ASPJ Summer 2009

Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Gen Norton A. Schwartz

Commander, Air Education
and Training Command
Gen Stephen R. Lorenz
Commander, Air University
http://www.af.mil
Lt Gen Allen G. Peck
Director, Air Force Research Institute
Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired
Chief, Professional Journals

Maj Darren K. Stanford
Deputy Chief, Professional Journals
Capt Lori Katowich
Professional Staff http://www.aetc.randolph.af
Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor

Darlene H. Barnes, Editorial Assistant
Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production
Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator
L. Susan Fair, Illustrator
Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager
The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air

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Inside cover.indd 2 5/26/2009 3:38:48 PM

Summer 2009 Volume XXIII, No. 2 AFRP 10-1
Senior Leader Perspectives

Assimilating Unmanned Aircraft Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Air Vice-Marshal R . A . Mason, Royal Air Force, Retired
Col Jeffery Barnett, USAF, Retired
Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired
Col Sung-pyo Hong, Republic of Korea Air Force
Perspectives on Leadership and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Dr . Raymond A . Shulstad, Brigadier General, USAF, Retired
Understanding the Enemy as a Complex System: A Multidisciplinary
Analytic Problem Requiring a Multidisciplinary Team Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
D . Lee Fuell Jr ., Defense Intelligence Senior Leader, USAF
Focus Area
Unmanned Aircraft Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Maj D . K . Stanford, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals
Features
Operators of Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Breaking Paradigms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Lt Col Houston R . Cantwell, USAF
Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, and the Perils of Battlefield
Micromanagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Dr . P . W . Singer
The Army’s “Organic” Unmanned Aircraft Systems: An Unhealthy Choice
for the Joint Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Maj Travis A . Burdine, USAF
Airpower Trends 2010: The Future Is Closer Than You Think . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Col John D . Jogerst, USAF, Retired
Departments
Prelaunch Notes
Publishing in Air and Space Power Journal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Ricochets and Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
The Merge
Managing the Human Weapon System: A Vision for an Air Force
Human-Performance Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Lt Col Anthony P . Tvaryanas, USAF, MC, SFS
Col Lex Brown, USAF, MC, SFS
Nita L . Miller, PhD
The Air Force Commander: The Power of Interaction and Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Col William Mott, USAF
2009-2 contents.indd 1 4/28/09 1:16:21 PM

America’s Two Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Lt Col Robert Spalding, USAF
PIREP
Optimizing the Effectiveness of Directed Energy Weapons with Specialized
Weather Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Maj De Leon C . Narcisse, USAF
Lt Col Steven T . Fiorino, USAF
Col Richard J . Bartell, USAFR
Quick-Look
Air Domain Development in Africa: A Reasonable Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Maj Jean-Philippe N . Peltier, USAF
Maj Thomas Meer, USAF
Book Reviews
ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Robert K . Brigham
Reviewer: Dr . Michael E . Weaver
New Heavens: My Life as a Fighter Pilot and a Founder of the Israel
Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Boris Senior
Reviewer: CSM James H . Clifford, USA, Retired
Go for Launch! An Illustrated History of Cape Canaveral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Joel W . Powell with Art LeBrun
Reviewer: Dr . Roger D . Launius
Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Sean M . Maloney
Reviewer: Lt Col James J . McNally, USAF, Retired
LeMay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Barrett Tillman
Reviewer: Lt Col Rick Hughes, USAF
Rattler One-Seven: A Vietnam Helicopter Pilot’s War Story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Chuck Gross
Reviewer: Lt Col John F . Guilmartin Jr ., USAF, Retired
Globemaster III: Acquiring the C-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Betty R . Kennedy
Reviewer: Kenneth P . Katz
1776 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
David McCullough
Reviewer: Dr . Jack D . Kem, Colonel, USA, Retired
Space as a Strategic Asset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Joan Johnson-Freese
Reviewer: Col Joseph J . McCue, USAF, Retired
Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Zahid Hussain
Reviewer: Dr . David R . Mets
2009-2 contents.indd 2 4/28/09 1:16:22 PM

War Bird Ace: The Great War Exploits of Capt. Field E. Kindley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Jack Stokes Ballard
Reviewer: Lt Col Raymond F . Hain III, USAFR, Retired
American Generalship: Character Is Everything: The Art of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Edgar F . Puryear Jr .
Reviewer: Col James M . Pfaff, Ohio ANG
Mission Debrief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired, Air Force Research Institute
Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired
Dr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army
Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy
Lt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)
2009-2 contents.indd 3 4/28/09 1:16:22 PM

Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers
Col Ronald K. Bartley, USAFR Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps

Air University USAF Air Command and Staff College
Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Dr. Tom Keaney
Naval Air Station Johns Hopkins University
Patuxent River, Maryland Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired
Dr. Kendall K. Brown Department of Homeland Security
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired
Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired Burke, Virginia
Daphne, Alabama
Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth
Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun RAND
US Army War College
Mr. Douglas E. Lee
Dr. Mark Clodfelter Air Force Space Command
National War College
Dr. Richard I. Lester
Dr. Conrad Crane Eaker College for Professional Development
Director, US Army Military History Institute
Mr. Brent Marley
Col Michael D. Davis, USAF Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Defense Attaché
Mr. Rémy M. Mauduit
Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute
USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired
Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF West Chicago, Illinois
The Pentagon
Dr. Daniel Mortensen
Dr. Stephen Fought
Air Force Research Institute
USAF Air War College (professor emeritus)
Dr. Richard R. Muller
Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF
USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
USAF Academy
Dr. Bruce T. Murphy
Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired
Air University
Westport Point, Massachusetts
Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF, Retired Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired
Montgomery, Alabama Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS
Ohio State University The Pentagon
Dr. Amit Gupta Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired
USAF Air War College Air Force Research Institute
Dr. Grant T. Hammond Dr. Steve Rothstein
Dean, NATO Defence College Colorado Springs Science Center Project
Dr. Dale L. Hayden Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF
Air Force Research Institute Air University
Dr. Thomas Hughes Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired
USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Toffler Associates
Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired
Air Force Research Institute Sci-Ops Consulting
Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Dr. Christopher H. Toner
LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education USAF Air Command and Staff College
Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired
The Pentagon Auburn University
Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Dr. Harold R. Winton
Navarre, Florida USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
2009-2 Board of Reviewers.indd 4 4/28/09 1:16:47 PM

Assimilating Unmanned Aircraft
Systems
Air Vice-MArshAl r. A. MAson, royAl Air Force, retired
col JeFFery BArnett, UsAF, retired
col richArd szAFrAnski, UsAF, retired
col sUng-pyo hong, repUBlic oF koreA Air Force
Envisioning future unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as stand-alone weapons is not productive. As these air
craft evolve, legacy systems will advance, and enemies will simultaneously adapt. The resulting mix of future
UASs and modernized legacy systems—as well as adaptive enemies—requires uniquely designed organiza
tions, career paths, and strategies. In the following discussion, four airpower theorists and analysts consider
historical lessons and current trends that might help airmen build the right combination of leaders, concepts,
and institutions to realize the full potential of unmanned aircraft.
Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason: The assimi

lation of UASs into national air forces is mov
ing briskly, but in an astonishing array of di
rections. If there is a clear path to the future
for these systems, no one has captured it to my
satisfaction. Dick Szafranski and Jeffery Barnett,
both of Toffler Associates, you are published
futurists on airpower. Sung-pyo Hong, your air
force is on a continuous war footing, so you
can keep these two futurists grounded in cur
rent realities. My questions to the three of you
are, “How should airmen assimilate UASs, and
what is the best path to the future of these air
craft?” Jeffery, lead us off.
Jeffery Barnett: As a first principle, I think
we have to remember that weapons are addi
tive. When new weapons emerge, they add
to arsenals; they seldom subtract. For ex
ample, today’s soldiers don wearable
computers—but they still train to kill
with knives and rifle butts. Naval ships
track and destroy satellites in orbit—but
they still carry cannons on their decks. The
new F-22 Raptor has supercruise engines, ad
vanced avionics, and stealthy coatings—but it
01-SLP-Mason et al.indd 5 4/28/09 1:17:46 PM

AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2009
is still armed with a machine gun. It is a mis clear—and reasonable. The US Air Force will
take to suppose that new weapons retire their develop UASs that integrate with the rest of the
predecessors. New weapons and methods ex force to fight across the spectrum of conflict.
pand the scale of war; they don’t replace it. Col Sung-pyo Hong: I think that all of these
Warriors retain the weapons of the past be points are right. Legacy weapons and types of
cause previous means of war making endure. war don’t go away. They just absorb new sys
The small number of weapons that fade away tems to create new military effects. In fact,
over time, such as sailing ships and horse shouldn’t we expect UASs to combine with
cavalry, is far too few to refute the additive legacy systems—to produce effects greater
nature of weaponry. than the sum of their parts?
Dick Szafranski: Types of war are also ac Jeff: I couldn’t agree more. Just as warriors
cretive. Conventional war did not make insur of the past integrated industrial- and agrarian-
gencies obsolete. Nuclear war did not make age weapons to fight over resources and land,
insurgencies and conventional wars obsolete. so will future warriors integrate industrial-,
Cyberwar will not make nuclear, conventional, agrarian-, and information-age weapons to
and insurgent wars obsolete. Just as the Third fight over resources, land, and cyberspace. In
Wave information age changed, but did not surgents, for example, will fuse information-
replace, the way societies manufacture and farm, age cell phones with industrial-age artillery
so will new waves in warfare change, but not shells to war over tribal homelands that formed
replace, humankind’s previous ways of violence. in the agrarian age. They will fuse multiple
Tribes will still war over land, using First Wave means of war to produce effects that exceed
(agrarian age) tools; nations will still war over the power of any single weapon or type of war.
fuels for factories, using Second Wave (indus It is the product of this fusion that modern
trial age) tools; and future societies will war warriors must seek to understand. With this
over cyberspace, using Third Wave (informa knowledge, they can build operational concepts
tion age) tools. These three types of war—and to master the wars of their generation, and they
all the other types developed by humans over can develop the talents needed to command
millennia—will inevitably remain.1 So when modern war as well as the tools to prosecute it.
we envision future UAS operations, we have to Because we need tools and talent to produce
see them in the context of all types of war. and execute new operational concepts—and
Jeff: Your comments remind me of an in because those new concepts demand particu
terchange during the Air Force chief of staff’s lar types and numbers of tools and talent—the
confirmation hearing. Senator Daniel Akaka entire process is iterative. Militaries that seek
asked Gen Norton A. Schwartz if he believed to posture for the next war must fuse weap
that the Air Force should continue building ons, concepts, and talent in parallel.
its counterinsurgency capabilities or if he Dick: That’s the point. Today’s generation
thought that doing so would adversely affect of military professionals must incorporate
preparations for building the future Air Force. UASs into their calculus of future war. These
General Schwartz replied, “ ‘Fundamentally, I platforms offer revolutionary capabilities on a
do not believe it is an either/or condition. . . . par with radar, jet engines, surface-to-air mis
The United States Air Force, like the other siles, precision weapons, and stealth. Like
services, needs to be a full-spectrum capabil these previous revolutionary capabilities, UASs
ity. . . . The bottom line, Senator, is that we as will realize their full potential only when fused
an Air Force can provide both the kind of con with legacy systems, novel concepts of opera
centrated effort required by the joint team in tion, and innovative organizational structures.
Central Command today and posture our Jeff: This fusion is easier said than done.
selves for future potential adversaries at the Humans tend to use a new capability as simply
same time.’ ”2 an improved version of a previous capability.
When it comes to unmanned systems, I think For example, office workers initially used per
that the guidance from the chief of staff is sonal computers as word processors. To an ex

ASSIMILATING UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
tent this was valid—desktop computers made rethinking existing bureaucratic and hierar
an existing task (typing) easier and faster. chical formations, which might prove more
However, desktop computers eventually in difficult than deploying the aircraft them
serted new functions and ways of operating selves.
into our offices. Lots of people fought this Hong: This is exactly what Mr. Andrew Mar
transformation for years, holding on to secre shall of the Office of Net Assessment articulated
taries, refusing to allow telecommuting, and in his theories on the revolution in military
insisting that all staff work arrive in bound affairs. He said that radically new technologies
form. Those people slowly lost out in the com required new concepts of operation and new
petitive workplace. The lesson learned from organizational structures to realize their full
the growth of personal computers is that al potential. He also said that the first step in
though the initial change may be linear (and building concepts and organizations for the
compatible with existing structures), the even future involved projecting the realistic poten
tual effects may undermine those same struc tial of new technologies.3
tures. Dick: We can’t predict the future or know
Hong: In other words, understanding new what’s ahead with precision, but we can project
technologies simply as improved versions of that enabling UAS technologies will continue
their predecessors has a short half-life. Can their rapid advance. Moore’s Law endures:
you apply this theory directly to the UASs of bandwidth and computer-processing speeds
today? continue to double every 18 months. Knowl
Dick: As we fuse unmanned aircraft with edge is now digitized, permitting the rapid
legacy systems to produce new operational ca sharing of cross-discipline data by billions of
pabilities, we need to think of UASs as far people. New types of sensors are spewing from
more than just uninhabited versions of the medical and security spheres. Global
manned aircraft. Though true, this linear per spending on information and communica
spective is less and less relevant. UASs are tions will soon pass $4 trillion a year.4 Individu
more than just airplanes without pilots, just as ally, these trends show no signs of slowing.
cell phones are more than just phones with Viewed collectively, they promise logarithmic
out wires. Our challenge is to foresee where advances for years to come in multiple tech
UASs will evolve in unique ways—and then nologies enabling UASs.
build future concepts of operation and orga Hong: If your projections prove true, the
nizations accordingly. UAS of the future will have a full range of ca
Tony: Let me expand on your point. A need pabilities. In Korea we are beginning the de
exists for more fusion than that simply be bate on employing these systems in air-to-air
tween current and future weapons, concepts, or air-to-ground combat. Most airmen agree
and talent. At present, the structure of UAS that UASs will eventually take part in future
operations is the legacy of an earlier era. It is combat missions. Our question is, “When will
determined by location rather than by func this happen?” The current consensus is that
tion. Horizontally, it corresponds to the UAS combat capabilities will lag behind those
boundaries of theatres and commands. Verti of manned aircraft for some time.
cally, the structure distinguishes among outer My personal guess is that our air force will
space, inner space, and atmosphere. The func continue to invest in manned fighters, such as
tions and capabilities of UASs already tran the A-0 or a more capable future KFX. We
scend earthly features. Satellites are un will gradually increase the roles of unmanned
manned systems. The new structure must aircraft. They will get more attention, but our
reflect function—not location or propulsion. UAS focus, at least for the midterm, will remain
It must present a seamless fusion of netted on constant surveillance and reconnaissance.
UASs, responsive to one central executive but Jeff: The prospect that UASs will produce
flexible enough to remain accessible and avail constant surveillance is profound. We have
able at any operational level. That will require never lived in a world where potential aggres

8 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2009
sors operated under such surveillance. Con ised by UASs may indeed allow “manipulation”
sider, for a moment, Heisenberg’s uncertainty of an opponent’s behavior. An intelligent op
principle, which theorized that the very act of ponent who is aware of the threat from UASs,
observation affects the object observed. however, may respond with behavior that be
Though envisioned for physical behavior, comes more difficult to detect, identify, and
this theory would seem to apply to organic be anticipate. An opponent not constrained by
havior as well. If fleets of UASs can persistently time, unscrupulous in the exploitation of in
observe potential aggressors and if the very nocents, and impervious to casualties will seek
act of observation can affect actions, then it new methods of concealment, deception, and
follows that skillfully applied observation can duplicity to counter the observation technolo
have a dynamic effect on adversary nations. In gies orbiting above.
essence, persistent surveillance from UASs Jeff: Enemies will certainly react, but their
may allow militaries to influence enemies options will be limited by the scope of poten
through skilled observation. tial observation. Let’s talk in terms of aviation
Anyone who has shined a flashlight on bugs history. Currently deployed UASs will soon
in the basement understands this principle. seem as quaint as a Wright Flyer. After all, it
As soon as the light shines on them, the bugs took just 1 years for manned aviation to prog
start scurrying about. Illuminating the bugs ress from Kitty Hawk to Billy Mitchell’s 1918
changes their behavior. St. Mihiel offensive with 1,00 Allied fighters
Dick: Viewed in this light (sorry for the and bombers. Within another decade, aircraft
pun), it’s clear that UASs will soon offer de were exceeding 300 miles per hour, Charles
grees of persistence unavailable to previous Lindbergh had flown the Atlantic, and Robert
generations of military leaders. They will loi Goddard was launching liquid-fueled rockets.
ter in massive numbers over practically any Ten years after that (1938), radar was invented,
point on the earth for days (even months) at a the DC-3 (with autopilot) was flying coast-to
time. Fleets of unmanned aircraft will offer coast, and jet engines were on the test stands
persistent intelligence, surveillance, and re (the first jet-powered aircraft flew in 1939).
connaissance; persistent strike; and persistent History’s lesson is that aviation technologies
logistics. These UASs will take full advantage advance rapidly.
of persistent development. The absence of a Hong: Putting these two thoughts together,
human in the cockpit allows far more aggres we clearly see great potential. Aviation’s inher
sive and risk-intensive approaches to experi ent freedom and flexibility, combined with
mentation, production, and adaptation. An the global information revolution, leave no
entirely new industrial base should emerge to room for conservative projections of future
leverage persistent development. capabilities. The UAS of 10 to 1 years from
Jeff: This kind of persistence has strategic now will perform far differently than the one
implications. The persistent effects made avail in development today. Given the speed of the
able through UASs, in concert with other joint information age and its enabling technolo
military capabilities, open new possibilities for gies, we should prepare for remarkable UAS
persistent deterrence. Nations can persistently advancements in the near future.
engage with other nations—and with insur Jeff: All of us must avoid “old think.” Con
gents—for extended periods without overtask sider the fact of institutional transformations.
ing manned systems. To meet the emerging Almost 90 years ago, the United States Navy
“long war” against global terrorism (a type of began an equally audacious transformation.
persistent conflict), nations can engage persis The slow-moving fleet of history adopted the
tently with UASs. They enable persistent effects airplane. Although sailors accepted it at varying
against a persistent enemy—at operational rates, naval leadership in 1921 set a firm course,
tempos that militaries can sustain indefinitely. probably with full awareness of the possible
Tony: The Heisenberg principle is well end game, by creating a single institution—
founded, and the constant observation prom within the Navy—to develop naval aviation.

ASSIMILATING UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 9
The Bureau of Aeronautics combined de ballistic missiles), developed an organization

centralized Navy aviation organizations into a dedicated to nuclear warfare, and contributed
single team. It developed technologies, con to the Single Integrated Operational Plan and
cepts, and personnel for naval aviation as an deterrence theory.
integrated whole. The bureau built naval avia This transformation trinity of technology,
tion while simultaneously integrating its vision organization, and doctrine came about under
with parallel developments across the fleet. Gen Curtis LeMay and Gen Thomas Power.
Even more important than creating the bu LeMay commanded SAC for nine years (1948–
reau was selecting its initial leadership. The ) and then oversaw its continued develop
Navy chose its best—Rear Adm William A. ment as vice-chief of staff and chief of staff of
Moffett, Medal of Honor recipient and battle the Air Force for another eight years. Power
ship commander—as first chief of the bureau. served as LeMay’s deputy at SAC for six years
He led it not only with aggressiveness but also (1948–4) and then commanded SAC himself
for a remarkably long time—12 years (until he for seven years (19–4). Both generals had
died during the crash of the airship Akron in immense credibility as combat leaders during
1933). Moffett had the credibility and lon World War II, shared the same institutional vi
gevity to implement his acquisition and per sion, and used their longevity in command to
sonnel plans. His successor, Rear Adm Ernest transform SAC—and the entire Air Force.
King, had similar stature, eventually rising to In these three cases, service leaders under
five-star rank as chief of naval operations in stood that revolutionary technologies require
World War II. transformation across the entire institution—
By picking leaders of this standing, the and that this transformation requires focused
Navy proved its commitment to naval aviation. leadership. The lesson for the Air Force’s
Leadership of such caliber and longevity gave UASs is obvious.
officers the confidence to bet their careers on Dick: We’re in violent agreement. As an
naval aviation. This leadership also signaled to emerging and potentially revolutionary capa
the entire Navy to get on board—a crucial bility, UASs are on a par with the early stages
step to overcome bureaucratic resistance to of the development of manned aircraft, jets,
transformation of this scale. missiles, and nuclear power. Their rapid prog
Dick: I seem to recall that the Navy repli ress will depend upon similar direction and
cated this model when it integrated nuclear protection. As a first step, UASs will need long-
propulsion. Adm Hyman G. Rickover, the term, credible leadership to implement mul
head of Naval Reactors for over three decades tiple, interrelated changes across the force.
(1949–82), personally vetted every officer ap These alterations will range from personnel
plying for nuclear-engineering duty. Under promotions and assignments, to acquisition and
Rickover, Naval Reactors executed compre budgets, to organization and doctrine. Identi
hensive responsibility for the development, fying, implementing, and following through
design, test, and operation of the Navy’s nu on these broad changes is an immense task.
clear-propulsion program. As with aviation, Historically, the institution stands the best
the Navy combined all elements of a revolu chance of carrying it out by unifying develop
tionary technology into one department and ment, placing the best officer in charge, and
entrusted one individual with authority and leaving that person in power for over a de
longevity. This combination attracted and cade. The fact that such longevity runs con
nurtured top talent while overcoming institu trary to current Air Force policy reflects the
tional resistance to new technologies. need for transformational approaches.
Jeff: Recall also that the Air Force took a Hong: We need to remember that UASs will
similar approach with Strategic Air Command progress outside the military sphere. The civil
(SAC). Within about a decade, SAC had de sector finds them particularly useful for “dull
ployed revolutionary weapons (such as jet and dirty” missions such as monitoring climate
bombers and tankers, plus intercontinental change, tracking the pace and direction of ty

phoons, and keeping an eye on pipelines and The lead enjoyed by the United States is likely
nuclear facilities. This is why major UAS cus to reduce as the burgeoning economies of na
tomers include police departments, which use tions such as India and China enhance the
these aircraft for a range of law-enforcement indigenous skills and advanced technology of
monitoring activities as well as search-and-rescue other countries. A military advantage as great
missions. Farmers also want to use them for as that conferred by UASs is unlikely to remain
agricultural spraying and pest control. unchallenged by any state determined to pre
Tony: The importance of a persistent UAS serve its own freedom of action, especially if
network cannot be overstated. It can redress a its own airspace is invaded or threatened.
critical asymmetric weakness by promising to Enthusiasts have always been quick to iden
recover for the United States and its allies the tify airpower’s potential. Although UASs do
irreplaceable advantage of time. It can enable encourage us towards new horizons, our vi
them to sustain protracted, low intensity con sion must include the questions “Then what?”
flicts with acceptable political, economic, and and “What if?” We must ensure that the vision
casualty risks, or it can provide real-time re not only lies within our reach but also remains
sponse to fleeting circumstances. Persistent within our grasp, despite all efforts of oppo
UASs can deny opportunities for short-term nents to counter it.
surprise and match the long-term commit This conversation offers a good start—but
ment enjoyed by insurgents and other uncon only a start. Years will pass before the world’s
ventional war fighters. More than that, a net airmen build new concepts of operation, new
work of persistent UASs will enable political organizations, and new career paths to realize
leaders and commanders to determine the the full potential of UASs.
time scale of appropriate action in anticipa I am also troubled by the one-sidedness of
tion, preemption, or response: a swift, real- this conversation. Our adversaries will have
time link between information and action in their say. It is too bad that we can’t include
seconds, or a measured reaction over days, them in our discussion. They may open our
months, or even years. eyes to possible impediments we are overlook
There is also a need for caution amidst the ing. They may also expose new vulnerabilities
vision and enthusiasm. Military history records that UASs could exploit.
the ebb and flow of technology: the swing of All this said, I enjoyed this dialogue. The
the offensive-defensive pendulum when a three of you have recast my conceptions of fu
weapon or system stimulates a counter. The ture unmanned aircraft. For that you have my
technology of the UAS will be no exception. profound appreciation. ❑
Notes
1. See Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Mor 2008), 1, http://www.witsa.org/KL08/DigitalPlanet2008
row, 1980). ExecSummary_cover.pdf.
2. John A. Tirpak, “Donley and Schwartz Step Up; . According to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle,
F-22 Gets Some Love; Why Not Do Both?” Air Force Maga it is impossible to observe an electron without changing
zine 91, no. 9 (September 2008): 1, http://www.airforce it. The mechanics of observation inevitably affect the tar
-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2008/ get of observation.
September%202008/0908watch.pdf. . Another example: Gen Bernard Schriever, the “ar
3. Andrew Marshall, Office of Net Assessment, con chitect of the Air Force’s ballistic missile and military
versation with the coauthor, 2 March 2004. space program,” led this effort for a dozen years (194–
4. Digital Planet 2008: Executive Summary (Vienna, VA: ). “General Bernard Adolph Schriever,” Air Force Link,
World Information Technology and Service Alliance, May http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=09.

Perspectives on Leadership and
Management
Dr. r aymonD a. ShulStaD, BrigaDier general, uSaF, retireD
my organizations—not I—should take credit

for almost all of those accomplishments. they
resulted from the leadership and manage
ment I had provided to people and organiza
tions and, of course, others’ hard work, initia
tive, and innovation.
For many years, I recognized that leader
ship and management, coupled with the per
formance of talented, hard-working people
and teamwork, were the essential ingredients
for an organization’s success and mission ef
fectiveness. For that reason, I placed a high
priority on improving my leadership and man
agement skills and on developing those of my
subordinates. although I was proud of the
contributions I had made over the years, as I
sat there listening to my bosses praise my lead
ership and management, I couldn’t help ask
ing myself if I had done enough to pass on my
perspectives and knowledge in this critical area.
as I settled into retirement and reflected
on this question, I came to believe that I
should have done at least one thing that I
hadn’t—formally document my perspectives
and knowledge in writing. However, over the
past 20 years, I had developed and continu
I
t was 21 april 2006, my retirement day ously expanded informal, unpolished notes
from the MItRE Corporation and from entitled “Perspectives on Leadership and
my 40-year professional career.1 as I sat Management,” which I used in a two-hour pre
in an auditorium on MItRE’s Bedford, sentation at various formal and informal lead
Massachusetts, campus and listened to my bosses ership and management training programs. I
and others praise and thank me for my contri also gave this presentation (or a derivative) to
butions, I thought back over that career, which my subordinates within a month of taking
included 28 years with the air Force, five with charge in every organization that I led. al
industry, and the last seven with MItRE. I re though I had been asked for copies of my
flected on the many different jobs I had had, notes many times over the years, I never ac
the challenges I had faced, the leaders who commodated those requests because, although
had mentored me, and the accomplishments good enough for me to talk from, they were
that I was proud of. I was struck by the fact too rough to pass out to my audiences. after
that either the people who worked for me or my retirement, I received support from MItRE
11
02-SLP-Shulstad.indd 11 4/28/09 1:18:16 PM

to polish the notes into a report designed to anything if they believe they can and are willing
contribute to the company’s development pro to put forth the effort.2 My experiences over
grams in leadership and management. Based the past 40 years strongly support Hubbard’s
on that report, this article reflects my attempt philosophy. third, setting goals is important,
to capture and pass on my perspectives on and but once people have the goal, they need a
knowledge of leadership and management. plan and must measure progress against the
I need to mention a couple of caveats up plan. Fourth, customer satisfaction and mis
front. First, when it comes to leadership and sion accomplishment always come before or
management, no universal model exists, and I ganizational interests. Most of the time, it is
strongly believe that leadership and manage possible to harmonize actions and decisions
ment approaches must be adapted to the situa to support both, but when a conflict arises,
tion. second, this article is not all inclusive; the customer and mission must come first. Fi
that is, I have not attempted to include every nally, if a leader wishes to take an organization
thing needed for effective leadership and man forward and effect change, he or she must in
agement. Nonetheless, the principles, philoso still both pride in past accomplishments and
phies, perspectives, and approaches presented excitement about future challenges and op
here have served me and many others ex portunities. Leaders have the fundamental
tremely well in a broad spectrum of organiza responsibility of convincing people that no
tional environments. third, the article is based matter how well they have done in the past,
on the personal knowledge and experience their best is yet to come.
that I acquired over my 40-year professional
career. some of that knowledge comes from
professional reading and from the many for Leadership versus Management
mal leadership and management programs I It is not useful to spend a lot of time trying
attended. But an equally important source is to distinguish between leadership and manage
the experience I acquired in a broad spectrum ment, but since this issue comes up so often, I
of demanding leadership and management will comment on how I think about it. First, one
jobs. Finally, the outstanding and competent should look at the functions that are clearly
leaders I worked for throughout my career interdependent and overlapping. Management
have strongly influenced my knowledge and functions include establishing objectives, plan
perspectives. Each of those leaders, like all of ning, organizing, directing, and controlling
us, had his or her own style, strengths, and execution. Leadership functions include set
weaknesses. I learned something from every ting the vision, goals, strategies, and priorities
single one of them. and then motivating people to fulfill them.
Leadership involves getting people to execute
management’s plan. In his briefings on lead
Underlying Philosophical Beliefs ership, Colin Powell sets the leadership bar
Before someone can adopt a leadership or even higher when he says, “Leadership is the
management style, he or she has to consider art of accomplishing more than the science of
personal philosophical beliefs. For me, it begins management says is possible.”3
with a deep sense of confidence in people. I Others have approached the distinction a
believe that they really want to do a good job little differently. For example, some say that we
and satisfy their bosses. therefore, leadership manage things (e.g., processes, cost, schedule,
has the fundamental responsibility of making performance, etc.) and lead people. Of course,
expectations clear and creating an environment most jobs require both. Others, like warren
where people can succeed. second, I believe Bennis, writing in Leaders: The Strategies for Tak
in the power of positive attitude. In his book ing Charge, say that “managers do things right
Escape from the Box, Ed Hubbard asserts and de while leaders do the right things.”4 again, we
fends the notion that people can do almost really need both: leaders who are good man

PERSPECTIVES ON LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 13
agers and managers who are good leaders. were five years ago are not working hard
Faced with making a choice, though, we enough at it!
should think about Bennis’s observation that
failing organizations are usually overmanaged Elements of Effective Leadership
and underled.5
Good, effective leaders must (1) care about
people; (2) set the organization’s direction in
Thoughts on Leadership terms of vision, goals, priorities, and strategies;
(3) communicate effectively; (4) embrace and
Before getting into a discussion of what I instill a positive attitude; (5) stay proactive; and
believe are the essential elements of good (6) mentor and develop subordinates:
leadership, I’d like to offer some general com Care about People. the fact that mission
ments on leadership. accomplishment largely depends upon efforts
of the leader’s people, not his or her own,
General compels a people-oriented focus. Leaders must
Many organizations have developed leadership- empower, inspire, enable, encourage, and
competency models to serve as the cornerstone support subordinates. their welfare is of great
of their leadership-development programs. the import, and leaders must show them with
models highlight qualities or competencies im words and actions that they really care about
portant to leadership, including integrity, vision, them. telling followers what they need to do
technical competence, management skills, com and delegating the “how” to them enables
munication skills, and a customer/mission fo them to accomplish much more than any
cus. Of these, the most important quality is in leader ever thought possible. Delegation cre
tegrity, the bedrock of character because ates a greater sense of responsibility in people
character and integrity are essential to gaining that synergistically enhances their strong, in
people’s respect and inspiring their confidence. nate desire to succeed and satisfy the leader,
Ultimately, these qualities determine whether who should not forget to praise and reward
people will follow someone and whether that them when they do a good job. Equally impor
person’s leadership will be effective. tant, they should receive immediate feedback
Occasionally, leaders will make mistakes, but if they fall short and disappoint. Finally, if
most of the time, they can recover and remain their behavior is inappropriate or their per
effective except when the error involves an in formance substandard, the leader must coun
tegrity issue. at times, doing the right thing can sel or reprimand them and take action, in
be difficult, but no one ever goes wrong by al cluding firing in some cases. the morale,
ways doing the right thing! In his lectures, Gen order, and effectiveness of the organization as
Norman schwarzkopf has addressed this issue well as leadership effectiveness depend on
even more emphatically when on occasion he correcting the situation promptly.
has said, “Leadership is a potent combination a tough job, whether managing a project
of strategy and character, but if you must be or running an organization, demands selec
without one, be without strategy.” tion of the right people for the leadership
Clearly, leaders are made and not born. as team. In his book Good to Great, Jim Collins ad
in my own case, leadership is developed vises leaders to put the right people on the
through formal instruction, learning from bus before even figuring out where the bus
other leaders, and, most importantly, through ought to go.6 Colin Powell’s lecture “a Leader
experience. Leaders must improve their ship Primer” cites 18 lessons in leadership
knowledge continuously and then apply it to learned over his career. In lesson number
the job. there is just no substitute for a per eight, Powell asserts that “organization doesn’t
son’s learning by doing and then practicing really accomplish anything. Plans don’t ac
what he or she has learned. People who can’t complish anything either. theories of man
say they are better leaders today than they agement don’t matter much. Endeavors suc

ceed or fail because of the people involved.”7 these matters to my subordinates, I had to
Further emphasizing the importance of people, take the time for self-reflection and figure
he sets forth his rules for picking people as these issues out myself. I held this session soon
lesson number 13: “intelligence and judgment, after I took over because I knew that the
and, most critically, a capacity to anticipate, . . . sooner they understood what I expected, the
loyalty, integrity, a high energy drive, a bal sooner I would get it from them. I described
anced ego and the drive to get things done.”8 very specifically what I liked and didn’t like.
I agree completely with his rules and would For example, I told them I liked being in
add only one thought regarding how I se formed and did not like surprises; I liked
lected people. I avoided filling key positions teamwork and did not like activity without ac
with stereotypes of myself, looking instead for tion; I liked initiative and innovation and did
opportunities to pick people who had strengths not like passivity and stagnation; I liked and
and personalities that would complement expected responsiveness when I asked them
mine. the power of diversity cannot be over to do something; and I liked communication
stated, but leaders must take those differences and action between staff meetings and did not
into account when they interact and commu like internecine bickering and whining.
nicate with people! staff meetings are absolutely essential to or
Set the Organization’s Direction. Organiza ganizational communication, but they are not
tional effectiveness, advancement, and align sufficient. the message that a leader commu
ment require the leader to collaboratively set nicates at the meeting gets filtered and trans
and communicate the vision, supporting goals, lated many times through many layers of the
priorities, and top-level strategy. to optimize organization. Leaders simply don’t know what
contributions to the organization, people need message actually gets communicated to many
to understand what it aspires to be and to of their people, but they can do several things
achieve, as well as how it is trying to move in to address this problem. If the message is es
that direction. the organization benefits greatly pecially important, they can put it into an
when its people view their jobs not just as a set e-mail or letter and personally send it to all
of tasks they get paid to do, but as work that employees. the leader can also hold periodic
contributes to the organization’s success. all-employee forums to discuss the organiza
Communicate Effectively. I cannot over tion’s state of health, celebrate achievements,
emphasize the importance of effectively com and highlight current challenges. another tech
municating organizational goals and expecta nique entails visiting each organizational unit
tions. Over my 40-year career, the root cause annually and holding town meetings with a
of many of the problems I saw was a failure to small but representative number of employees.
communicate. If the leader’s people under at these meetings, lasting an hour or so, I
stand the organization and mission, understand would encourage their leaders to tell me about
their roles, and know what he or she expects accomplishments, current work effort, and
from them, I guarantee that the leader will any issues they might have. I would then share
rarely be disappointed. Leaders must work with them my perspective on key organiza
hard—and then harder—at communicating tional initiatives and challenges, asking for
up, down, and across the organization. Here their support. the meetings would conclude
are a couple of examples of things I did to with a question-and-answer period during
meet this challenge. which they could ask me anything.
within a month of taking over an organiza Embrace and Instill a Positive Attitude.
tion, I would gather the first couple of layers Leaders must embrace and promote a posi
of senior leaders and talk to them about my tive, success-oriented, can-do/will-do attitude.
leadership and management style, my person they must instill such an attitude in their
ality in terms of Myers-Briggs behavioral pref people. No matter how tough the challenge,
erences, my expectations of them, and what leaders should have confidence in themselves
they could expect from me. to communicate and their people. then everyone must work as

hard as necessary to attain the objective. In his tional challenges, objectives, and strategies. In
famous reflection on the importance of attitude, spite of the demands of carrying out the cur
the renowned philosopher Charles swindoll rent mission, not only do they move their
concluded that “life is 10% about what hap people into new positions in which they can
pens to me and 90% about how I react to it.”9 continue to grow, but also they make them
Retired colonel Ed Hubbard, an air Force available for professional-development pro
colleague and hero of mine, spent six-and-a grams. they do so because they know that in
half years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam. In vesting in their professional development also
his book Escape from the Box, Ed maintains that represents an investment in the future success
he and fellow prisoners survived their ordeal of the organization.
by adopting an attitude that called for sup
porting their determination to survive with
extraordinary efforts to keep their minds and Thoughts on Management
bodies as healthy as possible. these efforts I view management as having two basic as
were complemented by a deep faith in their pects. the first focuses on managing projects
country and the unwavering belief that one or programs, and the second on managing the
day they would be free again and reunited organization. I have divided this section of the
with their loved ones. He supports this asser article into these two basic management aspects.
tion with many gut-wrenching stories that il
lustrate the power of attitude. simply stated, Program/Project Management
Colonel Hubbard’s philosophy, as espoused in
his book, is that people can do anything if they Management of a project starts with a tangible
believe they can and are willing to put forth objective that the organization desires to pro
the effort.10 I firmly believe that his philoso duce or attain. a manager then puts together
phy reflects the kind of positive attitude re a plan and a team, directs the team, and con
quired to become a successful leader. Embrac trols execution of the plan. Direction and
ing and instilling this philosophy in people control are facilitated by defining and measur
are the key to and challenge of good leader ing progress against the plan. Performance-to
ship. People who don’t do this can’t be good plan metrics, which involve measuring actual
leaders. those who do, can’t miss. values in terms of cost, schedule, and technical
Stay Proactive. Leaders must be proactive performance and comparing them to planned
and assertive, taking the initiative and making values during execution of a project, are es
things happen. they must not be afraid of sential to effective management.
making mistakes. when they do make one, as I moved into senior management posi
they learn from it and then move on. they are tions, I focused more on organizational man
bold and creative, encouraging their people agement and delegated project management
to be the same. they also push them to be to others. Effective delegation is challenging,
come proactive, striving to spend more time but putting someone in charge and holding
preventing problems and less time solving them. him or her accountable constitute the keys to
they trust their instincts and are willing to success. Doing so can be greatly facilitated by
make decisions on imperfect, incomplete in senior management’s approving the objective
formation. and they accept accountability for and plan up front and then moving into a
those decisions. manage-by-exception mode. My subordinates
Mentor and Develop Subordinates. Leaders understood that between in-process reviews, I
have no greater responsibility than develop assumed that the project was tracking to plan
ing the leadership and management skills of unless they informed me otherwise. I also con
those under them. they set the example, ever sider such reviews fundamental to effective
mindful that their subordinates are observing management and believe that managers must
them. they spend a great deal of one-on-one inspect to get what they expect. the question
time with their followers discussing organiza is how often and to what depth they must re

view progress. Unfortunately, the answer is not management jobs. From 1986 to 1988, I led
simple and depends on the importance of the and managed the largest multiprogram system
objective and the confidence that managers program office in air Force systems Command
have in the person they put in charge. by baselining more than 70 programs’ cost,
Effective management must orient itself on schedule, and key performance parameters. I
results and demand the measuring of progress conducted quarterly reviews of each program
and the taking of proactive action to stay on to assure it remained on course. Between re
plan and prevent problems. when problems views, I required program directors to report
arise, the manager must take prompt action the cause of baseline deviations and send a
and get back on plan. I always preferred to use “get well plan” to me. In 1989 I published the
a collegial, collaborative approach to problem first corporate plan for the Rome air Develop
assessment and decision making, with partici ment Center, then one of the air Force’s re
pation by the team and outside experts. when search and development laboratories. the
building a consensus proved too hard or did plan laid out a vision and long-range goals to
not yield the best solution, however, I was fulfill through a number of specific, near-term
ready to make the tough decisions. initiatives and strategies owned by senior lead
time management is probably the most im ers in the center.
portant daily problem that every project man Over the years, I brought the approach to
ager faces. splitting time among managing the maturity, based on my experience and Kaplan’s
project, solving problems, and reporting prog many papers and books on Balanced score
ress or problems to the management chain card. as I arrived in 2001 for my final assignment
can become overwhelming at times. Managers in organizational management with MItRE’s
always have too much to do, and they will air Force Center, I found that MItRE was
never have enough staff. I have found that pri moving toward such a management framework.
oritization offers an answer to this dilemma. I with the encouragement of my superiors, ac
operated off a “must do” weekly and daily list tive participation of my executive directors,
of actions as well as a mid-/long-term top-10 and help from some extraordinarily smart and
list that always had 10 items on it because talented engineers, I seized the opportunity
whenever something was removed, something and pioneered the adoption of an advanced,
else replaced it. web-enabled form of the approach in the air
Force Center.
Organizational Management Until my last couple of years at MItRE, I
did not openly admit that I was managing the
My approach to organizational management organization using a Balance scorecard type
(1) is goal driven; (2) integrates near-term ac of approach. three primary concerns drove
tion to support long-range vision and goals; my reluctance to do so. First, although Harvard
(3) centralizes top-level planning and delegates is widely regarded as one of our premier man
detailed planning and execution to empow agement schools, many people considered a
ered, accountable people; (4) focuses on mea number of its concepts too academic and
surable results; (5) actively promotes organi work-intensive to implement. second, my re
zational change and transformation; and (6) view of a number of successful and failed case
strives to align strategy from top to bottom in studies involving the Balanced scorecard gave
the organization. It is a tailored version of the me concern that implementation focused too
Harvard Business school’s Balanced scorecard strongly on strategic alignment not linked in a
approach, developed by Robert Kaplan and meaningful way to tactical operations and exe
his colleagues, beginning in the mid-1990s.11 cution. Finally, and related to the second con
I had been applying early versions of my cern, I thought that many of the metrics gen
own approach, starting in the mid-1980s, as I erated in support of corporate strategy maps
began a 20-year journey to undertake a series overly emphasized easy-to-collect, but not re
of progressively higher-level organizational- ally meaningful, activities instead of actions

and results. My tailored approach greatly alle layer of the organization and ultimately into
viated these concerns. In spite of my misgivings, individual performance goals. From bottom
I have the highest regard for Robert Kaplan to top, the work of the staff contributed to
and his Harvard colleagues, whose concepts achieving the outcome objective, which ad
and work have strongly influenced me. vanced the organization toward its long-range
the underlying operating model of my Bal goals and vision. although this bottom-up con
anced scorecard approach is the formulation tribution is good and essential, it is not suffi
of a layered strategy map in which a vision cient to assure timely organizational respon
drives long-range goals, which drive a number siveness to a dynamic strategic environment.
of objectives or outcomes, which spawn a For that reason, I added a complementary
number of near-term strategies and initiatives top-down and more strategic contribution to
ultimately owned by one or more of the lead the process in the form of an annual strategic-
ers and staff. this framework has the great ad environment assessment of the implications of
vantage of explicitly recognizing near-term changes in our internal and external environ
actions as the way to achieve long-term vision ment. I used the outcome of this assessment
and goals. Long-range planning and tactical- to identify focus initiatives and put a director-
operations planning are linked and integrated level team in charge of planning and making
within the framework. progress in these critical areas.
Over the years I spent in both government Before leaving the subject of organizational
and industry, I found that about four or five management, I want to highlight that I also
long-term goals are sufficient to drive an organi used both the top-down and bottom-up ele
zation toward its vision. One goal should focus ments of my approach to effect organizational
on current mission performance and improve change and transformation. No matter how
ment, and another on growth or expansion of good an organization, it can be better; and no
the mission. a third should concentrate on matter how solid its business base, it can be
the organization’s value proposition, reduc improved. spencer Johnson’s book Who Moved
ing its cost or improving its competitive posi My Cheese? urges companies to move proac
tion. a fourth should address an engaged and tively to find better cheese before their cur
productive work force—that is, people. a for- rent cheese goes bad or dries up.12 I believe
profit company would have a fifth goal, fo strongly in his advice—it is far better to be
cused on its financial well-being, measured proactive and innovative than remain compla
principally by three outcome objectives: (1) cent and risk obsolescence.
an increase in sales or revenue, (2) good profit
or margin, and (3) best-in-class shareholder
value or return on investment. Conclusion
In my approach, those four or five long-
term goals of the corporation were supported Certainly, none of the leadership and man
by one or more broad, all-encompassing out agement approaches and best practices pre
come objectives, each measured by a set of sented here is new or unique. to the contrary—
metrics as well as by tracking progress on ini they are time tested and proven successful by
tiatives that flowed down into the performance me and many others. I have merely tried to
goals of the staff. the most important metrics bring to bear my life experience as a real prac
included customer satisfaction, performance- titioner who has toiled in the trenches at many
to-plan for project delivery in terms of budget levels, and to offer a succinct, integrated over
and staff years, work-program value and im view. By sharing this, I hope that other leaders
pact, and staff demographic data tracked over can apply these positive lessons in their jobs,
time to highlight trends. grow professionally, and better prepare them
we attained organizational alignment by selves for future leadership and management
flowing outcomes and initiatives down to every challenges. ❑

Notes
1. a not-for-profit, federally funded research and de 8. Ibid., 259.

velopment center, MItRE provides systems engineering 9. Charles swindoll, Strengthening Your Grip (Nashville:
for information-technology systems to the government. word, 1982), 207.
2. Edward L. Hubbard, Escape from the Box: The Wonder 10. Hubbard, Escape from the Box, 259.
of Human Potential, ed. art Nicolet (west Chester, Pa: 11. the Balanced scorecard approach to organiza
Praxis International, 1994), 58. tional management and alignment calls for developing a
3. Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American strategy map to link vision to goals to objectives to initia
Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), 255. tives, as well as defining and using metrics to measure
4. warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, Leaders: The Strate progress.
gies for Taking Charge (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 20. 12. this concept is explained in spencer Johnson’s
5. Ibid. book Who Moved My Cheese? An Amazing Way to Deal with
6. Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make Change in Your Work and in Your Life (New York: Putnam,
the Leap—and Others Don’t (New York: HarperBusiness, 1998).
2001), 13.
7. Oren Harari, The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 258.

