cagayan, later before the Court of Appeals, thereafter back before said court of first instance, and then, again, before the Court of Appeals, never, within the period of six (6) years that had transpired until the Court of Appeals, rendered its last decision, 17 had he questioned the judicial authority of any of these three (3) courts over his person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps taken by him before said courts particularly the motions therein filed by him implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person. Upon the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action in this lease the crime of abduction with consent is and may be conferred only by law; 18 that jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involve in the offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent.19 It is true that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, . . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. The provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial." 20 In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such preference by filing the complaint adverted to above and going through the trials and tribulations concomitant with the

proceedings in this case, before several courts, for the last ten (10) years. Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible abduction, not abduction with consent; but, as already adverted to, the latter is included in the former. Referring particularly to the spirit of said provision of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, we believe that the assent of Ester Ulsano and her mother to undergo the scandal of a public trial for forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also, their willingness to face the scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent. The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are not included in the former, and, not alleged, according to him, in the complaint filed herein, 21 namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor ... 17 years of age ...", and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age. As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code,22 as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation, 23 because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members." 24 The complaint in the case at bar 25 alleges, not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her "by force and violence ... against her will and taking advantage of the absence of her mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force, intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, and, hence, single, thus leading to the presumption that she is a virgin, 26 apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation, 27 for, as Chief Justice Moran has aptly put it, the presumption of innocence includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a consequence, of chastity. 28 Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepeas. It is so ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur. Barrera, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., took no part. Footnotes
1

Which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 195 of said court. On May 31, 1956.

Reading: "The undersigned, upon complaint filed by the offended party Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother Mrs. Consuelo Ulsano, before the Justice of the Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan, appearing on page 1 of the record of the case, forming an integral part of this information, accuses, Maximino Valdepenas, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, defined and penalized by Articles 342 and 335, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

"That on or about January 5, 1956, in the Municipality of Piat, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, Maximino Valdepeas by means of force, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct the complaining witness Ester Ulsano, a virgin over 12 years and under 18 years of age, taking her away against her will and with lewd design, and detaining her in a vacant house wherein the said accused Maximino Valdepeas by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with the said complaining witness Ester Ulsano against her will. "Contrary to law."
4

And docketed as Criminal Case No. 1539 of said Court of First Instance. On December 3, 1956.

To an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P500.00, to acknowledge and support the offspring, if any, and to pay the costs.
7

On May 21, 1958, in CA-G.R. No. 19448-R thereof. By resolution dated September 20, 1958. Dated June 13, 1960 and promulgated on June 14, 1960. Dated May 21, 1958. In which it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 01306-CR. On June 11, 1962. Of June 13, 1960. On July 2, 1962. By resolution of the Court of Appeals dated Nov. 23, 1962.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Banco Espaol v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Infante v. Toledo, 44 Phil. 834; Nilo v. Romero, L-15195, March 29, 1961.
17

On June 11, 1962. Manila Railroad v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523; Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514.

18

19

U.S. v. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366; U.S. v. Asuncion, 31 Phil. 614; U.S. v. Yumul, 34 Phil. 169; See, also, Macondray Co. v. Yangtze Ins. Ass., 51 Phil. 789.

20

Samilin v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298, 304. Although explicitly alleged in the information.

21

22

Reading: "... The abduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs, shall be punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods."
23

U.S. vs. Casten, 34 Phil. 808; 811-812. U.S. vs. Alvarez, 1 Phil. 351; U.S. v. Reyes, 20 Phil. 510; U.S. v. Reyes, 28 Phil. 352.

24

25

Reading: "... The undersigned ESTER ULSANO, complainant and offended party, being a minor of 17 years of age, duly assisted by her mother MRS. CONSUELO ULSANO, both having been sworn to according to law, hereby declares: That she accuses MAXIMO VALDEPEAS of the crime of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE, committed as follows: "That on or about the 5th day of January, 1956, in the Municipality of Piat, Province of Cagayan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take by force and with violence the body of the complainant and offended party against her will take advantage in the absence of her mother, use superior strength the same dwelling of the offended party and carry to secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force, intimidation and violence, with lewd designs. "That the commission of the crime or felony charged, the aggravating circumstances of Nocturnity, use of superior strength and use of motor vehicle are present. "Contrary to law."
26

U.S. v. Alvarez, 1 Phil. 351, 353-354. Section 5(a), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.

27

28

6 Moran, pp. 28-29, 1963 Edition, citing In re Matthew's Estate, 47 N.E. 901; and Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 162416 January 31, 2006

CHESTER DE JOYA, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 40, Manila-RTC, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issuance must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. x x x1 This Court finds from the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952 the following documents to support the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest: 1. The report of the National Bureau of Investigation to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo as regards their investigation on the complaint filed by private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten against Mina Tan Hao @ Ma. Gracia Tan Hao and Victor Ngo y Tan for syndicated estafa. The report shows that Hao induced Dy to invest more than a hundred million pesos in State Resources Development Management Corporation, but when the latters investments fell due, the checks issued by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his investments were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or that the account was closed.2

2. Affidavit-Complaint of private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten.3 3. Copies of the checks issued by private complainant in favor of State Resources Corporation.4 4. Copies of the checks issued to private complainant representing the supposed return of his investments in State Resources.5 5. Demand letter sent by private complainant to Ma. Gracia Tan Hao.6 6. Supplemental Affidavit of private complainant to include the incorporators and members of the board of directors of State Resources Development Management Corporation as participants in the conspiracy to commit the crime of syndicated estafa. Among those included was petitioner Chester De Joya.7 7. Counter-Affidavits of Chester De Joya and the other accused, Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny S. Hao. Also included in the records are the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao finding probable cause to indict petitioner and his other co-accused for syndicated estafa,8 and a copy of the Articles of Incorporation of State Resources Development Management Corporation naming petitioner as incorporator and director of said corporation. This Court finds that these documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It bears remembering that "in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance."9 Thus, the standard used for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest against him. The foregoing documents found in the records and examined by respondent judge tend to show that therein private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources Development Management Corporation; that he issued several checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation; that the corporation, in turn, issued several checks to private complainant, purportedly representing the return of his investments; that said checks were later dishonored for insufficient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being incorporators and directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its activities and transactions. These are all that need to be shown to establish probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of the crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should be emphasized that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. Hence, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.10 In case of doubt

on the existence of probable cause, the Rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. In the present case, it is notable that the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the bases for his findings that there is probable cause to charge all the accused with violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689. The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the application of the exception.lavvph!l.ne+ In addition, it may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the courts jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus: x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction: a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner. b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons. c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties. d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10. e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant. Justice Regalado continues to explain: In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely

to comply with due process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals.11 Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the courts jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the courts jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chairperson ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Emphasis supplied. Original Records, pp. 36-40. Id. at 42-43. Original Records, pp. 45-48. Id. at 49-62. Id. at 64. Id. at 65-67. Id. at 22-33. Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995). Ibid. Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, pp. 7-9.

10

11

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners, vs. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered: 1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan; 2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and 3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 363523 and 36-3524. 2 The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt. Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice. On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001. On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001. On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003. Hence, this petition. The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of error: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused. The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals ruling that: [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process,

such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3 Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4 Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion. In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera: Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6 In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7: The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction

over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads: A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail. 13 While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17 There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the

processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest: 1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. 2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused. 3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest. We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case. Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt. In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion. We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case. After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24 Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest. In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground. The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question: In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accusedmovant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26 Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion. According to petitioners: In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification.28 Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary: Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29] The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following: 1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes; 2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez; 3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon; 4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz; 5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio; 6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355; 7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal; 8. Information dated 22 June 2001; 9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and 10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon. Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two

years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32 We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan. It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x. Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation: Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil. xxxx

This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34 This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause. We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad. Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding. In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause. We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge

Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed. Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners: It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit: 1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001; 2.) Order dated September 21, 2001; 3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and 4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001. Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38 Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion. Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005. While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order. In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40 As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection, 1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof; 2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases; 3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer; 4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and

5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch. 6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners. SO ORDERED. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice Chairperson CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao with Acting Presiding Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cancio C. Garcia and Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
2

Rollo, pp. 109-110.

Id., p. 103. Id. This should have been 301 SCRA 298. Oscar Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV, pp. 38-39 (2001 ed.). G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 643. Id.

Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, 28 August 1995, 247 SCRA 741, 750; Dinapol v. Baldado, A.M. No. RTJ-92-898, 5 August 1993, 225 SCRA 110, 116-117. In some jurisprudence, voluntary surrender is termed as "voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court by surrender to the proper authorities."
10

Layosa v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-46080, 10 November 1978, 86 SCRA 300, 303; People v. Umbrero, G.R. No. 93021, 8 May 1991, 196 SCRA 821, 829.
11

This is because of the rule that jurisdiction, once acquired, attaches until the final disposition of the case. In such a situation, the escapees right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses are deemed waived by his failure to appear during the trial of which he has notice (Gimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 1, 5).
12

See Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 75, 88-89 (1998). A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, 6 November 1992, 215 SCRA 421. Id., at 424. Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86792, 21 March 1990, 183 SCRA 464, 471. Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 112 Phil. 781, 783 (1961).

13

14

15

16

17

Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9, p. 749. This is what the Court of Appeals erroneously rephrased just before quoting Pico. Cf. note 1.
18

Rules of Court, Rule 15, Section 20. G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192, 198. 324 Phil. 568, 590 (1996). 361 Phil. 251, 284 (1999). Rules of Court, Rule 113, Section 6.

