THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001.]

SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, vs. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ

and ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents.

Mamaril Arca & Associates for petitioner.

Romeo B. Igot Law Offices for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The house of respondents was situated in a lot foreclosed and bought by

petitioner. In April and May 1986, an Order of Demolition of the house was
issued by the trial court but was enjoined by a temporary restraining order
(TRO) granted to respondents on June 2, 1986. In 1988, the TRO was made
permanent by the Court, but the house of respondents had already been
destroyed. The Court of Appeals held petitioner liable to respondents for
P250,000.00 for actual damages thereof. Hence, this appeal where petitioner
asserted the principle of damnum absque injuria.
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition has no merit. Petitioner argued
that he cannot be held liable for damages as he merely acted in accordance
with the Writ of Demolition. However, the Court noted that petitioner
commenced demolition of the house in May 1986 and did not heed the TRO
issued by the Court in June 1986. Petitioner unlawfully pursued demolition of
respondents' house well until the middle of 1987. Thus, although petitioner may
have been legally justified at the outset, the continuation of the demolition
even after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right.
Petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation to repair the damage caused
to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; PRINCIPLE OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA . —

Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of
a person's rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque injuria — for which
the law gives no remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises one's rights
does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR; REASONS. — True,
petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May 30, 1986
under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records
show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of
respondents' house, was issued by the Supreme Court On , June 2, 1986. The
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 CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process
server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4.
1986. Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with
the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents' house well
until the middle of 1987. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally
justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were
tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition,
respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before
the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid
exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from
this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with
the demolition.
3. ID.; HUMAN RELATIONS; CONCEPT OF ABUSE OF RIGHT;
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, the Court
discussed the concept of abuse of rights as follows: "Article 19, known to
contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honestly
and good faith. The law, therefore; recognizes the primordial limitation on all
rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by self legal because recognizes or grnated
by law as such, may nevertheless become the sopurce of some illegally. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined
in Article ', 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible . . . ." Clearly
then, the demolition of respondents' house b) petitioner, despite his receipt of
the TRO was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In
insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and
wittingly caused the destruction of respondents' house.
4. ID.; DAMAGES; PRINCIPLE OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJUR MUST BE
PREMISED ON A VALID EXERCISE OF RIGHT. — Petitioner cannot invoke
damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right.
Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection
that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is
occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated. In the
ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation to repair or
to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one's act or
omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not
punishable by law.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

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 Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a
person's rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result
in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This
principle does not, however, apply when there is an abuse of a person's right,
or when the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a
court order. Indeed, in the availment of one's rights, one must act with justice,
give others their due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the April 21, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 41451, which set aside the judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC had earlier dismissed the Complaint for damages filed
by herein respondents against petitioner. The dispositive portion of the
challenged CA Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE, and in its
stead judgment is rendered ordering the defendant-appellee Sergio
Amonoy to pay the plaintiffs-appellants Bruno and Bernardina
Gutierrez as actual damages the sum of [t]wo [h]undred [f]ifty
[t]housand [p]esos (P250,000.00)." 3

Likewise assailed is the October 19, 1999 CA Resolution, 4 which denied

the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the factual antecedents of this case as
follows:
"This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of
Branch I of the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six (6) parcels of land situated in
Tanay, Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos,
Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda. On 12 January
1965, the Project of Partition submitted was approved and . . . two (2)
of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Fornilda. The attorney's fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and
on 20 January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda executed a
deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to
them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney's fees.
But it was only on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the
claims settled and the properties adjudicated, that the estate was
declared closed and terminated.
"Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso
Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was
his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
"Because his attorney's fees thus secured by the two lots were
not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure in Civil
Case No. 12726 entitled Sergio Amonoy vs. Heirs of Asuncion Pasamba
and Heirs of Alfonso Fornilda before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and this was
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 assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs opposed, contending that the
attorney's fees charged [were] unconscionable and that the agreed
sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was
rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days
the P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the
harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorney's fees. Failing in
that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction.
"They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were
foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction sale was held where
Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid
was judicially confirmed. A deficiency was claimed and to satisfy it
another execution sale was conducted, and again the highest bidder
was Amonoy at P12,137.50.

"Included in those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez

spouses had their house.

