ASSAULT GLIDERS:

A REEXAMINATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College i n partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER O F MILITARY ART A N D SCIENCE

B.A.,

RONALD M. BUFFKIN, MAJ, USA Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, 1985

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1991

Approved for public release; distribution i s unlimited.

MASTER O F MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: M A J Ronald M. Buffkin Title of Thesis: Assault Gliders: A Reexamination Approved by:

- , Thesis Committee Chairman

Member

Member, Consulting Faculty COL Catherine H. T. Foster, Ph.D. Accepted t h i s 7th day of June 1991 by:

Philip J . brookes, Ph.D.

&4

, Director,

Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those o f t h e student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College o r any other governmental agency.

ABSTRACT ASSAULT GLIDERS: A REEXAMINATION by Maj Ronald M. Buffkin, USA 137 pages. This i s a critical examination o f t h e combat glider as used i n World War II. This study uses t h e Market-Garden airborne invasion of Holland i n 1944 to determine whether t h e glider was cost effective as a system o f airborne assault. Cost effectiveness i s determined by comparing glider echelons with parachute echelons. Five elements o f cost contribute to t h e expense of airborne operations. These elements are equipment costs, training costs, assembly-packing costs, pay costs, and recovery costs. A Standard U n i t Equivalent (SUE) provides the common denominator f o r capability of gliders and parachutes. SUES measure combat capability and produce a resultant dollar amount. The more cost effective force i s the echelon with t h e least cost f o r t h e same combat capability on the ground. Gliders, as used on t h e f i r s t day of t h e Market-Garden airborne operation were not cost effective because of high costs, poor recovery, and less combat power delivered compared t o t h e parachute. A cost effective successful glider model i s offered as having value to any consideration f o r f u t u r e glider use.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Major Edwin C . Parrish I I I kept a small model of a glider on his desk when I served as a platoon leader for him i n Task Force 160. Not

far from this model glider, one of the four known remaining CG-4A
gliders sat inside Fort Campbell's post museum. Both gliders captured the character of Parrish and the unit we served in--exceptional,

expedient, and experimental. That unit taught me tn continually apply new ideas to standard ways of doing things. This reexamination of the glider does the same thing with an aircraft I've always been curious about. My curiosity would have remained unanswered except for learning how

to

look

at

problems

differently

in

Parrish's

unit.

For

that

experience,

I'm grateful.

I'm also grateful to many others who have helped me i n this

project. These people are my wife, for her patience and support. Major Brian "B.D." d'Autremont, for introducing me t o the personal computer

and its cost effectiveness, and the exceptional staff of the Combined Arms Research Library who with such dedicated people as M r . Craig Mclean made this easier.
Of

course,

I want to thank the handful of glider pilots, many

authors themselves, who gave me the missing links to my research. To their dedication and wartime courage, I give my highest respect.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

................................................................................................ ... ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................. L I S T OF FIGURES ................................................................................ v i .. LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................. L I S T OF ILLUSTRATIONS ..................................................................... i x
ABSTRACT
Vll

1 1

1 1 1

Chapter

Page

1 INTRODUCTION TO ASSAULT GLIDERS

T h e Research Question D e f i n i t i o n of T e r m s L i m i t a t i o n s of the S t u d y

............................................1

.............................................................. -3 ..................................................................... 6 .......................................................... 11 2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ......................................................... 54 T h e B u t t o l p h S t a f f S t u d y ......................................................... 54 Wolfe's G l i d e r A s s e s s m e n t......................................................... 60 3. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 63 P r o c e d u r e s ................................................................................ 65 D e t e r m i n i n g the C o s t s ............................................................. 70 4. GLIDER AND PARACHUTE ECHELON ANALYSIS ................................ 85 C o s t C o m p a r i s o n s ..................................................................... 102 S u m m a r y of C o s t s .................................................................... 102 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................... 104 A n s w e r i n g the R e s e a r c h Q u e s t i o n ........................................... 104 C o s t E f f e c t i v e S u m m a r y ........................................................... 110 A C o s t E f f e c t i v e A s s a u l t G l i d e r ............................................... 118 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................... 127

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 . 1

1 . 2

Page

.
.

Number of Gliders Employed on 17 September 1944 Glider Student Hours i n Training

................ 4

3.2
3 . 3

.......................................... 29 . Parachute Training Cost (U.S) ............................................... 72 . Parachute Training Cost (British) .......................................... 72

3 . 4

Glider Pilot Training Cost

...................................................... 72

LIST OF TABLES Table CG-4 Production Data Page

.............................................................17

Basic Airborne Course Cost

....................................................56
.............................................
57

Cost of Glider and A i r Training Cost of Equipment i n Divisions U.S.

.............................................. 57 Equipment t o Parachute One Ton................................... 58

Cost per Ton by Delivery Means Standard Unit Equivalents

........................................59

.....................................................68 Parachute Packing Shift......................................................... 76 Glider Pilot Crew .................................................................... 80

Glider Echelon Organization (10 l s t Airborne) 10lst Glider Echelon Reaching Landing Zone

........................84

........................ 87 Organization of 10lst Parachute Echelon............................... 89 Comparison. Glider and Parachute Echelons.......................... 90
Cost per Standard Unit Equivalent

....................................... 91

........................ 92 Results of Glider Echelon (82nd Airborne) ............................ 93 Crew Pay Cost (82nd Airborne) ........................................94
Glider Echelon Organization (82nd Airborne) Organization of 82ns Parachute Echelon 4 1 .0 4 . 1 1 4 . 1 2 4 . 1 3

................................95

. Cost Comparison (82nd Airborne) .......................................... 96 . Cost per Standard Unit Equivalent .......................................97 . Glider Echelon (1st Airborne) ................................................ 98 . Parachute Echelon (1st Airborne) .........................................100
vii

LIST OF TABLES (CONTINUED) Table 4.14 Page

. Echelon Comparison (1st Airborne) .......................................101 4.15 . Comparison of Standard Unit Equivalents ............................102
4.16 4.17 4.18 4.19

. Cost per . Cost per

. Glider

................................................................... 102 Standard Unit Equivalent ......................................118 Model for Cost Effectiveness...................................... 118
Division

. Cost to assault 6,809 by Glider and Parachute ....................120

viii

LIST O F ILLUSTRATIONS l llustration Page

. Two.
One Three Four Five Six

CQ-4A Qlider

.................................................................... 15

Horsa I I Glider

.................................................................. 19
..........................23
................. 24 ....................26

. Hamilcar Glider .................................................................. 21

C-47 Tugs and Gliders Readied For Use parachutists and Gliders Near Grave. Holland U.S. Parachutists with T-7 Parachutes

.
.

............................ 25

Seven Eight

. British Parachutists with X-type

Abandoned CQ-4A i n Holland

Parachute

........................................41

I t is well to remember two things: no weapon is obsolete, and the second of evep greater import--no weapon, whose potential is once recognized as of any degree of value, ever becomes obsolete.
J.M. CAMERON

The National World War II Glider Pilots Association coat of arms was designed by the US Army Instilute of Heraldry. The shield in the center is air force blue with eight s t m at the top denoring the number of World War II campaigns in which gliders were used for combat assoulrs. rescue operations, and resupply attempts. The single star at the base of theshield represents the jive Army Air Forces to which gliders were assigned. The scarlet globe in the center symbolized the worldwide conflict of World War II. and is rwo sections allude l o the glider's employment h both the northern Iatiludes of Europe and thesouthern laliludes o f the Pacific. The silhouetfed glider shown isa Waco CG-4A seemingly in flight aguirw a background o f sky and clouk. Silcnf Wings Mweum.

CHAPTER O N E INTRODUCTION T O ASSAULT GLIDERS Defining The Research Problem Qliders served as an airborne assault system on a mammoth scale. The scope of these operations however, occurred during a brief period when viewed across the expanse of airpower's contributions t o military tactics and doctrine. The assault glider, as defined i n this thesis,

enjoyed a robust, albeit brief, life. This lifespan dawned following the start of World W a r 1 1 . For the United States, gliders rolled off assembly lines t o rank as the t h i r d most produced combat aircraft of the w a r behind the 8-24 bomber and P-51 fighter.l Following the end of the

war, gliders remained an operational technique for airborne units. The last doctrinal mention of assault gliders was in
1952.

The Army's

Airborne Techniques for Divisional Units field manual referred to assault transports employed without engines as gliders.:!
A t the time, powered assault transport aircraft and the successful

combat airdrop i n Korea of troops and heavy equipment edged the glider out of the airborne arsenal. Perhaps the glider's demise was premature when viewed against the competing technologies of the assault transport and parachute delivery of heavy equipment, neither having enjoyed Force

success i n World War II. The newly created United States A i r

committed itself to fielding a durable short take-off and landing tactical powered aircraft to support the Army.
1

The aircraft it picked had

durability,

payload, and the short landing characteristics the Army

needed. By no coincidence, the aircraft was a glider with engines. The CG-20A glider, developed during World W a r I I , became the C-123 assault t r a n ~ p o r t . With ~ equal vigor, the Army pressed for the capability to deliver heavy equipment by parachute. The heavy-drop technique of using cargo parachutes to deliver artillery, vehicles, and some armored equipment was virtually perfected. Many airborne enthusiasts however, argued that limitations i n accurac:y, payload, and the time required to configure heavy loads proved far less a panacea for parachute forces than originally envisioned. The same i s t r u e of the assault transport. The C-123 i s obsolete i n the active force and its replacement, the C-130, although a workhorse, requires relativetly prepared surfaces for operation. What then, of the glider as used i n World War II? Would an assault glider offer any increase i n capability today? Perhaps technology and tactics have advanced enough to overcome the limitations causing the death o f the glider. This study answers these concerns through the window of cost effectiveness. Cost effectiveness i s traditionally one measure o f the success or failure of a piece of

equipment or system. This study goes beyond a simple cost effectiveness review however, by selecting as a model for study an actual combat airborne operation. This model, limited to the f i r s t day o f the largest airborne assault i n history, provides the framework for this study.

The Research Question Were gliders cost effective compared to the use of parachutes as a means of airborne assault on the f i r s t operation? Background to the Research Question During World War II, gliders flew on a scale never seen before with the United States Army's plans to build 36,000 g ~ i d e r s .The ~ scope of the glider's use was planned to exceed the use of parachutes. Each of the Army's airborne divisions initially owned two glider regiments and one parachute regiment, b u t this changed to two parachute regiments and one glider regiment when staff officers discovered that not enough cargo space existed for the troopships moving overseas if the airborne division packed its gliders. regiment i n each airborne I n the interest of economy, one glider division
was

day o f the

Market-Garden

converted

to

parachute

regiment with the stroke of a pen.5 Fortunately, the airborne training pipeline readily provided enough parachute qualified soldiers for the change. Cost effectiveness issues would continue to affect the Army's glider program however. This study uses the Market-Garden operation as the laboratory to study the cost effectiveness of the glider. MarketGarden was selected for several reasons. First, Market-Garden was the largest airborne operation of all

time. The operation, over i t s course, inserted by parachute and glider, more than three divisions behind enemy lines. The operation planned for both glider and parachute echelons to land on drop zones and landing zones i n similar terrain. Although the tactics and strategy of the Market operation have been argued over the years,
3

the f i r s t

day,

as an

airborne operation was an unqualified s u c ~ e s s .As ~ shown i n Figure 1--1, the number of gliders employed on the f i r s t day o f the Market airborne operation provides a large sample from examined. which glider use may

be

MARKET GLIDERS 17 September 1944

120 Hamilcar
13

Figure 1-1. Number o f gliders employed on 17 September 1944 i n Market operation. Number obtained from U.S. W a r Department, Re~0I-t of Airborne Phase. O~erationMarket, 18th Airborne Corps, 17-27 September 1944.

Second,

Market was a combined operation.

The f i r s t

day,

17

September 1944, saw the combined airborne assault of the First Briti:sh Airborne Division, the United States 82nd and 10lst Airborne Divisions, and the corresponding airborne corps headquarters with these divisions. I n assessing the cost effectiveness of the glider, the British use along with the United States' employment on the same operation provides im unparalleled model for study not found elsewhere i n the war.

Thlrd, and most important if this study holds any lessons for the future, i s that Mwket occurred relatively l a b in the w a r ,

By the

summer of 1944, airborne dodrine had matured to a state of confidence by both the troop carrier units and the airborne units. Unlike many earlier fumbled attempts a t airborne assault, Market was the result of valuable combat experience. As such, Market gives this study the combat laboratory needed to assess cost effectiveness. Several assumptions are required to establish the framework for this reexamination of the assault glider.

Assum~tionsReauired of This Studv

1. The Market airborne operation,

specifically the f i r s t day,

i s the

correct sample population for this cost effectiveness study. Only an actual combat operation would provide the credible scenario,
or

laboratory, for this study. The hazard i n selecting only one operation for study however, i s that perhaps the selection i s of the wrong battle. The assumption is that Market best represents a large-scale, successful airborne operation and as such w i l l provide the accurate model for study.

2. This study's use of the Standard Unit Equivalent (SUE) to determine

the value o f a glider's cargo i n relation to a parachute delivered r i f l e squad i s a fair assessment of glider capability for delivering combat power to the battlefield.

3 . The five cost elements used to determine the cost effectiveness of the
gllder accurately represent the major costs of using gliders on the f i r s t

day of Market. These cost elements are assumed to have value when applied to any other study o f the glider.
4.