19

20

21

22

23

Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Orga. v. Phil. Blooming Mills Inc., 151-A Phil. 656, 676 (1973). Joint Order dated 17 August 2001, rollo, p. 204. 317 Phil. 758, 796 (1995). Joint Order dated 17 October 2001, rollo, p. 196. Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2. Petitioners Memorandum, rollo, pp. 477-478. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order dated 6 July 2001, rollo, p. 193. G.R. Nos. 94054-57, 19 February 1991, 194 SCRA 292, 300. G.R. No. 88919, 25 July 1990, 187 SCRA 788, 792. Joint Order dated 17 August 2001, rollo pp. 197-201. Webb v. De Leon, supra note 25, pp. 675-676. Joint Order dated 14 November 2001, rollo, pp. 271-272. Id. Petitioners Memorandum, rollo, p. 493. Rollo, pp. 150-151. Id., pp. 498-499. Rules of Court, Rule 71, Section 3 (b) and (c). People v. Monteiro, G.R. No. 49454, 21 December 1990, 192 SCRA 548, 553. 419 Phil. 241 (2001).

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41

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and SARAH LANGCO y ANGLI, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, P/C INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN, P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS, PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2 ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR., Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 4 February 2004 Decision2 and 25 June 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76345. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Maca-Angcos Alawiya y Abdul, Isagani Abdul y Siacor, and Sarah Langco y Angli. The Facts On 18 September 2001, petitioners executed sworn statements4 before the General Assignment Section of the Western Police District in United Nations Avenue, Manila, charging accused P/C Insp. Michael Angelo Bernardo Martin, P/Insp. Allanjing Estrada Medina, PO3 Arnold Ramos Asis, PO2 Pedro Santos Gutierrez, PO2 Ignacio De Paz and PO2 Antonio Sebastian Berida, Jr., who were all policemen assigned at that time at the Northern Police District, with kidnapping for ransom. The sworn-statements of petitioners commonly alleged that at about 10:00 in the morning of 11 September 2001, while petitioners were cruising on board a vehicle along United Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped their vehicle from behind; that when they went out of their vehicle to assess the damage, several armed men alighted from the Toyota Sedan, poked guns at, blindfolded, and forced them to ride in the Toyota Sedan; that they were brought to an office where P10,000,000 and two vehicles were demanded from them in exchange for their freedom; that, after haggling, the amount was reduced to P700,000 plus the two vehicles; that the money and vehicles were delivered in the late evening of 11 September 2001; that they were released in the early morning of 12 September 2001 in Quiapo after they handed the Deed of Sale and registration papers of the two vehicles. After the initial investigation by the Western Police District, the case was reported to the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group in Camp Crame, where a lateral coordination was made with the Philippine National Police-National Capital Regional Police Office Regional Intelligence and Investigation

Division (PNP-NCR-RID) for the identification, arrest and filing of appropriate charges against the accused. After its own investigation, the PNP-NCR-RID recommended that accused be charged with violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,5 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco), who conducted the preliminary investigation, issued a Resolution6 dated 14 January 2002, recommending that the accused be indicted for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The Resolution was endorsed for approval by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano and approved by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo. On 24 January 2002, State Prosecutor Velasco filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41,7 an Information for Kidnapping for Ransom against the accused with no bail recommended. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 02198832, reads as follows: That on September 11, 2001 at about 10:00 AM along United Nations Avenue, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused, who are all police officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and there by force and intimidation, and by the use of high-powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL and ZARAH LANGCO of their liberty against their will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for their release amounting to TEN MILLION PESOS (PHP10,000,000.00) which amount was later reduced to SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (PHP700,000.00) plus two vehicles consisting of TOYOTA FX and MITSUBISHI ADVENTURE to the damage and prejudice of MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL and SARAH LANGCO in said amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code. CONTRARY TO LAW.8 On 28 January 2002, the trial court, upon motion by the prosecution, issued a Hold Departure Order against the accused.9 On even date, the trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest against all the accused.10 Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the accused filed a petition for review of the Resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco with the Office of the Secretary of Justice. On 18 February 2002, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground that "the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so."11 In an Order12 dated 27 February 2002, the trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao,13 an accused who is at large is not entitled to bail or other relief. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction and power of the Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770),14 as well as Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, are not exclusive but shared or concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the authority of the Department of Justice to investigate, file the information and prosecute the case could no longer be questioned. In a Resolution15 promulgated on 24 September 2002, then Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the latter to cause the withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for ransom. The Secretary of Justice ruled that there was no

prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman before the Information for kidnapping was filed with the trial court. He also found that the incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, not kidnapping for ransom. On 11 October 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong in a Resolution promulgated on 17 February 2003.16 Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking the nullification of the Secretary of Justices ruling for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision of 4 February 2004 dismissing the petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a Resolution of 25 June 2004. Hence, this petition. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the Secretary of Justice that the incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, contrary to the finding of State Prosecutor Velasco, that it was a kidnapping for ransom. The Court of Appeals gave credence to the accuseds documentary evidence which supported their claim that the incident was a botched buy-bust operation. The Court of Appeals specifically noted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Cesar Landayan (Landayan), who was driving a taxi at the time of the incident and was apprehended together with petitioners. The Sinumpaang Salaysay categorically stated that he and petitioners were released from accuseds custody at about 12:50 in the afternoon of the same day, 11 September 2001. Thus, Cesars statement refuted the complaint of petitioners that they were freed only in the morning of 12 September 2001 after a pay-off of P700,000 in casino chips and two vehicles. The Court of Appeals stressed that Landayans Sinumpaang Salaysay was given on 14 September 2001, prior to petitioners complaint for kidnapping for ransom which was filed on 18 September 2001 before the Western Police District. Having been executed prior to the filing of the complaint for kidnapping for ransom by petitioners, CesarsSinumpaaang Salaysay could not be discredited as a cover-up evidence. The Court of Appeals upheld the Secretary of Justices ruling that prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military was needed for the filing of the Information before the RTC, pursuant to OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001.17 The Court of Appeals further sustained the finding that there were sufficient evidence that the offense charged against accused was committed in relation to their office and that the accused were all acting in the discharge of their functions as policemen. The Issues The issues in this case are: 1. Whether the prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military is required for the investigation and prosecution of the instant case against the accused;

2. Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco amounted to an "executive acquittal;" 3. Whether the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a motion to quash the information) from the trial court when they had not been arrested yet; and 4. Whether there was probable cause against the accused for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The Ruling of this Court On the prior approval by the Ombudsman for the investigation and prosecution of the case against the accused policemen The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which is representing the Secretary of Justice, agrees with petitioners that prior approval by the Ombudsman is not required for the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen. The OSG correctly cites the case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice,18 where the Court held that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors. In view of the foregoing, both the Court of Appeals and the Secretary of Justice clearly erred in ruling that prior approval by the Ombudsman is required for the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen. On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court.19 In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,20 reiterated in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court clarified that nothing in Crespo v. Mogul22 forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court.23 The nature of the power of control of the Secretary of Justice over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals24 in this wise: Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. (Emphasis supplied) Contrary to petitioners contention, the Secretary of Justices reversal of the Resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco did not amount to "executive acquittal" because the Secretary of Justice was simply exercising his power to review, which included the power to reverse the ruling of the State Prosecutor. However, once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court.25 Trial judges are not bound by the Secretary of Justices reversal of the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause. Trial judges are required to make their own assessment of the existence of probable cause, separately and independently of the evaluation by the Secretary of Justice.26

On the motion to quash the information when the accused had not been arrested yet People v. Mapalao,27 as correctly argued by the OSG, does not squarely apply to the present case. In that case, one of the accused, Rex Magumnang, after arraignment and during the trial, escaped from detention and had not been apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated. The Court held that since the accused remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested. While at large, the accused cannot seek relief from the court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in court.28 In Mapalao, the accused escaped while the trial of the case was on-going, whereas here, the accused have not been served the warrant of arrest and have not been arraigned. Therefore, Mapalao is definitely not on all fours with the present case.lavvphil.net Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash29 which requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.30 However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.31 At any rate, the accuseds motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the filing officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the Ombudsmans power to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. On the existence or non-existence of probable cause Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.32 However, in the following exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation.33 a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; [and] k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. There is no clear showing that the present case falls under any of the recognized exceptions. Moreover, as stated earlier, once the information is filed with the trial court, any disposition of the information rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the existence of probable cause and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice amounts to an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause.35 Considering that the Information has already been filed with the trial court, then the trial court, upon filing of the appropriate motion by the prosecutor, should be given the opportunity to perform its duty of evaluating, independently of the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice recommending the withdrawal of the Information against the accused, the merits of the case and assess whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial for kidnapping for ransom.36 WHEREFORE, we REMAND this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case to determine whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Though the petition was captioned as a "Petition for Certiorari and for Review on Certiorari," the Court shall treat the present petition as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2

Rollo, pp. 151-162. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong concurring.
3

Id. at 209-211. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong concurring.
4

CA rollo, pp. 66-87.

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. -- Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above- mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
6

Rollo, pp. 63-68. Presided by Judge Rodolfo A. Ponferrada. Rollo, pp. 69-70. Id. at 72. Id. at 73. CA rollo, pp. 134-137. Rollo, pp. 74-75. 274 Phil. 354 (1991).

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14

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. -- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; xxx
15

Rollo, pp. 77-82. Id. at 83-84. The pertinent portions thereof are: 1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees IN RELATION TO OFFICE whether cognizable by the SANDIGANBAYAN or the REGULAR COURTS, and whether filed with the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN or with the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR shall be under the control and supervision of the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. 2. Unless the OMBUDSMAN under its Constitutional mandate finds reason to believe otherwise, offenses NOT IN RELATION TO OFFICE and cognizable by the REGULAR COURTS shall be investigated and prosecuted by the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR, which shall rule thereon with finality.