Understanding the Enemy
as a Complex System
A Multidisciplinary Analytic Problem
Requiring a Multidisciplinary Team Approach
D. Lee FueLL Jr., DeFense InteLLIgence senIor LeaDer, usaF
T
Our greatest challenge today is to iden he Air Force’s intelligence, sur
tify and understand the enemy we need veillance, and reconnaissance (isr)
to affect. strategy requires the Air Force isr
—Lt Gen David A. Deptula enterprise to understand current
Deputy chief of staff for and potential enemies as a system—a complex
intelligence, surveillance, “organism” dependent on leadership, people,
and reconnaissance resources, infrastructure, defenses, the envi
headquarters Us Air Force ronment in which it operates, and myriad
other factors that determine war-fighting ca
pabilities and vulnerabilities.1 Understanding
the adversary as a complex system requires
comprehensive knowledge well beyond order
of battle and disposition of forces; moreover,
it is fundamental to an effects-based approach
to operations.2 This knowledge allows Us
strategists and operational planners to predict
enemy behavior and select means of attack
that achieve maximum effect with maximum
efficiency, whether the desired effect is to in
fluence or to destroy.3 Without comprehen
sive knowledge of the enemy, armed conflict
can degenerate into an extended, bloody, and
expensive war of attrition.
Developing such an understanding of for
eign air and space forces as complex systems is
the responsibility of the National Air and space
intelligence center’s Global Threat Analysis
Group (NAsic/GTG), whose mission is to de
liver predictive intelligence on global integrated
capabilities across the air, space, and informa
tion domains.4 GTG analysts are charged with
synthesizing intelligence data and other intel
ligence assessments from across the breadth
of “Boyd’s Trinity” of “people first, ideas sec
ond, and things third” into cohesive and coher
ent assessments of foreign air and space war
19
03-SLP-Fuell.indd 19 4/28/09 1:18:49 PM

fighting capabilities and vulnerabilities, from der of battle, logistics, maintenance, intelli
tomorrow to as far as 20 years in the future.5 gence, geography, and any number of other
As the technical director for global threat, i tangible and intangible influences. some of
provide senior oversight and guidance to the the tangible factors, like weapon-system per
group’s analysis and production—analysis as formance and order of battle, lend themselves
intellectually challenging as graduate-level re well to objective analysis based on the sciences
search and production that generates assess and engineering. others, like human motiva
ments on par with master’s theses and, occasion tions and intentions, are “fuzzier” and require
ally, PhD dissertations, and sometimes more so. different, less-well-defined skill sets to assess.
in some cases, the breadth and depth required, in the GTG, we challenge our analysts of air
and space force employment to “think like a
foreign general officer”—a concept difficult
In the GTG, we challenge our analysts to grasp for many junior- and midlevel mili
tary and civilian analysts who lack the experi
of air and space force employment to ence and skill sets of a joint force air compo
“think like a foreign general officer.” nent commander.
The Air Force isr enterprise, well manned
with analysts skilled in the sciences and engi
neering, has an excellent track record of sci
combined with the need to deal with active de entific and technical intelligence analysis of
nial and deception by the enemy whom the ana foreign weapon system (and “system of systems”)
lysts seek to understand, surpass any level of aca capabilities and limitations (Boyd’s “things”).
demic research in difficulty and complexity.6 Formal education opportunities in the sciences
Assessing an adversary as a complex system and engineering abound, and the Air Force
is a daunting analytic task, fraught with nu makes good use of both active duty and civil
merous organizational and behavioral chal ian scientists and engineers to do this kind of
lenges and requiring extensive expertise in analysis. expertise in the hard sciences alone,
multiple disciplines. This article examines two though necessary, is not sufficient to develop
of those challenges—analyst expertise and the required understanding of enemy forces
teamwork—and recommends changes that as a complex system—we must also under
the Air Force’s isr leaders can consider to stand the less objective, more human-centered
overcome them. factors (Boyd’s “people” and “ideas”). Unfor
✯ ✯ ✯ ✯ ✯ tunately, opportunities for formal education
in the art of employing air and space forces
To improve analysis, we need better are not as readily available as those in the hard
analysts. sciences. Although Air University’s Air com
—Dr. Thomas Fingar mand and staff college (Acsc) awards an
Former Deputy Director accredited master’s degree in military opera
of National intelligence tional art and science (including a course in
for Analysis research and analysis methodology) to its
Analysis of foreign integrated air and space graduates, military officers attend Acsc as
war-fighting capability—developing that un majors for the most part.7 By the time intelli
derstanding of the adversary as a complex sys gence officers have been formally educated in
tem—requires a breadth and depth of exper the theory, principles, and practices of em
tise difficult for a single individual to obtain. A ploying air and space forces, as well as critical
country’s ability to employ air and space forces thinking and analysis, career development
is affected by diverse factors including, but dictates that they move out of analysis and into
not limited to, strategy, doctrine, training, na leadership positions. Without a change in our
tional and organizational culture, morale, or career-development mind-set, the skills and
03-SLP-Fuell.indd 20 4/28/09 1:18:49 PM

UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM 21
knowledge that officers develop at Acsc can • increasing the emphasis on nonresident
not be directly applied to intelligence analysis. Acsc, or similar developmental educa
opportunities exist for civilian analysts to tion that emphasizes operational art, as
attend Acsc in residence and earn a degree, part of the individual development plan
but those opportunities are not sufficient to for midlevel civilian analysts, providing
educate all of the analysts required by the mis increased on-duty time and resources to
sion. Fortunately, the Air Force has an enlight do the course work.
ened enrollment policy for nonresident devel • increasing emphasis on, and funding for,
opmental education that allows midlevel civilian graduate-level study in other disciplines
analysts to complete Acsc via distance learn required to establish in-depth knowledge
ing. Though not as beneficial as the in-residence of adversaries as complex systems.
program, nonresident Acsc at least provides
a structured education in the theory, principles, • establishing opportunities for rotational
and practices of the operational art of employ assignment or extended temporary duty for
ing air and space forces. intelligence analysts in an Aoc’s strategy
Perhaps more important than formal edu and combat plans divisions to provide them
cation is actual experience at planning and at least an exposure to the complexities
of employing air and space forces.
employing air and space forces at the opera
tional level of war. This experience is even • Actively recruiting retired officers with
harder to come by than education, but a prior operational war-fighting experience as
assignment or rotational detail in an air oper civilian analysts of air and space force
ations center’s (Aoc) strategy or combat plans employment, and reforming civilian hir
division would be a plus for an analyst charged ing practices and compensation to make
with assessing an enemy’s integrated air and such employment more attractive.
space war-fighting capability. Unfortunately, the • Leveraging the experience of Air Force
same career-development factors cited above senior mentors to assist with developing
complicate the use of experienced planners as analysts’ expertise in air and space opera
intelligence analysts. tional art.
expertise in air and space operational art,
though necessary, is not sufficient. Predicting ✯ ✯ ✯ ✯ ✯
enemy behavior also requires extensive knowl We’ve got a lot of smart people, but none
edge of subjects as diverse as international af of them are smart enough by themselves
fairs, foreign policy, culture, religion, sociology, to adequately address the array of very
and a host of other factors.8 The knowledge complex, fast-moving issues that we’re
required to attempt complex system analysis asked to analyze.
of an enemy far exceeds what we can reason —Dr. Thomas Fingar
ably expect an individual to master, driving us Former Deputy Director
to the need for multidisciplinary analytic teams. of National intelligence
Actions the Air Force can take to improve for Analysis
the individual expertise of analysts tasked with Building knowledge requires a team.
developing understanding of the enemy’s air
—Lt Gen David A. Deptula
and space war-fighting capability as complex
Deputy chief of staff for
systems include the following: intelligence, surveillance,
• changing the paradigm for the career and reconnaissance
headquarters Us Air Force
development of intelligence officers to
value post-Acsc and/or post-Aoc ser No matter how well we develop individual
vice as an analyst, providing that analysis expertise in analysts charged with developing
focuses on the operational level of war. the understanding of our adversaries as com
03-SLP-Fuell.indd 21 4/28/09 1:18:49 PM

plex systems, the challenge remains too broad phous phrases such as “key member of.” We
and deep for a single individual to accomplish stratify our individuals: “my no. 1 captain of
on his or her own. As the Air Force’s isr strategy 20” is a highly desirable appraisal bullet. our
correctly notes, mastery of such complex awards and decorations process is also biased
problems becomes possible only through the toward individual accomplishment; awards for
actions of high-performing teams.9 compre team accomplishment are not valued as highly
hensive analysis of enemy forces requires not as those for individuals. Do any of us believe
only the broad, “big picture” perspective of that any Air Force member would rather have
analysts schooled and experienced in opera an outstanding Unit Award than a Meritori
tional art, but also the in-depth knowledge of ous service Medal? in this culture, it is not sur
analysts more tightly focused on the constituent prising that many analysts would rather work
components of overall war-fighting capability. individually than as team members on broad,
it is not simply a matter of aggregating sepa multidisciplinary analyses of overall integrated
rate assessments of the constituent components; war-fighting capability. Asking our analysts to
the synergy between breadth and depth ob emphasize teamwork while evaluating and re
tained by the dynamic interaction of analysts warding them for individual excellence sends
who bring expert knowledge from multiple a mixed message that leaders must strive to
disciplines with different perspectives working overcome. At worst, such a message can result
in a “self before service” mind-set in analysts
more motivated by personal advancement
The ability to function as a team than mission success. Air Force isr needs high-
performing individuals in order to have high-
player and to put team accomplishment performing teams, but isr leaders need to do
ahead of individual accomplishment more to encourage and reward participation
is an essential attribute of an in analytic teams—formal or informal, top-
intelligence analyst in today’s down driven or bottom-up self-synchronized,
or anything in between.
Air Force ISR enterprise. intelligence-analysis organizations like NAsic
are often functionally organized, with subor
ganizations grouped by analytic discipline
toward a common goal produces insight not (e.g., grouping all fighter-aircraft analysts into
obtainable by single analysts working alone. a single flight). however, the task of under
Also, research indicates that reasoning by groups standing the enemy as a large-scale system
with different pools of knowledge modulates does not bin well into a unidisciplinary orga
individual bias and prevents errors in individual nizational element. All organizations develop
reasoning, producing higher-quality judgments unique identities and cultures, and if a unidis
than simple aggregation.10 All things consid ciplinary suborganization becomes insular and
ered, the ability to function as a team player inwardly focused, it undermines the ability of the
and to put team accomplishment ahead of in larger organization to form high-performing
dividual accomplishment is an essential attri multidisciplinary teams that cross organiza
bute of an intelligence analyst in today’s Air tional boundaries. A contributing factor to this
Force isr enterprise. insularity is the desire for “credit” for work
Unfortunately, our performance-evaluation done—analysts and their leaders may perceive
processes (for officers, enlisted members, and that they will receive less credit for their work
civilians) tend to be based more on individual as members of a multidisciplinary team than
rather than team accomplishment. raters are for more narrowly focused work performed
frequently reminded to describe actions and within their “box” on the unit’s organization
their effects in appraisals that value individual chart. A functional organizational structure
action verbs like “led” or “discovered” or “im has great benefit for training and equipping
plemented” more highly than more amor intelligence analysts to perform a specific ana
03-SLP-Fuell.indd 22 4/28/09 1:18:50 PM

UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM 23
lytic task within a discipline, but that discipline ship challenges. The isr strategy also calls on
alone will rarely prove sufficient to understand us to “reserve our leadership positions for
the enemy as a complex system. those who demonstrate the ability to lead
An “ownership” mentality with regard to a teams to create knowledge” and identifies our
suborganization’s mission can also emerge as most valuable people as “those who success
an unintended consequence of a functional fully lead cross-domain, cross-discipline teams
organizational structure. such a mentality can
manifest itself as reluctance to share knowl
edge, reticence toward participating in teams,
resentment of other analysts’ mentioning Ultimately, analysts and their
“their” subject in a product, or any of a num leaders should think of themselves
ber of other antiteamwork pathologies. in as stewards of their mission and
reality, analysis missions overlap and are inter
dependent; it is neither possible nor desirable
knowledge, not owners.
for an analyst or leader to claim sole owner
ship of a topic. instead, analysts and leaders
must embrace the concept of mission overlap
to create actionable knowledge.”13 in addition
and interdependency in order to make high-
to increasing the emphasis on team leadership,
performance teams possible. in fact, some de
in order to field high-performance teams, we
gree of overlap is necessary to provide the must do the same for team membership. if we
common perspective and purpose that ana fail to value and reward participation on teams
lytic teams need in order to work broad, com as highly as individual accomplishment, team
plex problems successfully; leaders should not achievement will continue to be less valued
view this necessary overlap as duplication.11 than individual achievement.
Ultimately, analysts and their leaders should realizing the vision of the Air Force’s isr
think of themselves as stewards of their mission strategy will require some significant changes
and knowledge, not owners. We should also to the way we evaluate and reward our people
learn to think of functional organizations as and the way we organize for and perform in
capability providers to multidisciplinary teams telligence analysis. some recommendations
for their area of expertise, much as we have include the following:
learned to view the individual services as capa
bility providers to the joint combatant com • increasing the emphasis on collabora
mands. Analysts may be “ADcoN” (adminis tion and team performance in training
trative control) to functional organizations, programs for all isr analysts.
but “oPcoN” (operational control) to cross- • requiring a team-performance element
functional, multidisciplinary integrated analy on all performance plans for civilian ana
sis teams formed to solve complex, large-scale lysts and emphasizing team accomplish
intelligence problems. ments on performance appraisals.
The Air Force’s isr strategy for 2008 ad
dresses these challenges by emphasizing cross- • issuing guidance to raters to emphasize
organizational information sharing and the team leadership and team accomplish
need to foster multidimensional leaders.12 ment on performance reports for officers
The isr strategy calls on us to favor sharing and enlisted members.
too much information over sharing too little,
• issuing guidance to promotion boards to
but for years the intelligence community has
value team leadership and team perfor
marched to the drum of “need to know.” Tran
mance as highly as, if not more than, in
sitioning from a “need to know” to a “respon
dividual accomplishment.
sibility to share” mind-set represents a major
cultural change for experienced intelligence • increasing the number and type of isr
professionals, with all the attendant leader awards for team accomplishment and
03-SLP-Fuell.indd 23 4/28/09 1:18:50 PM

perhaps decreasing those for individual The threats and challenges that the Air
accomplishment. Force will continue to face in the twenty-first
century are diverse and complex; deterring
• concerning ourselves less with credit for and defeating them will require an unprece
mission accomplishment and more with dented depth and breadth of understanding
mission accomplishment itself. of and capability to predict and influence ad
• Formally defining functional organiza versaries’ capabilities, limitations, and inten
tions as “capability providers” to cross- tions. The Air Force’s isr strategy provides
functional analysis teams. the overall guidance and philosophy for de
veloping that understanding; this article has
• establishing integrated analysis teams as identified some of the personnel and institu
the norm, not the exception, for Air tional challenges to implementing that strategy
Force isr analysis and giving those teams and recommends actions that isr leaders can
oPcoN of analysts required to perform take to overcome them. clinging to the skills,
their assigned task(s). processes, and rigid organizational structures
✯ ✯ ✯ ✯ ✯ of the industrial age is a recipe for failure in
the information age: we will fail to sufficiently
Dominating capabilities . . . will not understand our enemies and anticipate their
evolve from the skills, institutions and actions, allowing them to fight us on their terms,
platforms of the past. They demand a to our detriment. We need greater depth and
uniquely trained, equipped, integrated, breadth of expertise and more flexible and
and empowered enterprise. adaptable organizational constructs, necessi
—Lt Gen David A. Deptula tating fundamental changes in our sight pic
Deputy chief of staff for ture of how we do intelligence analysis and
intelligence, surveillance, whom we select to do it. ❑
and reconnaissance
headquarters Us Air Force
Notes
1. Lt Gen David A. Deptula, Lead Turning the Future: 7. col Tomislav ruby, AF/A2DD, to the author, e-mail,
The 2008 Strategy for United States Air Force Intelligence, Sur 27 october 2007; and “Welcome to the Air command
veillance and Reconnaissance (Washington, Dc: headquar and staff college,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/acsc/about
ters Us Air Force, 4 July 2008), 8, http://www.af.mil/ Acsc.asp.
shared/media/document/AFD-081201-007.pdf. 8. Wilkinson, interview.
2. Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Or 9. Deptula, Lead Turning the Future, 10.
ganization, 3 April 2007, 19, http://www.fas.org/irp/dod 10. Kevin Dunbar, “how scientists really reason: sci
dir/usaf/afdd2.pdf.
entific reasoning in real-World Laboratories,” in Creative
3. Deptula, Lead Turning the Future, 8–9.
4. Global Threat Analysis Group (NAsic) mission Thought: An Investigation of Conceptual Structures and Pro
statement. cesses, ed. Thomas B. Ward, steven M. smith, and Jyotsna
5. For “Boyd’s Trinity,” see Grant T. hammond, The Vaid (Washington, Dc: American Psychological Associa
Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington, tion, 1997), 461–93.
Dc: smithsonian institution Press, 2001), 110. 11. Wilkinson, interview.
6. Bonnie Wilkinson, 711 hPW/rhcs, Wright-Patterson 12. Deptula, Lead Turning the Future, 9.
AFB, oh, interview by the author, 10 september 2008. 13. ibid., 9, 10.
03-SLP-Fuell.indd 24 4/28/09 1:18:51 PM

ASPJ
Maj D. K. StanforD, USaf, Chief, ProfeSSional joUrnalS
Unmanned Aircraft Systems

This is one of those inflection points, one of those times when the whole path of history shifts. . . .
That’s what’s happening, and the question is whether the United States Air Force wants to be on
that wave or left behind.
—Gen norton Schwartz
chief of Staff of the Air Force
19 February 2009
A
new chApter in airpower his manner in which we integrate this unmanned
tory is being written. Unmanned air capability remains controversial. will an Air
craft systems (UAS) have proven Force culture dominated by manned flight
their military worth, both to ground relegate unmanned systems to discrete mission
and air forces. Undoubtedly, UAS technology sets, or do they represent a fundamental shift
will continue to evolve and become a greater in the delivery of airpower, ultimately replac
asset; moreover, an important debate taking ing manned systems as the primary platform?
place right now will determine not only how General Schwartz recently observed that
to use this tool but also who should use it. “there will always be a need for manned avia
Questions regarding the proper role of tion, but it will be a lesser proportion of the
UASs in the joint fight remain unanswered. fleet than is currently the case.”2 this shift,
Opinions diverge widely on whether these sys whatever its size, will be profound and will
tems require trained pilots or highly skilled drive changes in doctrine, force structure, and
technicians—perhaps enlisted personnel. An technical training. Although we can accurately
other issue concerns whether each service describe UAS technology as evolutionary, it of
should build its own UAS fleet and, if so, how fers capabilities that are revolutionary. this is
that service should integrate these weapons sue of Air and Space Power Journal (ASPJ ) in
systems in the joint battle. the answers to cludes insightful articles that wrestle with all
these questions will shape the future force as of these topics. Although the healthy debate
well as our concept of airpower. over the proper role of UASs will surely con
this debate is healthy and necessary—and tinue, we hope that this edition of ASPJ, the
in many cases passionate. there is no doubt professional journal of the Air Force, pro
that UASs will assume more critical war-fighting motes dialogue on this fascinating topic. ❑
roles, that technology will advance, and that
they will become more ubiquitous. in January
2009, Lt Gen norman Seip, commander of
twelfth Air Force, pointed out that “next year, Notes
the Air Force will procure more unmanned 1. Megan Orton, “Air Force remains committed to
aircraft than manned aircraft. . . . So i think Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” Air Force Link, 14 January
that makes a very pointed statement about our 2009, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123131324
(accessed 26 March 2009).
commitment to the future of [the] UAS and 2. Michael Briggs, “chief of Staff Sees UAS role expand
what it brings to the fight in meeting the re ing,” Air Force Link, 20 February 2009, http://www.af.mil/
quirements of combatant commanders.”1 the news/story.asp?id=123136606 (accessed 27 March 2009).
25
Focus Area - 2009-2.indd 25 4/28/09 1:19:37 PM

Capt Lori KatowiCh, USaF, DepUty ChieF, proFeSSionaL JoUrnaLS
Publishing in Air and Space Power Journal
M
any people inquire about authors should nevertheless include one so we
our process for determining the can verify that it was not overlooked.
publication potential of articles it takes commitment on the part of both
submitted to Air and Space Power the authors and editors to significantly revise
Journal (ASPJ ). The following offers a rough submissions. academic papers written for vari
outline of that process. after we receive an ar ous education classes, whether military or ci
ticle, members of the editorial board meet to vilian, may be of interest to ASPJ but often do
review it and discuss its merits. Submissions not meet our needs in terms of either article
significantly over our 5,000-word limit are re length or formatting. For that reason, we ad
turned to the author without specific action. vise authors to review au-1, Air University Style
if the topic seems to be of interest to our read and Author Guide (available online at http://
ers, however, we may suggest revisions for aupress.au.af.mil/resources/style/austyle
bringing the article within that limit. _guide.pdf or in hard copy from air univer
Keeping in mind our editorial focus on the sity press), prior to submitting. although based
operational level of war, including issues re on the Chicago Manual of Style, au-1 adds terms
lated to strategy and policy, we review articles and examples peculiar to the military environ
for content, scholarliness, relevance to air Force ment. The editorial board will provide advice
concerns, support, currency, value to force de regarding our formatting needs, but the re
velopment, and quality. Moreover, our articles sponsibility for meeting those requirements
should support the multilevel thinking that remains with the author.
characterizes today’s professional dialogue. referees (subject-matter experts) vet an ac
Submissions of a purely historic nature gener cepted submission through a peer-review pro
ally fall outside our focus area. our feedback cess, validating it in terms of concepts and
to authors ranges from specific technical aspects evaluating the soundness of the supporting
(spelling, grammar, word choice, etc.) to rec argument; they do not judge the article on the
ommendations on strengthening weak areas basis of their personal feelings about its con
or correcting illogical organization. However, tent. Furthermore, neither referee nor author
we often reject poorly written articles, regard knows the other’s identity. after we receive
less of topic, without revising them. Similarly, the referees’ comments, we forward them to
we may also reject articles that lack the neces the author so that he or she can address any
sary documentation. concerns or simply withdraw the submission.
authors should submit high-resolution photo We then submit the revised article to the
graphs and graphics suitable for printing in public affairs office for a security and policy
black and white as separate files rather than (S&p) review, which examines it for sensitive
importing them into the text file; further content that may pose a security risk. after we
more, they should properly credit all images. receive a clearance, we schedule the article for
although photos from air Force or other gov publication, based on focus area, timeliness,
ernment sources do not require a credit line, and available space.
26
Prelaunch Ricochet 2009-2.indd 26 4/28/09 1:20:13 PM

RICOCHETS AND REPLIES 27
not specifically assigned to ASPJ, the refer We hope that this overview has increased
ees and S&p reviewers complete their work on your understanding of ASPJ’s publication pro
an “as available” basis, which requires extra cedures. We always want our authors to look
processing time. Therefore, although we pro good in print. For more detailed information,
vide “latest submission” dates for upcoming please see the “Submissions” page of our Web
issues, we highly encourage authors to submit site at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil. ❑
articles as early as possible.
We encourage you to e-mail your comments to us at [email protected] or [email protected]. We reserve

the right to edit your remarks.
MEDALS FOR MEDIOCRITY: HOW TO should be authorized. i fondly recall the days
RESTORE MEANING TO AIR FORCE when virtually no one, officer or nCo, wore
DECORATIONS any ribbons, even on the Class a [service dress]
uniform. The exception was for parades, for
lt Col raymond M. powell’s article “Medals which it was mandatory. That was when we saw
for Mediocrity: How to restore Meaning to the Silver Stars, Distinguished Flying Crosses,
air Force Decorations” (Spring 2009) has to air Medals, and other awards for valor that
tally missed the point. now that the air Force people wore. i liked the way that General
has over 100 awards and decorations that can eisenhower and General Marshall wore only
be worn on the uniform, it is time to do away one row of ribbons on their Class a uniforms.
with many of these decorations. When i go on air i saw a picture of Charles yeager (when he was
Force bases these days, i see young airmen a major) in a fairly recent issue of Air and Space
with more ribbons on their chests than i had Magazine wearing a Class a blue uniform, and
in 26 years of service, most of it spent on Stra the only things on his blouse were his “uS”
tegic air Command combat aircrews and a insignia and his senior pilot wings; that’s class!
tour in Vietnam. When i see company-grade CMSgt Stanley E. Allen, USAF, Retired
air Force officers and senior noncommis Indianapolis, Indiana
sioned officers (nCo) with more ribbons on
their uniforms than General leMay had on The article on returning power and prestige
his, i know it is time to back off from some of to medals is an excellent piece of work (in my
these decorations—it looks ridiculous! i sub humble opinion) and should be executed as
mit that only medals awarded for valor in com policy. i cannot number the times when i felt
bat, campaign medals, and the airman’s Medal disappointment that the most outstanding
belong on the air Force uniform. eliminate troops had to wait until their next assignment
all of the other awards and decorations cur to receive their medals and that they some
rently authorized. Badges are also overdone times received the same end-of-tour award as
on the air Force uniform. only pilot, officer someone who did not accomplish very much
aircrew, enlisted aircrew, and jump wings at all. lieutenant Colonel powell’s insight is

not new, but he words this in such a way that it nazi approach actually enhanced the value.
becomes much more useful. i personally never The disturbing thing that occurred to me was
lost any sleep over my own medals, but i fought that the uS army approach to medals and
hard to get them for the most deserving awards in World War ii was very similar to the
troops, and i believe that lieutenant Colonel current air Force approach. in contrast, the
powell’s thoughts on this should be elevated German approach was that medal awards were
and reviewed. not just “hanging some decorative color” on
MSgt Gregg Williams, USAF, Retired the uniform. German military medals were
Universal City, Texas specifically intended to be a morale and moti
vational enhancement for the spectators as
i just wanted to take a moment to tell you how well as the recipients. Medal awards were used
much i enjoyed lieutenant Colonel powell’s specifically to recognize and nurture qualities
article in the latest issue of Air and Space Power that the military organization valued—not
Journal. as an air reserve technician at March simply to designate the end of a particular as
air reserve Base, California, i can especially signment or tour. at least in van Creveld’s ar
understand his concerns with the burdensome gument, the German approach worked.
steps associated with awarding personnel a if i remember it correctly, in the German
medal. of particular interest is the disparity approach, following orders or doing one’s
that was apparent when i attended the non job—no matter how hazardous—did not merit
commissioned officer academy in residence any award whatsoever. Without a prominent
in 1998. on days when all in attendance wore display of personal initiative, charging a rus
service dress uniforms, i noticed that our ac sian tank with a hand grenade and pistol was
tive duty counterparts typically had a rack with simply a German infantryman doing what was
at least one Meritorious Service Medal and of required. Furthermore, there were no awards
ten two or even three Commendation Medals, whatsoever for “been there, done that!” The
whereas our Guard and reserve counterparts argument was quite involved (and it was a bit
had racks with little more than the “automatic” challenging to consider any Dutch/Jewish au
ribbons (e.g., the air reserve Forces Meritori thor admiring the nazi military machine), but
ous Service Medal). i believe that the author’s the arguments as presented were compelling.
idea of a quota has merit and hope that his Van Creveld concluded that medals, awarded
article generates dialogue aimed toward im for the proper purposes and with the proper
proving a process that, sadly, has become un criteria, served a serious purpose by enhanc
realistically labor intensive. ing the fighting prowess of a military organiza
MSgt Phillip C. Maffett, USAFR tion. if one accepts this finding, it is in a mili
March ARB, California tary organization’s best interest to enhance
and focus the meaning of the medals rather
let me offer a radically different view of medals than to cheapen them through relaxed crite
and award criteria in general. There used to ria for their award. He further concluded that
be a very interesting little book in the air War there is little purpose to awards granted for
College library—Fighting Power: German and “as expected” performance, in spite of the of
US Army Performance, 1939–1945 by Martin van ten herculean administrative efforts required
Creveld—that touches in part on the practical to process and award them.
effects of medals in the uS army and German if the administrative tedium of awarding
army during World War ii. i did a small paper meaningless awards were not enough of a
on it (Squadron officer School, class 83D), speed brake on an organization, there are the
and some of the concepts advanced in that compounding issues of using these token
book have stuck with me over the years. award “trinkets” as institutionalized “brownie
one of the interesting points in the book points” for advancement. When everyone is
was that the uS army policies towards medals expected to get a medal for each tour, how
seriously devalued the awards whereas the can the true achievers be distinguished from

the “been there, done that” masses? How do the Battle of the Bulge, crossed the rhine at
we distinguish those who simply did their duty remagen bridgehead, and helped liberate a
from those who showed initiative and took death camp. He rose from buck private to ma
personal risks to achieve? jor in three-and-a-half years—and had only
like all of my peers, i received my share of three ribbons on his chest. But i see junior
the “present and accounted for” medals and airmen who’ve been in service for a year or
ribbons during my 15-year air Force career. i two, never in actual combat, and they have a
am sorry to say that none of them have very whole chest full of ribbons!
much personal meaning as anything more i know that airmen work hard, and they de
than a line of text on my personnel record. serve recognition, but the public associates
The fact that i had an “achievement medal” ribbons/medals with awards for bravery or
certainly has no meaning whatsoever to others service in actual combat theaters, such as my
other than “he was alive.” Today, as was noted uncle and his World War ii comrades. Hand
in the original article, awards without mean ing them out for merely doing one’s job—even
ing have become even more of a bureaucratic if it was important and done exceptionally
necessity and a rite of passage than in World well—seems to cheapen the idea. When civil
War ii. at the organizational level, the inces ians see that airman with the chest full of rib
sant processing of meaningless “end of tour” bons, they assume that they were awarded for
awards has even become a managerial “effi bravery under fire, when actually they may be
ciency objective” tracked diligently on practi for “outstanding service in installing $1,400,000
cally all staff levels, diverting time and effort worth of water lines.” (i work in a civil engi
from the true missions assigned. at the per neering squadron, and this happens a lot.)
sonal level, we have ended up expecting awards i also remember a scene from a classic
simply for doing our jobs. Because of the em eisenstein movie; i think it was Ten Days That
phasis, via the career-advancement policy, we Shook the World. The tsar’s army is demoralized
end up concerned when we don’t receive that and in full retreat from the Germans, so they
ribbon, or we spend time wondering how many start handing out medals to restore morale—
tours in al udeid, and at what rank, are shoveling them out by the bucketful, then the
needed for what medal. barrelful, then the carload—but it’s all a useless
We should bestow medals and military gesture. The poor peasant soldiers are so beaten
awards to identify and publicly recognize the down by their cruel officers that no number of
military excellence of the individuals to whom medals can restore their courage. (oK, it’s a
they are awarded—they should not just adorn communist movie, but the point remains.)
the uniform. anything less cheapens the awards Andy Hayes
as well as perhaps cheapens and diverts the or Malmstrom AFB, Montana
ganization that proffers them.
perhaps the Wehrmacht had the right idea. interesting article. Having spent six months in
Robert Keeter afghanistan and been involved in a joint awards
Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts process there, i know that it is not just an air
Force problem. Task force commanders of more
i enjoyed lieutenant Colonel powell’s article than 500 “outside-the-wire” combat-support
“Medals for Mediocrity.” as a civilian air Force personnel struggle to receive a Bronze Star at
employee, i attend commander’s calls and have the end of a one-year tour, while junior en
often wondered about how generous the air listed and junior officers downrange get them
Force is at handing out medals. it certainly wasn’t routinely—with the same awards board and
like this when i was in the army in the sixties. commander approving them all. air Force, navy,
i remember a family portrait of my uncle, and Marine personnel in the army-heavy Com
recently deceased at age 92, taken about the bined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 101 fare poorly,
time of his discharge from World War ii. This even though they are regularly shoulder-to
man fought his way across France, including shoulder with their army brethren in the

fight. in CJTF 101’s defense, they see hun relations. The author mentions that Spanish is
dreds of joint awards each week for four ser one of the strategic languages, yet unless
vices and various governmental agencies, with someone is in a billet identified for that lan
terms of deployment from a few weeks to guage, he or she doesn’t get the pay. i love the
years. The awards process of the international language and strive to keep it up (i also keep
Security assistance Force for uS personnel is up Brazilian portuguese, though it’s not as
another story. good as my Spanish), so i don’t need money
in an increasingly joint military, the process to motivate me. yet the air Force message is
could use some equalization across services; incongruent: learn a language, maintain it,
obviously, the mechanism for that would be and, in my case, we won’t pay you for it. i
difficult to manage and too easy to micromanage would like some broader programmatics from
in a peacetime military. in a combat zone, how the air Force level in this area to help guys
ever, the war-fighting commanders could easily like me use my language more actively.
have their service-component commanders Capt Jeremy Cole, USAF
coordinate this from the outset for standard Barksdale AFB, Louisiana
ization. (For example, uS air Forces Central
is currently involved in the approval of all, in
cluding joint, awards for air Force personnel ASYMMETRIC AIR SUPPORT
but is nowhere close to army standards for the Maj Gary Burg’s article “asymmetric air Sup
awarding of purple Hearts.) outside the com port” (Winter 2008) does a good job of high
bat zone, the decorations frameworks could lighting the challenge of today’s support in
be roughly aligned with each other since they operations enduring Freedom and iraqi
all have comparable service awards, and lieu Freedom but falls short of really addressing
tenant Colonel powell’s ideas could be imple the bigger issue of getting an air Force that
mented easily and somewhat effectively at the can support irregular warfare (iW) around
lower echelons. the globe. aviation in iW brings a true asym
Lt Col Tony Haugrud, USAF metrical advantage to the joint force. airpower
Eglin AFB, Florida provides time-critical and actionable intelli
gence that often can be gathered only from a
bird’s-eye perspective. it also provides mobility
THE DILEMMAS OF PROVIDING
and flexibility for the always-changing battle
LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION FOR
field. “Fires” is usually the end phase of an
THE US AIR FORCE
operation—if required at all. in the special-
i found lt Col Jay Warwick’s article “The Di operations counterinsurgency targeting model
lemmas of providing language instruction of find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze, “finish” does
for the uS air Force” (Spring 2009) very inter not always mean kinetic but usually means cap
esting. i decided to go active duty some seven ture of the insurgent. For iW, intelligence is op
years ago to use my language skills and have erations! even the assault forces on the ground
been able to use them only at one assignment. are training in “sensitive site exploitation” (SSe)
i’m a Spanish speaker with bachelor’s and to garner intelligence while on target. That
master’s degrees in Spanish. i taught Spanish SSe often leads to the next target. When it
while earning my degrees for a total of five- comes to intelligence, surveillance, and recon
and-a-half years. i did get to use my language naissance (iSr), i believe that we in the air
on two different deployments—one to el Sal Force have fallen short of appreciating the
vador and one to Colombia. i’m an intelli needs to provide this capability to meet the
gence officer and am looking to go to regional demands of iW. When a majority of F-16 task
affairs strategist / political-military affairs strate ings is nontraditional iSr, why do we still call
gist training soon, perhaps via the naval post it nontraditional? With multirole, multicapable
graduate School or an air Force institute of assets, we need the ability to support a variety
Technology degree program in international of missions with surges across the spectrum.

The air tasking order / airspace control order flyers, imparting knowledge and wisdom as
process has often conflicted with how forces they go. any program that keeps these officers
ask for and get air support, and, as the author around is beneficial to the air Force and the
states, it doesn’t match how we fight. How is united States. The author mentioned how im
an iSr asset capable of close air support (CaS) portant seniority is in the airlines. a loss of
different from a CaS asset capable of iSr? We aCp would make it probable that officers on
can no longer afford to have a fleet that is the fence about staying or going would be
comprised of “unitasker” missions. The fleet more likely to go in order to gain seniority be
must have multiple capabilities—that is reality. fore the next round of furloughs. i agree that
The fact that the mission is boring or requires military aviators obtain skill sets marketable in
endurance does not mean that only unmanned the civilian workplace. However, waiting until
aircraft systems (Mq-1 or Mq-9) should ac the end of 20-year career and starting all over
complish it. Though these systems are cost ef again at the bottom of a seniority list is a tough
fective at times, there are benefits of manned pill to swallow. aCp makes this pill a little easier
assets over unmanned for these same mission to choke down. These are just a few thoughts
sets—hence the MC-12 liberty Ship initiative. from an aviator who will never see aCp—but it
i agree with Major Burg’s premise that we can would be nice.
not continue to use our assets under our cur LT Mike Woodrum, USCG
rent construct. To quote the iW Joint operat Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak, Alaska
ing Concept, “Waging protracted irregular
warfare depends on building global capability Major Maue’s article was interesting, and i’ve
and capacity.” airpower will be needed to sup read plenty of responses to it that were filled
port potentially hundreds of small, dispersed with emotion and a few facts. Just so you know
teams operating globally in permissive, con my background, i am a pilot and have flown
tested, and denied areas. We cannot neglect for about 15 of my 18 years in the military. i’ve
one requirement for another (major combat spent three years of that time at the pentagon
operations or iW). We need to ensure that we in the air Staff, part in plans and programs in
have a mix of capabilities to operate across the charge of funding undergraduate flying train
spectrum of operations and recognize that ing and the other part in operations and
the air Force cannot do it all alone. We will Training in the division that manages rated
need joint, coalition, and interagency support force policy. aF/a3o-aT has a community of
to ensure that we have the right force at the practice—Headquarters uS air Force a3 Con
right place at the right time. ference (which focused on rated force man
Lt Col Peter LeHew, USAF agement)—that met on 4 –5 november 2008
Creech AFB, Nevada at andrews aFB, Maryland. a briefing entitled
“rated Manning Strategic assessment” found
in the “briefings” folder (see https://afkm
WHY WE SHOULD END THE AVIATOR
.wpafb.af.mil/aSps/Cop/openCop.asp?Filter
CONTINUATION PAY BONUS PROGRAM
=aF-op-00-08) will provide some facts regarding
i am writing with regard to Maj Brian Maue’s why we’re not doing away with aCp right now.
article “Why We Should end the aviator Con i have said several times in the past that the
tinuation pay Bonus program” (Winter 2008). bonus is a retention tool, not an entitlement.
although i am a Coast Guard aviator in a ser But since the cost and time required to create
vice without a version of aviator continuation a qualified aviator to be an instructor or staff
pay (aCp), i see many benefits to the program officer are high, the bottom line the air Staff
that the article did not address. The most no is presenting is that we need to retain every
table argument is the experience of the avia aviator we can at this time, or else drastically
tors that the program retains. aCp targets the reduce our rated requirements. The community
midgrade officers who still operate on the of practice is very informative—it’s another
front lines with the upcoming generation of data point that wasn’t available when Major

Maue did his research. The bottom line is that 2. Changes in retention rates occur in cor
the air Force will keep aCp in place as long as relation with changes in aCp bonus
the service is failing to meet its requirements. amounts. This standard of causality is
Lt Col Edward R. Presley, USAF not met. a cursory review of retention
Dyess AFB, Texas rates before and after the terrorist attacks
of 11 September 2001 (9/11) (such as
Editor’s Note: The link to the community of practice in the ones in the community of practice
Lieutenant Colonel Presley’s letter has restricted access slides) shows that retention rates did not
and is not available to all readers; however, Major gradually climb as aCp bonus amounts
Maue’s response addresses most of the pertinent points. rose. instead, retention rates correlated
with a competing causal explanation, as
elaborated in causality standard no. 3.
3. no other factor simultaneously caused
WHY WE SHOULD END THE AVIATOR
the increased pilot retention. Condition
CONTINUATION PAY BONUS PRO
three does not hold with regard to aCp’s
GRAM: THE AUTHOR RESPONDS
causality. a strong case can be made that
Sir, given your background, you are by far the the simultaneous factor of “civilian air
most qualified person who has offered data line opportunity declining” caused the
for review. Before i respond to the slides from increased pilot retention. using pre-9/11
the community of practice, i would like to fo data, a fighter pilot (who also earned a
cus on your statement “i have said several times phD) researched this issue. (See Col
in the past that the bonus is a retention tool, richard Fullerton, “an empirical assess
not an entitlement. . . . The bottom line is that ment of uS air Force pilot attrition,”
the air Force will keep aCp in place as long as Defense and Peace Economics Journal, 2003.)
the service is failing to meet its requirements.” His logistic regression analysis suggested
First, i agree that, given the unmanned air that the biggest factors predicting reten
craft systems (uaS) and other human-airframe tion were “the pay differences between
needs, the air Force could definitely use every the airlines and the uSaF, the strength
(qualified, productive) aviator that it can retain. of the uS economy, and the demand for
Second, my policy review of the aCp bonus pilots by the major airlines.”
used this standard: “Does the aCp bonus cause This corresponding pattern of pilot-retention
pilot retention?” To elaborate, “causality” or behavior continued after 9/11, when civilian
the claim that “factor a caused reaction B” de airline opportunity declined as furloughs in
pends upon three standards: creased, annual earnings were cut, and pen
sion values declined from “defined benefit”
1. Factor a occurred before reaction B. plans to “defined contribution.” Compared to
2. Changes in reaction B occurred in cor civilian airline opportunities, the excellent pay
relation with changes in factor a. and benefits of the military became even more
attractive. patriotism must have played some
3. no other factor simultaneously caused part in the higher retention rates, but such pa
reaction B. triotism was not, by itself, strong enough to keep
Within the context of the aCp policy, these retention rates high before 9/11, when increased
three standards might be stated as follows: operations tempo caused increased stress to
the rated force (e.g., family separation).
1. The aCp bonus’s ability to affect a pilot’s Thus, i agree with statements such as “the
retention decision occurs before a pilot cost and time required to create a qualified
decides to remain in, or separate from, aviator to be an instructor or staff officer are
the air Force. This causal standard is high.” at the same time, based upon the evi
not in dispute. dence that i have reviewed, i believe that these

statements should also include the following: Magazine, 25 February 2009, http://www.air
“yet aCp has not been shown to cause reten manonline.af.mil/articles/story.asp?id=
tion of those positions, at least not when com 123137103.) alternatively, that money could
pared to the magnitude of the impact from be directed to improve our nation-building
reduced airline opportunity or operations- abilities through security forces bonuses, civil
tempo stresses.” We might also note that “ca engineer bonuses, and foreign language im
dets sign up for their 10 years of service, which mersion schools.
will include instructor pilot duty, without con Given the space constraints associated with
sideration of the aCp bonus.” writing this response, i must selectively com
additionally, if i am interpreting your air ment on but a few of the community of
Staff reference correctly, i must begin by stat practice slides that you offered. These slides
ing that i have never served on the air Staff, so appear to mirror many of the assumptions
i can only speculate about the implied air that surround the aCp-effectiveness discus
Staff belief that aCp is helping “retain every sion. For example, one slide shows a predicted
aviator we can at this time.” if the air Staff’s retention line and includes the accompanying
guiding rationale is to be able to say to Con statement “assumes aCp in place for the out-
gress or the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of years.” Why “assumes”? The slide implies that
Staff, “We are doing everything that we can to aCp will cause the retention rate, which ap
obtain high pilot retention, including large pears to be a misinformed assumption when
bonuses,” then continuing the aCp policy viewed from an evidence-based perspective.
makes sense from that rationale. another slide states that “rated retention is
at the same time, if the senior leaders are currently a bright spot” without bringing in
saying, “The aCp bonus is causing our higher the causal link of reduced opportunity in civil
retention rates,” then they have probably been ian airlines. The term “currently” also seems
misinformed. The rational, empirical perspec to imply a fragile condition—there is no men
tive strongly favors “lower civilian airline op tion of the higher than 60 percent retention
portunity” as the dominant reason for the rates of the last several years, nor of the pro
higher retention rates. jected continuation of poor opportunities in
unnecessarily spending bonus money is ac civilian airlines. (See “airlines ‘Shrinking by
companied by an “opportunity cost.” That is, all Measures,’ ” CNNMoney.com, 20 December
given that the preponderance of the evidence 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/30/
suggests that aCp has an “insignificant causal news/air_traffic_falls.reut/index.htm.) lastly,
effect” on retention abilities, where might that one slide states “the goal for Fy09: retain every
aCp money be better placed in order to cre rated officer possible while being fiscally respon
ate a more effective war-fighting force? Sir, i sible!” Given the excellent pay, health benefits,
would wager that you have more accurate pension benefits, and aviation career incen
numbers than i, but for the moment, let us tive pay that pilots already receive, the case for
assume that each aCp cohort has a contract of the aCp’s representing fiscal responsibility,
five years, with an average of 500 pilots accept when viewed from a causality framework, ap
ing each year. That stream of money would pears weak.
then be $62.5 million per year (500 pilots x if i have overlooked any of your concerns
$25,000 per year per pilot x 5 cohort years = (or any additional current reader’s concerns)
$62,500,000). it would seem that $62.5 million or any other key information, please let me
per year could significantly enlarge the uaS know, and i will respond accordingly. i ap
school for nonrated individuals (simultaneously preciate the opportunity from ASPJ to offer
increasing the pilot population while reducing you a response as well as explore further the
the need for undergraduate pilot training gradu issues of “fiscal responsibility, relative to dollar
ates to do the uaS mission). (See SSgt Matthew effectiveness.”
Bates, “air Force uFC: new Course Teaches Maj Brian E. A. Maue, USAF
airmen the Basics of uaS operations,” Airman US Air Force Academy

In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.”
In a similar spirit, air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers are free to
join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to [email protected] or [email protected].
Managing the Human Weapon System

A Vision for an Air Force Human-Performance Doctrine
Lt CoL Anthony P. tvAryAnAs, UsAF, MC, sFs
CoL Lex Brown, UsAF, MC, sFs
nitA L. MiLLer, PhD*
The basic planning, development, organization and training of the Air Force must be well
rounded, covering every modern means of waging air war. . . . The Air Force doctrines likewise
must be flexible at all times and entirely uninhibited by tradition.
—Gen Henry H. “Hap” arnold
I
n a recent paper on america’s air special operations forces’ declaration that
Force, Gen t. Michael Moseley asserted “humans are more important than hardware”
that we are at a strategic crossroads as a in asymmetric warfare.2 consistent with this
consequence of global dynamics and view, in January 2004, the deputy secretary of
shifts in the character of future warfare; he defense directed the Joint Staff to “develop
also noted that “today’s confluence of global the next generation of . . . programs designed
trends already foreshadows significant chal to optimize human performance and maxi
lenges to our organization, systems, concepts, mize fighting strength.”3 In response, US Joint
and doctrine. We are at an historic turning Forces command began a transformation of
point demanding an equally comprehensive force health protection (FHP) by addressing
revolution.” Furthermore, to revolutionize the human-performance standards, metrics, ca
twenty-first-century air Force, according to pabilities, and gaps via a new Joint Human
General Moseley, we must start with our air Performance enhancement Joint capabilities
men since “any organizational renaissance be Document.4 In 2005 the director of the Office
gins with people. We must prepare our air of net assessment sparked wider interest by
men for a future fraught with challenges, publishing Human Performance Optimization and
fostering their intellectual curiosity and ability Military Missions, which prompted the Depart
to learn, anticipate and adapt.”1 ment of Defense (DOD) / Health affairs to
an evolving recognition of “the human as sponsor a conference on human-performance
the most important weapon system in the optimization in June 2006.5 the conference
Global War on terrorism” is evident in the report advocated such optimization at all DOD
*Lieutenant colonel tvaryanas is a PhD candidate at the naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, california. colonel Brown is director,
Human Performance Integration, 711th Human Performance Wing, Brooks city-Base, texas. Dr. Miller teaches human systems integration
and human factors engineering at the naval Postgraduate School.
34
01-Merge-Tvaryanas et al.indd 34 4/28/09 1:20:51 PM

THE MERGE 35
levels, but as yet, no overarching implementa and physical well-being of Service members
tion strategy has appeared.6 across the range of military operations,” char
In the air Force, human-performance pro acterizes every service member as a human
grams are generally more product oriented weapon system requiring total life-cycle support
than human-centric, and relevant strategy and and maintenance.11 It specifically describes this
doctrine are limited to health services.7 as support in terms of three interrelated pillars:
General Moseley reminds us, “History is re “healthy and fit force,” “prevention and pro
plete with examples of militaries that failed tection,” and “medical and rehabilitative care.”12
due to their inability to transform organiza With this framework in mind, FHP catalyzed
tions and culture, adopt new operational con the genesis of our model for human perfor
cepts, or leverage breakthrough technologies.”8 mance as providing capabilities of human
the air Force cannot leverage breakthroughs weapon systems to the joint force commander.
in human performance unless it is organiza We departed from the health focus of FHP
tionally and culturally ready. Similarly, the and embraced a large scope of application by
2008 air Force Medical Service (aFMS) capa accepting two transformational tenets. the first
bilities review and risk assessment concluded involves managing Airmen consistent with other
that we must make the most of human capital military weapon systems. this necessitates the
in terms of recruitment, selection, training, op creation of capability-based requirements with
erational performance, cross training, reten
associated performance thresholds and objec
tion, and postretirement health and well-being.9
tives derived directly from needs identified by
the assessment recommended a coordinated
the combatant commander to drive airman
program to operationalize human performance
for all airmen by developing an overarching acquisition and sustainment programs.13 these
human-performance doctrine, organizationally programs should be managed by a program
redefining human performance as a line re executive officer (with associated program man
sponsibility with health-services input, and de agers using integrated process and product
veloping ethical and legal frameworks for air development) who provides a single organiza
Force human performance. tional focus for the total life-cycle manage
In rising to Defense Secretary robert Gates’s ment of airmen and remains accountable for
challenge to “think out of the box” in continu life-cycle costs, schedule, and performance.14
ous pursuit of better ways to support the joint the second tenet requires health-service
force, we believe it is high time to address the support to focus on human performance in addi
shortfall in air Force human-performance tion to health care as the primary means of support
doctrine.10 We propose a holistic doctrine that ing the joint force commander. although this may
incorporates a capabilities-based, total life-cycle seem at odds with the historical objectives of
approach to managing airmen—a performance health-service support, it actually expands
based force-projection model that concentrates upon them, once we understand that health is
on human performance while continuing to a prerequisite for performance but that the
provide health care and casualty prevention presence of health does not guarantee perfor
to joint force commanders. mance.15 Given the prerequisite need for
health, addressing performance satisfies the
FHP pillars of “healthy and fit force” and “pre
Transforming from Force
vention and protection” (which we can equate
Health Protection to
with primary and secondary preventive medi
cine). In fact, superior performance itself is a
Human-Performance Doctrine
means of prevention and protection. For ex
Doctrine for FHP, defined as “all measures ample, victorious forces historically suffer
taken by commanders, leaders, individual Ser lower casualty rates than defeated forces, and
vice members, and the Military Health System improving situational awareness decreases the
to promote, improve, or conserve the mental risk of fratricide.