This study assumes all dollar figures as correct and accurate

assessments o f costs. A three dimensional verification was performed ,on all dollar amounts. First, every dollar figure was confirmed from a

primary source where possible. Second, dollar figures were confirmed by subject matter experts, and these experts are noted i n this study. Finally, the author applied subjective experience to the dollar figures t o be sure they were applicable. Where actual amounts were not available,
it is noted i n this study, and a close approximate i s made.

Definition of Terms
1 .

Assault

glider.

The

assault

glider

is

powerless

aircraft

of

conventional design with inherent f l i g h t characteristics of

powered

aircraft. It i s dependent upon powered aircraft for movement through the medium of a t o w rope. When released for free f l i g h t from any altitude, i t s relatively low wing loading gives it a high gliding ratio and a comparatively l o w landing speed. The successful employment of the glider i s i n direct proportion to the quality o f the pilok7 During World W a r II, United States gliders were classed as Cargo Gliders, hence the designation "CG." The assault glider, as developed during the war, wits heavily armed glider that never made it off the

a squad carrying,

drawing boards. For this study however, all gliders are called assault gliders because of the way they were employed. Gliders i n this study flew i n direct assault upon enemy-held terrain. The accurate term is assault glider and i s used i n this study.
6

2. Parachuta troops (parachutists). Those troops delivered to the combat

area by transport aircraft upon arrival who w i l l jump from tho aircraft

in f l i g h t and conduct a parachute descent into battle.

3. Personnel parachute. The personnel parachute was designed to carry

one paratroop and his individual equipment into battle. The standard
U.S.

personnel parachute for Market was the T-7. The standard British

personnel parachute during Market was the X-type.

4. Landing Zone (LZ). An area of terrain, upon which, gliders w i l l land.

The ideal LZ would be relatively flat, free of obstacles, generally level, and large enough i n size to support the number o f gliders anticipatad
to land there.

5. Drop Zone (DZ).

An area of terrain, upon which paratroops w i l l land. and large

The ideal DZ would be relatively flat, free of obstacles,

enough i n size to support the number of jumpers anticipated to land

there.

Considerations for both the drop zone and landing zone are

similar. The chief difference i s that a drop zone must consider the dispersion o f the jumpers and speed of the aircraft as it passes over the drop zone. A landing zone for the gliders must consider the ground r u n of the glider and the number of gliders expected to use the landing zone. The limitation of the parachute i s that a large number of jumpers requires a large area. Even with current technology, a single parachutist requires an area 300 meters X

300 meters.* This figure is

for peacetime safety concerns. The glider also required a large area for
training, b u t i n combat these dimensions were reduced.

6. Qlider troops. Troops whose primary means o f insertion into battle was by glider. Glider troops did not initially receive the pay or special uniforms that their paratroop comrades received. Although authorized by the time o f Market, those glider troops participating i n Market did not receive glider pay for that operation.
7. Tow and tug. These terms are interchangeable. The cargo aircra~ft,

usually a C-47 aircraft, having the mission to t o w a glider to its release point near the L Z was called a tug. The act of pulling a glider behind a t u g was called towing. During World W a r II, a variety of different types of aircraft were used to "tow" a glider. A most novel concept was that bomb

of using a P-38 fighter aircraft to t o w a glider by the P-38's

shackle. The P-38 could then release the glider over its L Z and the P-38 could provide fighter cover until the glider landed. This concept would have had remarkable cost effectiveness implications if it had been employed. 8. Tow rope. A 300-foot nylon rope used to pull a glider behind a tug. Other lengths of rope were sometimes used, b u t the 300-foot length was standard for the Market operation. The British gliders used a Y-shaped rope o f shorter length usually 150-feet long. The t o w rope deserves mention because it limited the glider's effectiveness. Several gliders

would not make it to Market because of broken t o w ropes. Tow ropes frequently became overloaded or overstressed causing the rope to

break. The normal position o f the glider was to f l y slightly above and behind the t o w plane with slack i n the tow rope. Normally, a w+e communication cable would be wrapped around the
tow

rope for

communication with the t o w plane. 8

The Germans eventually solved the t o w rope problem by developing a r i g i d tow-bar. The r i g i d tow-bar, although requiring a longer time ~ Q P the marshalling and attachment to its glider, problems associated with the t o w rope.
9.

prevented most of the

Market-Garden.

Market-Garden was actually two operations.

Market

was the airborne assault to seize a narrow corridor i n Holland, through which, armored forces would attack. Qarden was the ground armor Market-Qarden became badly and did not meet i t s

linkup and attack phase.

I n execution,

overextended, outnumbered by enemy forces,

objectives. While the tactical failure to follow-up on the initial success

of the airborne assault and the failure of the British 3Bth Armor Corps
to effect linkup raises serious questions, they are not the focus of this

study. Suffice it to record that the f i r s t day, 17 September 1944, was a successful multi-division airborne assault.

10. Cost. Costs i n this study applies to five cost elements of glider and
parachute operations associated with the f i r s t day of Market. Each of these five costs are described i n detail i n Chapter Three, b u t w i l l be briefly mentioned here. a . Equipment costs. This refers to the capital equipment costs needed to outfit the glider and parachute echelons of the three participating airborne divisions. Specifically, this element refers to the glider and personnel parachute end-item costs. b. Training costs. This cost i s a relative value of the training needed t o produce a qualified glider pilot for the glider echelons and the costs to produce a qualified paratroop.

c. Packing-Assembly. This cost element applies to the man-hours needed

to pack personnel parachutes for the parachute echelons and the man-

hours needed to assemble gliders for the glider echelons. d. Pay. Pay costs applied to two distinct elements of paying so1die.r~ associated with airborne operations. For this study, pay for the glider echelons only applies to the base and flight pay of the participating glider pilots. Pay for the paratroopers applies only to the jump pay for the participating paratroops. e. Recovery. This element of costs i s the most critical to this study and most difficult to understand. Basically, every glider not salvaged from the Market operation was a glider that had to be replaced. Similarly, every parachute lost or abandoned was a parachute that had to be replaced. Recovery costs i n this study assume that gliders and

parachutes not recovered had to be procured again a t the same costs used for initial equipping of the parachute and glider echelons.
11. Standard Unit Equivalent (SUE).

This i s the result of a formula to

establish a relationship between costs of using gliders versus the cos'h of using parachutes. SUE i s expressed as a number. I t i s a value i n relation to the 12-man infantry squad for the U.S. forces, and the I'l-

man infantry squad i n the British airborne forces. The SUE i s the resu~lt

of this study's requirement to provide an accurate comparison between

what a glider can do compared to what a parachute can do. The SUE assigns a numerical value to the payloads of the gliders and troc~p carrier aircraft. I t provides the common denominator link for comparison between the glider and parachute.

llmjtations of the Studv This study i s limited to the f i r s t day of Market, 17 September 1944. This single day of operations was not the largest airborne mission, b u t it was the most successful of the Market operation. This study i s

limited to the f i r s t day because the f i r s t day went almost totally according to plan. The subsequent days were plagued by poor weather and the enemy reaction to the operational surprise afforded by the success on 17 September. This study further l i m i t s its reexamination of the glider to the selected cost elements. I n evaluating any weapon or system, many

factors may be used to determine the contributions of the weapon or system. Cost is traditionally one sure measure to determine the value of military hardware. Cost effectiveness evaluations are part of all

development processes i n the military. If this study i s to have future application, then the costs of employing gliders must be considered.

Delimitations of the Studv This study w i l l not include other costs besides the five elements

of cost as defined i n this chapter. This i s both a deliberate and

conscious decision to focus strictly on the significant outstanding costs of conducting the airborne portion on the f i r s t day of Market. The main reason many costs were l e f t out i s because in comparing the parachute and glider echelons, some costs cancelled each other out. For example, whether a infantryman rode to battle via parachute or glider, he still received his base pay. What was unique about his base pay i n the case
11

o f the paratrooper i s that it was boosted by an additional $50 per month

jump pay. The glider soldier did not get this, so the jump pay becomes a cost element. Another significant cost was involved i n transporting all the gliders to England. Once i n England, gliders had to be assembled and transported to their respective staging bases. The troop carrier planes whose mission was to drop paratroopers simply had to f l y to the correct marshalling area and load the jumpers. While the costs of assembly of gliders was significant enough to include, the other transport costs were not. Many of these types of cost elements were inappropriate for this study and were not included. Leadership's impact on the effectiveness of glider and parachute units cannot be discounted. The yardstick for the success o f leadership i s mission accomplishment. Accordingly, both glider and parachute uni% were highly successful, and both were a t various times misemploy~~d, misunderstood, and misguided. The author's review of the history of glider and parachute units uncovered many brave deeds, many heros,

and individuals with a strong sense o f mission for both the glider and parachute units. Senior leadership's vision for the organization i s the name for this infusion of spark, guidance, and support. For this study,

it was recognized that divergent leadership objectives existed for both

glider and parachute units. They w i l l not be included here. Some measure of background i s needed to understand this

study's approach to the cost effectiveness problem. For each of the five elements o f cost, a brief introduction to the elements i s included here to bring the reader to the necessary level of understanding for this study
12

to

proceed. This background w i l l assist i n understanding the nature of

the glider and parachute costs invoived in this study and rraaonr for their selection for inclusion.

Backaround to the Cost Elements Equipping the Airborne Force The United States Glider Proaram Germany provides the backdrop to the United States glider

program. The German's initial success w i t h assault gliders sparked the United -States program. Qermany's program however, was born of i t s defeat i n World W a r I. Following that war, the defeated Germans began building their air force for use i n world W a r 11. The Treaty o f Versailles prevented the Germans from developing powered aircraft for military use. The Qermans however, already sport glider enthusiasts, began toying with the idea of gliders f o r military applications. Since the Germans, by treaty, could not build more

expensive forms o f aircraft, the glider offered them i n the prewar years an economical alternative to more expensive forms of aircraft as well as providing an excellent training tool for pi10ts.~ The German pioneering effort with assault gliders resulted from constraints following its defeat i n World W a r I. Qermany prior to World
W a r II had 186,000 licensed glider pilots compared to only 384 licensed

glider pilots i n the United States. The glider's advantage however, as a combat and cost effective aircraft would wait until its f i r s t successful use i n combat. The Qermans' assault on Belgium i n the early days o f World W a r II would demonstrate the glider's success. 13

The f i r s t assault glider to slip on silent wings i n combat flew during the German's successful assault on the Belgian fortress o f Eben Emael i n 1940 when the Nazi invasion swept across the Low Countries. This well-rehearsed assault by a small group o f Qerman glider-bor,ne troops sparked a race for gliders among the allies. The United Statcs and Britain, shocked by the swift, silent, and stunning Eben Emc~el United Statzs

assault launched a rapid program to develop gliders.

planners however, could not have known i n 1940 that the f i r s t U.S. glider assault in combat was still more than two years away.

Consequently, the U . S .

began its glider program a t a pace preventing

any detailed research and development normally associated with new aircraft. The urgency of the program resulted i n cost overruns and unguided direction. The race was to p u t gliders i n the hands o f troops

for training as soon as possible.

I n February of 1941, U.S. Army A i r Corps General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold directed the start of the glider program. Many different

manufacturers acted on the oppwtunity to make gliders for the Army. Besides aircraft companies, many unlikely candidates for the production of combat aircraft signed up for glider contracts. Furniture factories, piano companies, a casket maker, and a pickle company entered the glider business to produce CQ-4A gliders from common plans.10 Almost 16,000 gliders rolled of assembly lines i n the United Stattss during World W a r II. Most were the CQ-4A glider. (See Illustration One.) This glider i s commonly called the Waco. Waco made 999 CQ-4A gliders,

ILLUSTRATION ONE CQ-4A QLIDER

Reprinted, by permission, from James E. Mrazek, Fighting Gliders of World War I I , (New York: St. Martins's Press, 1977) 105.
15

!.

only a small portion of the total, but as the Waco Aircraft Company of Troy, Ohio delivered the first, the name Waco stuck. Most references to the CG-4A use the term "Waco" to describe the CG-4A, but Waco was the fourth largest maker of the CQ-4A. The CQ-4A designation refers to "Cargo Glider," production model

4. The Army shipped 5,991 CQ-4As to the European Theater of Operaticlns (ETO). Other types were the CG-15A, a total of eighty-seven shipped to the ETO, and eighty-one CQ-13As, also i n the TO. Although both of these gliders were more capable and available during Market, the

literature failed to disclose why these were not used i n Market. Qlider procurement involved twenty-three companies i n ten states for the experimental models and twenty-two companies i n fourteen statas for the production models. Almost $500 million was spent i n the

program.ll gliders.

No quality control measures watched the f i r s t production

to $1.7

Cost per glider ranged from $15,000

million.12 The

production rates had never been attempted before, even by experienced aircraft companies. As an example of some faulty manufacturing, a tragic

t . Louis glider contractor killed the mayor of !st. accident involving a S

Louis, the president of the Robertson Aircraft Corporation and other officials during a demonstration flight. An investigation revealed a

defective s t r u t brace. This negative testimony to the reliability of gliders would plague the program throughout the war.l3 The haste of the glider program and the urgency to begin

training of airborne units resulted i n the uncoordinated purchase of gliders. Table 1-1 shows the various makers of the CQ-4A.