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3. x x x 4. Considering that the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN has jurisdiction over public officers and employees and for effective monitoring of all investigations and prosecution of cases involving public officers and employees, the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR shall submit to the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN a monthly list of complaints filed with their respective offices against public officers and employees.
18

G.R. No. 159747, 13 April 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 70, and 74. Dimatulac v. Villon, 358 Phil. 328, 361 (1998). G.R. No. 106695, 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA 39, 48. 324 Phil. 568, 598 (1996). 235 Phil. 465, 476 (1987). See Caoili v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 791, 795-796 (1997). 344 Phil. 207, 228-229 (1997). Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 22.

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25

26

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra at 235; Jalandoni v. Drilon, 383 Phil. 855, 872 (2000), citingCrespo v. Mogul, supra note 22.
27

274 Phil. 354 (1991). Id. at 363. Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 377, 388, 390.

28

29

30

31

Id. See Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 643. See also Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, Tenth Revised Edition, p. 478, where the author stated that by filing a motion to quash on other grounds (such as the lack of authority of the officer filing the information), the accused has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
32

Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 615 (1996).

33

Id. at 615-616, citing Brocka v. Enrile, G.R. Nos. 69863-65, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 183, 188-189. Citations omitted. See also Samson v. Guingona, 401 Phil 167, 172 (2000).

34

Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 163741, 7 August 2007, 529 SCRA 274, 282, citing Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 158236, 1 September 2004, 437 SCRA 504, 516.
35

Id. Id. See also Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.

36

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012

DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante La. Jimenez (petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 20062 and June 28, 20073 in CAG.R. SP No. 96584, which dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. The Factual Antecedents The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency. On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.5 The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSIs articles of incorporation6 to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavits allegations.7 Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counteraffidavit. In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.

Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information.9 The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition10 and comment to the opposition, respectively. In an August 1, 2005 resolution,11 the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.12 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents. On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not. On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.15 On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC, in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.16 In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent Alamils motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it had already found probable cause against the respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order. On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial.18 On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the RTC.19 In a January 4, 2006 order,20 Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration and the petitioners motion to expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon. The RTC Rulings In its March 8, 2006 order,21 the RTC granted respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamils motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest. On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.22 On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutors conformity.23

In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutors conformity. On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.25 On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioners notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.26 On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.27 In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioners notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records. On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders. The CA Ruling In its November 23, 2006 resolution,29 the CA dismissed outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The CA denied30 the motion for reconsideration31 that followed. The Petition The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since he is the private complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the respondents illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice. The Case for the Respondents The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the power to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case. The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. Our Ruling The petition lacks merit. The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit."33 Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved.34 By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.35 When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.36 Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."37 In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides: SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added) The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases38 and continues to be the controlling doctrine. While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf39 (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case. In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.40

Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.41 Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.42 WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Acting Chief Justice Chairperson MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice CERTIFICATION I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Designated as Acting Chief Justice in lieu of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno per Special Order No. 1384 dated December 4, 2012.

Under Rule 45 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; rollo, pp. 10-43.

Penned by Associate Justice Elvi JohnS Asuncion, unJ concurred in by Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and CeliaC I .ibrea-I.eagogo; id at 48-50.
3

Penned by Associate Justice Jnse Catral Membza, and concurred in by Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and MariJlor Punzctlan-Castillo; id at 52.
4

Id. at 76-82.

Under Section 6(c), in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), effective July 15, 1995.
6

Rollo, pp. 57-63. Id. at 83-92. Id. at 104-108. Id. at 109-110. Id. at 111-116. Id. at 118-119. Id. Id. at 120-124. Id. at 125-129. Id. at 130-142. Id. at 143-148. Id. at 150-151. Id. at 152-171. Id. at 172-187. Id. at 189-191. Id. at 192-196. Id. at 197-207.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Id. at 209-212 Id. at 218. Id. at 219-220. Id. at 221-224. Id. at 225-229. Id. at 240-241. Supra note 2. Supra note 3. Rollo, pp. 242-247.

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

Per the October 12, 2009 Resolution, the Court dispensed with respondent Avgoustis comment to the petition since, as per the petitioners report, he could not be located; id. at 322323.
33

1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 3, Section 2.

34

Theodore and Nancy Ang, represented by Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron v. Spouses Alan and Em Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012; and Goco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010, 617 SCRA 397, 405.
35

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 171905, June 20, 2012; and Jelbert B. Galicto v. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.
36

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc., et al., supra;and Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981, 1000 (2001).
37

REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 110, Section 5.

38

Bureau of Customs v. Sherman, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 809; Ong v. Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 188; People of the Philippines v. Arturo F. Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 30, 2009; Heirs of Federico C. Delgado v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 184337, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 501; Cario v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688; Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa, 493 Phil. 85 (2005); Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208 (2000); Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 384 Phil. 322 (2000); Labaro v. Hon. Panay, 360 Phil. 102 (1998); People v. Judge Santiago, 255 Phil. 851 (1989); and City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Judge Espina, 248 Phil. 843 (1988).
39

Merciales v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 70 (2002).

40

See Minute Resolution, Carina L. Dacer, Sabina Dacer-Reyes, et al. v. Panfilo M. Lacson, G.R. No. 196209, June 8, 2011.
41

Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 377, 388, 390; and Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86792, March 21, 1990, 183 SCRA 464, 471.
42

Almviya v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 164170, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 267, 280; and Miranda v. Tuliao, supra at 391.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-37933 April 15, 1988 FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE LA VEGA, JR., respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioners. Victor de la Serna for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.: Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this petition for certiorari and mandamus. The first is whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the custody of the law. The other issue is whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. The following facts are not in dispute: On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. On August 22, 1973 all the above-named. accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the acused including private respondent, were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides: SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory

process to the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. (Emphasis supplied.) * Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. 1 After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. The dispositive portion is as follows: WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused Samson Suan Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula Fernando Cargando and Rogelio Baguio are concerned, this case is hereby dismissed. The City Warden of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby ordered to release these accused if they are no longer serving sentence of conviction involving other crimes. The proceedings in this case against the accused Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. who has escaped on August 30,1973 shall remain pending, without prejudice on the part of the said accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever the court acquires back the jurisdiction over his person. 2 On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated November 22, 1973. Hence, this petition. The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners, expressed the opinion that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the private respondent, who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and present his evidence. 3 The reasoning of the said court is that under the same provision, all accused should be presumed innocent. 4 Furthermore the lower court maintains that jurisdiction over private respondent de la Vega, Jr. was lost when he escaped and that his right to cross-examine and present evidence must not be denied him once jurisdiction over his person is reacquired. 5 We disagree. First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accusedprivate respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In cases criminal, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.

But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have consistently ruled in several earlier cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law. Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in absentia"may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower Court. 7 It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter 8 that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified. The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and moss e the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. As it has been aptly explained: . . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a number of reported instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of his non- appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. 9 The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him

guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. 10 In the same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him. Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit: ... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in regained.... Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. 11 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 112-L in so far as it suspends the proceedings against the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is reversed and set aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon the innocence or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance with the evidence adduced and the applicable law. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio- Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes * Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution has similar provision. 1 Decision, page 15, Rollo. 2 Decision, pages 23-24, Rollo.

3 Page 32, Rollo. 4 Pages 32 and 71, Rollo. 5 Page 24, Rollo. 6 Lat vs. Phil. Long Co., 69 SCRA, 425 (1975); Tuvera vs. de Guzman, 13 SCRA 729 (1965); In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rolando M. Abadilla, G.R. No. 79173, December 1, 1987. 7 Annex A, page 10, Rollo. 8 Annex B, page 12, Rollo. 9 Enrique M. Fernando. The Costitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., page 701. 10 U.S. vs. Anastacio, 6 Phil. 413; U.S. vs. Rota, 9 Phil. 426; U.S. vs. Binayon, 35 Phil. 23; U.S. vs. Golanco, 11 Phil. 575. 11 People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, 166-167.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008

VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697. Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings: On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction.7 The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial courts decision, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8 Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution: a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel? b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly

crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime charged? c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case? d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect? e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9 Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.10 In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus reads: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94. While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part,

counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable. To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter. As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that: It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.) Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x16 Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained: 4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says: Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.) Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18

But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations: It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Courts jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus: x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latters jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20 Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be toleratedobviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverseas well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277. The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22 For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches

is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.24 In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the courts jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled: While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOCShipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held: Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower courts jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower courts decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours) Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled: In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial courts jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial courts jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions. The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigants participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the courts jurisdiction (PNOC

Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics ours)26 Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1 Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that: Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended. The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a courts jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.1avvphi1Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not

contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.30 Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said: Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA.Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.32 And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus: Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.34 The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.35 Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years.37 The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case. We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarelyonly from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42 It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the

court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. x x x Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.43 With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the petition. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING* Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

In the records, "Venancio" is also spelled as "Vinancio."

In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 508, dated June 25, 2008.
2

Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (now an Associate Justice of this Court), with Associate Justices Candido V. Rivera and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring; rollo, pp. 23-31.
3

The indictment reads: That on or about the 16th day of January 1994, in the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of German Espiritu Bus bearing plate no. PHZ-542, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and operate the same along the highway in the said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to the traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary precautions to prevent death or injuries to persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence, said German Espiritu Bus driven by him to hit and bump one Rodolfo Lopez y Amparado, thereby causing physical injuries to the latter which caused his death. (Id. at 23-24.)

Id. at 26. Id. at 55. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Vinancio Figueroa y Cervantes GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to (sic) homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years and two (2) months and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of: 1. P50,000.00 indemnity; 2. P3,034,560.00 for loss of earning capacity;

3. P24,000 for cemetery lot; 4. P45,000 for funeral expenses; 5. P54,221.00 for wake expenses. SO ORDERED. (Id. at 24-25 and 56.)
7

Id. at 25. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the judgment reads: Appellant Vinancio Figueroa is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (formerly the Automobile Law) and is accordingly hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of One (1) Year, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of prision correccional as minimum to Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and Twenty (20) Days of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim the following: 1. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2. P339,840.00 as damages for loss of earning capacity; 3. P45,000 for funeral expenses; and 4. P24,000 for burial expenses SO ORDERED. (Id. at 30.)