Managing airmen’s capabilities through of maintaining target performance levels through

human performance erects a new doctrinal out a career while minimizing total life-cycle costs. It
edifice with three foundational pillars: perfor also embraces the FHP pillars of “healthy and
mance sustainment, performance optimization, fit force” and “prevention and protection.”
and performance enhancement (fig. 1). Since Preventive medicine is a major contributor to
no universally accepted human-performance performance sustainment because physical and
definitions exist, the names chosen for the pil mental health remains a necessary, but not
lars serve as placeholders for major enterprise sufficient, precursor for performance. Perfor
areas rather than specific definitions.16 Figure mance sustainment contains most health-
1 also depicts the pillars resting on an organi service support functions with the exception
zational foundation that embodies attributes of of consequence management.19 the objective
the university model: dissemination of knowl calls for sustaining performance in the face of
edge, research, and teaching.17 Doctrine, organi enemy actions, full-spectrum (natural and tech
zations, and weapon systems are interrelated— nological) environmental threats and stressors,
history demonstrates that advances in one and advancing age.
area without corresponding advances in the If we accept the paradigm of the human
others limit the overall effectiveness of weapon weapon system, then the breadth of perfor
systems.18 thus, the university model repre mance sustainment fits comfortably within the
sents the organizational change needed to larger framework of the DOD acquisitions life
support the human-performance doctrinal vi cycle (fig. 2), specifically including the use of
sion for the human weapon system. requirements derived from the Joint capabili
ties Integration Development System. apply
Performance Sustainment for Airmen
ing the Defense acquisition Management
Framework to airman acquisitions affects the
Performance sustainment covers accession aFMS and air Force in the following transfor
through separation/retirement with the goal mational ways:20
"JSNBO
1SPHSBN.BOBHFNFOU
1FSGPSNBODF 1FSGPSNBODF 1FSGPSNBODF

4VTUBJONFOU 0QUJNJ[BUJPO &OIBODFNFOU
,OPXMFEHFr3FTFBSDIr5FBDIJOH
Figure 1. Three pillars of program management for Airmen

THE MERGE 37
• Development of a portfolio of airman ca year career during acD development and
pability documents (acD) derived from preaccession screening, with the aim of
the Joint capabilities Integration Develop minimizing total life-cycle costs.
ment System for groups of related air Force
• alteration of the aFMS’s preventive
specialty codes incorporating physical,
health assessments to performance and
physiological, psychological, and cognitive
health assessments, primarily focusing
performance thresholds and objectives.21
on physical, physiological, psychological,
• Formulation of a supporting test and and cognitive performance (based on
evaluation master plan (teMP) for each the acD and teMP), with continued
acD, which becomes the source docu emphasis on health maintenance. ex
ment for conducting preaccession screen amples of performance monitoring in
ing, gauging developmental progression clude duty-specific fitness assessments,
during training, and monitoring perfor exposure-driven mental-health screen
mance over a career.22 ing, and neurocognitive assessments.
• consideration of the time from accession • Deployment of tailored, multidisciplinary
to end-of-life instead of a nominal 20 expeditionary-performance support teams
Figure 2. Application of the Defense Acquisition Management Framework to Airman acquisitions.

(From Defense Acquisition University, Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management, 7th ed. [Fort
Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University Press, 2005], 49.)

containing traditional expertise in pre of a workstation to simplify a work process

ventive medicine augmented by expertise (HFe domain), thereby reducing manpower
in the physiological, psychological, and and training requirements (manpower and
cognitive domains. training domains), yields significant savings
over the life cycle of a system. In addition, the
Performance sustainment will drive research
HSI tool enables program managers to coun
and development of continuous, real-time,
ter shortfalls in one domain by augmenting
and periodic performance-assessment tools to
another to achieve targeted system perfor
support both the acD and teMP; mitigation
mance. For example, a program forced to ac
strategies of the performance-degrading effects
cept shortfalls in cockpit design (HFe do
of advancing age; and physical and psycho
main) could respond by augmenting training
logical countermeasures to maintain perfor
(training domain) or selecting more capable
mance during warfare or exposure to environ
or experienced aircrew members (personnel
mental threats such as climatic extremes, g-forces,
domain). Failure to adequately attend to HSI
fatigue, weapons effects, prolonged mental
results in a degraded weapon system that can
stressors, and witnessing or participating in
become prohibitively expensive to repair.
violent acts. However, the systems-engineering
a new, high-level conceptual model of the
process, rather than the development of counter
HSI process (fig. 3) better explains the essen
measures and personal protective equipment,
tial relationships between the HSI domains
offers the primary means of mitigating threats
and human performance.27 the input domains
and stressors.23
(manpower, personnel, training, and HFe)
are typical items or services procured by the
Performance Optimization for Airmen
DOD, which makes their specification as pro
Performance optimization seeks to achieve the cess inputs more congruent with the DOD’s
most efficient use of limited human resources by capabilities-development process. additionally,
comprehensively integrating airmen within focusing on the four input domains greatly
the air Force’s sociotechnical systems.24 People simplifies the challenges of forecasting the im
are the critical elements within systems, so pact of HSI trade-offs through modeling and
adopting a human-centric perspective of sys simulation, a necessary consideration given
tems increases total system performance and DOD initiatives for simulation-based acquisi
minimizes total ownership costs.25 Optimiza tions.28 In contrast, the eSOH, habitability,
tion occurs in defense acquisitions, starting and survivability domains represent desired
with the specification of system requirements system attributes or behaviors not directly pro
and flowing down through system design, de curable; rather, they emerge through various
velopment, and deployment. It goes well be combinations of the input domains. these
yond human-machine interface design and three domains also collectively describe the
involves deliberate planning to efficiently leverage FHP pillar of “prevention and protection,” di
the Airman through the process of human systems rectly linking performance optimization to
integration (HSI), a process model for obtaining FHP and providing an avenue to address FHP
performance. Perhaps more importantly, that through a systems-engineering approach.
model defines the domains of performance: Performance optimization affects perfor
human factors engineering (HFe); personnel; mance sustainment, during which the bulk of
training; manpower; environment, safety, and prevention activities occur. the HFe domain
occupational health (eSOH); habitability; drives the human physical, physiological, and
and survivability.26 We obtain better system cognitive performance requirements that, in
performance with lower ownership cost by ac turn, must be sustained throughout the life of
tively managing the interactions and trade a system. System requirements specified for
offs between domains rather than simply opti the eSOH, habitability, and survivability do
mizing individual domains. as an illustration, mains influence the likelihood of future haz
employing intuitive automation in the design ardous exposures that will require prevention

THE MERGE 39
)VNBO1FSGPSNBODF
Physiological Cognitive Motivated and
Capabilities/ Capabilities/ Psychologically
Competencies Competencies Fit for Duty
Environment,
Safety, and Habitability Survivability
Occupational Health
)VNBO4ZTUFNT*OUFHSBUJPO
)VNBO
'BDUPST 1FSTPOOFM 5SBJOJOH .BOQPXFS
&OHJOFFSJOH
+$*%4
%05.-1'%PDUSJOF 0SHBOJ[BUJPO 5SBJOJOH
$BQBCJMJUJFT#BTFE %05.-1' .BUFSJBM -FBEFSTIJQ 1FSTPOOFM BOE'BDJMJUJFT
"TTFTTNFOU "OBMZTJT +$*%4+PJOU$BQBCJMJUJFT*OUFHSBUJPO
%FWFMPQNFOU4ZTUFN
Figure 3. Linkages between the HSI process model and the Joint Capabilities Integration Devel
opment System gap analysis. (Adapted from Robert Lindberg, to the author, personal communication
regarding the 711th Human Performance Wing’s HSI model, 23 July 2007.)
and protection. Failure to compensate for hu performance science and technology road map
man weaknesses or to capitalize on human “by investigating future threats; recognizing
strengths when specifying system require capability gaps and requirements; capturing
ments drives research and development of needed system-performance characteristics;
countermeasures to prevent injury or illness. and understanding technology gaps, risks, and
therefore, performance optimization maxi needs.”29 advances in performance enhance
mizes efficiencies and cost savings through ment create new capabilities for airmen, en
primary and secondary prevention. abling performance sustainment and optimi
zation by expanding the existing performance
Performance Enhancement for Airmen envelope and providing solution sets for trade
Performance enhancement occurs chiefly offs in the HSI domain. thus, the three foun
through science and technology initiatives that dational pillars of program management for
enable Airmen to operate beyond established and airmen in figure 1 become a set of interrelated
sustainable performance thresholds, a spectrum enterprises rather than distinct and indepen
ranging from intrahuman (biotechnology and dent efforts. Integration becomes the key word
pharmacology) to extrahuman (hardware and when we organizationally, functionally, and fi
software). We developmentally plan a human nancially address human performance.

Summary to a performance-based force-projection model. In

this new paradigm, the medical service maxi
the world’s security environment is chang mizes successful force projection through its
ing dramatically in many dimensions—political, contribution to the human-performance mis
economic, social, and military. In response, sion while simultaneously standing ready to
“the air Force is transforming into an effects- mitigate performance failures through conse
based, efficient provider of human combat quence management. that said, the aFMS
capability, which can sustain air, space, and cy alone cannot implement the vision described
berspace superiority for the joint force and here: its scope is driven by the breadth of ap
our nation.”30 as General Moseley pointed out, plication of human performance, which goes
“It is the Airmen who transform hunks of metal, well beyond health services. the air Force,
buckets of bolts, microprocessors, and circuitry therefore, must think strategically about its
into the nation’s warfighting edge” (emphasis human weapon systems and develop both
in original).31 Providing capability for human doctrine and the supporting organizational
combat, however, requires related doctrine on structures to operationalize human perfor
weapon systems. this article has proposed a mance for all airmen. We agree with General
vision for a broad human-performance doc Moseley’s observation that we are at a strategic
trine for the air Force—to sustain, optimize, crossroads, believing that a holistic approach
and enhance airmen. It addresses “how we to human performance is critical to the pos
think” about human performance and lays the ture of the air Force. We cannot say it any better
foundation for future doctrine describing “what than did our former chief of staff: “america’s
we think” about human performance. Ulti air Force will succeed in the 21st century only by
mately, human-performance doctrine should developing and resourcing a coherent strategy
provide a capabilities-based, total life-cycle ap that closes the gap between ends and means.
proach to managing airmen. Within the aFMS, the window of opportunity is shutting fast.
it is time to move from a health-based FHP model time is not on our side.”32 ❑
Notes
1. Gen t. Michael Moseley, The Nation’s Guardians: 7. air Force Doctrine Document (aFDD) 2-4.2, Health
America’s 21st Century Air Force, cSaF White Paper (Wash Services, 11 December 2002, 47–52, https://www.doctrine
ington, Dc: Department of the air Force, Office of the .af.mil/aFDcPrivateWeb/aFDD_Page_HtML/Doctrine
chief of Staff, 29 December 2007), 3, 6, http://www.af _Docs/afdd2-4-2.pdf.
.mil/shared/media/document/aFD-080207-048.pdf. 8. Moseley, Nation’s Guardians, 2.
2. Patricia a. Deuster et al., “Human Performance 9. Headquarters US air Force, assistant Surgeon
Optimization: an evolving charge to the Department of General for Operations, United States Air Force Medical Ser
Defense,” Military Medicine 172, no. 11 (november 2007): vice 2008 Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment: Operation
11, http://www.siib.org/news/367-SIIB/version/default/ alize Human Performance for All Airmen (Washington, Dc:
part/attachmentData/data/HPO%20Mil%20Med Department of the air Force, 31 March 2008).
%202007.pdf.
10. Michael W. Wynne, secretary of the air Force, and
3. PowerPoint briefing, 2007 Military Health Services
Gen t. Michael Moseley, chief of staff of the air Force, to
conference, subject: “Human Performance Optimization
(HPO) within DOD,” slide 6, http://www.tricare.mil/ all airmen, memorandum, 24 april 2008.
conferences/2007/Mon/M107.ppt (accessed 27 May 2008). 11. Joint Publication 4-02, Health Service Support, 31
4. Ibid. October 2006, I-3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/
5. a. russell, B. Bulkley, and c. Grafton, Human Per new_pubs/jp4_02.pdf; and aFDD 2-4.2, Health Services, 21.
formance Optimization and Military Missions: Final Report, 12. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Force
GS-10F-0297K (Washington, Dc: Office of net assess Health Protection (Washington, Dc: Department of De
ment, May 2005). fense, 6 november 2003), 10, 13; and Department of De
6. Deuster et al., “Human Performance Optimiza fense Directive (DODD), 6200.04, Force Health Protection, 9
tion”; and PowerPoint briefing, 2007 Military Health Ser October 2004, 2, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
vices conference. corres/pdf/620004p.pdf.

THE MERGE 41
13. chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff Instruction command. See Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense,
(cJcSI) 3170.01F, Joint Capabilities Integration and Develop Force Health Protection and readiness, to assistant Sec
ment System, 1 May 2007, a-3, a-8, http://www.dtic.mil/ retary of Defense, Health affairs, memorandum, 26 De
cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3170_01.pdf. cember 2006. the use of performance optimization in
14. Office of the Undersecretary, acquisitions and the context of this proposal is not congruent with the for
technology, DOD Guide to Integrated Process and Product De mulation of human-performance optimization as used by
velopment (Washington, Dc: Department of Defense, 5 that command; nor is it intended to suggest that HSI is
February 1996), 1-1 through 2-12; and DODD 5000.01, solely a health-services function since it clearly crosscuts
The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 2003, 2, 10, http:// multiple functional capabilities described in the agile
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500001p.pdf. combat Support concept of Operations (e.g., acquisition,
15. Deuster et al., Human Performance Optimization, 3, 5. civil engineer, logistics readiness, manpower, personnel,
16. Many organizations have become interested in safety, science and technology, training, test and evalua
pushing the limits of human performance, and they have tion, etc.). We use the term performance optimization simply
developed terminology corresponding to their interests and because it best describes the proposed enterprise area.
funding (e.g., aFMS and Joint Forces command—human 25. DODI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
performance enhancement; Office of net assessment and System, 43.
DOD Health affairs—human-performance optimization; 26. Ibid., 43–45; and MIL-HDBK-46855a, Department
Defense threat reduction agency—human-performance of Defense Handbook: Human Engineering Program Process and
modification). this multiple, overlapping terminology Procedures, 17 May 1999, 19–20, http://hfetag.dtic.mil/
reinforces stovepipes and prevents effective unity of ef docs-hfs/mil-hdbk-46855a.pdf.
fort, potentially harming the larger air Force and DOD 27. nita L. Miller and Lawrence G. Shattuck, “re
mission. V. Martindale, to the author, personal communi
thinking HSI: an applied approach,” draft, 2007.
cation regarding “Point Paper on Human Performance
28. Since the key word in human systems integration is
terminology for aFMS,” 25 July 2007.
integration, any modeling and simulation effort needs to
17. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea of the University: A Reex
capture domain interactions in order to accurately pre
amination (new Haven, ct: Yale University Press, 1992),
dict the impact of domain trade-offs on total system per
32–43, 58–62, 78–98.
18. I. B. Holley Jr., Ideas and Weapons (new Haven, ct: formance and ownership costs. For example, assuming we
Yale University Press, 1953), 175–78. could model performance by using a log-linear model,
19. consequence management is defined as those in capturing domain-interaction effects requires a full or
dividual and organizational activities directed at halting saturated model. When we work with all seven human-
the progress of disease or limiting the damage caused by systems integration domains, the resulting model would
injury and reducing the long-term social disability pro have 127 terms—a significant computational challenge.
duced by any residual impairment. However, by considering only the four input domains, we
20. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.2, reduce the model to a more manageable 15 terms.
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 2003, 2, 29. Gen Bruce carlson and Maj Stephen chambal,
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/ “Developmental Planning: the Key to Future War-Fighter
500002p.pdf. capabilities,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 1 (Spring
21. cJcSI 3170.01F, Joint Capabilities Integration and 2008): 5, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/
Development System, a-8. apj/apj08/spr08/spr08.pdf.
22. DODI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 30. Air Force Roadmap: 2006–2025 (Washington, Dc:
System, 35. Department of the air Force, June 2006), 19, http://www
23. Beverly S. cohen, “Industrial Hygiene Measure .af.mil/shared/media/document/aFD-060713-002.pdf.
ment and control,” in Environmental and Occupational 31. t. Michael Moseley, “america’s air Force: the
Medicine, ed. William n. rom (Philadelphia: Lippincott nation’s Guardian,” Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2d quarter
raven, 1998), 1753–55. 2008): 11, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/
24. the term human-performance optimization has been editions/i49/8.pdf.
discussed as a focus area for the Joint Medical research 32. Ibid., 13.

The Air Force Commander
The Power of Interaction and Vision
Col William mott, USaF*
H
ow do you measure command direction and observe the firsthand effects, but
success? Simply by the next job you also react to the directions of my commander.
are awarded? or by combat victory,
plain and simple? If you care about
these questions, this article has something for Command Climate
you. The target audience is uS Air Force com Command is about impact! Coach Tom
manders, but I suspect that any leader can im Landry of the dallas Cowboys once said,
prove by paying careful attention to the sub
“Leadership is getting someone to do what
jects of interaction and vision.
they don’t want to do, to achieve what they
Many individuals measure command suc
want to achieve.” Combat commanders have
cess by a combination of mission and people.
been inspiring followers ever since Alexander
The question is, “How do you successfully ful
fill the mission and maximize your people’s the Great led the charge that routed the Per
potential?” Answer that, and you probably sians at the river Gaugamela. It is what today’s
have the essence of command! Command is commanders need to do. The question is,
“the legal authority to direct and order subor “How can Air Force commanders make a dif
dinates to perform duties or accomplish ac ference from the moment they enter their
tions to attain military objectives.”1 one way of units until they head home?” Everything that
measuring commanders’ success involves con occurs affects the command climate, which,
sidering their command climate—the envi though perhaps more of a joint term than an
ronment in which they exercise their author Air Force one, means “a state or condition ex
ity and guide their people to carry out the isting from shared feelings and perceptions
mission. This article addresses the tools, means, among soldiers about their unit, about their
and feel that a commander uses to create a leaders, and about their unit’s programs and
successful environment. policies. This condition is created by the com
I have experience as commander of an F-22 mander and his chain of command from the
operations group. Before you decide, “well, commander’s vision and leadership style, and
I’m not one of those!” let me simply say that it influenced and perpetuated by their commu
puts me in a unique position of having both nication and their leadership.”2
subordinate commanders and an immediate A positive command climate blends the im
superior in close proximity to my command. portance of people and mission into an orga
This position as a middleman allows some in nizational climate that breeds success. Com
sight into command because I not only give manders can be either the moat that prevents
*Commander of the 325th operations Group, Tyndall AFB, Florida, the author has commanded at the group and squadron levels. An
F-22 instructor pilot, he has over 3,000 hours in the F-15C, with assignments to Bitburg AB, Germany; Langley AFB, Virginia; Nellis AFB,
Nevada; Eglin AFB, Florida; and Tyndall AFB. He has served at Headquarters Air Education and Training Command and Headquarters
North American Aerospace defense Command. Colonel Mott is a combat veteran of operations desert Storm and Southern watch.
42
02-Merge-Mott.indd 42 4/28/09 1:21:22 PM

THE MERGE 43
their units from attaining the goal or the some key guidelines do exist for the different
bridge that enables them to reach it. whether types that a commander might face.
they excel or just plod along, the command Rule one: every interaction with people has
er’s leadership will make a difference, either an effect on the command climate. whether it
for good or bad. is with your superior, subordinates, or family
How do you shape a favorable command and friends, it all makes a difference. After
climate? How do you create a unit that Airmen even a small interaction, someone walks away
fondly recall, saying, “That was a great squad with an opinion of you and your command.
ron,” or “That was a golden time at Base X,” or Consider the commander’s personal staff.
“The oRI [operational readiness inspection] How the commander walks into the office and
rated us outstanding because. . . .”? you do it starts the day is key. Like it or not, the com
through interaction with subordinates and su mander’s demeanor will answer questions
periors and through a well-communicated com they all have, such as “will it be a good day or
mand vision. Finally, preparation for an oRI a bad day?” and “what kind of mood is the
will test these command skills. boss in?” The way the commander starts the
day with his immediate staff will shape how
they deal with the rest of the command. you
Command Interaction can’t afford to have a quiet morning or bad
day—you simply must start with enthusiasm,
Commanders shape their units. Their mere courtesy, and excitement.
presence affects mission accomplishment and How often does the average Airman inter
Airmen’s perceptions of the unit. The means act with his or her commander? I would say
and tools that the commander uses to interact that time with the commander is less available
with his or her command are critical. than most of us would like to admit. In fact,
unfortunately, human interactions can’t be some of your subordinates’ only contact with
boiled down to cookbook solutions or check the commander will occur through the staff.
lists of things to do or say. The nature of com How many phone calls do the executive officer
mand interaction is dynamic, and what applies and secretary field each day that never reach
in one situation may not apply in another. For the commander’s office? A great many. The
example, one of my subordinates asked me staff represents you and may “impact” more of
for an appointment. I determined that the the command than the commander. How the
meeting would certainly be a “routine” discus commander interacts with his staff has a cas
sion about assignments since the officer was cading effect throughout the entire command.
scheduled for reassignment, so the best means what about your interactions with subordi
to get ready called for reviewing his personnel nate commanders and leaders? Just as your
records. when the officer sat down, I started staff deals with your Airmen, so do your subor
talking about potential training and assign dinate commanders touch everyone under their
ments. Suddenly, I learned that the real rea command. Commanders interact with subor
son for the meeting was the officer’s personal dinate commanders via writing or by commu
situation and how the assignment might affect nicating one on one or in a group. within
his family—not exactly what the “checklist” these engagements a commander makes his
said about a counseling session. or her influence felt within the unit.
That is the point about using a checklist or Letters—now e-mail—offer an easy way to
an academic approach to interactions within communicate. you state your case, hit “send,”
the command. Personnel issues are not easily and move on to something else. There is no
divisible into subject areas or readily handled need to converse, explain, debate, or align
with a checklist. There is no checklist for each your schedules. Personal digital assistants (PdA)
meeting because you never know where that and e-mail make access nearly instantaneous.
encounter is going. yet, even though you can’t written communication to subordinates has a
have a checklist for every type of meeting, great number of advantages, and, clearly, a

modern commander must use e-mail to exer get to see the “ground truth” of the facilities
cise command. Those who say that “e-mail and people under your command.
leadership is no leadership” must come from what should you say during one-on-one
a different generation! Nevertheless, you must conversations with subordinate leaders? Again,
be careful when using written communica there is no checklist to use. Commanders have
tion, especially instant communication. How an agenda, and subordinates have theirs. I sug
many e-mail addicts do you know—people gest that the more the subordinate talks, the
with cell phones attached to their belts and set more the commander can support him or her.
to vibrate for every message received? The ad Think of it as bump steering, a term that de
dictive and impersonal nature of e-mail war scribes how a pilot can adjust an aircraft’s auto
rants special care when used by a leader. pilot while keeping it engaged: small control-
Immediate written communication carries stick inputs that “bump” the aircraft to the
hidden dangers. Certainly, the risk of being correct heading and altitude. Similarly, subor
misunderstood is high unless you are a careful dinate commanders need to remain engaged
writer. do you have a humorous personality? and receive only small guidance from the senior.
Someone may simply interpret your e-mail you should spend less time talking and more
humor as sarcasm or worse. what about that time listening when interfacing one on one.
instant access to your subordinates or com The more common method of communi
manders? what message do you convey when cating with subordinate commanders occurs
the date and time tag on your e-mail says Sat via meetings. Most units have a leaders’ meet
urday at 0200? do you expect an immediate ing at least once a week, but is it a pleasure or
response? does it send an implied message a pain? Is it productive or stifling? As expected,
the way the commander conducts the meeting
about your priorities at home? Maybe not, but
determines the environment that, in turn, will
your recipient can infer something about your
affect the unit. does communication take place
leadership—perhaps a message that you do
in one direction? does the commander allow
not want to convey.
dissension? does the conversation delve too
Pres. Abraham Lincoln supposedly wrote
closely into the subordinate commander’s
letters to his generals that he never sent. He area of responsibility? The commander must
obviously put some thought into his directions ensure that the meeting is productive, enjoy
yet found it better not to send them. Perhaps able, and marked by open communication
a similar lesson applies to e-mail communica and clear decisions. ultimately, are the com
tions: some thought needs to go into the craft mander’s meetings “councils of war” in which
ing of messages, and perhaps more than a few democracy reigns or a means of gathering
should not go forward! data, listening to opinions, and making deci
Commanders can also communicate with sions? I prefer the latter style.
subordinate commanders one on one, a style Here are two insights that speak to the
that offers the best chance for interaction. I power of meetings. In one case, I was chairing
consider the time I get with the wing com a meeting with subordinate commanders. Jok
mander precious. Any small conversation with ingly, one of them said, “Sir, I’ve been elected
him answers questions that save me from send to talk to you on a certain issue.” It seemed
ing e-mails, and I hear what is important to humorous, but it raised the question of whether
him. Face-to-face time with the boss is invalu I was approachable or too autocratic. If subor
able. And so it is with your subordinate com dinate leaders are not comfortable voicing dis
manders. That communication must occur sent, then they are not likely to talk openly
frequently, outside your office. you must move about difficult issues. And that can mean that
around so that your Airmen can see you talk their vision may not cover the commander’s
ing to subordinate commanders and supervi blind spot.
sors in their work areas. Not only do they get In a second case, while attending a meeting
to see you outside the ivory tower, but also you chaired by the wing commander, I noted that

THE MERGE 45
when someone brought up bad news, mem “Pennsylvania, sir.”

bers of the audience kept their eyes not on the “did you get those shoulders working in a coal
briefer but on the commander. They wanted mine?”
to read his body language—to see how he
would react. In the same manner, the “eyes “yes sir.”
and ears of the wing” were looking at the sub “Good luck to you tonight, soldier.”
ordinate commanders at the table to see how
they would react—to see if they would get This exchange demonstrates that Eisenhower
not only spoke to soldiers, he saw them as well.
along, fix blame, or say nothing. The conduct
That was and is rare for generals.3
of the leaders at any meeting, even their inter
actions, influences command climate. on that night of 5 June 1944, General
As in one-on-one discussions, large meet Eisenhower watched the members of the en
ings provide a means by which the commander tire 101st Airborne division board their C-47s,
influences his or her unit, for good or bad. In waited while they launched, and saluted each
the Air Force, we traditionally call the room to plane as it took off.4 I think there was some
attention out of respect for the commander. thing real in the general’s command interac
Just as that focuses everyone on the command tion—an attitude that connected the com
er’s presence, so should the commander focus mander with his men. This is an essential
on his or her conduct during the meeting. aspect of command interaction.
Commanders have the power to concentrate I look for that interaction all the time.
on the mission’s and their people’s success, when I step out to fly, the crew chiefs and
and to build a positive command climate. flight-line supervisors know that the com
Command interaction is a powerful part of mander is coming out. Those five minutes be
commanding the staff and subordinate com fore I need to climb in and go fly are critical.
manders, but especially members of the unit. The same is true when I’m in the staff car driv
How should the commander interact with Air ing or walking the flight line during a launch.
men? The commander is the identity of the As a commander, you see the other command
unit and the representative of the Air Force ers often, whether in daily meetings or be
enterprise to those Airmen. If you can’t be ap cause “you’re the boss.” But the people that
proachable, if you can’t share some informa you meet for five minutes on the flight line
tion, how are your Airmen supposed to know don’t see the commanders as often. Those few
what is important to you? Most of us have seen minutes of interaction represent their com
pictures of Gen dwight Eisenhower meeting plete picture of them. you can’t afford that
with members of the 101st Airborne division time to be negative in any way. Like General
prior to d-day. Some might think it was a me Eisenhower, you must “see” your Airmen.
dia stunt, but in reality it was good for the men Here is an example that humbled me and
and good for Eisenhower. According to one emphasized the power of words from a leader.
account, I was having breakfast with the wing’s chiefs
Corporal Kermit Latta was struck by the “terrific and with those of Air Education and Training
burden of decision and responsibility” which Command and went through the dining-hall
showed on his face and by the sincerity of his line first. I was polite, engaging, and pleasant
effort to communicate with his young soldiers. to the Senior Airman who was cooking. or so
He paused to speak to their group, and we can I thought. As I waited, the two chiefs ordered
detect in his exchanges something of the deft their food and chatted with the Senior Air
personal appeal which was to make him the man and other servers. In the time it takes to
united States’ most popular postwar president: cook an omelet, the chiefs learned where the
“what is your job, soldier?” Senior Airman was from, how he joined the
Air Force, that he was a football player, that he
“Ammunition bearer, sir.”
was finishing his college degree, and that he
“where is your home?” liked his job at Tyndall AFB, Florida. The two

chiefs joked with one another and compli detract from achieving the vision or help it
mented the young Airman on his service to along. The point is that just as a commander’s
the country. All I got was an omelet, but I was interactions affect Airmen’s ability to accom
pleasant! The Airman got a memorable con plish the unit’s mission, so can daily routine
versation with two command chiefs. who did hinder attainment of the commander’s vision.
the better job as a leader? How do you shape a vision, craft it, and
In summary, a commander’s interaction make it valuable to the unit? Command vision
with subordinate leaders and Airmen will cre can be defined as that which “empowers, in
ate an environment depending solely on his spires, and challenges. . . . Vision is the rudder
or her style. But without a purpose, message, that keeps a ship on course.”6 It is that concept
and vision, it can amount to nothing more to which all unit efforts return. when crafting
than pleasantries. It is essential that a com a vision, you should begin by referencing mis
mander communicate a vision—the purpose sion and vision statements for echelons of
behind all this interaction. A commander’s in command above the unit (Air Force, major
teraction becomes more than words, e-mails, command, numbered air force, wing, and even
or meetings when he or she communicates combatant command, if applicable). Next, you
the core of the mission—the vision. should write a vision statement for the unit, fo
cusing it on the future, grounding it on current
operations, and dividing it into components.
Command Vision we can explain the crafting of a vision state
ment simply by analyzing one. Consider the
A commander’s interaction style must be vision that I espouse for my F-22 / F-15 / Air
precise and purposeful. you can’t have one Battle Manager operations group: “Shape the
without the other. Vision is a powerful thing, CAF [Combat Air Forces] with Air dominance
but without the tools to communicate, it is war Fighters of Character.” I think it works as
wasted. That is why I spoke of command inter a vision statement because I can break it into
action before vision. components that reflect the values of my
Vision is a tough concept to master. Is it just group. The main component ideas are
words or a true means by which the com “shape,” “war fighters,” and “character.” The
mander communicates his or her intent? 325th operations Group is a training com
Think of “Integrity, Service, Excellence.” Is it a mand. our focus is air dominance. And war
slogan or powerful set of words? Is it a saying fighters are needed in the global war on terror.
on the bottom of PowerPoint slides, or is it Every student will someday be in a position to
truly our core values? I think it is what we are influence the CAF. Before long, our graduates
because I can weave those words into any mis will become instructors at Tyndall; most instruc
sion, action, or event with which I am associ tors are in only their third or fourth year of fly
ated. Gen douglas MacArthur said, “ ‘duty,’ ing in their weapon system. Finally, the students
‘Honor,’ ‘Country’—those three hallowed words who depart Tyndall are leaving Air Education
reverently dictate what you want to be, what and Training Command and going to the CAF
you can be, what you will be.”5 This is true for after nearly two years of flying training that
the uS Military Academy’s “duty, Honor, started at a commissioning source focused on
Country,” and it is the same with the Air character development. Isn’t it appropriate
Force’s “Integrity First, Service before Self, Ex that their last training unit again emphasize
cellence in All we do.” But it is that way only character? I’ve had the privilege of flying with
because leaders make it part of their everyday many pilots, and I remain convinced that the
actions. Vision—specifically, the Air Force’s great ones were people of character.
core values—frames our daily operations. A vision statement that can be broken into
Vision is an equally tough concept to imple components directly relating to the mission is
ment. It is the inspiration for future operations, useful and helps move the unit ahead. How
while the activity of daily operations can either ever, a vision can simply become a set of words.

THE MERGE 47
I was in a unit that had very impressive slides then schedule it. If you want time to talk with
for various meetings, but I began to notice another commander, then schedule it. with
that the last slide always included a powerful my own calendar, after I subtract time for fly
quotation, something that could easily be a ing and meetings, I have roughly two days
mission or vision statement—yet it wasn’t the each week to meet my priorities. Command
current wing mission. It wasn’t even the major ers shouldn’t leave time open on the calendar
command’s mission. Then it changed! de and wait to see what comes up. They should
pending on the briefer, the ending slide had a have a plan for their time that will support
different slogan. It took me a while to track their goals, address their concerns, and sup
down those words and discover that they were port the unit’s vision.
old but that they had lingered on the Power- Second, control your in-box—both for paper
Point master slide! unfortunately, they had work and e-mail. I worked for a man who kept
become just words. his in-box in a desk drawer. I supposed he did
If a well-crafted commander’s vision can be so purely for aesthetics—for keeping the com
powerful, how does he or she capture that mander’s desk looking neat. But I noticed that
power and make it work for the unit? How he would look at the in-box only when he
does the commander take the time available wanted to, checking it in the morning and
each day and shape it so that the unit’s efforts evening. He would go through it when he had
reach towards the vision—the goal? Two the time, and by limiting his constant atten
means for a commander to do that include tion to it, he always had a small stack of paper
keeping a combat focus and planning for each work to plow through. He maximized his time
day in command. by limiting his “nibbling” at the in-box. This
I have flown in combat, and, clearly, the wasn’t an accident; it was planned.
best way commanders can push their vision is The same is true of e-mail messages: you
to have a combat focus. That is all there is to could spend all day answering them. Although
it. we have one mission to execute, one activ you would never miss anything, consider the
ity for which everyone in the unit is responsi effort necessary to answer e-mail as it arrives.
ble. when all else fails, combat employment, you’ve seen the guy with the belt-mounted
execution, and mission are number one! That PdA set to buzz for each new e-mail. He grabs
is the emphasis. we are warriors, and a com it, enters his password, selects “messaging,” se
bat focus is the first step towards achieving a lects “e-mail,” and then waits for the program
commander’s vision. Think of professional to open. If he doesn’t reply, he takes time to
football, whose teams concentrate on winning close the program and return the PdA to his
the Super Bowl. Nothing else matters. The belt. Think of the time it takes to answer each
same is true in the Air Force—winning in e-mail—how it adds up over a day, a week, a
combat is all that matters. year. Haven’t we learned something from the
To be focused, a commander requires a industrial revolution of American history?
daily plan of attack. Commanders will likely wouldn’t it be better to set aside time for
be bombarded with 50 e-mails a day that can e-mail, much as you do for an in-box, and plow
shackle them to their computers, just as the through it all at once? I think so, and I don’t
paperwork in-box can occupy them for hours. set my PdA to ring for new e-mails—or wear it
Paying excessive attention to immediate needs on my uniform! (Although I know you can,
can detract from commanders’ long-term goals. this is my technique!)
Here are some ideas to help control the So what is the point of controlling the lit
needs of today and meet the goals of tomor eral and electronic in-box? To generate time
row. First, have a calendar—marked not only to realize your command vision, not simply re
with other people’s meetings that you have to act to daily activities. The payoff is having time
attend but also with things that you want to to focus on goals and objectives rather than
do. If you want time to walk the flight line, jumping for every other organization’s priori
then schedule it. If you want time to work out, ties. A commander must keep perspective on

the needs of daily correspondence versus its focus, keep moving forward, and keep manag
impact on the overall game plan. ing distractions. The largest percentage of a
For example, an e-mail from the unit train commander’s time should concentrate on car
ing manager appeared one day, containing rying out the mission and making the vision a
various details found in a status-of-training re reality—not managing the daily routine. An
port as well as comments on additional train oRI offers one way of determining the success
ing that the group lacked. This includes routine of your vision and command-interaction skills.
events such as fire-extinguisher training—
mandatory items reportable to headquarters
because they reflect the unit’s and each indi Application:
vidual’s ability to deploy. This particular e-mail Preparation for an Operational
listed 238 events overdue in the operations

group, consisting of five squadrons. Two hun Readiness Inspection
dred thirty-eight events! Good grief! This re A commander’s interaction with his or her
quired immediate commander involvement! I command—whether individually, in meetings,
made it a priority to “solve this problem” and or via electronic communication—is critical
make our “stats” improve. unfortunately, how to success. The way that the commander ap
ever, these events had no effect on our daily plies his or her vision to the unit contributes
mission; this training did not support my vi to the command climate.
sion. Their completion, whether immediately How can you know that your unit is on the
or later, would neither change the number of right track? we are a warrior culture and a na
sorties we flew nor improve the safe execution tion at war, so combat would represent the ulti
of our primary flying mission. worse yet, it mate test. Short of that, consider an oRI. In
turned out that the operations group and all the preparation for and execution of this in
of its Airmen had over 20,000 ancillary train spection, a unit commander faces a strong
ing events to fulfill! This e-mail about the sta challenge of his or her command climate.
tus of ancillary training identified less than 1.2 Earlier, I talked about command interac
percent of the annual training requirements tion and then about vision. I chose this order
that were delinquent! what would a reason because without the tools for communication,
able level of training amount to? Perhaps 90 a good vision will rot within the commander.
percent complete? That translates to 2,000 But a major event like an oRI demands that
events not completed—and we would still be we start with vision. we always want to begin
at 90 percent! with “outstanding” and work from there. we’re
The point is that an e-mail arrives announc all winners; it’s why we are in the service and
ing a problem, but without a comprehensive desire to fight the good fight. But what if you
approach to determining its priority and rele declare “an ‘outstanding’ or go home” and
vance to the mission, it can quickly become a then garner only an “excellent”? A better
snare for a commander’s time. Commanders place to start is to simply say, “we’ll do our
need that time to make their vision real. How best” and build a game plan that focuses on
often has an e-mail arrived announcing a the oRI’s major areas.
deadline for required information to “solve a I was once involved in an oRI, working
problem”? I suggest that, often, the problem closely with the chief of Standardization and
is neither a mission-threatening issue nor wor Evaluation (Stan/Eval), who told me point-
thy of the given deadline. True, a commander blank that the best we could expect was a “sat
must react to his or her superiors, but without isfactory” since there were just too many issues
a game plan for e-mail, the “ping” can be to correct in the time remaining. It was a truth
translated down into the unit with the wrong ful and accurate assessment. To our credit,
message about priorities and focus. though, both of us agreed to attempt to earn
Simply stated, have a command vision, and the best possible rating. It took commitment,
make time to move it along. Keep a combat far more extra effort than expected, and close

THE MERGE 49
interaction between us to find the key areas ducted by the same people who will re
and determine where to place our main ef turn to inspect during the oRI. The key
fort. It wasn’t fun preparing, but we achieved is to think like the inspectors and use
our vision—an “outstanding” rating. To this the same procedures they use. The IG
day, I think we succeeded because we started inspectors are Airmen, just like us. They
small and worked big. we literally applied the run checklists and inspect according to
old adage that “the journey of 1,000 miles be the AFIs, so there is no magic involved!
gins with a single step.” we transferred vision what they can do, you can too.
from wishful thinking into something that
If that answers vision, what of interactions?
produced practical results—and that chief of
An oRI tests commanders’ interaction with
Stan/Eval was a true hero!
their commands. Clearly, they have the great
Now I’ll bet you want more detail than
est experience with inspections and know the
“work from small to large” when facing an
mission and operations. Quite literally, com
oRI. your oRI is probably not the unit’s first.
manders can best endure the brunt of the in
A review of past reports offers a good place to
spection and handle all details. But, of course,
start. Beyond that, here are some focal points
they can’t do that. They have to get their units
for inspection preparation:
ready, get them to do the work, be ready to
1. obvious discrepancies. do not have an meet inspectors, and solve problems. This is
obvious, lingering issue that would cause the test of communications within a unit.
the inspector general (IG) to say, “our An oRI is known as a leadership test. Al
hands are tied. Sorry!” determine what though it tests vision—the ability to set a goal
must be at 100 percent. and reach it—the oRI really gauges a com
mander’s ability to interact and communicate
2. Checklists and Air Force instructions with his or her Airmen. After the inspection,
(AFI). Every inspector asks, “what do you we quickly forget the grade—but not the
do?” and follows with, “Show me your months of preparation. The methods, tone,
checklist and AFIs.” we all do our jobs, and environment created by the commander’s
but can we show why we do them that way approach to the oRI will remain. The oRI
and document training and execution? tests the commander’s skill at interacting with
3. Programs. whether they are major, like Airmen in the face of a challenge. when the
Stan/Eval or Quality Assurance, or mi IG tells the commander, “we have a finding
nor, such as recall rosters, if they are you need to know about,” his or her interac
programs, they will be inspected. So they tion skills are going to be stressed and tested.
must be in good order! Consider trying The oRI will assess commanders’ ability to
an information-exchange program be overcome obstacles to fulfilling their vision. It
tween units with similar programs. requires honed interaction skills that are both
logical and practical. Some say that we should
4. Attitude. Likely, the IG team will find do away with oRIs or call them something
faults in every area it examines. If in else, but that is nonsense! Tested units per
spectors find nothing on first glance, form better, and tested commanders improve
they will continue to dig. I suspect that their leadership skills.
subjective judgment plays a role in de
termining the final grade. The unit with
attitude (which includes dress, appear Conclusion
ance, customs, and courtesies) can win
that “gray area.” This article is one of many on command. It
won’t be the last, and it presents no new trick
5. Staff-assistance visits and self-inspections. or fad. I sought to take some of the mystery
These are powerful tools for the com out of formulating a command vision and to
mander because they are often con emphasize that command interactions are

powerful tools. I hope it made you think, “I’ve interactions that inspire confidence in their
been there” or “I’ll watch for that.” leaders and trust amongst their subordinates.
I concentrated on command climate—the The effort placed on command interactions
subjective assessment that a unit is good or makes all the difference.
bad. Commanders play the greatest role in de what does it all add up to? Some call it moral
termining the unit’s status by setting the vi toughness within a unit, good morale, or posi
sion, focusing the unit’s eyes on the goals, and tive command climate. Any way you interpret
de-emphasizing the daily routine. At the same it, I say it adds up to successful command! ❑
time, they build a cohesive unit via personal Tyndall AFB, Florida
Notes
1. Air university (Au)-2, Guidelines for Command: A 3. Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him (New
Handbook on the Leadership of People for Air Force Commanders york: G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1987), 617.
and Supervisors (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air university Press, 4. Ibid., 618.
September 2003), 1, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/ 5. Gen douglas MacArthur (speech to the Corps of
aupress/Books/au-2/Au-2.pdf. Cadets, uS Military Academy, west Point, 12 May 1962),
2. LTC duane A. Lempke, “Command Climate: The http://www.nationalcenter.org/MacArthurFarewell.html.
Rise and the decline of a Military Concept” (master’s thesis, 6. Au-2, Guidelines for Command, 23.
uS Army war College, April 1988), 33, http://stinet.dtic
.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRdoc?Ad=AdA194178&Location=u2
&doc=GetTRdoc.pdf.