TABLE 1-1.--CG-4A

PRODUCTION DATA

I.
Contractor Ford Wac0 Gibson Commonwealth Northwestern G & A General Ridgefield Robertson

I
Average Cost $14,891 $19.367

Deliyered 2,418 999

$25.785 $24,232 $24,543 $25.144

1.055 950 887 464

I
I

$31,010 $38.209 $39,027 $30.802

1
I
I

1,013 155 147

Pratt, Read

925 216 750 60 433

I
LaisbrKauffmann
I

$29,437 $30,324

Cessna Babcock Timm

1 I

I
$50,906 $51,123

I
Ward $379,457

I
7

National 1 $1,741,889 Source: James E. Mrazek, Fiahtins Gliders o f World W a r I 1 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 19771, Appendix III.

The British Glider Prosram The British Horsa glider has been called t h e "ugly duckling" o f World W a r II gliders and was t h e mainstay o f t h e British glider force during t h e w a r . It was designed with t h e intent of saving critical metals 17

by

drawing

upon

woodworking

industries

not

involved

in

war

production. A specification was issued to the Airspeed Aviation Company, Limited a t Portsmouth for the Horsa. The f i r s t production Horsa flew i n September of 1941, only nine months after the initial specification was issued.14 (See illustration Two.)
Hdl,

The f i r s t prototype Horsas were completed a t Salisbury

London Colney, and then assembled a t Fairey's Qreat West Aerodrome. Remaining prototypes were assembled and test flown at Portsmouth under trials with combat equipmentl5 The plan for Horsa production was for woodworking factories t o produce the Horsa i n sections. I t would then be assembled and &,st flown by Royal A i r Force (RAF) maintenance units. Almost 3,000 were made this way Horsas

w i t h another 700 being entirely

construdxtd,

assembled, and test flown a t the Airspeed factory a t

amp shire.^^ The

Horsa went into f u l l production following the allied invasion of Sicily i n 1943. Test flights i n the Horsa were recorded up to an altitude of 20,000 feet.17 The Horsa was made largely of wood. Examination of its cockpit revealed great woodworker skill. Dual controls with air-brake control levers, tow-release, and trimming wheels were of wood. 18 The main landing gear could be jettisoned. If jettisoned, a nose wheel and shockabsorbing skid took over. Both the Mark I and Mark I 1 Horsa were similar i n appearance. The Horsa was a high-wing monoplane. It had an eighty-eight fcmt

wingspan and a fuselage length of sixty-seven feet. A t the top of its

tail, it was more than twenty feet tall.

18

ILLUSTRATION TWO AIRSPEED HORSA I I

Reprinted, b y permission, James E. Mrazek, F i g h t i n g Gliders of W & War II, (New York: S t . Martin's Press, 1977), 71.

19

Designed to be towed over a drop zone and for parachutis.ts to jump from the glider, the Horsa had two jump doors and firing ports

for the parachutists to shoat a t attacking planes. A loading door was a t

the left front of the Horsa. A jeep could be maneuvered around this door onto the cargo floor. Upon landing, troopers would either cut or blow the tail off the glider for unloading. Because of the need t o recover gliders for future operations however, the Horsa I I hinged nose similar to the CQ-4A for less destructive unloading. The Mark I I Horsa carried twenty-eight troops, a pilot and copilot. Instead of all troops, the Horsa could carry two jeeps, used a

or a 75rnm

howitzer and a jeep, or a cargo load of 7,380 pounds. The Horsa used a Y-shaped t o w rope. The t o w position was above and behind the tug, a ~ i d the Horsa could be towed a t a maximum speed of 160 knots. The Horsa had a stall speed of fifty-eight knots and a glide aspect of 7.2:l. The

Horsa's primary t o w aircraft were the RAF's Albemarle transport and the
U.S.

C-47 transport.19 Although 1,554 Horsas were produced by April of 1943, this was

still not enough. The British were anticipating a production rate of 600 Horsas and 100 Hamilcars during 1943. This was increased to 900 Horsas for 1944 with The twenty-five twenty-five percent percent more extra possible was with a on higher a
U.S.

based

calculation because during 1943, the U.S. a day i n training. The

U.S.

was losing three to six gliders percent above

estimated twenty-five

requirements could cover losses i n trainingS2l Although only thirtesn

t was British Hamilcar gliders were used on the f i r s t day of Market, i

significant. 20

ILLUSTRATION THREE GENERAL AIRCRAFT HAMILCAR

Reprinted, by permission. James E. Mrazek, Fightinn GLiders o f World War 1 1 , (New York: St. .Martin's Press, 1977), 65.

21

The Hamilcar was the largest allied glider as well as the largest
~ Hamilcar was designed wooden aircraft built during World W a r 1 1 . ~The

for the requirement to move heavy vehicles including light tanks during an airborne assault. It had a payload of forty troops or 17,500 pounds of cargo.23 (See Illustration Three.)

The f i r s t Hamilcar was flown on 27 March 1942. Qeneral Aircraft built twenty-two and subcontracted another 390 out to woodworking firms such as the Birmingham Railway Carriage Company and Waggon Company. ~ i m i t e d . Towing ~~ was as the CQ-4A. (See lllustration Four.)

Direct comparisons between the Horsa and the Waco vary i n their description of which was the better glider. S.L.A. Marshall's Night Drop,

chronicles the airborne assault into Normandy and describes the Horsa as "splintering into matchwood" upon landing compared to the CQ-4As remaining "intacLW (See program of the U.S. Illustration Five.) The personnel parachuk provides a greater

and the British however,

comparison between two different airborne systems than the glider does and w i l l be examined next. The United States Parachute Program The Army A i r Corps had managed the parachute program based on the small requirement for parachutes as a safety device for the rare moment when a pilot had to jump from a disabled aircraft. The larger requirement for thousands of soldiers to deliberately jump i n training and i n combat placed strains on an already committed system.25 Three parachute regiments were organized and began training a t F o r t Benning, Qeorgia i n 1942.

ILLUSTRATION FOUR C-47 TUGS AND CQ-4A GLIDERS READIED FOR USE

......

..

----- ...... . .-. :. .-,i...>. . . . .................,.. . .> . ;*-%w ~ ' : ~ ~~~~";;;; 7 f .; ; .: ,, ',, ~$~ i ~,. . . . . . . >..* . _ . .....................................- .... --;::-:+. I - : ...:.... . r .........".. # ,: , ..,;.. . .< .,:.<;,;,: ;,>i::: ,.'.;'el:..? ;.i :".'"' . -~ ........ ..-, . .,:, ! '? , " . : ; . % : . : . : . ....... 7:. 7 . ..3* :. ... : . . .. . . "., ,. . :,.>: jw.+-. -. ., : , : :-.<.'.'+J. : .- .. : . ~. .* ; . :..:.:,..: .. ..;j?.::;, ......:.... , , .,,. . . . ..,..... . . . . . , ,. ,, , . . . . . ............... . i. , ... :.... .. ... . . . . .. .. ,.. ..... ,. .:. .?.. +'>,.-. .... , :: .. . . .
,-.
:. , ,

. I . . . .

5.

--

(2

? : .

'd

_.... .

,..

........
~,

-,

,,

US ARMY Photo, 17 September 1944 23

ILLUSTRATION F I V E PARACHUTISTS AND GLIDERS NEAR GRAVE, HOLLAND 23 SEPTEMBER 194,4

U S ARMY Photo, 23 September 1944 24

ILLUSTRATION SIX US PARACHUTISTS WITH T-7 PARACHUTES AND RESERVES

US ARMY photo, 17 September 1944 25

ILLUSTRATION SEVEN BRITISH PARACHUTISTS WITH X-TYPE

PARACHUTE

US ARMY Photo, 17 September 1944

26

The parachute Issue was based on two parachutes per man. The Army stated this as a requirement for 8,654 parachutes in 1942.2~ (See Illustration Six.) The Irving Parachute Company had contracted with the Army to produce 200 parachutes per week starting i n September of 1941, but fell behind schedule. The Switlick Parachute Company promised 3,750 parachutes by July 1941, 1-5

but was also unabie to meet schedule.27

Finally, parachute production met the demands of the large numbers of soldiers going through jump school. Production schedules were expanded and the parachutes supplied to the units needing them. A modified quick-release harness, based on a German design, resulted i n the

adoption of the personnel parachute the Market jumpers would use, the T-7 parachute. The T-7 was adopted i n December of 1 9 4 3 . ~ ~

The British Parachute Program The British airborne forces used a reliable personnel parachute called the X-type parachute. I t was a silk or rayon canopy, twenty-eight feet i n diameter with a twenty-two inch central vent. The parachute had a relatively shock-free opening and was considered so reliable that no reserve parachute was used.29 So reliable was the X-type, that British airborne forces did not adopt the standard U.S. practice of jumping with a reserve parachute

until 1956. I n fact, when the British made the combat parachute assault into the Suez i n 1956, most elected to discard the reserve parachute and carry more ammunition (See Illustration Seven.)

Training the Airborne Force Training United States Glider Pilots The idea of training glider pilots for the Army started i n 19129 when civilian sport glider enthusiasts tried to integrate glider training for Army pilots. Unfortunately, the Army rejected the idea after

conducting a survey among its pilots.

This survey announced that

introducing gliding i n Army flying schools served "no good purpose."31 World W a r I1 and the Qerman success with gliders brought about the need for a US. glider program so training began i n 1941. The training evolved during the w a r with students initially getting forty hours of training i n light planes before transitioning to gliders. Glider training was conducted a t an elementary glider school first. Following the elementary course, students would attend advanced glider schools scattered across the country.

Initial organization o f the program was poor. Students complained of poor living conditions, and the discipline was either too harsh or tm lax. Many o f the promised promotions never came, or were slower than promised. A lack o f gliders kept many students grounded for long periods of time.32 Many of the glider pilots who flew i n Market trained as part of the Army's 6,000 Glider Pilot program beginning on May 8, 1942. This program followed the 4,200-man glider pilots trained.
A

program and was the largest group of

Staff

directive issued by the Chief of A i r

required 6,000 trained glider pilots by December 31 1942. This directive reduced training time to a total of six weeks.33

TWO type8 o f students entsred the program. A Class A student

was one who had some type of previous flight training or rxprrirnce.

f training to qualify as a Class A student were Examples o f the type o

holding an airman certificate, having 200 or more glider hours,

or

having had a t least f i f t y hours of f l i g h t instruction. Trainees i n the 6,000 program received t h i r t y hours in the f i r s t four weeks on cub-type hours i n two-place powered aircraft. Then they received eight

gliders followed by eight hours on fifteen-place

gliders for a total of forty-six hours. The requirements for the program were for students to be between the age of eighteen and thirty-five and never have been failed i n a course of flying instruction. Aviation

officers o f the Army who were also rated pilots could also apply.34

GLIDER STUDENT HOURS

HRS

Preliminary houn

Phase II

Advanced

Figure 1--2. Glider Student Hours i n Training SOURCE: USAAF Historical Studies Number 1 , The Glider Pilot Trainbg Program 1941-1943. 53.

Unlike the training of paratroops, conducted primarily at Fort Benning, Georgia, eighteen different locations supported glider schoo'ls. Civilian contract pilots operated most of the schools. Perhaps the civilian nature of the training resulted i n a lack of combat training for the glider pilots. This lack of a coordinated effort to give combat training to the glider pilots resulted i n severe criticism of their function on the ground later i n the war. As an example, close to 1,000 glider pilots assembled i n the objective area i n the Market operation w i t h no furthlsr mission than to carry a load of ammunition to the nearest battalion command post.35 The poor focus on ground combat training for the glider pilots is understandable considering how little was known of the glider pilot's e would be part of an airborne unit, and upon completicm role i n 1942. H of his transport mission, take part i n some ground combat. The directive for the 6,000 program specified the ground combat training of the pilots, but provided no resources for the training to occur. Glider pilots expected the majority of the combat training to happen i n exercises wit:h airborne divisions. Doctrine, if not practice, caught up with the role, mission, ar~d function of the glider pilot i n 1942 when more specific guidance was issued. This guidance said the glider pilot was to land safely, expedik the unloading of his glider, secure his glider, and participate i n ground combat only i n "exceptional circum~tances."3~ The contract schools did not have the qualified instructors or facilities to conduct this ground combat training, and the Army's attempt

t o institutionalize such training never reached the level of ground

30

combat training the British Qlider Pilot Regiment achieved. A glimpse into the level of detail provided by the flight training w i l l show that not much time was available for much ground combat training during the flight portions of glider school. The f i r s t thirty hours of instruction was to simulate glider flying as close as possible and was conducted i n light planes to save damage

to the gliders. Given during the f i r s t twenty days of training, flying

skills were devoted to powered off dead-stick landings from 2,000 feet. The landing gave the student a feel for powered-off flight. Five hours of flight training taught the student to make a powered-off approach to a precise point on the ground without using brakes. Students landed to strange fields from 5.000 feet i n daylight and darkness. Dead-stick landings taught the student to judge the

distance and correctly use technique to land safely. Students landed to a chalk mark on the landing field. This training gave the student

confidence and translated to heavier gliders later.

A sixty-hour ground school was also included i n the training. The

course called for twenty days of instruction and used two manuals as basic texts.37 These small manuals served as basic reference for the student. Both of these, T M 1-800, Basic Glider ~ r a i n i n g ~ and * T M 1-815, ~~ the student's instruction. Advanced Glider ~ r a i n i n g , guided Once the elementary phase of training was completed, the glider student attended an advanced course. The advanced course, still part of the six-week total, taught students the finer techniques of handling a glider including more detailed hook-up and towing procedures. Students flew the CG-4A i n this phase, but i n many cases, a shortage of CQ-4A 31

delayed the advanced

phase for

many

students.

