Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1977

Aviation Requirements for the Combat Structure of the Army
UNITED ARMY AVIATION

____ --------....-."" '1GESJ
MG James C. Smith
COMMANDER
U.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER
A major activity of the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
COL Keith J. RynoH
COMMANDER
U.S. ARMY AGENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETY
A major activity of the
Inspector General and Auditor General
of the U.S. Army
Richard K. Tierney
EDITOR
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
ABOUT THE COVER
Our thanks to Dot Crowley of the T"'iIIg
Aids ...... , Directo ..... of Tr ..... De-
,.I.p ....... , ft ... ek.r, for this IIIOIIth's
co,.r art
26
Io1'A ..
. ~ Of.AllANa
~
PITOT TUBE
JULY 1977 VOLUME 23 NUMBER
Views From Readers ...................................................................................... .
ARCSA III, MAJ George R. Hall; MAJ Russell H. Smith; MAJ
Lewis D. Ray; CPT Lloyd D. McGammon .... m ........................................
Valor Awards ........................................................................................................ .
Yano Hall .................... ...... ...... .......................................... ...... ............................. .
A Preplanned Accident To Test A Preaccident Plan ....... ..
Fly, Plan International, CPT Roger E. McCauley; CW2 Frederick
L. Cappo ............................................................................................................... ..
EPMS Corner: Enlisted Flying Pay, SFC Douglas Allen ............. .
"Six Eight Four, Please Turn Right," Roland Weldon . ............ .
- 10 Corner: Weight A Moment ................................... ..
OPMS Corner: I Have An Answer For You!, CW4 Chuck
Hawk; CW4 Lloyd Washer ............................ .-.............................................. .
Hall Of Fame, '77 ............................................................................................ ..
Who Says I Can't Kill You, CPT William J. Ely Jr ......................... ..
Aviation Center At A Glance, II ......................................................... .
Pitot-Static Pitfalls, Barry Schiff .............................................................. ..
Just Another Incident? ................................................................................. .
I Knew That Was The Point Of No Return ............................... .
Eject, Don Heyden ................................................................................................... .
Pea rt .............................................................................................................................. .
A TC Action Line ............................................................................................... ..
Annual Writing Awards ....................................... .lnside Back Co,
A Moment To Relax And Reflect ................................. Back Co,
The mission oflhe U.S. ARMY A VIATION DIGEST is to provide information of an operational. functional
nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention. training. maintenance. operations. research
and development. aviation medicine and other related data.
The DIGE ST is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly under the supervision of
the Commanding General. U.S. Army Aviation Center. Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of
the Department of the Army nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise
specified. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the DIGEST and to the author. unless
otherwise indicated.
Articles. photos. and items of interest on Army aviation are invited. Direct communication is authorized
to : Editor. U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST. Fort Rucker. AL 36362.
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General. Headquarters. Department ofthe Army. 23
December 1975, in accordance with AR 310-1.
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlined in AR 31()'1.
Complete DA Form 125 and send directly to CDR. AG Publications Center. 2800 Eastern Boulevard.
Baltimore. MD 21220. For any change in distribution requirements. initiate a revised DA Form 125.
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should submit DA Form 12-5.
Other National Guard units should submit requests through their state adjutant general.
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the DIGEST can order the
magazine from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington. DC 20402.
Annual subscription rates are $15.70 domestic and $19.65 overseas.
JEWS
ROM
EADERS
Sir:
Hi. I was once a very skillful and
highly trained mechanic and super-
visor . Aviation mechanic no less,
working on several different types of
gas turbin engines. What ' s that you
say? Oh, I could do to turbine engine
what Betty Crocker could do to apples .
I could in pect , adjust , repair and
rebuild the turbine engines on a
number of different Army aircraft .
Yes, it was a job r quiring a certain
know-how, with all the delicate and
preci ion parts that made it work.
Heavens no, all that wasn' t worth a
hoot if the proper TMs weren't
followed.It wouJd only take a few
thousandths of an inch to throw a
turbine wheel out of balance causing
damage to the bearings and set up a
vibration out of this world. Well , let's
see, nearly 10 years in that field . Well
one day DA sent hundreds of letters to
hundreds of NCOs that were needed
somwhere else within the Army. Its
been over a year now and I'm still a
tank commander.
Sir :
SSG Willard W. Hunter
Ft. Hood, TX
We at the U .. Army Re erve Flight
Facility at St . Paul happen to be very
proud of the high standard and qual-
ity of our aviators. They generally fly
more hours , maintain more qualifica-
tions. and maintain a better safety and
standardization record than mo t of
their active They do all
this at probably one-fourth the cost to
the American taxpayer and then hold
down a full -time civilian job to boot.
-ry-.-,""
STAN RIDE, UH-l,
l STAN RIDE, U9 STAN
(RIDE, INSTRUMENT {
(RENEWAL NOE,
PHYSICAL, NEW ANNUAL 1
THE BOSS WANTS-)
TO WORK OVERTIME, I
\BILLS, BILLS. BILLS . )
I.. Y
.... gg - ./
U
v
July 1977
We just wonder if the authors of the
new ARs gave any thought to the Re-
serve Components when they wrote
the changes placing even more re-
quirements on our aviators. We don t
feel they did and therefore submit the
following cartoon - not for its humor-
ou value, if any - but a a comment
on what we feel may develop into a not
o humorous ituation. i. . accidents,
p rsonnel retention problems, recruit-
ing problem , domestic problems, etc.
Sir :
Michael D. Rominger
Flight instructor
SARFFAC
t. Paui M
The March 1977 is ue of the AVIA-
TION DIGEST wa fuJI of good and
Continued on page 30
1
Major George R. Hall Major Russell H. Smith Major Lewis D. Roy Captain Lloyd D. McCommon
A VE YOU RECENTLY en-
countered the acronym ARCSA III
and wondered what it meant ?
ARCSA III sounds as if it names
some faraway galaxy in a science
fiction novel. But , it really has a
more down-to-earth meaning -
especially to Army aviators.
As spelled out in the title ,
2
Directorate of Combat Developments
U. S. Anny Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
ARCSA III is the acronym describ-
ing a TRADOC community study.
It determines the aviation re-
quirement to equip the active
Army and its reserve components
to fight in a high air defense threat
environment from 1977 to 1986.
A special study group was
formed at the U.S. Army Aviation
Center , Ft. Rucker , AL, in
January 1976 to perform the
analysis for TRADOC headquar-
ters. COL Robert L. Sauers, direc-
tor of Combat Developments at
the Aviation Center was the
ARCSA III study director . LTG
Frank A. Camm, deputy com-
manding general , TRADOC, was
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
ARCSA III study advisory group
chairman. Representatives from
all aviation TOE proponent cen-
ters and schools ; Headquarters,
TRADOC; DA; and other agencies
provided input to contribute to the
results of the study effort.
On 15 February 1977 the com-
pleted ARCSA III package was
briefed to the U.S. Army Chief of
Staff who approved it for im-
plementation. Indeed, the study
was not simply a study of aviation,
done in isolation by a group of av-
iators.
ARCSA III was intended to de-
termine how many aircraft , what
types of aircraft, how many avia-
tion personnel , and where all these
assets should be located in the
Army structure. You may wonder ,
" Well , what is wrong with our
present aviation structure? "
There are a number of reasons
why the Army aviation organiza-
tion for combat must be over-
hauled. For starters, the current
organization does not adequately
consider the intense air defense
environment looming as the
threat. It was developed by
ARCSA II in 1967 and modified by
an aviation baseline study in 1972.
Both oriented heavily on the low
intensity combat environment of
Southeast Asia.
Additionally, new progressive
organizational ideas such as the
FORSCOM Quick Fix a
noteworthy attempt to obtain the
maximum antiarmor capability
from existing aircraft - merited
evaluation for Armywide applica-
tion. Also, the current aviation or-
ganization does not adequately in-
tegrate new technology such as
the introduction of the AH-1 Cobra
TOW and the new family of air-
craft beginning to enter the inven-
tory.
These are just a few of the pres-
sing developments that made
reevaluation of the aviation or-
ganization necessary.
The basic Army force consid-
ered in ARCSA III (figure 1) es-
sentially consists of 7 corps, 24 di-
visions, 27 separate brigades and 6
armored cavalry regiments
(ACR). ARCSA III was to provide
the blueprint for fitting Army av-
iation into these organizations. A
July 1977
GLOSSARY
TRADOC Training and Doctrine
Command
TOE tables of organization
and equipment
HQ headquarters
DA Department of the Army
FORSCOM Forces Command
TOW tube-launched, optically-
tracked, wire-guided
ACR Armored cavalry r egi -
ments
AAH advanced attack helicop-
ter
UTTAS utility tactical transport
aircraft system
ASH advanced scout helicopter
TDA table of distribution and
allowances
AHC attack helicopter com-
pany
ACT air cavalry troops
mm millimeter
CONUS Continental United States
ITAADS Initial Target Acquisition
and Designation System
CSAC combat support aviation
company
MHC medium helicopter com-
pany
lOSS Intelligence Organization
and Stationing Study
FY fiscal year
primary goal was to reduce the
number of " separate" units and
locate all units in a division or
corps structure. Units fight with
divisions and corps ; therefore,
they should belong primarily to
divisions and corps.
ARCSA III considered all the
aircraft in the Army aviation in-
ventory plus the new advanced at-
tack helicopter (AAH) , the utility
tactical transport aircraft system
(UTTAS) , the advanced scout
helicopter (ASH) , and the moder-
nized CH-47 Chinook (CH-47D).
Additionally, specific issues were
evaluated. At division level pool-
ing of assets was examined and
recommended.
The reorganization of aviation
assets in the division into a combat
aviation battalion similar to that
already tested in Europe also was
recommended.
At echelons above the division,
pooling of numerous small sepa-
rate TOE units was studied. Reor-
ganization of the aviation units in
the corps into either a combat av-
iation group or battalion was
recommended.
Organizations operating under
a TDA were examined to reduce
the number of aircraft used in
other than combat roles .
Figure 1
Force Structure
Divisions
Ac'tl'Ve
1 Airborne
1 Airmobile
3 Infantry
7 Mechanized
4 Armored
3 ACR
1 ACCB
Separate Brigades
Active
1 Berlin
1 Armored
3 Infantry
i
ores
ctlve 6 (5 structured)
Reserve Component
5 Infantry
1 Mechanized
2 Armored
3 ACR
Reserve Component
1 Airborne
4 Armored
10 Infantry
7 Mechanized
Reserve 1
Total
Light Div
Heavy Div
ACR
ACCB
Total
Light BDE
Heavy BDE
Totol
10
14
6
15
12
3
Valor AW'ard
Recipients of Annual American Legion Aviator Valor Awards are from left : LTC Clarence R. Reed , CPT Victor
G. Grahn, CW3 Stephen L. Davidson and LCDR John M. lewis. At far right is Mr . William A. Hill, Post No.
743 Commander
OUR MILITARY flier from
the Army, Air Force and Coast
Guard were honored with the 1977
American Legion Aviator 's Valor
Award in ceremonies last May at
Ft. Hamilton, NY.
The award, established in 1953
by the American Legion Post No.
743 in Brooklyn, NY, is given for
" a conspicuous act of valor or
courage performed during an ae-
rial flight , in ox out of combat by a
rated member of the Armed
Forces. "
4
Chief Warrant Officer Stephen
L. Davidson an instructor pilot
and commandant of the U. S. Ar-
my's 222nd Aviation Battalion
High Altitude Rescue School , Fort
Wainwright , AK, was honored for
the rescue of two mountain
climbers on Mt. McKinley. The
helicopter rescue took place at the
15,OOO-foot level. The effort lasted
for more than 20 hours.
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence R.
Reed and Captain Victor G.
Grahn , of the Air Force's 481st
Tactical.Fighter Training Squad-
ron at annon AFB NM were
cited for their action during an
F-111D inflight fire emergency,
saving the aircraft from destruc-
tion.
Lieutenant Commander John
M. Lewis , a Coast Guard rescue
helicopter pilot assigned to Corpus
Christi Air Station, TX, received
the award for the rescue of the
captain of a capsized oil drilling
rig off the Texas Coast. .,.,.
July 1977
Yano all:
Homage
To A Hero
Upper left: General Harrison assists
Mr. and Mrs. Yano in unveiling
plaque
Right: (L- R) COL Bahnsen, General
Harrison and Mr. and Mrs. Yano dur-
ing ceremony
Left : (L-R) SFC Yano's brother
Glen, daughter Reni, and Mr. and
Mrs. Yano following dedication
Below: Mr. and Mrs. Yano examine
equipment inside hall nomed for their
son
(photographs by Rick Wasser and
Debbie Caskey)
T HE MAINTENANCE Train-
ing Division building, the largest
structure at Fort Rucker, AL, was
dedicated Memorial Day as Yano
Hall. It was named in honor of
Sergeant First Class Rodney J . T.
Yano, a helicopter crewchief who
was awarded the Medal of Honor
posthumou ly for the action which
led to his death on 1 January 1969,
while serving with the Air Cavalry
Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment , in Vietnam. (See
" Among The Honored," page 2,
June 1973 DIGEST.)
Att ndees at the dedication in-
cluded Sergeant Yano's parents
and brother: Mr . and Mrs.
Richard S. Yano and Glen , of
Kealakekua, HI. Brigadier Gen-
eral Benjamin L. Harrison, Fort
Rucker deputy commander, de-
livered the dedication address .
Colonel John C. Bahnsen,
Sergeant Yano s commander in
Vietnam and fl ying with him in the
helicopter the day he received his
fatal injuries, also participated in
the ceremony.
Yano Hall , which contains
123,247 square feet , is used for
training OH-58 and UH-1 crew-
chiefs.
5
ap
< 3 1 D i ~
UBAAAVB
6
Photo 1. Injured crew chief being evacuated by
civilian crash crew.
Photo 2. Civilian fire deportment checking aircraft
for fuel leaks and damage.
Photo 3. Boardmembers open occident investiga-
tion kit and begin their investigation.
Photo 4. CPT Griffin uses chalk to indicate struc-
tural damage to the aircraft .
July 1977
AYDAY! MAYDAY!
AY! Army Guard 31727. I
c-an' t move my pedals. We are in a
spin going down 8 miles south of
Midway. " With that call began an
exercise to test the reaction
pre accident planning, and
craft accident investigation
abilities of the Illinois ARNG. This
exercise was part of a program en-
titled " The Field Aircraft Acci-
dent Investigation Training
Course" being conducted by the
U.S. Army Agency for Aviation
Safety (USAAA VS) . The Illinois
ARNG has not had an aircraft ac-
cident in 6 years and the state av-
iation officer, C lonel Lawrence
L. Hamacher, dec ded there was a
need to test the unit 's ability to
react to a major mishap and pro-
vide the aircraft accident investi-
gation board with refresher train-
ing.
Plans for the program had
begun several weeks before . A
program of instruction was de-
veloped and approved by
USAAA VS. Before the exercise
COL Hamacher briefed the
cies outside the National Guard,
incl uding the FAA and the state
police. He selected a location from
which to conduct the training
program and coordinated with the
police and fire departments of the
surrounding communities. The
program was developed to test the
unit ' s pre accident and investiga-
tion plans ; provide 8 hours of
classroom instruction at the con-
clusion of the practical exercise ;
and informall y outline the
and areas requiring
Improvement.
The day before the program be-
gan CPT Charles K. Griffin, chief
of the investigation committee,
and CW4 John C. Moodt , senior in-
structor of the investigation com-
mittee, both of the Education and
Evaluation Division, USAAA VS,
flew to Chicago, carrying with
them portions of the wreckage of a
previous major accident that was
to be reenacted in Illinois . After
landing and parking their aircraft
without the unit knowing of their
arrival , they met with COL
Hamacher and proceeded to the
area selected for the imulated
crash to finalize detail for the
exercise.
The following morning, COL
Hamacher, under the guise of a
valid mission, departed the Army
aviation flight activity in a UH-1
and proceeded to the intended
crash site. When he arrived over
the site, a MAYDAY was declared
using a code word to advise the
FAA that a simulated accident
and training exercise was being
conducted. No one knew the time
the exercise would be conducted
other than it would be within a
2-month time frame . The FAA at
Midway tower , Chicago, upon re-
ceiving the MAYDAY, activated
the primary crash alarm sy tern.