Id. at 156-158.

10

Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 393 Phil. 143, 155 (2000); Escobal v. Justice Garchitorena, 466 Phil. 625, 635 (2004).
11

Entitled "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," approved on August 14, 1981.

12

Entitled "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Muncipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," approved on March 25, 1994, and took effect on April 15, 1994, fifteen days after publication in the Malaya and in the Times Journal on March 30, 1994, pursuant to Section 8 thereof.
13

Revised Penal Code, Art. 365.

14

In Re: Calloway, 1 Phil. 11, 12 (1901). 9 Phil. 22 (1907). Id. at 26. (Emphasis ours.) 111 Phil. 73 (1961). Id. at 93-94. (Emphasis ours). No. L-14591, September 26, 1962, 6 SCRA 14. Id. at 16-17. 131 Phil. 556 (1968). Id. at 563-565. 204 Phil. 25 (1982). Id. at 34-35. G.R. No. 139031, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 389. Id. at 395-396. G.R. No. 154295, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 320. Id.at 337. G.R. No. 154684, September 8, 2005, 469 SCRA 424. Id. at 429-431. G.R. No. 143951, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 153. Id. at 162. G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 616. Id. at 635-636. (Citations omitted.) Jolley v. Martin Bros. Box Co., 109 N.E. 2d, 652, 661 (1952). Wisdoms Admr v. Sims, 144 S.W. 2d 232, 235, 236, 284 Ky. 258. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, at 37.

15

16

17

18

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20

21

22

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24

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26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

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36

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C & S Fishfarm Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 279, 290-291 (2002). Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 27; 143 S.E. 2d 300, 306 (1965). Veneracion v. Mancilla, G.R. No. 158238, July 20, 2006. Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 20, 53. G.R. No. 162890, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 743. Id. at 755-757. (Italics supplied.)

39

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 182651 August 25, 2010

HEIRS OF JANE HONRALES, Petitioners, vs. JONATHAN HONRALES, Respondent. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 182657 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HEIRS OF JANE HONRALES, Petitioners, vs. JONATHAN HONRALES, Respondent. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before this Court are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the October 1, 2007 Decision1 and April 3, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92755. The antecedents are as follows: On August 19, 2002, Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan Honrales. Thus, in a Resolution3 dated October 28, 2002, Bernardino R. Camba, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, recommended the filing of an information for parricide against respondent. On November 18, 2002, the following Information4 was filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila: That on or about August 19, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one JANE HONRALES y ILAGAN, his legal wife, by then and there shooting her with a 45 cal. pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound of the head and neck which was the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter. Contrary to law. On November 21, 2002, Judge Teresa P. Soriaso of the RTC of Manila, Branch 27, ordered respondents arrest.5

On November 22, 2002, respondent moved to reconsider6 the October 28, 2002 Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Camba which recommended the filing of parricide charges. Respondent later also filed a supplement to his motion. In view of respondents motion for reconsideration, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Alfredo E. Ednave moved that the RTC defer proceedings.7 Respondent in turn filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest,8 which the public prosecutor opposed.9 On December 12, 2002, the RTC issued an Order10 deferring proceedings in view of the pendency of respondents motion for reconsideration. It, however, denied the motion to recall the arrest warrant since deferment of proceedings does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the offense as would constitute a ground for quashing the information. The trial court further held that considering the evidence submitted, it finds probable cause for the issuance of the arrest warrant. On May 21, 2003, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Laura D. Biglang-Awa filed a Motion for Leave to Conduct Reinvestigation11 with the RTC in light of the affidavit of one (1) Michelle C. Luna, which respondent, in his motion/supplemental motion for reconsideration, argues "will belie the statement of witness for the complainant, John James Honrales that the shooting of the victim . . . was intentional." On May 30, 2003, the RTC issued an Order12 granting leave to conduct the reinvestigation and authorizing 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa to reinvestigate the case. On September 9, 2003, the heirs of the victim (petitioner heirs) moved before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for the inhibition13 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa from conducting the reinvestigation and praying that the case be remanded to the court for trial.14 On September 25, 2003, City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia issued Office Order No. 164015 reassigning the case to Assistant City Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay. Hearings were scheduled on October 15 and 22, 2003. On October 15, 2003, both parties appeared but petitioner heirs manifested that they earlier moved to reconsider Office Order No. 1640. Respondent moved that he be given up to October 22, 2003 to file an opposition. On October 22, 2003, respondent filed his opposition. Counsel for petitioner heirs then manifested that they be given until November 5, 2003 to submit a reply thereto. On November 17, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued an Order16 denying petitioners motion to reconsider Office Order No. 1640 and set the continuation of the hearings on December 3 and 10, 2003. On December 3, 2003, both parties appeared. Petitioner heirs moved that the hearing be suspended on the ground that they have filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assail the Order of November 17, 2003. Respondents counsel objected in view of the presence of their witness Michelle Luna. Thus, the hearing proceeded. After the hearing, petitioner heirs moved for the cancellation of the December 10, 2003 hearing and filed a formal motion to that effect.

On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a Motion and Manifestation praying that the case be submitted for resolution or, in the alternative, that it be set for final clarificatory hearing on December 22, 2003. The following day or on December 16, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued an Order denying the prayers for suspension and submission of the case for resolution and instead set the hearing on December 22, 2003. On December 19, 2003, however, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued a Resolution17 setting aside the October 28, 2002 Resolution and recommending the withdrawal of the information for parricide and the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide in its stead. City Prosecutor Garcia approved the Resolution. On January 16, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the information for parricide.18 On January 28, 2004, while the Motion to Withdraw Information was still pending, an Information19 for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed against respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. The Information reads, That on or about August 19, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then in possession of a 45 cal. pistol, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously, after removing the bullets of the gun in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner playfully poked the gun to his maid, son and to his wife, by then and there accidentally shooting upon one JANE HONRALES, his legal wife, inflicting upon the latter a gun shot wound of the head and the neck which was the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter. CONTRARY TO LAW. Determined to have respondent prosecuted for parricide, petitioner heirs filed a petition for review20 with the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the offense. They likewise filed an Opposition to Motion to Withdraw Information21 with the RTC arguing that there was no final resolution yet downgrading the charge against respondent that would justify withdrawal of the Information for parricide. On February 17, 2004, petitioner heirs filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Proceedings22 with the RTC to give time to the DOJ Secretary to resolve their petition for review. On March 17, 2004, the DOJ, through Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, dismissed the petitions for review assailing (1) the Order dated November 17, 2003 of Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay denying the urgent motion to reconsider Office Order No. 1640 and (2) the Resolution dated December 19, 2003 finding probable cause against respondent for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide, instead of intentional parricide as charged.23 Petitioner heirs moved to reconsider24 the Resolution, and the RTC of Manila issued an Order25 on April 14, 2004, holding in abeyance the resolution of the pending incidents in the parricide case in view of the said motion for reconsideration.

On May 14, 2004, the DOJ, through Chief State Prosecutor Zuo, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.26 Thus, Judge Soriaso of the RTC of Manila issued an Order27 on May 28, 2004 considering the motion to withdraw the Information submitted for resolution. Undaunted by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, however, petitioners again filed a petition for review28 with the DOJ on June 14, 2004, assailing said denial. Said petition, however, was dismissed with finality by the DOJ in a Resolution29 dated July 14, 2004. Contending that the petition for review before the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the offense was no longer an impediment to the resolution of the pending Motion to Withdraw Information, respondent promptly filed with the RTC a Manifestation with Reiteration to Resolve the Motion to Withdraw Information.30 On August 5, 2004, petitioner heirs appealed31 the dismissal of their petitions to the Office of the President (OP). Thus, on August 6, 2004, Judge Soriaso reiterated her previous ruling to hold in abeyance the resolution of the motion to withdraw in deference to the appeal taking its course before the OP.32 In the meantime, on October 11, 2004, respondent was arraigned before the MeTC and pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days to two (2) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional.33 On October 27, 2004, respondent filed with the RTC a motion34 seeking to dismiss the parricide charges against him. He cited his arraignment and conviction by the MeTC as grounds for the dismissal of the case against him. On October 28, 2004, petitioner heirs filed with the MeTC a motion35 to nullify the proceedings held on October 11, 2004. They claimed that they were denied procedural due process since October 11, 2004 was not the agreed date for respondents arraignment but October 18, 2004. They also argued that the Information before the MeTC was invalid. On December 6, 2004, the OP dismissed petitioner heirs appeal of the DOJ Resolution.36 Petitioner heirs promptly moved to reconsider the OPs dismissal of their appeal, but their motion was denied by Resolution37dated April 20, 2005. On May 5, 2005, respondent moved for Judge Soriasos inhibition38 alleging bias in favor of the prosecution as shown by her continued inaction on his motion to withdraw Information. On June 6, 2005, petitioner heirs filed before the CA an appeal by certiorari39 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the denial by the OP of their motion for reconsideration. On June 30, 2005, Judge Soriaso inhibited herself from the case.40 The case was eventually re-raffled off to Branch 54 presided over by Judge Manuel M. Barrios. Shortly thereafter, Judge Barrios issued an Order41 on September 26, 2005 granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest issued against respondent. Judge