Revised training

estimates lengthened the time to train a glider pilot to as long as tan weeks i n some sch0ols.~0 The long wait between elementary and advanced training for some students h u r t morale. Rank structure for glider pilots h u r t morale also, and deserves mention here. Graduates of the glider pilot course with no previous experience received appointments as f l i g h t officers i n the Army
A i r Corps. Flight officers ranked below a Second lieutenant, the Army's

most junior commissioned rank, b u t above enlisted ranks. Those students already holding commissioned rank were allowed to keep it. Future promotion of glider pilots was tied to unit Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) slots i n troop carrier units4' Many glider pilots also received specialized training as glider mechanics. Following an Army report i n early 1943 stating that a t any one time as many as seventy-five percent of the CQ-4As owned by the Arrny were grounded
for

maintenance,

the

Army

established

a technical

inspection system for gliders.42 Failure of the landing gear components was blamed on faulty pilot technique and poor skill transfer from tl?e l i g h t powered aircraft used to train glider pilots. The lack of a long development process for the CQ-4A was also blamed on many of the structure failures. The Army report also alluded to a deliberate deciskn by the Army not to implement further changes to the CG-4A because of the long grounding time such changes would require. The changes would have happened a t a time when all CQ-4As were urgently needed training.
f m 3 r

The Army report concluded that the cargo glider was b u i l t

with the specific mission of accomplishing one transport flight, not be

32

used as a 400 hour training device.43 Another result of the report was the mechanic training for glider pilots. The A i r Technical Training Command arranged

to train 100 glider

pilot students every ten days. Every ten days, glider pilots who could not immediately begin advanced training would report for the sixty-five day Qlider Mechanic Course. This course proved important to the glider pilot, especially the ten days of instruction devoted

to crating,

uncrating, and assembly of the glider. Later, the course for glider pilots was modified and reduced to thirty days with emphasis on supervising glider maintenance and inspection of an assembled glider.44
A limited experiment late i n 1943 highlights the Troop Carrier

Command's estimate on the value and cost of training glider pilots. The Troop Carrier Command conducted an experiment with a pool of excess power pilots, rated aviators qualified i n the AAF's powered pilot course. These pilots transition in the CG-4A glider with a minimum of

instruction. This instruction was basically an orientation flight with evaluation a t the end. The powered pilots scored higher than the

average glider pilot graduate. Furthermore, the Troop Carrier Command stated that a glider-only pilot was of limited value when assigned duties other than directly piloting a

glider^^

The

report of

the

same

experiment found the expense of training powered pilots was less i n time, money, and material than the training of glider pilots. About the same time as the Troop Carrier Command's experiment, the British RAF and the U.S.
A i r Transport Command experimented with

the concept of towing gliders across the Atlantic. This was to have a cost effect of reducing the number of 33 powered aircraft to move

equipment from the U.S. to England. The experiment set a record for a glider

tow,

but

was

failure

as

demonstration

of

the

cost

effectiveness of the glider. The

Air

Transport

Command's

towing

tests

with

the

CG-4.A

concluded that the efficiency of a C-47 towing a glider compared to the airplane alone. combination loaded to 28,000 The test used a C-47

was poor and CG-4A

pounds against a C-47 loaded to 31,0(#0

pounds alone. This was the f i r s t transoceanic glider flight, a distance of

3,500 miles, and was never d ~ p l i c a t e d . ~ ~

The British Glider Pilot Program I n the British glider pilot program, only one i n twenty-five would win the coveted glider pilot wings. The Royal A i r Force(RAF) believed the glider pilot should be capable of flying fighters or bombers so it devoted more time to the training of its glider pilots. This concept was not adhered to throughout the war, and most of the glider pilots used i n Market were rated i n gliders only. Another training concept the British remained committed to was the idea that the British glider pilot was an infantryman who could also f l y gliders. The glider pilot, i n the British view, should fight on the ground when needed. The British realistically expected a large number of glider pilots on the ground during a large airborne assault an.d planned to use them i n some ground combat role. The British casualty figures among its glider pilots also reflected this belief. The R A F obtained company sergeants major from the Brigade o f Guards of the British Army. These Noncommissioned Officers (NC0:s)
34

organized a training regiment for the glider pilots. The psychological discipline of the glider pilot training regiment produced a pilot who could f l y and fight. A f t e r a basic pilot course i n a two-place trainer called a Tiger Moth, the British glider pilot attended a day-only, month course i n the British Hotspur glider.
After

one

this course, the

student was awarded "2nd Pilot" wings. These were essentially copilot ~ an example of the wings; to earn 1st Pilot, more training f ~ l l o w e d ? As product of the British glider pilot training, the operation code-named, "Pegasus Bridge" is instructive. Pegasus Bridge was designed to seize a pair of bridges crossing the Orne River and Caen Canal about six miles inland from the Normandy invasion beaches. These bridges provided the Germans with the capability to rapidly reinforce the coast. British Major John Howard, commander of the small raiding party to seize the bridges, was given a choice of glider or parachute insertion of his force. He chose gliders and was given six Horsa gliders and their crews to train for the operation about eight weeks prior to the invasion. Howard believed the stealth and accuracy required of his mission was suited to the gliders. The six gliders and their crews trained using mock-ups and flew during darkness. The glider pilots were all given a ground combat mission following landing. The landing was successful and the objective seized with no loss to the gliders or crews.48 This

successful glider operation was recreated i n a popular board game called, "Pegasus Bridge." This game uses dice to determine successful landings by the gliders.49
35

A l l of the British glider pilots were members of the Glider Pi'lot

Regiment. The regiment was a large unit. The glider pilots were assigned

to subordinate squadrons and were usually given a ground comksat

mission. They were employed under their Glider Pilot Regiment chain-cfcommand and were usually given some form o f on-order ground combat mission. I n Market, as an example, the British glider pilots were used for defense of key points and distinguished themselves i n this

The Training o f Paratroo~ers By the time o f Market, airborne units had suffered heavy

casualties i n previous operations. Airborne commanders wanted to fill their depleted ranks with parachute-qualified soldiers.
A

request to the

War

Department for

in-theater

training

of

parachutists was disapproved. I n a message to the airborne divisions, commanders i n the field were told all replacement airborne training would be conducted a t the Airborne Training Center a t F o r t Benning, not i n North Africa or ~ u r o p e ? ' This guidance was later changed allowing theaters to train urgently needed parachute replacements, but only i n specific units. Theaters were authorized to train infantry

replacements as parachutists up to a strength of fifteen percent above

TO&E. This was authorized only i n the Thirteenth Airborne Division, the

541st Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 542nd Parachute Infantry Battalion. Theaters trained 3,000 parachutists between July and

September of 1 9 4 4 . ~ ~ The Airborne Training Center believed it could provide enough qualified parachute replacements at this phase of the w a r because all of 36

Its resources used to train the airborne divisions could now be devoted
to individual replacements. The eight-week course a t Fort Banning was

deslgned to train soldiers to jump, land without injury, and carry out a ground tactical mission. Soldiers were also taught to pack and inspect their parachutes, and the principles of a mass tactical jump.53 The basic course was divided into six phases. For packing

instruction, fifty-two hours was given. For jump training, another f i f t y two hours, and for tower training, thirty-six hours. Equipment d r i l l took twelve hours followed by eight hours o f lecture. The final five

qualifying jumps were assigned forty-eight hours. The total training was not to exceed one month of twenty-six hours.54 The British parachute course was equally demanding. The major difference affecting this study was that the British made several of the qualifying jumps from a tethered balloon. This had cost effectiveness strengths not associated with the U.S. program.55 The commander of the Airborne Center a t Fort Benning made a decision i n late 1943 that stopped training individual replacements for glider units. These were not the glider pilots, b u t the glider troops i n the glider regiments o f the airborne divisions. Glider replacements could be trained i n a short period of time after arrival i n an airborne division. A division, it was believed, could be trained to use gliders i n only five weeks.56 days, each day lasting eight

The Assembly and Packing Elements I n m a j o r airborne operations involving gliders and parachutes, a considerable effort i n time and manpower was spent i n two laborintensive functions.
For the gliders,

they were uncrated, assembled, For the parachutes, they Both of these

inspected, and time permitting, test flown.

were unpacked, inspected, repacked, and reinspected.

functions used manpower to get these items of airborne equipment ready

for use.
I n Market, the First Allied Airborne Army used the Twenty-sixth Mobile Repair and Reclamation Squadron to assemble gliders. Based at Cookham Common, the Twenty-sixth assembled 1,045 CQ-4As by 1 July 1944 i n anticipation of Market. This number was only enough for one glider echelon of one division. From 8 August, an assembly line at

Cookham prepared forty gliders a day. The line used twenty-six officers and 900 men working i n three shifts with automobile assembly line techniques. On several days, the line assembled sixty and once even 110 gliders. By the end o f August, 1,629 gliders were ready for the Ninth Troop Carrier Command's use. By 15 September, 2,160 gliders were

assembled. The Market plan called for ninety percent of these The glider pilot problem for Market could not be solved as easi1.y. By the end of August, 1,900 glider pilots were on hand. A t the f i r s t ,of September, 200 more arrived from the U S . The shortage was still severe enough however, to prompt General Lewis H. Brereton, commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, to decide to select copilots from anyone willing to ride up f r o n t i n a glider.58

Recoverv of Gliders and Parachutes The costs of parachutes and especially gliders demanded their quick recovery so they could be used again. Unfortunately, this did not happen often and many gliders and parachutes were abandoned i n combat. To prevent this, glider units developed recovery techniques to pick up gliders after an assault. One technique used a t o w rope

attached to two poles about fifteen feet off the ground. The other end of the t o w rope would be attached to the glider. A C-47 would swoop i n low and snatch the glider and its cargo off the ground. Typical uses for this technique were to recover glider pilots and wounded. Other utility uses for gliders were as mobile field hospitals, and field kitchens

although this was seldom done. Recovering parachutes was as important as recovering gliders. Obtaining serviceable parachutes was such a problem that Major General James M. Gavin made it a court-martial offense for a soldier to be caught with parachute cloth around his neck. Many soldiers, some not even i n airborne units destroyed parachutes to make scarves, ground sheets, or for local barter.59 General Gavin, wartime commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, on the recovery of parachutes said,

The retrieving of parachutes i s essential. I do not see how you can say we are not going to recover parachutes. Parachutes are very costly and it i s difficult i n w a r to obtain them, particularly, some of the components. 60

The nature of airborne operations sometimes prevented recovery. The same was t r u e of gliders. The point i s that gliders and parachutes

were not expendable. Although generally regarded as expendable i n the sense that a glider made an unpowered and certain descent on an 1-2, attempts were made on every operation to recover gliders. Recovery

rates varied from one out o f six gliders recovered following OperaVan Varsity where a deliberate recovery plan was executed to fifteen out of seventeen recovered during a night operation i n ~ u r m a . ~ ~ Only 350 gliders out of 1,926 CQ-4As were recovered following

Market. This i s a recovery rate of only thirteen percent. Most of theme were not recovered until December of 1944.~~ I n the Army's 82nd

Airborne Division's Army Ground Forces Report 440, Combat Lessons.& the 82nd Airborne Division, 9 December 1944, damage to gliders aind parachutes was called, "willful destruction." and "misappr~priation.".~~

(See Illustration Eight.)

Postwar Glider Use The loss of gliders i n battle was b u t one reason for their demise. Following the war, Although gliders continued to serve until the early insignificant, two primary sources, 19561s.

statistically

interviewed

during research provide valuable insight into the glider problem. Captain Herman L. Alley commanded A Battery, 456th Parachute Field Artillery i n the 82nd Airborne Division. Although he believes

gliders would not be cost effective today, he assaulted into Market with his battery i n gliders because o f a shortage o f parachutes. During the earlier Normandy invasion, only one-third of his battery was able to parachute into Normandy i n June of 1944 because the remainder of his battery was not parachute qualified. These soldiers went i n by glider. 40

ILLUSTRATION EIGHT ABANDONED CQ-4A IN HOLLAND

---

Photograph furnished to Silent Wings by J. A. A. Labm, of Molenhoek, Holland

. .-

An unidentifd German trooper looks over an abandoned American CG4A glider after it landed in enemy-held territory during the Market Garden operation. This glider, one of the 1,899 CG4As committed t o this action, appears t o have suffered very little, if any, damage in i t s landing. It i s believed that the serial number of this aircraft was 43-19851. Note the missing landing gear wheels Local residents found these wheels t o be highly valuable and used them for farm carts. P!obably many such carts are still in use today!

Reprinted, by permission, SILENT WINGS (Dallas, Texas: S i l e n t Wings Inc, September 1990), 7
41

The advantage of going i n gliders, according to Alley, was that his battery was i n position and f i r i n g within one hour of landing during Market. Alley's glider was so damaged on landing that his driver had to use an axe from his jeep
to chop their

way out of the

glider.