After landing at the preselected
site, the crew of the aircraft was
replaced by CPT Griffin and CW 4
Moodt , who were to play the parts
of the pilot and copilot. The crew
chief, SP5 Foster, was told he had
sustained certain injuries and to
remain on the floor in the rear of
the aircraft. His position made ex-
traction difficult for an untrained
crew of rescuers.
Within 3 minutes after the UH-1
landed, the local fire and police
units arrived at the crash site .
They were advi ed that it was a
7
Publications required to plan an international flight .
Only the telephone land patience are missing
FL Y, PLAN INTERNATIONAL
USAREUR'S CROSS-COUNTRY
CPT Roger E. McCauley and CW2 Frederick L. Cappo
1 75th Aviation Company (AH), USAREUR
T HAT CONVINCING,r dom-
ineering, European winter has set
in. The number of flying days has
trailed off, even the SIP aviators
are walking. In an IP room,
somewhere in central Germany, a
crowd huddles around a coffeepot.
By standing just outside the
door, you can hear the sounds that
often accompany the telling of war
tories. Silently, without warning,
the shadow of the operations of-
ficer fills the doorway. The coffee
drinking stops and the voices sub-
side one by one as they acknow l-
edge his presence. A lone voice
pierces the silence which has
grown as thick as Stuttgart fog.
8
" What 's happening, sir? "
The operation officer looks to-
ward the interrogator. He takes
his time in replying, choosing his
words carefully. He looks
perplexed.
" I've just come from a meeting
with the CO. We' ve been given a
mission that requires crossing
some international boundaries .
Has anyone ever planned an inter-
national flight ?"
A dozen heads sway from left to
right.
" Well then I' ll need some volun-
teers to ... "
Before he can finish, the room
explodes with the clamor of boots
headed for the only other exit in
the room, a window three stories
up. In an in tant all that is left are
12 paper cups. Th op rations of-
ficer looks distraught. What
truck t rror in the heart of these
s a oned USAREUR veterans ?
Th thought of planning an inter-
national flight !
More and more Army aviator
find them elves behind the pencil
planning international fli ghts for
one reason or the other. Oddly
enough, the attack helicopter
brought the occurrence into
perspective rather suddenly.
When the AH-1G HueyCobras
were brought to Germany in great
U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
quantity several years ago, range
facilities were found rather
limited in this country only
slightly larger than the state of
Oregon. The search continued
until more suitable range facilities
were located outside Deutschland.
When a decision was made to go
outside this island of Army avia-
tion surrounded by nine countries
and the North Sea, quite a few
aviators were involved in planning
and flying international flights .
The flights included heavy lift air-
craft for ammunition carrying
duties, fixed wing VIP flights and
utility aircraft flying service sup-
port. These req uire men ts and
other varied and challenging tasks
make the idea of international fly-
ing anything but farfetched.
Planning an international flight
is not as impossible as it eems,
but it does require some careful
planning and technical know-how.
All flight planning should be
thorough but planning an interna-
tional flight calls for special atten-
tion to detail. Army aircraft can
plan and fly international1y filing
either IFR or VFR, with VFR
flights requiring slightly more
planning. It's useless, though, to
page through DOD publications
looking for an index referencing
planning procedures - inter-
national flight routes never flown
before - it just isn't there. What
you w ill run across in your
search are bits and pieces of in-
formation that need to be col-
lected and implemented in an
orderly, logical format.
The following steps for planning
an international flight were sum-
marized after actually planning
and flying several international
trips . The flights were unique in
that no previous Army flights or
any flight of similar nature were
flown along the courses taken. As
in all things new, the bugs had to
be worked out. When they were,
only a definite sequence of plan-
ning was left; one that got the job
done with a minimum amount of
wasted effort. Here they are-
general enough to apply for both
IFR and VFR flights , yet
specific enough to include all
necessary actions .
July 1977
See Glossary
Page 23
No matter what flight rules you
observe, your first move should be
to scan the FLIP Planning Chart
(you probably will want the low
altitude version). It will give a
good perspective of the overall op-
eration and some good references
for more detailed attention. It also
gives an idea or two for possible
alternate routes. But since the
FLIP gets printed only twice a
year, you may have to look around
for it. If you are lucky, some joker
just may have put it up in the brief-
ing room, where it should be any-
way. Your next move should be to
gather all the low altitude enroute
c harts for the flight route. By
using the airways as a guide , the
most direct route between landing
points can be plotted. The most
important restricted areas will be
depicted and so will all those help-
ful , usable navigational aids.
While the charts are unfolded,
choose an alternate route.
Next, the route of flight should
be plotted on VFR maps, if you
have the maps. If you don't , and
have never ordered maps before,
sever al questions will a rise.
Where do I get them? You' ll prob-
ably spend a lot of time question-
ing your fellow aeronauts about
this. Chances are they'll reply
with a shrug or an "ask the opera-
tions specialist who maintains
your unit FLIP account. " You'll
be surprised at what goodies are
available and being provided on a
subscription basis. After some
discussion about charts, you'll be
introduced to the DMA Catalog of
Maps, Charts and Related Pro-
ducts , Part I: Aerospace Pro-
ducts. The specialist advises , "It
is all right there, but if you really
want help, call those troops in
Heidelberg, USAASDE. Phone
number is right here in the front of
the supplement." After perUSing
Photo depicts flight over water and over mountains on a 1.to 5 ~ O O O scale map
Enlisted Personnel Management System
Enlisted Crewmember Flight Payscale
PAYGRADE YEARS OF SERVICE
under 2 over 2 over 3 over 4 over 6 over 8 over 10 over 12
over 16 over 18
E9 105.00
E8 105.00
E7 80.00 85.00 85.00 85.00 90.00 95.00 100.DO 105.00
E6 70.00 75.00 75.00 80.00 85.00 90.00 95.00 95.00 100.00
E5 60.00 70.00 70.00 80.00 80.00 85 .00 90.00 95.00
E4 55.00 65.00 65.00 70.00 75.00 80.00
E3 55.00 60.00
E2 50.00 60.00
E1 50.00 55.00
E1 (under 4 mas)
50.00
Aviation 50.00
Cadets
(If no amount is shown for a pay grade under cumulative years of service, the amount immediately to the left applies.)
sergeants; shop foremen; aircraft maintenance
section or branch sergeants; aircraft maintenance
or repair supervisors ; and aircraft technical inspec-
tors in TOE/TDA direct support and general support
aircraft maintenance units and activities may be
authorized noncrewmember flying status.
Enlisted personnel may be authorized noncrew-
member flying status while performing as air ob-
servers in units whose normal ground mission re-
quires the use of aircraft for air photography, map-
ping and similar purposes other than combat sur-
veillance.
Armorers of primary aerial weapons systems
may be authorized noncrewmember flying status in
TOE units provided they are required to perform
freguent and regular aerial flights in performance of
theIr duties on the aerial weapons systems. These
positions are limited to two per unit.
Physical Standards. Enlisted personnel who are
assigned to positions crewmember or
noncrewmember flying status must meet Class 3
medical standards in order to qualify.
120-Day Advance Notice. Enlisted crewmembers
will be accorded at least 120 days' advance notifica-
tion prior to being involuntarily removed from flying
duty through no fault or actIOn of their own. The
service member may waive the advance notice by so
stipulating in writing to competent authority.
Flying pay may be continued for 120 days although
advance notice of termination is less than 120 days
July 1977
and minimum performance requirements are not
met. This will be permitted only under unusual and
compelling circumstances such as national
emergencies, short notice of unit deactivation and
manpower authorization reductions, when it is not
possible to give 120 days' advance notice of removal
from flying duty.
Advance individual notice of removal from en-
listed crew member flying duty shall be written - by
competent authority - or verbal, provided a suita-
ble memorandum for record is made and it is later
followed in writing.
Removal from enlisted crewmember flying duty
for cause includes but is not limited to removal for
failure to satisfactorily perform assigned duties;
reclassification or school attendance based on ser-
vicemember's request; confinement; AWOL; re-
duction in grade; medical unfitness; or separatioil.
Enlisted noncrewmembers are not required to be
provided advance notice prior to removal from fly-
ing duties and attendant loss of flight pay.
Flying Pay Rates. Enlisted crewmember flying
pay varies with grade and years of service as indi-
cated in the payscale extracted from the "DOD
Military Pay And Allowances Entitlement Manual "
(see figure). Noncrewmember flying pay is $55
per month regardless of grade or years of service.
For further details on enlisted flying status, refer
to AR 600-106 and the "DOD Military Pay And Al-
lowances Entitlements Manual."
11
"Six Eight Four,
Please Turn Right"
Roland Weldon
Directorate of Training Developments
U.S. Anny Aviation Center
I T WAS LATE evening and there was only the one
aircraft. The pilot had reported 50 miles west and
wanted to make a ground controlled approach
(GCA) radar approach. I'd switched to the
maximum 53-mile range of the CPN 18A radar
scope. Sure enough, there I'd seen a target , just
inside the scope's outer western edge, moving
east. Everything had checked. The aircraft ' s posi-
tion, as reported by the polIt , plus the size and
speed of the target being observed, had led me to
believe that I was looking at a C-47 type aircr aft.
Still , I had to be sure.
" Six eight four , what is your heading? Over. "
" Six eight four , my heading is zero nine zero,"
came the reply.
" Roger , six eight four, for radar indentification,
turn left heading zero four five for one minute, then
resume normal inbound heading, over."
" Six eight four, roger turning left."
After having observed the target ' s left turn, fol-
lowed by the right turn inbound, I'd transmitted,
" Six eight four, radar contact five zero miles ~ t of
airport , continue heading zero niner zero, If no
transmissions are received for one minute .... "
After that, there had been little to do other than
watch 684's target as the pilot flew the 40 odd miles
toward the GCA traffic pattern. Flying at 130 knots
this was expected to take some 20 minutes. Until the
aircraft arrival in the pattern, control was to be
confined mostly to observing the target and report-
ing its progress through frequent position reports to
the pilot (at least once each minute).
" Six eight four, four seven miles west of airport,
over. "
" Six eight four , roger." .
" Six eight four, this will be a precision radar 'ap-
proach to runway three two right. Runway three two
right is seven thousand two hundred feet in
length ... ,"
12
" Six eight four , roger."
" Six eight four, four five miles west of the airport,
over."
"Six eight four, roger. "
The target ' s speed had appeared faster than nor-
mal, so I'd transmitted, " Six eight four , you appear
to be making good time, what is your airspeed?
Over."
" Six eight four, I'm indicating one thirty seven.
I've got a good tailwind up here, though. "
Some 40 uneventful miles and a number of position
reports later found 684' s target 5 miles west of the
airport, a position from which a turn to the
downwind leg normally was made.
"Six eight four , turn right heading one four zero
for downwind, descend and maintain two thousand."
"Six eight four , roger, turning right to one four
zero, leaving five thousand. "
The only problem was that 684' s target had not
turned, but had continued east. The first pangs of
doubt had crept in. What in the world's going on?
" Six eight four , what ' s your heading? Over, "
" Six eight four , I'm heading one four zero, over. "
Well , the target that I'd been controlling sure
wasn' t heading one four zero, Still, it wasn't too un-
common for pilots to simulate a gyro compass out to
see if we in GCA would recognize it. And, it just
might be that the pilot's gyro was out. With this sort
of thinking, I'd gone ahead and initiated a no-gyro.
"Six eight four, do you understand the no-gyro
procedure? Over, "
" Six eight four , affirmative. "
" Six eight four, turn right now," And hopefully, I'd
added, " You should be in a right turn, over. "
" Six eight four , roger , I'm in a right turn. "
The target had not turned, Instead, it had con-
tinued on its monotonous eastbound journey, and
was even then passing over the antenna, still
eastbound. The pangs of doubt had then turned to a
sick feeling, because I'd known that I had been con-
trolling the wrong aircraft .
"Six eight four , radar contact lost, do you know
your position? Over. "
Shortly after that , I'd found the real68414 miles to
the west, still in a right turn. I'd then vectored the
pilot to the airport where the GCA had been made,
without further mishap.
Who was the mystery target ? Well , it seems that a
Convair 440 commercial airliner had passed above
684 at the time radar contact first was being estab-
lished. The targets of the two had apparently
merged on the radar scope and I had begun control-
ling the faster Convair, which also happened to be
following the same route as 684. The initial position
of the two aircraft being near the scope's edge prob-
ably had contributed to the misidentification. It was
never to be explained why I failed to observe the real
684 behind the faster target.
While this 1957 incident was to cause little more
than inconvenience for 684's distraught pilot, the
problems of misidentification have continued to
plague radar controllers, often with serious and
even tragic consequences. Final controllers have
been known to talk targets right down to the runway,
only to have pilots of the real targets report their
position 8 and 10 miles on final approach. Tragically,
aircraft have flown into mountains while radar con-
trollers were unknowingly controlling the wrong
targets .
If there is one common thread tying all the inci-
dents of misidentification together, it would have to
be the presence of a nagging tinge of doubt, or some
sort of incompatability, which in retrospect should
have alerted the controller to action. In 684' s case, it
was the fast airspeed. In other cases, a faulty posi-
tion report , and even in one case the misreading of
an altimeter by the pilot, which had controllers
vainly searching an elevation scope for a descend-
ing jet aircraft at 2,000 feet , who had leveled pre-
maturely at 12,000.
Impossible, no! Impractical, yes. But, this is the
controller' s world. Here, nothing can be taken for
granted. Doubts must be the rule , not the exception.
In answer to every doubt , the monotony of proce-
dure, exact and absolute, must be repeated with
alertness and precision. For the controller to do
otherwise is to err-and to err may well be tragic!
Recently the instructions for com-
puting the moment in block 17 of the
DO Form 365F (Transport) were
ct;anged in the U H-1 0/ H Huey
Operators Manual to clear up a gray
area that has been with us many
years. The problem existed because
the instructions for computing weight
and balance did not state that the
moment/100 for fuel burnoff is not
the same as the moment/1 00 for fuel
weights in the fuel loading table, chart
12-2, sheet 3 of 16, page 12-6, TM
55-1520-210-10.
Weight
A Moment
Prior to the change, paragraph
12-6t of the dash 10 instructed the
crew to "estimate the weight of the
fuel which may be expended before
landing" and "enter this figure to-
gether with moment/ 1 00 in the spaces
provided" in block 17 of DO Form
365F.
July 1977
These instructions have led persons
computing weight and balance to read
the moment for the expended fuel di-
rectly from the Fuel Loading Table.
For example, according to the Fuel
Loading Table for the crashworthy
system the moment/1 00 for 975
pounds is 1,428. If this moment had
been entered in block 17 and sub-
tracted from the takeoff conditions to
find the estimated landing condition,
the calculated landing center of grav-
ity (CG) would be incorrect.
The correct method requires the fol-
lowing calculations: First, estimate
the amount of fuel onboard at land-
ing.ln the example above, 325 pounds
would be onboard at landing if 1,300
pounds were onboard at takeoff
(1,300-975= 325). Second, from the
Fuel Loading Table we find that the
moment/1 00 for 325 pounds is 431.
Finally, subtract 431 from 1,979, the
moment for 1,300 pounds, and enter
the result (1,548) in block 17 with the
975 pounds of fuel consumed. When
we compare the CG derived by using
this moment with the CG from the
previous method, we find there is an
approximate 2-inch difference in CG.
That 2-inch error could be critical
when the CG is near the fore or aft
limit.
13
Managing CONUS Assignments Are:
TRADOC CW4 Will Stuckey AV 221-7835
FORSCOM CW4 Tom Keene 221-7836
Bragg
Hood CW4 Charlie Sturtevant 221-7835
Campbell
Overseas Assignment Managers Are:
Europe CW4 Chuck Hawk
Other Overseas CW4 Lloy<;i Washer
RA officers must be able to complete the school and
service obligation before reaching 23 years of active
federal service. Other than Regular Army (OTRA)
must be able to complete schooling and service obli-
gation before reaching 20 years of AFS. Applicants'
performance potential must justify schooling. In-
formation on tuition assistance programs may be
obtained from the local education center .
Q: I recently received orders assigning me to the
21st Replacement Battalion in Frankfurt , Germany.
I thought that warrant officer assignments were to
specific units in U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Is
that not the case?
A: The initial order moving a warrant officer to
USAREUR will assign that person to the 21st Re-
placement Battalion in Frankfurt. About 90 to 120
days prior to the overseas report date USAREUR
will make the ultimate "pinpoint" unit assignment.