Barrios ruled that the Information for parricide found itself without a supporting resolution and thus its withdrawal was appropriate. On October 14, 2005, petitioner heirs filed a motion for reconsideration42 of the September 26, 2005 Order but their motion was noted without action on November 3, 2005, as it was made without the approval or intervention of the Public Prosecutor.43 On January 9, 2006, petitioner heirs filed a petition for certiorari44 with the CA assailing the September 26, 2005 and November 3, 2005 Orders issued by the RTC through Judge Barrios. Petitioner heirs argued that Judge Barrios granted the motion to withdraw the Information for parricide on grounds other than his personal and independent findings. They likewise contended that Judge Barrios should not have granted the withdrawal of the Information and recall of the arrest warrant since he knew that their appeal with the CA disputing the downgrading of the offense was still pending. Petitioner heirs further argued that the adoption of a contrary stand by the prosecutor after the filing of the Information for parricide should not bar them from prosecuting the case actively sans supervision and intervention of the prosecutor. On August 16, 2006, petitioner heirs filed a Motion to Implead the People of the Philippines as party respondent.45 On August 31, 2006, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a similar motion46 and further prayed that it be furnished a copy of the petition and be given time to file its comment. On October 10, 2006, the CA granted the motions.47 On October 1, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.1wphi1 Though it found that Judge Barrios failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the case and thus abdicated his judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice, it ruled that the remand of the case to the RTC would serve no useful purpose since it may result in the reopening of the parricide case which would violate respondents constitutional right against double jeopardy. Petitioner heirs and the OSG moved to reconsider the CA decision, but their motions were denied on April 3, 2008. Hence, they filed the present consolidated petitions raising the sole issue of whether the remand of the parricide case to the trial court will violate respondents constitutional right against double jeopardy. Petitioner heirs argue that the MeTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the case for parricide through reckless imprudence and that jurisdiction remained with the RTC where the Information for parricide was filed. They also assail the filing with the MeTC of the Information for the downgraded offense after a supposedly dubious reinvestigation and question the hasty arraignment of accused which was done allegedly without notice to petitioner heirs and without them being furnished with the result of the reinvestigation. They even claim that they were not furnished with a copy of the motion for leave to conduct reinvestigation as it was sent to the wrong address. Petitioner heirs further argue that when respondent immediately pleaded guilty to the charge for reckless imprudence without notice to them, such a plea cannot be legally invoked in respondents defense of double jeopardy. Also, the Information for parricide was still pending with the RTC when accused was hastily arraigned for the downgraded offense. Thus, not all requisites of double jeopardy are present. The OSG, for its part, argues that the MeTC could not have validly acquired jurisdiction over the case for the same offense of parricide or any offense necessarily included therein because the prosecutions

motion to withdraw the Information for parricide before the RTC remained unacted upon by the said court. Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that if the petition is granted, it would violate his right against double jeopardy. The first jeopardy has already attached because there was a valid indictment, arraignment and plea and the proceedings were already terminated as he is already serving sentence and has applied for probation. He also contends that proceeding with reinvestigation was justified since the principal action can continue if there is no order from the appellate court to stop the proceedings. He further argues that petitioner heirs have no right to file this appeal especially since the appeal was filed by petitioner heirs without the public prosecutors conformity. Respondent likewise contends that it is already too late for petitioner heirs to question the validity of the MeTC proceedings since its decision has become final and executory, no appeal having been taken from the decision. Also, petitioner heirs failed to present evidence to prove that there was fraud in the reinvestigation and subsequent plea to a lesser offense. We grant the petitions. It is beyond cavil that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest without making an independent assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record.48 By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor that it is abiding by the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. What remains for our resolution is whether the case may be remanded to the RTC without violating respondents right against double jeopardy. On this question, we find the answer to be in the affirmative. Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended provides: SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. xxxx Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.49 In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still pending before the RTC. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr.,50 we held

that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is filed, it is there retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in the charge for intentional parricide51pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case filed before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent. A decision rendered without jurisdiction is not a decision in contemplation of law and can never become executory.52 WHEREFORE, the present petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated October 1, 2007 and Resolution dated April 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92755 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the September 26, 2005 and November 3, 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54 are hereby NULLIFIED and said trial court is hereby DIRECTED to REINSTATE Criminal Case No. 02-207976 for parricide for appropriate criminal proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ* Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Designated additional member per Raffle of March 8, 2010 in view of the recusal of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin from the case due to prior action in the Court of Appeals.
1

Rollo (G.R. No. 182651), pp. 27-34. Penned by Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe with Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) concurring.
2

Id. at 35. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 3-5. Id. at 1-2. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-207976. Id. at 58. Id. at 68-74. Id. at 65. Id. at 66-67. Id. at 83. Id. at 84-85. Id. at 102-103. Id. at 112. Id. at 116-122. Id. at 121. Id. at 147.

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12

13

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Id. at 190. Id. at 224-228. Id. at 229. Id. at 302. Id. at 306-320. Id. at 235-241. Id. at 344-345. Id. at 369-370. Id. at 371-378. Id. at 426-427. Id. at 435. Id. at 443. Id. at 446-452. Id. at 495-496. Id. at 493-494. Id. at 504-511. Id. at 548. Id. at 576. Id. at 573-575. Id. at 620-629. Records, Vol. 2, pp. 4-5. Id. at 36-37. Id. at 17-20. CA rollo, pp. 63-79.

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Records, Vol. 2, p. 63. Id. at 93-98. Id. at 104-107. Id. at 108. CA rollo, pp. 2-15. Id. at 206-208. Id. at 210-213. Id. at 216-217.

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42

43

44

45

46

47

48

See Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 158236, September 1, 2004, 437 SCRA 504, 515; Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656, 682.
49

People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 438, 449; People v. Tampal, G.R. No. 102485, May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA 202, 208.
50

Nos. L-38579 & L-39951, September 9, 1982, 116 SCRA 451, 456.

51

See Magno v. People, G.R. No. 149725, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 246, 258, citing People v. De Fernando, 49 Phil. 75 (1926); People v. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 267;Samson v. Court of Appeals, et al., 103 Phil. 277 (1958).
52

Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, No. L-65334, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 820, 825.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 188471 April 20, 2010

FRANCISCO ALONSO, substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO, TOMAS V. ALONSO and ASUNCION V. ALONSO, Petitioners, vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Public Respondent. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners appeal the order dated December 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Cebu City, denying the motion for issuance of writ of execution of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of the Government, and the order dated April 24, 2009, denying their motion for reconsideration filed against the first order. Antecedents The antecedent facts are those established in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,1 which follow. Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso (Francisco) was the only son and sole heir of the late spouses Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle. Francisco died during the pendency of this case, and was substituted by his legal heirs, namely: his surviving spouse, Mercedes V. Alonso, his son Tomas V. Alonso (Tomas) and his daughter Asuncion V. Alonso.2 In 1992, Francisco discovered documents showing that his father Tomas N. Alonso had acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government in or about the year 1911; that the original vendee of Lot No. 727 had assigned his sales certificate to Tomas N. Alonso, who had been consequently issued Patent No. 14353; and that on March 27, 1926, the Director of Lands had executed a final deed of sale in favor of Tomas N. Alonso, but the final deed of sale had not been registered with the Register of Deeds because of lack of requirements, like the approval of the final deed of sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required by law.3 Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title covering Lot No. 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been "administratively reconstituted from the owners duplicate" of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc., the predecessor of respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc (Cebu Country Club); and that upon the order of the court that had heard the petition for reconstitution of the TCT, the name of the registered owner in TCT No. RT-

1310 had been changed to that of Cebu Country Club; and that the TCT stated that the reconstituted title was a transfer from TCT No. 1021.4 It is relevant to mention at this point that the current TCT covering Lot 727-D-2 in the name of Cebu Country Club is TCT No. 94905, which was entered in the land records of Cebu City on August 8, 1985.5 With his discoveries, Francisco formally demanded upon Cebu Country Club to restore the ownership and possession of Lot 727-D-2 to him. However, Cebu Country Club denied Franciscos demand and claim of ownership, and refused to deliver the possession to him.6 On September 25, 1992, Francisco commenced against Cebu Country Club in the RTC in Cebu City an action for the declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation of certificates of title, and the recovery of property. On November 5, 1992, Cebu Country Club filed its answer with counterclaim.7 On May 7, 1993, the RTC decided in favor of Cebu Country Club. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which ultimately affirmed the RTC on March 31, 1997. Thus, Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on October 2, 1997.8 Nothing daunted, Francisco appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 130876). On January 31, 2002, this Court decided G.R. No. 130876, decreeing: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. However, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 08. IN LIEU THEREOF, we DISMISS the complaint and counterclaim of the parties in Civil Cases No. CEB 12926 of the trial court. We declare that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines. 9 The petitioners sought a reconsideration. On December 5, 2003, however, the Court denied their motion for reconsideration.10 Hence, the decision in G.R. No. 130876 became final and executory. In late 2004, the Government, through the OSG, filed in the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.11 Cebu Country Club opposed the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in due course. Later on, the proceedings on the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution at the instance of Cebu Country Club in deference to the on-going hearings being conducted by the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives on a proposed bill to confirm the TCTs and reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City.12 The Congress ultimately enacted a law to validate the TCTs and reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City. This was Republic Act No. 9443,13effective on July 27, 2007.