America’s Two Air Forces
Lt CoL RobeRt SpaLding, USaF*
A
lthough AmericA needs two all of the nation’s airpower requirements—
air forces, it is buying neither. lately witness the Air Force’s heavy involvement in
the us Air Force has been caught seven continuous years of war in Afghanistan
aloft in uncertain skies and has lost and iraq. this fact, coupled with the Air
its way. its message certainly does not resonate Force’s simultaneous maintenance of world
with the civilian leadership or congress.1 even wide strategic commitments, demonstrates
Airmen have started to doubt their worth to why we need an independent air force.
the nation. the service has answered with a one solution to the nation’s dilemma that
madison Avenue–styled ad campaign, engag instantly comes to mind entails merely increas
ing everyone in furious debate. ing the capability of the air forces already resi
A better method may involve trying to under dent in the Army, navy, and marine corps.
stand what is precipitating the doubt and then indeed, the Army has argued strenuously for
composing a rebuttal—if indeed the Air Force just this option.3 on the surface, this seems a
is important to the future health and prosperity tantalizingly easy solution; however, many fac
of our nation. i believe that it is, and i think i tors absent from the current conflicts in iraq
understand people’s confusion regarding air and Afghanistan demand an independent air
power. By trying to do all things well, the Air Force force. in the end, soldiers are adept on land,
has lost sight of what it was created to do best.
airmen are adept in the sky, and the nation will
this article focuses narrowly on conven
be better served by an autonomous air force
tional combat airpower, mentioning neither
fully engaged in the irregular fight than by a
space nor cyberspace. incorporating the vari
larger air component within the ground forces.
ables associated with each of those functions
would complicate the airpower analysis. nor some individuals believe that the nature of
does it discuss nuclear operations since they warfare has changed forever. thomas Barnett,
differ from conventional combat airpower for example, argues that the end of the cold
and thus would require an independent analy War ushered in a new era of conflict among
sis. i also exclude strategic airlift, tanker sup peoples, not nations.4 others agree that we
port, and special operations. Just as no one need to better prepare for irregular war and
disputes that special operations are part of the accept more risk when confronting potential
combat air forces, so would no one question peer competitors.5 during any war, however, it
the requirement for a specialoperations com is natural to think that the character of the
ponent within the Air Force. present struggle reflects that of future wars.
one might argue that the us military al can a lone superpower afford to dismiss
ready has too many combat air forces. given the threat of a peer competitor, even if it
the fact that each of the other services (Army, seems a remote possibility? can an indepen
navy, and marine corps) has one, it might dent air force that merely augments combat
seem that having an independent air force capabilities already present in the Army, navy,
amounts to overkill.2 however, those other and marine corps and that provides support
services’ air forces have not been able to meet in the form of airlift as well as intelligence,
*the author is an Air War college student at maxwell AFB, Alabama.
51
03-Merge-Spalding.indd 51 4/28/09 1:21:51 PM

surveillance, and reconnaissance be expected

to defend against this possibility?
Assuming that we cannot dismiss threats
from peer competitors, let us look at a super
power’s requirement for an independent air
force. can we field a single air force that can
meet any contingency on a spectrum bounded
by the peer competitor at one end and the ur
ban guerrilla at the other? What type of air
craft should form the core of that air force?
since the end of the cold War, we have wit
nessed a transformation of the Air Force that
involved dismantling a service that had as its
core platform the heavy bomber and creating
a new one around the versatile F16. We are
now on the verge of replacing that platform
with the Joint strike Fighter (JsF), which, de
spite its modern wizardry, merely improves a
similar capability. the Air Force seems intent Joint Strike Fighter
on having a multirole fighter aircraft as its in
stitutional core.6 can an independent service
with such a core platform meet any contin
gency on the combat spectrum? i argue that it time the Berlin Wall came down, Airmen had
cannot. in fact, America’s defense requires forgotten that strategic meant long-range air-
two air forces, and the aircraft that form each power, long before “nukes” came around.
one’s core differ in form, function, and use. meaning more than just long range, strategic
Air Force no. 1, the peercompetitor force, is implies having the capacity to create strategic
characterized by such terms as strategic capability, effects—something that few forces in America’s
deterrence, long range, stealth technology, static pre arsenal can do. Fewer still can do so anywhere
cision, high technology, speed, B-2, F-22, and cen on the earth within mere hours. only one type
tralized control.7 Air Force no. 2, the irregular of aircraft is strategic in this sense: the bomber.
warfare force, is characterized by such terms as to be fair, at any given time, all aircraft can be
tactical capability, persuasion, persistence, stealth ef considered strategic, depending on their cur
fects, dynamic precision, low technology, slowness, rent mission. the bomber, however, remains
A-10, Predator, Reaper, and decentralized control. the only aircraft that is strategic at its core.
the following discussion contrasts each air on the other hand, we can consider any
force’s requirements, term by term. aircraft tactical, even when its mission calls for
achieving a strategic objective. Although tactical
has sometimes become synonymous with fighter,
Strategic versus Tactical given today’s technology, any combat aircraft
can create tactical effects. Bombers have dem
Ask some Airmen what “strategic airpower” onstrated this fact for years over the skies of
means, and their answer will be “nukes.”8 such iraq and Afghanistan. therefore, an indepen
a connection between the terms strategic air- dent air force capable of producing tactical
power and nuclear was a perversion of the origi effects is not limited to any specific type of
nal airpower theorists’ ideas about airpower, combat aircraft.
brought on by necessities of the cold War. most nations are content to shape their
the enormous destructive power of nuclear own regional environment, but a superpower
weapons made up for the inaccuracy of the must shape the global environment. Airpower
bomber’s ordnancedelivery system. By the theorists such as gen Billy mitchell consid

THE MERGE 53
ered the airplane revolutionary because of its be able to persuade. it can do so by working in
ability to create strategic effects. Knowing that concert with sister services and allies alike. Be
officers in a terrestrial service would fail to cause a superpower’s financial resources may
grasp this concept, he lobbied for an indepen enable it to procure advanced aircraft and
dent air force. if mitchell’s argument remains weapons beyond the means of its allies, that
valid, a nation that seeks to create strategic ef superpower must develop a range of capabili
fects beyond its regional environment must ties suitable to any level of conflict, allowing it
have such an air force that is strategic at its to provide those countries more affordable
core. therefore, any superpower’s indepen equipment and training. this interaction also
dent air force must have the bomber as its establishes goodwill that lessens the risk of
core aircraft—the platform characteristic of conflict. typically, a developing nation’s main
Air Force no. 1.9 combat platform is a cheap tactical aircraft.
the F22 is also crucial to Air Force no. 1— thus, if a superpower requires an indepen
but not as our service has sought to use it (as a dent air force capable of persuasion, that air
bomb dropper). We would do better to utilize force must field such an aircraft.
it as offensivecounterair support to penetrat
ing bombers, as well as defensive counterair
for highvalue airborne assets. other F22 mis
Long Range versus Persistence
sions might include suppression or destruc useful strategic aircraft must have good
tion of enemy air defenses. Although it drops range among their key traits; indeed, one
bombs quite capably, that is not what it was would have difficulty deterring a distant enemy
primarily designed to do. We have misused with aircraft not made to cross oceans. range
aircraft in past wars—witness our interdiction becomes more important than speed or stealth
of the ho chi minh trail during the Vietnam during attempts to deter. obviously, speed or
War.10 no doubt the F105 jet could perform stealth may allow entrance to the enemy’s do
that mission, but analysis identified the Ac main, but that foe has nothing to worry about
130 gunship as much more efficient because if aircraft cannot reach his region. Air Force
of its long persistence, heavy payload, and no. 2 requires persistence rather than long
slow speed. range. larger aircraft with more efficient en
gines feature both range and persistence.
in our current inventory, only bombers and
Deter versus Persuade unmanned aerial vehicles have both of these at
tributes.12 close to the fight, we could attain tac
Deterrence and nuclear capability also became
tical persistence with a lightly armed, propeller
synonymous during the cold War, but they driven aircraft such as an At6, a platform less
are distinct ideas. the ability to deter need technologically sophisticated than a bomber.
not mean mutually assured destruction.11 An air force capable of providing dedicated
rather, it can give a tyrant clear indication of support to ground forces during an irregular
our ability to create effects detrimental to his war could use such an aircraft.
rule. many times, airpower has done just that:
during operation el dorado canyon, when
President reagan sought to deter libyan Stealth Technology versus
leader mu‘ammar gadhafi; operation desert

Fox, when President clinton sought to deter Stealth Effects
saddam hussein; and operation Allied Force, the idea of stealth conjures up images of
when President clinton sought to deter the sophisticated technologies and large defense
serbians. each time, the department of de programs, but this need not be the case. Both
fense relied heavily on the bomber. air forces must be able to produce stealth ef
An independent air force must have the fects. only Air Force no. 1 requires stealth
core capability of deterrence, yet it must also technology to do so because only that air force

must penetrate an integrated air defense sys fuel to remain airborne. “silver bullets” are
tem (iAds). wholly unsuited for this environment.
Aircraft from Air Force no. 2, on the other
hand, can produce stealth effects by loitering
high enough so that an irregular foe can nei Fast versus Slow
ther see nor hear them—a daily occurrence in until air superiority is established, Air
iraq and Afghanistan. By understanding the Force no. 1 needs speed. it must enter and
necessity of producing stealth effects, we can leave the dragon’s lair before the dragon no
save precious defense dollars by fielding sim tices it has even been there. speed refers to
pler aircraft, which could form the backbone the capability to penetrate and exit an iAds.
of Air Force no. 2. thus, the aircraft must be fast.
Air Force no. 2 needs fast response. this
Static Precision versus
response, however, comes from the speed of
communications and the weapons employed.
Dynamic Precision
Police forces discovered long ago that they
A peer competitor will have precious, immo did not need faster cars since radio waves
bile infrastructure that we can attack and destroy travel faster than any automobile. the same
with staticprecision weapons accurate against holds true for airpower during an irregular
stationary targets. thus, Air Force no. 1 requires war. As long as Air Force no. 2 remains tied to
static precision. irregular war, however, which ground forces, its speed comes from commu
involves constant motion and takes place nications and the weapons employed. thus,
among the populace, carries the potential for the aircraft themselves can be slow.
substantial collateral damage. For this reason,
Air Force no. 2 requires dynamic precision B-2 and F-22 versus
weapons of low destructive power that can be

controlled throughout their flight.13 A-10, Predator, and Reaper
each of these aircraft carries within its de

High Tech versus Low Tech sign the implicit explanation of the air force
to which it belongs: B2 and F22 to no. 1, and
For all of the reasons already mentioned, A10, Predator, and reaper to no. 2. conspicu
Air Force no. 1—an expensive asset absolutely ously absent is the JsF, which does not fit into
necessary for a global power such as the either because it has neither the range re
united states—must be high tech. Without quired for Air Force no. 1 nor the persistence
this “silver bullet,” belligerents would spout required for Air Force no. 2.14
their rhetoric more easily. it is no accident
that north Korea is keenly aware of a B2’s ar
rival in the Pacific theater. Centralized Control versus
Air Force no. 2, however, which relies on Decentralized Control
dynamic weapons, synchronized sensors, and

constant communication, can get by with We once considered centralized control
lowtech platforms. the aircraft themselves the key doctrinal tenet of airpower, but Air
merely need to loiter for a long time, hardly men are starting to understand that the proper
a technical challenge today. Air Force no. 2 degree of centralization depends on the situa
doesn’t need high tech, which, in fact, hin tion. centralized control works for Air Force
ders the mission. the less technically com no. 1 engaged in a national or theaterlevel
plex the aircraft, the easier it is to fix and the fight but not for Air Force no. 2 engaged in a
less logistical support it requires. Air Force highly localized fight.15 some people have
no. 2 must have platforms that can take a noted that Army and marine corps captains
daily beating yet rely on little maintenance or are linchpins to the counterinsurgency effort

THE MERGE 55
in iraq.16 their services give them broad mis

sion orders and allow them to adjust their ap
proach, based on the locality. centralized con
trol in irregular warfare prevents the Air Force
from similarly capitalizing on the creativity of
its young officers.
Recommendation
if budget realities force us to choose be
tween the two air forces, without question,
America needs Air Force no. 1, whose core
must be the nextgeneration bomber. We
should also buy more F22s, which we cur
rently do not have in sufficient quantity to A-10
provide adequate support for such a force. to
pay the costs, the Air Force can either signifi
cantly reduce or eliminate the JsF program.
more suited to the other services, that aircraft
will also find a home with the regional air
forces of our allies. since aircraft required for if the Air Force does not want to buy Air
irregular warfare are relatively inexpensive, Force no. 2, it could simply build more bomb
we would then be able to afford enough plat ers. since those aircraft are suited to both types
forms to build Air Force no. 2—specifically, the of conflict, the Air Force would not have to
Predator, reaper, and a new combat version of train pilots for both bombers and light tactical
the t6 to replace the aging A10. organization aircraft; nevertheless, it could still handle both
ally (assuming we decide to fund no. 2), the Air types of scenarios. since we can never be sure
Force should move that component towards about the kind of war we will fight, this course
decentralized control for irregular warfare.17 of action would give the same flexibility to the
the Air Force’s new doctrine for irregular war war fighter but at less cost to the Air Force in
fare recognizes this necessity, yet the service terms of personnel and infrastructure. ❑
remains encumbered by its own legacy.18 Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Notes
1. see Peter spiegel, “military doesn’t Back soldiers 5. “We will have no global peer competitor and will
enough, gates says,” Los Angeles Times, 22 April 2008, http:// remain unmatched in traditional military capability.” The
www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/ National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Wash
lanagates22apr22,1,701682.story. ington, dc: department of defense, march 2005), 5,
2. i do not include the coast guard here, focusing http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408
instead on the combat air forces. strategy.pdf. see also Brian g. Watson, Reshaping the Expe
3. roxana tiron, “Air Force, Army clash Again on ditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabiliza
unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Hill, 30 october 2007, http:// tion Capacity in the Modular Force (carlisle, PA: strategic
thehill.com/businesslobby/airforcearmyclashagain studies institute, August 2005), http://www.strategicstudies
institute.army.mil/pdffiles/PuB621.pdf.
onunmannedaerialvehicles20071030.html (accessed
6. the Quadrennial defense review notes that
17 April 2008).
4. see thomas P. m. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: the Air Force has set a goal of increasing its longrange
War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (new York: g. P. strike capabilities by 50% and the penetrating compo
Putnam’s sons, 2004). nent of longrange strike by a factor of five by 2025.

Approximately 45% of the future longrange strike 13. the new terms static precision and dynamic precision
force will be unmanned. the capacity for joint air clarify the requirements of the two air forces. the former
forces to conduct global conventional strikes against refers to the ability to precisely destroy immobile targets.
timesensitive targets will also be increased. . . . the latter refers to the ability to destroy mobile targets.
14. see “developing an Affordable Fighter for the Fu
[the department of defense will] develop a new land ture,” rAnd research Brief (santa monica, cA: rAnd
based, penetrating longrange strike capability to be corporation, 1997), http://rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/
fielded by 2018 while modernizing the current bomber rB351/index1.html. the JsF may provide some capabili
force. ties that the Air Force can leverage, but by buying 1,763 of
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, dc: de them, the service is actually building its institution around
partment of defense, 6 February 2006), 46, http://www the multirole fighter because it will fly most conventional
combat missions. such reliance also unduly increases the
.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf. Yet, the Air Force’s budget
burden on an already overtaxed tanker force. not only
submission for fiscal year 2009 does not allocate any
could bomber or unmanned aircraft, which provide 10
money for a new longrange strike aircraft. see Procurement
times the range and endurance of the JsF, diminish the
Programs (P-1): Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 2009
tanker workload but also they could carry out the mission
(Washington, dc: department of defense, February 2008),
from more distant, secure bases that possess a better logis
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/
tics infrastructure. Finally, because JsF pilots would fill
fy2009/fy2009_p1.pdf.
most combat air force (cAF) staff positions, a JsFcentric
7. these terms are not meant to be mutually exclu
view would likely develop at the staff level and resonate
sive. For instance, in some cases we will need aspects of
throughout the cAF. this would culminate in a staff view
Air Force no. 1 in an irregular environment; however, Air point myopically focused on what fighter aircraft can do
Force no. 2 can fulfill most requirements of an irregular for the war fighter, rather than what the Air Force could
conflict. global hawk, for example, is useful across the do for the war fighter if given the right equipment.
spectrum of conflict. 15. “Air Force planners may have to adapt and de
8. the author did not conduct a survey but neverthe velop creative c2 [command and control] relationships
less makes this claim because Air Force officers who re to facilitate successful mission accomplishment and opti
viewed this article assumed that strategic airpower meant mize the tenet of centralized control / decentralized exe
nuclear weapons. though not prima facie evidence of the cution. due to the localized nature of most [irregular
correctness of this assumption, it does indicate that the warfare] enemies and specifically insurgencies, decentral
association of the two terms is alive and well with at least ized execution is vital to the successful integration of air
some Air Force personnel. Perhaps a future study could power.” Air Force doctrine document (AFdd) 23, Irregu
examine the prevalence of this association within the Air lar Warfare, 1 June 2007, 66, https://www.doctrine.af
Force. .mil/AFdcPrivateWeb/AFdd_Page_html/doctrine
9. Although some individuals may claim that fighters _docs/afdd23.pdf. this statement may have been a com
have become modernera bombers because they have flown promise between those who advocate decentralized con
the majority of conventionalbombing missions since the trol in irregular warfare and those who continue to favor
end of the cold War, this may have been the case because centralized control, regardless of the situation. From the
the Air Force has sought to procure everincreasing num author’s own experience in iraq, permitting local ground
bers of fighters during that period. in this article, the commanders to exercise tactical control in irregular war
term bomber refers to an aircraft with range and a payload fare can yield synergy because it allows assigned Airmen
at least equivalent to that of the current B2, B1, or B52. to become intimately familiar with the “human” terrain
10. see col herman l. gilster, “the commando not readily visible from the air. to compensate, the Air
hunt V interdiction campaign: A case study in con Force has increased the number of joint terminal attack
strained optimization,” Air University Review 29, no. 2 controllers, but the Airman in the cockpit still must spend
(January–February 1978): 21–37, http://www.airpower precious time becoming oriented to the human terrain
.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1978/janfeb/ once on orbit. Because this orientation is never complete,
gilster.html (accessed 8 may 2006). it is difficult for the Airman to become a thinking (and
11. Keir A. lieber and daryl g. Press, “the rise of creative) addition to the team. After all, during a sortie, an
u.s. nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (march/ airborne Airman must operate in many local environ
April 2006): 42–54, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2006 ments, each with its own unique and unfamiliar “human”
0301faessay85204p0/keiralieberdarylgpress/therise terrain.
ofusnuclearprimacy.html. 16. see michael Kamber, “sovereigns of All they’re
12. some people may disagree, saying that fighters Assigned, captains have many missions to oversee,” New
can provide similar persistence with refueling, but one York Times, 21 march 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
has to question whether this makes sense, given the cur 03/21/world/middleeast/21captain.html?ref=world.
rent high price of fuel. efficiency becomes even more 17. Perhaps the Air Force could adapt us marine
important during irregular warfare, due to the length of corps doctrine for air support to ground forces.
time required to conduct operations. 18. see AFdd 23, Irregular Warfare, 66.

Editor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to
pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we use this
department to let readers know about items of interest.
Optimizing the Effectiveness of Directed

Energy Weapons with Specialized
Weather Support
Maj De Leon C. narCisse, UsaF
Lt CoL steven t. Fiorino, UsaF
CoL riCharD j. BarteLL, UsaFr*
When the thunderclap comes, there is no time to cover the ears.

—Sun tzu
A
ccuRAtE chARActERIzAtIon vides centralized terrestrial and space weather
of the atmosphere is essential to support to the Joint chiefs of Staff, Air Force,
maximizing the use of directed en Army, unified commands, national intelli
ergy (DE) weapons. Developing, gence community, and other agencies as di
procuring, and sustaining such weapons has rected.1 this article outlines some of the
been and will continue to be difficult; there unique atmospheric influences on DE weap
fore, it is imperative that they achieve opti ons and the ways that specialized weather sup
mum effect when employed. the atmosphere, port can enhance the mission capability and
a highly dynamic medium in which these sys efficacy of those weapons.
tems must operate, can significantly impact Anticipating the changing nature of war
their effectiveness, thus necessitating an under fare is part of the responsibility that AFW
standing of this environment and a capability shares with other parts of the Department of
to predict it. DE systems, particularly high-energy Defense (DoD) after the terrorist attacks of
lasers (hEL) employed at low altitudes, will 11 September 2001. AFW cannot afford to
exhibit significant variations in performance wait for DE weapons events to happen and
based on location, time of day, and time of then react. According to the Quadrennial De
year. through the Air Force Weather Agency, fense Review Report of 2006, “new capabilities
the Air Force Weather (AFW) community pro [are] needed by combatant commanders to
*Major narcisse is director of operations, 651st Electronic Systems Squadron, hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. Lieutenant colonel
Fiorino is an assistant professor of atmospheric physics at the Air Force Institute of technology (AFIt). colonel Bartell is a research
physicist at AFIt’s center for Directed Energy.
57
01-PIREP-Narcisse.indd 57 4/28/09 1:26:37 PM

confront asymmetric threats.”2 not all of the more, they can affect enemy electrical systems
“new capabilities” are the weapons themselves; regardless of whether those systems are on or
much of the advancing technology in the DE off.5 For example, hPMs can stop air-, land-,
weapons realm involves the transition of high- or seaborne systems in their tracks. Addition
fidelity modeling and simulation competencies ally, hEL and hPM systems can engage mul
into mission-planning tools. these decision tiple targets nearly instantaneously since they
aids, coupled with timely and accurate envi propagate at the speed of light.6 DE systems
ronmental assessments, would enable the DE can have a “deep magazine,” which means
weaponeer to optimize an employment strategy. that their ability to fire is limited only by their
AFW’s ability to guide the employment of DE capacity to recharge and cool themselves.7 Be
weapons in all environments—via accurate cause DE weapons only expend energy, the
determination of how to exploit information cost per shot represents the sole cost of power
on target-area weather conditions to best ad ing the device. Electrically generated and free-
vantage—is essential to secure the battlespace electron lasers require nothing more than
of tomorrow. Identifying the optimum time of power sources, eliminating the need to trans
day, attack heading, and attack altitude for port, store, and load munitions, and minimizing
low-altitude employment of hELs serves as an the logistical footprint, compared to conven
example of such information exploitation. tional weapons. the fact that the factory can
directly resupply chemical lasers eliminates
the need for long-term storage.8 hEL weap
Major Types of Directed
ons provide almost surgical precision, greatly
Energy Weapons
minimizing the potential for collateral damage.
this article addresses two types of DE sys
tems: the hEL and the high-power microwave Issues with the Atmosphere
(hPM). Whereas hELs direct a beam of fo
cused energy to a precise point on the target In a vacuum, electromagnetic energy travels
to damage or destroy it, hPMs do not physi unattenuated, reaching its target with the the
cally destroy a target. Rather, they invade the oretical maximum energy available; however,
electronics and disrupt the components, cir Earth’s atmosphere contains mitigating fac
cuitry, and switches inside the device. Addi tors that affect the intensity of DE received at
tionally, they can cause behavior-modifying the target. these factors include linear and
sensations in living organisms. hPMs, which nonlinear processes in the atmosphere that
do not require the precise aiming necessary can affect the propagation of DE systems or
for hELs, can function as area weapons, de electromagnetic energy in general. Linear
pending on the frequency, field of view, range processes are those in which the DE beams do
to the target, and selection of either a large or not modify the characteristics of the atmo
small footprint.3 sphere—for example, scattering caused by
these weapons complement each other, each molecules, aerosols, rain drops, or other par
having advantages and disadvantages. hPM ticles. nonlinear effects such as thermal bloom
weapons cannot focus on as small an area as ing, a defocusing of the beam caused by heat
can hEL weapons but have proven effective ing of the beam path due to absorption, result
through clouds and fog since they experience from the presence and intensity of the DE
about two orders of magnitude less extinction beam itself.9 Both linear and nonlinear effects
(i.e., loss of energy due to absorption and scat combine to reduce intensity at the target.
tering) in those conditions than do hELs. Because the atmosphere decays exponen
hPMs generate high electric fields over the tially with height, its effects on hEL/hPM
entire target, in sharp contrast to the intense propagation vary most dramatically in the ver
energy delivered by a laser to a typically small tical. thus, a definition of the atmosphere’s
and precisely selected target area.4 Further vertical structure is in order. For the purposes

PIREP 59
of this article, the atmosphere consists of the Directed Energy Weapon
boundary layer; lower, middle, and upper at

mospheres; high altitude (as defined by the Systems and Environments
Air Force); and space regions (fig. 1).10 the the armed forces will develop unique DE
atmospheric zone where each DE system op weapon systems tailored to their various mis
erates influences not only those systems’ capa sions. Land warfare dictates smaller engage
bilities but also their support requirements. ment ranges than may be encountered
critical to the success of military weapon through the air or via the seas. the Army, Air
systems is understanding the conditions in Force, navy, and Marine corps must adapt DE
which they must operate. Atmospheric differ systems to their unique environments.
ences can affect DE systems in various ways,
depending on whether the weapon operates Army Systems and Their Anticipated
over water or land within the boundary layer Operating Environment
or in the upper atmosphere (fig. 1). For ex
ample, although a system may operate in the the Mobile tactical high Energy Laser
boundary layer, many different climates exist (MthEL), a combined effort of the uS Army
within this area (e.g., desert, tropical, wood and Israel, seeks to defeat rockets/artillery/
land), not to mention variations associated mortars (RAM), cruise missiles, short-range
with the four seasons. the varied DE systems ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles
under development or planned for military in the boundary layer of the atmosphere.11 In
use must account for the environments in addition to defeating the RAM threat, the
which they are designed to function. Army might also consider using DE solutions
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Figure 1. Structure of the atmosphere. (Adapted from “The Atmosphere,” Directed Energy Professional
Society, High-Energy Laser Weapon Systems Short Course, sec. 6, p. 50.)

to counter improvised explosive devices and Air Force Systems and Their Anticipated
man-portable air defense missiles.12 Although Operating Environment
not currently an active program, the MthEL the Air Force manages the airborne laser
helped pave the way for other programs such (ABL), a modified Boeing 747-400 aircraft de
as Skyguard, a land vehicle produced by signed to carry a high-energy chemical oxygen-
northrop Grumman that provides a laser-based
iodine laser (coIL) and shoot down enemy
air defense against short-range ballistic missiles,
ballistic missiles during their boost phase. the
RAM, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise
ABL operates primarily at altitudes between
missiles.13 Skyguard protects aircraft from man-
12 and 16 km, nearly ideal for a high-energy
portable air defense systems out to a range of
coIL because of the general absence of clouds,
roughly 20 km (12.4 miles); against harder
the vast reduction of water-vapor content, and
RAM targets, it has an effective range of 5 km
pressure that amounts to only about 20 per
(3.1 miles).14 Additionally, a laser ordnance-
cent of that at sea level, which further reduces
neutralization system integrated onto a hum
vee, dubbed “zeus,” has seen action in Iraq absorption. here, the laser has an expected
for destruction of surface land mines and un range of hundreds of kilometers. In January
exploded ordnance. Another descendant of the 2007, the ABL fired two solid-state illuminator
MthEL, the high Energy Laser Rocket Artil lasers at the nc-135E “Big crow” test aircraft,
lery Mortar vehicle, developed by northrop verifying the ability to track an airborne target
Grumman, is a truck-mounted hEL designed and measure atmospheric turbulence.18 on 8
to defeat the RAM threat.15 September 2008, the ABL aircraft successfully
In the future, Army DE systems may oper fired its high-energy chemical laser for the
ate at ranges from tens of kilometers against first time during ground testing at Edwards
larger weapons, to hundreds of meters against AFB, california.19 the ABL is scheduled to
small-arms fire, primarily confined to long conduct its first intercept test against an in-
and nearly horizontal paths in the boundary flight ballistic missile in 2009.20
layer. the potential to employ DE weapons on the Advanced tactical Laser (AtL), a
other Army platforms (e.g., tracked vehicles, modified c-130 aircraft with an integrated
wheeled vehicles, and helicopters) grows as DE coIL designed to support special operations,
weapons become modular and smaller. the functions in and through the boundary layer
precision and speed of hEL weapons raise the with the laser primarily directed toward Earth’s
possibility of use in the countersniper or sniper surface. thus, the diurnal variation of aerosol
mission. Due to the stealth of these systems effects, coupled with other manifestations of
(hELs emit no visible light beam and produce the dynamic nature of the lower and bound
no sound), they may offer a level of tactical ary layer of the atmosphere, is of extreme im
surprise not previously realized in warfare.16 portance for the AtL, which has an expected
the ground-based nature of potential range of tens of kilometers.
Army hEL engagements will be strongly af the degrading effects of the boundary
fected by the required long, oblique slant layer on hEL propagation vary throughout any
paths through the dense atmospheric bound given day with changes in relative humidity
ary layer. Additionally, the most stressing ef (fig. 2). Furthermore, the thickness of the
fects of aerosols and optical turbulence, boundary layer and the strength of optical tur
which create distortions within the atmo bulence also vary diurnally. At times, high rela
sphere, will often occur near the aperture of tive humidity can cause increased attenuation
the hEL, where any induced bending or due to scattering, but a correspondingly thin
spreading of the energy is more likely to re ner boundary layer or lower optical turbulence
duce the weapon’s effectiveness.17 thus, op could offset this negative effect somewhat. Ef
erational weather forecasting and tactical de forts to quantify these effects to optimize hEL
cision aids will likely play key roles in the engagement performance are likely to be of
employment of the Army’s hEL weapons. paramount importance.

PIREP 61

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8:00 12:00 16:00 20:00 0:00 4:00 8:00
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Figure 2. Variations in temperature, dew point, and relative humidity on a typical fair-weather
day at a midlatitude site (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, on 6–7 October 2004). Periods with lower
(higher) relative humidity are noted as times with reduced (enhanced) aerosol scattering and thus greater
(reduced) thermal-blooming effects. (Blooming is the effect that characterizes an intense laser beam
passed through an absorbing medium [such as the air], causing the absorbed energy to produce density
changes that can alter the intensity distribution of the beam and shift it away from the intended direction of
propagation. Thermal blooming is an effect associated with heating the atmosphere. “The Atmosphere,”
Directed Energy Professional Society, High-Energy Laser Weapon Systems Short Course, sec. 6, p. 50.)
Periods with greater solar heating and optical turbulence are also noted, primarily during afternoon / early
evening hours.
the director of the AtL Advanced concept lation Response man-portable laser weapon, a
technology Demonstration program has indi nonlethal deterrent for protecting troops and
cated that Boeing is considering an array of controlling hostile crowds. the operating en
potential fixed-wing platforms to carry the vironment for this weapon includes the very
AtL. A coIL device was installed in a c-130h lowest levels of the boundary layer. It uses la
in late 2007, and during a test on 7 August ser light that temporarily impairs aggressors
2008, the AtL aircraft fired its high-energy by illuminating or “dazzling” individuals, pre
chemical laser through its beam-control system, venting them from seeing the laser source and
which acquired a ground target and guided areas near it.22 use of this weapon in rain,
the laser beam to it, as directed by the AtL’s snow, or fog could have collateral, off-axis ef
battle-management system.21 fects not yet fully quantified.
the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) the Active Denial System (ADS), a nonlethal
has developed the Personnel halting and Stimu hPM DE weapon designed for use against per

sonnel, uses focused millimeter-wave beams to Weather-Support
produce an intolerable heating sensation

on a person’s skin. Mounted on a vehicle, Considerations
the ADS operates over primarily horizontal Describing and predicting the weather may
paths in the boundary layer against ground reach unprecedented levels for the proper
targets. According to a media demonstra employment of DE weapons. We cannot under
tion held at Moody AFB, Georgia, in Janu estimate the need for a better understanding
ary 2007, the vehicle’s two-man crew located of the atmosphere as it relates to DE weapons.
and affected targets more than 500 meters the work being done to address environ
away. Full production should begin in 2010.23 mental issues must be leveraged, but much
Further study is necessary to quantify the more is needed. We must also address weather
tactical impact of weather on ADS operations requirements for DE weapons.
because many tropical locations can experi
Accurate Characterization of the Atmosphere
ence conditions that cause up to a 30 per
cent loss of ADS beam energy over a 1 km DE weapons require an accurate characteriza
path. this is significant since it may force tion of the atmospheric path between sensor
ADS operators to adjust power output based and target. the same holds true of traditional
on humidity conditions. ordnance, but to a much lesser degree of ac
curacy since a bomb is not modified by the
Navy and Marine Systems and Their Anticipated atmosphere at the molecular level along the
Operating Environment path between the vehicle that transports it and
the intended target. For example, wind can
the navy is focusing efforts on several require blow a bomb dropped from high altitude off
ments that DE might help to address, such as course by a few hundred meters, but the bomb
protecting the fleet. Efforts include mitigating impacts somewhere on the ground. however,
air-sea cruise missiles, cigarette (fast-moving) at every step along a DE weapon beam’s in
boats, unmanned aircraft systems, rockets, tended propagation path, the atmosphere can
floating mines, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, modify its intensity, lethality, and overall effec
and other emerging threats.24 optimally, any tiveness. clearly, these types of weapons exem
system designed for use on navy surface-warfare plify an unprecedented dependence on accu
ships, which operate in a maritime environ rate weather characterization.
ment heavily laden with moisture in the form Laser weapons demand a more complete
of water vapor, should provide ship protection understanding of what happens to the beam
and indirect fire support to ground forces.25 along the potential engagement path than
these systems direct fire from maritime sur current predictive capabilities allow. there
face vessels toward a land or an airborne tar fore, we cannot overemphasize the need for
get. If DE systems proliferate onto navy and accurate characterization of a DE weapon’s
potential propagation path. Engagement dis
Marine aircraft that support ground forces or
tances and the changing environment create
provide fleet defense, they too will often oper
a need for more robust models and simula
ate in the lowest, most attenuating reaches of tions than currently exist in the AFW inven
the atmospheric boundary layer. tory. Much of the present research addresses
Marine corps systems for large- and small- beam-control issues related to the ABL, which
scale land engagements and close-quarters generally operates in the favorable environ
combat may prove similar to those used in ment of the middle and upper atmosphere.
tactical scenarios envisioned for the Army. this same type of emphasis must occur in the
thus, some opportunities may present them boundary layer, where smaller-scale DE weap
selves for leveraging investments from the ons operate. According to AFW’s transforma
other services. tion guidance, we must “anticipate and manage

PIREP 63
increasing model resolution, vertical domain high-fidelity forecast of the diurnally varying
from surface to near space, and physics require height of the boundary layer.28 Such detailed
ments based on new weapon systems coming forecasting in the apparent absence of “bad
into the inventory (e.g., Airborne Laser).”26 weather” differs significantly from traditional
AFW has concerns about whether or not Air Force and Army weather support but is
weather-support products are robust enough not completely unprecedented. the advent
to meet anticipated requirements for the em and later proliferation of infrared sensor and
ployment of DE weapons. imaging systems in the 1970s and 1980s led to
the development of electro-optical tactical de
Leveraging the Work of Others cision aids for weather forecasters, based upon
primitive radiative-transfer modeling algorithms
Army Materiel command manages the Battle
used in research and development. Equipped
field Environment Division, the lead DoD
with straightforward graphical user interfaces,
agency for research and development of
they were repackaged as operational decision
boundary-layer weapons unique to the Army.
aids.29 these aids saw use as, among other
AFW should be able to collaborate with the
things, “thermal crossovers” for infrared target
Army Research Laboratory to leverage the
ing systems, helping distinguish targets by
characterization of atmospheric effects on DE
highlighting differences between hot and cold
battlefield weapons used by the Army. this
backgrounds. As hEL and hPM systems enter
work not only could help AFW understand
the inventory, we will need operational decision
the effects of the atmosphere on these types of
aids for DE weapons, based on today’s sophis
weapons, based on Army tactics, but also could
ticated modeling, simulation, and research.
help support the development of unique fore
casting products for current or anticipated
needs not currently being addressed.27 Recommendations
Readiness for the Operational Weather Various activities can be utilized right now
Requirements of Directed Energy Weapons as we begin to support DE weapons. AFW has
many opportunities to tailor weather support.
tactics related to hEL and hPM systems will We must continue existing research and se
likely differ from those utilized for conven cure funding to help push atmospheric char
tional weapon systems. What is generally con acterization forward. Beyond the research and
sidered “fair weather” for conventional weap funding, which are key, we must have support
ons may not be favorable for DE weapons. from the services at the highest levels.
Again, citing the example illustrated by figure
2, the time of day during fair weather can have Leveraging Current Air Force Weather Activities
a dramatic influence on the effectiveness of
an engagement involving low-altitude DE AFW can begin by augmenting the education
weapons. A weather forecaster supporting such and training of new forecasters in the 335th
an engagement that includes low-altitude, tac training Squadron at Keesler AFB, Missis
tical, high-energy, solid-state lasers would sippi, with a block of instruction on weather
need to balance the counteracting effects of issues affecting the propagation of DE weap
reduced aerosol extinction with greatly in ons. For example, a “For Your Information”
creased optical turbulence in the afternoon, document or Air Force Weather Agency tech
as opposed to morning-hour conditions of nical note can help forecasters in the field. At
relatively high aerosol extinction and much most of its conferences and symposia, the Di
lower turbulence. Despite the quiescent weather rected Energy Professional Society offers short
suggested by figure 2, an accurate assessment courses in hEL propagation and hPMs taught
of the dwell time necessary to produce the de by subject-matter experts.30 Research model
sired effect on an hEL engagement in the ing and simulation codes such as the high En
boundary layer could not be made without a ergy Laser End-to-End operational Simulation

(hELEEoS), developed and managed by the Funding for Research

center for Directed Energy at the Air Force
Funding would help support many areas of re
Institute of technology (AFIt), and the Di
search. A key research topic would address
rected Energy Environmental Simulation tool whether today’s meteorological observations
(DEESt), managed by the AFRL’s Space Ve support DE weapons to the degree required.
hicles directorate, provide opportunities for We may need to develop new products, such
developing operational and tactical decision as optical-turbulence maps, molecular and
aids.31 By attending briefings or short courses, aerosol absorption maps, scattering maps,
senior leaders across the DoD can begin to thermal-blooming maps, and others. these
understand the effects of weather. In summary, types of environmental inquiries will involve
AFW can begin educating forecasters and academia, private industry, and the DoD.
those in leadership positions at senior levels We must urge senior-level DoD and con
both inside and outside the DoD. Educated gressional leaders to understand the criticality
leaders can help secure funding for research of continuing support for research, develop
and development since they understand the ment, and testing related to DE and environ
problems associated with forecasting for DE mental effects on DE weapons. Proper charac
weapons. Leveraging high-fidelity modeling terization and prediction of the environment
codes such as hELEEoS and DEESt will as are warranted in order to quantify environ
sist with incorporating weather effects on DE mental impacts. Benefits include speed-of
propagation spanning from ultraviolet to ra light engagement, precision strike to destroy,
dio frequencies. these available codes—can area strike to disable, low expended mass per
didates for decision-aid software used by the engagement (deep magazine), and low cost per
operational weather community—have been engagement.33 Furthermore, uS adversaries
validated as modeling tools and have earned are rapidly moving ahead with the develop
credibility in the research community. ment of DE weapons (especially hELs).34 A
better understanding of how environment
Current Research Efforts modifies the performance of such weapons
AFW must examine current programs spon would become an exploitable advantage even
sored by the high Energy Laser Joint tech if the adversary has superior hardware.
nology office (hEL-Jto) to assess the rele
vance of the research in terms of assessment Advocacy
of atmospheric effects and prediction for op AFW and the Air Force Weather Agency,
erational DE weapons. Established in 2000 to through the Weather Requirements for op
manage a comprehensive approach to the de erational capabilities council, must continue
velopment of hEL science and technology for to work with the acquisition community to an
DoD organizations, this office has had annual ticipate and determine unique support needs.35
operating budgets in recent years in excess of new DE weapon-systems prediction information
$70 million, with programs sponsored across such as optical-turbulence forecasts, aerosol-
industry, academia, and government agen concentration products, boundary-layer height
cies.32 Sponsored programs include research forecasts, and so forth, will require policy sup
and development of the hELEEoS at AFIt port and coordination from the Air Force
and part of the DEESt development at the Weather Agency. other products may be re
AFRL. Leveraging current efforts pursued by quired to support the numerous systems un
the AFRL’s Directed Energy directorate der development.
(AFRL/RD), the office of naval Research, headquarters Air Force Materiel command,
and the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Intelligence and Requirements (AFMc/A2/5)
command may also provide useful research may be in the best position to address weather-
that supports atmospheric propagation of acquisition concerns related to Air Force DE
hELs and hPMs. systems as they make the transition from the

PIREP 65
labs to the war fighter. For the Air Force, ronmental effects), as well as the unintended
AFMc could serve as lead command for this strategic/political fallout that such a lack of
effort. headquarters AFMc/A2/5 must ac support could have on future operations. We
count for these atmospheric-related concerns must encourage current research efforts that
before any air or space system becomes opera translate easily into operational decision aids
tional. close cooperation among AFRL/RD, for atmospheric characterization and assess
Army Space and Missile Defense command, ment. Education and training in DE weapons
naval Sea Systems command, acquisition pro are necessary for senior leaders and for people
fessionals, and the operational community is at all levels of the Air Force weather commu
essential. nity to ensure weapons effectiveness against
Political considerations must become a part potential enemies. the united States’ adver
of this effort. Engaging the wrong target can saries are not waiting for tomorrow; they are
have massive geo-political consequences, which acting today.36
can affect the acceptance and use of a new We anticipate no major changes in the or
type of weapon that could change warfare. ganization of AFW. however, weather personnel
may need to fill key positions in the hEL-Jto,
AFRL/RD, or naval Sea Systems command to
Conclusions advocate and lead efforts to address atmo
With continued funding for research and spheric characterization. collaboration with
focused advocacy by senior leaders, an already hEL-Jto, AFRL/RD, academia, and private
robust AFW community can transform itself industry is essential to keep abreast of ad
into a superior support provider for DE weap vancements in areas related to military opera
ons and an enhancer of employment. Fund tions. AFIt and the AFRL should receive
ing from hEL-Jto, major military commands, funding to continue the upgrading/improv
and the Army can help answer how best to ing of software codes such as hELEEoS and
mitigate and/or, perhaps, ultimately exploit DEESt, and mission-level decision aids based
atmospheric effects in the employment of DE on these research tools must be developed. In
weapons. We need advocacy in various arenas the current fiscal climate, increased manning
as commands and agencies continue to battle is not a realistic expectation, so accurate char
for precious resources. Senior leaders must acterization of the atmosphere through deci
understand the potential consequences of not sion aids will likely be necessary—and might
supporting these research and development possibly represent the accepted solution. AFW
efforts (e.g., DE weapon systems may not per can shape DE support and optimize DE per
form as expected due to unanticipated envi- formance for tomorrow by acting today. ❑
Notes
1. Air Force Mission Directive 52, Air Force Weather 6. hPM: A form of energy that can “deny, disrupt,
Agency, March 2004, 1. damage, and destroy” electronics. hPMs are designed to
2. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, Dc: incapacitate equipment, not humans. Walling, High Power
Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 1, http://www Microwaves, 1, 20. See also uSAF Scientific Advisory Board,
.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf. New World Vistas, 8.
3. col Eileen M. Walling, High Power Microwaves: Stra 7. Richard J. Dunn, “operational Implications of Laser
tegic and Operational Implications for Warfare, occasional Weapons,” Analysis center Papers (Los Angeles: northrop
Paper no. 11 (Maxwell AFB, AL: center for Strategy and Grumman Analysis center, 2005), 19.
technology, Air War college, February 2000), 6, http:// 8. Ibid., 20.
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat11.pdf. 9. capt De Leon c. narcisse, “comparison of the Re
4. uSAF Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air fractive Index Structure constant Derived from numerical
and Space Power for the 21st Century—Directed Energy Volume Weather Prediction (nWP) Models and thermosonde
(Washington, Dc: uSAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1995), 7. Data” (master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of technology,
5. Walling, High Power Microwaves, 2. March 2003), 17.

10. Air Force Space command news Service, “near- www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123012699 (accessed
Space Programs to Provide Persistent Space capability,” 8 January 2009).
SpaceRef.com, 15 March 2005, http://www.spaceref.com/ 23. Elliott Minor, “Ray Gun Makes targets Feel As If
news/viewpr.html?pid=16403 (accessed 9 January 2009). on Fire,” Air Force Times, 25 January 2007, http://www.air
11. northrop Grumman corporation, “Mobile tactical forcetimes.com/news/2007/01/apRayGun070125/ (ac
high Energy Laser (MthEL),” Defense Update: International cessed 9 January 2009).
Online Defense Magazine, July 2006, 1, http://www.defense 24. B. tait, briefing, high Energy Laser Joint tech
-update.com/news/MthEL.htm (accessed 8 January 2009). nology office Annual Review, Monterey, cA, subject: na
12. c. Lamar, briefing, high Energy Laser Joint tech val Sea Systems command, PMS 405, 3 May 2005.
nology office Annual Review, Monterey, cA, subject: uS 25. cAPt William J. Mccarthy, uSn, Directed Energy
Army Space and Missile Defense command, 3 May 2005. and Fleet Defense: Implications for Naval Warfare, occasional
13. northrop Grumman corporation, “Mobile tactical Paper no. 10 (Maxwell AFB, AL: center for Strategy and
high Energy Laser (MthEL).” technology, Air War college, May 2000), 21, http://www
14. Jefferson Morris, “northrop unveils Skyguard Laser .au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/occppr10.htm.
Air Defense System,” Aviationweek.com, 13 July 2006, http:// 26. Air Force Weather Strategic Plan and Vision, FY 2008–
www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp 2032 (offutt AFB, nE: Air Force Weather Agency, August
?channel=defense&id=news/LASE07136.xml (accessed 8 2004), 2.
January 2009). 27. The Federal Plan for Meteorological Services and Sup
15. Marc Selinger, “u.S. Army Studying Guns, Lasers, porting Research, Fiscal Year 2008 (Washington, Dc: uS De
Interceptors to Destroy RAMs,” Aviationweek.com, 28 octo partment of commerce / national oceanic and Atmo
ber 2004, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story spheric Administration, office of the Federal coordinator
_generic.jsp?channel=aerospacedaily&id=news/RAM for Meteorology, August 2007), 145, http://www.ofcm
10284.xml (accessed 8 January 2009). .gov/fp-fy08/pdf/entire-fedplanFY2008.pdf.
16. Dunn, “operational Implications of Laser Weap 28. the dwell time is the time the laser spot is main
ons,” 21. tained on the target for the desired effect. See Directed
17. See George Y. Jumper and Robert R. Beland, Energy Professional Society, high-Energy Laser Weapon
“Progress in the understanding and Modeling of Atmo
Systems Short course, sec. 8, p. 3.
spheric optical turbulence,” AIAA-2000-2355 (paper pre
29. Maj K. G. cottrell et al., Electro-Optical Handbook,
sented at 31st American Institute of Aeronautics and As
Volume 1: Weather Support for Precision Guided Munitions, Air
tronautics Plasmadynamics and Lasers conference,
Weather Service technical Report AWS/tR-79/002 (Scott
Denver, co, 19–22 June 2000). optical turbulence is de
AFB, IL: Air Weather Service, May 1979).
fined as “temporal and spatial fluctuations in the index of
30. “DEPS Short courses,” Directed Energy Profes
refraction that result from atmospheric turbulence.”
sional Society, http://www.deps.org/DEPSpages/short
18. tSgt Eric M. Grill, “Airborne Laser Returns for
More testing,” Air Force news, 26 January 2007, http:// courses.html (accessed 9 January 2009).
www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123038913 (accessed 8 31. “high Energy Laser End-to-End operational Simu
January 2009). lation (hELEEoS),” Air Force Institute of technology, cen
19. “Boeing, Airborne Laser team Begin Firing high- ter for Directed Energy, http://www.afit.edu/de/Default
Energy Laser on ABL Aircraft,” Boeing, 8 September .cfm (accessed 8 January 2009).
2008, http://www.boeing.com/ids/news/2008/q3/080908 32. Lt col John B. Wissler, “organization of the Joint
a_nr.html (accessed 8 January 2009). technology office: Finding the Right Model for an Inte
20. “Boeing-Led Airborne Laser team Fires tracking grated, coordinated Investment Strategy,” Program Man
Laser at Airborne target,” Boeing, 16 March 2007, http:// ager Magazine, november–December 2002, 26, http://
www.boeing.com/news/releases/2007/q1/070316d_nr www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf02/nov_Dec/wis-jf3.pdf;
.html (accessed 8 January 2009); and “Boeing-Led Air and uS Government Accountability office to congressional
borne Laser team Actively tracks Airborne target, com committees, memorandum GAo-05-933R high Energy
pensates for Atmospheric turbulence and Fires Surrogate Laser transition Plans, subject: Department of Defense’s
high-Energy Laser,” Boeing, 16 July 2007, http://www Assessment Addresses congressional concerns but Lacks
.boeing.com/news/releases/2007/q3/070716c_nr.html Details on high Energy Laser transition Plans, 28 July
(accessed 8 January 2009). 2005, 5, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05933r.pdf (ac
21. Dave Ahearn, “Boeing Laser Weapon Develop cessed 9 January 2009).
ment Achieves Major Advances,” uS Air Force AIM Points, 33. uSAF Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas, 8.
16 october 2006, http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm 34. Shaveta Bansal, “Pentagon confirms china’s Anti-
?id=14435&printer=no (accessed 8 January 2009); and Satellite Laser test,” All headline news, 6 october 2006,
“Boeing tests Entire Weapon System on Advanced tactical http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7005096999
Laser Aircraft,” Boeing, 13 August 2008, http://www (accessed 28 February 2007).
.boeing.com/ids/news/2008/q3/080813a_nr.html (ac 35. Ibid.
cessed 8 January 2009). 36. col M. D. zettlemoyer, chief, Integration, Plans,
22. Eva D. Blaylock, “new technology ‘Dazzles’ Ag and Requirements, to AF/A3o-WR/RP, MAJcoM A3Ws,
gressors,” Air Force Print news, 2 november 2005, http:// letter, 12 February 2007.