USAREUR will then forward this assignment to the
individuals servicing Military Personnel Office
(MILPO). A "pinpoint" assignment then will be is-
sued in the form of an amendment to the person' s
original orders which made the assignment to the
21st Replacement Battalion.
Q: Must I wait until I receive my "pinpoint" as-
signment instructions from USAREUR before ap-
plying for dependent travel?
A: No. You should make application for dependent
travel immediately upon receipt of orders assigning
you to the 21st Replacement Battalion. Approval for
concurrent travel of dependents hinges on availabil-
ity of housing at ultimate assignment.
Q: How long can I expect to stay stateside (at any
post) in Continental United States (CONUS)?
A: Minimum, mandatory time onstation within
CONUS is 36 months and normally you will not move
prior to that. Normal turnaround time is 4 years
except for those who have not been overseas in which
case turnaround is 3 to 3% years. Because of the
current aviation reorganization in Germany, Cobra
pilots may spend less than 4 years in CONUS.
Q: How can I get to a specific place overseas?
A: Fill out a DA Form 4187 (Personnel Action) and
forward it as outlined in chapter 2, AR 614-30. Re-
member you must have 3 years onstation before you
can be moved and a volunteer statement does not
July 1977
protect you from involuntary overseas assignment if
it' s your time to go. Incidentally, there must be a
requirement at the place you want to go in order for
you to be sent there.
Q: What can I do to get the CONUS post I want
when I DEROS (date eligible for return from over-
seas) ?
A: Put in a current preference statement 6 or 7
months before DEROS. Attach a note or letter to
explain any special circumstances that you want to
emphasize. Finally, call the assignment officer, but
not until 90 days or less before DEROS.
Q: Can I get a military school enroute?
A: Those who have not received functional train-
ing in either an advanced aircraft or career track
will be considered for an appropriate school in con-
junction with their change of
(PCS). This procedure IS necessItated by the lImIted
number of available quotas which are used-largely
to support field requirements. Make your prefer-
ences known through a preference statement (DA
Form 483) or letter . Your assignment officer will
coordinate your schooling through the Professional
Development Branch of Warrant Officer Division.
Occasionally we do have quotas left over after as-
signments have been made. However , for the most
part , these are administered to the various CONUS
installations to meet their internal requirements.
Q: What about severe personal hardship? How can
I be diverted from my current orders? How can I
move to a specific place?
A: MILPERCEN must approve a compassionate
or permissive assignment under the provisions of
paragraph 3-3 or 3-2, AR 614-101. Your local person-
nel officer will help you get the required documents
together. CW4 Valaer, Personnel Actions Branch,
AUTOVON 221-7854, will process the paperwork in
the Warrant Officer Division. He also is available for
advice and assistance.
Q: What is the greatest advantage that an RA WO
has over an OTRA WO?
A: In our opinion it' s the fact that an RA WO has a
measure of job security beyond 20 years of active
service which is not available to the OTRA WOo The
potential security provided for an OTRA WO by the
Managed Tenure Program can be a fleeting thing
since MTP needs are based on forecasted MOS vac-
ancies and are not mandated in law as is the RA
program. In other words, due to limited require-
ments by year group and MOS, the MTP may not be
offered to a warrant officer; therefore, that person
must retire at the end of 20 years AFS.
Q: Where do I send my Officer' s Preference
Statement (DA Form 483)?
A: Commander, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-
OPW-AV, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332.
We' re sure this doesn' t answer everyone' s ques-
tions, but it's a shot at replying to some of the more
frequent queries we receive. We realize your ques-
tions are triggered by legitimate concerns and un-
certainties. So remember, we' ve got (or will get) the
answers!
15
Hall Of Fame, '77
New inductees into the Army Aviation Hall of Fame are (L-R): Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool; Lieutenant General John Norton;
Colonel Robert H. Nevins Jr.; Colonel Claude L. Shepard Jr.; Command Sergeant Major lawrence E."Kennedy; Brigadier
General Robert M. Leich; and Chief Warrant Officer Four Johnnie R. Sandidge . All are retired (photo by Debbie Caskey)
SEVEN MEN were inducted into the Army Aviation Hall of
Fame 4 June at Ft. Rucker, AL, in observance of Army avia-
tion's 35th birthday .
Major General James C. Smith, post commander, introduced
the guest speake'r, retired Lieutenant General Robert R. Wil-
liams, national president of the Army Aviation Association of
America (AAAA). The association is the Hall of Fame's spon-
soring agency.
General Williams emphasized that it is the Army Aviation
Hall of Fame and not the Army Aviation Association Hall of
Fame. He explained that Aviation Center commanders have
made the Hall of Fame a major part of the aviation birthday
celebration.
Those inducted into the Hall of Fame were chosen by a
six-member Board of Trustees of AAAA. The new inductees
are: Lieutenant General John Norton; Brigadier General Robert
M. Leich; Colonel Robert H. Nevins Jr.; Colonel Jay D. Vander-
pool; Colonel Claude L. Shepard Jr.; Chief Warrant Officer W-4
Johnnie R. Sandidge and Command Sergeant Major Lawrence
E. Kennedy . All are retired.
CSM Kennedy is the first enlisted man to be inducted into the
Hall of Fame.
Escorts for the honorees were Hall of Fame members:
General Hamilton H. Howze, Lieutenant General Harry W. O.
Kinnard, Brigadier General O. Glenn Goodhand, Colonel Del-
16
bert L. Bristol, and Colonel John W. Oswalt, all retired; Arthur
Kesten, editor and publisher of The Army Aviation Magazine;
and Ft. Rucker's Command Sergeant Major Robert L. Roots .
Each inductee and his escort came forward and the new
member's portrait was unveiled. The portraits will be placed in
the Army Aviation Museum section designated as the Hall of
Fame alongside the 21 other members' pictures already on
display.
General Williams presented James G. Craig, the Army Avia-
tion Museum's acting curator, with a plaque which also will
hang in the Hall of Fame. It is inscribed with the names of the
351 Hall of Fame patrons.
The birthday activities also included a static display on the
Army Aviation Center Parade Field, rides in the UH-1 Huey
simulators, the opportunity to see one of the world's largest
hot air ballons, the radar laboratory used to train air traffic
controllers and the parabolic screen used to teach navigational
skills for nap-of-the-earth flying .
The day's formal events were concluded with an Honors
Dinner at the Officers' Club. Attendees heard General Howze
speak on the usefulness of helicopters and airmobility. General
Howze is a pioneer in advanced concepts for ainnobile opera-
tions and air assault doctrine.
The new inductees increased the Hall of Fame membership
to 28.
ARCSA III
Continued from page 3
Figure 2
Attock Helicopter Companies
2 per Armored/mechanized division
1 per Infantry/airborne division
1 per Armored cavalry regiment
6 per Air Cavalry Combat Brigade (ACCB)
(2 battalions)
3 per air assault division (1 battalion)
Attack Helicopters: Since
ARCSA III was not a zero based
study, the ongoing reorganiza-
tions in FORSCOM and the exist-
ing procurement schedules for at-
tack helicopters were of signifi-
cance.
In FORSCOM, 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault) reorganiza-
tion created an attack helicopter
battalion from attack helicopter
assets in both of its 12-gun attack
helicopter companies and the 36
attack helicopters in the aerial
field artillery battalion. Also, ef-
forts in the 82d Airborne Division
were underway to increase the an-
tiarmor capability by converting
all attack helicopters to missile
firing aircraft.
The overriding desire to in-
crease aerial antiarmor capabil-
ity in the divisions was included in
ARCSA III, which recommended
all attack helicopters be located in
AHCs and ACTs. Therefore, at-
tack helicopters were removed
from all the assault helicopter
companies. As a result, ARCSA III
developed the structuring rules in
figure 2 for attack helicopter com-
panies.
Because air cavalry is impor-
tant to all divisions, the structur-
ing rules in figure 3 were de-
veloped for air cavalry troops:
Figure 3
Air Cavalry Troops
3 per Infantry/airborne/air assault
division (active) (1 squadron)
Figure 4
Combat Support Aviation Companies
2 per Infantry/airborne division
1 per corps
6 per air assault division
To equip the AHCs and ACTs,
ARCSA III proposed conversion of
all AH-IG/Q HueyCobra helicop-
ters to AH-lS. These can be equip-
ped either with the TOW or used in
the overwatch role, employing
2.75 inch rockets and a 20 mm in-
terim turret. Also, integration of
the AAH will be made using a
schedule to maintain an overseas
and CONUS AAH balance for rota-
tion, stationing and training pur-
poses.
When AH-lS conversions and
AAH procurements are complete,
enough assets will be available to
equip both the active and reserve
component AHCs and ACTs with
preferred aircraft assets.
Scouts: The nature and mission
of scout aircraft necessarily as-
sociates them with AHCs and
ACTs. ARCSA III considered the
OH-58C Kiowa (product improved
OH-58) and the ASH. The ASH
program was delayed 2 years to
take advantage of increased
technology in the aircraft. As an
interim solution, UH-IH Huey air-
craft equipped with the Target
Acquisition and Designation Sys-
tem will be fielded and known as
the Initial Target Acquisition and
Designation Systems (lTAADS).
Utility Aircraft: These include
the UH-IH and UTTAS. Reevalua-
tion of ongoing UTT AS procure-
ment plans showed them to be
valid in light of other aviation
reorganizations. ARCSA III in-
creased the role of the
Figure 5
1 per Infantry division (reserve component) 2
Medium Helicopter Companies
per corps
1 per Armored cavalry regiment 2
3 per Air Cavalry Combat Brigade (ACCB) 2
(1 squadron) 1
July 1977
per air assault division
per theater (USAREUR)
per Air Cavalry Combat Brigade (ACCB)
UTT AS by assigning UTT AS
equipped units with a resupply
mission to the heavy divisions , as
well as assigning them to light di-
visions with a combat assault mis-
sion. The name of the assault
helicopter company has been
changed to combat support avia-
tion company (CSAC) to better in-
corporate the tone of both mis-
sions.
ARCSA III found that a number
I of logistical resupply missions can
be better performed by the UTT AS
' than by a heavier, larger helicop-
ter such as the CH-47. To provide
each division with an integrated
logistic and resupply capability
the following structuring rules in
figure 4 were developed for
CSACs:
CSACs in the armored/mech-
anized division will have a pri-
mary mission of logistical sup-
port, while CSACs assigned to the
Infantry/airborne divisions will
have a primary mission of combat
assault . UTTAS aircraft also are
scheduled both for air cavalry
troops and helicopter ambulance
companies and detachments in the
active force.
Cargo Aircraft: Current pro-
grams provide for modernization
of the CH-47 aircraft fleet and
designation as the CH-47D.
ARCSA III concurred with ongo-
ing programs and recommended
that the preponderence of the
CH-47 fleet be in the active force
in order to be deployed rapidly
to forward areas. Consequently,
ARCSA III recommended mov-
ing three CH-54 Flying Crane
companies from the active force
to the reserve components in ex-
change for moving three CH-47
units to the active force.
Both the CH-47D and CH-54 are
considered to possess a medium
lift capability. However, the CH-47
will be located in medium helicop-
ter companies (MHC), the new
designation for the old assault
support helicopter company. The
CH-54 will be in the heavy helicop-
ter company. Figure 5 contains
structuring rules for the MHC.
Medium helicopter companies
have been increased in size from
16 to 24 CH-47s. This provides the
17
I
Brigade
Aviation
Section
12 OH
6 UH
r-
Intantry jAirborne Division
-
Division
Artillery
Aviation Section
14 OH
32 OH
+13 UH
45
Figure 6
Present Structure
Division
Aviation
Company
6 OH
7 UH
L
Brigade
Aviation
Section
12 0 H
Armored/Mechanized Division
-
Division
Artillery
Aviation Section
14 OH
32 OH
+ 4 UH
36
Division
Aviation
Comp.any
6 DH
4 UH
33 aircraft available per day [75 %1 27 aircraft available per day [75 %1
MHC the capability to modularize
the company :nto three eight -
aircraft platoons to provide sup-
port to separate units or task
forces as necessary while simul-
taneously increasing the aircraft
availability within the company.
Heavy helicopter companies are
to be assigned to a theater on a
specific mission or need basis.
Other Aircraft: ARCSA III also
considered the military intelli -
gence aircraft (OV-IB, C and D),
and the elctronic warfare aircraft
(RV-I , RU-21 and EH-l). It was
found that ongoing studies con-
cerning these aircraft generally
are reasonable and in accordance
with the Intelligence Organization
and Stationing Study (lOSS). No
changes in the current organiza-
tion or procurement quantities
were recommended by ARCSA
III. Other aviation unit organiza-
tions studied by ARCSA III with
their respective structuring rule
are:
Division Aviation Company, I
per division.
Combat Aviation Battalion, I
per division.
General Support Aviation Bat-
talion, I per corps ; I per separate
brigade (Alaska/Canal Zone).
Corps Aviation Company, I per
corps.
Army Aviation Company, I per
Theater Army.
An ongoing study of helicopter
ambulance companies and de-
tachments is being conducted by
the Health Services Command, Ft.
18
Figure 7
6
1
2
11
2
2
10
I
Brigade
Support
Platoon
16 OH
4 UH
ARCSA m
Division
Aviation
Company
Division
Artillery
Support Platoon
10 OH
4 UH
32 OH
+14 UH
46
I
Division
Support
Platoon
6 OH
6 UH
39 aircraft available per day [85 %1
Signal Unit Consolidation
(Example)
.illi!I
HHC Corps Sig Bn
HHC Sig Const Bn
HHC Sig Cbl Bn
HHC Sig Bd/ Cbl Bn
HHC Army Sig Bn
HHC Army Sig Ops
HHC Army Sig Bde
HHC Sig Gp (Minus
Abn Unit)
Total: 126 Aircraft
5 HHC, Corps Sig Bde: 7 5 3
Totol: 75 Aircraft
Saved: 51 (40%)
OH
1
5
4
2
1
2
2
54

UH
5
5
2
1
56
U-21
2
1
1
16
Figure 8
Sam Houston, TX. For this reason,
ARCSA III did not make a recom-
mendation concerning these units
pending completion of these delib-
erations.
ARCSA III reviewed and
" scrubbed" all TOEs containing
aircraft to reduce the number of
TOEs and to economize on aircraft
personnel. Pooling aircraft in the
division and at echelons above di-
vision was recommended . See
figure 6 for the ARCSA III recom-
mended division aviation com-
pany with the current divisional
assets pooled. Figure 7 reveals , as
anexample, the reduction of TOEs
at echelons above division by pool-
ing Signal Corps TOEs to
maximize aircr aft a vaila bility
and reduce overhead.
TDAs were studied to reduce the
number of aircraft used in roles
other than combat. This resulted
in a 34 percent savings in aircraft
in TDA positions. Training base
Headquarters
and
Headquarters
Company
July 1977
Figure 9
Combat
Aviation
Battalion
Armored/Mechanized
Division
Aircraft
Maintenance
Company
requirements were included in the
TDA evaluation and updated to re-
flect the most current training re-
quirement and the projected train-
ing requirement for the new air-
craft (UTTAS, AAH, etc.) enter-
ing the inventory.
What does all this mean to the
division and corps structures ?
Figure 8 shows the armored-
/mechanized division structure.
Shaded areas indicate new or-
ganizations. All of these divisions
are to be structured alike with av-
iation assets consolidated in a
combat aviation battalion.
The CSAC has a primary logis-
tics mission. Figure 9 shows the
aviation structure of the Infan-
try/airborne division. Notice that
there are two CSACs with a prim-
ary mission of combat assault and
only one attack helicopter com-
pany.
Implementation: How long will
it take to make the Army actually
Infantry / Airborne
Division
Aircraft
Maintenance
Company
Armored
Cavalry
Squadron
Air Cavalry
Troop
look like this? Based on current
plans, the entire ARCSA III force
structure will be completed in the
late 1980s. However , there are
some significant milestones that
are a little closer to the " now"
timeframe.
Based on programed de-
liveries of AAH and AH-1S conver-
sions we can:
Provide AHC in all active divi-
sions and ACR equipped with
prime assets by mid to late 19OOs.
Provide AHC in reserve com-
ponents equipped with prime as-
sets by late 1980s.