Thereafter, both Cebu Country Club and the OSG brought the passage of R.A. No. 9443 to the attention of the RTC for its consideration in resolving the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.14 On December 28, 2007, therefore, the RTC denied the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution through the first appealed order.15 The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 1, 2008, questioning the denial of the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.16 Upon being directed by the RTC to comment on the petitioners motion for reconsideration, the OSG manifested in writing that the Government was no longer seeking the execution of the decision in G.R. No. 130876, subject to its reservation to contest any other titles within the Banilad Friar Lands Estate should clear evidence show such titles as having been obtained through fraud.17 After the filing of the OSGs comment, the RTC issued the second appealed order, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration, giving the following reasons: 1. The party who had a direct interest in the execution of the decision and the reconsideration of the denial of the motion for execution was the Government, represented only by the OSG; hence, the petitioners had no legal standing to file the motion for reconsideration, especially that they were not authorized by the OSG for that purpose; 2. R.A. No. 9443 "confirms and declares as valid" all "existing" TCTs and reconstituted titles; thereby, the State in effect waived and divested itself of whatever title or ownership over the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in favor of the registered owners thereof, including Lot 727 D-2; and 3. The situation of the parties had materially changed, rendering the enforcement of the final and executory judgment unjust, inequitable, and impossible, because Cebu Country Club was now recognized by the State itself as the absolute owner of Lot 727 D-2.18 Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari. Contentions of the Petitioners The petitioners challenge the orders dated December 28, 2007 and April 29, 2009, because: 1. R.A. No. 9443 did not improve Cebu Country Clubs plight, inasmuch as R.A. No. 9443 presupposed first a sales certificate that lacked the required signature, but Cebu Country Club did not have such sales certificate. Moreover, the titleholders were in fact the owners of the lands covered by their respective titles, which was not true with Cebu Country Club due to its being already adjudged with finality to be not the owner of Lot 727-D-2. Lastly, Cebu Country Clubs title was hopelessly defective, as found by the Supreme Court itself; 2. The doctrine of law of the case barred the application of R.A. No. 9443 to Cebu Country Club; 3. The RTCs declaration that R.A. No. 9443 confirmed Cebu Country Club as the absolute owner of Lot 727-D-2 despite the prior and final judgment of the Supreme Court that Cebu Country

Club was not the owner was unconstitutional, because it virtually allowed the legislative review of the Supreme Courts decision rendered against Cebu Country Club; 4. The use of R.A. No. 9443 as a waiver on the part of the Government vis--vis Cebu Country Club was not only misplaced but downrightly repugnant to Act 1120, the law governing the legal disposition and alienation of Friar Lands; and 5. The petitioners had the requisite standing to question the patent errors of the RTC, especially in the face of the unholy conspiracy between the OSG and Cebu Country Club, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the passage of R.A. No. 9443 and DENR Memorandum No. 16, both of which in fact made their predecessor Tomas N. Alonsos sales certificate and patent valid.19 Issues The Court confronts and resolves the following issues, to wit: 1. Whether or not the petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to question the denial by the RTC of the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution; 2. Whether or not R.A. No. 9443 gave the petitioners a legal interest to assail the RTCs orders; and 3. Whether or not the petitioners can appeal by petition for review on certiorari in behalf of the OSG. Ruling The petition for review is denied due course. A. Preliminary Considerations: Petitioners contravene the hierarchy of courts, and the petition is fatally defective Before delving on the stated issues, the Court notes that the petitioners are guilty of two violations that warrant the immediate dismissal of the petition for review on certiorari. The first refers to the petitioners breach of the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court to appeal the assailed issuances of the RTC via petition for review on certiorari. They should not have done so, bypassing a review by the Court of Appeals (CA), because the hierarchy of courts is essential to the efficient functioning of the courts and to the orderly administration of justice. Their non-observance of the hierarchy of courts has forthwith enlarged the docket of the Court by one more case, which, though it may not seem burdensome to the layman, is one case too much to the Court, which has to devote time and effort in poring over the papers submitted herein, only to discover in the end that a review should have first been made by the CA. The time and effort could have been dedicated to other cases of importance and impact on the lives and rights of others.

The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded by litigants. The CA stands between the RTC and the Court, and its establishment has been precisely to take over much of the work that used to be done by the Court. Historically, the CA has been of the greatest help to the Court in synthesizing the facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and intelligible manner and in identifying errors that ordinarily might escape detection. The Court has thus been freed to better discharge its constitutional duties and perform its most important work, which, in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco,20 "is less concerned with the decision of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental rights."21 The need to elevate the matter first to the CA is also underscored by the reality that determining whether the petitioners were real parties in interest entitled to bring this appeal against the denial by the RTC of the OSGsmotion for the issuance of a writ of execution was a mixed question of fact and law. As such, the CA was in the better position to review and to determine. In that regard, the petitioners violate Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which demands that an appeal by petition for review on certiorari be limited to questions of law.22 The second violation concerns the omission of a sworn certification against forum shopping from the petition for review on certiorari. Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the petition for review should contain, among others, the sworn certification on the undertakings provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz: Section 2. xxx The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (n) Only petitioner Tomas V. Alonso has executed and signed the sworn certification against forum shopping attached to the petition. Although neither of his co-petitioners Mercedes V. Alonso and Asuncion V. Alonso has joined the certification, Tomas did not present any written express authorization in his favor authorizing him to sign the certification in their behalf. The signing of the certification by only one of the petitioners could not be presumed to reflect the personal knowledge by his co-petitioners of the filing or non-filing of any similar action or claim.23 Hence, the failure of Mercedes and Asuncion to sign and execute the certification along with Tomas warranted the dismissal of their petition.24 B. Petitioners are not proper parties to appeal and assail the order of the RTC The petitioners are relentless in insisting that their claim to Lot No. 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate should be preferred to that of Cebu Country Club, despite the final judgment in G.R. No. 130876 being adverse to their claim. Their insistence raises the need to resolve once and for all whether or not

the petitioners retained any legal right to assert over Lot No. 727-D-2 following the Governments manifest desistance from the execution of the judgment in G.R. No. 130876 against Cebu Country Club. The above-noted defects of the petition for review notwithstanding, therefore, the Court has now to address and resolve the stated issues on the sole basis of the results the Court earlier reached in G.R. No. 130876. In this regard, whether or not the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this appeal is decisive. After careful consideration, the Court finds that the cause of the petitioners instantly fails. In G.R. No. 130876, the Court found that the petitioners did not validly acquire ownership of Lot No. 727-D-2, and declared that Lot No. 727 D-2 legally belonged to the Government, thus: The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Cebu Country Club, Inc. is owner of Lot No. 727. Admittedly, neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any title to the land in question. The most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in the name of Tomas N. Alonso.The sales patent, however, and even the corresponding deed of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds and no title was ever issued in the name of the latter. This is because there were basic requirements not complied with, the most important of which was that the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void. "Approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale." Moreover, Cebu Country Club, Inc. was in possession of the land since 1931, and had been paying the real estate taxes thereon based on tax declarations in its name with the title number indicated thereon. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are strong evidence of ownership. This Court has ruled that although tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind will be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. Notwithstanding this fatal defect, the Court of Appeals ruled that "there was substantial compliance with the requirement of Act No. 1120 to validly convey title to said lot to Tomas N. Alonso." On this point, the Court of Appeals erred. Under Act No. 1120, which governs the administration and disposition of friar lands, the purchase by an actual and bona fide settler or occupant of any portion of friar land shall be "agreed upon between the purchaser and the Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (mutatis mutandis)." In his Memorandum filed on May 25, 2001, the Solicitor General submitted to this Court certified copies of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor of Leoncio Alburo, and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor of Tomas N. Alonso. Conspicuously, both instruments do not bear the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of the Interior. They also do not bear the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Only recently, in Jesus P. Liao v. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled categorically that approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable for its validity , hence, the absence of such approval made the sale null and void ab-initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment. Consequently, petitioner Franciscos father did not have any registerable title to the land in question. Having none, he could not transmit anything to his sole heir, petitioner Francisco Alonso or the latters heirs. In a vain attempt at showing that he had succeeded to the estate of his father, on May 4, 1991, petitioner Francisco Alonso executed an affidavit adjudicating the entire estate to himself (Exh. "Q"), duly published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province and city of Cebu (Exh. "Q-1"). Such affidavit of self-adjudication is inoperative, if not void, not only because there was nothing to adjudicate, but equally important because petitioner Francisco did not show proof of payment of the estate tax and submit a certificate of clearance from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Obviously, petitioner Francisco has not paid the estate taxes. Consequently, we rule that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the latters heirs are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute. xxx.25 The pronouncement in G.R. No. 130876 renders beyond dispute that the non-execution of the judgment would not adversely affect the petitioners, who now hold no right whatsoever in Lot No. 727-D-2. Otherwise put, they are not the proper parties to assail the questioned orders of the RTC, because they stand to derive nothing from the execution of the judgment against Cebu Country Club. Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules.26 A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.27 "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The rule refers to a real or present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.28 One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.29 Thus, an appeal, like this one, is an action to be prosecuted by a party in interest before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper, the litigant must of necessity continue to hold a real or present substantial interest that entitles him to the avails of the suit on appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is an exercise in futility. So it is with the petitioners! In contrast, the Government, being the legal owner of Lot No. 727-D-2, is the only party adversely affected by the denial, and is the proper party entitled to assail the denial.30 However, its manifest desistance from the execution of the decision effectively barred any challenge against the denial, for its non-appeal rendered the denial final and immutable. C. R.A. No. 9443 gives petitioners no legal interest to assail the denial of the motion for execution Section 1 of R.A. No. 9443 provides:

Section 1. All existing Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, notwithstanding the lack of signatures and/or approval of the then Secretary of Interior (later Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and/or the then Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (later Director of Public Lands) in the copies of the duly executed Sale Certificates and Assignments of Sale Certificates, as the case may be, now on file with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City, are hereby declared as valid titles and the registered owners recognized as absolute owners thereof. The law expressly declares as valid "(a)ll existing Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate," and recognizes the registered owners as absolute owners. To benefit from R.A. No. 9443, therefore, a person must hold as a condition precedent a duly issued Transfer Certificate of Title or a Reconstituted Certificate of Title. Although Lot 727-D-2 was earlier declared to be owned by the Government in G.R. No. 130876, R.A. No. 9443 later validated Cebu Country Clubs registered ownership due to its holding of TCT No. RT-1310 (T11351) in its own name. As the OSG explained in its manifestation in lieu of comment31 (filed in the RTC vis--vis the petitioners motion for reconsideration against the RTCs denial of the OSGs motion for issuance of a writ of execution), the enactment of R.A. No. 9443 had "mooted the final and executory Decision of the Supreme Court in "Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.," docketed as G.R. No. 130876, which declared the Government as the owner of Lot 727-D-2 based on the absence of signature and approval of the then Secretary of Interior;" and that the decision in G.R. No. 130876 had "ceased to have any practical effect" as the result of the enactment of R.A. No. 9443, and had thereby become "academic."32 On the other hand, the petitioners could not benefit from R.A. No. 9443 because of their noncompliance with the express condition of holding any Transfer Certificate of Title or Reconstituted Certificate of Title respecting Lot 727-D-2 or any portion thereof.1awph!1 The appropriate recourse for the petitioners, if they persist in the belief that the TCT of Cebu Country Club should be nullified, is to compel the OSG through the special civil action for mandamus to commence the action to annul on the ground that Cebu Country Club had obtained its title to Lot 7217D-2 through fraud. Yet, that recourse is no longer availing, for the decision in G.R. No. 130876 explicitly found and declared that the reconstituted title of Cebu Country Club had not been obtained through fraud. Said the Court: On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) bears the same number as another title to another land, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu Country Club, Inc.s reconstituted title bears the same number as the title of another parcel of land. This came about because under General Land Registration Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February 19, 1947, and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated August 5, 1946, which were in force at the time the title was reconstituted on July 26, 1948, the titles issued before the inauguration of the Philippine Republic were numbered consecutively and the titles issued after the inauguration were numbered also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that eventually, the titles issued before the inauguration were duplicated by titles issued after the inauguration of the Philippine Republic. xxx. xxx

Petitioners next argue that the reconstituted title of Cebu Country Club, Inc. had no lawful source to speak of; it was reconstituted through extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in the absence of a deed of conveyance in its favor. In truth, however, reconstitution was based on the owners duplicate of the title, hence, there was no need for the covering deed of sale or other modes of conveyance. Cebu Country Club, Inc. was admittedly in possession of the land since long before the Second World War, or since 1931. In fact, the original title (TCT No. 11351) was issued to the United Service Country Club, Inc. on November 19, 1931 as a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1021. More importantly, Cebu Country Club, Inc. paid the realty taxes on the land even before the war, and tax declarations covering the property showed the number of the TCT of the land. Cebu Country Club, Inc. produced receipts showing real estate tax payments since 1949.On the other hand, petitioner failed to produce a single receipt of real estate tax payment ever made by his father since the sales patent was issued to his father on March 24, 1926. Worse, admittedly petitioner could not show any [T]orrens title ever issued to Tomas N. Alonso, because, as said, the deed of sale executed on March 27, 1926 by the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and could not be registered. "Under the law, it is the act of registration of the deed of conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the land registered under the Torrens system. The act of registration creates constructive notice to the whole world of the fact of such conveyance." On this point, petitioner alleges that Cebu Country Club, Inc. obtained its title by fraud in connivance with personnel of the Register of Deeds in 1941 or in 1948, when the title was administratively reconstituted. Imputations of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence of fraud. In an action for re-conveyance based on fraud, he who charges fraud must prove such fraud in obtaining a title. "In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed." The strongest suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. "The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass." Worse, the imputation of fraud was so tardily brought, some forty-four (44) years or sixty-one (61) years after its supposed occurrence, that is, from the administrative reconstitution of title on July 26, 1948, or from the issuance of the original title on November 19, 1931, that verification is rendered extremely difficult, if not impossible, especially due to the supervening event of the second world war during which practically all public records were lost or destroyed, or no longer available.33 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit. The Court declares that Cebu Country Club, Inc. is the exclusive owner of Lot No.727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, as confirmed by Republic Act No. 9443. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners. SO ORDERED. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

G.R. No. 130876, January 31, 2002, 375 SCRA 390. Id., p. 393. Id., pp. 393-394. Id., p. 394. Annex 3, Comment on the petition for review on certiorari. Rollo, p. 394. Id., p. 395. Id., pp. 396-398. Id., p. 410. G.R. No. 130876, December 5, 2003, 417 SCRA 115. Rollo, p. 15. Id.

10

11

12

13

Entitled An Act Confirming and Declaring, Subject to Certain Exceptions, the Validity of Existing Transfer Certificate of Title Covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Situated in the First District of Cebu.

14

Rollo, p. 17. Id., pp. 42-43. Id., p. 18. Id., p. 176. Id., pp. 44-47. Id., pp. 22-23. Philippine Political Law, 10th Edition, p. 323 Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 144

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
23

Gonzales v. Balikatan Kilusang Bayan sa Pananalapi, Inc., G.R. No. 150859, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 111, 115.
24

Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, relevantly states: Section 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the ground that the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. (3a)

25

Supra, note 1, 375 SCRA 390, 403-405. Section 2. Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Quisumbing v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138437, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 7, 15.

26

27

28

29

Ralla v. Ralla, G.R. No. 78646, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 495.

30

Caete v. Genuino Ice Company, Inc., G.R. No. 154080, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 206, 220222, where the petitioners admitted not to be the owners of the land, but the Government, the Court declared: "xxx petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for the purpose of maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may institute such suit. Jurisprudence on the matter has been settled and the issue need not be belabored."); Gabilla v. Barriga, No. L-28917, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 131 (where the Court declared: "xxx In his amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at all that any part of the land covered by the defendants title was privately owned by him or by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is admitted therein that the said land was at all times a part of the public domain until December 18, 1964, when the government issued a title thereon in favor of the defendant. Thus, if there is any person or entity [entitled] to relief, it can only be the government."); Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, G.R. No. 147379, February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 206, 214 (where the Court held: "Where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendants title because even if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.").
31

This was submitted by the OSG to the RTC in connection with petitioners motion for reconsideration dated January 28, 2008.
32

Rollo, p. 175. Supra, note 1, pp. 399-402.

33

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 161330 February 20, 2007

RENE CABARLES, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: In an original action filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Rene Cabarles seeks to annul the Order1 issued by respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda in Criminal Case No. 990878, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rene "Nonoy" Cabarles y Adizas, for murder, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275. The questioned Order dated April 1, 2003 cancelled the scheduled promulgation of judgment and reopened the case for reception of evidence from two prosecution witnesses who were not presented during trial. The facts of the case are as follows: On June 18, 1999, Cabarles was charged with murder under the following information: The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RENE "NONOY" CABARLES Y ADIZAS of the crime of Murder, committed as follows: That on or about the 25th day of April, 1999, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable motive with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with a deadly weapon (fan knife) one Antonio Callosa, which directly caused his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.2 Cabarles pleaded not guilty. The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on the following dates, to wit: pre-trial on November 22, 2000; presentation of prosecutions evidence on April 18, May 4, 11, 18, and 23, 2001; and presentation of defense evidence on June 20 and 27, July 4 and 18, and August 1, 2001.3 The prosecution had subpoenas issued to its witnesses: Flocerfina Callosa, the mother of the deceased; Imelda Pedrosa, the alleged eyewitness; Carlos Callosa, brother of the deceased; and Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Police Senior Inspector of the Southern Police District (SPD) Crime Laboratory to testify on the contents of the death certificate of Antonio Callosa.

Through no fault of its own, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates. Instead, trial on the merits began only on May 23, 2001 when the prosecution called Carlos Callosa to the witness stand. Since defense counsel agreed to stipulate that Carlos would testify on matters in his May 13, 1999 Sinumpaang Salaysay, his testimony was dispensed with. The second prosecution witness, Police Inspector Prudencio Parejos, was presented in court during the June 20, 2001 hearing. His testimony was likewise dispensed with after defense counsel agreed to stipulate that Police Inspector Parejos would testify on what was in the spot report of the stabbing incident. In the June 20, 2001 hearing, the prosecution said it would offer its evidence and rest its case should the People fail to present a witness at the next scheduled hearing.4 When the case was called on June 27, 2001, the prosecution failed to present a witness. Neither Pedrosa nor Dr. Salen appeared during the said hearing. Records show that four subpoenas were issued to Pedrosa informing her that she had to appear on November 22, 2000,5 April 116 and 18,7 May 11 and June 20,8 and August 1, 2001.9 The first subpoena was personally received by her; the second subpoena by her husband, Salvador Pedrosa; and the third and fourth subpoenas had no proofs of service. Meanwhile, the three subpoenas issued to Dr. Salen requiring his attendance on May 1110 and 23,11 June 20,12 and August 1, 2001,13 were all returned with the notation "addressee moved." There was no evidence, however, that subpoenas were issued to these two witnesses requiring their attendance for the June 27, 2001 hearing, which would explain why they were absent. Taking into consideration the absence of a subpoena issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen and notwithstanding the vehement objection registered by Cabarles, Judge Maceda gave the prosecution a last chance but warned: It is however understood whether the subpoena is actually issued and served or not upon the prosecution witnesses and service of such subpoena or notice will not relieved (sic) the prosecution to make a formal offer of evidence should the prosecution failed (sic) to present any witness in the next scheduled hearing.14 With no witness for the August 1, 2001 hearing, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its evidence.15 Thereafter, Cabarles, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence but it was denied by Judge Maceda.16Two witnesses were called for the defense, accused Cabarles and Luisito Javier, a fisherman. A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2, 2003, Judge Maceda motu proprio issued the questioned order reopening the case. In it, he observed that the prosecution may not have been given its day in court resulting in a miscarriage of justice. He explained that because there was a mix-up in the dates specified in the subpoena and the hearing dates of when the case was actually heard, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four of the five hearing dates: April 18, May 4, 11 and 18, 2001 assigned to it. Judge Maceda found that there was no hearing conducted on April 18, 2001. Thereafter, the subpoena issued to Pedrosa required her to appear on April 11, 2001, which was not a date assigned for the prosecution but May 11, 2001. Also, Judge Maceda noted that another subpoena was issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen requiring them to appear on May 11 and June 20, 2001. But, the May 11, 2001 hearing was reset to May 25, 2001 because the judge was indisposed, and insofar as the June 20, 2001 setting was concerned, it was not one of the days set by the court for the prosecution. Judge Maceda further observed that the May 18, 2001 hearing was never scheduled and May 25, 2001 was likewise not a hearing date set by the court. According to Judge Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates and