Operators of Air
As the Air Force plans the integration of
Force Unmanned
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the
fleet, it confronts a personnel system and
Aircraft Systems
culture designed for and inherently biased
towards manned aviation. In this article,
the author discusses the history of UAS per
Breaking Paradigms* sonnel policy, training, and operations,
highlighting the growing chasm between
manned and unmanned flight and encour
Lt CoL Houston R. CantweLL, usaF
aging the reader to challenge paradigms.
The proposed UAS operator badge combines the historic pilot shield with space-operator wings, recognizing that
only Airmen who physically take to the air earn the right to wear feathered wings. It symbolizes the role of these op
erators as “pilots” of unmanned aircraft yet recognizes that they control airpower from a console on the ground, as do
space-operations professionals.
*This article is derived from the author’s thesis “Beyond Butterflies: Predator and the Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
Air Force Culture,” which he wrote at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in
2007. Sincere appreciation goes to Dr. Stephen Chiabotti and Lt Col John Davis of the SAASS faculty and to Maj Brannen Cohee for their
guidance in preparing the article.
67
01-Feature-Cantwell.indd 67 4/28/09 1:28:28 PM

My concern is that our services are still not moving aggressively in wartime to provide resources
needed now on the battlefield. I’ve been wrestling for months to get more intelligence, surveil
lance, and reconnaissance assets into the theater. Because people were stuck in old ways of doing
business, it’s been like pulling teeth. . . . All this may require rethinking long-standing service
assumptions and priorities about which missions require certified pilots and which do not.
—Secretary of Defense robert M. gates
Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 21 April 2008
D
Uring hiS ViSiT to the hallowed that we weren’t going to get [the program] ei
halls of the former Air Corps Tactical ther. That’s why we insisted on pilots.”1
School, Secretary of Defense gates Air Force senior leaders dedicated themselves
called upon Airmen to think criti to providing the necessary expertise to assure
cally about many of the challenges facing the Predator’s early success: “general Fogleman
Air Force, specifically questioning whether or said as he sent non-volunteer instructor pilots
not future operators of unmanned aircraft sys to fly the Predator UAV, ‘if this program fails,
tems (UAS) need to be rated pilots. As dem it won’t be because of our pilots.’ ”2 The deci
onstrated through years of policy debate, this sion at the onset to utilize navigators as UAS
difficult question still receives attention. Analy operators, provided they also possessed a Fed
sis of current personnel policy, opinions of eral Aviation Administration commercial/in
noted aviators, and historical lessons reveals a strument aircraft rating, increased the pool of
growing chasm between manned and un aviators from which operators were selected.
manned flight. Existing paradigms surround Policies governing the management of UAS
ing UAS operators require rethinking due to operators have had a brief but turbulent his
technological advances and the Air Force’s tory, including issues such as the awarding of
cultural traditions. flying-gate credit and establishing eligibility
for combat medals. The possibility of creating
a separate career field for UAS operators has
In the Beginning . . . generated even more controversy.3 general
Policies governing UAS aircrews have roots Jumper made the first such proposal, estab
with gen ronald Fogleman, former chief of lishing a combat systems officer, followed a
staff of the Air Force. in the mid-1990s, during few years later by a second one—the “17XX,”
the genesis of the Predator UAS, he formu representing a new Air Force specialty code.4
lated the original policies, which have changed The latter proposal gained enough momen
little over the years. recognizing that the Army tum that three volunteer test-case trainees en
had experienced operational problems with tered the program, which, despite demonstrat
UASs, many Air Force people believed that ing potential, was abruptly cancelled on 13
these failures were in part due to the Army’s December 2006, and the three officers received
treating these aircraft as “trucks.” When the new assignments.5 initial indications from
Air Force took over the Predator program in gen norton Schwartz, the current Air Force
1995, its senior leaders declared that they chief of staff, demonstrate a willingness to re
would “treat them like airplanes.” According open the debate regarding establishment of a
to gen John Jumper, another former chief of separate UAS career field.
staff, “The original notion of using pilots was
because of the Army experience [with unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV)]. . . . if you treat it like
Professional Opinion
an airplane, it will act like an airplane. . . . We Over the years, proponents of a separate
were trying to get the accident rate down and career field have held strong convictions,
get the operator-caused accidents down. We pointing to the unique technical skills re
knew if we crashed a bunch of these things, quired to operate UASs as sufficient justifica

OPERATORS OF AIR FORCE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 69
tion. For example, Col Michael McKinney, lishment of a distinct UAS career path would
former commander of the Predator Opera negate. Additionally, Colonel Wilson recog
tions group, supports creation of a new career nizes that the increasing complexities of UAS
field similar to the one proposed in 17XX, missions demand dedicated personnel. not
with young officers starting with Specialized ing that manning UAS squadrons with pre
Undergraduate Pilot Training and then branch dominantly first-assignment individuals has
ing into a UAS career. Operators would de brought many challenges, he observes, “What
velop judgment about these aircraft over the if we proposed manning [F-16 or B-1] squad
course of their flying careers. he believes that rons in this manner? We’d say you were crazy.”9
alternative ways of building airmanship exist A new career field would bring continuity to
and that Airmen can learn to extract three- the community.
dimensional situational awareness from a two- retired colonel Tom Ehrhard, who wrote
dimensional screen.6 an influential doctoral dissertation at Johns
Col Stephen Wilson, a former assistant op hopkins University in 2001 on the development
erations officer with Air Education and Train of UASs within the armed services, strongly
ing Command, who helped develop the 17XX supports designation of a new career field. he
syllabus, offers a pragmatic approach towards recognizes two fundamental pieces in its de
UAS training. recognizing that the identifica sign. First, it must satisfy the technical require
tion of key skills and the appropriate training ments to operate UASs efficiently and effec
of students helped develop the Specialized tively in both combat and in mixed-aircraft,
Undergraduate Pilot Training syllabus, he ar controlled airspace. Second, and equally im
gues that a similar process could occur with portant, long-term success demands cultural
UAS operators. The process should determine integration. Any new career field must de
the skill sets required to operate UASs, design velop personnel who maintain professional
a training syllabus around those skills, and se credibility with the rest of the combat air
lect the people best suited to carry out the force. in turn, these officers would form a
mission—at that point, training would begin.7 constituency within the service to advocate
Aside from recognizing a new set of skills follow-on systems. Ehrhard proposes opening
required to fly UASs, Colonel Wilson’s pro a UAS career field to individuals not physically
posal also addresses a significant Air Force qualified to fly Air Force aircraft but capable
cultural issue relating to UAS personnel. Since of passing the Federal Aviation Administra
Predator’s genesis, the Air Force has struggled tion’s class-three physical examination—require
with finding enough high-quality volunteers ments more lenient than Air Force standards.
to fly UASs. in order to explain some of the This would open the career field to a new
intricacies of Air Force culture, Colonel Wilson group of people not qualified to fly Air Force
breaks an Air Force commander’s personnel- aircraft. Most importantly, these individuals
ranking system into three tiers.8 Tier-one indi would be highly motivated volunteers from
viduals, whom the commander wants to keep the start.10
in the weapon system, have outperformed their Colonel Ehrhard also recognizes the im
peers and have the most potential for future portance of maintaining flying credibility and
leadership roles. Falling just below them, tier developing airmanship, recommending the
twos generally have also done a good job with addition of a career-long aircrew enhancement
their mission but just do not have what it takes program, which would direct that UAS opera
to earn first-tier status. Commanders encour tors maintain flight currencies in a compan
age these personnel to serve in training com ion aircraft such as the T-1, T-6, or T-38.11 This
mand as flight instructors. generally, people would offer UAS pilots the opportunity to bol
in tier three, who have done a fine job fulfill ster their credibility and develop airmanship.
ing the mission but are simply outperformed historically, such programs have supplemented
by their peers, normally find themselves pushed aircrew training by providing additional flight
into UAS assignments—a tendency that estab hours through the use of T-37 or T-38 aircraft.

Pilots who fly the B-2 and U-2 have benefited UPT, all i had were stick-and-rudder skills and
from T-38 training due to the relatively small some knowledge about weather. . . . i knew
number of flight hours available in their ma just enough to stay safe. . . . i developed air
jor weapon system. manship over the years.”16
The final set of perspectives comes from
three highly respected Air Force leaders, all of
whom support (in some fashion) creation of a Training and Operations for
new UAS career field. general Jumper, who Unmanned Aircraft Systems
encourages implementation of the combat-

systems-officer concept, recognizes the impor The last decade of UAS operations has re
tance of putting the Air Force’s UAS operators fined training practices and operational pro
in aircraft so that they can more easily under cedures in the Predator, reaper, and global
stand flight.12 his ultimate concern involves hawk communities. Events within each have
the building of “credentialed warriors” who produced many lessons learned. Facing an in
must fully understand how best to employ air satiable demand for intelligence, surveillance,
power and internalize the ramifications of their and reconnaissance, the Predator community
actions. regarding UAS operators, he notes has streamlined training practices to the ex
that “the nintendo mentality is a detached treme. Even in its brief history, reaper has
mentality. This stuff is real. i’m taking real had its training practices shaped in a similar
lives. i’m shooting real weapons. And i have to manner. Discussions with global hawk profes
be really responsible for my actions.”13 gen sionals identified distinct differences between
eral Jumper’s concept of the combat systems skill sets used by traditional pilots and those
officer moves away from using pilots but re used regularly by UAS operators. global hawk
mains focused on the development of airman operators also recognized the ability to relax
ship. Former Air Force chief of staff gen independent decision-making requirements,
Michael ryan recognizes the ever-increasing given the ability to “bring additional people
levels of UAS autonomous operations and rec into your cockpit” to help solve problems.
ommends reevaluating pilots’ roles in them: The last decade has identified many differ
“We shouldn’t have pilots stick-and-ruddering ences between manned and unmanned aviation
UAVs.”14 The Air Force should keep pilots in in the Air Force, thus justifying noteworthy
the operational decision-making process, but changes to training programs. The tremendous
emerging automated flight-control systems such demand for Predator coverage has forced
as autotakeoff and autoland should permit re maximum operational efficiencies. To assure
moving them from the controls. Finally, ac availability of a full complement of personnel
cording to gen richard hawley, former com for contingency operations, the squadrons have
mander of Air Combat Command, “i’ve spent carefully evaluated their training programs
time in a [UAS] control van. You don’t need and made important changes. Comparing
500 hours of F-16 time to know how to fly a such programs to those of traditionally crewed
Predator. You do need to understand some aircraft, one finds at least two noteworthy dif
thing about winds, weather, and the environ ferences. First, the operational Predator and
ment in which the Predator operates.”15 he reaper squadrons, 99 percent of whose opera
recommends that the Air Force evaluate a tions are real-world contingencies, do not
“much truncated” program of Specialized Un carve time out of their flying-hour program to
dergraduate Pilot Training followed by a ca meet training requirements. Second, uninter
reer in UAS operations, air-battle manage rupted contingency operations question the
ment, and command and control. To those relevance of many of the currencies typically
who argue against his proposal for a separate maintained by pilots. Elimination of takeoff
career path, he points out, “When i started and landing currencies, for instance, has
UPT [Undergraduate Pilot Training], i was caused significant changes to the Predator
just another guy off the street. . . . When i left training syllabus.

Unending demand for Predator support, however, it quickly became apparent that op
coupled with limited personnel availability, erators flying the Predator from the mission
has prompted operational squadrons to elimi control element back at nellis AFB, nevada,
nate continuation-training sorties. The need would not have to perform takeoffs or land
for personnel to fly contingency missions is so ings—flown only as line-of-sight operations
great and the supply of Predator crews so (not through beyond-line-of-sight satellite com
small that any effort directed away from con munication) by personnel forward-deployed
tingency operations reduces the squadron’s in-theater. Therefore, only the crew of the
capacity to provide intelligence, surveillance, launch-and-recovery element needed takeoff
and reconnaissance.17 The lack of continua and landing skills. individuals selected to de
tion training may appear unimportant in light ploy forward would receive the necessary train
of the fact that most Predator flying occurs on ing in takeoff and landing just prior to their
autopilot while the aircraft collects video. deployment. Many people considered this the
however, a closer look at the types of missions most challenging part of Predator initial train
flown by the 15th reconnaissance Squadron ing; indeed, it occupied almost one-third of
reveals that, in addition to video collection, it the entire syllabus.19 Eliminating takeoff and
flies some of the most demanding missions landing from this document increased the
available. The squadron’s Predators routinely availability of Predator operators, thereby add
conduct close air support, air interdiction, ing to the number of combat air patrols flown
support of special forces, and killer scout mis in support of the war fighter.
sions.18 in comparison, pilots of A-10s and F The idea of eliminating training in takeoff
16s maintain carefully regulated currencies and landing from the Predator schoolhouse
and training requirements for such challeng
syllabus did not sit well with some people. Lt
ing events. Should the training of UAS opera
Col James gear, commander of the 11th re
tors follow suit, or is the cost of taking them
connaissance Squadron, initially opposed the
off the combat-flying schedule too great?
idea because “that’s where you learned how to
reaper challenges old training paradigms
fly the airplane. That’s where you learned the
to an even greater extent. its operators must
employ a host of weapons, including hellfire stick-and-rudder skills.”20 Later, however, he
missiles and laser-guided bombs, in a multi came to realize that a majority of the time
tude of possible scenarios. Additionally, they spent flying the Predator occurred in a mis
must collect streaming video around the clock sion control element on autopilot: “The bot
in support of intelligence requirements. Such tom line is we’ve been successful not teaching
conflicting requirements as maintaining im people how to take off and land. . . . You’ve
portant training currencies and supporting got to approach everything with UAVs and get
contingency operations will only grow stron over your paradigms.”21 in the 11th recon
ger as reaper’s capabilities increase. naissance Squadron, the possibility exists that
in 2003 a significant change to Predator an instructor pilot not qualified to land the
operations occurred with the advent of re aircraft could fly a training mission over nevada
mote split operations, a concept permitting a and experience engine problems. recognizing
majority of the squadron to directly support the risk, Colonel gear discussed it with leaders
theater operations from a central location by of the 432nd Operations group. he accepted
means of networked command and control. the possibility that if engine failure occurred,
Careful observation reveals that this capability the Predator operator would either call down
significantly affected training. Formerly, Preda the hallway and direct qualified personnel to
tor crews deployed essentially as a squadron to take the controls as soon as possible—or might
support contingency operations, performing elect to try to land the aircraft himself, “giving
every aspect of the mission in-theater, from it a shot.” he recognized that in some cases,
takeoff, to mission execution, to landing. With “giving it a shot” might be an acceptable an
the establishment of remote split operations, swer in UAS operations.22

Years of Predator operations have helped airspace, and taking off and landing the air
identify pertinent skills. According to Brig gen craft. A typical mission of 24 hours requires
Charles Lyon, “Less than 50 percent of Preda only 30 minutes of interaction with control
tor pilots’ skills rely on stick and rudder—most lers as the aircraft transits from the surface to
has to do with the operational experience that 18,000 feet and back.26 given the rotating
rated aircrews have from previously flying air eight-hour shifts and mission lengths of 24
planes and operating in the environment.”23 hours, global hawk operators typically deal
As Predator becomes more automated with with controllers only once every two months.27
the addition of capabilities such as autotake instead, a significant amount of time spent on
off and autoland, the requirement for stick- missions involves optimizing collection efforts.
and-rudder skills will further decrease. Maj During these “ad hoc taskings,” operators bal
Thomas Meeks, a former Predator operator, ance last-minute collection requests against
believes that “it makes sense to separate tech previous taskings. Working within the chain of
nical skills from judgment skills in UAVs.”24 command, they constantly revise the collec
Pilots of traditional aircraft must necessarily tion plan to maximize results of each mission.
develop their stick-and-rudder skills simulta global hawk’s high level of automation has
neously with judgment and airmanship (be introduced new challenges to the develop
cause they must always remain physically air ment of proper training regimens for operators.
borne to do so), but Predator operators can Unlike Predator, global hawk already uses
refine their judgment and airmanship inde autotakeoff and autoland capabilities instead
pendently of their technical skills. For the of stick and rudder. The pilot simply monitors
most part, the computer handles most of the aircraft operations to make the system execute
stick-and-rudder challenges. Major Meeks adds
as directed, a concept that challenges tradi
that “pilots bring an initial appreciation for
tional thinking about airmanship development—
the medium of air, the integration of multiple
or even the definition of airmanship. global
air assets, and a basic understanding of the
hawk pilots rely on their previous experience
employment of airpower.”25 Time spent in the
with major weapon systems for a great deal of
Predator continues to develop many basic air
manship skills, including how best to integrate their judgment. The longer their assignment to
the platform into the airspace, support troops global hawk, the more their airmanship skills
on the ground, and ensure safe recovery of fade because the missions typically do not en
the vehicle. Development of this type of judg gage those skills.28 According to Colonel Jella,
ment can occur largely independently of stick- “After a year, it’s actually that our experience
and-rudder skills due to the advent of more level is backwards—the experienced guys are
sophisticated autopilot functions. Although the brand-new ones coming in, with airmanship
some similarities exist, the skills required of and situational awareness, and they become
a Predator operator differ from those of a complacent after a period.”29 Mission profiles
pilot—which differ from those of a global send aircraft primarily on preplanned routes
hawk operator. carefully monitored by the pilots. One of the
The global hawk community has also wres greatest challenges to flying global hawk, un
tled with the task of properly determining like flying traditionally crewed aircraft, is the
training requirements. in a recent interview, requirement to know the preplanned proce
Lt Col Christopher Jella, commander of the dures for a lost-communications link, which
18th reconnaissance Squadron, highlighted change throughout the flight profile and require
many challenges to global hawk operations. constant situational awareness. Because auto
The long duration of missions and high alti mated procedures and advanced autopilot con
tudes (in excess of 50,000 feet) prevent global trols govern basic aircraft control, the global
hawk operators from developing skills typi hawk operator’s airmanship skills rarely come
cally associated with Airmen: interacting with into play during routine missions. Thus, when
air traffic controllers, transiting controlled anomalies do occur, they can be hair-raising.

Although normal operations may not sig formation on the situation as the pilot. Dur
nificantly test a pilot’s airmanship, the nature ing requests for help, no longer can the pilot
of global hawk operations requires pilots to chastise individuals on the ground, accusing
draw upon every ounce of airmanship they them of having no idea about what is happen
have ever developed to handle such anomalies. ing in the cockpit. Everyone involved can build
Compared to pilots of traditional aircraft, in situational awareness from the same set of in
dividuals flying global hawks from halfway formation displays. Colonel Jella points out that
around the world must deal with a host of ad the issue is discussed at length in seminars on
ditional issues when maintenance problems the management of crew resources and that
occur. First, assessment of the situation is more
[squadron leaders have] to understand that
difficult since pilots cannot “feel” how the air they don’t need the experience—the aircraft
craft is handling. They know only the informa commander does. . . . So look at the situation,
tion transmitted into the ground-control station, comprehend it, give the pilot your inputs, and
having just their instruments at their disposal. walk away from the situation. . . . it’s essential for
Something as simple as air turbulence can easily the pilot’s experience as a decision maker, the
be mistaken for a flight-control anomaly.30 development of their logic trains, and their
next, due to the long duration of missions, no problem-solving skills, that squadron leadership
single pilot can bring continuity to a complete does not spoon-feed pilots through decision-
mission. Although pilots conduct a thorough making processes.32
debrief as they swap out the controls, it is im These examples, pulled from the opera
possible to completely capture the aircraft’s tional environment of Predator, reaper, and
performance across an entire mission. Brig global hawk, highlight the divergence of un
gen h. D. Polumbo, commander of the 9th manned and manned aviation. Of even greater
reconnaissance Wing, believes that “when deal importance to any discussion of the profes
ing with an emergency aircraft that is operat sional development of future UAS operators is
ing thousands of miles away at 60,000 feet and the Air Force’s proud history of manned flight.
dealing with malfunctioning critical aircraft
systems . . . you had better have a great deal of
airmanship in your pocket to ensure the safe Cultural Considerations
recovery of the aircraft.”31 Critical, unanswered
questions remain: how does the Air Force de An investigation of perceptions of UAS as
lineate the differences between manned and signments unveils several important issues. As
unmanned aviation? Can airmanship be de an institution, the Air Force has developed
veloped solely through the remote operation cultural norms regarding pilots and their de
of aircraft? velopment as leaders. in turn, pilots them
The final issue uncovered within the global selves have developed career expectations as
hawk community relates to the development professional Air Force aviators. The introduc
of pilots’ decision-making abilities. Unmanned tion of UASs into the inventory contests many
aviation has the unique capability to access ad of these norms.
ditional expertise; that is, individuals at the Pilots love to fly. A passage from Mark
controls of global hawk can always either call Wells’s book Courage and Air Warfare captures
for assistance on the telephone or, in most the emotional bond between pilots and flight:
cases, even physically bring an expert into the The visual and kinesthetic sensations could seem
control center with them. Doing so, however, almost intoxicating.
can create a problem in the long run. Calling The rest was wonder, a joy compounded of ex
on higher-level commanders to weigh in on hilaration, a limitless sense of freedom and reach
important decisions allows us to spoon-feed to the very limits of the sky. how many pilots
young pilots through difficult decisions. Due have shared this sensation which defies adequate
to the physical location of the pilot, the casual description! The instant of knowing that the
observer can often have just about as much in skies truly are yours in which to fly and soar, to

glide and swoop, is truly a moment of sweetness stream of pilots cycling through the Predator
incomparable to any other.33 schoolhouse, completing an operational tour,
Air Force pilots may love to fly, but they also and then immediately returning to their ma
pursue a career in aviation for societal status: jor weapon system—a cycle that has failed to
“From the earliest days of aviation, airmen fulfill the demand for Predator crews.
have been regarded as members of an elite People who joined the service to become
group.”34 Today’s Air Force subculture sup pilots would rather fly airplanes than UASs.
ports this perception. Pilots must undergo rig The last 10 years of the Predator operators’
orous physical examinations and pass a de assignment history demonstrate Air Force pi
manding, year-long training regimen to earn lots’ desire to stay in cockpits instead of
their wings. Put simply, pilots are a select ground-control stations. Pilots choose cock
group of specialists. The advent of “unmanned pits first, leaving tier-three personnel to fill
flying” requires Airmen to give up the oppor the remaining UAS billets. The Air Force
tunity to fly, to relinquish their membership needs to aggressively target motivated people
in the fraternity of pilots. For some, the op who will voluntarily pursue careers in UASs. A
portunity to fly means even more to them separate career field of volunteers would solve
than their professional military service.35 Lt many of the challenges currently facing the
Col James Dawkins nicely sums up the cultural UAS community. Morale and dedication to the
considerations regarding unmanned operations: development of unmanned aircraft would in
crease if, in the future, people came into the
The culture of the Air Force flying community Air Force with the expectation of flying them.38
itself added to feelings of inadequacy [in rela
tion to UAV careers]. it is a culture where opera
tors identify themselves with their respective Implications
airframes more so than their occupation. if you
ask an aviator what he does in the Air Force, he Over the years, a clearly defined set of tech
is likely to answer with “i’m a bomber pilot” or nical skills and cultural associations has com
“i’m a Viper (F-16) pilot.” Some even consider bined to forge the image of Air Force pilots,
themselves pilots first and Air Force officers sec who must understand the physiological stresses
ond. But ask a Predator pilot what he flies and of flight, the medium of air, and, of course,
he’s likely to say “i’m a former Viper (Eagle, C-5,
the airplane. They harbor an independent
B-1) pilot, but i fly Predators now.”36
spirit, permitting them to make decisions from
We cannot overlook the cultural percep their often-isolated cockpits. Along with the
tions of unmanned systems. Since its begin technical aspects of being a pilot, a cultural
ning, the Air Force has taken pride in its chiv association also accompanies the title. Pilots
alrous nature, raising warfare out of the must pass strict physical standards and com
trenches of World War i. The personal con plete years of rigorous training. Associated
nection between man and airplane resembles with flying are inherent risks to life and limb.
in some ways the relationship between the The title “pilot” thus brings cultural status.
cavalry’s man and horse. Carl Builder observes A majority of pilots’ traits do not apply to
that, “when other means such as unmanned UAS operators, who require many skills not
aircraft, guided missiles, and spacecraft be normally associated with pilots. Operators do
came available, it was the aviators who re not need to understand the physiological
vealed, by deeds more than words, that their stresses of flight. They must know airplanes
real affection was for their airplanes and not but also must understand much more than
for the concept of air power.”37 Certainly, ten that in order to conduct unmanned opera
sions exist between young Air Force pilots who tions safely. UAS operators should have a firm
dream of slipping the surly bonds of Earth appreciation of the vulnerability and flexibility
and those assigned to sit in Predator ground- of the link between the ground-control station
control stations. The result? A continuous and the aircraft. Unlike a crewed airplane, an

unmanned one depends on security of particu sponsibilities associated with pilots. The inte
lar parts of the electromagnetic spectrum for gration of automated and human-regulated
basic aircraft control. processes depends upon careful evaluation of
Most importantly, cultural perceptions of the command-and-control procedures that
pilots and UAS operators differ significantly. govern unmanned operations.
The fraternity of pilots shares a love of flight, The challenge becomes identifying basic
enjoys a perception as an elite group of risk skills required of the evolving UAS operator.
takers, and holds a particular social status Emerging UAS technologies will likely make
within the Air Force. UAS operators, who do unmanned flight even more distinctive. As
not share these traits, must build their own computers continue to assume greater respon
culture. Any reference to a “UAS pilot” only sibility for basic aircraft control, we must seek
blurs what should be a clear distinction be to define the responsibility of the “human in
tween two separate professions, each steeped the loop.” Ultimately, “flying” unmanned craft
in its own particular cultural norms. Clearly, a will boil down to developing processes for the
negative cultural stigma attaches to UAS op effective command and control of effects de
erators, but as the community continues to livered through the air.
prove itself in combat operations around the
globe, operators will prove their worth and
gain the respect of the rest of the war-fighting A Look towards the Future
community. references to them as pilots cause
only tension and confusion. The extreme dedication to operations in
independence—one of the hallmark traits iraq and Afghanistan has pushed aside a fun
of military aviators, is challenged by the con damental discussion. As highlighted by Colonel
nectivity of UASs. gen Billy Mitchell said, “in Ehrhard, “The Air Force needs to reevaluate
the actual fighting of the aircraft, moral quali how it defines airmanship.”40 instead of rede
ties are required that were never before de fining the term, the service has made a default
manded of men. in the first place, they are all assumption that pilots who have at least a single
alone. no man stands at their shoulder to sup operational tour possess the necessary level of
port them.”39 Military aviation required an in airmanship to operate UASs safely.41 however,
dependence by war fighters never seen before examples from the Predator, reaper, and
in the battlespace. The connectivity of un global hawk communities already demon
manned systems introduces a new concept to strate important divergences from manned
the independent aviator—the fact that UAS aviation. UAS operator skills and those of tra
operators are never alone—and sets these sys ditional pilots differ. new UAS capabilities,
tems apart from aircraft. On the one hand, greater automation, and a wider span of mis
sorties by fighter aircraft rely in large measure sion types will bring this discussion increas
on the decision-making capabilities of select, ingly to the forefront. The Air Force needs to
highly trained aircrew members, each of whom formally evaluate UAS training requirements
must receive training to perform the mission for an individual who has absolutely no avia
successfully, from preflight to landing. On the tion background, and then build an appropri
other hand, as evidenced by Predator opera ate training syllabus.
tions, UASs can rely on the skills of distinctly Deep-seated cultural issues concerning pro
separate crews, separated by thousands of fessional Air Force pilots further complicate
miles and sharing only a communications net the discussion. The act of awkwardly forcing
work and an aircraft. The difficult question chivalrous young pilots out of their cockpits
becomes how to balance skill specialization and into ground-control stations produces
with the general development of important suboptimal results. Pilots are left performing
decision-making skills and judgment—in short, jobs that do not generate the same level of sat
airmanship. Computers and automated pro isfaction as flying. in the long run, this hurts
cesses will continue to assume more of the re the development of UASs because of the in

ability to retain valuable operational experi skies like no other war fighter of the day, so
ence. The Air Force’s UAS personnel policy does the Airman of the twenty-first century
has led to an overworked community of pro rely on technology to create effects while re
fessionals dedicated to supporting the global maining grounded. Determining the best doc
war on terror but eager to return to their pre trine, organization, and training policies to
vious jobs. Policies that focus on training non employ unmanned aircraft will continue to
rated, volunteer UAS crews would help pro confront the Air Force; empowering a spe
vide enough people for today’s fight while cific, newly defined career field offers the best
preparing for tomorrow’s. way of overcoming such challenges. Proud tra
The Air Force’s institutional push towards ditions and cultural norms help define our
cyberspace offers an opportunity to combine service’s greatness. They also have the poten
old with new. A new UAS operator career field tial to hinder its advance. in line with Secre
could nicely bridge the gap between old per tary gates’s remarks, gen Thomas White, a
ceptions of Airmen (people who fly airplanes) former Air Force chief of staff, warns that “the
and new ones (Airmen conducting operations senior Air Force officer’s dedication to the air
in air, space, and cyberspace). Old principles plane is deeply ingrained and rightly so, but
of airmanship, combined with nuances of the we must never permit this to result in a battle
new cyber medium, merge within the UAS ship attitude. We cannot afford to ignore the
community. Potentially, the UAS operator rep basic precept that all truths change with
resents the new Airman. Just as the Airman of time.”42 ❑
the 1920s relied on technology to take to the
Notes
1. gen John P. Jumper, former Air Force chief of staff, 11. ibid.
interview by the author, 20 December 2006. 12. Jumper, interview.
2. Thomas Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in 13. ibid.
the United States Armed Services: A Comparative Study 14. gen Michael E. ryan, former Air Force chief of
of Weapon System innovation” (PhD diss., Johns hopkins staff, interview by the author, 19 December 2006.
University, 2001), 593. 15. gen richard hawley, former commander, Air Com
3. Although this article focuses on the UAS operator, bat Command, interview by the author, 3 January 2007.
it should not detract from the importance of properly 16. ibid.
training enlisted UAS sensor operators. Their contribution 17. Lt Col John harris, former commander, 15th re
to the accomplishment of the mission is equally impor connaissance Squadron, interview by the author, 26 Janu
tant, and their struggle for recognition no less significant. ary 2007.
4. gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff, US Air Force, 18. Lt Col Christopher Plamp, commander, 15th re
“Chief’s Sight Picture,” 10 March 2003. connaissance Squadron, interview by the author, 23 Janu
5. Lt gen Carrol h. Chandler, deputy chief of staff, ary 2007.
Air, Space, and information Operations, Plans, and re 19. Maj Thomas Meeks, former Predator operator,
quirements, headquarters US Air Force, Washington, 15th reconnaissance Squadron, interview by the author,
DC, memorandum for record, 13 December 2006. The 20 January 2007.
program selected three candidates from a pool of volun 20. Lt Col James gear, commander, 11th reconnais
teer applicants: 2nd Lt Leslie McPeak, Capt Thomas sance Squadron, interview by the author, 25 January 2007.
Bean, and Capt Oswald Bonilla. 21. ibid.
6. Col Michael McKinney, director, Air Force Opera 22. ibid.
tions and Training, interview by the author, 18 December 23. Brig gen Charles Lyon, former commander, 57th
2006. Operations group, interview by the author, 19 December
7. Col Stephen Wilson, former assistant operations of 2006.
ficer, Air Education and Training Command, interview by 24. Meeks, interview.
the author, 6 December 2006. 25. ibid.
8. ibid. 26. Lt Col Christopher Jella, commander, 18th re
9. ibid. connaissance Squadron, interview by the author, 22 Janu
10. Col Thomas Ehrhard, USAF, retired, Senior Fel ary 2007.
low, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, in 27. ibid.
terview by the author, 20 December 2006. 28. ibid.

29. ibid. 37. Carl h. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air
30. Brig gen h. D. Polumbo, commander, 9th recon Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force
naissance Wing, interview by the author, 22 January 2007. (new Brunswick, nJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 32.
31. ibid. 38. Current Air Force initiatives to manage UAS op
erators include two nonvolunteer programs: Tactical Air
32. Jella, interview.
crew Management initiative 21 and a no-permanent
33. Mark K. Wells, Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied
change-of-station policy from Creech AFB, nV. Each
Aircrew Experience in the Second World War (Portland, Or: highlights the institutional problems related to attracting
Frank Cass, 1995), 92. and maintaining sufficient numbers of Predator operators.
34. ibid., 4. Both are short-term solutions with little long-term effect.
35. James r. FitzSimonds and Thomas g. Mahnken, 39. William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development
“Military Officer Attitudes toward the Adoption of Un and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military
manned Systems” (paper presented at the Annual Meet (1925; repr., Mineola, nY: Dover Publications, 1988), 163.
ing of the international Studies Association, San Diego, 40. Ehrhard, interview.
41. UAS personnel policy is rapidly changing. Senior
CA, 22 March 2006).
leadership recently made the decision to directly assign
36. Lt Col James C. Dawkins, “Unmanned Combat
graduates of Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training to
Aerial Vehicles: Examining the Political, Moral, and So Predator UASs. Also, a recently initiated experimental
cial implications” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced “Beta” program takes nonpilots directly into the UAS
Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, community.
2005), 42. 42. Quoted in Builder, Icarus Syndrome, 175.

Tactical
Generals
Leaders,
Technology,
and the Perils
of Battlefield
Micromanagement*
Dr. P. W. Singer
In 1999 Gen Charles Krulak coined the term “strategic corporal” (i.e., a junior member
trained and empowered to make time-critical decisions in response to the dynamic ground
fight). In this article, the author examines a similar phenomenon occurring among senior
officers, observing that modern technology allows generals to personally engage on the tactical
level from remote locations. How the military manages this phenomenon will become a core
leadership question in the years ahead.
T
he four-sTar general proudly re- sonally checked the situation, he gave the or-
counts how he spent “two hours der to strike. But his role in the operation
watching footage” beamed to his didn’t end there; the general proudly tells
headquarters. sitting behind a live how he even decided what size bomb his pilots
video feed from a Predator unmanned aircraft should drop on the compound.1
system (uas), he saw two insurgent leaders
sneak into a compound of houses. he waited
as other insurgents entered and exited the The Rise of the Tactical General
compound, openly carrying weapons. Now, he
was certain. The compound was a legitimate In The Face of Battle, his masterful history of
target, and any civilians in the houses had to men at war, John Keegan writes how “the per-
know that it was being used for war, what with sonal bond between leader and follower lies at
all the armed men moving about. having per- the root of all explanations of what does and
*This article is derived from the author’s latest book, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York:
Penguin, 2009). for further information, see http://wiredforwar.pwsinger.com.
78
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TACTICAL GENERALS 79
does not happen in battle.”2 In Keegan’s view, there were 5,331 uass in the total us inven-
the exemplar of this relationship was henry V, tory.6 In Iraq, some 700 drones supported that
who inspired his “band of brothers” by fighting same V Corps just a few years later, while the
in their midst during the Battle of agincourt. sum total of army and air force uass was log-
With the rise of each new generation of ging almost 600,000 annual flight hours.7
communications technology, these connec- rapid growth in ground robotics has oc-
tions between soldiers in the field and those curred as well. Zero unmanned ground ve-
who give them orders grew distanced. Generals hicles took part in the 2003 invasion of Iraq;
no longer needed to be on the front lines with a year later, 150 were in use. By 2008 the in-
their men but operated from command posts ventory in Iraq had approached the 12,000
that moved further to the rear with each new mark, with the first generation of armed
technological advance. Yet, the very same ground robots arriving that same year.8 and
technologies also pushed a trend “towards the technological development is moving so
centralization of command, and thus towards fast that all of these systems are outdated
micromanagement.”3 the very moment they hit the marketplace
for instance, when telegraphs were intro- and battlespace. These are just the Model T
duced during the Crimean War (1853–56), fords and Wright flyers compared to what
generals sipping tea back in england quickly is already in the prototype stage.
figured out that they could send daily plans to With these trends in play, warfare is under-
the front lines in russia. so they did. With the going a shift that may well parallel that which
radio, this went even further. adolf hitler was occurred in World War I. amazing new tech-
notorious for issuing highly detailed orders to nologies, almost science-fiction-like in their
individual units fighting on the eastern front, capabilities, are being introduced. (Indeed, the
cutting out the German army’s entire com- number of unmanned ground systems now in
mand staff from leading its troops in war. even Iraq roughly parallels the number of tanks used
the us military has suffered from this problem. in 1918.) Yet, as in World War I and the ensu-
During the rescue attempt of the american ing interwar years, the new technologies are
cargo ship Mayaguez in 1975, the commander not “lifting the fog of war” or ending friction,
on the scene received so much advice and or- as some of the acolytes of network-centric war-
ders from leaders back in Washington that he fare would have it. rather, in everything from
eventually “just turned the radios off.”4 doctrine to the laws of war, they are present-
These leaders of the past, though, never ing more questions than we can answer.
had access to systems like today’s Global Com- Issues of command leadership offer just
mand and Control system (GCCs). as one one example of the ripple effect now under
report describes, “GCCs—known as ‘Geeks’ way. The combination of networked connec-
to soldiers in the field—is the military’s haL tions and unmanned systems enables modern
9000. It’s an umbrella system that tracks every commanders as never before, linking them
friendly tank, plane, ship, and soldier in the closer to the battlefield from greater distances
world in real time, plotting their positions as and changing the separation of space. But the
they move on a digital map. It can also show separation of time has changed as well. Com-
enemy locations gleaned from intelligence.”5 manders can transmit orders in real time to
This tracking system is reinforced by video the lowest-level troops or systems in the field,
feeds from various unmanned systems blan- and they have simultaneous real-time visibility
keting the battlefield. The growth in america’s into it. Previously, generals may have been dis-
use of robotic systems has taken place so fast tanced, but they could never “see” what sol-
that many people seem not to realize how big diers saw in the crosshairs of their rifle sights—
it has gotten. us forces initially went into Iraq or do anything about it. With a robotic system
with only a handful of unmanned systems in such as a Predator uas or special Weapons
the inventory; indeed, just one uas supported observation reconnaissance Detection system
all of V Corps. By the end of 2008, however, (a ground robot, the size of a lawn mower,

armed with a machine gun), commanders can To Intervene or
see the same footage that the operator sees, at

the same time, and even take over the deci- Not to Intervene
sion to shoot or not. The four-star general who told how he spent
Many people, especially the network-centric two hours watching Predator footage recounted
acolytes who surrounded former secretary of the story proudly and unprompted. he did so
defense Donald rumsfeld, thought this link- while trying to make a point about how he in-
ing together of every soldier and system into a tended to assume personal leadership of op-
vast information-technology network would erations for which he was responsible.
decentralize operations, enable greater initia- That a general, who can now see what is un-
tive among the lower-level units in war, and al- folding on the ground, would want to shape it
low frictionless operations that lifted the fog directly makes perfect sense. Who better knows
of war.9 so far, actual experience with un- “commander’s intent” than the commander
manned systems is proving to be the opposite. himself? all sorts of battles have been lost
New technologies have certainly enabled a when subordinates in the field misinterpreted
powerful revolution to occur in our capabilities, or wrongly implemented a general’s com-
creating a strange new world where science mands. a general who stays on top of an ongo-
fiction is fast becoming battlefield reality. But ing situation can also rapidly adjust to any
although commanders are empowered as changes that happen in the midst of battle,
never before, the new technologies have also rather than proceed with old plans that have
enabled the old trends of command interfer- been overcome by events.
ence, even taking them to new extremes of unfortunately, the line between timely su-
micromanagement. Too frequently, generals pervision and micromanagement is a fine one
at a distance use technology to insert them- and may be quickly fading with unmanned sys-
selves into matters formerly handled by those tems. More and more frequently, generals in-
on the scene and at ranks several layers of sert themselves into situations inappropriately,
command below them. “ ‘It’s like crack [co- and their command leadership role becomes
command interference.
caine] for generals,’ says Chuck Kamps, a pro-
examples run rampant. one battalion com-
fessor of joint warfare at the air Command
mander in Iraq told how he had 12 stars’ worth
and staff College. ‘It gives them an unprece-
of generals (a four-star general, two three-star
dented ability to meddle in mission command-
lieutenant generals, and a two-star major gen-
ers’ jobs.’ ”10 eral) tell him where to position his units dur-
over the last few years, many analysts have ing a battle. a captain in special operations
discussed what Marine Corps general Charles forces recounted how a brigadier general (four
Krulak described as the rise of the “strategic layers of command up) had radioed him while
corporal”—how technology has put far more his team was hunting down an Iraqi insurgent
destructive power (and thus influence over who had escaped during a raid. Watching live
strategic outcomes) into the hands of younger, Predator video back at the command center
more junior troops. a 20-year-old corporal in Baghdad, the general had orders for the
can now call in air strikes directed by a 40-year- captain on where to deploy not only his unit
old colonel in the past. But these new tech- but also his individual soldiers!11 another in-
nologies have quietly produced its inverse, terviewee described how officers hundreds of
what I call the “tactical general.” Technology miles away would tell him which roads his ve-
may have helped move senior leaders off the hicle should take during raids in afghanistan.12
actual battlefield, but now it allows them to as retired air force lieutenant colonel Dan
become more involved in the real-time fight- Kuehl points out, the fact that a general now
ing of war. What to do about this phenome- can use a “5,000-mile-long screwdriver” doesn’t
non will pose a core leadership question in mean he should.13 Besides the frustrations
the years ahead. that such micromanagement brings subordi-

nates, there is also the question of the appro- Jumping in and out of tactical issues, rather
priate division of labor in command. To the than working them day to day, senior officers
general who described spending two hours also don’t have the local context (nor are they
watching Predator footage, this was time well usually trained for analysis). Moreover, they
spent. as the ultimate commander, he would sometimes interpose their assumptions onto
be held accountable if the strike went awry what they do see. During anaconda, for ex-
and collateral damage ensued. so, if the tech- ample, american commanders viewed live video
nology allowed, he believed that he should of al-Qaeda fighters moving across a moun-
make sure the operation went exactly the way tain. Despite the footage staring them in the
he wanted. face, the commanders still thought they must
But this comes at a cost. While this general be seeing americans since they expected to see
was doing a job normally entrusted to junior them there, based on their original plans.15
officers, who was doing his job? New technolo- older generations’ lack of familiarity with
gies allow him and other senior flags to make cutting-edge technology can also heighten
tactical decisions as never before. But the cap- misunderstanding from afar. During the 2003
tains, majors, colonels, and so forth, whom Iraq invasion, for example, overall commander
they cut out of the chain, cannot, in turn, as- Gen Tommy franks reportedly became quite
sume responsibility for the strategic and policy possessed with the “Blue force Tracker” map,
questions that the generals would have wres- a massive electronic display that showed the
tled with instead. exact locations and status of every us unit, as
such generals seem more attracted to micro- well as Iraqi units facing them. The appear-
management in the kinetic realm. I liken it to ance of so much information, however, proved
the “super Bowl” effect. That is, they have deceiving. at one stage early in the fight, see-
spent their entire professional lives preparing ing that the tracking map showed no Iraqi
for battle and usually look back on their days units nearby, franks concluded that several
at field level as the best part of their careers. units in the army’s V Corps were idle, neither
so these generals don’t want to miss out on moving nor fighting. he reportedly flew off
“the big game” simply because they have ad- the handle and tracked down his land-forces
vanced past it in their careers. commander, who then, in his words, was made
The challenge is that tactical generals often to eat “a sh[- -] sandwich.”16
overestimate how much they really know about There was only one problem: the audience
what happens on the ground. New technolo- back at us Central Command saw the battles
gies may give them an unprecedented view of unfolding at the wrong scale. The blue icons,
the battlefield and the ability to reach into it representing american units, may have looked
as never before, but this view remains limited. alone on the large-scale map but were actually
for example, during operation anaconda in locked into one of the toughest battles of the
2002, when the 10th Mountain Division took entire invasion, fighting against a swarm of
on Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in the shah-i- saddam fedayeen teams. These small insur-
Khot valley in afghanistan, generals back in gent units had sufficient size to give the us
the united states could watch a battle play out invasion force fits but not enough to merit
live, beamed back to them by a Predator uas their own logos on the high-tech map viewed
that flew above the fight. The danger, explains by generals far from the battle.
Maj Louis Bello, the fire-support coordinator Most of all, officers in the field lament what
for the division, is that the video tends to “se- they call the “Mother, may I?” syndrome that
duce” commanders, leading them to focus on comes with the greater use of these technolo-
what the uas beamed back, as if it told the gies.17 rather than rely on the judgment of
whole story. “You get too focused on what you highly trained officers, generals increasingly
can see, and neglect what you can’t see,” Bello want to inspect the situation for themselves.
said. “and a lot of the time, what’s happening This is fine if the enemy plays along and gives
elsewhere is more important.”14 the general several hours to watch the video

and decide which bomb to use. But sometimes battle, for instance, the Predators beamed
matters aren’t decided on a general’s sched- video of the fighting to bases and offices all
ule. an air force officer in the Middle east over the world. army major general franklin
described his ultimate frustration, noting a hagenbeck, commander of us ground forces
time when even though he had information during the battle, recalls how “disruptive” this
that could have saved lives, “it sat in someone’s was since officers in places ranging from
e-mail queue for six hours.”18 Tampa to the Pentagon now felt “they were in
a position to get involved in the battle.” While
his team tried to fight the battle in afghani-
Generals on Lake Wobegone stan, “people on other staffs at higher levels
would call all the way down to my staff and get
ultimately, these problems combine to add
information and make suggestions.” In the
another new problem. or, rather, they create
midst of battle, some officers back in the
a new wrinkle on a venerable truism of war. as
united states even called in asking for infor-
Napoléon once said, “one bad general is bet-
mation that they could plug into their own
ter than two good ones.”19
generals’ morning briefing, pestering soldiers
a pyramid represents the traditional con-
in combat “for details that they presumed
cept of a military operation, with the strategic
their bosses would want to know.”23
commander on top, the operational com- each of these tasking orders is tough to ig-
manders beneath, and the tactical command- nore. Not only do they originate from senior
ers occupying the bottom layer. aided by the leaders, who can make or break careers, but
new technologies, strategic and operational also they tend to come in on a “priority basis.”
commanders who usurp authority from tactical Generals around the world tend to use a logic
commanders are erasing this structure from that humorist Garrison Keillor cites in Lake
above. The pyramid also finds itself endangered Wobegon Days. every single one of them consid-
from the sides. as one uas squadron officer ers his or her missions and orders “of above
explains, the simultaneous location of reach- average” importance. But not everyone can be
back operations in multiple spaces presents a above average. This “flattening of the chain of
major challenge to their command and con- command,” summed up retired lieutenant
trol.20 although uass fly over Iraq, they launch general William odom, causes “constipated
out of a base in the Persian Gulf and are flown communication channels” and “diarrhea of
by operators sitting back in Nevada. at each of the email” that distracts troops from the mis-
those locales, “each commander thinks he’s in sion at hand.24
control of you.”21 even worse, everyone clam- at its worst, this pattern leads to the battle-
ors for these high-demand assets. field version of too many cooks spoiling the
This situation results in “power struggles meal. a Marine officer recalls that during an
galore,” tells the squadron commander. Be- operation in afghanistan, he received wildly
cause operations are located around the diverging orders from three different senior
world, it is not always clear whose orders take commanders. one told him to seize a town 50
priority. Instead, units get “pulled in many di- miles away. another said to seize just the road-
rections because you are in virtual space. am I way outside the town. The third ordered him
at Nellis, or am I at CeNTaf [us Central not to “do anything beyond patrol five miles
Command air forces, the air command in the around the base.”25
Middle east]?”22 In this case, the officer ultimately chose to
Moreover, by giving everybody in the com- seize the town. a veteran of the 1991 Gulf War,
mand structure access to the Internet, the he felt confident enough to take the career
ability to watch what goes on and weigh in on risk of going with his gut on selecting the right
what units should do is not limited to a unit’s order to follow. But the rise of virtual com-
physical location (Nevada) or virtual location mand from afar threatens to hollow out the
(the Middle east). During the shah-i-Khot experience of those who will move into these

command roles in the future. explains one called the “eye of command,” who can find
former Predator squadron commander, “You the right balance, will achieve what retired
may have some general officer sitting behind lieutenant general richard a. Chilcoat once
four Toshiba big screens [TVs] with greater described as “simultaneous awareness.”30 This
knowledge of the battlefield from the distance. is the “sweet spot” of future generalship. It in-
and maybe it works the first time when they volves having a good sense of what is going on
intervene and save the day. But my worry is at all levels of war and making the appropriate
what happens with the next generation. What decisions at the right levels.
happens when that lieutenant, who learns Developing this skill will not be easy. all the
thinking the guys in the back are smarter, be- information collected, all the real-time re-
comes a colonel or a general. he’ll be making quests, and all the general “diarrhea of the
the decisions, but not have any experience.”26 email” threaten to flood officers with data.
Where this trend will end, no one is certain Much like their corporate counterparts (often
yet. some worry that the ability to reach into thought of as drones in their office cubicles),
the battlefield could even prove tempting to twenty-first-century generals fighting with drones
those outside the military. retired marine will also have to cultivate the ability to manage
Bing West expects that “in the near future . . . their in-boxes.
a president will say, ‘Why do we need these 20 our professional-development system must
links in the chain of command?’ ” enhanced put more focus on cultivating an ethic of “en-
connections could certainly help the com- lightened control.” Generals literally will have
mander in chief become better informed the entire battle at their fingertips. With the
about the true situation on the ground but new networks and technologies, they can watch
could prove catastrophic if civilian leaders are nearly every action and make every minute de-
tempted to intervene, as West puts it, “trying cision. But they still do not have an infinite
to play soldier.”27 referring to how Pres. Lyn- amount of time. at some point, the leader has
don B. Johnson often tried to influence air to turn matters over to subordinates. Generals
operations in Vietnam, former secretary of who can figure out when to intervene, when
the air force Michael Wynne similarly warned to delegate, and when to empower junior
that “it’ll be like taking LBJ all the way down troops to act with initiative will enjoy much
into the foxhole.”28 more success than those who don’t trust their
force to do anything without them. striking
this balance will become the essence of strate-
Digitally Leading gic leadership.
Leaders must also focus on developing the
so how must commanders—and even more, mental flexibility needed to guide a “learning
the training and development programs that organization” that adapts to changing circum-
create our cadre of leaders—respond to this stances in something beyond just a top-down
new phenomenon that enables them in power manner.31 senior leaders not only must have
and reach but also can enable their worst in- open minds themselves but also willingly em-
stincts? Clearly, twenty-first-century generals power subordinates to wrestle with new con-
need to bring certain skills to increasingly un- cepts and technologies that they don’t even
manned wars in order to be successful. New understand. as one colonel writes, “I specu-
technologies are creating an environment late that the digital general some 35 years
“where the strategic, operational, and tactical from now might not just communicate differ-
levels of war can at times be so compressed as ently but will actually think differently from his
to appear virtually as a single function.”29 The or her predecessors, because conceptual be-
downside of this “compression” of the battle- havior itself is evolving during the Informa-
field is that it tempts officers to micromanage tion age” (emphasis in original).32
(the “tactical general” problem). however, of- although a general may no longer have to
ficers who have what Carl von Clausewitz be as fit a fighter as the troops, the way henry