By fiscal year 1979-1980 you will
see through the Army aviation
force the organizational structure
shown in this brief article. The
process of writing new TOEs for
the new units already is underway
and will be completed before the
end of this year . Before you know
it, ARCSA III will be a reality in
your unit. ""*
Air Cavalry
Squadron
Air Cavalry
Troop
Armored
Cavalry
Troop
19
Who Says I Can't Kill You
(Avoid My Environment)
IFEEL THAT I should warn
you before it is too late. This arti -
cle represents a betrayal on my
part and seemingly classifies me
as a traitor to my own kind, but I
still question whether or not it
truly represents a substantial re-
duction in odds, giving you the dis-
tinct advantage. This depends on
your attitude and how seriously
you interpret what I am about to
say.
My skin is colored. As an indi-
vidual , I alone possess the poten-
tial strength of inflicting serious
injuries or - more than likely -
killing you. Associated with others
like me, our combined strength is
unbreakable. Our growth during
the past decade has been phe-
nomenal. We have literally span-
ned almost every portion of the
Captain William J. Ely Jr.
Area Commander, Recruiting Force
Eugene, Oregon
globe. As we continue to grow in
both size and number so, propor-
tionately, does the power that
surges through us. We are too well
established. We have existed too
long already and will be around for
centuries to come, so it is incon-
ceivable that we will ever be
eliminated. But , our growth and
strength are only two of the advan-
tages we possess.
We are inconspicuous . Our
camouflage is natural. We have
the peculiar advantage of being
able to blend with almost any type
of background. At night, we are'
invisible to the eye. Be it as it may,
however, most of our victims are
snared during the daylight hours.
We rely solely on the element of
surprise, our encounters being
sudden, violent and devastating.
Hardly aggressive, we prefer to
wait in ambush, striking when you
least expect it.
Finally, we possess a unique
characteristic of reproduction.
Any time one of us is torn down or
destroyed - within days our dam-
ages have been repaired and we
are generally much stronger than
before. Fortunately for you, how-
ever, our replacements are much
more recognizable.
As a rule, I and others like me
prey on the naive - the unedu-
cated. If you feel that you fall into
this category, then you will proba-
bly literally run into me some-
time. It is unfortunate, for I and
other strands of wire too often are
writing obituraries.
Army Aviation Accident Prevention Award of Excellence
20
Major John Kilkenny (right) , com-
mander of the 355th Transportation
Company (Heavy Helicopter), re-
ceived the Army' s Aviation Accident
Prevention Award of Excellence last
May from Ft. Eustis commander,
Major General Alton G. Post. The
company earned the award by flying
more than 6,000 accident-free hours
in 74 months.
The unit has 25 aviators assigned,
flying 10 CH-54 Flying Crane helicop-
ters. During the 6 years since the
company returned from Vietnam, it
has flown a variety of missions in-
cluding support for the Argo M er-
chant oil spill and recovery of
downed aircraft. The CH-54 is the
largest helicopter in the Army' s in-
ventory, capable of airlifting 25,000
pounds. (Army photo by David Byrd)
FLY, PLAN
the catalog, you suddenly realize
"what scale chart do I want?"
The scale of maps needed will
depend particularly on the dis-
tance to be flown. As a guideline
for long flights, a 1:500,000 scale
probably is best. (Remember
those NA VAIDs? They're great
for helping pinpoint your position
on those large-scale maps while
flying VFR.) Aircraft type may in-
fluence the scale selected. A
1:250,000 scale map in an AH-IG
for a noon to 1600-hour voyage
might tend to clutter the cockpit.
While checking your route on the
map, you should note if any part of
the flight will be over mountains or
water. Check the height of those
mountains and consider the sea-
son and climatic trends before you
cement your route. Over water,
break out the flotation equipment
and brief the crew on water
emergency procedures.
Now dust off the DOD publica-
tion, Special Use Airspace, AP/2A
- remember? The pub you picked
up by accident when your IFR
stuff was outdated. In this very
important collection of paper and
ink is a listing of every restricted
area in Europe, Africa, and the
Middle East. A check here should
reveal any route deviations you
might have to make to avoid any
"no fly" areas. But it also gives
limits (vertical and horizontal),
operating times and controlling
authority should a deviation be
undesirable. Just maybe it will not
be necessary.
It is inevitable, and it happens
every flight. Time to research the
enroute supplement, digging out
the control frequencies, reading
the aerodrome remarks and ask-
ing yourself some important ques-
tions. Is fuel available? Can I get
an APU start? While reading the
supplement, interesting things
concerning your flight may come
to light. For instance, the airport
where you intended to refuel is
open only 2 hours in the morning
and 2 in the afternoon. Have you
ever heard of fuel cash payment
only? Read carefully, you might.
July 1977
A completed DO Form 1801 flight plan filed for an actual international flight
If possible, always call or teletype stopping points or destinations
ahead, even the most current pub- might be helpful. DOD may not
lication may contain erroneous publish the ones needed. Where
data. are they available? Some of our
At this point, a few VFR arriv- allied countries publish a few of
alJdeparture routes or approach these, but chances are USAASDE
plates for foreign airports used as will be able to obtain. and au-
See Glossary
Page 23
21
thorize use of, these for you.
So far, you've done pretty much
what you might for any flight of
considerable distance. The route
is plotted; maps collected with the
route drawn; N A V AIDs chosen;
restricted areas noted; landing
points researched; 2283 com-
pleted ; and coffeepot empty. If
this were not an international un-
dertaking, all would be finished
except the flight plan and the
weather briefing. In this case
make more coffee and start read-
ing the FCG.
The Foreign Clearance Guide is
must reading for international fly-
ing. Questions concerning border
entrance requirements will be
answered in the Guide. Will your
flight be governed by diplomatic
clearance, permanent overflight
code or is 7 days notice required
prior to entry? Are trilingual
travel orders necessary? What
are the custom regulations? Not
only does the Foreign Clearance
Guide impose certain require-
ments, it lists the costs of hotels,
the current money exchange rate
and what clothing to wear to
negotiate the weather. Teletype
and embassy addresses you
might need to contact for infor-
mation also are listed. There's
another little hooker - note the
remark ' see classified supple-
ment.' Some sensitive info exists
that may affect your flight , par-
ticularly birds with weapons sys-
tems onboard. That operations
specialist can help you on that or
put you in touch with the right
folks.
The whole thing is now com-
municated via DOD Form 1801
flight plan. The 1801, aptly enti-
tled the DOD International Flight
Plan, is used for all flights out-
side the loc al areas of Army air-
fields in the European area. The
Army Flight Operations De-
tachment (AFOD) which
monitors all U. S. Army aircraft
in the Benelux countries - Den-
mark, Switzerland, Austria ,
Germany, and France - will
send out all required PPRs on
your request. However , since
you may be unusual traffic to
some foreign airfield, PPR all
22
stopping points not only as a
courtesy but as a precaution.
Actually, flying across friendly
borders poses no difficulty but you
will not want to become an inter-
national embarrassment. There
are two steps to take to avoid mis-
takes in this phase. First , check
the AP/2, Area Planning,
Europe-Africa-Middle East under
National and/or FIR UIR Proce-
dures and see what special infor-
mation is needed for crossing.
Don' t " bust" across the border'
follow the procedures. The second
step, though not required , may
make things a little easier. If it' s
feasible and possible, stop at an
airfield next to your intended
crossing site and check out the
local practice.
It ' s all done now. You call the
CO and are asked about time
and if you have checked the
weather. A quick run to the
weather desk and things look
good. The aerospace environ-
mental prognosticator outlines
all the weather patterns in an
easy-to-understand go/no-go lan-
guage. What happens out of the
jurisdiction of your friendly
blue-suit_ed
Once on the road, your weather
brifing is usually only as good as
you are. A few foreign forecasters
do not speak English and chances
are you won't speak enough what-
ever to get a good briefing. There
is a solution. Be familiar with and
A weather map, station report list and other weather information given to
aviators when they requested weather briefings at foreign airfields . The
forecasters did not speak English. This is the total briefing most cases
Closeup of station reports written in accordance with the METAR code . It is
important to have a TM 1-300, "Meteorology for Army Aviation," to interpret
the reports when there is no English-speaking forecaster available
take along an FM 1-30, " Meteorol-
ogy for Army Aviation. " This FM
explains the only internationally
used weather code, METAR
(Weather Aviation Routine). If
you don't you may be surprised
when you ask for a weather brief-
ing and receive a stack of
weather maps and station re-
ports written in accordance with
the MET AR code. When this
happened to a pilot we know, he
resorted to drawing a picture of
mountains which were in his
flight path. The Spanish weather
forecaster, who was briefing for
a field in France, paused only a
moment and then drew clouds
through the aviator's artwork.
The MET AR code may create
some interesting conversation
until you are accustomed to it. A
flight of three Army helicopters
landing at an airport on the
July 1977
French island of Corsica was
cleared to land with the following
instructions:
"Flight of three cleared to land,
left hand, CA VOK" (pronounced
Cavok).
There was a short pause before
chalk two queried lead on the in-
terflight radio , about what the
controller had said concerning the
Cav. " I think he said the Cav is
ok," was leads reply.
Chalk three added, " I don' t
know what ther got against the
Cav, but there s nothmg in the
Supplement that says we can' t
land. "
Without further hesitation, lead
returned the tower' s call. " Under-
stand flight of three cleared to
land left downwind, and the Cav is
ok."
As it turns out , CA VOK is a
MET AR term meaning the pre-
vailing visibility is 10 kilometers
or greater, no cloud below 1,500
meters (5,000 feet) and no precipi-
tation or thunderstorms reported.
No one said international flight
wouldn' t be enlightening.
International flight planning
and fl ying is certainly one of the
most interesting experiences an
aviator can have. As an aviator in
today's Army, you can probably
count on one aviation assignment
in the United States Army, Eu-
rope. The tour will present many
interesting challenges and new
learning experiences. Planning
and flying an international flight
may become only a small part of
that tour , a secondary considera-
tion in regard to an assigned mis-
sion. Accomplishing it , however ,
will attest to the professionalism
and resourcefulness of the av-
iator, facing just one of the many
challenges of Army aviat.ion to-
day.
GLOSSARY
APU
Cbs
CO
DOD
FCG
auxiliary power
unit
Cumulonimbus
commander
Department of
Defense
Foreign Clear-
ance Guide
FIR/UIR flight information
IFR
IP
METAR
region/ upper
flight information
region
instrument flight
rules
instructor pilot
weather informa-
tion routine
NA VAIDs navigational aids
PPR prior permission
S-2
SIP
required
intelligence of-
ficer
standardization
instructor pilot
TM technical manual
USAREUR United States
VFR
VIP
Army, Europe
visual flight rules
very important
person
23
Army Avia
AtA G
Hatch stagefield (1) is the scene of
primary program training in the
TH-55 Osage. All TH-55 first solo
flights are flown at Hatch. Hanchey
(2) provides base field support
maintenance for the initial, entry
rotary wing (lERW) program, home
field for 100 TH-55s. Hanchey also
supports the CH-47 Chinook ad-
vanced helicopter qualification
(AHQ) and instructor pilot (IP)
course and the CH-54 Tarhe IP
course. Goldberg stagefield (3) is
where the Department of Graduate
Flight Training (DGFT) operates
AH-1 HueyCobra and CH-47 IP qual-
ification courses. Ech stagefield (4)
bristles with IERW qualification fly-
ing in UH-1 Hueys, below. Left, an
AH-1 performing nap-of-the-earth
(NOE) operating in the area of
Tabernacle stagefield.
on Center
Inee, II
July 1977
25
Pitot-Static Pitfalls
Barry Schiff
Trans World Airlines, Captain
Reprinted from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (ADP A) Pilot
AN ACCIDENT investigator
from the National Transportation
Safety Board claims that many
more fatalities are caused by
pitot-static icing than is possible to
determine.
With resigned frustration , he
adds, " We often accuse a pilot of
disorientation and loss of control
when we know instinctively that
the accident was really caused by
erroneous flight data resulting
from blocked pitot-static lines .
But the ice usually melts before an
investigator arrives at the crash
site and the proof is gone forever. "
A spectacular example of such
an accident occurred in 1974 when
a Northwest Airlines Boeing 727
was being ferried from New
York' s JFK International to Buf-
falo, NY. Although the aircraft
was cleared to FL310 (31,000 feet) ,
the ill-fated jetliner never reached
its assigned altitude. At 24,800
feet , the trijet entered a spin and
crashed only 83 seconds later (the
average rate of descent was more
than 17,000 fpm).
Were it not for the voice and
flight data recorders salvaged
from the strewn wreckage , it
might have been inconceivable to
conclude that such a disaster was
caused by a simple, yet lethal
overdose of pitot icing. But that ' s
exactly what happened. And if a
professional airline crew flying an
elaborately equipped aircraft can
fall victim to such a terminal fate,
then so can the lone, general avia-
tion pilot flying a less sophisti-
cated machine.
The [Boeing] 727 pilots were de-
ceived by erroneous airspeed in-
dications. Because of ice-clogged
pitot probes, both airspeed indi-
cators behaved like altimeters
and responded only to changes in
altitude (for reasons explained
later). During the climb, the lAS
(indicated airspeed) increased
26
steadily and persistently. This
urged the pilots to raise the nose
farther in an attempt to arrest
what appeared to be a danger-
ously fast airspeed. The action re-
sulted in an increased climb rate
which compounded the problem.
As altitude increased, so did indi-
cated airspeed. The pilots con-
tinued to raise the nose until they
had unwittingly forced the air-
craft to stall.
There are three lessons to be
learned from this accident:
Always adhere diligently to
appropriate checklists. (The 727
crew failed to turn on the pitot heat
even though this item was on their
taxi checklist.)
When various instruments
disagree, initially believe the one
that indicates the most adverse
condition. (Apparently, both arti-
ficial horizons in the 727 indicated
properly at all times and reflected
the dangerous 30-degree pitch
angle prior to stall. )
Distrust instruments that indi-
cate performance beyond the
capability of the aircraft. (Near
the top of the 727' s abbreviated
climb, the pitot-static instruments
indicated a continuous 5,OOO-fpm
climb at an lAS of 340 knots, a gen-
erally impossible feat unless the
airplane is caught in the violent
updraft of a thunderstorm " chim-
ney. " )
We should not, however, be too
quick to criticize the 727 crew for
not recognizing their problem.
Contradictory instruments can be
totally bewildering.
During subsequent experiments
in a simulator, several profes-
sional pilots were subjected to
similar flight coliditions and in-
strument indications. More than
half of them fixated on the errone-
ous airspeed indicator while ignor-
ing the properly functioning arti-
ficial horizon.
Surprised? You shouldn' t be.
When a pilot takes his first flying
lesson, he begins to develop the
deep-seated habit of observing
and reacting to airspeed indica-
tions. The lAS gauge becomes his
primary key to survival. Later, he
is introduced to the artificial hori-
zon, a relatively complex device
that is more subject to mechanical
failure than the simpler, more re-
liable airspeed indicator. It is little
wonder that - in a pinch - pilots
revert to airspeed.
Figure 1 is a diagram of the
pitot-static system typical of most
general aviation aircraft. Its pur-
pose is to provide static (ambient)
air pressure to the altimeter, ver-
tical speed indicator (VSl) , and
airspeed indicator as well as to
provide pitot (ram air) pressure to
only the airspeed indicator.
Many pilots are of the impres-
sion that two static ports (one on
each side of the fuselage) are pro-
vided for system redundancy. Not
so. Otherwise, considerate air-
frame manufacturers also would
provide a backup pitot tube be-
cause this item is most prone to
icing, for example. Dual static
sources are necessary and
equalize (balance) pressure vari-
ations that occur on both sides of
the fuselage when the aircraft
yaws (such as during turbulence) .
To determine the effect of hav-
ing available only one static
source, for example, I enlisted the
aid of noted aviation attorney
Robert Cleaves. In addition to
owning a Cessna 185 that would be
ideal for simulating various types
of pitot/static difficulties, Cleaves
is an experimental test pilot.
Prior to our first flight, we
placed masking tape over the
right-hand static source. During
the subsequent climb, all instru-
LEFT RIGHT
MAIN STATIC LINE
I COCKPIT I
ALTERNATE
STATIC
SOURCE
PETCOCK
STATIC SOURCE STATIC SOURCE
Figure 1
ments functioned normally, using
air pressure from the left-hand
static source.
After leveling at 4,000 feet ,
Cleaves alternately stabbed at the
left and right pedals at which
times the three pitot-static in-
struments behaved erratically.
Why they did so is not mysterious.