"More than a year after the Decision in Civil Case No. 12726 was
rendered, the said decedent's heirs filed on 19 December 1973 before
the CFI of Pasig, Rizal[,] Civil Case No. 18731 entitled Maria Penano, et
al vs. Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the annulment thereof. The case
was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977, and this was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981.
"Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession
and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August
1985. On Amonoy's motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of 25 April
1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in
the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses. DHSaCA

"On 27 September 1985 the petition entitled David Fornilda, et al

vs Branch 164 RTC IVth Pasig, Deputy Sheriff Joaquin Antonil and Atty .
Sergio Amonoy, G.R. No. L-72306, was filed before the Supreme Court.
Among the petitioners was the plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On
a twin Musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon Para Papanagutin Kaugnay ng
Paglalapastangan, and Musiyung Makahingi ng Utos sa Pagpapapigil ng
Pagpapagiba at Pananagutin sa Paglalapastangan) with full titles as
fanciful and elongated as their Petisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri
Taglay and Pagpigil ng Utos), a temporary restraining order was
granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the petitioners'
houses.
"Then on 5 October 1988 a Decision was rendered in the said
G.R. No. L-72306 disposing that:
"WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the Order of
respondent Trial Court, dated 25 July 1985, granting a Writ of
Possession, as well as its Orders, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May
1986, directing and authorizing respondent Sheriff to demolish
the houses of petitioners Angela and Leocadia Fornilda are
hereby set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued, is made permanent. The six (6) parcels of land
herein controverted are hereby ordered returned to petitioners
unless some of them have been conveyed to innocent third
persons." 5
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 But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned
Decision, respondents' house had already been destroyed, supposedly in
accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.
Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their
house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December
15, 1989.
In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents' suit. On
appeal, the CA set aside the lower court's ruling and ordered petitioner to pay
respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was also denied.

Hence, this recourse. 6

The Issue
In his Memorandum, 7 petitioner submits this lone issue for our
consideration:
"Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that
the petitioner [was] liable to the respondents for damages" 8

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:
Petitioner's Liability
Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate
exercise of a person's rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque injuria
— for which the law gives no remedy. 9 In other words, one who merely
exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for
damages.

Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the
demolition of respondents' house. He maintains that he was merely acting in
accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.

We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to

this case.

True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May

30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the
records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the
demolition of respondents' house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2,
1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme
Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself
on June 4, 1986.
Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the
CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents' house well until
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 the middle of 1987. This is clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrez's testimony.
The appellate court quoted the following pertinent portion thereof: 10
"Q. On May 30, 1986, were they able to destroy your house?

A. Not all, a certain portion only

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Was your house completely demolished?

A: No, sir.

Q. How about the following day?

A. It was completely demolished"
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Until when[,] Mrs. Witness?

A. Until 1987.
Q. About what month of 1987?
A. Middle of the year.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court who completed the demolition?
A. The men of Fiscal Amonoy." 11

The foregoing disproves the claim of petitioner that the demolition, which
allegedly commenced only on May 30, 1986, was completed the following day.
It likewise belies his allegation that the demolition's had already ceased when
he received notice of the TRO.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the
outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an
insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith.
Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have
suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts
constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that
had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4,
1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
A commentator on this topic explains:
"The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The
mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is
repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a
person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another . . .
. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme
norms of justice . . .; and he who violates them violates the law. For this
reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others." 12

Likewise, in Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, 13 the Court discussed the

concept of abuse of rights as follows:
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 "Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on
all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible . . . ."

Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite

his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of
such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's
Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents' house.
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle
premised on the valid exercise of a right. 14 Anything less or beyond such
exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And
when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be
obscured, much less abated.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation
to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one's
act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not
punishable by law. 15
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. aSEHDA

SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 34-44. The CA Decision was penned by Justice Roberto A. Barrios,
with the concurrence of Justices Godardo A. Jacinto (Division chairman) and
Renato C. Dacudao.
2. Rollo , pp. 83-87; written by Judge Gil P. Fernandez.
3. Rollo , p. 41.
4. Rollo , pp. 43-44.
5. Rollo , pp. 35-37.
6. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on July 21, 2000, upon
receipt by this Court of respondents' Memorandum signed by Attys. Romeo
B. Igot and Liberato F. Mojica. Filed earlier was petitioner's Memorandum,
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 signed by Attys. Gelacio C. Mamaril and Roberto B. Arca.
7. Rollo , pp. 180-210.
8. Ibid., p. 192. Upper case used in the original.
9. Custodio v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483, February 9, 1996; China
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 472, March 28, 1994;
Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50, August 24, 1990; Ilocos Norte
Electric Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5, November 6, 1989;
Auyong Hian v. CTA, 59 SCRA 110, September 12, 1974.
10. CA Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 39-40.
11. TSN, February 12, 1991, pp. 14-15.
12. Alicia Gonzales-Decano, Notes on Torts and Damages, p. 97.

13. 217 SCRA 16, 24-25, January 11, 1993, per Bidin, J.
14. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778,
August 25, 1989.

15. Occena v. Icamina, 181 SCRA 328, January 22, 1990.

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