there was either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was no subpoena issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution should have been given a last chance to present the alleged eyewitness and the doctor. His order in part read: As a consequence*,+ the promulgation set tomorrow, April 2, is canceled. Set the reception of the testimony of the eye witness and the doctor on May 1, 2003 at 2:00 [p.]m. to enable the prosecution to avail [of] the last chance granted by this Court. Issue the corresponding subpoena to Imelda Pedrosa and Dr. Romeo T. Salen directing them to appear on the aforesaid date and time, to be served by the Branch Sheriff who is required to make a prompt return thereof. SO ORDERED.17 Judge Maceda denied Cabarless motion for reconsideration in an Order dated April 25, 2003 and set the case for hearing on May 8, 2003 to hear the testimonies of Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. The subpoena issued to Pedrosa for that hearing was duly served,18 but service upon Dr. Salen failed since the doctor was no longer assigned to the SPD Crime Laboratory. Notwithstanding the service upon Pedrosa, the prosecution still failed to present a witness during the May 8, 2003 hearing. Nonetheless, Judge Maceda, upon motion, again decided to extend to the prosecution another chance, giving the People June 19 and July 3, 2003 as additional hearing dates.19 Finally, on June 19, 2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and completed her direct examination. A few days thereafter, Cabarles filed the present petition questioning Judge Macedas order, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Since trial in the lower court continued, on July 3, 2003, the Public Attorneys Office conducted its cross-examination of Pedrosa. On July 24, 2003, the defense counsel agreed on the facts contained in the death certificate of the victim, so the testimony of Dr. Salen was dispensed with. Thereafter, Judge Maceda set the date for the reception of evidence on the civil aspect of the criminal case on August 14, 2003, when Carlos, the deceaseds brother, was recalled to the witness stand.20 Cabarles was then given a chance to adduce further evidence on his behalf.1avvphi1.net On August 9, 2004, Judge Maceda deferred the promulgation of judgment and ordered the case archived pending this Courts resolution of the case.21 In his petition, Cabarles raises as issues the following: [1] WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION. *2+ WHETHER PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS VIOLATED.22 1awphi1.net

Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing motu proprio the April 1, 2003 Order reopening the case, before judgment was rendered, to receive the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses after both parties had rested their case? Did the said order violate Cabarless right to due process and speedy disposition of his case? On the first issue, Cabarles insists that Judge Maceda gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the reopening of the case before promulgation of judgment although both parties had already rested their case. Cabarles argues that a case may only be reopened after a judgment of conviction has been made but before its finality, as provided in Section 24,23 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Cabarles insists that the reopening of a case under Section 24 presupposes that judgment has already been promulgated, which is not the case here. According to petitioner, the cases cited by the People are not at all applicable in this case since they were tried and decided before the introduction of Section 24 under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. For Judge Maceda, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that Section 24 is a new provision which merely formalized the long accepted practice of judges of reopening a case to avoid a miscarriage of justice. This being the case, jurisprudence providing that a judge has the discretion to reopen a case even before promulgation of judgment still holds. After a thorough consideration of the submissions by the parties, we find that the petition is meritorious. A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage.24 This lack of a specific provision covering motions to reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. The April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order. Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears.25 A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered,26 and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment27 and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice.28 This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.29 However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against

the due process clause of the Constitution which requires notice and opportunity to be heard.30 The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the express language of Section 24, Rule 119. Although the defense counsel had cross-examined Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after the case was reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarless objection to the April 1, 2003 Order. To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.31 Here, Cabarles filed the present petition seeking for a writ of certiorari against Judge Maceda before Pedrosa was cross-examined. Also, when asked to comment on the prosecutions formal offer of evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles objected to its admission on the ground that the same was inadmissible having been received by the court after Judge Maceda issued the questioned order. On the second issue, Cabarles maintains that contrary to Judge Macedas observation, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present its case as seen by the issuance of several subpoenas to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. Cabarles argues that he is presumed innocent until proven guilty and should not be made to wait indefinitely for prosecution witnesses to testify. To do so would violate his constitutional right to due process and a speedy disposition of his case. According to Cabarles, the reopening of the case is clearly detrimental to him since it meant another day in prison. The OSG counters that the reopening of the case was made in accordance with Section 24 since the prosecution is entitled to the reopening of the case to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, Cabarless right to a speedy trial had not been violated since delays caused by the absence of a prosecution witness are excluded when computing the time within which trial should start under Section 3,32 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably.33 In this particular case, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses but it failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take full advantage of the opportunities given does not change the fact that it was accorded such opportunities. Contrary to the justification stated in the April 1, 2003 Order, the prosecution was not deprived of its day in court. While it may be true that due to some confusion with the trial courts calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to the prosecution did not push through and some of the subpoenas issued to Pedrosa and/or Dr. Salen pertained to hearing dates which were different from those assigned for reception of prosecutions evidence, still the prosecution had a total of four hearing dates when it was given the chance to prove its case: May 23, June 20 and 27, and August 1, 2001. The presence of prosecution witnesses in court is the responsibility of the public prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to take the initiative of ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial.34 Since Judge Maceda issued the questioned order without complying with the third requirement of Section 24, that there be a hearing conducted before the order to reopen is issued, then the assailed order must be annulled and set aside for having been issued contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion.35 On Cabarless right to a speedy disposition of his case, we agree that under the Constitution, all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases. Nowhere is this guaranty more significant and meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at stake.36

Although a discussion on the right to speedy disposition of the case is mooted by our nullification of Judge Macedas April 1, 2003 Order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, we are constrained to reiterate that the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.37 The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.38 With regard to the OSGs allegation in its Comment and Memorandum, that Cabarles failed to observe the rule on hierarchy of courts since the petition for certiorari was filed directly with the Supreme Court, Cabarles insists that he is a detention prisoner needing immediate resolution of his case. He also argues that this case not only involves grave abuse of discretion but also a pure question of law involving the application of Section 24, which is a new provision.39 It is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Court of Appeals and with the regional trial courts in proper cases within their respective regions. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts determines the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against a regional trial court should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is the established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of its docket.40 Under the present circumstances however, we are willing to take cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the information against him was filed way back in June 1999,41 and almost eight years thereafter, no judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised.42 Since Section 24 is a new provision, and considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this petition. As a final word, we find the Supreme Courts pronouncement in the case of People v. Monje instructive: A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court for further proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed to prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an accused is on the brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to augment its evidence which should have been presented much earlier. This is a criminal prosecution, and to order the remand

of this case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to present additional evidence would violate the constitutional right of the accused to due process, and to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable failure of the prosecution to fill the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the State and the private offended party, should not be treated by this Court with indulgence, to the extent of affording the prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish its evidence. In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion - whether privileged or less privileged - to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proved.43 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. We hold that the assailed Order dated April 1, 2003 was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Said Order is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, any evidence received and offered in this case as a result of the April 1, 2003 Order is hereby stricken off the record. Let the records of this case be REMANDED immediately to the trial court concerned for its appropriate action without further delay. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION DANTE O. TINGA Asscociate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 14-15. Id. at 13. Records, p. 37. Id. at 66. Id. at 41. Id. at 47. Supra note 5. Id. at 55. Id. at 72. Id. at 52. Id. at 59. Supra note 10. Id. at 70. Id. at 68. Id. at 74. Id. at 91. Rollo, p. 15. Records, pp. 133-134.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Id. at 136. Id. at 172. Id. at 223. Rollo, p. 85.

20

21

22

23

SEC. 24. Reopening. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
24

Alegre v. Reyes, No. L-56923, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 226, 231.

25

Gacayan v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483 (OCA-IPI No. 98-578-RTJ), September 17, 1999, 314 SCRA 682, 694; People v. Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. 45037, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 38, 42.
26

Alegre v. Reyes, supra note 24; II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 551 (10th ed., 2004), citing People v. Concepcion, 84 Phil. 787, 788 (1949).
27

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 119, Sec. 24; II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra.
28

People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 419, 444. II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra. See Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004, 426 SCRA 29, 40. Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998, 287 SCRA 581, 591.

29

30

31

32

SEC. 3. Exclusions. The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence: (a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following: (1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused; (2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused; (3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;

(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days; (5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts; (6) Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a prejudicial question; and (7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement. (b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness. For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. He shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence. (c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of the accused to stand trial. (d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge. (e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has been granted. (f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
33

Gacayan v. Pamintuan, supra note 25, at 695. People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 160, 174.

34

35

See Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 141, 148.
36

Clave v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 102502 and Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 103143, June 19, 2001, p. 5 (Unsigned Resolution).

37

Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 478, 485.

38

Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116945, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 499, 504, citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991, 199 SCRA 298, 307.
39

Rollo, pp. 51-52, 100-102. Page-Tenorio v. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004, 443 SCRA 560, 567-568. Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 13. Ark Travel Express, Inc v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010, August 29, 2003, 410 SCRA 148, 157. Supra note 34, at 179-180.

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43