During a yaw to the right , the
only operational static source (on
the left ) was turned partially into
the relative wind. This allowed the
airstream to blow into that static
port which increased the pressure
In the static line and was inter-
preted by the altimeter in this in-
stance as a loss of 400 feet. Also,
the VSI indicated a substantial
sink rate and the indicated
airspeed dropped 15 mph. (The
behavior of the lAS is explained
later.)
Conversely, during a yaw to the
left , the open static source was on
the " downwind" side of the fuse-
lage and sensed a decre ase in
pressure. As a result , the altime-
ter rose, the VSI indicated a climb
and the lAS increased.
In turbulence, the three instru-
ments were extremely sensitive
and fluctuated wildly between
high and low indications.
July 1977
Should all three of these gauges
act similarly during a normal
flight , the odds strongly favor that
one static port is clogged. By yaw-
ing the aircraft and observing the
readings , a pilot can determine
which of the .two static sources is
plugged. \
Prior to a second flight , both sta-
tic sources were covered with tape
to simulate heavily iced static
ports. During the takeoff roll , ev-
erything seemed normal. But dur-
ing the climb from sea level to ap-
proximately 5,000 feet , the VSI
remained at zero and the altime-
ter insisted we were still on the
ground. The lAS gradually de-
creased from 90 mph at sea level to
about 60 mph at 5,000 feet even
though attitude and power settings
remained constant.
Since the static sources were
sealed at sea level, sea-level pres-
sure was trapped in the static lines
and prevented the VSI and altime-
ter from sensing an altitude
change.
Totally blocked static sources
are extremely hazardous. Without
an altimeter, how can a pilot exe-
cute an IFR (instrument flight
rules) approach or maintain an
assigned altitude or remain clear
... au
e z
:::::i
PITOT TUBE
of obstacles?
At such a time, a pilot has two
choices. The most obvious one is to
use the alternate static source.
This is simply an extension of the
main static line that is routed into
the cockpit to where it is within
reach of the pilot. This tube is
.sealed with a petcock so that
cockpit air cannot normally enter
the static system. However, when
the normal static source is
blocked, the petcock can be
opened to introduce cockpit air to
the static instruments. Since the
air pressure in an unpressurized
cabin is nearly the same as the
ambient pressure outside the air-
craft , this restores reasonable ac-
curacy to the pitot-static instru-
ments.
These instruments , however,
will not be quite as accurate as
when the normal static source is
used because ambient pressure in
the cockpit varies slightly with
airspeed, attitude and the posi-
tioning of ventilation controls.
When the vents are open, for
ex am pIe , air rushing in to the
cockpit tends to pressurize the
cabin. This increased pressure is
sensed by the altimeter as a lower
altitude. Closed vents, on the other
27
Pitot-static Pitfalls
hand, often result in cabin air hav-
ing slightly less pressure than the
air outside and results in a higher
than true altitude indication.
When using the alternate static
source during an IFR approach,
open the vents fully, no matter
how cold it is outside. In this way,
the altimeter probably will read
lower than true, a safeside error.
Unfortunately, many light
planes used for IFR are not equip-
ped with alternate static sources.
This is ludicrous. When pilots can
spend thousands of dollars on elec-
tronic redundancy, it is totally il-
logical for them not to invest 40
bucks to install an alternate static
source and provide a backup sup-
ply of static air for the single most
important IFR device: the altime-
ter.
Lacking an alternate static
source, a pilot with an ailing static
. system has an emergency alterna-
tive : break the glass on the face of
the VSI. Doing so allows cabin air
to flow into the instrument and
then through the normal static
system plumbing to the altimeter
and airspeed indicator. But when
breaking the glass, try to do so
without damaging the needle.
Cleaves ' 185 has an alternate
source. So, with the normal static
ports still sealed at 5,000 feet , the
petcock was opened and all three
instruments sprang to life. After
the needles stabilized, we closed
the alternate source which
"froze" the static system at 5,000
feet. As the flight continued, there
was no way to detect gradual al-
titude changes . A subsequent
steep, intentional descent was de-
tected only by a significant in-
crease in airspeed and noise level.
As we leveled off a few hundred
feet above the Pacific, the altime-
ter and VSI were still at 5,000 feet.
Many pilots contend that if icing
conditions are so severe as to clog
up the normally ice-free static
sources , then unusually heavy
structural icing would have
created an earlier emergency.
This is not always true because
static sources are subject to other,
28
more insidious forms of icing.
Take, for example, a pilot who
flies after a recent rain or after his
aircraft has been washed. Water
droplets and/or condensation in
the static lines will freeze after
climbing to a sufficiently cold al-
titude - in VFR (visual flight
rules) or IFR conditions. Bugs ,
dirt , wax and blowing sand are
other culprits that attack the
credability of the static system.
These latter items can partially
clog a static' system, a particu-
larly hazardous condition because
the symptoms are difficult to de-
tect and vary according to the de-
gree of blockage.
To simulate this condition, we
retaped the static ports and poked
very small holes in the tape to
allow only a restricted flow of sta-
tic air pressure to the instruments.
During the climb, we noted that
the altimeter and airspeed indi-
cators were lagging and indicated
less than true values; also, the
VSI indicated less than the actual
rate of climb. This was because
the static pressure outside the air-
craft changed faster than could be
sensed through the pin-pricks in
the masking tape used to cover the
larger static ports.
After leveling off, the instru-
ments slowly caught up and indi-
cated correctly.
The danger of partially blocked
static lines was accented during
descent: the lAS was higher than
actual , the lagging altimeter indi-
cated higher than actual and the
VSI indicated less than the true
rate of descent. We were deceived
into believing that we were safer
than we really were.
One way to combat this problem
is to temporarily open the alter-
nate static source at least once
during every IFR descent., If the
needles move significantly when
this is done, a static pressure pro b-
lem exists and the alternate
source should be used during the
remainder of flight.
Figure 2 is a simplified diagram
of the airspeed system and is use-
ful in analyzing lAS errors result-
ing from partially/fully blocked
pitot-static air sources.
When ram air enters the pitot
tube, it flows into a sealed dia-
phragm within the airspeed indi-
cator housing that expands with
increasing pitot pressure. It is the
expansion and contraction of this
diaphragm that causes the
airspeed needle to move. The ram
air entering the pitot tube actually
consists of two types of pressure:
the static or ambient atmospheric
pressure of the air surroundmg the
airplane and the dynamic pres-
sure of the air caused by forward
motion.
To prove this , consider an
airplane at rest. Static air pres-
sure enters the pitot tube and the
diaphragm. Since the diaphragm
is filled ~ static air pressure, why
doesn' t It expand? Because static
pressure - from the static ports -
enters the case of the instrument
and surrounds the diaphragm.
Since the pressure inside the dia-
phragm is then equal to the sur-
rounding pressure, the diaphragm
is " relaxed" and indicates zero
airspeed. (For the airspeed indi-
cator to work properly, static air
pressure must be allowed to enter
the case of the instrument to coun-
teract the static - not the
dynamic - pressure that enters
the diaphragm through the pitot
tube in flight.)
Assume that an airplane is in a
steady climb during which the en-
tire pitot tube freezes over with
ice. The air in the diaphragm is
trapped. But , as the climb con-
tinues , the static air pressure sur-
rounding the diaphragm de-
creases . This reduction in sur-
rounding pressure allows the
diaphragm to expand and causes
the lAS to increase even though
the actual airspeed remains con-
stant.
Conversely, during a descent
without pitot pressure, the static
pressure in the instrument case
increases and compresses the
diaphragm resulting in a de-
creased lAS.
In this manner, the airspeed in-
dicator behaves like an altimeter
and was the problem encountered
by the 727 crew mentioned earlier.
Many pitot tubes are provided
with a drain hole (see diagram) to
allow water to leave the system.
Assume that the main pitot en-
trance is clogged but the drain
hole remains clear. What then?
Static pressure then only will
enter the diaphragm through the
drain hole, pressure exactly equal
to the static pressure surrounding
the diaphragm. As a result , the
diaphragm "relaxes" and the lAS
drops to zero.
To prevent icing, pitot heat
should be used at all times when
flying in visible moisture. Also,
turn it on before takeoff if there' s a
chance that taxiing through a
puddle might have splashed the
probe.
Frequently check the operation
of the pitot heat on the ground by
ALTERNATE r J 4 ~ . . . I
STATIC
SOURCE
July 1977
NORMAL
STATIC
SOURCE
feeling the pitot probe. But don' t
grab it. A properly operating heat-
er will heat the tube sufficiently to
burn the unwary. Also check the
tube - before every flight - for
foreign matter that might clog the
works.
Unless the static source of an
airplane is loc ated on the pitot
probe, an iced-over pitot does not
affect altimeter and VSI indica-
tions. A static system that is not
free and clear, however, does af-
fect lAS even when the pitot is
clear.
Assume the static ports are
blocked during a climb. As a re-
sult, static pressure surrounding
the diaphragm does not decrease
Figure 2
as it should. The diaphragm,
therefore, cannot expand as much
as it should and the lAS indicates a
lower reading than it should.
Conversely, during a descent
the static air pressure surround-
ing the diaphragm does not in-
crease as it should. Resultantly,
the diaphragm expands more than
it should and the lAS indicates a
higher reading than it should.
When a pitot or static source be-
comes impaired, the instruments
can present a bewildering display
of flight data. The best prepara-
tion for such an emergency is to
understand the system and know
how to interpret its messages .
--.I
- DYNAMIC PRESSURE + STATIC PRESSURE = PITOT PRESSURE
- STATIC PRESSURE
The DIGEST thanks the AOPA Pilot for
permission to reprint Barry Schiff's article. It
appeared in the November 1976 issue of the
AOPA Pilot
TO ELECTRICAL
SOURCE
x
PITOT
~ PRESSURE
(DYNAMIC RAM AIR
PRESSURE PLUS STATIC
PRESSURE)
29
JEWS
OM
ADERS
timely articles and information.
The U. S. Army Aeromedical Re-
search Laboratory (USAARL) is
queried regularly about the hazards of
static electricity and Nomex uniforms.
I'd like to p8ss on some tips that have
proven useful .
Master Sergeant Bill Bailey' s article
on " Static Electricity," mentioned
static electricity buildup in uniforms ,
but did not provide a remedy except
grounding. Since Nomex should only
be washed and neverdrycleal)ed, it is a
simple task to add a fabric softener/
antistatic agent to the final rinse
water. If dryed in a dryer, one of the
spray or paper impregnated softeners
should be added. The result will be a
uniform that is relatively free of static
electricity. Unfortunately, commer-
cial or quartermaster laundering does
not provide this protection.
Captain Dan R. Popham' s article,
" Army Aviation Gas Mask," was very
disturbing. It upset , especially, those
who have and are struggling so hard to
urge the development of an aviation
specific gas mask. Aviators wear
helmets , night vision goggles ,
helmet-mounted sights and a plethora
of other special equipment that pre-
vent rapid donning of any available
standard or " converted" ground Sol-
dier' s gas mask. The ABC-M-24 Mask
is a get-me-down-and-no-more! To be
operationally effective , you must
know you have a cloud of noxious stuff
to fly through so you can trade off
control of the aircraft with your copilot
while doffing your helmet and donning
your mask. Incidentally, the helmet ,
night vision goggles , etc. , now need
refitting to fit over the mask straps.
CPT Popham makes the statement
that , " .. . The ABC-M-24 protective
gas mask can be used effectively and
safely to ensure the survivability of
aircraft and aircrewmen .. .. " He is
correct and quite candid in his listing
of the deficiencies of this mask in the
aviation environment. But I submit
that these deficiencies are so serious
that they represent a distinct threat to
mission accomplishment and even
influence safety during crisis situa-
tions. These deficiencies make certain
missions, i .e., medevac hoist missions,
30
impossible. Inadequate depth percep-
tion and visual distortions and restric-
tions make station holding and preci-
sion hover movements difficult. The
hoist operator has a lite on the end of a
cable and he can' t afford visual errors .
The nausea and headache problem
described by CPT Popham, as well as
high " drag" or resistance to respira-
tion make use of the mask by aircrew
and by medevac patients hazardous ;
especIally, above 5,000 feet MSL
regardless of the AGL. We have a long
way to go! I am disappointed that CPT
Popham' s one statement implies that
the M-24 satisfies Army aviation
safety and mission requirements . The
rest of his candid article does not
support that ,tatement.
COL Stanley C. Knapp
Dir, Bioeng & Life Spt Equip Div
USAARL
Ft. Rucker , AL,36362
Sir: .
Flight instruction must be ap-
proached with the attitude that avi-
ators have unique strengths and
weaknesses and because of this we can
learn from them as well as teach them.
We as instructor pilots are essen-
tially the same in experience and
ability as other Army aviators. Our
only added asset is that we have
learned the techniques and methods of
instruction. But there is more to it than
just knowing the techniques and
methods .
Good flight instructors must possess
qualities other than flying ability and a
Method Of Instruction certificate.
Each must have a sense of responsibil -
ity, infinite patience, and an agreeable
personality. But an individual may be
a superb pilot, possess the aforemen-
tioned qualities and still not be able to
instruct.
In our day-to-day dealings with
aviation matters, it is not enough to
know the parts of the aircraft , the
maneuver requirements and the
pilot's name. We are dealing in
personalities as well as effective flight
instruction.
We were taught in training not to
exceed aircraft limitations or our own
capabilities. It was constantly stres-
sed to exercise sound judgment ,
maintain patience and use the positive
approach. Experience has taught us to
develop perceptions into insight and
teach from the known to the unknown.
All these techniques and concepts are
ours to employ, something we have
control over. What about the one point
we cannot control ? That's right - the
other guy-the aviator with whom we
are flying.
The human element is the weak link
in the flight instruction process . No
amount of explanation, demonstra-
tion, practice, or review will work if
the aviator is not receptive. Per-
sonalities fall into many different and
complex categories too numerous to
mention. It is important to realize that
due to unique personalities the be-
havior of aviators differs in given
situations. Conscientious flight in-
structors, learning from the aviators
with whom they fl y, eventually will
realize this .
1 have modified Murphy's Laws
somewhat and included them as
" Hartwick' s Axioms." They represent
some of the absolute feelings I have
experienced as a flight instructor.
No aviators are so predictable or
reliable that at one time or another
they won't do something completely
unpredictable.
In any given flight situation, any-
thing that can go w.rong will go wrong.
Left unattended, these thin'gs al -
ways go from bad to worse.
With the possibilfty of se ve ral
things going wrong, the one that will go
wrong will be the one that does the
most damage.
.If e verything seems to be going
well , you have obviously overlooked
something. .
.If you can remain calm in all the
confusion, you obviously don' t under-
stand the situation.
Our ultimate objective concerning
instruction is to identify with the
individual personality so that the
aviator' s behavior can be conditioned
to respond appropriately for any given
situation.
As a result , our responsibilities as
flight instructors are much greater
than often realized. No two aviators
are alike and the same approach or
method of instruction will not always
be effective . This is when we must
become flexible and adapt our teach-
ing techniques to fit each aviator.
Effective instruction can only occur by
analyzing the aviators and remember-
ing that they are individuals with
unique personalities. If we fail in our
responsibility to identify with the
a viator ' s personality, all the instruc-
tion in the world will not produce the
desired results of training.
Unfortunately, some instructors
view training as nothing more than
repetition and critique. They can tell
you what is wrong, what caused it , and
how to correct it. But sometimes this is
not enough. Sometimes the reason for
error is totally unrelated to the ma-
neuverorthe act of fl ying. This implies
that the instructor must have an in-
sight into the aviator's psychological
makeup.
Currently, instructor pilots receive
an introduction to psychology during
the academic portion of their training
and this helps them realize that each
person is a highly complex personality
and must be handled as a unique
individual. But the real test is the
actual application.
Take the opportunity as often as
possible and observe other aviators
while you are flying with them.
Develop your understanding of human
behavior by a continuous application
of the techniques of instruction and
above all observe the paraphrase of
the Golden Rule - teach others as you
would like to be taught.
Sir:
CW2 Dwain Hartwick
Warrant Officer Advanced
Career Course
Warrant Officer Career College
Ft. Rucker, AL 36362
In December 1970 General Dy-
namics submitted a proposal for an
air-launched missile for attack
helicopters . The proposal was submit-
ted 7 months after the U.S. Army
completed its project analysis con-
cerning air-to-air combat for attack
helicopters. Both the proposal and the
project analysis supported the feasi-
bility of arming attack helicopters
with an air-to-air weapon capability.