Fortunately, said Alley, no one was injured i n the landing. "Most" of the gliders Alley saw were not worth recovering, and he said he never hild time to recover any parachutes. Alley believes the glider's speed and accuracy contributed to his unit's success.64 Another veteran was Captain Frank D. Boyd. Boyd served as a liaison officer i n the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion. This u n i t was the f i r s t to parachute an artillery battalion i n combat. Boyd wrote that his u n i t could only assemble ten of its twelve howitzers on the drop zone. The 75mm pack howitzers were dropped using six bundles attached to shackles under the C-47.
A seventh bundle contained the

howitzer's wheels and was dropped from the door o f the C-47 as it would not fit i n a shackle. Boyd said he never packed a parachute after jump school. T h k function, according to Boyd, was done by parachute riggers who also jumped i n to recover parachutes from the drop zone. Because of the time and equipment needed to drop howitzers, Boyd believes the glider was more effective during the Market operation.65 Another source was able to confirm the huge effort required to pack parachutes. Captain Arnold Mom served as a rigger i n the 82nd Airborne Division's parachute maintenance company. The company was formed from riggers i n the parachute regiments. The mission of this unit was to pac:k
42

parachutes a t the division level by consolidating all riggers i n one organization. This u n i t had about 100 soldiers and spent much time inspecting and packing p a r a ~ h u t e s . ~ ~ The Army's review of glider performance however, was mixed even though it stated that glider units.67 units assembled faster than parachute

The commander of Market gave a mixed report of the glider's

performance. I n a letter outlining difficulties of the Market operation, General Brereton, commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, said,

Even ~ with General "the glider, while valuable, has limited a p p l i ~ a t i o n . " ~ Brereton's remarks, the Army continued development o f the glider. As late as 1949, the Army was still developing new gliders. I n a test of the YG-18A glider, the Army attempted to correct the deficiencies i n the CG-4A. These limitations were mainly payload and construction

problems. The newer gliders offered increased payload and were metalskinned for strength and f i r e p r o t e ~ t i o n .This ~ ~ new glider appeared too late. Many of the problems with the U.S. glider program stayed i n the

minds of Army planners. The Army failed to appreciate, early i n the war, the f u l l potential of the glider as was reported to the Secretary of War during World W a r I I .

There exists an insufficient appreciation of the effectiveness of the glider as an instrument of war and a general apathy on the part of all echelons with respect to glider training. This attitude seriously impaired the development of proper technique i n employing gliders.70

A f t e r the war, the government began selling crated CG-4A gliders

for $75 each. Five large shipping crates carried a single glider, and the
glider itself used more than 10,000 board feet of grade A lumber. Gliders were bought for the lumber and shortly after the w a r few CG-4As remained. I n January of 1991, the retail price of 10,000 board feet of grade A lumber cost $4,975.00 i n ~ a n s a s .As ~~ of 1990 however, only fi.ve

complete CG-4As remained. Considering that the U.S. built 14,612 gliders and the British built 5,935.72 the small number that survived is

testimony to perceptions of the glider's continued utility a t the war's end. The commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, Major General John
M. Gavin wrote i n 1947 that future airborne operations must get away

from the escort planes and "miles o f rope"73 used i n an airborne operation. These comments indicate that Gavin was searching for a

better glider or a more capable aircraft to carry his paratroops. A historian disagreed with Gavin and viewed the glider's weakness as a fault i n U.S. employment technique. The U.S. typically led with paratroops and followed with gliders. This, according to the historian, only alerted the defenders to the glider's arrival. The British experience tends to reinforce this idea

because the British frequently led with gliders and consequently had fewer glider casualties i n the assault. The surprise effect of intact units landing together was afforded only by the glider.74 In 1951, the glider still had its champions i n the Army. An officer writing i n lnfantrv Journal argued that the glider remained the best means of delivering troops and equipment. The author said the rapid
44

assembly time and payload remained advantages of the glider.75 Some

data from the war confirms the article's point of view. For example, i n
an after action report from the Market operation, parachute were called wasteful and supply drops by

~nreliable.~ Gliders, ~

for

both

assault and resupply, were considered successful if landing zones could be identified and anti-aircraft f i r e was minimal.77 Airborne historian Ernest K. the glider Fisher favored the parachute over glider-tug

because o f the long columns of aircraft the

combinations required.

The long t o w ropes and aircraft were not as

efficient as the troop carrying aircraft alone.78 The glider, as used i n World W a r I I, faded from use around 1951. The successful paradrop of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team

in combat during the Korean War i n 1951 proved the feasibility of

parachuting heavy the equipment newer previously ceased carried and by the glider. perfect

Development of

gliders

efforts

to

parachute delivery increased. Edward M. Flanagan, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, and w r i t e r o f the "Before the Battle" column featured in

ArmV

served as a parachutist and gliderman i n World W a r II.

As a

young major i n 1951, he wrote an epitaph for the glider i n Infantry School Quarterly. I n the epitaph, Flanagan called the World War II glider an "oversized kite-hedge cutting, vibrating bag of plywood and canvas; nose diving, Flanagan was uniquely

man and equipment killer."79

qualified to make such statements.

He commanded an airborne field

artillery unit i n combat and served most of his career i n airborne units. Although Flanagan favored the parachute over the glider, the glider

concept would surface t h i r t y years after Flanagan heralded the glider's death. Contem~orarvGlider Conce~ts The military potential of gliders surfaced again i n the late 1970s. Two studies, one by the United States A i r Force, and one by the United States Navy, considered military applications for gliders. The A i r Force study sought new strategic a i r l i f t concepts, one being a powerless glider and powered t u g combination. The study cited savings i n procurement and reduced operating costs as advantages of the glider. The proposed glider would have a payload of between 200,000 and 800,000 pounds-- well beyond that of a World W a r I I glider. Unfortunately, no existing aircraft were found suitable for the tug role. A higher cost t u g and glider would have to be developed a t a higher cost than a single system. The A i r Force glider never l e f t the concept The Navy's glider study targeted a lower flight

envelope, one of special operations capability. The Navy study examined Powered Hang Gliders (PHGs) for Marine and Navy special warfare units. The mission profile involved insertin.3 small teams and performing limited reconnaissance missions. The glider required a range o f 200 nautical miles. The Navy tested and selected t h m s "Quicksilver M" PHQ. O f significance to this study was the low radarcross-section, low cost, and survivability of the PHG. While the PHG only carried two people, it demonstrated a modern attempt a t a cost effective glider. The PHG demonstrated a search for a capability not found i n the current i n ~ e n t o r y . ~While ' the P H G concept did not gain acceptance i n the U.S. Navy, it did not go unnoticed. Palestinian groups used hang
46

gliders i n combat against Israeli positions during a terrorist attack i n the early 1 9 8 0 s . ~Obviously, ~ the terrorists saw the PHG as a cost

effective, viable stealth aircraft. This study however, uses a heavier model, a model based on a combat scenario. This study holds significance i n three significant areas.

Significance of the Study Historical sianificance As a historical review of the f i r s t day of the Market operation, this study focuses on the initial airborne assault. The f i r s t day, from an airborne assault perspective was successful. This study ties costs into a historical framework. As such, this study provides a comprehensive

historical review of the f i r s t day's assault. This study looks at the tactics, techniques, and procedures used during large airborne

operations and w i l l contribute to the historical study of World War I I. Oaerational significance This study i s an operational one i n that i t s view is from a cost effective approach and identifies the major costs associated with the world's largest airborne operation. I n examining the major costs, areas

for improvement are selected. These areas are i n training and equipping
an airborne force. Accordingly, this study i s of importance to anyone concerned about the costs of military operations. Future significance This study alone cannot bring back the glider. identify the major costs of using gliders.
I t does however,

This holds importance i n

planning for three areas of future air delivery. The three areas are

47

strategic airlift, tactical airlift, and special operations airlift. I n each of these areas, this study i s applicable i n identifying weaknesses i n

Market. If the glider concept returns, i n any of the three areas, this study provides valuable information regarding the shortfalls, the traps, and the successes based on actual glider use. I n the next chapter, the review of literature w i l l show how sever.al authors attempted reexamination of the glider cost effectiveness.

ENDNOTES l ~ a m e sE. Mrazek, Fiqhtina Gliders of World W a r II Martin's Press, 1977), 21. (New York: St.

2~epartment of the Army, FM 57-20 Airborne Techniques f o r Divishnal

Units January 1952 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), 11.

3 ~ e r a l dM. Devlin. Silent Wings, with a forward b y General William C. Westmoreland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 373.

5 ~ a n u a l Conley,

"Silent

Squadrons,"

American

History

Illustr~d

X V l l l (June, 1983): 16.

6 ~ a r Department, After Action Report, "Airborne Operations i n Holland," 22 December 1944, from General Brereton, commander F i r s t Allied Airborne Army to General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 2. 7 ~ a r Department, A i r Force Manual Number 3, "Glider Tactics and Techniques," Army A i r Forces, Training Aids Division (Washington: 24 January, 1944), 3. 8 ~ e p a r t m e n t o f the Army, Jum~master Student Information Sheeg:, (Jumpmaster Training Branch, F o r t Benning, Georgia: 1985), 6. g ~ e v l i n , Silent Winas.17. l a ~ r a z e k ,Fighting Gliders of World War 11, 99. 11l bid.

, 99.
15.

l*conley, "Silent Squadrons," 13Devlin, Silent Wings, 106. 141bid.

, 70.
Putnam and

1 5 ~ .A. Taylor, A i r s ~ e e d Aircraft Since 1931, (London: Company, 19701, 101. 16\bid.

, 102.

l71bid. , 105.

lgMrazek, Fighting Gliders o f World W a r 11,

75.

2 0 ~ h i e fof Military History, The Airborne Team 1941-1945, (Washington, 1948), 54. 211 bid.

, 55.

2 2 ~ r a z e k ,Fightinq Gliders o f World W a r 1 1 , 62.

240wen Thetford, Aircraft o f t h e Royal A i r Force Since 1 9 a (London: Putnam, 1962), 562. 25~amesA. Huston, Out o f t h e Blue, (West L a f a y e b , Indiania: Purdue University, 1972), 101.

27~arshall Brucer, A Historv o f t h e Airborne Command, (Sharpsburg, Maryland: Antietam National Museum, 19891, 24. 28~uston,Out o f t h e Blue, 104. 2 9 ~ r e g o r Ferguson, The Paras: British Airborne Forces 1940-198Ll, (London: Osprey Publishing,1984), 4. 3 0 ~ o h nWeeks, Airborne EauilJmenk A Historv o f i t s Develo~ment,(New 'fork: Hippocrene Books, 1976), 28.

31war Department, The Glider Pilot Training Program 1941-194% USAAF Historical Studies Number 1 , (Washington: Assistant Chief o f Staff f o r Intelligence, 1943), 1.
3 2 ~ i l t o n Dank, The Company, 1977), 56. Glider Gang, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott

3 3 ~ aDepartment, r The Glider Pilot Training Program 1941-1945, 18.

3 6 ~ .Kuter, ~ Memo f o r AFRIT, 12 May, 1942, "Officers, Grades," in Glider Pilot Training Program 1941-1945, 20.

Titles and

37~ar Department, Glider Pilot Training Program 1941-1945, 21. 50

3 8 ~ a rDepartment, M s i c Qlider Training, Technical Manual 1-800, (Washington: February 15 1943), 2.

3 9 ~ aDepartment, r Advanced Glider Training, Technical Manual 1-815, (Washington: April 8 1943), 2.

40~ar Department, Glider Pilot Traininn Pronram 1941-1945. 30.

41 lbid.

, 46.

4 7 ~ a n k ,The Glider Ganq, 43. 4 8 ~ o b e r tD . Lewis, "Pegasus Bridge-- Prelude to D-Day," i n S ~ e c i a l Warfare. Volume 2, Number 2 (Fort Bragg, N . C . : J.F.K. Special Warfare Center and School, Spring 1989), 43. 4 9 ~ a r k Seaman, "Pegasus Bridge," in Strategy and Tactics, 122, November-December 1988 (Cambria, California: 1988), 19. Number

5 0 ~ e o r g eChatterton, Wings o f Penasus, (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1982), 173. 5 1 ~ h i e fo f Military History, The Airborne Team 1941-1945, extract of letter from AGF Board to Headquarters, Airborne Training Center North Africa through 0-3 Training, ARHQ, 24 August 1943, subject: "Qualification o f Parachutists," 173.

5 3 ~ a r Department, Field Manual 31-31 Tactics and Techniaues o f Airborne T ~ w D ~ (Washington: , Qovernment Printing Office, 1942), 87.

55~eguson,The Paras, 14. S6chief o f Military History, The Airborne Team 1941-1945, 179. 5 7 ~ e v l i n ,Silent Wings. 245. 51

59~ames M. Gavin, i n Quartermaster A s ~ s d so f Airborne O ~ e r a t i o r p , Department o f t h e Army Ad Hoc Committee Report, (Office o f t h e Quartermaster General: Washington, 1950), 86.

61~amuel T. Moore, Tactical EmDlo~ment i n t h e U.S. Armv o f T ~ ~ ~ s D o ~ & Aircraft and Gliders in World War II, Volume I, (Troop Carrier Command: 19 June, 19461, 51. 621bid.

, 53.

6 3 ~ a Department, r Combat Lessons of t h e 82d Airborne Division i n Market, Army Ground Forces Report C-444 ETO, 9 December 1944, 6.
6 4 ~ e r m a nL. Alley, Letter to author. Brownwood, Texas, 16 December, 1990. 6 5 ~ r a n kD . Boyd, Letter to author, Overbrook. Kansas, 16 December, 1990. 66~rnold Mom, Telephone interview with author, Madison, Wisconsin, 3 January, 1991. 6 7 ~ r m yField Forces Board Number 1 , Project Number AS 851, pound Universal Airborne Container," 28 September, 1951, 3.