V or Gustavus adolphus was considered among remains an apt model for twenty-first-century
the best warriors in his army, new technolo- leaders. New inventions like the radio and
gies do impose certain physical requirements teletype may have given him the ability to in-
that commanders must cultivate in wartime. struct from afar, but Marshall chose to set the
for one thing, generals should develop skills broad goals and agenda. he had smart staff
at using computers, e-mail, and other infor- officers write up details of the plan but en-
mation technologies (beyond the ability to make sured that everything remained simple enough
a PowerPoint presentation)—something that that a lieutenant in the field could understand
once seemed an almost abhorrent concept to and implement everything.34 similarly, Marine
leaders. General Chilcoat once predicted, “To general James Mattis’s guidance to his troops
the strategic commander of the Information before the 2003 invasion of Iraq was just as
age, the laptop computer, or its successor, will brief, understandable, and worthy as a guide:
be a natural extension of his mind, as familiar “engage your brain before you engage your
as the telephone, map, and binoculars.”33
weapon.”35
events in Iraq have borne out his lessons.
Likewise, the fact that generals may not
need the kind of physical fitness to wield a General 2.0
sword or match their troops in push-up con-
tests does not signal the return of 300-pound- But the questions of leadership don’t just
plus generals like nineteenth century com- stop at the issue of how much leash command-
mander Winfield scott. rather, stamina—not ers give their subordinates. every decision in a
strength—now matters. Command has always military operation, be it the corporal in the
been taxing, but it is now becoming a round- field deciding whether to pull the trigger or
the-clock job, no matter the commander’s Gen Dwight eisenhower deciding whether to
physical location. Thus, generals now need give the “go” for the D-day invasion, can be
the physical and psychological endurance of a broken down into four basic parts, known in
young medical student on call in the emer- the military as the observe, orient, decide, act
gency room. (ooDa) loop. one gathers information, fig-
some of these changes might seem im- ures out the situation, issues orders, and takes
mense, but they will not supplant many of the action. Then, the whole cycle begins again.
qualities that made great generals in the past. But technology has shrunk the time inside
for example, the idea of enlightened control this decision cycle. Because massive amounts
(i.e., giving just enough guidance to officers of data come in faster, decisions have to be
closer to the scene, so that they can best de- made quicker. This, for example, led to our
cide what to do) is nothing new. The great
turning over the defense against mortars and
Prussian generals of the nineteenth century
rockets at major bases in Iraq to the Counter
called this Führen durch Auftrag (leading by
task) as opposed to Führen durch Befehl (lead- rocket, artillery, and Mortar (C-raM) auto-
ing by orders). Their ideal was that the best mated gun system. humans just couldn’t fit
general gave his officers the objective and into the shorter ooDa loop needed to shoot
then left it to them to figure out how best to down incoming shells and rockets.
achieve it. The most famous instance occurred shortening of time in the decision cycle is
before the 1864 Prussian invasion of the Danish not just for the trigger-pullers. The shrinking
province of schleswig. The commanding gen- ooDa loop is working its way up the chain
eral so trusted his officers that, supposedly, he to the generals’ level. Marine general James
only ordered that he wanted to sleep in the Cartwright, former commander of us strategic
enemy’s capital within the week. Command, predicted that “the decision cycle
although this may be a bit too succinct for of the future is not going to be minutes. . . .
modern war, the example set by World War The decision cycle of the future is going to be
II’s General of the army George C. Marshall microseconds.”36

Thus, many people think that one last, fun- management” aI whose primary job entails
damental change may occur in the role of supporting mission commanders but can also
commanders at war. If the first step of tech- take over in extreme situations (e.g., when the
nology’s effect on command and control is to number of incoming targets overwhelms the
force officers to learn how to lead troops fight- human).40
ing from afar, and if the second is to require Developers behind such programs argue
generals to figure out when to intervene di- that the advantage of using computers instead
rectly in the battle or not, then the final may of humans is not only their greater speed and
be figuring out just what command roles to processing power, but also the absence of hu-
leave to humans, and which to hand over to man flaws—they lack our so-called “cognitive
machines. biases.”41 Because searching though reams of
The world is already awash with all sorts of data and then processing it takes too much
computer systems that we use to sift through time, human commanders without such aids
information and decide matters on our be- must filter which data they want to look at and
half. artificial intelligence (aI) in e-mail pro- which to ignore. This inevitably leads them to
grams filters out junk mail, and aI systems skip information they don’t have time to cover.
trade billions of dollars on the stock market, humans also tend to give more weight in their
deciding when to buy and sell based only on decisions to the information that they see first,
algorithms. even if it is not representative of the whole.
The same sort of “expert systems” is gradu- This produces something called a “satisficing”
ally being introduced into the military. The result—a satisfactory, though not the optimal,
Defense advanced research Projects agency, answer. one air force officer planning air
for example, created Integrated Battle Com- strikes in the Middle east, for example, describes
mand, a system that gives military officers what how each morning he received a “three-inch-
it calls “decision aids”—aI that allows a com- deep” folder of printouts with that night’s in-
mander to visualize and evaluate plans, as well telligence data, which he could only skim
as predict the impact of a variety of effects.37 quickly before he had to start assigning mis-
The system can help a command team build- sions. “a lot of data is falling on the floor.”42
ing an operational plan to assess the various emotions also can shape decisions, even
interactions that will take place in it. The sys- the most major command decisions in war.
tem sees how changing certain parameters recent neurological findings indicate that
might play out in direct and indirect ways so emotions drive our thought processes, includ-
complex that a human would find them diffi- ing leaders’ political decisions, to a greater
cult to calculate. The next phase in the proj- extent than previously recognized.43 That is,
ect involves building an aI that plans an entire our idealized concept of how decisions are
military campaign. made in war and politics—rationally weighing
real-Time adversarial Intelligence and De- the evidence to decide how and when to act—
cision Making, the military-intelligence-officer does not tell the full story of how human lead-
version of this system, is an aI that scans a data- ers’ brains actually work.
base of previous enemy actions within an area studies have shown how two underrated
of operations to “provide the commander with factors frequently shape strategic choices in
an estimate of his opponent’s strategic objec- war.44 The first—powerful emotional experi-
tives.”38 similarly, “battle management” systems ences that leaders had in the past—often
exist that not only provide advice to human steered their decisions, sometimes decades af-
commanders on actions an enemy might take, terwards, including even decisions on whether
but also suggest potential countermoves, even to go to war. The second factor concerns how
drawing up the deployment and logistical body chemistry affects one’s state of mind.
plans for units to redeploy, as well as creating People with high levels of testosterone, for in-
the orders an officer would have to issue.39 stance, are more likely to exhibit aggressive
The Israeli military is fielding a “virtual battle behavior and risk taking; Gen George Custer

and Gen George Patton seem classic examples. ego” for the commander. a sort of artificial
By contrast, those with low levels of serotonin aide-de camp to future generals, this technology
are more prone to depression and mood would “automatically send and collate infor-
swings, typical of both hitler and Pres. abraham mation for him to have at his beck and call.”48
Lincoln.45 as these examples show, emotions as with the issue of tactical generals, even
can shape a leader’s decisions both for better though this outcome may enable leaders, it
or worse, so to pull emotions out of the equa- also opens up a whole new array of questions
tion could yield widely divergent results. that once seemed science fiction but may well
setting aside the worry that such artificial lie in our not-too-distant future.
decision systems are what enable robots’ take-
over of the world in sci-fi movies like The Termi-
nator, machine intelligence may not be the Robot Conclusions
perfect match for the realm of war for the very
When exploring the future role of ma-
reason that it remains a human realm, even
with machines fighting in it. “The history of chines in war, people often want to focus on
human conflicts is littered with examples of the obvious issues of whether a robot should
how military forces achieved results that no be armed or how much autonomy should be
algorithm would have predicted,” according to given to keep the “man in the loop.” But it is a
an air force general.46 and he is right. Com- far more complex world that we are entering.
mand may seem just like a game of chess to By providing generals insight into the front
some, but war doesn’t have a finite set of pos- lines—something they have lacked since the
sible actions and a quantifiable logic of zeros age of gunpowder and telegraphs—new tech-
and ones. Instead, “in war, as in life, spontaneity nologies like unmanned systems are lifting
still prevails over programming.”47 many of the burdens of command. But in giv-
even so, the Pentagon’s work on such pro- ing newfound reach and visibility to the com-
grams continues. few see robot generals any- mander, they also add many new challenges.
time soon, but many do think that the most Most importantly, these technologies present
likely result for future command and control a serious test for simultaneously managing an
in the decades ahead is a parallel to the Depart- amazing array of possibilities and information
ment of Defense’s “war fighter’s associate” con- while resisting the temptation to microman-
cept, which is becoming a part of the army’s age subordinates.
future Combat systems plans. The latter call But the trend doesn’t stop there. human
for us units to have mixed teams of soldiers commanders and their staffs may even one
and robots fighting together in the field. We day face a challenge to their own role as the
may soon have to wrestle with a situation in pace and complexity of war continue to grow.
which their future commanders back at the In short, where the ever-expanding role
base may have a staff that mixes advice from of machines in war will one day take us is a
human officers and aI as well. retired colonel question that used to only be suitable for
James Lasswell of the Marine Corps Warfight- science-fiction conventions. Today’s technolo-
ing Lab thinks that the various technological gies, however, are bringing this question to
decision aids will likely evolve into an aI “alter our real-world battlefields. ❑
Notes
1. General officer, interview by the author, Brookings 2. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking
Institution, Washington, DC, 17 December 2007. (all Press, 1976), 114.
anonymous interviews were conducted in confidentiality, 3. Chris hables Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics
and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual of Conflict (New York: Guilford Press, 1997), 274.
agreement.) 4. Ibid., 63.

5. Joshua Davis, “If We run out of Batteries, This War 24. Quoted in rosenberg, “Technology and Leader-
Is screwed,” Wired Magazine, issue 11.06 (June 2003), ship,” 17.
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.06/battlefield 25. united states Marine Corps general, interview by
.html. haL 9000 was the computer in arthur C. Clarke’s the author, Washington, DC, 16 January 2007.
book 2001: A Space Odyssey. 26. air force colonel, interview by the author, arling-
6. Tom Vanden Brook, “report: Insurgents Benefit from ton, Va, 28 august 2006. see also LCDr John J. Klein,
Drone shortage,” USA Today, 25 March 2008, http://www “The Problematic Nexus: Where unmanned Combat air
.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2008-03-24-uaV_N.htm. Vehicles and the Law of armed Conflict Meet,” Air and
7. Lolita C. Baldor, “Military use of unmanned aircraft Space Power Journal - Chronicles Online Journal, 22 July 2003,
soars,” USA Today, 1 January 2008, http://www.usatoday http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/
.com/news/military/2008-01-01-unmanned-killers_N.htm. klein.html.
8. robert s. Boyd, “They’re Very expensive, but They 27. Bing West, telephone interview by the author, 23
save Lives: u.s. enlisting smart robots for War’s Dirty, august 2006.
Deadly Jobs,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 20 february 2006, e02. 28. Michael Wynne, interview by the author, Washing-
9. secretary of Defense Donald rumsfeld, interview ton, DC, 25 January 2008.
by richard Dixon, WaPI-aM radio, Birmingham, aL, 28 29. richard a. Chilcoat, “The ‘fourth’ army War Col-
september 2004; stephen J. Cimbala, “Transformation in lege: Preparing strategic Leaders for the Next Century,”
Concept and Policy,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 38 (2005): Parameters 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995–96), http://www.carlisle
28–33, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0838 .army.mil/usawc/parameters/1995/chilcoat.htm.
.pdf; Network Centric Warfare: Department of Defense Report to 30. Ibid.
Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Com- 31. see Janine Davidson, “Learning to Lift the fog of
mand and Control research Program, 27 July 2001), Peace: The united states Military in stability and recon-
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/ncw_report/report/ncw struction operations” (PhD diss., university of south
_cover.html; and arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, Carolina, 2005).
“Network-Centric Warfare: Its origin and future,” united 32. Paul T. harig, “The Digital General: reflections
states Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 1 (1998): 28. on Leadership in the Post-Information age,” Parameters
10. Quoted in Noah shachtman, “attack of the 26, no. 3 (autumn 1996): 134.
Drones,” Wired Magazine, issue 13.06 (June 2005), http:// 33. Chilcoat, “ ‘fourth’ army War College.”
www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.06/drones.html. 34. Credit for this point goes to harlan ullman.
11. andrew exum, interview by the author, Washing- 35. James Mattis (presentation, Brookings Institution,
ton, DC, 28 april 2008. Washington, DC, 16 January 2007).
12. united states Marine Corps officer, interview by 36. Quoted in John T. Bennett, “DoD struggles to
the author, Washington, DC, 16 January 2007. Craft offensive Cyberspace Plan,” Defense News 22, issue 9
13. Quoted in Barry rosenberg, “Technology and (26 february 2007): 1.
Leadership,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2007, 18, http:// 37. Tony skinner, “DarPa Develops strategic Decision
www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/07/2786772. support Tools,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 January 2007, 7.
14. Quoted in Thomas e. ricks, “Beaming the Battle- 38. Donald Mcfarlane, “Dr. alexander Kott,” Jane’s
field home: Live Video of afghan fighting had Ques- International Defence Review 41 (March 2008): 66.
tionable effect,” Washington Post, 22 March 2002, 1. 39. Gray, Postmodern War, 58.
15. stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Vic- 40. Barbara opall-rome, “Israeli Defense to use arti-
tory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton ficial Intelligence, Defense News 23, issue 3 (21 January
university Press, 2004), 65. 2008): 1.
16. Michael r. Gordon and Bernard e. Trainor, Cobra 41. Mcfarlane, “Dr. alexander Kott,” 66.
II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, 1st 42. Interview by the author, us military facility in us
ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 314. Central Command region, 19 february 2008.
17. four different interviewees used this expression. 43. Drew Westen, The Political Brain: The Role of Emo-
18. Interview by the author, us military facility in us tion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation (New York: Public af-
Central Command region, 19 february 2008. fairs, 2007), ix, 69–88, 417–20.
19. Nicholas Wade, “Bytes Make Might,” New York 44. stephen Peter rosen, War and Human Nature
Times Magazine, 12 March 1995, 28. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton university Press, 2005), 28.
20. Reachback is “the process of obtaining products, 45. Ibid., 87.
services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or ma- 46. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Technology and the 21st Cen-
terial from organizations that are not forward deployed.” tury Battlefield: Recomplicating Moral Life for the Statesman
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of and the Soldier (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: strategic studies In-
Military and Associated Terms, 12 april 2001 (as amended stitute, us army War College, 1999), 12, http://www.strategic
through 17 october 2008), 454, http://www.dtic.mil/ studiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00222.pdf.
doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 47. Christopher Coker, The Future of War: The Re-
21. air force colonel, interview by the author, arling- Enchantment of War in the Twenty-first Century, Blackwell
ton, Va, 18 april 2006. Manifestos (Malden, Ma: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 73.
22. Ibid. 48. James Lasswell, interview by the author, Washing-
23. Quoted in ricks, “Beaming the Battlefield home,” 1. ton, DC, 7 November 2006.

The Army’s “Organic” Unmanned
Aircraft Systems
An Unhealthy Choice for the Joint
Operational Environment
Maj Travis a. Burdine, usaF
The rapid increase in demand for long-duration intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais
sance assets, coupled with the Air Force’s inability to meet that demand, has caused the Army
to initiate procurement of its own extended-range, multipurpose, armed, “organic” unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) that will operate independently from the joint force air component
commander’s centralized control or tasking authority. The author discusses the Army’s deci
sion to parcel out these assets to division commanders and questions whether organic Army
UASs provide the joint force commander the best solution for achieving US military objectives.
“Grunt 21, this is Cyclops 55, ready for check-in,” says the pilot of the US Air Force Predator
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) over the radio.
Grunt 21, an Army ground unit in the combat zone, replies, “Cyclops 55, this is Grunt 21. Go
ahead with check-in.”
The pilot, located in a ground control station in Las Vegas, Nevada, says, “Cyclops 55 is a
single MQ-1B Predator, currently overhead at 12,000 feet, armed with two Hellfire missiles, 21
hours of playtime, with infrared-pointer and laser-designator capability. Sensors are on the target
house, ready for situation update.”
88
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THE ARMY’S “ORGANIC” UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 89
“Cyclops 55, Grunt 21 copies all. Situation update is as follows: the ground commander has been
waiting two days to get Air Force UAS support over this target house. We plan to execute a raid in
two hours. We are looking for a high-level insurgent commander and a weapons cache.”
“Cyclops 55 copies all.”
Just prior to the planned raid, the UAS crew hears a call for help from Alpha 6, an Army special
forces team located 15 miles away from Grunt 21. “Alpha 6 is being engaged. Multiple friendlies
killed in action. Requesting immediate CAS [close air support]!”
Knowing that troops in contact (TIC) are the joint force commander’s (JFC) highest-priority objec
tive, the UAS crew immediately conveys the TIC information to the combined air and space
operations center (CAOC) and the special forces operations center. The CAOC informs Cyclops
55 that, at three minutes away, it is the closest asset.
The CAOC immediately directs the crew to support the CAS request. Cyclops 55 informs Grunt
21 that it is leaving its station to respond to a TIC and calls the airspace controller to request
immediate clearance at 12,000 feet to the coordinates of Alpha 6.
“Cyclops 55, request denied. Army restricted operating zone [ROZ] Charlie is active directly in
your flight path, surface to 25,000 feet.”
“Cyclops 55 is unable to stand by. We are responding to a TIC with US casualties. Need immedi
ate clearance at any altitude!”
“Unable to clear you for that airspace at this time. I do not own that airspace. It was chopped to
the Army earlier this morning, and the status is unknown. We are trying to contact the Army on
a separate channel. Meanwhile, I will arrange a longer alternate route.”
While working the airspace problems, Cyclops checks in with Alpha 6 for a situation update.
With gunfire in the background, Alpha 6 reports, “We hit a roadside bomb and were ambushed
by an unknown number of insurgents. We are taking fire and need immediate CAS!”
After 13 minutes of working airspace issues, Cyclops 55 finally declares “on station” and receives
the target information from Alpha 6.
“Cyclops 55, this is Alpha 6. You are cleared hot. Danger close!”
“Weapons away! Sixteen seconds to impact.”
As the missile destroys the target, the Predator liaison officer in the CAOC receives a message
from the original Army unit that was supposed to have Predator coverage all day: “Cyclops 55,
there is an Army colonel on the phone with the joint force air component commander [JFACC],
screaming about how you botched the entire operation by leaving his unit without his permission.
He cancelled his entire ground operation because you failed to support him by departing your
orbit . . . again.”
T
his scenario highlighTs Uas range, multipurpose, armed, “organic” Uass that
challenges in the joint operational will operate independently from the JFacc’s
environment. The rapid increase in centralized control or tasking authority.
demand for long-duration intelli is the army’s decision to parcel out theater-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capable Uass to division commanders the cor
assets, coupled with the air Force’s inability to rect way to apportion the limited supply of these
meet that total demand, has caused the army high-demand assets? Do organic army Uass
to initiate procurement of its own extended- provide the JFc the best solution to achieve

Us military objectives? The army’s decision to (raid support, target development, direct at
develop and field organic theater-capable Uass tack) to reactive events (Tics, detection of
is not in the best interest of the Us military; roadside bombs), the demand for Uass con
however, there are ways to integrate these army tinues to grow.5
Uass into the joint operational environment.
Growth
Background The number of requests for Uass is stagger

ing. in a memorandum to all his command
Uass give the JFc the ability to gain situa ers, gen T. Michael Moseley, former chief of
tional awareness of the battlefield and simul staff of the air Force, mentioned “a continued
taneously project power. according to one key and apparent[ly] insatiable demand for our
document, “information is the key enabler to Uas capabilities,” before outlining his plan to
today’s joint warfighter,” and isr is still the increase the air Force’s Uas capacity.6 Preda
number-one Department of Defense (DoD) tors have flown over 500,000 total hours since
priority for combatant commanders.1 Uass 1995, currently fly over 16,000 hours per
deliver real-time, full-motion video and signals month, and support the JFc with 31 caPs in
intelligence directly to tactical users and stra central command’s area of responsibility.7 To
tegic decision makers, while “maintaining a put this in perspective, three additional caPs
degree of covertness.”2 These aircraft have the are the equivalent of building an entire fighter
unique ability to sustain long-duration missions squadron’s worth of aircrews.8 annual requests
(in excess of 21 hours) by changing crews in for full-motion video have increased by 300
the middle of a sortie. They provide “unre percent.9 according to the air Force Uas Task
lenting pursuit” of the enemy while reducing Force, it took 12 years for Predator to reach
the time required to prosecute “actionable in the first 250,000 flight hours and only 20
telligence.”3 The JFc can wield this capability months to reach the second 250,000 hours.10
without air-refueling tankers or support from although the air Force’s Uas capacity is dou
combat search and rescue. additionally, most bling every two years, it still cannot keep up
air Force Predator crews conduct operations with current demands from war fighters (fig.
from the United states via remote split opera 1).11 effective integration of emerging capa
tions (rso). bilities and systems into the joint operational
The air Force’s MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 environment for Uass is vital to the future
reapers fly 24-hour combat air patrols (caP), success of Us joint combat operations.
supporting the JFc in Us central command’s
area of responsibility. each caP provides MQ-1B Predator versus MQ-1C Sky Warrior
armed reconnaissance with full-motion video The air Force and the army have developed
at a fraction of the cost of manned assets. ac two distinctly different constructs for operat
cording to the 432d Wing at creech aFB, ne ing essentially the same airframe. Both systems
vada, Predators and reapers in 2007 and 2008 are theater-capable, medium-altitude, armed,
launched 247 hellfire missiles (95 percent di multirole unmanned aircraft manufactured
rect hits), dropped 71 bombs, supported 834 by general atomics aeronautical systems (fig.
Tics, and provided armed isr during 2,509 2). Both have two lasers (one for guiding mu
raids on enemy compounds in both opera nitions and one for illuminating targets at
tion iraqi Freedom and operation enduring night), infrared cameras (for night opera
Freedom, while burning less than four gallons tions), and electro-optical cameras (for color
of fuel per hour.4 as demonstrated in the sce daytime video); moreover, both aircraft fly ei
nario that began this article, long-duration, ther line of sight or beyond line of sight with a
centrally controlled, theater-capable Uass can satellite link, and both appear almost identi
also be dynamically retasked to higher-priority cal. The air Force has flown Predators since
objectives within seconds. From proactive events 1995, while the sky Warrior is still in develop

150,000
120,000
Flight Hours
90,000
60,000
30,000
0
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Calendar Year
Training Combat
Figure 1. Growth of UASs: The MQ-1B Predator’s flight hours. (From information provided by Head
quarters Air Combat Command/A8U1.)
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Aeronautical, http://www.ga-asi.com.)

ment. sky Warrior, however, can carry two ex operations and is a major priority for the air
tra missiles and fly 4,000 feet higher than Force.”16 air Force doctrine calls for the the
Predator (see fig. 2).12 ater air control system, operated through the
caoc, to manage the air war.17 centralized
control of the entire airspace and all theater-
Service Perspectives capable assets provides massed “airborne isr
The air Force and army have contrasting and firepower anywhere across the battlefield
views of Uas employment. Department of De in minimum time.”18 The air Force model re
fense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Depart sponds to the theater commander’s priorities
ment of Defense and Its Major Components, defines by optimizing range, speed, and payload to
the functions of the services according to Title deliver theaterwide effects. however, this con
10, US Code.13 The functions of the two services struct often poses serious challenges for
are clearly different by design. however, the ground commanders.
need for isr, coupled with the advent of Uass,
has blurred the boundaries between those Army
functions. The primary purpose of army aviation is to
support ground-maneuver commanders and
Air Force their objectives.19 The army has struggled to
The air Force has over 60 years of experience fulfill ever-growing demands for isr following
flying theater-capable medium-to-high-altitude the terrorist attacks of 11 september 2001. in
manned aircraft, as well as over 14 years and september 2007, gen David h. Petraeus told
half-a-million hours of Predator flying time. congress that “unmanned aircraft have proven
The Predator, the “Wright Flyer” of Uass, be invaluable in iraq.”20 as the army transformed
came the first production Uas in the air Force’s into a lighter, more technologically reliant
inventory. The air Force and Federal aviation force, the capabilities that Uass bring to the
administration (Faa) use only rated pilots (or ground fight became vital.
navigators with civilian commercial instrument simultaneously, the air Force historically
ratings) to operate the larger theater-capable has failed to meet the army’s growing Uas
Uass because the skill set required to fly them and isr needs, due to both a lack of assets and
in the joint operational environment is nearly the necessity of fulfilling higher-priority re
identical to that required of pilots of manned quests such as special operations and Tics.
assets.14 skilled pilots mitigate the risks associ army colonel James g. rose, commander of
ated with flying Uass in complex, crowded the army intelligence center, observed that
airspace and dropping precision weapons in “current and envisioned non-army UaV [un
close proximity to friendly forces. manned aerial vehicle] systems are limited in
To meet the overwhelming demand for isr their ability to provide responsive support to
while decreasing the need for constant de various requesting ground-maneuver units
ployments, the air Force developed the rso based on limited assets.” Furthermore, he
concept to enable aircrews to perform theater noted that “when units were successful in re
operations from their home station. rsos re questing UaV support, communications prob
duce the expeditionary footprint by enabling lems, delays in data receipt, and retasking pro
the pilot to control the aircraft via satellite link. cedures/authority decreased the effectiveness
air Force doctrine states that centralized and responsiveness of the UaV system.”21
control of limited airpower assets is essential in 2004 the army decided to solicit bids for
to maximize aviation’s strengths of range, speed, an extended-range/multipurpose Uas to re
mass, and lethality.15 in a memorandum to the place the aging hunter Uas and fulfill divi
chief of staff of the army, the former chief of sion commanders’ requirements for dedicated,
staff of the air Force remarked that “inter reliable, and organically controlled isr. it did
dependence has become the standard for joint so partly because limited Uas support “is mul

tiplied by the supporting units’ lack of direct This level of control explicitly prohibits the
control and direct tasking authority over the JFacc from using these assets for integrated
UaV asset.”22 The army contends that only Uass JFc objectives, effectively mitigating the posi
controlled by the division commander will be tive attributes of mass and maneuver for dy
immune from last-minute, higher-priority task namic situations.
ings. it also strongly believes, based on success after reviewing the current Uas situation,
with smaller tactical Uass, that enlisted “op retired army general Barry r. Mccaffrey wrote,
erators” should fly these systems. Therefore, “We are confusing the joint battle space doc
the only way to ensure that it has them is to trine. air component commanders should
own and control them. coordinate all UaVs based on combatant
commander situational war-fighting directives.”26
air combat command (acc) and the army
Issue Analysis Training and Doctrine command recently de
To find solutions to the contrasting air veloped a “Predator and sky Warrior Uas en
Force and army Uas perspectives, one must abling concept” outlining how the JFc will
review the following five contentious issues employ these two similar aircraft. it allows the
from both points of view. additionally, it is im JFacc to manage most assets for air-centric
portant to acknowledge the change in envi campaigns, giving the organic army assets
ronment over the past five years, particularly back to the joint force land component com
the growth in the air Force’s Uas capacity mander for predominantly ground-centric
and the increased experience of both services. operations.27 This concept is a positive sign
that the army and air Force can employ a
Command and Control joint, interdependent solution that best meets
the needs of the JFc.
according to air Force doctrine, centralized Military leaders since World War i have tried
control and decentralized execution are critical various constructs to manage limited airpower
to the employment of airpower because they assets—each with varying degrees of success.
have “been proven over decades of experi in the north african battle at Kasserine Pass
ence as the most effective and efficient means during World War ii, the germans decimated
of employing air and space power.”23 The american ground forces. army doctrine at the
caoc weapons system, as part of the theater time tied airpower, as an auxiliary force, to the
air control system, “provides operational-level corps commanders. airmen commonly used
c2 [command and control] of air and space the phrase “penny packets” when referring to
forces” capable of coordinating thousands of “the improper subdivision and parceling out
sorties per day.24 historically, there has never of airpower to ground forces,” a procedure
been enough airpower—including Uass. To that failed miserably.28 While german planes
gain maximum capability from limited air as attacked gen george Patton’s troops, “some
sets, a single airman—the JFacc—should be fighters and bombers were not even tasked” to
responsible to the JFc for all such assets ca help out. The few allied aircraft that did fly
pable of operating throughout the joint op were unable to coordinate their efforts. Brit
erations area. ish air marshal arthur coningham declared
The army intends to give operational con that “the strength of airpower lies in its flexi
trol of sky Warrior to the joint force land com bility and capacity for rapid concentration.”29
ponent commander, who will delegate tactical airpower did not arrive when ground com
control to division- and brigade-level com manders needed more air help than they
manders. operational and tactical control of could organically provide themselves. The
Predator, on the other hand, resides with the ground commander’s inability to coordinate
JFacc for centralized tasking. The army’s and mass airpower over the enemy caused the
current plan calls for each army division com death of many Us soldiers. air Marshal con
mander to receive 12 sky Warrior aircraft.25 ingham added, “it follows that control must

be centralized in an air commander and com tinue to push the upper limits of Uas capa
mand exercised through air Force channels; bilities so vital to the service’s core mission
and air forces must be concentrated in use requirements.32
and not dispersed in penny packets.” Within although we can accept risks in combat air
three weeks of returning from africa, the War space, major legal issues exist for nonpilot op
Department published Field Manual 100-20, erators flying Uass in both Us and interna
which declared that “the inherent flexibility tional airspace. according to the Faa, “a
of airpower is its greatest asset. . . . control of person may not act as pilot in command or in
available airpower must be centralized and any other capacity as a required pilot flight
command must be exercised through the air crew member of a civil aircraft of the U.s. reg
force commander if this inherent flexibility istry, unless that person has a valid pilot cer
and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be tificate.” Furthermore, “because the Faa has
exploited.”30 The success of the major combat determined that Uas are civil aircraft . . .
phases of operations Desert storm and iraqi [they] must be operated by a pilot.”33 The
Freedom demonstrated the lethality of joint rules are the same in foreign airspace. annex
airpower managed by a single airman. The 13 of the international civil aviation organi
army has a penchant for lessons learned, so it zation convention states that “Uass are air
would be a travesty if it had to relearn past les craft,” thereby subject to the same rules and
sons by penny packeting the sky Warrior to regulations as manned aircraft.34 For example,
division commanders. to fly above 18,000 feet in the United states
(the altitude varies by country), pilots must
Rated Pilots versus Operators have an instrument rating. all air Force pilots
maintain an instrument qualification, allow
The most apparent divergence between the
ing them to fly above 18,000 feet. The former
army’s and air Force’s Uas models is the ar
chief of staff of the air Force cited the require
my’s plan to fly the sky Warrior with enlisted
ment for all of the air Force’s Uas pilots to be
“operators.” The air Force contends that only
“credentialed” to fly anywhere in the world as
officer rated aviators should fly Predators.
one of his reasons for cancelling the first Preda
general atomics has committed to incorpo
tor nonpilot test program.35 Both the Faa and
rating new technology into sky Warrior that
international civil aviation organization have
will reduce the army’s need for traditional pi
declared that the rules applying to manned
lots. These advances include an automatic
aircraft are the same for Uass. The DoD and
takeoff-and-landing system, an automatic sense
JFc should comply with these regulations. a
and-avoid capability to help prevent midair
midair collision between a large Uas and a ci
collisions, and an improved, user-friendly ground
vilian airliner would have strategic repercus
control station. simultaneously, to get more
sions for the joint fight, especially if nonpilot
capacity out of its existing platforms, the air
operators were involved.
Force is pushing increasingly complex up
grades, such as advanced weapons and the op
Airspace Control and Deconfliction
eration of multiple aircraft by one pilot. The
air Force uses the skill and experience of fully Uass make airspace control and aircraft de-
qualified pilots to safely fly Uass within 1,000 confliction significantly more difficult in the
feet of manned aircraft, a feat regularly re joint air domain. high-flying, long-loitering,
quired by the current operational environ and organically controlled army Uass vastly
ment.31 as the joint community continues to complicate the JFacc’s limited and crowded
demand greater coverage and increased capa airspace dilemma.
bilities from Uass, we must have well-trained The airspace control plan for the army’s
“pilots” flying them. The air Force stood up organic Uass degrades the combat effective
the first Uas Weapons school at nellis aFB, ness of the joint force. The air Force’s theater
nevada, in september 2008 in order to con air control system and the army’s airspace c2

systems meet at a horizontal plane in the joint ficult for other air assets to navigate through
air domain called the “coordinating altitude” the joint airspace. according to joint doctrine,
(fig. 3). recent combat operations have placed “efforts should be made to integrate UaVs
that altitude at approximately 3,000 feet above with manned flight operations to enable a more
the ground.36 all aircraft above the coordinat flexible and adaptable airspace structure.”38
ing altitude must fly in a more centralized, Using the roZ as a Uas airspace-control mea
positive-control manner, falling under the sure represents a step backwards towards inde
procedures and special instructions set by the pendent and deconflicted operations, which
JFacc.37 The newer, more capable army Uass lack the synergy that properly integrated air-
(like sky Warrior) operate at much higher al power should bring to the joint fight.
titudes than that service’s traditional aviation Many of the army’s organic Uass fail to in
assets. The army’s desire to fly its noncentrally tegrate into the JFacc’s airspace plan, mak
managed aircraft in the JFacc’s centrally man ing air defense difficult. historically the JFacc
aged airspace (above the coordinating alti (or caoc) has little situational awareness of
tude) is one of the major contentious issues air operations below the coordinating altitude
degrading the effectiveness of joint combat. or inside the roZs. The army’s organic avia
The army solution to this airspace-coordi tion assets such as helicopters and Uass take
nation issue calls for creating a restricted op off, land, and fly at the discretion of the
erating zone around the Uas. as depicted in ground-maneuver commander. This discon
figure 3, the roZ is typically a large cylinder nect with the JFacc fails to provide a com
of airspace, from the surface to an altitude mon operational picture, making air defense
safely above the Uas, that excludes other air virtually impossible—historically not a prob
space users. This allows the army to fly with lem due to Us air supremacy. in iraq, impro
out using centralized positive-control proce vised explosive devices (ieD) have killed more
dures. The disadvantage of this model is that ground soldiers than any other threat—over
it uses airspace inefficiently, preventing air 60 percent of the total—and the enemy, no
space controllers from maintaining situational doubt, will convert inexpensive Uass into air
awareness within the roZ and making it dif borne ieDs.39 To support the joint fight, the
Figure 3. The restricted operating zone and coordinating altitude

JFacc, as the designated area air defense builds a small land force. only a proactively
commander, must be able to integrate all air designed interdependent system will allow
borne assets into one system. american service members to deliver the effi
cient combat performance that american tech
Service Interdependence nology promises to deliver.
Joint interdependence offers the best solution
Deployment Footprint
to allow the United states to win future wars in
an environment of significantly constrained an integral part of service interdependence
resources. lt gen David Deptula highlights lies in achieving greater efficiency by opti
the progress thus far: “goldwater-nichols helped mizing the expertise of each service.45 Flying
move the american military from the inde theater-capable Uass from the United states
pendent, barely deconflicted operations of the offers the best example of how the air Force’s
early 1980s to the sustained interoperability lessons learned from a fielded system promote
that has proved so effective [today].”40 But it is efficiency through centralized control. ac
time to make the next step to interdependence. cording to acc, remote split operations rep
The JFc cannot afford to have two inde resent a force multiplier that provides a 200
pendent and barely deconflicted airspace percent increase in armed isr capability to
control systems or two redundant, separately the JFc with almost no extra manning or air
developed weapons systems. Joint doctrine craft. For example, without rsos, it takes 240
states that “joint interdependence is the pur total aircrew members (pilots and sensor op
poseful reliance by one service on another erators) to sustain four caPs in-theater—80
service’s capabilities to maximize comple deployed, 80 in garrison, and 80 in prepara
mentary and reinforcing effects.”41 according tion for deployment. With rsos, acc main
to army Field Manual 1, “joint interdepen tains four caPs indefinitely with only 86 total
dence allows each service to divest itself of re aircrew members—80 flying combat missions
dundant functions . . . [and] reduces unneces (while in garrison) and six deployed.46 rsos
sary duplication of capabilities among the allow over 85 percent of trained crews to sup
services . . . [to achieve] greater efficiencies in port the JFc indefinitely.47
their respective domains.”42 The current di The army system dedicates a combat avia
verging plans for Predator and sky Warrior do tion brigade, including a sky Warrior com
not follow joint interdependent principles. pany, to each division in the traditional de
The air Force’s repeated failure to meet ployed manner—with only one-third of the
the needs of the army has reduced trust be force deployed at a time.48 according to the
tween the two services. consequently, the air Force’s Uas Task Force, the JFc would re
army is scheduled to spend $1.02 billion to ceive an almost 100 percent increase in caPs
research, develop, test, train, and field the sky by applying the air Force’s rso model to the
Warrior Uas—a capability that already exists planned army sky Warrior program. The cur
in the air Force.43 Meanwhile, the air Force rent sky Warrior plan would provide 21 caPs
simultaneously develops, trains, and fields a to central command. By applying the rso
temporary force of airmen to augment the model, that number increases to 40 long-term,
army by performing traditional army func sustainable caPs.49
tions, such as guarding prisoners, driving con army leaders argue that organic caPs of
voys, and conducting civil affairs, having de sky Warriors supporting the division com
ployed over 22,000 airmen since 2004 to mander will be more effective than rso caPs.
perform such army functions.44 congress has an army publication notes that “dedicated
already initiated a comprehensive review of Uas at brigade level will increase effectiveness
service roles and missions to determine if it is of operations by providing more responsive
in the best interest of the country to have the and more detailed reconnaissance.”50 The army
army build an air force while the air Force contends that requesting Uas support in the

air Force’s method of centralized control is tions relay, and rotary-wing teaming / target
too slow and carries too much risk of having acquisition). The air Force should concentrate
the asset diverted to other priorities. it also be its efforts on the requirements aligned with its
lieves that rsos negatively impact effective core function found at the upper end of the
ness due to the communication degradation complexity envelope (e.g., air superiority,
caused by the 8,000 miles between crews and global precision attack, combat search and
ground commanders. Finally, the army argues rescue, c2, and global integrated isr). addi
that in order to fight as a cohesive unit, the tionally, the air Force should continuously ex
aircrew needs to deploy with the units it sup pand its end of the envelope with the addition
ports, so as to “feel” the intensity and tempo of highly complex Uas tasks such as suppres
of the day-to-day fight.51 sion of enemy air defenses, air-to-air engage
These concerns are warranted; however, it ment, and airborne forward air control. This
is unlikely that the ground commander will be interdependent model would provide maxi
colocated with the Uas crews due to sky War mum capability to combatant commanders
rior’s runway-length requirements. The army while capitalizing on the strengths of the re
will use Uas communication methods similar spective services. in order to build this Uas
to those the air Force uses today, such as ra capability envelope, we must first resolve the
dio, chat, phone, and e-mail. five contentious issues, discussed previously.
implementing the following recommenda
tions would help resolve the contentious issues:
Recommendations /A Solution:
1. We must treat theater-capable army

The UAS Capability
Uass the same as other similarly capable
Envelope Model
fixed-wing manned aircraft (regardless
of service). systems such as sky Warrior
it is time for a comprehensive review of air- must operate under the same nonorganic
power management in the joint operational en centralized control system as the JFacc’s
vironment. The rapid proliferation of theater- other air assets. The army will still oper
capable Uass has brought this issue to a point ate the systems and regularly support its
that requires action. realistically, the army own ground commanders’ taskings, but
will not abandon the sky Warrior program. the JFacc would have situational aware
Despite the negative effect on the joint opera ness and retain retasking authority to
tional environment, sky Warrior and other capitalize on the strengths of centrally
(non–air Force) theater-capable Uass will managed airpower. The division com
proliferate. The secretary of defense must con manders can retain their smaller, less
vey to the joint community a clear and achiev capable assets but would have to com
able system that addresses the five contentious pete for the theater-capable assets with
issues highlighted above. only then will the the rest of the joint community. central
DoD maximize taxpayer dollars in a truly ized control of all theater-capable air
joint, efficient, and effective plan that meets craft is feasible if the army can clearly
the needs of both the army and the JFc. articulate its required baseline require
Uass will continue to provide increased ments to the JFc.
combat capabilities. Both the army and the
air Force should develop their theater-capable 2. To resolve the “pilot” versus “operator”
Uass as fast as possible, with their respective issue, we must ensure that all personnel
sights set at opposite ends of the Uas com who control Uass are pilots in the tradi
plexity envelope (fig. 4). The army should de tional sense. at a minimum, the army’s
velop its Uas force, focusing on the higher- Uas training plan must include training
demand tasks found at the lower end of the equivalent to that required to earn a ba
complexity spectrum (e.g., small-unit situational sic civilian pilot’s license. in addition,
awareness, battlefield awareness, communica army pilots would need an instrument

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%FOPUFTBO"JS'PSDF$PSF'VODUJPO
&"4&0'"650."5*0/
Figure 4. Air Force and Army UAS interdependence model
rating to fly at high altitude or in clouds. available to the JFc. The sky Warrior sys
This policy would assure that all aircraft tem should adopt the rso model and
flying in the joint operational environ thus provide the greatest capability to
ment are legal and safe, as was the case the joint environment.
prior to the advent of army Uass.
The army’s adoption of the preceding rec
3. rather than protect high-flying army ommendations will result in service interdepen
Uass (like sky Warrior) in the highly in dence. if the two services focus their efforts on
efficient roZs, we must see to it that air their respective ends of the Uas capability en
space controllers actively manage those velope, then a truly interdependent system
aircraft. roZs dedicate an inordinate will prevail. only then will aviation assets in
amount of airspace to each aircraft and the joint operational environment be able to
drastically complicate the JFacc’s airspace satisfy the JFc’s aviation-related objectives.
plan. The joint community must make
roZs the exception instead of the rule.
4. We must realize that the effective way to
Conclusion
solve the army’s demands for Uass in- airmen and soldiers alike must put service
theater involves placing more of them in rivalries aside, think creatively, and work to
the joint fight through the rso model. gether to solve today’s problems. The current
Flying Uass from the United states via Uas c2 system is not capable of handling a
the rso system has tripled the number significant number of theater-capable Uass
of the air Force’s theater-capable assets flown by “operators” in a decentralized man

ner in airspace that excludes other air assets. maximizes the capability of the force.”52 The
To fully utilize the potential of this new tech army’s proposed sky Warrior model does not
nology, the DoD must develop a single inter capitalize on jointness. We must resolve the
dependent system capable of maximizing the five issues dealing with the joint operational
joint operational environment. The day the environment, highlighted by comparing the
enemy starts flying remotely operated flying air Force’s Predator to the army’s sky Warrior.
ieDs will mark the first time in over 50 years The joint battlespace is starting to suffer, and
that the army will need to worry about enemy matters will only get worse. The army and the
threats from the air. it would be tragic if the air Force can no longer “agree to disagree” on
United states lost air superiority due to the the Uas issue because risks to the joint fight
services’ unwillingness to agree on one seam are too high. The secretary of defense must
less model for the joint air domain. make the tough decision that “going organic”
Joint doctrine tells us that “the synergy that with theater-capable army Uass is unhealthy
results from the operations of joint forces for the joint operational environment. ❑
Notes
1. office of the secretary of Defense, Unmanned Sys 10. capt albert Bosco, chief, Public affairs, Us air Force
tems Roadmap 2007–2032 (Washington, Dc: office of the Uas Task Force, interview by the author, 5 March 2009.
secretary of Defense/acquisition Technology and logistics 11. col eric Mathewson, director, Us air Force Uas
[osD/aT&l], 2007), 23 http://www.jointrobotics.com/ Task Force, “Predator 101” (presentation, air Force Pub
documents/library/office%20of%20the%20secretary lic affairs, Washington, Dc, January 2009).
%20of%20Defense,%20integrated%20Unmanned%20 12. “Products and services,” general atomics aeronau
systems%20roadmap%20(2007-2032).pdf. tical systems, http://www.ga-asi.com/products/index.php
2. ibid. (accessed 6 March 2008).
3. ibid., i. 13. Department of Defense instruction 5100.1, Func
4. col christopher chambliss, commander, 432d Wing, tions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, 1
creech aFB, nV (presentation to the Us air Force Uas august 2002, 1, 15, 21, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
Task Force, 9 January 2009). corres/pdf/510001p.pdf.
5. Joint Unmanned aircraft systems center of excel 14. Mathewson, interview.
lence, Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Sys 15. air Force Doctrine Document (aFDD) 1, Air Force
tems (Washington, Dc: Joint Unmanned aircraft systems Basic Doctrine, 17 november 2003, 28, http://www.dtic
center of excellence, 2007), ii-22. .mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1.pdf.
6. gen T. Michael Moseley, memorandum for record 16. gen T. Michael Moseley, to Us army chief of staff,
to all MaJcoM ccs, subject: Direction to Maximize Uas memorandum, subject: Unmanned aircraft system syn
capability, 29 February 2008. chronization, 2006.
7. Maj Jonathon songer, Uas subject-matter expert, 17. aFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 January 2000, 49, 54, http://
allied Forces central europe, telephone interview by the www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afd2_1.pdf.
author, 10 January 2009. 18. Moseley to Us army chief of staff, memorandum.
8. according to col eric Mathewson, it takes 10 pilots 19. Field Manual (FM) 1-100, Army Aviation Operations,
and 10 sensor operators to stand up an additional caP. 21 February 1997, 1-3, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
During surge operations, this number can be reduced to military/library/policy/army/fm/1-100/index.html.
seven. The average air Force single-seat fighter squadron 20. institute of land Warfare, U.S. Army Aviation: Bal
has 20–25 pilots. Two-seat fighters such as the F-15e have ancing Current and Future Demands, Torchbearer national
20–25 of each crew member. Therefore, adding three security report (arlington, Va: association of the United
caPs requires 21–30 Uas pilots and 21–30 Uas sensor states army, January 2008), 11, http://www3.ausa.org/
operators—the same number of aircrew members as an webpub/deptilw.nsf/byid/rboh-7avkzb/$file/aviationtb
entire fighter squadron. col eric Mathewson, com _28dec.pdf?openelement.
mander, 432d operations group, telephone interview by 21. James g. rose, “extended range / Multi-Purpose
the author, 15 March 2008. (er/MP) Unmanned aerial Vehicle (UaV) operational
9. Tom Vanden Brook, “report: insurgents Benefit requirements Document (orD),” version 4.5 (Washing
from Drone shortage,” USA Today, 25 March 2008. ton, Dc: Department of the army, 14 June 2004), 4.

22. ibid. 37. ibid.

23. aFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 28. 38. Joint Publication (JP) 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Air
24. air Force instruction 13-1aoc, Operational Proce space Control in the Combat Zone, 30 august 2004, iii-6,
dures—Air and Space Operations Center, 1 august 2005, 5, 9, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_52.pdf.
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/ 39. office of the secretary of Defense, “global War
aFi13-1aocV3.pdf. on Terrorism—[casualties] by reason: october 7, 2001
25. rose, “extended range / Multi-Purpose”; and col through January 31, 2009,” http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/
Jeffrey T. Kappenman, training and systems manager for personnel/casUalTY/gwot_reason.pdf (accessed 5 april
Uass, Us army Training and Doctrine command, inter 2008); and lt gen James c. riley and Brig gen Michael
view by the author, headquarters army aviation center, Means, “The looming Force Protection crisis for Brigade
Fort rucker, al, 5 March 2008. combat Teams,” Air Defense Artillery, october–December
26. gen Barry r. Mccaffrey, Usa, retired, adjunct pro 2006, 9, http://www.airdefenseartillery.com/online/
fessor of international affairs, Us Military academy (UsMa), extracts/Force%20Protection%20crisis.pdf (accessed 18
to col Mike Meese, UsMa, memorandum, subject: after February 2009).
action report: Visit to nellis and scott aFB, 14–17 august 40. lt gen David a. Deptula, “Toward restructuring
2007, 15 october 2007, 5, http://www.mccaffreyassociates national security,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Winter
.com/pages/documents/airForceaar-101207.pdf (ac 2007): 5, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2007/Winter/
cessed 5 april 2008). deptula.pdf.
27. Maj Matt Martin, acc/a3YU, chief of armed isr 41. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
Branch, interview by the author, 4 March 2008. 14 May 2007, i-2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new
28. rebecca grant, “Up from Kasserine Pass,” Air Force _pubs/jp1.pdf.
Magazine 90, no. 9 (september 2007): 76, http://www.air 42. FM 1, Army Forces in Unified Action, 14 June 2005,
force-magazine.com/Magazinearchive/Pages/2007/ 3-ii, http://www.army.mil/fm1/chapter3.html.
september%202007/0907kasserine.aspx. 43. rose, “extended range / Multi-Purpose,” 52.
29. ibid. 44. house, Presentation to the Subcommittee on Readiness
30. ibid., 78. Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Represen
31. The author regularly flew 1,000 feet above or be tatives, In-Lieu-of (ILO) Taskings: Statement of Brigadier Gen
low other manned aircraft while flying over 750 hours of eral Marke Gibson, Director of Current Operations and Train
Predator time in both iraqi Freedom and enduring Free ing, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements,
dom. in the busiest airspace, this altitude buffer some United States Air Force, 110th cong., 1st sess., 31 July 2007,
times was only 500 feet. http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/read073107/
32. Maj Joseph campo, director of operations, Uas gibson_Testimony073107.pdf (accessed 4 april 2008).
Weapons school, telephone interview by the author, 15 45. FM 1, Army Forces in Unified Action, 275.
December 2008. 46. capt Kathryn nelson, acc/a8U1, to the author,
33. “Questions and answers: operating Uas,” Fed e-mail, 17 March 2008; and capt Kathryn nelson, tele
eral aviation administration, 29 February 2008, http:// phone interview by the author, 17 March 2008. Both the
www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/uas/ e-mail and interview dealt with the Predator-reaper 101
uas_faq/uas_qa-op/. briefing.
34. “addressing Unmanned aircraft system (Uas) 47. Megan orton, “general Underscores commit
accident investigation and Prevention by icao Member ment to Fielding Unmanned aerial systems,” american
states,” international civil aviation organization Working Forces Press service, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Paper, 18 september 2007, 3, http://www.icao.int/icao/ newsarticle.aspx?id=52673.
en/assembl/a36/wp/wp217_en.pdf (accessed 4 april 2008). 48. institute of land Warfare, U.S. Army Aviation, 7.
35. col Jeffrey eggers, headquarters aF/a3-5, for 49. nelson, e-mail and interview.
warded e-mail from Maj gen stephen M. goldfein, acc/ 50. institute of land Warfare, U.S. Army Aviation, 22.
cV, dated 16 november 2006, 10 april 2008. 51. army intelligence and aviation personnel, inter
36. headquarters air Force Doctrine center, “Doc views by the author, Fort rucker, al, 6 March 2008.
trine Watch no. 22: Unmanned aircraft (Ua) and air 52. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, i-2.
space control in the combat Zone” (Maxwell aFB, al:
headquarters air Force Doctrine center, 17 January 2006).

Airpower Trends 2010
The Future Is Closer Than You Think
Col John D. Jogerst, UsAF, retireD
The author examines the state of airpower in the near future by addressing three broad areas
in which radical change has already occurred. First, he shows that close air support has under
gone a revolution in efficacy by improving networked coordination, using simpler delivery
systems, and developing one-shot-per-target capabilities. Second, he examines advances in
unmanned aircraft systems and discusses the impact of these platforms. Third, the author
notes that airborne laser systems and other directed energy weapons stand poised to deliver
near-instantaneous effects from unparalleled standoff distances. Ultimately, he argues that
these systems are alternatives to, not additions to or adjuncts of, the manned force.
Technologies in place today have produced unmanned systems capable of replacing manned
aircraft. Will we react to the challenge or act on the opportunity?
T
he Air Force has always seen itself using those technologies is less impressive. Jet
as the force of the future. We live in fighters fought like fast biplanes of World War i
a future that our predecessors built— vintage until col John Boyd developed the
with jet aircraft, missiles, operations fundamentals of energy maneuverability in
from space, precision munitions, and, now, cyber the 1960s. even then, it took another decade
warfare. however, our record of innovation in for colonel Boyd’s supporters—his fighter
101
04-Feature-Jogerst.indd 101 4/28/09 1:30:40 PM

mafia—to implement the concepts through puts a premium on situational awareness and
out the Air Force.1 Practical precision muni accuracy, thus making cAS a demanding mis
tions, introduced during the Vietnam War, sion. The “close proximity to friendly forces”
initially offered nothing more than a way to and “detailed integration of each air mission
destroy fixed targets without the 1,000plane with the fire and movement of those forces”
raids of World War ii. col John Warden’s re define cAS in Air Force doctrine.2 conse
vival of the strategicweb targeting theory in quently, in the past, cAS aircraft had to fly
his book The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat over the battlefield to clearly identify enemy
(1988) explicitly set out the revolutionary na and friendly positions. once oriented, the pi
ture of this capability. The debate continues lot then had to maneuver close to the target to
today with the (ongoing) development of the deliver weapons. close proximity offered the
theory of effectsbased operations. only way of attaining sufficient accuracy to de
Tactics in the field lead institutional inno stroy the enemy without collateral damage to
vation. This traditional path makes for good friendly forces. overflying the battle required
doctrine but is slow—glacial in peacetime— that the cAS platform be maneuverable and
and seldom anticipates change. There is much tough. Technology in the field today, however,
truth to the saying that doctrine is about fight radically changes this equation.
ing the last war. Faced with the challenge of a The availability of realtime intelligence,
new conflict, our young airmen (as well as sol observation, and targeting referenced to GPS
diers, sailors, and marines) are adept at solv coordinates has eliminated the need for cAS
ing problems with the tools and technologies aircraft to overfly the battlespace for situa
at hand. eventually, these innovations may tional awareness. The lengthy coordination
find their way into service doctrine. The pace among joint headquarters, ground observers,
of doctrinal change seems locked to genera and pilots can now take place in seconds over
tional changes in Air Force leadership. Must tactical networks. The groundforce commander
we wait for today’s captains and majors fight can provide the current disposition of his or
ing in iraq/Afghanistan to be promoted be her forces, specify exactly where fires are
fore we come to grips with the future? needed, and deliver that information any
Technologies now reaching the flight line where on the battlefield.
or already in combat can radically alter the Precise locations of friendly and enemy
way we fight. This article briefly explores three forces delivered directly to an aircraft supply
broad areas that not only represent better ways the necessary battlefield orientation, permit
of doing business but also may transform the ting nearimmediate weapons release. Guid
business itself. Not the stuff of sciencefiction ance on board the weapon then maneuvers it
scenarios or nanotech warfare, these capabili to impact. The aircraft no longer has to close
ties are on the ramp today. with the target to ensure accurate delivery. in
turn, the fact that cAS aircraft can now stand
off from the battlefield reduces the need for
Precision Munitions and
maneuverability.
the End of Close Air Support
Furthermore, avoiding the immediate battle
space keeps these aircraft out of the threat en
As We Know It
velopes of small arms, antiaircraft artillery, and
A transformation in close air support (cAS) small surfacetoair missiles, further relaxing
is occurring through the combination of a the performance requirements for cAS sys
common precision frame of reference for the tems. Lower performance means that simpler,
entire joint force provided by the global posi cheaper systems can carry out the mission.
tioning system (GPS), broadband communi Precision targeting also reduces the weap
cation linkages (tactical internet), and cheap ons yield necessary to destroy a target. in prin
processing power that controls maneuverable ciple, precision allows delivery of every muni
weapons. The proximity of forces in contact tion within feet of the point designated by a

AIRPOWER TRENDS 2010 103
tactical commander. concentrating the weap ing the author’s tenure commanding the Joint
on’s effect on the target reduces the yield Special operations Air component in 2005,
needed for target destruction as well as the the majority of cAS sorties launched without
number of weapons per objective; it also allows a target as “XcAS,” tasked in the air to meet
for delivery of fewer, lighter weapons by smaller immediate needs of the ground force. The
systems, which can be much less complex since Aoc had largely become a logistical node,
the detection and aiming tasks have effectively providing and sustaining armed aircraft on
moved from the delivery platform to the net call for ongoing operations. The detailed co
work and the munition, respectively. Moreover, ordination called for in cAS doctrine shifted
the supported ground force’s surveillance sys from the joint headquarters level to the ground
tems or other parts of the intelligence, surveil tactical operations center, where networklinked
lance, and reconnaissance “cloud” over the overhead sensors supplied the battlefield over
battlefield can put immediate poststrike obser view directly to the cAS platform, air liaison
vation of a weapon’s effects on the network. officer, and troop commander. This trend is
Because precision weapons’ oneshot, one also evident in the development of the joint
kill capability reduces the number of weapons airground control cell concept discussed in
required per target, we can place more weap Air Force Doctrine Document 21.3, Counter-
ons on existing platforms or use smaller plat land Operations.5
forms as effectively as today’s cAS aircraft. We in combination, these factors also diminish
can already see both ends of this spectrum in the logisticalsupport footprint for cAS, allow
use. At the high end, B52 and B1 “bomb ing both control and basing of delivery sys
trucks” are releasing single precision weapons tems to move forward to lower echelons of the
from their capacious bomb bays to strike indi tactical force. A moveable complex of light
vidual targets on call. At the light end, reap unmanned and manned aircraft supported by
ers (and, very soon, cessna caravans) are de a distributed intelligence, targeting, and con
livering hellfire missiles.3 This ability to kill trol network can replace a squadron of A10s
more targets with the same number of weap at a fixed airfield—witness the Army’s Task
ons reduces the number of aircraft required Force oDiN (observe, detect, identify, neu
to perform cAS. tralize) in iraq. combined within an Army
opposing this trend toward fewer cAS plat combat aviation brigade are manned and un
forms is an increase in the utility of—hence, manned sensor aircraft as well as manned and
the demand for—cAS.4 Smaller weapons yield unmanned light aircraft and helicopters. Tra
drastically shrinks the scope of collateral dam ditional linkages to artillery support, itself ca
age and allows weapons delivery closer to pable of delivering precision munitions, also
friendly forces, expanding the usefulness of remain. A networked surveillance and target
cAS to those forces and lowering barriers to ing system supports the tactical force com
its use. Significantly, not all of this demand mander, who now controls a package of systems
need be satisfied from above, though airborne offering an overview of the battlefield, target
cAS will likely remain the most responsive op detection, and immediate firepower. Though
tion. Guided munitions for artillery and mor initially designed to prevent the emplacement
tars can provide similar precision from small, of improvised explosive devices on iraqi roads,
unitportable weapons. Task Force oDiN has all the capabilities needed
The combination of networked coordina to support troops in contact with the enemy—
tion, simpler delivery systems, and one shot in short, to do cAS.6 of course, today’s fight
per target makes lowerechelon control of in iraq and Afghanistan is as unique as any
cAS feasible, pulling it out of the central air other conflict; however, the above logic holds
and space operations center (Aoc) and mov up well across the range of military operations.
ing it down to the ground force’s tactical op Largescale, mechanized (conventional) con
erations center. We see this today in the air flict does not change the cAS equation for the
tasking orders in iraq and Afghanistan. Dur tactical commander. if anything, it expands the

need for speed and precise effects. Primary but also calls for more coordination across the
changes include an increase in the intensity of theater. existing information networks already
the ground threat to cAS aircraft, potential air distribute tactical information around the
space congestion over the battle, and growth in globe. Adding capacity to these linkages pres
the size and complexity of the fight. ents a logistical problem of securing sufficient
Unmanned systems in use today would bandwidth—not just a technical one. Moving
prove effective in a conventional fight. Stand the information where it is needed allows us
off delivery of precision weapons from outside to focus command and control at any given
the range of enemy defenses makes more in level—from tactical to theater strategic. We
tense air defenses irrelevant since the delivery can synchronize multiple tactical engagements
platform would rarely come within reach of centrally, with execution decentralized to ap
those defenses.7 in addition, smaller delivery propriate network nodes. of course, this need
platforms present a smaller detection signa for bandwidth to move information and com
ture. The visual, infrared, and radar signature mands remains a major vulnerability for all
of a lowpowered, composite Predatortype operations in a largescale conflict.
platform is significantly less than that of tradi Ultimately, these trends will push toward a
tional cAS aircraft—stealth on the cheap. smaller/simpler Air Force cAS force, a smaller
Large numbers of lowcost platforms can also “combat” role for the Aoc in the cAS fight,
saturate defenses or make losses tolerable. and more control of the cAS mission by tactical
Similarly, in situations requiring airpower, commanders. By 2010 a typical call for cAS
the greater effectiveness of each precision might resemble this scenario:
weapon negates the increase in enemy forces A companylevel commander in the fight lo
in a conventional fight. each cAS platform cates targets from an intelligence picture that
can destroy large numbers of targets using in synthesizes everything from groundplatoon re
dividual munitions or precision area weapons porting, overhead visual images, infrared sen
such as the cBU105 (sensorfused weapons in sors, radar, and radiointercept information up
a windcorrected munitions dispenser).8 rather loaded to a tactical network. The commander
than building a wall of fire across the battle “points and clicks” to designate specific targets
front, massed cAS changes to become the and to upload precision coordinates to the tacti
cal net. Personnel designate mobile targets by
massed effect of numerous small explosions
type to specify seeker settings for appropriate
directly on each battlefield target. weapons. They also determine nofire areas
We must still contend with the perennial from reported GPS locations of friendly units,
problem of operating multiple types of sys and go online to calculate frag patterns for col
tems in constricted airspace over the battle. lateral damage.
We are addressing the problem (painfully) to
once placed on the net, the information is
day in the skies over iraq as Ac130 gunships, available to all weapons within range of the
helicopters, fighters, Predators, and other sen fight—anything from mortars and artillery to
sor platforms regularly operate in support of a unmanned and manned aircraft. orbiting outside
single operation—so far without an actual col the battle area, these might include a few large
lision. Deconfliction in a less permissive envi aircraft, each with many weapons, or a large num
ronment would pose even more of a prob ber of manned/unmanned light aircraft, each
lem—but only if we need to operate multiple with fewer weapons. Weaponsdelivery systems
platforms directly above the fight. covering a “bid” for targets based on their capabilities, each
given number of targets with fewer platforms system making specific targeting assignments,
and then fire weapons that converge on the
standing off from the fight would diminish
battlespace. Detailed flightpath coordination is
the need to operate in congested airspace unnecessary since only the weapons, not the de
over a conventional battlefield. livery systems, enter the area. intelligence, sur
Largescale, mechanized combat not only veillance, and reconnaissance systems from the
increases the physical size and scope of the supported ground force and theaterlevel assets
battle across multiple tactical engagements put strike results on the net.

The Aoc carries out its role of launching Although World War i ended before the Bug
manned and unmanned cAS aircraft, directing saw action, this unmanned system set the tone
them to holding orbits. it also monitors the status for future UAS development. The challenges
of fuel and weapons, keeping the orbits resup of making a successful powered takeoff and
plied by managing tanker support and launch
ing replacement cAS aircraft. The Aoc has little
landing limited UASs to singleuse systems
to do with the tactical fight. launched by catapult, air, or track—that is, fly
ing bombs. in situations that precluded the
Unlike many forecasts, this is not specula launching of the UAS—for example, World
tion about new technology but observation and War ii’s Aphrodite systems, which employed
synthesis of trends in current equipment and modified heavy bombers stuffed with explo
tactics used today, taken to their logical conclu sives—a pilot flew the takeoff and then para
sion. Still missing is a comprehensive machine chuted from the explosivesladen aircraft, at
tomachine interface to share existing informa which point a following aircraft took over by
tion and allocate weapons to targets. radio control.11
our challenge lies in accommodating this Some previous unmanned aircraft could be
reality. What force structure does the cAS mis recovered and used again if equipped with a
sion require? how many A10s, F16s, and F35s parachuterecovery system, but their complexity
can MQ9s replace? Do we lead this charge or and the inevitable damage that occurred dur
cede the mission area and funding to ground ing the process prevented a quick turnaround
forces?9 The revolutionary impact of the GPS, for aircraftlike operations.12 We developed re
communications, and computer power on cAS coverable systems when we needed to limit
comprises one aspect of a broader application costs (target drones) or retrieve recorded in
to airpower. formation (reconnaissance drones).
in the 1970s, a better understanding of
Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
aerodynamics and the availability of comput
ers to execute control algorithms solved the
Pilot Chips instead of Wings
problems of taking off and landing safely. Not
The evolution of unmanned aircraft has developed for unmanned systems, the capability
been constrained by the need to respond to grew from the continued refinement of auto
the complex aerodynamic and navigational pilot systems for commercial aircraft. Driven
requirements of controlled flight. Moreover, by safety requirements and a need to operate
the tactical aspects of combat missions demand more reliably in poor weather, avionics com
immediate human decisions and control. Never panies developed systems that could use an
theless, capabilities developed and deployed aircraft’s autopilot to fly a coupled precision
in the last two decades now allow UASs to con approach. A logical extension of this capability
duct some combat missions effectively. was the addition of radaraltimeter informa
UASs are as old as flight itself. The first fly tion to bring the aircraft all the way to the
ing machines were unmanned models and landing flare. economics drove acceptance of
gliders built to investigate the fundamental the technology, allowing airlines to provide
principles of flight. Development then turned more reliable service in poor weather.13
to putting a man into the machine. Shortly af A corresponding economic need, this time
ter the Wright brothers’ first successful pow to save fuel costs, led to the concurrent devel
ered flights, however, certain military missions opment of autopilots that could control en
required removal of the man from the aircraft. gine power settings as well as aircraft attitude
The Kettering unmanned aerial torpedo of and flight altitude. The autothrottle optimized
1917—the Bug—was the first practical mili the engines’ power setting and aircraft climb
tary UAS.10 A preset system of electrical and rate to save fuel. it was only a short step to add
pneumatic controls flew this aircraft and re logic that could extend this control from air
leased its payload—hopefully, on the target. craft brake release to touchdown.

Accurate navigation remained a problem. tance to unmanned operations usually centers

Autopilots could guide an aircraft along an on safety, specifically the problems of dealing
airway or approach path but could neither with emergencies or nonroutine operations.
“see and avoid” obstacles nor determine a Actually, executing emergency procedures
precise position without external navigation is one of the easier problems to solve. Genera
aids. either inertial navigation systems or tions of thought and experience have given
complex automatic star trackers could pro us very good algorithms to deal with emer
vide aircraft position but not with the preci gencies—specifically, the emergencyprocedure
sion needed for flexible operations outside a checklists in every flight manual. For each po
welldefined route structure. tential problem, we have a stepbystep proce
The development and deployment of terrain dure to analyze problem indications, take ac
following radar systems coupled to an aircraft’s tion, observe the results of the action, and
autopilot (F111) added obstacleavoidance take further action if necessary. Autonomous
capabilities. The problem of avoiding other implementation simply requires that the prob
air traffic is yielding to cooperative aircraft lem indications be available to the UAS’s con
transponder networks, with aircraft sharing pre trolling computer and that the various con
cise information about position and velocity.14 trols, switches, and circuit breakers be activated
Finally, the level of accuracy provided by the by that computer.
GPS enables aircraft to determine their posi We also have a model for dealing with un
tion to any practical level of precision. usual or intractable emergencies. currently, a
Together, these developments have given pilot declaring an inflight emergency quickly
us aircraft like the Global hawk, able to oper receives support from a team of experienced
ate autonomously from initial takeoff to sub aircrew, leadership, and engineering personnel.
sequent landing at another airfield anywhere We can gather the same team for a UAS, but
in the world. Now that pilots possess an air that team now determines additional actions
plane capable of flying itself, the toughest task to transmit to the remote aircraft.
remaining for them on a routine flight in The remaining problem—making nonrou
volves navigating the ground traffic between tine tactical decisions required in combat—
the parking ramp and the runway. represents our present justification both for
We have solutions in hand to get unmanned the continued use of manned aircraft and the
systems from takeoff to a destination—more close manned supervision of UASs. Today’s so
than enough capability for straightforward mis lution is to keep the human in the loop, even
sions like cargo delivery. No technical reason if the loop stretches through a satellite linkage
prevents us from deploying an unmanned tac to Nevada. This demands plenty of bandwidth
tical cargo air bridge by 2010. equipping a to pass the information needed to maintain the
constellation of Qc27 aircraft with the brains remote operator’s situational awareness. The
from Global hawk would do it. Farfetched sci communication linkage also imposes a time
ence fiction? Not at all: the 17 November 2008 delay as the signal travels from the UAS to the
issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology re operator and back. Global operations using a
ported that the US Army has tested an “op satellite relay incur oneway transmission de
tionally piloted” cessna caravan for “utility lays of at least a quarter of a second.16 A total
transport in routine, but sometimes danger roundtrip delay of half a second may not
ous, battlefield and areaofinterest reconnais sound like much, but the lag is more than
sance and patrol missions.”15 enough to cause problems during rapid aero
We seem to have the practical capabilities dynamic maneuvers. routine delays may be
for routine operations in hand—but not the much longer, depending on details of the
doctrine and attitudes. however, it is instruc transmission route and any required com
tive to note that commercial airline operations puter processing of information or commands.
are adopting autotakeoff/pilot/land systems To deal with nonroutine mission opera
in the name of increasing flight safety. resis tions, a UAS must have some ability to detect a

change to the preplanned mission and then Moving targets are more demanding be
develop and implement a solution. en route, cause we must search the area to locate them.
the problem becomes how to maneuver the They impose more demands on the UAS’s sen
UAS around unforeseen obstructions, whether sors, or they require more detailed external di
terrain, weather, threats, or other aircraft. De rection. however, we have already deployed
tecting them requires either an appropriate or demonstrated solutions to this problem
sensor—mapping radar, threatwarning receiver, with existing missile seekers, like that of the
or collisionavoidance system—or information imaging infrared Maverick, and with the laser
provided by offboard sensors through a net Joint Direct Attack Munition.17 The key is rec
work. None of these is new technology; all are ognition of targets—and friendlies—an area
available today. in which we may require human intervention
After detecting the obstruction, the UAS for some time yet.
must replan its route to avoid the obstacle. in the targetrich environment of high
once again, we already have the solution in intensity combat, truly autonomous UAS op
the field: automated software for route plan eration is now feasible. existing sensorfused
ning and inflight replanning. Today’s UASs, weapons and other precision munitions can
and some airliners, are not “flown” during the both find and strike conventional targets.
en route portion of their flight but are di More ambiguous combat environments, such
rected by changing the desired routing for the as counterinsurgencies and urban fights, will
autopilot—using a mouse click instead of the need to maintain a human in the decision
control stick. For UASs, moving implementa loop to designate targets and approve weap
tion of the software from the control cab to ons release. Assuming adequate bandwidth,
this is how we do business today.
the aircraft themselves represents just a small
Although the problem of offensive and de
step. Determining the need to revise a route
fensive maneuvering remains, we can make some
involves only the incorporation of software to
general observations. The fight beyond visual
allow the UAS to update its internal map au
range should remain within the capability of
tonomously, replan its route as required by
today’s UAS since the problem is essentially
traffic or threats, and update any relevant air limited to target detection and weapons re
space controllers. lease. For a closein fight, the UAS is probably
once in the target area, a UAS must detect not yet ready. This mission would likely re
and locate its objective, release weapons, and quire much more complex control laws than
conduct any required offensive/defensive ma we now use. existing logic for maneuvering an
neuverings. how close are we to pushing these airtoair missile to an intercept would proba
decisions forward to the UAS? bly not prove sufficient to solve the more com
Detecting and locating targets is already a plex problem of maneuvering for a missile or
heavily automated task. We deploy a network gun shot while preventing the target, and
of sensors across the battlespace and analyze other enemy aircraft, from attaining a firing
the resulting information with a series of com solution on the UAS. Using a human in the
puter tools. Today, we manually transfer this loop would run up against the previously men
information to the flight crews, who then tioned timedelay problem as well as require
manually enter it into their aircrafts’ systems. excessive bandwidth to provide the remote
Transferring the information directly from a controller with situational awareness. Devel
targeting cell in the Aoc to the UAS only sim opment of a practical airtoairfighter UAS
plifies the process. will depend on future improvements in both
Striking fixed targets, whether preplanned or framing the maneuvering problem and creat
designated by a ground/airborne observer, is ing the artificial intelligence to solve it.
straightforward. The UAS simply transfers the Defensive maneuvering against ground
provided coordinates to an onboard weapon threats poses a less difficult problem. Due to
and maneuvers to the weapon’s release box. high cockpit workloads and the need for short

reaction times, existing countermeasures suites sition community.18 Another revolutionary ca
generally operate automatically, once armed. pability is emerging from a similarly long and
A UAS could arm/disarm its countermeasures, difficult saga of development and acquisition.
based on known threats, onboard threat de
tection, or mission profile.
one argument maintains that incorporat Directed Energy Weapons:
ing all these capabilities will drive up the size Revenge of the Battle Plane
and cost of a UAS, negating any advantage

over a manned system. The flaw in the argu in late November 2008, the YAL1 airborne
ment is that, to put a UAS in combat, we don’t laser (ABL) completed the first ground test of
need hardware as much as we do software and the entire weapon system integrated aboard
computing power. Making a bigger, smarter the aircraft, generating and directing the
“brain” takes grams of silicon—not pounds of beam onto a simulated target and thereby pre
aluminum. Furthermore, the UAS does not paring the way for flight tests in 2009.19 What
require the volume, protection, and environ are the implications of an operationally useful
mental systems needed to carry an aircrew. directed energy (De) weapon? The designed
Additionally, many of the technologies that mission of the megawattclass laser on the ABL
enable UASs are not carried on the airframe. is to destroy missiles at ranges in excess of 200
Precision GPS navigation and targeting infor miles.20 however, like the creative operators
mation from the network harness a huge in who placed a 105 millimeter howitzer in a c
frastructure with minimal equipment on board 130, the developers of the ABL are already dis
the UAS. of course, relying on offboard sup cussing the weapon’s effectiveness against air
port highlights the major UAS vulnerability breathing targets.21
today—bandwidth. Limited capacity and vul Speedoflight/lineofsight weapons like
nerability to electronic attack make this the the laser on the ABL are fundamentally differ
UAS’s weakest link. increasingly autonomous ent from kinetic weapons. Lineofsight preci
UAS operations should render this problem sion ensures oneshot, onekill effectiveness.
more tractable by reducing the amount of ex Speedoflight response ensures that the target
ternal information needed by the aircraft. has no warning to make evasive maneuvers or
That said, if UASs are so capable, why are employ countermeasures.22 if the technology
we not fielding them in greater numbers? Ul proves practical and affordable, a De weapon
timately, it comes back to resources. The de will provide a nearinstant kill of targets de
mands of maintaining and updating the in tected within its effective range. echoes of
ventory of manned aircraft already exceed Giulio Douhet’s combat plane able to clear its
available funds in the Air Force budget. With way through the skies with superior firepower
every dollar spoken for, the Air Force still can be heard as the ABL takes flight.
needs more F22s, new tankers, a new combat At its maximum range, the ABL weapon is
search and rescue platform, and more airlift, designed to weaken a target’s structure enough
as well as repairs and upgrades for the existing to cause aerodynamic and acceleration forces
fleet. There are simply no resources to in to break it up. elementary physics assures that
crease the inventory with a large number of the laser beam’s power becomes substantially
UASs—and we are unwilling to trade U2s for more destructive as the range decreases. At
Global hawks or A10s/F16s for reapers. De shorter ranges, the beam will have less spread
spite the UAS’s demonstrated operational ca and less atmospheric absorption. We can ex
pability, we do not seem to have reached a tip pect a laser that can kill a relatively thin
ping point in our attitudes. skinned target at 200 miles to have much more
As with the adoption of the Predator and its capability at 50 miles—solidly in the medium
successor combat UASs, we are seeing field airtoairmissile range.
utility and the troops’ creativity advance the At first glance, the ABL would seem the ul
mission—not service leadership or the acqui timate fighter on offense or defense, able to

kill any detected aircraft or missile coming ing up enemy air defenses remains, but the
within range. countering the ABL would individual targets are now much tougher.
place a premium on stealth (preventing de We have no experience with these weapons
tection and targeting), avoidance (remaining in combat—only questions. however, we would
outside the laser’s effective range), numbers do well to remember past revolutions in weap
(saturating the engagement area), or weather ons technology: “distance” weapons (english
(operating below weather the laser cannot longbows) against “contact” weapons (French
penetrate). however, a more serious threat to mounted knights) at crécy and Agincourt,
the ABL’s effectiveness is its own vulnerability and machine guns against unprotected cav
to other De weapons. Weight and volume re alry and infantry in World War i. Tactics and
quirements may preclude fightersized aircraft doctrine adjusted to accommodate these
from carrying longrange De weapons, but changes, but it wasn’t pretty.
those requirements are greatly relaxed for
groundbased systems. 2010 Is Today
operation from the high ground repre
sents a major factor in the ABL’s effectiveness. The changing nature of cAS, autonomous
highaltitude operations provide the line of combat UASs, and De weapons do not change
sight needed for extended range and put the the fundamentals of warfare. They do, however,
weapon above much of the atmosphere and provide new tools that we must learn to use or
associated weather, reducing beam distortion counter. The key is not the system itself—but
and attenuation. That same high ground, what we can do with the system. We are seeing
however, also puts the ABL in the line of sight rapid advances in UAS operations driven by
of De weapons on the ground. Speedoflight the pressure of combat in iraq and Afghani
propagation makes for a formidable ground stan. Without that pressure, and without their
weapon despite the limitations of atmospheric successful debut over Kosovo in the 1990s,
attenuation and the horizon on a ground UASs would likely remain curiosities confined
weapon’s range and line of sight. overcoming to the lab or occasional field experiments.
atmospheric effects to extend the effective range With each new technology comes a funda
mental question—what can we do with it?
of a ground weapon may prove as simple as
The metric for the answer is simple but con
scaling up its size or deploying an array of
text dependent: for what missions or situa
weapons to focus multiple beams on a distant
tions is the new technology better, and when
target. once a target is in range, the effective is it just different?
ness of a groundbased De weapon depends our challenge today is more traumatic
only on detection and aiming since the weap than the decision to embrace an “alljet” Air
on’s effect is essentially instantaneous over Force. We are not merely swapping a spinning
usual ranges.23 Using networked information propeller for a tail of fire. As UASs and other
from sensors that can see over the horizon to new weapons demonstrate capability, they be
cue the weapon should allow an assured kill as come alternatives—not additions to or ad
soon as the target breaks the horizon. juncts of the manned force. Much of the stress
The deployment of practical laser weapons on the current budget comes from the cost of
raises fundamental questions for Airmen. can maintaining the old capability (whether through
any aircraft operate within range of a De extending the service life of old systems or de
weapon? is the F22 the “lastgeneration” fighter? veloping better versions) while beginning to
how do we attack a weapon that can destroy acquire the new. At some point, we must re
incoming missiles and warheads? how do we duce our reliance on horse cavalry (the A10/
achieve air superiority against an enemy with F35?) and embrace the mechanized brain
ground and airborne lasers? The task of roll power of a UAS force. ❑

Notes
1. See Grant T. hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd Airbus’s latest aircraft, the A380, is equipped with an Auto
and American Security (Washington, Dc: Smithsonian insti pilot Traffic collision Avoidance System, linking this func
tution Press, 2001). tion to the autopilot and “BraketoVacate” technology.
2. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 21.3, Counter- This allows pilots to select an appropriate runway exit
land Operations, 11 September 2006, 6, http://www.fas.org/ when landing and regulate the aircraft’s speed and decel
irp/doddir/usaf/afdd213.pdf. eration accordingly.
3. robert Waal, “Keeping Watch,” Aviation Week and 15. Guy Norris, “Pilot optional—US Army Quietly Tries
Space Technology 169, no. 18 (10 November 2008): 53. caravan UAV out for a New Defense role,” Aviation Week
4. For a discussion on the current demand for cAS, and Space Technology 169, no. 19 (17 November 2008): 38.
see rebecca Grant, “Armed overwatch,” Air Force Magazine 16. Twentytwo thousand miles up to and 22,000 miles
91, no. 12 (December 2008): 40, http://www.airforce down from geosynchronous orbit + some distance of sur
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/December face relay / 186,000 miles per second (speed of light) = .24
%202008/1208overwatch.aspx. seconds oneway signal travel time. Twoway transmission
5. AFDD 21.3, Counterland Operations, 58. will take twice that amount of time plus the time for the
6. Jeffrey Kappenman, “Army Unmanned Aircraft operator to react to the information.
Systems: Decisive in Battle,” Joint Force Quarterly, issue 49 17. MSgt Joy Josephson, “The ‘hog’ Drops in on his
(2nd Quarter 2008): 20–23, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ tory,” Air Force Link, 14 November 2008, http://www.af.mil/
Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm. news/story.asp?id=123124172&page=3 (accessed 15 De
7. The system’s range exceeds 40 nautical miles. See cember 2008).
“GBU39B Small Diameter Bomb Weapon System,” US 18. For an excellent overview of the Predator acquisition
Air Force fact sheet, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet saga, see Michael r. Thirtle, robert V. Johnson, and John L.
.asp?fsiD=4500 (accessed 15 December 2008). Birkler, The Predator ACTD: A Case Study for Transition Planning
8. The windcorrected munitions dispenser, extended to the Formal Acquisition Process, rAND report Mr899oSD
range, has a range of 40 miles, providing standoff precision (Santa Monica, cA: rAND National Defense research
delivery for this weapon as well. See Susan h. h. Young, institute, 1997), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph
“Gallery of USAF Weapons,” Air Force Magazine 91, no. 5 (May
_reports/Mr899/ (accessed 15 December 2008).
2008): 158–59, http://www.airforcemagazine.com/Magazine
19. “Boeing Airborne Laser Team Fires highenergy
Archive/Pages/2008/May%202008/May2008.aspx.
Laser through Beam control System,” news release, Boeing,
9. John A Tirpak, “Washington Watch,” Air Force Maga
1 December 2008, http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/
zine 91, no. 11 (November 2008): 12, http://www.airforce
2008/q4/081201a_nr.html (accessed 15 December 2008).
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/November
20. “Since the weapon system was designed to shoot
%202008/1108watch.aspx. in September 2008, the Army
down theater ballistic missiles, will it have enough power
and Air Force reached an agreement on a joint concept
of operations for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which to shoot down the longerrange missiles? Yes. The coiL
gives the Air Force control of all highaltitude operations [chemical oxygen iodine laser] is a megawattclass laser,
while allowing the Army to control tactical operations be which means in its current configuration of six modules it
low 10,000 feet. The Army operates Sky Warrior UAVs— is designed to generate a million watts or more of energy
armed variants of the basic Predator, similar to the MQ1. to destroy a target at a distance of more than 200 miles.”
Details should be finalized in early 2009, but the basic Airborne Laser System Program office, office of Public
principle clears the way for the Army to extend its organic Affairs, “The Airborne Laser: Frequently Asked Ques
cAS capability from helicopter gunships to include UAVs. tions,” US Air Force fact sheet, 24 March 2003, http://
10. Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD070404
(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1985), 024.pdf (accessed 15 December 2008).
16, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA162646 (accessed 21. David A. Fulghum, “Gates’s opening: Defense
15 December 2008). Secretary Turns to Procurement cleanup,” Aviation Week
11. ibid., 32. and Space Technology 169, no. 22 (8 December 2008): 26.
12. Lt col e. J. Kellerstrass, “Drone remotely Piloted 22. The ABL system uses a tracking laser to aim the
Vehicles and Aerospace Power,” Air University Review 24, weapon’s beam, potentially allowing for some warning be
no. 6 (September–october 1973): 44–54, http://www fore a shot. More conventional surveillance and targeting
.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1973/sepoct/ radars that may be needed for other De weapons can also
kellerstrass.html (accessed 31 January 2009). provide some warning of attack. however, this warning
13. “From the A300 to the A380: Pioneering Leadership,” would be orders of magnitude shorter than the time be
Airbus, http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/innovation/ tween detecting a missile’s guidance lockon or launch
(accessed 15 December 2008). The european Airbus family and the arrival of that missile at the target.
of aircraft had an autoland capability as early as 1977. 23. Another simple calculation shows that at light
14. “30 Years of Aerospace Technology,” NASA Tech Briefs, speed—186,000 miles per second (300,000 kilometers
1 october 2006, http://www.techbriefs.com/component/ per second)—the beam reaches a target 200 miles away in
content/article/901?start=1b (accessed 15 December 2008). .001 second.

Air Domain Development in Africa
A Reasonable Proposition
Maj jean-PhiliPPe n. Peltier, USaF
Maj thoMaS Meer, USaF*
I
n lIght of the recent stand-up of US We need to develop a framework to guide
Africa Command, we should consider in our strategy and ensuing operations on the
novative ways to apply airpower in Africa. continent. ADD can enhance economic growth
We traditionally think of airpower per and political stability on a continent plagued
forming combat or humanitarian-relief roles, with fragile states and instability, yet the great
but with regard to many developing regions of variety of the African experience precludes a
the world, we should think in terms of build single template. for example, Somalia, a state
ing aviation capacity—or what we call air do struggling to control a neighborhood within
main development (ADD), based on benefi its capital, faces different challenges than a
cial interaction and cooperation between a more stable and prosperous ghana.
nation’s civil- and military-aviation organiza the United States government Aviation
tions.1 ADD emphasizes the building of a na Community can strongly contribute to a part
tional air domain by enhancing air safety and ner nation’s ADD. given the challenges faced
expanding trade through development of civil- by many African countries, the community can
military partnerships while working towards help partner nations increase their capacity to
control of sovereign airspace. Combined, these govern and promote regional stability while
elements increase a state’s presence through strengthening connections between urban and
out its geographic borders. rural populations. however, two issues con
When considering the roles that ADD might
front sub-Saharan Africa.
play within an African context, we must re
member that one size does not fit all. the
presence of 53 African countries with over Two Central Challenges
2,000 spoken languages on a continent three
times the size of the United States produces a Many states in this region find themselves
great variety of experiences and contexts. fur hard-pressed to project a meaningful govern
ther, we must note the differences in regional mental presence outside their capitals. Just
dynamics between the five states comprising about every African state must deal with a sig
north Africa and the 48 states in sub-Saharan nificant scarcity of resources. Many do not
Africa, the latter area the object of our focus. have sufficient budgets to meet basic social
*Major Peltier is director of the sub-Saharan Africa Course at the United States Air force Special operations School, hurlburt field,
florida. Major Meer is chief of the Irregular Warfare Branch, Irregular Warfare Division, USAf Special operations School.
111
01-Quick Look-Peltier-Meer.indd 111 4/28/09 1:31:48 PM

needs, nor do they have adequate infrastruc Benefits of Air Domain
ture and resources for power projection across

a vast territory. Many states struggle to effec Development
tively control their own borders and provide In view of these challenges, ADD can best
security to their populations. this goes to the benefit African states through its ability to
very definition of a state, which emphasizes a project central authority and influence to re
government’s capacity to monopolize the le mote areas while improving capacity and sup
gitimate use of force within its territory.2 port for the military among the general popu
the second challenge concerns the mili lation. the question then becomes how to
tary’s need to control that territory effectively establish ADD despite a scarcity of resources.
first, ADD gives states the mobility to ac
and act as a visible agent of the state in remote
cess territories despite inadequate transporta
areas. from a narrow military perspective, we
tion infrastructure. Small-to-medium-sized
must realize that many national militaries have transport planes would enable states to estab
limited interaction with the population and, lish a presence in regions that would other
due to resource constraints, have difficulty wise remain difficult to access via ground ve
maintaining presence in remote regions. this hicles. Selection of the particular aircraft
situation is of particular importance if states would depend upon the situation, but use of
want to sustain a presence, exert control, and the right technology for the given environ
effectively counter any potential rebellion or ment is the most important consideration.
criminal activity that might form beyond their Second, dual-use ADD would benefit both
reach. nor can we ignore the general lack of civilian and military interests, enhancing the
security services afforded to rural populations overall safety and security of the air system.
so far removed from government-controlled for instance, air traffic control requires basic
urban centers. A correlation exists between a navigational aids and air routes that would en
state’s ability to project military force in remote able the safe movement of passengers and
goods as well as help secure borders. thus,
areas and citizens’ security. Domestic force
the state could train pilots to fly transport
projection strengthens links between citizens planes across its territory, delivering both mili
and their state—especially if the people see tary and civilian cargo.
the military as providing a service by protect the military’s needs would take priority,
ing them from unsanctioned violence and by but its planes and runways could transport
defending sovereign territory. other people and goods when space is avail
We find such challenges, for example, in able, thus helping develop the urban-rural
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. About connections often missing in today’s limited-
as large as that part of the United States east of capacity states. further, the state could project
the Mississippi River, this country has fewer forces, have a tailored presence in remote areas,
than 1,737 miles of paved roads and contains and respond quickly to threats, disasters, or
large areas of difficult terrain, complicating other emergencies—whether civil or military.
government access and movement of goods third, this program would help ensure pro
and services. In contrast, france—roughly the ficiency training for pilots. Many African states
simply lack the resources to provide sufficient
size of texas—boasts 590,914 miles of paved
flight time to their pilots, although some coun
roads.3 ADD could help the Congo overcome tries circumvent this dilemma by allowing their
these obstacles by enabling the state to pro pilots to accumulate hours by flying aircraft in
mote economic activity, government presence, the national airline. In a context of resource
and security throughout its far-flung territory. scarcity, such a policy would drastically cut the
A host of complex, additional issues affect costs of maintaining pilot proficiency.
continental stability and development, yet the finally, offering a service to the population
two mentioned above are particularly urgent. would reflect favorably on the military, help

QUICK-LOOK 113
ing promote security and stability for all citi ing fees, increased economic and trade op
zens. the United States engages in similar ac portunities, stronger civil-military ties, and
tivity with the Air force’s C-17 aircraft. this professionalization of the military through
fleet gives the US government great opportu regularized training and operations.
nities to utilize the most advanced carrier of
military cargo in the world to supply medical
and logistical support to relief efforts for hu Recommendations
manitarian or natural disasters worldwide.
ADD represents exactly the type of innovative,
long-term, sustainable capacity development that
Obstacles and Benefits Africa Command, in concert with other agen
cies, should promote. Seeking to conduct “sus
As with any endeavor, we must contend
tained security engagement through military-
with obstacles, such as lack of funding, inter
to-military programs,” the command finds itself
nal conflict, and a dearth of technical exper
tise to operate an air traffic control system— uniquely postured to initiate and lead this
just to name a few. Yet, potential benefits far truly joint civil-military effort.4 By partnering
outweigh the obstacles, the former including with the United States government Aviation
greater state access to remote areas, the nur Community in working with African states to
turing of vital links between urban and rural promote ADD, Africa Command would help
regions, state oversight of its outlying terri address critical challenges in sub-Saharan Af
tory, regular use and maintenance of aircraft, rica, especially by promoting dual-use air-
increased aviation training and proficiency, transportation systems that enable African states
revenue-generation possibilities such as land- to reach all their territory. ❑
Notes
1. See Maj William “Chris” Robinson, “Air Domain 3. Central Intelligence Agency, The 2008 World Fact-
Safety and Security,” working paper (hurlburt field, fl: book (new York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2008), https://www
USAf Special operations School, 20 August 2008). Stu .cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
dents in the Special operations School’s Irregular War cg.html (accessed 5 november 2008).
fare Seminar have begun to explore this idea and its real- 4. “AfRICoM Mission,” United States Africa Command,
world implications. http://www.africom.mil/AboutAfRICoM.asp (accessed
2. hans heinrich gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., 5 november 2008).
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (oxford, UK: oxford
University Press, 1958), 78.

and memoirs, and dozens of interviews of ARVN
veterans. Indeed, Brigham only used oral histories
he could corroborate with other sources.
Among the strengths of this book are the au-
thor’s analyses of ARVN conscription and the rela-
tionship among the draft, morale, and family life.
Conscription was nothing new to Vietnam, but his-
torically it had been molded to the rhythms and
requirements of family and agricultural life through
terms not exceeding one year. When the ARVN in-
creased the term to two years in pursuit of a stron-
ger army, village agriculture and family life suffered
severely from the loss of the backbone of the labor
force. Consequently, the government prevented
soldiers from fulfilling obligations to their families,
forcing them to behave in a way that is shameful
within that culture. Morale plummeted. By the late
1960s, soldiers brought their families with them to
encampments or shantytowns so they could care
for each other.
Army life discouraged the soldiers because they
did not receive adequate weapons and combat
training prior to field operations, and the govern-
ment made no effort to explain in political and cul-
tural terms the reasons why they needed to sacrifice
and fight for the government and idea of South
Vietnam. This was the policy of Ngo Dinh Diem
and his successors. They feared that a nationalistic,
patriotic, and motivated ARVN might someday
hold them accountable for corruption, failed poli-
cies, and the like. The ARVN was notorious for a
high desertion rate, but Brigham points out that
perhaps “only 20 to 30 percent of the soldiers listed
ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese as deserters actually were” skirting their duties out
Army by Robert K. Brigham. University Press of of fear or malice (p. 48). Over half of the deserters
Kansas (http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu), 2502 actually served in units to which they were not as-
Westbrooke Circle, Lawrence, Kansas 66045- signed. Many deserted to see their families and
4444, 2006, 250 pages, $29.95 (hardcover). eventually returned to their units. Brigham thus ac-
complishes one of his goals: dispelling ill-founded
The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) conclusions with sound analyses.
never became a fully legitimate arm of the govern- In analyzing why the ARVN soldiers fought—in
ment of Vietnam because of misguided policies, spite of poor training, poverty-level pay, and abject
poor leadership, and a failure to create a Vietnam- facilities—Brigham arrives at several inferences.
ese army with origins in and connections to Viet- Because training and training facilities were so sub-
namese culture and history. Robert K. Brigham standard, a conscript initially experienced alienation.
makes his case convincingly in this welcomed post- He would be away from his family for years, and the
revisionist monograph on a maligned army. He ARVN lacked the spirit to function as a substitute
does so, not with recycled English-language sources family. Interviewees asked, “How can you build a
but with documents from the Vietnamese Archive nation without a well-trained army that knows why
in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnamese-language books it is fighting and then gets to fight?” They also as-
114
2009-2 Book Reviews.indd 114 4/28/09 1:32:32 PM