Vietnam, which had served as an
active environment for the develop-
ment of new systems for helicopters,
was in its final phases. One of the more
demanding tests of airmobility in a
high threat environment came in the
spring of 1971. The assault into Laos
demonstrated the helicopter' s sur-
vivability. However, a threat exists
today that was not present then - the
threat of air-to-air conflict.
The current threat which supports
the need for an air-to-air capability has
received superficial notoriety. The
Mi-24 Hind represents an awesome
threat for those who may have to face
it on future battlefields. According to a
Czechoslovakian aviation magazine it
was " .. . designed on the basis of
technical specifications similar to the
S-67 BLACKHAWK. "
The Soviets have embarked on a
costly program which has brought its
helicopter inventory to a figure of
approximately 2,500. This has been
accomplished in a relatively short
period of time w.ithout benefit of
testing their product in a combat
situation. Instead, they could easily
capitalize on the success of the
helicopter demonstrated by the U.S. in
Vietnam.
July 1977
It is readily accepted that the Soviets
train using tactics similar to tactics
used by the U.S. It is also readily
accepted that Soviet helicopters can be
expected to use similar employment
techniques. One of the more obvious is
the use of weather to increase surviva-
bility.
Weather historically has been a key
factor in the outcome of battles.
European weather has and will con-
tinue to dictate how the battle will be
fought. Current U ~ S field manuals
emphasize that , " adverse weather
reduces visibility also reduces the
effectiveness of attack helicopters ;
however, low ceilings may favor
attack helicopter employment. "
Further " extreme weather conditions
may limit the use of attack helicop-
ters; however, close air support , both
enemy and friendly , will have been
severely limited or terminated long
before helicopters are forced to stop
flying. "
What kind of weather phenomena
can we expect in Europe? According to
the U.S. Air Force Weather Service,
ceilings of less than 200 feet , with
visibility of less than 1f2 mile, can be
anticipated between 0300-0800 hours
from 28 to 32 percent of the time during
the months of September and October.
The preceding paragraph outlines a
" worst case " example of flying
weather. Ceilings of less than 1,000
feet , with visibility of less than 2 miles ,
can be encountered fJom September
through March from 17 to 38 percent of
the time.
European weather will favor
employment of attack helicopters,
U.S. and Soviet. High performance
aircraft will present a minor threat to
attack helicopter operations while the
helicopter versus helicopter threat
will be a significant one.
Unlike the Soviets, Army aviators
are restricted by regulation in flying
during periods of limited visibility.
Even rpore significant is the limjted
exposure of U.S. aviators to European
weather phenomena. The Soviets can
well be expected to capitalize on this
advantage. It is also within the realm
of reality that they would capitalize on
developing an air-to-air weapon sys-
tem to defeat an opponent who lacks
the defense.
The most effective system to defeat
the attack helicopter threat is a system
which can operate under the same
weather conditions, over the same
terrain, have the same characteristics
concerning flight maneuverability,
and, most importantly, have the
appropriate weapon to engage and
destroy the enemy.
Until the combat developments
community can justify a need for an
air-to-air weapon system, comman-
ders have a responsibility to fill the
gap. It is essential to train crews to
defend themselves against possible
attack by other helicopters. Training
should include procedures for crew-
members to maintain visual alertness
for enemy helicopters and evasive
maneuvers should be practiced. Hope-
fully an adequate defensive weapon
system will be fielded before it is
realized in a combat situation that we
ar' behind our enemy in the field of
helicopter weapon technology.
Sir:
MAJ Robert C. Knight
U.S. Army ROTC Instructor Gp
. Norwich University
Northfield. VT 05663
In the March 1977 issue of the
AVIATION DIGEST, your article
" Minimizing N-PER-REV Vibra-
tions ," page 34, contained the follow-
ing statement : " The techniques de-
scribed used on every approach would
definitely reduce mean time between
failures. ' ,
Unless I'm mixed up you want to
EXTEND or lengthen time between
failures .
What is your opinion?
Carl W. Strever
Chief, Aircraft Section
Fort Lewis Maintenance Division
Fort Lewis, W A 98433
You are right. We want to EX-
TEND-not reduce-time between fai-
lures. That's what the introduction to
the article should have stated.
Sir :
Kudos to the U.S. Army Aviation
Center! Major Thomas' article on
training literature, "New Horizons
Revisited, " Nov 76 gives me the
opportunity to laud the Center' s efforts
in effective use of the print medium.
The Aviation Center was one of the
first to implement the new approach to
presenting training information. The
staff has leatned quickly and its
products are among the best being
published.
The team concept for production is
being proven valid by the Aviation
Center. The team' s professional at-
titude and pride in work could well
serve as an example to other prepar-
ing agencies. The reader of the new
manuals may never understand the
effort necessary to bring the latest
information in a readable , usable
format , but I'm sure he appreciates it.
LTC Paul B. ' Minton
Ch, Training Literature Div
Ft . Eustis, VA 23604
31
JUST ANOTHER INCIDENT?
The direct cause, of course, was
was being operated at an altitude insufficient to
clear all obstacles in the area. But let's back up a bit.
Before departing on the final leg of the cross-country
flight, the flight commander had no indication of
possible problems, and he neglected to plan in ad-
vance for some contingency. Consequently, he did
not give his flight an updated briefing - an omission
that was to strongly influence his decisions during
flight.
When the flight initially encountered light rain and
a lower ceiling, the flight commander probably felt
justified in electing to follow the highway. Although
he had not updated his VFR sectional map to show
all the wire hazards present, he had flown this route
approximately a month earlier and knew of them.
He also knew the highway led to their home field
where the weather conditions were known to be
VFR. In the absence of any other plan, he made his
first decision.
However, shortly afterwards he was forced to
make a second one - to continue following the high-
way or to go IFR. At this point of the flight, weather
was obviously deteriorating and ceilings lowering.
Visibility was restricted and haze prevented use of
searchlights. Already, Chalk 5 decided IFR was the
answer and had gone that "route." The other air-
crews also felt that they should execute inadvertent
1M C procedures, but did not do so bec ause of a strong
feeling that the "integrity of the flight" should be
maintained. Although the copilot of the lead aircraft
felt strongly that they should proceed IFR, exces-
sive radio traffic prevented him from trying to con
34
vince the flight commander to take this course of
action.
Once again, a lack of prior planning influenced the
flight commander's decision. He knew they were
about 40 miles from their destination where weather
conditions were VFR, but he was uncertain as to
whether or not all the pilots in the other aircraft were
instrument qualified and current. Consequently, he
elected to continue following the highway - a deci-
sion that resulted in the wire strike.
Mter the mishap occurred, he was left with one
final decision: land or continue. He knew the terrain
was extremely hazardous. This, coupled with the
near-total darkness and poor visibility brought on by
the inclement weather, resulted in his decision to
continue flight after he ascertained the aircraft was
responding normally - a lucky guess.
What would you have done under the same cir-
cumstances? Obviously, a long-winded discussion
with pros and cons could readily develop. But the
real point is not so much the course of action the
flight commander in question elected to take but
rather that the major decisions would have already
been taken care of had thorough planning and brief-
ing of all the pilots been accomplished - before the
flight. One portion ofthe recommendations concern-
ing the mishap makes this pointquiteclear: " ... That
commanders ensure all aviators are familiar with
all requirements in AR 95-1, with special attention
given chapter 4, paragraph 4-1, c, e, i - 'preflight
action for all flights will include a careful evaluation
of the following: appropriate charts and maps, al-
ternate course of action if flight cannot be completed
as planned, and routes, obstructions, hazards and
equipment requirements.' "
Another recommendation admonishes flight lead-
ers and aircraft commanders to insist on radio dis ..
cipline so that meaningful transmissions can be
aired.
In conclusion, we may note a touch of irony. Along
the route followed by the flight of aircraft, high ten- .
sion lines cross the interstate highway at 14 points.
Only one - the fourth set of wires - is depicted on
the current VFR sectional map. That was the set the
aircraft struck.
L Y at treetop
mergency which
ca1'lSesl't!'._llete or partial power
loss ertainly result in
the into the trees
be! rat or's manual
emerg cedures can be in-
itiated. arion F. Standridge
recently eived the Broken
Wing A for the way he dealt
with a pa power loss at treetop
level. US VS 1 inter-
viewed Mr. e t6 find out
how he successfully coped with the
situation. I'
July 1977
USAAA VS: Tell us about your
emergency and what your reac-
tions were.
STANDRIDGE: We were.cruising at
90 knots and 50 feet above the trees
on a UH-IH training mission when
I noticed a decrease in engine
noise and a substantial decrease in
engine and rotor rpm. At the time
of this indication, the student pilot
was on the controls and we were
over tall trees and rugged terrain
with no available landin'g area to
our right, left or front. I took ~ h
controls and my initial reaction
I KNEW THAT WAS THE POINT OF NO RETURN
CW3 Marion F. Standridge graduated
from flight school at Fort Rucker in
July 1969 and was assigned to Viet-
nam. He then trained Vietnamese
student pilots at Hunter Army Air-
field for 2 years. He is presently with
the 14th Company, U.S. Army Avia-
tion Center, Fort Rucker, AL, with
primary duties as an IP for the De-
partment of Undergraduate Training.
was to roll the throttle back on,
because I have had students get
tense on the controls and reduce
the throttle. This failed to correct
the situation, so I then started
trading off airspeed for altitude. I
slightly reduced collective pitch,
but rpm continued to decrease and
the needles remained joined.
When engine rpm reached 6000
and rotor rpm about 295, I knew
that was the point of no return. The
only alternative was to either
regain rpm or go into the trees. I
then put the governor switch into
the emergency mode but still
didn't get any immediate reac-
tion. So I further reduced collec-
tive and the rpm slowly started to
increase. Once rpm reached 6400,
I flew to the nearest field and,
fortunately, landed without
damaging the helicopter.
USAAAVS: Did the aircraft yaw
when you first noticed a loss of
rpm and engine noise?
STANDRIDGE: Not enough that I
could tell. However, the student
pilot could have automatically
corrected for it.
USAAAVS: Did you look at your NI
speed?
STANDRIDGE: No. I was too close
to the trees to worry about N I, but I
did look at the rotor tachometer
and primary instruments.
USAAA VS: Did you or the student
switch the governor on?
STANDRIDGE: I did, eventually.
When I initially brief my students,
I always tell them that if we should
get an indication of engine failure
during terrain or NOE flight to put
the governor switch in the
emergency mode as soon as I tell
them. However, I had just picked
up this student and failed to brief
him on this technique. So when I
told him to go to emergency, he
instinctively reached for the
transponder.
USAAA VS: Did you roll the throttle
to the flight idle position?
STANDRIDGE: Negative.
USAAAVS: Did you have any surg-
ing of the engine?
STANDRIDGE: None.
USAAAVS: You stated there was a
lag before the governor took
effect. Did you increase or de-
crease the throttle to get the rpm
back into range?
STANDRIDGE: I think it was prob-
ably a combination of both. I still
had a small amount of power in the .
system and when I went to
emergency I reduced the throttle
slightly because I thought I would
get an overspeed. The rpm sort of
hung where it was so I decreased
the collective a little more and
rpm started increasing with pitch
and throttle application.
USAAAVS: When you have a fuel
control failure and lose power, the
N I turbine speed decreases. When
you go to emergency governor and
minim urn fuel flow there is an
initial lag while the Nt turbine
regains it speed. For this reason,
an overspeed or overtemp will not
occur' immediately if the throttle
is not in the flight idle position. As
the N I regains its speed, it will be
necessary to reduce the throttle to
control the N I speed and prevent
an overspeed. That' s the reason
for the curiosity about your N I
speed. Also, a delay in the aircraft
regaining rpm can be expected
when the Nt has been reduced
significantly. If you are going to
lose the engine and possibly the
aircraft it won' t make a bit of
difference if you get an overspeed
or overtemp.
You mentioned you tell all your
students to be prepared to go to the
emergency governor if there is an
indication of an engine problem at
NOE altitude. I realize this is not
in the dash 10. What do you base
this on?
STANDRIDGE: IP technique and
the fact that if the engine fails you
are going down anyway. Right?
But if you still have partial power,
you have a chance to salvage the
aircraft.
36 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
USAAAVS: Is this standard proce-
dure among your entire training
branch or is it just something you
do personally?
STANDRIDGE: Well , it should be
standard but it is just one of my
personal techniques.
USAAAVS: In your opinion, do you
feel that switching to the
emergency governor position
should be standard procedure for
power loss while in the NOE
environment?
STANDRIDGE: Why not ? If you
have a low-side governor failure,
you have a chance of salvaging the
aircraft , whereas if it is an engine
failure you are going down any-
way.
USAAA VS: Since you fly every
day, do you believe this would be a
justifiable emergency procedure?
STANDRJDGE: Definitely.
USAAA VS: Do you feel you were
actually flying NOE or contour?
STANDRIDGE: We were terrain
flying at 50 feet above the trees.
USAAA VS: Fortunately, you
weren' t flying NOE and had
airspeed you could trade for al-
titude to provide the needed time
factor. If you had been flying at 40
knots it would have been a dif-
ferent story.
STANDRIDGE: We would have
probably gotten at least some
blade strikes:
USAAA VS: First of all , there is less
ability of the system to maintain
altitude at 40 knots as opposed to 80
knots. If you lose power at 40
knots , you w ~ actually experi-
ence a decrease in altitude be-
July 1977
cause you don' t have enough
airspeed to trade for altitude.
How much time would you say
elapsed from the time you first
detected a failure until you were
once again in controlled flight ?
STANDRIDGE: It ' s going to be a
guess because it was hot and
heavy after I decided what was
going on. I'd say no more than 6
seconds. That is from the time that
I rolled the throttle back on and
decided that it wasn' t an error on
the student' s part.
USAAAVS: You said you were at 90
knots when the emergency oc-
curred. What was your airspeed
once you were back in control ?
STANDRIDGE: About 60 or 65 knots.
USAAAVS: So you traded off about
30 or 35 knots.
STANDRIDGE: Like you men-
tioned, at NOE you don't have that
airspeed to trade off.
USAAA VS: Did you lose any
altitude or were you still at
approximately 50 feet after the
aircraft was brought under con-
trol?
STANDRIDGE: Try about half of
that.
USAAAVS: A very important fac-
tor here is that in low-level flight ,
pilots are taught to maintain at
least 90 knots . If you ever have
engine failure at 50 knots during
low-level flight you' re going in the
trees. Would you agree with this?
STANDRIDGE: I definitely would.
USAAAVS: The salvaging factor
for you is that you had airspeed to
trade off, which gave you that
element of time necessary to
effect an emergency procedure .
STANDRIDGE: Had we been at 50
knots and by the time I realized
what was going on, we would have
probably made a successful au-
torotation into the trees.
USAAA VS: Then you feel that ,
more or less, the key that allowed
you to recover the aircraft was
your airspeed plus you were
mentally prepared for what you
would do in the case of a failure ?
ST ANDRIDGE: Well , as soon as I
realized that it was not the student
pilot, I checked out the trees.
When the airspeed reached 60 or 70
knots and the rpm got down to the
bottom of the green, I was
prepared to go either way.
USAAAVS: One of the important
things we are trying to point out
here is that you mentally prepare
your students so that in the event
of a failure you have crew
coordination and the students
know what you expect them to do.
This is very important for success-
ful recovery during an
emergency. If you had never
talked to the students and only had
5 or 6 seconds to react , you know
there is no way for them to
understand what you are talking
about.
ST ANDRIDGE: This particular stu-
dent is like all students who aren' t
briefed. Whefi you say emergency,
they instinctively go to the trans-
ponder . But as I said earlier, I had
failed to brief him.
USAAAVS: Well , there may be a
conflict in the student' s mind
because one of the emergency
procedures requires that you
switch to the transponder. That is,
of course, if time permits. So this
has to be made clear to the
students before NOE or terrain
flying.
STANDRIDGE: The dash 10 con-
tains about eight emergency pro-
cedures which aren' t applkable to
terrain flying and especially NOE.
I think that chapter 40f the dash 10
should be reviewed and proce-
dures incorporated for terrain and
NOE flying.
USAAA VS: Thank you, Mr. Stan-
dridge. ';j;t, l
37
' 38
f 1 D i ~
USAAAVS
Don Heyden
Fixed Wing Branch, Maintenance Engineering Division
Directorate for Maintenance
U. S. Army Aviation Systems Command
DOES THE SIGHT or sound of the word EJECT
cause a queasy feeling, or one of uncertainty?