"6,0(10

6 8 ~ e w i sH . Brereton, Letter from General Brereton, commander 1st AAA, to General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, commander o f Army A i r Forces, dated 4 November 1944, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 6 9 ~ r m yField Forces Board Number 1 , Project Number AB 748, "YG-1E;A Medium Assault Glider," 4.

70~.~ Dorr, . Assistant to t h e Secretary o f War, memo to Secretary of War, Odober 1943, subjed: "Airborne Training" in The Airborne Team 1941-1945. 124.
71~elephone i n q u i r y b y author to Lansing Lumber Company, Lansing, Kansas, 28 December 1990. 7 2 ~ e v l i n ,Silent Wings. 372. M. Gavin, 'The Future o f Airborne Opearations," 73~hn Review. Volume 27, Number 9 (December, 1947): 4 . Militarv

74~amea A.

World War 11,"

Huston, "Thoughts on the American Airborne Effort i n Jlilbrv Review, Volume 21, Number 1 (April, 1951): 13. Cargo," lnfantrv Journal, Volume 64,

75~oman W. Maire, "Airborne Number 2 , (February, 1949): 14.

7 6 ~ . ~ Army . A i r Forces, Airborne Assault on Holland, (Washington: Assistant Chief o f Staff for Intelligence, 1945), 24.
77~amesK. Whitifield, "Gliders-- Do They Have A Place In A Modern Military?" A i r Command and S t a f f College, (Maxwell A i r Force Base, Alabama, A i r University Library, May 1973), 26. 7 8 ~ r n e s tK. Fisher, "Evolution o f U.S. Airborne Doctrine," Review, Volume 51, Number 5 (May, 1971): 66. 7 9 ~ d w a r d M. Flanagan, "Death o f the Glider," Quartarly, Volume 38, Number 1 (January,l951): 91. lnfantrv Military Schwl

80~ou~la Aircraft s Company, "New Strategk A i r l i f t Concepts," V01~me I, Final Report, June, 1979, Douglas Aircraft Company, (Long Beach, California, Technical Report TR-79-3062),13. 8 1 ~ a v a Weapons l Center, Investigation o f t h e Feasibility of the use--of Powered Hanq Gliders f o r Military_Aeplication, April 1981, (Department of Parachute Systems, China Lake, California),l2. 82~anes'Defense Weekly, "The Case For The Ultralight," 1990), 987. (17 November

CHAPTER T W O LITERATURE REVIEW

This study explores new ground. The focus of this thesis, a

CO&

effectiveness comparison between glider and parachute assault based on a single day of actual combat, has never been addressed. Therefore, the literature review as to the cost effectiveness research question deliberately narrow. I n the forty-five years since the last glider combat assault, only one study addressed a direct comparison between parachute and glider ,is

costs. Another study immediately after the w a r examined the costs c,f
parachuting equipment. detail.
S t a f f Studv The B u t t o l ~ h

Both of these studies are reviewed here i n

In May of 1949, a U.S.

Army student a t the Command and General

S t a f f Coilege a t Fort Leavenworth, Kansas wrote a detailed staff study

titled, "The Case For Parachute Landing of Material and Personnel As Opposed to Glider and ~irlanding."' Loren D. Buttolph was a lieutenant colonel a t the time and author of the study. His conclusions came a t
is

time when the assault transport was a required operational capability i n the minds of many airborne commanders. Buttolph's study made fourconclusions.

Buttol~h's Conclusions Parachute drops of personnel and equipment w i l l continue as a part o f warfare. Night assaults i n areas unsuited for glider landings would mean the parachute and its attendant training and costs would remain a capability of the U.S. ~ r m y . * Glider troops can be assaulted i n combat without the specialized training required of parachute troops. The glider unit w i l l land more intact than a parachute unit. The costs however, of gliders with their historically low wartime recovery rates require that gliders remain a special piece of airborne equipment with limited use.3 Assault aircraft would provide the accuracy and payload of gliders without the attendant costs of training parachutists. Assault aircraft would delete the requirement for all specialized equipment associated with both gliders and parachute^.^ Parachute training and capability should be held to a minimum to save costs. Gliders should be kept, b u t as specialized piece of airborne equipment used only under strict conditions considering their high cost. Assault transport aircraft would offer savings i n airborne B u t t o lh's ~ recommendation Assault aircraft be developed as the most cost effective means of delivering troops and equipment. Gliders and parachute assault

operation^.^

capability should be practiced, b u t kept to a m i n i m ~ m . ~ Buttol~h's elements of cost The 1949 study compared the training time to qualify a division i n both parachute and glider assault techniques. The 1949 study used time estimates from the parachute school a t Fort Benning, Georgia. A t that

55

tima, a r i x week qualificatbn course was offered. I n comparison, a one

week course, based on Buttolph's survey of officers, was all that required to qualify a division i n glider or air land techniques.7 Equipment costs were considerably lower for the glider troops than for the parachute troops i n training. The costs in the 1949 study did not include the capital equipment costs such as the gliders

was

themselves, -but looked at things such as parachute drying facilities, jump training towers, and wear and tear of parachutes.* The recovery 1949 study rate of fifty did examine salvage costs. Buttolph used a and

to

ninety

percent for

the

parachutes

associated items. He used a fifty percent recovery rate for the gliders, and did not measure the assembly and transport costs. Buttolph did however, accurately identify the transport and assembly effort of

gliders as major costs even if he did not assign a dollar figure to thern.

Table 2-1 Basic Airborne Course Costs

Number of school troops Number trained weekly Cost o f rigger facilities Cost of jump towers

500 800 $1,000,000 $250,000

Cost of jump aircraft unknown Source: Loren D. Buttolph, "The Cjse For Parachute Landing of ~ a t e r i ~ i l and Personnel as Opposed to Glider and A i r Landing,: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 31 May 1949, Annex C.

Table 2-2. Cost of Glider and A i r Land Training

Number of school troops Number o f troops trained Cost of training aids

80 1 division unknown

I
I

Cost of a i r c r a f t unknown Source: Loren D. Buttolph, "The Case f o r Parachute Landing of Material and Personnel as Opposed to Glider and A i r Landing," United States Army Command and General Staff College, 31 May 1949, Annex C .

Table 2-3. Cost o f Equipment i n Division Airborne Operations

PARACHUTE ECHELON Parachutes $1,250,000

GLIDER ECHELON
I

CG-l8A Gliders Special Equipment

$1,780,000
N/A

Special Equipment $750,000

TOTAL $1,780,000 TOTAL $2,000,000 Source: Loren D . Buttolph, "The Case f o r Parachuting Landing of Material and Personnel as Opposed to Glider and A i r Landing," United . States Army Command and General Staff College, May 1949, Annex C The second cost study focused mainly on t h e costs o f parachuting equipment and supplies. This study compared t h e costs o f parachuting supplies with landing supplies. The landing method could have been

either glider o r cargo aircraft. This study did not account f o r gliders damaged i n landing. The figures from t h e second study came from data gathered

between 1 April 1943 and 31 December 1944. Market data was used i n the figures. This second study came a t a time when t h e Army was t r y i n g to

develop its parachute r i g g i n g and maintenance organizations.

A t the

time, the newly formed United States A i r Force shared some air delivery functions with t h e Army. The Army wanted more responsibility and control i n developing airborne techniques. The focus o f t h e second study was to make a case

for fiscal resources i n Army hands for parachute equipment.

These

resources would enable the Army, t h e study indicated, to better suppot-t its requirements. The figures in the second study are less valuable t n t h i s research except as a tool to demonstrate t h e considerable costs 'in parachute t y p e material associated with parachute delivery means.9

Table 2-4.--

U.S. Equipment

Needed to Parachute 1 Ton

14 11

parachutes 24' A-4 containers

$72.35 each

$ 1.012.90

$ 279.51 $25.41 each $ 89.50 2 A-5 containers $44.75 each 3 A-6 containers $ 105.00 $35.00 each $ 3.00 each $ 9.00 3 A-7 straps $ 140.00 $10.00 each parapack assy. 14 $ 2.25 224 rubber bands .O1 each .25 .06 each 40 yards b r k cord Source: Department o f t h e Army, Quartermaster Aseects o f Airborne O~erations, (Washington: Office o f the Quartermaster General: 1950), 60.

Table 2-5. Cost per Ton by Delivery Means

Glider Landed per ton

I

$49.61 $1.989.65

Parachuted per ton

I
$94.07 Free-dropped per ton Source: Department of the Army, Quartermaster A s D ~ c of ~ ~ Airborne. O~erations,(Washington: Office of the Quartermaster General, 1950). 60.

Significance of Previous Studies These two important cost studies gliders. point to savings in using

Both studies illuminate several hidden costs associated with

conducting parachute delivery of troops or equipment. These costs are i n training because i n the instance of troops, all must be qualified and current parachutists. I n the instance of parachuting equipment, huge

costs are associated with the parachutes and other hardware needed to successfully perform the paradrop. These costs, as shown by these two studies, are not a component of glider operations. Glider operations however, have their hidden costs also. The huge effort required
to

assemble

gliders

before

every

major

airborne

operation i s an example of the glider's hidden costs. In the next chapter this study w i l l examine five major costs of both parachute and glider assault applicable to the research question. Before proceeding with this study however, a contemporary reassessment, not relating to cost, i s instructive i n understanding the role, glider. mission, and function of the

Wolfe's Glider Assessment Martin Wolfe served i n the 81st Troop Squadron i n World War I I. He was a radio operator on a C-47, b u t recorded the day-to-day life

inside a troop carrier squadron. The u n i t flew i n Market. Wolfe wrote a comprehensive narrative o f its operations and he kept an accurate roster of members of the squadron and was able to interview many for his narrative. The narrative was published as Green Liaht! Men of t 81st T~OOD Carrier Sauadron Tell Their storv.1 Wolfe devoted an entire chapter to reassessing glider potential and performance. He described four problems with gliders. These t ~

problem areas were: (1) glider airworthiness; (2) glider crashworthiness;

(3) ground role of the glider pilot; and (4) perceived delays of glider

pilots i n returning from landing rones.ll The glider airworthiness issue, according to Wolfe, was a myth. The Waco and the Horsa were durable, capable aircraft. an understanding of their capabilities and limitations Both requireld however,
fcr

successful employment. The crashworthiness issue was another matter. Wolfe's review reported that an atmosphere of "every man fcr

himself carried the day upon the glider's release from i t s t o w ship."l2 This attitude resulted i n glider collisions over LZs. Considering the number of broken gliders the average soldier criticism was justified. saw on an LZ, th.is

The gliders however, crashed as well as any night landings on pilots' I n this uneven .terrain. Wolfe's has many

aircraft making unaided, criticism of the glider already be discussed.

inability t o function as infantry examination of 60 the literature,

instances of personal bravery by glider pilots are a matter of military record. The problem, as viewed today, was a matter of command and The final criticism i n

control once the glider mission was complete.

Wolfe's book i s the glider pilot's perceived delay i n returning to base after a mission. Again, the command and control of glider pilots was never adequately addressed so the delays were understandable even though damning to the glider effort.

o this study. He Wolfe made only one cost comparison applicable t

wrote that his unit received an abundant supply of everything including gliders. $75,000 The $15,000 CQ-4As his outfit abandoned would cost about

i n 1990s dollars.13 Although considerable today, this figure i s

low compared to the cost of powered aircraft. The cost of some of the gliders Wolfe wrote about are examined i n the next chapter. As this review has shown, no previous study included the five elements o f cost this study applies to a single combat operation.

ENDNOTES
D. Buttolph, "The Case For Parachute Landing of Material and I~oren Personnel As Opposed to Glider and A i r Landing," United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 31 May 1949.

4lbid.

bid.
'I bid.

, 2.

9~epartment of the Army, Quartermaster Aspect. of Airborjg Operations, (Washington: Office of the Quartermaster General, 1950), 60. lg~artin Wolfe, Green Light! Men of the 81st TrooD Carrier Sauadr0.n Tell Their Storv. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 19891..

CHAPTER THREE THE METHODOLOGY O F COSTS

l ntroduction to Methodolow
I n selecting a cost-effectiveness approach
to the

study

of

gliders i n Market, it was necessary to determine which elements of cost were applicable if this study was to assist f u t u r e planners of airborne operations. Cost effectiveness studies involve more than j u s t juxtaposing cost and effectiveness data and drawing conclusions. Meaningful

comparisons are difficult to make whenever both the cost and levels of effectiveness of competing systems differ. I n t h i s study, an eight step process was used. The f i r s t three steps involved reviewing the literature (see Chapters One and Two), determining the order of battle for friendly were

forces on the f i r s t day, and organizing those forces as they

employed on the f i r s t day (see Chapter Four). These steps produced a glider and parachute comparison for study. Step four determined which elements of cost contributed to the cost of the Market operation. Five elements were selected for inclusion i n this study (see Chapter Three). Step five designed a measurement tool for the five elements (see

Chapters One and Three).