BOOK REVIEWS 115
serted that they did not fight for their buddies be- training in weapons and tactics, and materiel sup-
cause the ARVN’s small units lacked closeness and port, like equipment and firepower. ARVN reveals
cohesion. Brigham concludes that soldiers fought the existence of a straight line from cultural under-
on behalf of their families. pinnings to a unit’s combat effectiveness. Brigham
He observes that the ARVN displayed better provides an example of the consequences of ignor-
fighting skill, endurance, and effectiveness than it ing familial values, priorities, concepts of honor
is commonly credited for. The discussion of the and responsibility, family obligations, and political
Battle of Ap Bac is excellent, and Brigham notes a training for an armed force expanding during war-
couple of battles in which the ARVN fought very time. I recommend ARVN: Life and Death in the South
well, one of which Military Assistance Command- Vietnamese Army to scholar and policy maker alike.
Vietnam called “a brilliant performance” (p. 94).
Unfortunately, the author devotes only 28 pages to Dr. Michael E. Weaver
an assessment of the army’s abilities in combat. Al- Maxwell AFB, Alabama
though he defends the South Vietnamese perfor-
mance during Tet, that offensive receives only two
pages. Brigham scarcely mentions Lam Son 719 (a
single sentence), and the 1972 Easter Offensive New Heavens: My Life as a Fighter Pilot and a
gets two paragraphs of coverage. Although he did Founder of the Israel Air Force by Boris Senior.
not intend to analyze specific battles or the ARVN’s Potomac Books (http://www.potomacbooksinc
performance in battle, a fuller coverage of battle .com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Virginia
would have strengthened his thesis that by the early 20166, 288 pages, $20.76 (hardcover), $13.56
1970s, soldiers fought to keep their families to- (softcover).
gether. Armies exist to fight. The topics of this
book—conscription, family life, morale, training, Boris Senior grew up as the son of a prosperous
and politics—all influenced the fighting effective- farmer and businessman who immigrated to South
ness of the ARVN. An analysis of its battle perfor- Africa to escape Russia’s oppression of Jews. As a
mance would have completed his social history of young man, he had only a casual knowledge of his
the ARVN by more thoroughly tracing the connec- religious heritage and very little appreciation of the
tions between society and culture and the army’s worldwide oppression exacted upon Jews. When
deeds in war. The historiography of the Vietnam World War II erupted, Senior’s older brother joined
War still awaits the definitive history of the Army of the South African Air Force as a fighter pilot. He
the Republic of Vietnam. Perhaps Professor Brigham soon followed in his brother’s footsteps.
will satisfy this need with a second edition of his As a fighter pilot flying for the Royal Air Force,
most recent work. Senior attacked targets throughout Italy. On one
Glaring defects are rare in this book. Brigham mission, he was shot down over the Adriatic, but a
states that “from 1969 until 1973 the Nixon admin- US Army PBY (patrol bomber) plucked him out of
istration launched one of the most massive air cam- the freezing water in a daring rescue. The war en-
paigns in history” (p. 100). Actually, that air cam- lightened Senior to the plight of his fellow Jews and
paign did not become “massive” until March of 1972. stirred his sense of Zionist nationalism. Afterward
Only 2,107 “attack” sorties occurred over North he surreptitiously joined forces with the Irgun and
Vietnam from 1969 to 1971, in contrast to the later the Haganah to set the stage for establishment
41,057 in 1968 and the 21,496 in 1972 (Wayne of the Jewish state of Israel.
Thompson, To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force After the United Nations mandate of 1948, which
and North Vietnam, 1966–1973 [Washington, DC: created an independent Israel, he became one of
Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000], 304). He also the founding members of the new air force, serving
claims that “most modern armies in a time of war” as an Israeli pilot and eventually retiring with the
are not “built on the draft” (p. 7), a surprising as- rank of colonel. New Heavens is Senior’s memoir of
sertion, given the reliance of armies on conscrip- experiences throughout these turbulent times.
tion during both world wars. One would expect that such a book would be a
Aside from its contribution to our understand- must-read for anyone interested in the infancy of
ing of an understudied aspect of the war, ARVN is what has become one of the most respected air
especially relevant to the US military’s current ef- forces in the world. Unfortunately, the book fails to
fort to upgrade its understanding of non-Western live up to expectations.
culture and language. Americans equate combat As a memoir, New Heavens is adequate. As history
skill solely with functions they can engineer, such as it is seriously lacking in substance. It reads like a

travel book—interesting and entertaining but hardly ironically referred to as the abode of both the
enlightening. Senior, who passed away shortly after “heron and the astronaut.”
he finished the book, wrote in a very engaging, per- Go for Launch! attempts to capture the 50-year
sonal style. His anecdotes, such as the detailed ac- history of this place as the central space-launch site
count of his rescue at sea, are thrilling. But that is in the United States. There are three central com-
as far as it goes. After reading the book, one will ponents to the Cape’s space-access efforts. The one
know no more about the political or military strategy best known is the Kennedy Space Center, the Na-
or tactics of the Israeli Air Force than before. The tional Aeronautics and Space Administration in-
stories herein are those of a participant and some- stallation that serves as the site for the preparation
times an observer of events, but they reveal nothing and launch of the nation’s human-spaceflight ef-
regarding the shaping or leadership of these events. fort. The Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and space shuttle
The author’s lifetime of service is certainly worthy launches have all taken place there. The military
of respect, but it makes one wonder if he was truly also has a huge presence at the Cape, with Air Force
a “founder” of the Israeli Air Force. A deeper dis- and Navy facilities engaging in all manner of test
cussion of the historical events would have erased and evaluation at the Eastern Test Range, extend-
all doubt in this regard. ing into the Atlantic Ocean. Finally, recent years
Additionally, considering the times in which we have seen a major effort to establish commercial
live, Senior’s breezy description of his terrorist ac- space operations in the area, and a growing num-
tivities in Europe and South Africa made this re- ber of nongovernmental launches have flown from
viewer a little squeamish. His easy transition from the Cape. The first rocket took off with the launch
Allied fighter pilot to terrorist operating in Eng- of Bumper 8 on 24 July 1950, establishing a prece-
land draws an uncomfortable parallel to the very dent that has endured more than 50 years.
real possibility of terrorist cells operating in our Divided into three major parts, Go for Launch!
own nation today. Neither my support of Israel nor devotes the first part, nearly half of the book, to the
the fact that Senior proved inept as a terrorist failed period from 1950 through the Sputnik crisis of
to mitigate a growing nausea in the pit of my stom- 1957. It relates in words and photographs the his-
ach as I read these passages. History should not be tory of the military’s effort to establish a launch ca-
denied, but the author’s free and unapologetic ad- pability at the Cape and to undertake research and
missions may make the reader uncomfortable. All development on a range of missiles and research
in all, New Heavens is an easily forgettable book that, rockets. These included ballistic missiles so well
unfortunately, fails to live up to its potential. known in history—the Atlas, Titan, Minuteman,
Polaris, Trident, and Poseidon—as well as cruise
CSM James H. Clifford, USA, Retired missiles such as the Matador, Snark, Bomarc, and
McDonough, Georgia Navaho. This part also covers scientific rocket
launches and the construction and operation of fa-
cilities that supported them. The authors have
done a good job of locating and printing unique
Go for Launch! An Illustrated History of Cape Ca and interesting photos of these activities, many of
naveral by Joel W. Powell with Art LeBrun. them not familiar to the public. Indeed, a number
Apogee Books / Collectors Guide Publishing of pages are essentially photographs with captions.
(http://www.apogeebooks.com), 1440 Graham’s The second section relates the story of the or-
Lane, Unit no. 2, Burlington, Ontario L7S 1W3, bital space-launch era from the flight of the first
Canada, 2006, 320 pages, $29.95 (softcover). orbital spacecraft, Explorer 1, launched from the
Cape atop a Juno rocket on 31 January 1958,
The history of space activities at Cape Canaveral, through the loss of the space shuttle Challenger on
Florida, America’s spaceport, is as interesting as it is 28 January 1986, 73 seconds into its flight. Again,
varied. Go for Launch! seeks to tell this story—al- the authors found interesting imagery to illustrate
ready available in both scholarly and popular as the work. Dealing with the more recent era, the
well as illustrated and textual forms—with an em- third section focuses on the return to flight after the
phasis on illustrations. At a fundamental level, the Challenger accident and the development and flight
“Cape,” as it is universally known by those in the of various types of expendable vehicles launched
space community, may be as much a state of mind from the Cape.
as it is a physical place. With high-technology enter- The imagery is quite adequate overall, but the
prises resting side by side with a wetlands refuge, it reader should be aware that the vast majority of it is
is an eerie location—what Anne Morrow Lindbergh in black and white with only a small color section

BOOK REVIEWS 117
added to the book. Accordingly, readers seeking ghanistan. For example, Maloney recounts going
the splashy design of a coffee-table book will assur- on patrol with a squad from a German battalion of
edly be disappointed. A better work of that type is Gebirgsjaegers (mountain hunters). As they drive
David West Reynolds’s Kennedy Space Center: Gateway through Kabul, an Afghan taxi strikes one of their
to Space (Firefly Books, 2006), even though it does vehicles. Although the taxi receives only a tiny
not treat in any detail the military aspects of the scratch, the driver immediately draws a crowd by
story and has several glaring errors of fact. What Go loudly demanding compensation from the Ger-
for Launch! does is collect in one place a large num- mans and pushing at members of the patrol. The
ber of interesting and helpful photographs of more German leader, a junior noncommissioned officer
interest to the specialist, perhaps, than the casual (NCO), quickly takes charge and tells the driver
reader. Additionally, if one seeks a complex his- that he must accompany the patrol to the local po-
torical analysis of the history of space-launch facili- lice station to discuss compensation. Upon arrival,
ties at the Cape, this is not the best book. Instead, the taxi driver is taken to a back room and soon
one may find a superb analysis in A History of the returns to apologize to the Germans. The German
Kennedy Space Center by Kenneth Lipartito and Orville NCO declines to accept the apology because of the
R. Butler (University Press of Florida, 2007). Go for driver’s insincerity. After another trip to the back
Launch! fills a key niche in the effort to understand room, the Afghan offers a more acceptable apology,
the history of the Cape but does not stand alone as and both he and the German patrol return to work.
the only work on the subject that interested readers This episode illustrates the difficulty of the mission
will want to consult. in Afghanistan, which requires junior officers and
NCOs who can think quickly, understand political
Dr. Roger D. Launius implications, and realize cultural differences, all
Washington, DC the while keeping themselves as safe as possible. En
during the Freedom makes this very clear. Dr. Maloney
also has few qualms about indulging in a little gos-
sip, recounting a couple of meetings in the Afghan
Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghan countryside with intrepid war correspondent Geraldo
istan by Sean M. Maloney. Potomac Books (http:// Rivera as well as encounters with a famous, though
www.potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver unidentified, European reporter.
Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2006, 320 pages, The book is not without its weak points though.
$22.00 (hardcover), $15.16 (softcover). A section that offers historical background to the
conflict in an attempt to explain how Afghanistan
A military historian with a degree from Temple became the primary target after the terrorist attacks
University, Dr. Sean M. Maloney, who served as a of 9/11 simply tries to do too much in too little
Canadian army officer, currently teaches in the War space. In only 21 pages, Dr. Maloney covers the re-
Studies Program of Canada’s Royal Military Col- lationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
lege. In the spring of 2003, he traveled to Afghani- development of radical Islam, the Afghan-Soviet
stan to study operations of the International Secu- war, Western support for the mujahideen, the rise
rity Assistance Force (ISAF). In Enduring the Freedom: of the Taliban, the effect of the collapse of the So-
A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan, he documents his viet Union on Central Asia, and the rise of al-Qaeda
time with the ISAF in Kabul and with US forces in and its operations against the West, culminating in
Bagram and Kandahar. the 9/11 attacks. I was almost out of breath at the
For the most part, Enduring the Freedom is a well- end. In addition, the author’s personal biases become
written, enjoyable account that provides the reader evident throughout the book. He has nothing com-
with a great deal of insight into the largely unre- plimentary to say about the Canadian government,
ported story of US and allied operations in Afghan- academicians, or the media, and his affection for the
istan after the fall of the Taliban. By far the best soldiers with whom he patrols is obvious—they seem
part deals with the author’s time in Afghanistan to have his unqualified support. But these biases
with various national forces. A good storyteller, are a double-edged sword, enhancing the quality of
Maloney uses his eye for detail to vividly describe the memoir because they reveal his true feelings
the Afghan countryside and his ear for dialogue to but raising the reader’s suspicion that he may have
recount conversations with soldiers, bureaucrats, omitted some unflattering stories about these pa-
and others in a way that rings true. The stories trols in order to protect the soldiers.
about his time on patrol give the reader a real ap- Nevertheless, I strongly recommend Enduring
preciation for and insight into the mission in Af- the Freedom if for no other reason that there simply

isn’t much written about the day-to-day operational of the most innovative leaders in the European the-
environment in Afghanistan. Dr. Maloney tells his ater of operations, his transfer to China, and his
story well, drawing readers into the action and, as performance in the Mariana Islands, which helped
clichéd as it sounds, making them feel as if they are bring Japan to its knees. The author also docu-
there with him. In many ways, this book reminds ments LeMay’s work at the start of the Cold War—
me of some of the better Vietnam memoirs. The as commander of US Air Forces in Europe—includ-
activities described may comprise only a small part ing his efforts to sustain an entire city by air during
of the overall operation, but at the end of the story, the Berlin airlift. Chapters about his leadership of
we have a better understanding of the whole and a Strategic Air Command illustrate the general’s well-
greater appreciation for the young men and women known attributes, such as his insistence on relent-
who serve there. less training, excruciatingly high standards, gruel-
ing inspections, and rewards for combat readiness
Lt Col James J. McNally, USAF, Retired (e.g., the “spot promotion”).
Tampa, Florida However, Tillman exposes a bit more of LeMay
in subsequent chapters, using refreshing prose that
illuminates a different aspect of the man. Indeed,
the author highlights his subject’s determination to
LeMay, Great Generals Series, by Barrett Tillman. obtain better living facilities, additional recreational
Palgrave Macmillan (http://www.palgrave-usa activities, and better pay for his Airmen. Granted,
.com), 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York LeMay had an intense capacity for focusing on the
10010, 2007, 224 pages, $21.95 (hardcover). mission, but these more human aspects show his
dedication to the people who served under his
Curtis Emerson LeMay was a straightforward, command. In his later years, the general and his
combat-proven aviator and one of the most contro- wife, Helen, founded the Curtis E. LeMay Founda-
versial officers ever to serve in the US Air Force. tion, which, to this day, provides financial aid to
Both revered and reviled, he is one of our most mis- spouses of Air Force retirees—a tribute to the com-
understood military leaders, often depicted as an passion this leader felt for the men and women of
uncaring, driven individual who wanted to bomb our service.
enemies “back to the Stone Age.” Tillman does not shy away from the controver-
Barrett Tillman’s excellent, albeit concise, biog- sial elements of LeMay’s life, discussing the impli-
raphy LeMay paints a much different picture of this cations of the firebombing of Japan as well as the
aviation legend, one that dispels many of the myths decision to drop the atomic bomb. Furthermore, he
about him. A great deal shorter than Thomas explores the antagonistic relations between LeMay
Coffey’s Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara over
Curtis LeMay (1986), Tillman’s text covers the es- weapon-system development (including the TFX and
sential periods of LeMay’s life, from seeing his first XB-70 Valkyrie aircraft) and the war in Vietnam.
airplane in flight (at age eight), through his retire- Additionally, he discusses the alienation that LeMay
ment in 1965, to his death in 1990. felt in the “Camelot” of the Kennedy administration,
The author illustrates how LeMay’s formative which prized politics and posturing over combat
years laid the foundation for greatness. The oldest ability and sound military advice.
of six children, LeMay was a hard-working young The author also touches upon LeMay’s strange
man, an avid hunter, and a mechanically inclined bid for the office of vice president in 1968, running
individual who built his own radios. After leaving on the same ticket with segregationist governor
the ROTC program at Ohio State University for fi- George Wallace of Alabama. Although the general
nancial reasons, he entered the National Guard, maintained that he simply wished to keep Hubert
eventually moving on to flight training and receiv- Humphrey from winning the election, this ill-fated
ing his commission as a fighter pilot in October 1929. attempt at politics further degraded his reputation.
Assigned to the 27th Pursuit Squadron, he immedi- Tillman also reveals that LeMay never refuted the
ately sought opportunities to refine his aviation “bomb them [the North Vietnamese] back to the
skills, mastering celestial navigation as well as in- Stone Age” quotation attributed to him. Although
strument flying and becoming an instructor. All of no evidence exists that he ever uttered those words,
the skills honed his airmanship, preparing him for he remains linked with them nonetheless.
the maelstrom of the Second World War. In the book’s last chapter, Tillman reflects on his
Tillman effectively explores the highlights of subject’s accomplishments as well as his mistakes,
LeMay’s wartime exploits, including his rise as one highlighting not only LeMay’s enduring legacy but

BOOK REVIEWS 119
also—and more importantly—the traits that make makes good use of the testimonies of comrades
him a leader worth emulating, especially his drive who served with him. His style is spare and straight-
to become the best aviator possible and to know all forward, and his account modest and direct, un-
aspects of his craft. How may senior leaders today sparing in his assessments of himself and others.
take on the “tough missions”? By demanding ac- His observations on leadership, good and bad alike,
countability, cultivating subordinates, and empha- are compelling. After returning from Vietnam,
sizing teamwork. LeMay exhibited such traits by the author embarked on a career in aviation—at
word and deed. the time he wrote this book, he worked as a cap-
In the final chapter, Tillman’s analysis addresses tain for American Airlines, flying Boeing 757s and
all aspects of his subject—the good and bad quali- 767s. He knows his flying, and it shows. In the re-
ties of the driven, demanding commander who viewer’s perhaps biased opinion (I flew Air Force
seeks the best for all of his subordinates, down to HH-3E and HH-53C “Jolly Green” rescue helicop-
the newest and lowest-ranking Airman. In the final ters in Southeast Asia in 1965–66 and 1975), Rat
pages, the author asks the reader to think about tler One-Seven is one of the most authentic pilot’s
what makes a good soldier and apply those criteria memoirs to come out of Vietnam—and surely the
to Curtis LeMay. LeMay does indeed answer that best by a helicopter pilot.
question, bringing to light unknown facets of this Gross takes the reader with him from his deci-
illustrious yet often misconstrued warrior. sion to join the Army, through his experiences with
helicopter training, to the long flight from McChord
Lt Col Rick Hughes, USAF AFB, Washington, to Vietnam. Arriving as a “newby,”
Robins AFB, Georgia he undergoes the trials and tribulations of learning
the operational environment and aircraft while
gaining acceptance from his unit’s experienced pi-
lots. Gross preferred to fly “Slicks”—UH-1 D and H
Rattler One-Seven: A Vietnam Helicopter Pilot’s troop transports—as opposed to UH-1G Cobra
War Story by Chuck Gross. University of North gunships, though he had friends in his brigade’s
Texas Press (http://www.unt.edu/untpress), P.O. attack-helicopter company and draws extensively
Box 311336, Denton, Texas 76203-1336, 2004, on their experiences in his narrative. We follow
248 pages, $27.95 (hardcover), $14.95 (softcover). along as he grows in skill and experience, finally
earning election (yes, election—very different from
Over three decades have passed since Ameri- Air Force procedures!) as senior aircraft commander
cans last saw combat in Vietnam, and we might sup- at the tender age of 20. Gross flew a variety of mis-
pose that the supply of first-rate, first-person mem- sions, ranging from being on night flare-ship alert,
oirs by those who fought there had dried up. standing by to help beleaguered outposts; hauling
Wrong! Interest in the Vietnam War remains strong, ground commanders and their staffs; spraying Agent
and the erosion of antiwar editorial bias has led to Orange; and inserting special operations groups
the release in recent years of some remarkably into Laos as well as extracting them. His account of
frank and gripping personal accounts, the work un- a night extraction of a compromised patrol from a
der review among them. Rattler One-Seven—the title minuscule landing zone (LZ) in south Laos had
comes from the author’s personal call sign—is the hair standing up on the back of my neck!
about author Chuck Gross’s one-year tour of duty The author logged the bulk of his missions in
as a warrant officer UH-1 “Huey” pilot assigned to the assault role, hauling mostly troopers from the
the Chu Lai–based 71st Assault Helicopter Com- Army of the Republic of [South] Vietnam (ARVN)
pany of the Americal Division, beginning 15 May into combat (US line infantry was being withdrawn
1970, prior to his 20th birthday. when he arrived in-theater). This was mostly rou-
Time tends to smooth memory’s rough edges, tine—but not entirely. The climax of the book
and the value of Gross’s account is greatly enhanced comes with the participation of Gross’s unit in Op-
by frequent reference to his letters home—letters eration Lam Son 719, the ARVN’s drive west from
that preserve an emotional intensity and authen- Khe Sanh to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail by land in
ticity of language that otherwise would have been February–April 1971. One of the most ill-conceived
lost. The book is well illustrated with photographs operations of the war, Lam Son 719 was hamstrung
taken by the author and his fellow aviators (the in- by a congressional edict prohibiting the use of US
credible youth of the warrant-officer pilots and ground forces in Laos. Consequently, the ARVN
their crews is striking), and these surely enhance battalions went in without their American advisers
the intensity and authenticity as well. Gross also and, lacking English-speaking forward air control-

lers, had no access to close air support. That became trade-offs. In Globemaster III: Acquiring the C-17, Betty
a matter of life and death—mostly the latter—when R. Kennedy, former Air Mobility Command histo-
they found themselves heavily outnumbered by rian, traces the C-17 program from its origin to its
North Vietnamese regulars backed by tanks and important role in the global war on terror. The pro-
antiaircraft artillery. gram had its roots in the desire of Tactical Air Com-
The congressional ban did not apply to US avia- mand to replace the C-7 Caribou and C-123 Pro-
tors, and the results were not pretty. The belea- vider intratheater transports that had seen use in
guered ARVN infantry depended totally on US Vietnam. By the mid-1970s, this desire had morphed
Army helicopters for insertion and extraction, and into the Advanced Manned STOL [short takeoff
the assault-helicopter companies depended on and landing] Transport program, which produced
Huey gunships for fire support, affording what pro- two technology-demonstrator aircraft (the Boeing
tection they could against North Vietnamese .51- YC-14 and McDonnell Douglas YC-15), more ori-
caliber heavy machine guns and, on occasion, 23 ented toward replacing the C-130 Hercules. By the
mm and 37 mm antiaircraft artillery and tanks. late 1970s, airlift requirements had shifted to a
Gross’s gripping account of the LZ Lolo fiasco of 3 need for more intertheater airlift, so the Air Force
March (because the author did not fly that day, he initiated the C-X program. McDonnell Douglas
depends on his friends’ eyewitness accounts) alone won the competition with a design that essentially
is worth the price of the book. The vision of over called for a larger and longer-ranged YC-15; this
100 Hueys going into a single-ship LZ in trail for- aircraft became the C-17. But the C-17 program still
mation under constant fire, uncertain as to just had to face many obstacles, including advocates of
who controlled the LZ, made my blood run cold. In such alternatives as acquiring additional C-5 Galax-
the end, the courage, skill, and determination of ies (which did occur [the C-5B]) and Boeing 747
the Army aviators salvaged something from defeat, freighters (which did not occur).
but at a heavy price: 107 helicopters destroyed and Clearly the author sifted through an enormous
battle damage to an additional 618 (pp. 179–80). number of documents and conducted many inter-
The devil, of course, is in the details, and Gross views in this well-researched history, as reflected in
handles them well. The Army helicopter side of the the voluminous and thorough endnotes. However,
Vietnam War has been poorly served in the litera- she does not appear to have consulted the detailed
ture, but this fine account goes far in making good technical reports produced by the Air Force Flight
the deficiency. Test Center; doing so would have provided addi-
tional, valuable insight into the many technical
Lt Col John F. Guilmartin Jr., USAF, Retired challenges that the program encountered. Ken-
Columbus, Ohio nedy explains the many twists and turns of the pro-
gram—from the initial statement through opera-
tional service—as it was buffeted by changing
threats and national strategies, congressional direc-
Globemaster III: Acquiring the C-17 by Betty R. tion, debates over interservice roles and missions,
Kennedy. Office of History, Air Mobility Com- multiple layers of the Air Force organization, com-
mand, Scott AFB, Illinois, 2004, 298 pages (soft- peting business interests, and technical challenges.
cover). One is left impressed by the enormous complexity
of conceiving, planning, and executing the acquisi-
The ideal military airlifter would have high tion of a major weapon system. This well-written
speed and global range. It would operate from book reveals the many problems experienced dur-
short dirt airfields and air-drop cargo as well as ing the program. Although painful and protracted,
paratroopers. The airplane would be big enough it did eventually produce an excellent aircraft. The
to carry every type of equipment and vehicle used detailed appendices and color photographs add
by the US Army and US Marine Corps yet still fit much to the book’s usefulness.
on the runways, taxiways, and ramps of austere air- The reader will encounter several small but an-
strips. It would cost relatively little to develop, noying errors. For example, the last name of Sena-
manufacture, operate, and maintain; further- tor Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.) is misspelled, and
more, it would move quickly from concept to op- designations of US Army vehicles are frequently in-
erational service. correct. Also, the author erroneously states that the
Needless to say, such an ideal airlifter is a physi- C-135 is the military designation for the Boeing 707
cal impossibility; like all weapon systems, the C-17A airliner. In fairness, these minor points do not de-
Globemaster III represents a compromise based on tract from the value of the book.

BOOK REVIEWS 121
One should also note that Kennedy deals with New Jersey. McCullough describes the American
the C-17 program, not the airplane itself. Readers successes in Boston that compelled the British forces
who want a thorough and well-illustrated descrip- to evacuate, the British successes in New York City
tion of the C-17 should consult Boeing C-17A Globe- that forced the American troops to evacuate, and
master III (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, the American triumph in New Jersey.
2001) by Maj Bill Norton, USAF, retired, who was a The strength of the book, however, does not lie
flight-test engineer in the program. His book effec- in the historical description of these clashes al-
tively complements Kennedy’s. though they are quite adequate, especially for non-
Globemaster III offers an outstanding case study for historians. Rather, one finds the real strength—and
anybody interested in America’s modern military- most interesting part—of 1776 in the rich detail
acquisition process. I also recommend it to people that McCullough provides about warfare and the
who operate, maintain, and support the C-17. They people involved in it, including the effect of the
will benefit from an appreciation of the enormous weather, knowledge of terrain, morale, leadership,
effort it took to bring their weapon system into training, sickness, and chance. By utilizing multiple
service. sources, especially diaries and personal letters, the
author makes the stories come to life. As Thomas
Kenneth P. Katz
Paine wrote in The Crisis after the withdrawal from
Longmeadow, Massachusetts
New York City, “These are the times that try men’s
souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot
will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their
country; but he that stands by it now, deserves the
1776 by David McCullough. Simon and Schuster love and thanks of man and woman” (http://www
(http://www.simonsays.com), 1230 Avenue of .ushistory.org/Paine/crisis/singlehtml.htm).
the Americas, New York, New York 10020, 2005, McCullough’s 1776 shows the tenuousness of the
400 pages, $32.00 (hardcover); 2006, 400 pages, situation in the first full year of the American Revo-
$18.00 (trade paperback). lution. It also demonstrates how good fortune, provi-
dence, and the exceptional leadership of George
David McCullough’s 1776 is an absolute delight
Washington preserved the cause for freedom. This
to read. Well researched and fully referenced for
book is a must-read for military professionals.
serious historians, the book will also appeal to
members of the general public interested in details Dr. Jack D. Kem, Colonel, USA, Retired
about the first year of the American Revolution. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The winner of two Pulitzer prizes (for Truman and
John Adams), McCullough again demonstrates his
ability to create a narrative that provides historical
accuracy while presenting personal insights with Space as a Strategic Asset by Joan Johnson-Freese.
vivid detail. Columbia University Press (http://www.columbia
The book has a relatively simple premise. It be- .edu/cu/cup), 61 West 62nd Street, New York,
gins with the debate in October 1775 in the British New York 10023, 2007, 320 pages, $45.00 (hard-
Parliament over the “desperate conspiracy” and cover).
“open revolt” taking place in America (p. 10). At the
end of the debate, the House of Lords and House Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, professor and chair of
of Commons voted overwhelmingly to support King the Department of National Security Decision Mak-
George III’s plan to deliver a decisive blow to the ing at the Naval War College, is an expert on the
riotous rebels of America. Four months earlier on political aspects of space as an important military
the other side of the Atlantic, the Continental Con- and commercial environment in which the United
gress had unanimously appointed George Wash- States has a critical national-security interest. Her
ington the new commander in chief of the army. book Space as a Strategic Asset offers a wonderfully
John Adams, who had nominated Washington, re- insightful account of the necessity of managing US
marked that the appointment “will have great ef- forays into this region. It addresses the political
fect in cementing and securing the union of these goals of the United States, Russia, China, and Eu-
colonies” (p. 43). The remainder of the book de- rope as well as the roles played by NASA, the Na-
scribes the clashes between British forces and the tional Reconnaissance Office, and the Department
Continental Army during 1776. These occurred in of Defense concerning the following space systems:
three different places: Boston, New York City, and Helios, Clipper, Columbus, Apollo, Galileo, Ariane,

International Space Station, Soyuz, Global Naviga- Zahid Hussain appears well qualified to attempt
tion Satellite System, Shenzhen, and the global po- to give us a picture of the situation. A journalist
sitioning system. providing materials to the Times of London, News-
The book has the right focus for discussing the week, and the Wall Street Journal, he has a good writ-
political, commercial, and military interests of ing style and is an expert on the region, having had
space as a region of national interest. Not filled access to some hard-to-get-at sources. He organizes
with technical equations about raising a platform his work in topical chapters and in a more-or-less
into low Earth orbit, it instead clearly explains why chronological order. The political landscape is clut-
various countries desire to utilize such a platform. tered with military, religious, power-seeking, nuclear-
Moreover, the author points out the shortcomings smuggling, and drug interests that yielded an al-
of some American political operatives who fail to most impossible problem for former president
grasp the importance of space unless it involves an Pervez Musharraf, who tried to survive in the midst
immediate and direct increase in jobs (read votes) of a number of mutually hostile domestic groups
for the constituents in their congressional districts. and the pressures of international politics.
Johnson-Freese explores the nuances of the inter- I fear that the reader seeking a coherent picture
national space race, including several interesting of Pakistan and Afghanistan is doomed to frustra-
tion. Both countries have long seemed ungovern-
discussions on issues underlying the military use of
able, partly because the central governments have
space, manned and unmanned space systems, and
had very limited powers over regional and local in-
the complexities of dual-use technology. Written in
terests. I suppose that the main idea of the book is
a pithy manner, this study is chock full of informa-
that trouble probably looms ahead for the United
tion regarding commercial, political, and military States because of Pakistan’s status as a principal ally
space issues. during the global war on terror—largely because
Space as a Strategic Asset will appeal not only to all President Musharraf sided with America, a position
serious students of political science, including offi- that goes very much against the tide in his own
cers attending the nation’s war colleges, but also to homeland. That cannot continue forever, accord-
armchair tacticians who want to expand their under- ing to Hussain, and I suppose that he thinks the
standing of the political and military aspects of only possible solution lies in allowing real democ-
space rather than its technical aspects. I certainly racy in Pakistan. However, given the strength of the
recommend this well-written, well-organized, and local warlords and the growing power of radical Is-
informative book, which exposes the reader to sa- lam, that would be a miracle. Atop that, Musharraf
lient issues related to space as a region of world- faced a tough problem of nuclear proliferation.
wide concern. Pakistan followed India into the elite group of nu-
clear states, but its control of nuclear secrets has
Col Joseph J. McCue, USAF, Retired
proved defective, and its people have been involved
Springfield, Virginia
in serious underground nuclear proliferation. If
that were not enough, he also was utterly depen-
dent upon the loyalty of his military—a little shaky
because the latter has an affinity for some of the
Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam radical Islamic groups, and they oppose secular
by Zahid Hussain. Columbia University Press government. Hussain does not address the charac-
(http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cup), 61 West ter of the “liberal” Pakistani groups who advocate
62nd Street, New York, New York 10023, 2007, secular rule, but it appears that radical Islam and
256 pages, $24.95 (hardcover). military rule are completely antithetical to them.
Moreover, Musharraf faced the perennial issue of
If any air warriors in the readership of Air and the dispute with India over Kashmir. Although he
Space Power Journal need convincing that the US for- managed to contain that to a certain degree, it re-
eign policy in the Islamic world is complex and mained fully capable of boiling over into a disaster
dangerous, they can get a good view of it in Frontline for him—and for the United States. Because our
Pakistan. Although readers accustomed to English campaign in Afghanistan against the remnants of
will have difficulty with the Pakistani personal and the Taliban and al-Qaeda greatly depends upon
place-names therein, the labyrinth of politics and our relationship with the Pakistani government,
religion in a region that hovers near anarchy will that means trouble.
persuade just about anybody of the dilemmas fac- Few Americans know much about Pakistan and
ing decision makers everywhere. its surrounding region, and Frontline Pakistan will

BOOK REVIEWS 123
certainly not make one an instant expert on the documented with both footnotes and a bibliography.
subject. However, it is readable and will serve as a The final chapter provides a good summary. Who
useful introduction to the problems of the area. I was Capt Field Kindley? What made him the person
therefore recommend that it occupy a moderately he was and the aerial leader he turned out to be? By
high place on your reading list. reading War Bird Ace, we discover the personal char-
acteristics that served one man well in becoming a
Dr. David R. Mets
leader as well as a commander in any military orga-
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
nization. We would do well to emulate them.
Lt Col Raymond F. Hain III, USAFR, Retired
Wilmington, Delaware
War Bird Ace: The Great War Exploits of Capt.
Field E. Kindley by Jack Stokes Ballard. Texas
A&M University Press Consortium (http://www
.tamu.edu/upress), John H. Lindsey Building, American Generalship: Character Is Everything:
Lewis Street, 4354 TAMU, College Station, The Art of Command by Edgar F. Puryear Jr.
Texas 77843-4354, 2007, 224 pages, $29.95 Presidio Press (http://www.randomhouse.com/
(hardcover). rhpg/category/military), Random House Pub-
lishing Group, 1745 Broadway, New York, New
Author Jack Stokes Ballard has written a biogra- York 10019, 2001, 400 pages, $17.95 (trade pa-
phy of Field E. Kindley, a high school dropout who perback).
ended his combat career as the fourth-ranking
American fighter ace of World War I. Not only an In American Generalship, Edgar F. Puryear aims to
ace, Kindley became a leading flight and squadron define and explain leadership as practiced by gen-
commander in the American air forces. Ballard’s eral officers from George Washington to Colin
book also offers a good introduction to the war in Powell. He builds a useful and highly readable lead-
the air over the trenches, highlighting the intro- ership primer filled with historical examples and
duction of the airplane to armed forces in combat. anecdotes that enable the reader to “hear” top
During his time as a flight commander, Captain commanders discuss their own experiences.
Kindley worked out his priorities, implementing Puryear’s premise is that military members can
practices to bring the pilots in his flight home after learn effective leadership skills and techniques from
the war. He remained in Europe as part of the oc- studying what has made great generals successful
cupation forces, tasked to contribute to the compi- and what has characterized their styles and philoso-
lation of lessons learned, particularly those con- phies. Military-management studies frequently com-
cerning the deployment and operation of air units. pare business practices to military ones and try to
Kindley’s fame became such that he testified before distill applicable lessons. Uniquely, this book pro-
Congress regarding the needs of the Army’s avia- vides hundreds of concrete examples of military of-
tion branch in both training and equipment. ficers exercising leadership in situations with which
He continued his Army career following the war, every officer and noncommissioned officer will
entering a number of races to show off the art of identify. The author proudly mentions that he has
aviation. Although he didn’t win any of them, his gathered over 10,000 pieces of correspondence
efforts proved instrumental in the life of Army avia- and interviews with more than 1,000 general and
tion, keeping it in the limelight and thus alive. Un- flag officers, including 100 four-stars. Among those
fortunately, Captain Kindley perished in an accident he has interviewed are legends such as Dwight
while practicing for a live-firepower demonstration. Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Matthew Ridgway, Carl
Noticing that several people had entered the target Spaatz, Jimmy Doolittle, and Curtis LeMay, grant-
area, he buzzed the location in an effort to get ing rare insight into their decision making—not
them to leave, but as Kindley returned to his flight, only on major issues of war and peace but also on
he apparently turned too sharply. The accident matters they faced as junior and field-grade officers.
board concluded that he had either unintention- Puryear’s ability to weave highlights from these dis-
ally stalled the airplane or that the aircraft’s aileron cussions into his narrative is compelling, and he
control had failed. The attempt to clear the target relates them in an engaging manner. In addition,
area reflected his consideration for others. he cites examples from Civil War memoirs and
Although the writing can become somewhat great American soldiers who lived before he began
tiresome in places, the book is an easy read, well his study. He does not deal in esoteric management

theories but repeatedly strikes his target with prac- pushed down the chain. A story told by Air Force
tical examples of military officers confronted with general T. R. Milton presents the view from the
the real challenges of leadership. Most of what his perspective of “I personally made a mistake.” He
subjects cite is neither battlefield bravado nor the recounts an ineffective bombing mission over
genius many of them displayed as combat leaders, Germany and how Gen Curtis LeMay had the dis-
but the hard decisions made by commanders at ev- cernment to see that the mistake was an honest
ery level and by program directors as well as section one (p. 290). We should heed the epigraph quot-
chiefs, doing the everyday work of the military. ing Gen George Marshall at the beginning of this
As his subtitle indicates, “Character Is Every- chapter: “Fix the problem, not the blame” (p.
thing,” and in these pages the reader finds officers 285). A leader has the vital task of judging when
making the “right” choices. Puryear points out that people have made that honest mistake and when
great leaders gain authority from their “strength of they have violated trust or procedure. One is a fail-
character” because “there is absolutely nothing as ure of training or learning; the other is willful or
important in successful leadership as character” (p. critical. One requires understanding; the other
1). He states that several principles are common discipline. We can learn as much from failure as
among great leaders. These include selflessness, from success. It is imperative that leaders exercise
decisiveness, willingness to hear opposing views, this level of sensitivity and judgment.
study of one’s profession (and related issues), men- Furthermore, the personal recollections of
toring, and having sufficient trust in subordinates World War II leaders prove fascinating. We some-
to delegate authority. All of these are essential to times forget that officers in that great conflict
success and growth within the military profession faced limited resources, operational demands,
and are real expressions of the Air Force’s core and the typical pressures we confront daily in the
values. None are always easy, yet all are crucial to military profession. Too often we place these leg-
success in command or in any leadership role. One ends in a pantheon, as if they were destined for
unique aspect of this book is its touch on intangi- greatness, forgetting that they were officers trying
bles, such as a sixth sense in decision making (a feel to do a job while coping with insufficient data,
for morale, conditions, and situations) and consid- competing requirements, and incredibly difficult
eration for others. Although both are essential to taskings, not to mention career issues such as assign-
any leader, neither is easily defined. In describing ments, training, promotion, family needs, and the
them, Puryear provides a reminder that much of uncertainties of life. Yet, in tying the experiences of
what we do as leaders is undefined but indispens- these renowned generals to men such as Ulysses S.
able. A leader who is trusted will be able to use Grant, William T. Sherman, and John J. Pershing,
these indescribable qualities more freely than one as well as leaders of our own time—H. Norman
who is not. Schwarzkopf, Colin Powell, and Charles Horner—
The interviewees’ frequent references to their Puryear builds historical unity in these principles,
own mistakes is a valuable feature of the book. validating their timeless nature and memorably re-
Many authors show us success and say “do this.” inforcing them by scaling these heroes in human
The candor shown by Puryear’s subjects human- proportions.
izes them and makes this study more interesting. American Generalship gives us an opportunity to
He relates a story from Maj Gen Lunsford E. Oliver, learn from leaders worthy of emulation and to pon-
a commander under Patton. As Oliver’s division der the way they coped with situations not too dif-
became increasingly ensnarled with other units ferent from those with which we deal every day.
on French roads, he was summoned to headquar- Many authors give us bits that we can put in our
ters. General Patton opened the meeting with the leadership toolbox, but Puryear provides a rich re-
statement “We are in a hell of a mess and it is my source for all military professionals who expect to
fault” (p. 289). These words eased a conscientious face the challenges of leadership.
subordinate’s mind, and he was able to continue
with his duties, knowing that he still had his com- Col James M. Pfaff, Ohio ANG
mander’s support and that blame would not be Columbus, Ohio

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125
Mission Debrief.indd 125 4/28/09 1:33:10 PM

OUR CONTRIBUTORS
Air Vice-Marshal Prof. R. A. Mason, Royal Air Col Jeffery Barnett, USAF, retired (AB, Col Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, retired (BA,
Force (RAF), retired, CB, CBE, MA, DSc, lege of the Holy Cross; MS, Troy State Univer Florida State University; MA, Central Michi
Hon. FRAeS, DL (DSc, University of Birming sity), is a senior consultant with Toffler Associ gan University), is a partner in Toffler Associ
ham), holds an honorary chair in the Depart ates. He recently drafted the Strategic Plan for ates. His consulting portfolio includes advising
ment of Political Science and International the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and chief executive officers and senior executives
Studies at the University of Birmingham, Eng Reconnaissance enterprise; the Air Force Re on managing change, creating growth, and
land. For many years, he has spoken and pub serve Strategic Plan; and a competitive analysis remaining competitive in the future. He serves
lished books, articles, and papers internation of the global air and space industry (for a cor on a number of industry advisory boards and
ally on airpower and related defense subjects. porate client). The author of Future War (Air was a member of the Defense Science Board’s
He has contributed to studies for the RAF and University Press, 1996), now in its seventh print 2007 summer study. He is a member of the In
United States Air Force (USAF), as well as the ing, as well as numerous articles in profes ternational Institute for Strategic Studies. His
air forces of Australia, New Zealand, Germany, sional journals, he served for 27 years in the Air Force career included command at the
Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, United States Air Force in a variety of flying, wing, base, and squadron levels. The author of
Oman, India, Thailand, South Korea, and the command, and planning assignments. Colonel many writings on military strategy and opera
Republic of China. A graduate of the RAF Staff Barnett is a graduate of the Air War College. tional art, he continues to lecture at the inter
College and the USAF Air War College, he is a mediate and senior levels of national and inter
former director of the Centre for Studies in national educational institutions for civilian,
Security and Diplomacy at the University of Bir government, and military professionals. Colonel
mingham and a specialist air force adviser to the Szafranski is a graduate of Air Command and
United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Staff College and Air War College.
Committee. He is a frequent commentator on
defense issues to the media. In 2007 Air Vice-
Marshal Mason was appointed an Honorary
Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society.
D. Lee Fuell Jr. (BSAE, West Virginia Univer

sity; MSS [Master of Strategic Studies], Air War
College) is technical director for global threat Maj Travis A. Burdine (USAFA) is the functional
at the National Air and Space Intelligence Cen manager and subject-matter expert for Predator
ter (NASIC), Air Force ISR Agency, Wright- and Reaper systems on the Air Force Unmanned
Patterson AFB, Ohio. He formerly served as a Aircraft System (UAS) Task Force, assigned to
senior advisor in the Office of the Under Sec the Air Staff, Headquarters US Air Force, Wash
retary of Defense for Intelligence; analysis and ington DC. A senior pilot with over 2,500 flying
production lead for the Defense Intelligence hours in the E-3 AWACS and over 750 hours in
Reform Team; chief of the Future Forces Divi the MQ-1B Predator, he served as the first chief
sion (NASIC); and lead unmanned aircraft of Group Standardization and Evaluation for the
systems subject-matter expert for the Iraq Sur United States Air Force’s first UAS wing—the
vey Group at Camp Slayer, Iraq. Mr. Fuell also 432d Wing at Creech AFB, Nevada. Major Bur-
served in a number of leadership and analysis dine is a graduate of Air Command and Staff
positions in the NASIC. College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
126
Bios - 2009-2.indd 126 4/28/09 1:34:02 PM

CONTRIBUTORS 127
Col Sung-pyo Hong, Republic of Korea Air Force Dr. Raymond Shulstad, Brigadier General, Lt Col Houston R. Cantwell (BS, University of
(PhD, University of Hull), is a professor at the USAF, retired (BS, University of Alabama; MS, Virginia; MS, George Washington University;
Korean National Defense University, where he PhD, Air Force Institute of Technology), is an MMOAS [Master of Military Operational Art
teaches defense policy, military strategic plan independent consultant to industry and govern and Science], Air Command and Staff College;
ning, future warfare, and airpower strategy. A ment for a broad range of topics, including orga MAAS [Master of Airpower Art and Science],
pilot, he previously worked in the Planning De nizational management and leadership, research School of Advanced Air and Space Studies)
partment of Headquarters of the Air Force, the and development, and systems engineering and serves as an operational planner at Headquar
Military Strategic Planning Department of the acquisition. In 2006 he retired as the senior vice ters Third Air Force, Ramstein AB, Germany.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of Revolu president and general manager of MITRE’s Cen He is an F-16 instructor pilot, having flown at
tion in Military Affairs of the Ministry of National ter for Air Force Command and Control Sys Osan AB, South Korea; Moody AFB, Georgia;
Defense, Republic of Korea (ROK). He did post tems. Prior to joining MITRE in 1999, he was the and Misawa AB, Japan. While assigned to the
doctoral research study at the RAND Corpora director of Strategic Planning for Surveillance Pentagon, he worked in several offices, includ
tion in 1996. He has translated two books into and Battle Management Systems for Northrop ing the Office of the Deputy Secretary of De
Korean—Future War (Air University Press, 1996) Grumman Corporation. General Shulstad re fense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
and A League of Airmen (RAND, 1994)—and has tired from the Air Force in 1994 after a distin Personnel and Readiness—Military Personnel
written numerous articles, including “Prospects guished 28-year career. His final assignments in Policy, and on the Air Staff for the Air Force
on the US-ROK Alliance,” Military History (De cluded vice-commander of the Aeronautical chief of safety. At Air University, he wrote sev
cember 2005), and “The Future of the USFK,” System Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio eral papers on the advance of unmanned air
New Asia (January 2006). (1993–94), and vice-commander of the Elec craft. Colonel Cantwell flew in support of Op
tronic Systems Division, Hanscom AFB, Mas eration Southern Watch and recently served on
sachusetts (1991–93). His publications include the headquarters staff, 1st Armor Division in
Peace Is My Profession (National Defense Univer Operation Iraqi Freedom and on the staff of
sity Press, 1986), a book that deals with the moral the air component coordination element in
dimensions of US nuclear policy. Operation Enduring Freedom.
Dr. Peter Warren Singer (AB, Princeton Univer

sity; PhD, Harvard University) is Senior Fellow
and director of the 21st Century Defense Initia
tive at the Brookings Institution, Washington,
DC. He is the youngest scholar named Senior
Fellow in Brookings’s 90-year history. He has
worked for Harvard University, the Interna
tional Peace Academy, and the Office of the Col John D. Jogerst, USAF, retired (USAFA;
Secretary of Defense. In his personal capacity, MS, University of Arkansas), has served as a C
Singer served as coordinator of the Obama ’08 130/MC-130 navigator and has commanded
campaign’s defense-policy task force. Singer is deployed theater special operations aviation
the author of the book Corporate Warriors (Cor components for Operations Provide Comfort,
nell, 2003), which introduced the study of private Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. He
military firms, and Children at War (Pantheon, has served as a squadron commander, com
2005), which explored the rise of another new mandant of the USAF Special Operations School,
force in modern warfare—child soldier groups. and a member of the faculty at the Air War
His latest book is Wired for War (Penguin, 2009), College as Special Operations Forces Chair to
which explores the implications of robotics on Air University. Colonel Jogerst is a graduate of
the battlefield. For further information, see Squadron Officer School, Air Command and
http://www.pwsinger.com. Staff College, and Air War College.
Bios - 2009-2.indd 127 4/28/09 1:34:03 PM

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Inside cover.indd 3 5/26/2009 3:39:09 PM

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Chief of Staff, US Air Force

Gen Norton A. Schwartz

Chief, Professional Journals

Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor

Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager

The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air

presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on

Inside cover.indd 2 5/26/2009 3:38:48 PM

Senior Leader Perspectives

Air Vice-Marshal R . A . Mason, Royal Air Force, Retired

Col Jeffery Barnett, USAF, Retired

Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired

Col Sung-pyo Hong, Republic of Korea Air Force

Perspectives on Leadership and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Dr . Raymond A . Shulstad, Brigadier General, USAF, Retired

Understanding the Enemy as a Complex System: A Multidisciplinary

Analytic Problem Requiring a Multidisciplinary Team Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

D . Lee Fuell Jr ., Defense Intelligence Senior Leader, USAF

Maj D . K . Stanford, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

Lt Col Houston R . Cantwell, USAF

Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, and the Perils of Battlefield

The Army’s “Organic” Unmanned Aircraft Systems: An Unhealthy Choice

for the Joint Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Maj Travis A . Burdine, USAF

Col John D . Jogerst, USAF, Retired

Ricochets and Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Lt Col Anthony P . Tvaryanas, USAF, MC, SFS

Col Lex Brown, USAF, MC, SFS

Nita L . Miller, PhD

The Air Force Commander: The Power of Interaction and Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Col William Mott, USAF

2009-2 contents.indd 1 4/28/09 1:16:21 PM

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Mission Debrief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired, Air Force Research Institute

Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired

Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army

Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy

2009-2 contents.indd 3 4/28/09 1:16:22 PM

Col Ronald K. Bartley, USAFR Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps

2009-2 Board of Reviewers.indd 4 4/28/09 1:16:47 PM

Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason: The assimi­

01-SLP-Mason et al.indd 5 4/28/09 1:17:46 PM

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The Bureau of Aeronautics combined de­ ballistic missiles), developed an organization

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01-SLP-Mason et al.indd 10 4/28/09 1:17:49 PM

my organizations—not I—should take credit

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1. a not-for-profit, federally funded research and de­ 8. Ibid., 259.

Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason: The assimi

The Bureau of Aeronautics combined de ballistic missiles), developed an organization

1. a not-for-profit, federally funded research and de 8. Ibid., 259.

Managing airmen’s capabilities through of maintaining target performance levels through

containing traditional expertise in pre of a workstation to simplify a work process

when someone brought up bad news, mem “Pennsylvania, sir.”

each of these aircraft carries within its de

in iraq.16 their services give them broad mis

boundary layer; lower, middle, and upper at