Granted, very few OV-l flight crews look forward to
an ejection, but with few exceptions, the 78 Army
crewmembers who have ejected successfully will
tell you they would not hesitate to eject again. Use of
an ejection seat is a mental attitude based upon
equipment knowledge and recognition of the need to
eject. A negative mental attitude could prove fatal.
Take that ejection seat you Mohawk crews have
been sitting on for all those hours. Have you thought
much about it? Do you really know how it works?
Could you recognize a malfunction and be able to
take responsive and proper corrective action? The
ejection seat isn' t nearly as complicated as the air-
craft or mission equipment you operate each day.
But when it's time to eject, you will be better pre-
pared if you have symptomatic recognition and pre-
conceived corrective actions mentally recorded for
timely use.
The improved MK-J5D ejection seat is a relatively
simple device which has been proven by extensive
testing to be very reliable when activated within its
design capability. The single most important act you
can perform is that of recognizing the need to eject;
the lower your flight altitude the quicker the decision
to eject must be. A general rule of thumb would be:
"In controlled flight " the decision can be delayed
until reaching 5,000 feet above the terrain. However,
" in uncontrolled flight " the decision should be made
immediately. The 5,000 feet of altitude will allow
ample time to initiate ejection remedial action,
should it ever become necessary. However, before
you can take remedial action, you must better un-
derstand the equipment and its performance
characteristics. Therefore, let ' s briefly review the
principal devices used and their design functions.
DROGUE GUN: The drogue gun ballistically ex-
tracts the drogue parachute from the ejection seat
head-box one-half second after ejection.
DROGUE CHUTE: Stabilizes the ejection seat in
preparation for main parachute deployment and
forcibly withdraws the main parachute from the
pack.
TIME RELEASE MECHANISM: Releases the oc-
cupant restraint points and allows the main
parachute to be extracted by the drogue parachute
system at a safe altitude and airspeed. These func-
tions occur one and three-quarters of a second after
ejection below 14,000 feet.
BAROSTAT: A five-stack metal aneroid which
. senses altitude and, by expansion, blocks the time
release mechanism gears from operating until the
seat has descended through oxygen-deficient al-
titudes.
MANUAL OVERRIDE: The linkage which, when
manually activated, will mechanically release the
occupant restraints , ballistically cut the main
parachute withdrawal line, and allow manual de-
ployment of the main parachute should the time re-
lease mechanism ever malfunction. The manual
override system can also be used for emergency
ground egress or water ditching.
Ejection posture is very important for a back-
July 1977
injury-free ejection. Back injury (Le. , a small chip
or crack on the edge of the vertebrae) is caused by
the vertebrae coming in contact with one another as
a result of body dynamic slump induced by the ejec-
tion forces. The more nearly vertical the spinal col-
umn, the greater the spacing between vertebrae,
and the lesser the probability for back injury. There-
fore, the shoulders and head should be positioned
full -back against the seat when the appropriate fir-
ing handle is pulled. Introduction of the rocket-
assisted MK-J5D ejection seat, with its attendant
lower ejection G forces , greatly reduces the poten-
tial for an ejection back injury.
Improper harness adjustment is the greatest con-
tributing factor to an ejection back injury. The
natural tendency is to overtighten the vertical ad-
justment straps, causing the spinal column to be-
come bent forward and thereby predisposing the
spinal column to compression injury. Therefore, pay
particular attention to adjusting the harness before
flight. Adjustment should be accomplished in a seat-
ed position. Pull down on each vertical adjustment
strap until a slight pressure is felt across each shoul-
der. Check fitting numbers on each adjustment
strap for uniformity and future fitting reference.
The new fitted parachute/restraint harness was
designed to eliminate the potential for spinal bend-
ing due to improper adjustment. Initial fitting of the
sized harness was performed by knowledgeable per-
sonnel, but their efforts can be negated by changes in
body size and/or addition of flight clothing under
the harness. Therefore, always be conscious of the
basic fitting principle " shoulders full back with a
mild snug feeling across the shoulders. " If the har-
ness feels too tight, find a buddy with the next larger
size harness and try it for fit. If it feels and looks
proper, order a new harness. A new harness is
cheaper than the loss in duty time which could result
from an unnecessary ejection back injury. Re-
member, also, the harness release fittings should be
positioned so the inertia reel "loop strap" holds the
shoulders against the back cushion when you are
sitting full back in the pre-ejection position. Adjust-
ing the release fittings will position the " split roller
yokes" so they are not too low nor too high, alleviat-
ing discomfort across the base of the neck.
The ejection seat lapbelt also plays a significant
role in reducing ejection back injury. We are all
39
EJECT
familiar with lapbelt crash restraint, but on the ejec-
tion seat the lapbelt also provides lower body re-
straint so the torso cannot slide forward nor slip
under (submarine) the belt during the ejection
dynamics period. Lack of positive lower torso re-
straint will allow bending of the lower back and loss
of separation between the vertebrae during ejection
G loading. A simple method of determining proper
lapbelt fit is to try scooting your buttocks under the
adjusted lapbelt. If you can move, more tightening
of the lapbelt is required.
Now let's narratIvely accomplish a moderate al-
titude ejection for performance characteristics and
remedial action review. The first and most impor-
tant knowledge for the ejection is your altitude.
Without knowing your altitude at the time of ejec-
tion, you are guessing from the very start.
PRE-EJECTION PHASE: Alert your crewmember
of the need to eject, and jettison the overhead hatch
(time permitting). The vast majority of OV-l ejec-
tions are through the hatch, so don't hesitate if time
is critical (i.e., low-level or uncontrolled flight). The
ejection handle to be used is dependent upon the
flight condition and the "ejection-decision-
altitude." Activation of the face blind requires ap-
proximately 2 seconds more than the lower firing
handle. Therefore, the quickness of the lower firing
handle activation is recommended for takeoff, final
approach, and/or low-level type ejections. The near-
ness of the lower firing handle to the hands is very
important in G force ejections caused by out-of-
control flight. Under the influence of G forces, phys-
ical control of the arms is greatly reduced and grasp-
ing of the face blind handle is difficult and time-
consuming. .
Crl>od pre-ejection body position can be assured by
forcing your body back into the seat by pushing on
the rudder pedals (observers push against the
floor). Don' t worry about your feet or legs. They will
be forcibly pulled back against the seat bucket for-
ward edge by the leg restraint lines and because of
the "knee-bending" action caused by the upward
acceleration of the seat. Press your head and shoul-
ders firmly against the seat cushions, and pull the
firing handle.
The occasion could arise which would require rud-
der and hand control of the stick during the pre-
ejection phase. Under such aflightcontrolcondition,
the lower firing handle should be pulled with the free
40
hand. Here, too, as the seat begins to rise, the leg
lines will pull the feet towards the seat bucket for-
ward surface, a complementary action to the knee-
bending motion. The extended arm and hand holding
the control stick will come to a rest position across
the leg thigh area as a result of the natural shoulder
motion induced by the vertical accelerations and
will be G-force-restrained as the seat exits the
cockpit area. If you are ejecting at 200 knots or fas-
ter, both hands should be used to initiate the ejection.
In this case, the wind blast caused by the aircraft
speed will cause " flailing" of the arms if they are not
restrained by gripping the wrist of the hand used to
pull the lower firing handle or by using both hands to
pull the face blind.
SEAT FAILS TO EJECT: The most probable cause
for this condition is failure to pull the face blind to
full out. This could be the result of being too timid so,
when pulling the face blind, be sure to press your
body firmly into the seat , and use your shoulders as a
pressure point for forcibly pulling the face blind. If
pulling the face blind fails to initiate ejection, retain
the face blind with one hand, grasp the lower firing
handle with your free hand, and pull upward. Do not
release the face blind once it has been pulled because
wind blast will " flail" the face blind. This can cause
injury or possibly foul the drogue parachute de-
ployment. Pulling and releasing the lower firing
handle will not cause any problem because of the
limited firing cable " run-length."
DROGUE PARACHUTE FAILS TO DEPLOY/ IN-
FLATE: This is the first occasion for knowing the
altitude above the local terrain at the time of ejec-
tion. The first half second after initiation of the ejec-
tion is beyond recollection by almost everyone who
ejects. Your first perceptible feeling should be that
of a stabilized upright falling, with a decelerating
positive G force in the seat-of-your-pants caused by
the inflated drogue parachute or the opening jolt of
the main parachute. If your first perceptible feeling
is that of tumbling, do not panic. Count to five. If the
tumbling continues, and your ejection altitude was
greater than 4,000 feet above the local terrain, in-
itiate a manual override and separate from the ejec-
DROGUE CHUTE
(In hauslnl)
DROGUE GUN
MAIN PERSONNEL CHUTE
tion seat. After separating from the seat, continue
holding the I ft parachute riser up near the pack
with your left hand, grasp the ripcord handle with
your right hand and pull hard. This two-handed act
is required b cau the parachute is free to move
and the parachute pack ripcord pins and D-ring
handl require a restraining force to allow them to
be removed from the pack.
If your jection wa initiat d below 4,000 feet
above the local terrain, initiate th manual override,
but pull th ripcord concurrent with the twisting
parachute removal act while you are still in the ejec-
tion seat. Remember , the parachute D-ring cannot
deploy the parachute unl ss th parachute pack ha
been pulled free from it towed position on th eat
back. This is a very risky m thod for main
parachute deployment, and should be used only for a
malfunction at low altitude.
MAIN PARACHUTE IS NOT EXTRACTED BY
DROGUE PARACHUTE: A with a malfunction of
the drogue syst m, knowledge of th altitude at the
time of ejection is e ential. Below 14,000 feet th
main parachute should be extracted by th drogu
July 1977
RELEASE
parachute within 2 econds from th ejection initia-
tion. The initial ejection events are occurring so fast
that your first perceptible recollection may be the
drogu decel ration forces or the opening jolt from
the main parachut inflation. When the drogue
parachute d ploy , the ejection at will stabiliz in
an upright position and you will feel the drogu de-
celeration force . If this condition is ever exp ri-
enc d, and your ejection wa initiated below 14.000
feet , do not panic. Once again count to five , and if
the main parachute still has not deployed, initiate a
manual override in accordance with previously dis-
cus ed procedures.
HIGH-ALTITUDE EJECTION: An ejection above
14 ,000 feet pre ents orne variations to the
aforementioned remedial actions. If an ej ction i
necessary at high r altitudes , it is critical that you
know your altitud abov sea level. During a high-
41
EJECT
altitude ej ction, the baro tat will block the
running-gears on the time reI a e mechanism,
thereby pr venting deployment of the main
parachute until the set altitude is .. descended
through" by the seat and occupant. The de cent will
be stabilized by the deployed drogue parachute be-
cause the drogue sy tem operates without regard to
altitude. Each ejection seat occupant will produce
minor differences in the descent characteristics of
the drogue-stabilized ejection eat. The usual
characteristic of an MK-J5D drogue-stabilized de -
cent is that of a rocking chair motion. Occasionally,
after a long descent from 30,000 feet, a spin may
begin due to aerodynamic forces acting on the seat
and occupant profile area. If a spin does begin, do not
panic. Attempt to control the spin by extending one
foot away from the edge of the seat or extend an
elbow away from your body. Do not release your leg
restraints and do not release your handhold. If the
face blind was used for the ejection, move it to one
side so you can ee, but do not I' lease it because of
the windflailing previou ly discussed. The drogue-
stabilized ejection seat will descend at ~ rate of ~
proximately 150 feet per second. Therefore, dunng
the drogue de cent from high altitude, check your
watch for a point of reference. A one-minute (9,000
feet) or two-minute 08,000 feet) drogue descent is
very worrisome for the person who does not have
confidence in the ejection eat automatic feature .
Consequently, know the ejection seat characteris-
tics and the prescrib d emergency procedure .
A malfunction of the drogue ystem at high al-
titude is recognized by the tumbling and unstable
characteristic previously discussed. If this mal-
function occurs, initiate the manual override proc -
dures with deliberate action. Staying with the tumbl-
ing and spinning ejection seat for an extended period
is not recommended due to the pos ibility of loss of
consciousness caused by reduced blood flow to the
brain induced by the unstable descent. Do not at-
42
tempt to deploy the main parachute while still
seated under these un tabl conditon b cause the
chute can possibly foul on the seat structure, and
inflation could be blocked. Therefore, accomplish a
total separation from the eat before initiating the
parachute D-ring pull as Rr viously described. .
The basic design of the jection at mam
parachute sy tem is not compatible with 10.ng fre
fall sky-diving techniques. During free fall. the
parachut ' pack will trail behind approximately 2
feet as a result of the parachute ri er extensions
which conn ct to the canopy release fittings located
on vour parachute harness. DOD test jumpers have
stated that the fibergla s pack is 0 aerodynami -
cally un table that it " flail about your body" to the
extent that injury could result. Therefore, alway
grasp the left ris '1' near th pa'k with your left hand
before exiting the eat during a manual override .
Rem 'mber to hold tightly to the riser b cau e wind
blasttdrag will tend to pull the pack out of your grasp
when it is I' moved from the eat-back assembly.
Additionally. loss of the ejection seat emergency
o.' ygen at high altit ude necessitates deployment of
the main parachut in a timely manner. After main
parachut deployment , a tate of semiconsciou ne s
may be experienced due to lack of oxygen at the
higher altitudes (20.000 fe t and higher), but full
consciou ne s will be restored as the inflated
parachute descend through the lower altitudes.
A malfunction of the time relea e mechanism at
altitud L the most difficult to detect correctly.
Under the stress of ejection, the relation hip of real
time is 10 t. Seconds pas like minutes , and minutes
pa like hour . Therefore, if a malfunction of the
time release mechanism is suspected during
stabilized descent above baro tat release altitude,
do not panic. Count out loud to 30, or check your
watch for a 30-second lapse of time. If the main
parachute till ha not deployed, initiate the manual
override procedures previously discussed. Even
better, if you mentally recorded the altitude of cloud
lavers. this information can be used for reference.
'DUAL EJECTION: Ejection from a Mohawk above
barostat release altitude produces the condition for
an unneces ary manual override. The barostat is an
assemblv of ten metal di CS, soldered into five cap-
sules. Therefore, each baro tat has a performance
variation. Consequently, any two barostats installed
on any two ejection seat will release the time re-
lease mechanism "running-gears" at a different al-
titude. A maximum of 1,500 feet difference could
exist between the two barostat assemblies. To
demonstrate this normal characteristic, suppose
two Mohawk occupants eject simultaneously at
14,SOO feet. Most probably one barostat will block the
time release mechanism "running gears" and pre-
vent deployment of the main parachute. The baro-
stat in the other occupant's time release mechanism
could be pressure altitude retracted, thereby allow-
ing deployment of the main parachute. Conceivably,
this deployment of the main parachute could be wit-
nessed by the other crewmember, who has not yet
reached the release altitude of the barostat installed
on his time release mechanism. Under the stress of
ejection, or because of unfamiliarity with ejection
seat system characteristics, an unnecessary man-
ual override could be initiated as a result of normal
tolerance variances. If you should ever experience
this condition, do not panic. Count to 10 before initiat-
ing corrective action. The normal rate of descent of
the drogue-stabilized ejection seat (ISO feet per sec-
ond) will allow the loss of about 1,500 feet during the
act of counting.
Another characteristic of ejecting from the
Mohawk i that of rocket motor exhaust inside the
cockpit. During MK-JSD qualification testing, the
condition of one occupant ejecting while the other
remained in the cockpit was successfully dem-
onstrated without injury to the live occupant who
remained in the cockpit. The ejection seat rocket
motor ignites after 63 inches of seat travel up the
catapult gun. Therefore, the ro.cket exhal}st is .di-
rected downward into the COCkPIt area. ThIS deSIgn
characteristic causes the cockpit to become filled
with nontoxic smoke, but tests showed this smoke
will clear in a very short time and never obscures the
cockpit instruments. However, if such an ejection
were to occur at night. the remaining occupant
would temporarily lose night vision due to the rocket
motor flash. Therefore, should the situation ever
arise where the observer ejects unintentionally dur-
ing flight, close your eyes to maintain night vision
and protection from cockpit dirt. Additionally, hold
your breath for a short time to prevent inhaling the
rocket exhaust during the initial period when the
exhaust is the greatest.