Steps six and seven applied the Standard Unit Equivalents to the glider and parachute echelons from step three and compared them to each other (see Chapter Four). The eighth step answered the research question and presented conclusions and recommendations (see Chapter Five). The cost studies i n this thesis demonstrate a concept of

determining the cost effectiveness of gliders compared with parachutes as a system of airborne assault. The model for this study i s a historical, operational one; the f i r s t day of Market, 17 September 1944. This study considered what were deemed the most significant factors for a valid comparison between the parachute and the glider. .As mentioned i n the limitations portion of Chapter One, some factors not considered were the costs of replacing combat losses of glider pilots suffered i n Market, or .the costs of deploying a glider-equipped airborne division overseas. Both of these areas surfaced from the examination of Market, b u t were eliminated from further study here. These two critical areas, i n the author's estimation, were ancillary to cost-effectiveness, and were peripheral to answering this study's research question. Typical historical studies fail to provide accurate data to solve the problem of costing of weapons systems o r other pieces of hardware. Therefore, this study was atypical because it relates the selected

elements of cost as they were then with a forward view to future glider use. I n other words, the cost estimates have value for any evaluation of airborne assault systems. The glider was selected i n this case because of the costs involved i n fielding it were so great, and was so brief cis an airborne delivery system during World War II.
64

Procedures This study examined primary sources such as original operation orders and initial after-action Army, the First British reports for the First Allied Airborne Division, the 10lst U.S. Airborne

Airborne

Division, and the 82nd U.S.

Airborne Division. Next combat narratives The purpose of this initial

and historical summaries were consulted.

procedure was to establish a complete order of battle for each glider and aircraft load by unit for the allies assaulting into Holland during Market on the f i r s t day. The objective was to establish a level of detail down to each glider and aircraft load by unit. This level of detailed was established. Next, the glider and parachute echelons for each division were organized as they actually were employed for the f i r s t day of Market. Each of the three airborne divisions employed i n Market had a different mission, and accordingly organized i t s glider and parachute echelons with regard to the division's commander's concept of using his airborne division and available aircraft. Since the f i r s t day's available lift was the only day that went according t o plan, this study uses the actual organization of the glider and parachute echelons i n its comparison. The next task was to established a common element of measure between the glider and parachute echelons. Because a glider could obviously carry more than a parachute, some standard basis for comparison was

required. The standard selected by the author was the Standard Unit Equivalent (SUE).

The SUE was developed because comparing tonnage delivered,

as the Army initially did i n its study of glider effectiveness, clearly

t s limitations. Other elements, such favors the glider without pointing to i

as number of troops delivered, fall short of an objective comparison
because a C-47 with a troop load of eighteen w i l l carry more troops always than a thirteen-troop CG-4A. These attributes of gliders and

parachutes do not provide a valid cost comparison. When applied to this study in particular, traditional comparisons do not fit because so many more jump aircraft took o f f for Holland than did gliders. None of the three divisions equally split their forces between the glider and

parachute elements of divisions. To compensate for this disparity and provide an objective measure, the SUE was developed. The SUE i s based on the value of the twelve-man airborne r i f l e squad. This i s used as a base of combat effectiveness. I n this study, a.11 parachute infantry regiments and glider infantry regiments and their British equivalents were divided by twelve to determine the number of
SU Es. Combat Support and Combat Service Support organizations were

assigned a value of a five-man element to provide one SUE. Since the glider echelons did not deliver a large number of troops, the SUEs fc,r the glider echelons was considerably less than for the parachute unit;. Consequently, this study examined the other critical equipment the

gliders delivered to battle to determine SUEs. For example, gliders delivered the 75mm pack howitzer. This

weapon played a significant part i n the battle. I t provided f i r e support i n the early phases of the assault, offset the lack of available firepower i n the airborne division, and countered German ground assaults.
66

For

this study, it was determined t h a t a 75mm Pack Howitzer carried a SUE o f 3.0 i n relation to the twelve-man infantry squad. I n other words, t h e 75mm Pack Howitzer was assigned a value o f three r i f l e squads. Other weapons and key pieces of equipment delivered by glider were also assigned a value. One of the sources used i n assigning values were the comments of General James M. Gavin, Market commander of the 82nd

Airborne Division. Gavin said the greatest contribution of the glider was
to deliver to the battlefield antitank defense means, jeeps,

and other

equipment t h a t Gavin rated in order of importance.' The SUE i s a relative operational value based on the following criteria:
1. Mobility: how mobile was the piece of equipment both i n the context

o f loading it f o r glider o r airborne assault, and how fast could it be placed i n t o operation? Also included i n t h i s category was the degree of mobility provided to the ground forces.

2.

Lethality:

how lethal was the weapon i n i t s ground employment?

Particularly high i n determining the SUE was the weapon's tank-killing equivalent as t h i s rated high of General Gavin's l i s t of requirements for glider-delivered weapons?

3. Crew: what was the crew requirement for the weapon o r piece of equipment?
4.

Weapon/Vehicle

performance:

how

did

the

weapon

or

vehicle's

performance compare to the space required on t h e available lift it used? By t h i s criterion, the study examined the value o f equipment such a jeep, and what t h a t jeep provided the airborne force considering t h a t it

took the space o f twelve soldiers on the glider.

67

Once these

relative operational values

were

applied to the

weapons and equipment delivered by the glider, a SUE was determined f o r each. Figure 3-1 shows the SUES developed f o r each. The 12-man r i f l e squad i n infantry organizations forms the base for the Standard was Unit Equivalent
to

(SUE) 11-man

measurement squad in

tool. the

This British

measurement

converted

an

organization. The r i f l e squad was considered the smallest tactical element capable o f fighting alone i n an airborne unit. Accordingly,
it i s tlhe

standard of measure f o r determining the relative value of the other systems employed i n an airborne assault. The other human element used as a measurment tool i s the 5-man support element employed by other than infantry formations. An examp;e of t h i s t y p e of element, also having a SUE of 1.0, i s the 5-man artillery crew f o r the 75mm howitzer. This i s to represent a relative combat value equal to t h a t o f the r i f l e squad. The reason these elements were

assigned a SUE o f one was t h e review of after-action reports reflecting commander assessment of the utility of other than infantry formations.. I n almost universal application, the other than infantry elements were included i n initial assault formations because they were critical to f i r e support, communication, signal, or medical functions. These combat

support functions were viewed as so critical to the airborne operation that r i f l e squads were deleted from manifest and replaced with the othelassets. The weapons systems i n the table also reflect t h i s methodology.

Table

3-1.

--

Standard Unit Equivalents (SUE)

Equipment 12-man squad(infantry t y p e unit) 5-man team, crew(artillery,support) 1/4 ton jeep, scout car 75mm pack howitzer AT weapons heavy machine -gun

Standard Unit Equivalents (SUE)

1.0 1.0 1.5 3.0

I
I

I
I

2.0 0.5

1/4-ton trailer, motorcycle 0.5 Note: Many other types o f equipment were flown i n gliders such as demolition material, fuel, and food, b u t Table 3-1 shows the major combat equipment used f o r this study.

While the SUES provided a common basis f o r comparison between what t h e gliders delivered and what the parachutes delivered, the cost element needed f u r t h e r examination to determine which elements o f cost would be used to determine cost effectiveness. The size and t y p e of

various expenditures were studied to decide which expenditures f o r the Market operation were applicable to t h i s study. The study determined that in an airborne operation the size of Market, a few areas

contributed to the majority o f t h e costs. These major areas were: 1 . Capital costs of parachutes. 2. Capital costs of gliders. 3. Cost o f training parachutists. 4. Cost o f training glider pilots.

5. Cost of assembling gliders used for Market (applicable only to glider

echelons). 6. Cost o f packing personnel parachutes (applicable only to parachute echelons).

7.
8.

Costs o f replacing gliders not recovered after t h e operation. Costs o f replacing parachutes not recovered after the operation.

Determining t h e costs Costs o f ~ a r a c h u t e ~ The parachutes capital are the costs of parachutes pieces of were selected because for

essential

airborne

equipment

parachutists. I t was the major system for parachute delivery o f airborne divisions assaulting into Market. The cost used f o r the American T-7 personnel parachute with reserve was $288.00. alone was $92.00.2 The T-7 was used b y the U.S. The cost o f the reserve units. The British units

used the X-type parachute without a reserve. The cost o f the X-type parachute was sixty British ~ o u n d s .This ~ was converted to 1942 U.S. dollars a t an official exchange rate o f $4.03.4
A t t h i s rate of exchange,

t h e British parachute costs $241.80 U.S. then-dollars.

Costs o f gliders The capital costs of the gliders used during the Market

operation was established as $19,367.00.~ This was t h e average cost of a Waco b u i l t CG-4A glider. The costs established f o r the British Horsa ! I and the British Hamilcar were derived from determining the average co5.t per pound of the Waco CG-4A and applying it to the empty 70 gross

weights o f the Horsa II and the Hamilcar. This method was selected f o r t h e British gliders because inquiries o f the Imperial War Museum and the RAF's museum i n London produced only one brief reference to a Horsa costing about $40,000.
II and $101,160.00

The costs used are $47,039.40

for the Horsa

f o r the Hamilcar. These costs used a capital cost per of $5.62. The Waco glider cost was selected as

airframe

pound

representative of the gliders used a t Market although the research could not accurately identify the exact manufacture o f the ones used for the operation. Although most CG-4A gliders were called Wacos whether

Waco made them o r not, t h e term "Waco" was universally applied t o t h e CQ-4A. Waco was the chief contractor and provided inspectors f o r all makers o f the CG-4A and charged the other makers $250 per glider f o r initial production runs. standardize all CG-4A The Army's plan to provide master jigs to because glider makers were

production failed

given the go ahead i n the urgency to field CQ-4As. Consequently, costs soared. If the manufacturers of the CG-4A 1,000 were selected, who produced more than Gibson, and Ridgefield per CG-4A. glider
If the top

the costs f o r the Ford,

gliders would be averaged to a cost of $23,895.00 six manufacturers were selected, the

Waco-made would

would

be
If

included, however,

b u t the average cost o f a CG-4A all 16 manufacturers of the CQ-4A

be $23,304.66.

were selected and t h e

average of their costs to the government were used, including the National $1,741,809 glider, the average cost of a CG-4A glider would be

$159,754.12.~ This capital cost exceeded most combat aircraft costs i n World War II. For this study, examination determined t h a t the Waco cost 71

most coincided with a typical cost for a CQ-4A.

Therefore, the $19,3137

amount i s used i n this study with the corresponding costs for the British gliders. Both U.S. and British gliders were expensive aircraft

t o

buy despite their low operating costs.

The costs f o r ~arachutists The costs for training f o r parachutists were developed t ~ y and British

examining all elements o f the parachute training for the U.S.

paratroopers and selecting an element of cost applicable to this study. The cost was determined by selecting an element common to both the training of parachutists and glider pilots and then developing a formu'la that would give a cost figure. The common element i n both the t r a i n i r g of the parachutist and the glider pilot was f l i g h t hours. For the

parachutist, the flight hours during his training for the five qualifying jumps before earning his wings was used. For the glider pilot it w a s the f l i g h t hours applied to his training culminating i n earning wings. This was the one training cost most suitable to quantify. I n the case of the parachutists, a dollar amount of $100 per flight hour was assigned to his training i n jump school. This amour~t was selected to represent operation and support costs, costs, and the crew costs per parachutist. maintenance hfs

This amount was then

multiplied by the number of jumps a student made t o qualify i n training as a parachutist(five), and then this figure was multiplied times the flight time per jump (.7 hour). This dollar value represented a cost per parachutist for training. This cost element was then applied to determine a cost for the Market operation. 72

The average f l i g h t time f o r the parachute echelons to reach their drop zones in Market was 3.5 hours. The average expected

operational service life o f a parachutist was determined as 2.14 combat assaults. I n other words, this study uses 2.14 combat parachutist

assaults as a service use o f a parachutist. This value was then divided i n t o t h e training cost element to give a dollar amount per parachutist f o r Market.

Figure 3-2. --Parachute Training Costs(United States) $100 per f l i g h t h r X 5 qualifying jumps a t .7 hour per jump 3.5(Market flight) X 2.14(operational life) =7.5 $350 divided by 7.5 equals $46.66 per parachutist.

Figure 3-3.--

Parachute Training Cost(t3ritish)

m a t .7 per jump($l00 X 1.4) $100 per f l i g h t h r X 2 jumps 3.5(Market flight) X 2.14 Jumps(operationa1 life) $140 divided b y 7.5 equals $18.66 per parachutist f o r Market

The training cost per U.S. parachutist i n Market was $46.66. This same cost formula was applied to the British parachutist, b u t with a slight variation. The British training o f parachutists was conducted

differently than i n the United States. The British Airborne Forces Depot formed a t Hardrick Hall, England i n 1942. Its mission was to raise and t r a i n the British F i r s t Airborne Division. The division's battalions were inkially formed into the Parachute Regiment under t h e Army A i r Corps. This regiment formed i n August o f 1942. The f i r s t division combat

assault was in North Africa on 12 November 1942. The Airborne Forces

Depot raised one other British airborne division, the Sixth, and helped train units such as the Polish Parachute Brigade which participated .in Market(D+l), and then the Depot trained individual repla~ements.~ What was unique i n the British training system however, was the practice of using a tethered balloon to train parachutists. This

too, was a co:st

effective measure because it freed aircraft for other missions. Normally, the f i r s t three of five qualifying jumps was made from a balloon. I f aircraft were available, students would jump from aircraft. For th'is

study, the f i r s t three qualifying jumps were considered to have been from balloons. Accordingly, the British training costs were less than t t ~ e
U.S. costs for this element.

The costs for glider ~ i l o t s The training cost for glider pilots was determined i n a similar method. The $100 value per f l i g h t hour was used. This figure represents the operational and support costs, maintenance and other costs of

training the glider pilots. The f l i g h t hour requirement i s averaged from the Class A and Class B instruction i n the U S . school and an estimate of the hours other than outside of the glider training regiment with the British. The hour figure was determined as f i f t y hours per student. The same average f l i g h t duration of 3.5 hour for Market applied
to the glider pilots as it did with the parachutists. The operational

service life of a glider pilot was determined as between two and four combat missions, as was the case with the parachutists. When using the

training cost formula f o r the glider pilots, t h e costs were developed as shown i n figure 3-4.