LOW-LEVEL EJECTION: This ejection condition
requires the quickest decision and reaction of any we
have discussed. During the takeoff/climbout and
approach/landing spectrums of flight, a mental pre-
paredness must be established to decrease the time
to initiate the ejection. In low-level ejections, time is
the essential factor necessary for a successful ejec-
July 1977
tion escape - time to recognize the need to eject,
time to pull the ejection handle, and time for the
ejection seat automatic functions to occur. Under
de cending flight conditions, time represent a loss
of altitude, and under unstable flight conditions,
such as torque-roll or wing stall, time represents a
loss of altitude caused by unusual attitude. Two of
these time factors are within your control: (1) Rec- ...
ognizing the need to eject and (2) initiating the ejec-
tion in the most rapid manner (i.e., lower firing
handle.)
A significant portion of this article has been ad-
dressed to emergency corrective action procedures.
These procedures have been cited to. fill. a p o s s i ~ l
void in ejection escape knowledge WhICh IS essentIal
to positive reaction. The information presented has
been consolidated from experiences of test person-
nel and the escap system technical community.
Think about what's been said here and discuss it with
your buddies. Above all else, mentally experience
the characteristics and the happenings for ready
reference if ever required.
The ejection seat in your Mohawk has been in-
stalled and maintained at great expense to the
Army. The true value of this investment is in your
hands. Know when and how to use it. Establish your
own preconceived conditions for ejection escape and
verify your decision points, using the MK-JSD per-
formance envelope presented in the OV-l Operator's
Manual. Throughout the evolution of ejection seats,
statistics have shown over and over again that the
single most contributing factor to fatalities has been
delaying the decision to eject until essential time/al-
titude was no longer available for successful
parachute recovery.
For more information on the MK-J5D ejection seat,
contact Mr. Don Heyden, USAAVSCOM, AUTOVON
698-3015, commercial (314) 268-3015. ~
43
A ACCIDENT TO TEST A PREACCIDENT PLAN
simulated accident and were
asked to conduct themselves as
though an actual accident had oc-
curred. Security was set up by the
police and a rescue unit from the
fire department responded for the
casualty in the rear of the aircraft.
The rescuers were told only that
the crew chief had a severe head
injury and before losing con-
sciousness had complained of se-
vere pain in his back. The rescue
unit extracted the injured crew
chief, provided immediate first-
aid treatment , and took him to a
local hospital. Hospital personnel
had been advised that a mock ac-
cident would be taking place and
that they were to simulate the
treatment of the casualty and be
as realistic as possible. The crew
chief " died" about 2 hours after
the crash before boardmembers
could question him.
Within 20 minutes after the
" crash," an aircraft from the
flight activity w as seen in a search
pattern that was part of the unit ' s
pre accident plan. The aircraft
landed and a crewmember came
to lend assistance to the crew of
the downed aircraft. At that point,
unit personnel were told that a
simulated accident had taken
place and to conduct themselves
as though a major accident had
just occurred.
Damaged parts brought to the
scene were laid out in the area sur-
rounding the aircraft. Chalk was
used to mark the aircraft to indi-
cate where structural failure or
major damage had occurred.
Within an hour, two members of
the aircraft accident investigation
board who were full -time person-
nel arrived at the accident scene
and took charge. The exercise was
fully explained to them and they
were told that their actions
throughout the remainder of the
exercise would be observed and
critiqued by the USAAA VS per-
sonnel. The other boardmembers,
who were part-time Guard mem-
bers, were notified at their jobs
44
and called to duty to conduct the
investigation.
Throughout the exercise ,
realism was kept at a maximum.
The crew gave conflicting stories
as to how the accident occurred
and fake witnesses were fur -
nished. Specific damage to the
aircraft was simulated to test the
unit' s investigative ability in the
maintenance area.
Several hours later , when the
required actions were completed,
the exercise was moved from the
accident site to the aviation flight
acti vity and the board recon-
vened. The crewmembers of the
" crashed" aircraft were called on
individually to explain the occur-
rence of the accident. The exercise
was carried through to the com-
pletion of the DA Form 2397 series
(Technical Report of U.S. Army
Aircraft Accident).
All of the aircraft accident in-
vestigation boardmembers from
two aviation activities within the
state were brought together the
following day and the USAAA VS
personnel conducted 8 hours of
classroom instruction.
Specific areas covered were:
Interpretation and explana-
tion of regulations that govern air-
craft accident investigations .
Proper completion of the DA
Form 2397 series report.
Proper security markings and
handling of documents to be in-
cluded in the accident report.
Diagramming of the crash
site.
Proper methods of photo-
graphing the crash site and other
physical evidence.
Proper methods of interview-
ing crewm mbers and witnesses.
In vestiga tion techniques .
Emphasis was placed on the im-
portance of a thorough preacci-
dent plan.
Police and fire departments in
all towns within a I5-mile radius of
the flight activity or in the re-
quired crash rescue plan area
should be thoroughl y briefed on
Investigation boardmember questions witness
at crash site
Boardmembers inspect tail rotor for damage
Photos by SSG Gary Huff, Ilinois National Guard
Accident investigation boardmember questions pilot and copilot at crash site
the preaccident plan.
Crash rescue posters for each
type aircraft used by the unit
should be furnished to all police
and fire stations to familiarize
them with the aircraft.
Joint Service Booklet No. 1,
" What to do and How to Report
Military Aircraft Accidents ,"
should be given to all . civil au-
thorities to keep in their
emergency vehicles.
Letters of agreement with the
coroner or medical examiners of
the surrounding communities
should be signed to avoid con-
fusion in the disposition of casual-
ties and the destruction of tox-
icological evidence through inad-
vertent or premature embalming
of bodies.
Letters of agreement with
July 1977
ho pitals in surrounding com-
munitie should be signed or hos-
pital personnel should be briefed
on requirements to contact and/or
coordinate with the military when
they receive casualties from a
military accident.
Unit commanders should have
actual eye-to-eye contact and
briefings with the officials and
agencies listed in the pre accident
plan, especially within the sec-
ondary crash alarm system, e.g.,
actual training of the photo-
grapher who would be on call in
the event of an accident so he
would know the requirements for
photograph to b taken.
Requirements and availability
of support equipment i.e. , light-
ing, cranes, heavy trucks, heavy
transportation equipment , and
other items that may be needed in
the course of the investigation,
should be considered.
The underlying theme of the en-
tire cla was that the worst time
to prepare a pre accident plan is
when an accident has just oc-
curred. After the 8 hours of in-
struction, all participants were is-
sued certificates of course com-
pletion. Member of the Illinois
ARNG and USAAA VS felt the
program had been extremely
worthwhile and of such value that
the training should be offered
Army-wide, especially to Reserve
Component units. If your unit
needs this training, contact Major
Bill Ross, Education and Evalua-
tion Division, USAAAVS, AUTO-
VON 558-2091/4806, commercial
205-255-2091/4806.
45
Personal Equipment & Re cu / urvival Lowdown
If :you have a question about
personal equipment or
rescue L gear, write Pearl,
USAAAVS, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362
46
n Cylind rand Handwh 1
n ylind rand Handwh el
T.O. 15X1-5-3-4 - Illustrated Parts Breakdown
T.O. 15X3-2-2-1 - Gauge, Low Pressure, Oxygen
T.O. 15X3-2-2-13 - Gauge, Low Pressure, Oxygen -
Overhaul Instructions and Illustrated Parts Break-
down
T.O. 15X5-2-4-1 - Mask, Passenger Type
T.O. 15X5-4-1-101 - Pressure Demand Oxygen Sys-
tem - General
T.O. 15X5-4-4-12 - Field Maintenance Instructions
and Breathing Oxygen Mask, MBU-5/P
T.O. 15X5-4-4-12S-1 - Field Maintenance Instruc-
tions and Breathing Oxygen Mask, MBU-5/P - Op-
erational Supplemental
T.O. 15X6-3-2-1 - A12 Regulator
T.O. 15X6-3-2-24 - A12 and A14 Diluter Demand
Oxygen Regulators , Illustrated Parts Breakdown
T.O. 15X6-3-2-23 - A12 and A14 Diluter Demand
Oxygen Regulators , Overhaul Instructions
T.O. 15X6-3-2-33 - Overhaul Instructions for the
A12A Diluter Demand Regulator
T.O. 15X6-3-13-3 - Overhaul Instructions for the
Pressure Demand Oxygen Regulator CRU-68/A
(same as MD1 )
T.O. 15X6-5-3-3 - Automatic Positive Pressure Dilu-
ter Demand Oxygen MB2 Regulator - Overhaul
Instructions
T.O. 15X6-5-3-4 - Automatic Positive Pressure Dilu-
ter Demand Oxygen MB2 Regulator - Illustrated
Parts Breakdown
T.O. 15X6-5-5-3 - Oxygen Regulator , Overhaul In-
structions
T.O. 15X6-5-5-4 - Illustrated Parts Breakdown for
Oxygen Regulator
Before ordering anyofthe above T.O.' s units must
first procure a distribution code in accordance with
T.O. 00-5-2 by completing AFTO Form 43. Thereaf-
ter, requests for USAF T.O.'s will be submitted on
AFTO Form 187, also in accordance with T.O. 00-5-2.
If further information is required, contact LTC
Frank S. Pettyjohn, M.D. , Chief, Cardiovascular
Medicine Branch, U.S. Army Aeromedical Re-
search Laboratory, Ft. Rucker , AL 36362, or call
AUTOVON 558-5114.
Issue and OX of flight clothing.
I have several questions concerning the direct ex-
change ( DX) and criteria for issue of flight clothing.
The Central s ~ u e Facility (CIF) at my installa-
tion will DX flight clothing only if it is ripped or torn.
Have criteria, other than obvious rips and holes,
been established for the DX of flight clothing?
The new Nomex flight jacket is not being issued
here. When I inquired as to why the jacket was not
July 1977
available, I was told that no Nomex jackets would be
issued until current stocks of the nylon jacket were
depleted. Have criteria been established for replac-
ing the old nylon flight jacket with the new Nomex
jacket?
The lightweight flight jacket is not stocked by our
CIF. Is this jacket not an authorized item for issue in
this area?
The U.S. Army Natick Research and Development
Command conducted extensive tests on the fire re-
tardancy of worn Nomex and concluded there was no
significant loss of fire retardation qualities until a
thickness of 0.012 inches or less is reached at 0.6
pounds per square inch. Realizing that all facilities
may not have the capability to make such a precise
measurement, a field expedient test may be used.
The test consists of pushing a standard ballpoint pen
into a single layer of worn, tightly stretched Nomex.
If the ballpoint penetrates fully and the fabric shows
a tendency to rip instead of separating, then con-
sider the fabric unserviceable. This test is exactly as
indicated, a field expedient. The best procedure
would be for the local issue facility to secure a mic-
rometer and perform the thickness test. Fire retar-
dant qualities of Nomex are seriously reduced by
nonstandard repairs . All repairs must be in accor-
dance with TM 10-8400-201-23.
Issue of the Nomex/nylon jacket is universal on
installations that still have nylon jackets, i.e., the
nylon jackets will be issued until stocks are depleted.
The nylon jacket will provide adequate protection
against thermal injuries when worn over the Nomex
flight uniform. A number of quality control prob-
lems have arisen with the Nomex jacket, thus the
nylon jacket may be more serviceable.
CTA 50-900 lists Jacket , Flyers, Man' s, Light-
weight , as authorized in Zones II , III, and IV. Zone
III applies to your state, but lists only the southeast-
ern portion. Your installation is not located in this
geographical area and is not normally authorized
the lightweight jacket. However, the abbreviation
D, column 5, Type of Allowance, opposite the listing
for the lightweight jacket (page II-47) means that
the jacket may be issued at the discretion of the
installation commander. See Appendix A, Explana-
tion of Terms, discretionary allowances and Appen-
dix B, Abbreviations. ~
47
WHAT'S RTCA?
Well , uh - it stands for Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics.
Aw, come on, what's that all about?
You' re right , it ' s a bunch of $25 words.
RTCA's mission is to advance the art and sci-
ence of aeronautics - through application of
electronics, telecommunications and closely
allied fields. RTCA has an important mission
today - the same mission it has had since 1935.
How do they do it?
They get together the best minds in elec-
tronics and aviation, both industry and Gov-
ernment, to study aviation problems and rec-
ommend solutions. This includes:
Studying existing and proposed systems of
navigation, communications and traffic con-
trol to determine suitability;
Fostering new developments that may be
required ;
And - the real strength of RTCA - serving
as a means of coordinating Government and
industry views on these matters.
This is RTCA's bread and butter - this is
what makes RTCA unique. If there was no such
thing as RTCA, we would have to invent one.
RTCA provides the only open continuing
forum for the exchange of views on technical
matters involving aeronautics, with full par-
ticipation from all parts of the aviation com-
munity.
At an RTCA meeting, whether it is an annual
assembly or special committee, the principle
of allowing all to make their respective con-
tributions applies. Whether you are a manufac-
turer, a consultant, a Government employee,
an operator or whoever - you have a right to
make your input - before the decisions are
made, and before the papers are printed. In-
ternational associates also can stand up and be
heard within RTCA's forum.
48
Think about this a moment - it is important
in two ways. First , from the standpoint of the
individuals and organizations who get to speak
their piece and present their respective view-
points; and second, it is important from the
standpoint of the ultimate users of the RTCA
report because they know that it represents the
views of the total aviation community. So
RTCA's methodology is valid; it is effective.
Hold it,just what does RTCA do for me, the
Army avia tor?
Glad you asked. You know the automatic di-
rection finder (AD F) , VHF omnidirectional
range (VOR), instrument landing system
(ILS) and distance measuring equipment
(DME) systems that you are using during
flight operations? RTCA is responsible for de-
veloping operating characteristics and per-
formance standards for all these systems and
many more used in aviation. The development
and implementation of the National Mic-
rowave Landing System (NMLS) and, in fact,
the present airway system is based upon RTCA
reports. RTCA' s achievements are excellent
examples of cooperative voluntary efforts on
the part of all concerned to work together for
the common good.
RTCA' s slogan is , " Dedicated to the Ad-
vancement of Aeronautics. " In living up to that
slogan RTCA has been helping everyone ,
including Army aviators since the early days of
the radio range up to today, and is looking for-
ward to continuing this service in the future.
Got some questions?
Readers are encouraged to send questions
to:
Director
USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
u.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Aug
Jul
MAJ David H. Price
The Army Aviation Story,
Part XI: ' The Mid-1960's
------- CW2 Joe S. Adams II
- CW3 George H
------ .
K A Good Safety Record
en ned y __ ___ ls_N_ o_ A_c_ci_d_en_t'"?-___ /
Fronk W K
ervin
---
Dec
Nov
1 L T Richard H. Dickinson
The Pilot And The Weather
Forecaster
Dennis R. Brightwell, M.D.
Winning The War On Weight
CPT Brendan P. Blackwell
and
MAJ N.I. Patio
Army Aircraft Survivability
MAJ Alexander Woods Jr.
Combat-In-Cities
Hatchet Man
May
Apr
Mar
Feb
CPT Charles T. Woolwine
Crash Helmet Or Headset
CW3 George H. Kennedy
The Three Cs
LTC Walter Urbach Jr.
Behind The Hind
CPT Ronald Cox
Helicopters In Aerial Combat?
ANNUAL
WRITING
Jun
Dr. Laurence B. Epstein
Army Organic Light Aviation:
The Founding Fathers
AWARDS
Y OU COULD BE a winner if you submit an arti-
cle to the AVIATION DIGEST' S seventeenth annual
writing contest beginning this month. Each monthly
winner will receive a certificate.
A person who does not place first will receive a
certificate signifying that he or she has had an arti-
cle published in the DIGEST. All authors receive
credit in their 201 or appropriate civilian personnel
files.
Three annual winners will be selected from the
monthly first place winners. First, second and third
place certificates will be awarded these winners.
To be eligible for publication in the DIGE ST, an
article must be original and concern Army aviation
or related subjects. Winning articles are selected by
judges who review the manuscripts without bylines.
Selection is based on accuracy, completeness, origi-
nality, readability, soundness, substance and over-
all merit.
Authors should include pictures, diagrams or
charts available or necessary to illustrate manu-
scripts. Your articles should be submitted to Editor,
u.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST, P. O. Drawer P,
Fort Rucker AL 36362.

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Aviation Requirements for the Combat Structure of the Army

UNITED ARMY AVIATION

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