Figure 3-4.

--

Glider Pilot Training Cost

$100 per f l i g h t h r X 50 hours(average training hours) = $500 divided by 3.5 hr(Market f l i g h t time) X 2.14(0perational life) = $500 divided by 7.5 = $666.66 training cost per glider pilot for Market. Costs o f assemblinn gliders The next cost element o f the cost effectiveness model i s the glider warrant

assembly cost o f t h e gliders. This element applied to t h e U.S echelons only, but was a significant expenditure
to

consideration i n t h i s study. During Market, ninety percent o f the U.S gliders were assembled from crates i n a labor intensive e f f o r t almost a month prior to the operation. This was the r e s u l t of a glider shortage following the Normandy invasion. Crated gliders were shipped from the U.S to meet the Market mission. The U.S. 26th Mobile Repair and Reclamation Squadron, based a t

Cookham Common i n England was assigned the mission o f assembling gliders. By 1 July 1944, it had only assembled 1,045 CG-4A, about

enough f o r one glider.echelon o f one d i ~ i s i o n . ~ The 26th, using twenty-six officers and 900 men from 8 August to 15 September, had assembled 2,160 gliders. The men worked i n three

shifts and used assembly line procedures. They assembled sixty gliders a day as an average, b u t once even assembled 100 gliders i n a single day.9 To assign a cost to t h i s assembly effort, t h i s study assumed t h a t one s h i f t included 300 soldiers and 75 nine officers. This one shift

assambled twenty CQ-4A gliders i n an eight-hour shift.

I n man-hours,

this assembly effort equals 2,472 for one shift. Using man-hours without assigning a dollar amount gave a value for comparison. Another

technique involved applying World W a r II pay scales to the assembly effort. I n this estimate, the study used the approximate pay grades i n a shift multiplied by the number of those pay grades present i n a shift. This gave an hourly wage for the glider assembly effort. The calculation i n then-dollars was used i n comparison with the packing of personnel parachutes.

Costs of Dacking Darachutes The parachute echelons had no glider assembly effort to use as a cost comparison, b u t did have an equally labor-intensive, peoplo-

driven effort to prepare for Market. The parachute echelons had to pac.k their parachutes for use i n Market. The packing effort preceded every major airborne operation and Market was no exception. Even thougn

every parachutist was trained i n packing a parachute, by the time of Market, the airborne companies division using had formed provisional personnel parachute from the

maintenance

rigger-trained

battalions and regiments. Each battalion and regiment was authorized a number of riggers

or

individuals

qualified

as

riggers.

Following

Normandy, the divisions had consolidated these people to maximize the number of parachutes that could be packed and to provide a badly needed quality control function to the parachute packing effort.l@ The packing of a parachute generally required two or three men. One or two riggers would pack and a t h i r d individual, usually an 76

officer, would i n s p e c t t h e parachute.

The packing of o n e parachute

averaged 15 minutes. Considering t h a t two soldiers were involved, t h e man-hour requirement w a s .5 p e r parachute. Using a method similar to t h e o n e used in assembling gliders, t h e parachute packing s h i f t involved a n estimated 100 soldiers organized as shown in t a b l e 3-2.

Table 3-2. Number 1 25 4 70

--

Parachute Packing Shift(l00-man) Pay g r a d e 0-3 E-5 0-2

E-3

Monthly P a y $166.67
$ 60.00

Hourly Pay .68 .24 .51 .14

8 Hour Pay $5.44 $1.92 $4.08 $1.12

$125.00 $36.00

Costs of r e ~ l a c i n gunrecovered gliders Considering t h e h u g e e f f o r t t h a t went i n t o packing parachutes a n d assembling gliders f o r Market a n d most major a i r b o r n e operations, a casual o b s e r v e r would assume a n equally h u g e e f f o r t would have gone i n t o t h e recovery of gliders a n d p a r a c h u t e s a f t e r a n operation. The c o s t associated with replacing total losses of t h e s e s y s t e m s are critical to t h i s study. The number of gliders employed in

Market,

both

U.S.

and

British, f o r t h e e n t i r e operation w a s 2,613. The total number recovered

as of 22 December 1944 was 350.11 The recovery rate from t h i s number

was 13.2 p e r c e n t f o r t h e gliders. This f i g u r e i s misleading however, a s many gliders were i n t a c t a n d serviceable following a n assault, b u t were

latar destroyed by enemy artillery f i r e o r damaged by friendly troops. The data for the f i r s t day o f Market w i l l show the numbers that landed in a serviceable condition.

o f

glidere

The situation of the ground

combat or availability of aircraft to recover the gliders or the lack of glider pilots prevented this from happening. confirming the
13.2

Applicable to this study i n large

percent recovery rate used was another

airborne operation conducted after Market. This large operation, called Operation Varsity was conducted i n March o f 1945. Varsity was an airborne assault across the Rhine r i v e r into

Germany. Because of the losses during Market, a plan was established to conduct immediate battlefield repair of the gliders and recover them across to the west bank of the Rhine for movement to the rear.12 It was an ambitious operation with cost effectiveness i n mind. A total of 839
U.S.

gliders were used i n the operation. O f these, 148 o r 16.6 percent recovered. Also, glider pilots were instructed
to

were

salvage

serviceable spare parts o f f damaged gliders. The results of this wel-e the recovery of forty-seven truckloads of spare parts and t h i r t y 1-ton trailer loads including 2,000 flight instruments and 1,273 t i r e and wheel assemblies. The British were less successful.
A total o f 416 British gliders were used, and only twenty-four

were recovered for a recovery rate of 5.8 percent. For the damaged gliders, only instruments were recovered from the Horsas as the

Ministry of A i r Production did not use other assemblies from damaged Horsas. For the Hamilcar however, major assemblies were recovered. The British usually jettisoned their

tow

ropes,

so

no t o w

ropes

were

recovered. The U.S.

glider pilots did recover many of their t o w ropes.

78

A total of 889 t o w ropes of 350-foot length were used. O f these,

360 were recovered with 288 still serviceable. The recovery rate for t o w ropes was 32.4 percent. Also, 296 t o w ropes of seventy-five foot length were used. These were f o r the double t o w and ninety of these were recovered with seventy-two serviceable for a recovery rate of 24.3

percent.13 Because of conditions of the landing zones for the British, the gliders recovered had to be dismantled and trucked to a suitable field for towing out. Parachute recovery was even less coordinated.

Costs of unrecovered aarachutes Both the U.S. and British recovered parachutes through ground salvage means with no special organization established. The U.S.

parachutes were supposed to end up i n England with the 334th o r 490th Quartermaster Companies. The British parachutes were shipped to RAF Station, cardington.14 For this study, recovery rates of sixty percent for the US. T-7 main parachute and seventy percent for the U.S. parachute, a

reserve parachute were used.

For the British X-type

recovery rate of sixty-five percent was used. O f note i n the Varsity report, was the conclusion regarding the glider pilot's recovery efforts. Even though doctrine had been establish for the glider pilot's role, mission, and function by 1945, apparently the glider pilot's recovery efforts were deemed

too

ambitious. The conclusion i n the Varsity report

was for glider pilots to, "immediately upon landing not initiate salvage operations o r guard

... f i g h t

the enemy The

equipment."15

Varsity

operation was supposed to have the benefit of lessons learned during Market.

In regard to recovery of gllders durlng Market, planners

fit

First Allied Airborne Army predicted total loss of gliders as O C C U ~ tk P ~ ~ ~ a "very high rate."16 The G-4 gliders. of the First Allied Airborne Army

predicted losses a t 1,800

I n planning, he estimated that the

minimum time for shipment o f a glider from the Port of Embarkation (POE) i n the United States was five weeks with several hundred

British production would leveled a t a awaiting shipment from the POE. l7 rate of 100 gliders per month, not enough to keep up with the rate o f loss.18 The next element of cost i s crew pay and parachute pay.

Costs of glider pilot Dav In examining the elements of cost i n regard to an airborne operation, two major areas of soldier pay enter the cost effectiveness equation. These two elements of soldier pay are the parachute hazardous duty pay entitled to the parachute troops, and the total crew pay

entitled to the glider pilots. These two areas were selected because they are additional expenditures outside of the normal regular military

compensation of the soldiers involved. The methodology i n this stud,y applies to the annual pay of both group; the glider pilot's annual crew pay, and the parachutists annual parachute pay. Although authorized hazardous duty pay i n September of 1944, the glidertroops participating i n Market did not receive it for the pay period during Market. The pay for glider pilots was established using pay tables from the documented pay tables from World War l1.I9 These tables were then applied to a typical glider unit organization. Although a glider unit

TO& was available, a interview with Doug Wilmer, author of the "Glidel80

Soldier" column i n Static Line, and S. Tipton Randolph, Secretary of the Glider Pilots Association, confirmed t h e table used in t h i s study. This was required because o f the number o f commissions handed o u t to t h e f l i g h t officers by 1 9 4 4 . ~The ~ crew pay used i n t h i s study i s shown i n Table 3-3. Table 3-3.--Glider Pilot Crew Pay Base Monthly Pay $105.00 $83.33 $62.50 $3780.00 $3000.00 $2250.00 Flight Annual crew pay

Pay Grade

Monthly Pay

Major 0-4 Captain 0-3 Lieutenant 0-2

$210.0aa $166.66~ $125.00

Flight Officer $148.0Oc $2664.00 $74.00 Note: Committee on Military Affairs, "Flying Duty Pay and Allowances," authorized officers on f l i g h t duty received 50 percent o f their base pay as f l i g h t pay, 179. aCommittee on Military Affairs, Table F-1-a, M a j o r less than 14 years of service. lbid. Captain less than 7 years of service. CCommittee on Military Affairs, Table D-1-a, Warrant officers other than Army Mine Planter Service, Flight Officer less than 4 years o f service. Costa of oarachute oav Parachute pay f o r the parachutists used a simplified formula. In World War II, officers received $100.00 per month as hazardous duty pay f o r conducting frequent parachute jumps. Enlisted soldiers received

$55.00 per month. Using these costs, it was assumed t h a t fifteen percent o f the parachutists were officers and entitled to the officer rate and the other eighty-five percent would receive the enlisted rate.

Now that all of the elements of cost effectiveness have been

identified, the study w i l l examine the glider and parachub echelono el?@ division at a time.

ENDNOTES

l ~ a m e s M. Gavin, Press, 1947), 141.

Airborne

Warfare,

(Washington:

Infantry Journal

2~nited States Army A i r Forces, lllustrtated Catalog of Clothing Eauipment, September 30, 1943, 13 3 ~ r e g o r Ferguson, The Paras: British Airborne (London: Osprey Publishing, 1984), 4. Forces

and

1940-1984,

4 ~ e p a r t m e n to f Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, (Washington: Government Printing Office,1942), 323. 5~amesE. Mrarek, Fighting Gliders of World War II, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), Appendix I I I. 6l bid. 7 ~ e r g u s o n ,The Paras: British Airborne Forces 1940-1984, 10. E. Devlin, Silent Wings, with a foreward b y General William C . 8~erald Westmoreland(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 245
9lbid.

, 244.
1942-

l g ~ r n o l dMom, parachute officer with 82nd Airborne Division, 1945, Telephone interview with author, 5 January 1991.

llwar
@(Market),

Department, 1st Allied Airborne Operations i n Holland, S~D-No!! Headquarters, 1st AAA, APO 740, 22 December 1944, 25. Headquarters, 1st

12war Department, "Report of Operation Varsity," Allied Airborne Army, APO 740, 19 May 1945, 48.

6 ~ . ~Whalley-Kelly, . Assistant Chief of S t a f f , 0-4, 1st Allied Airborne Army, Airborne memorandum t o Lieutenant Colonel Birnbaum, Deputy Chief of Staff(Plans), 1st Allied Army, subjed: "Status of Aircraft on Hand," 18 August 1944, 1 .
I7lbid.

, Enclosure "B".
76th Congress, Washington:

lg~ommittee on Military Affairs, Government Printing Office, 1940.

*as. Tipton Randolph, National World War I1 Glider Pilots Association, Telephone interview with author, 9 January, 1991, Freehold, New Jersey.

CHAPTER FOUR GLIDER AND PARACHUTE ECHELON ANALYSIS

This chapter w i l l examine each division's glider and parachute echelon f o r 17 September 1944. The f i v e elements f o r each are included

in tables followed by tables with t h e SUE comparisons. The mission o f

each division i s included as background to the analysis.

COSTS O F THE 10lst AIRBORNE DIVISION Mission o f the division 10lst Airborne Division w i l l land units i n the general area south o f UDEN, seize and hold highway crossings near NEERPELT (3596), VALKENSWAARD (4007), EINDHOVEN (4318), SON (4425), ST. OEDENRODE (4232), VEGHEL (4938), and UDEN (5343), and insure the advance o f t h e Second British ~ r m y . l

Factors affecting organization o f qlider and parachute echelons General Maxwell D. Taylor organized his available lift t o provide mobility to his division when it landed. General Taylor did n o t b r i n g his a r t i l l e r y on t h e f i r s t lifts because he believed he could use t h e B r i t i s h artillery advancing as p a r t o f Garden. The linkup was supposed to take place i n eight hours.2 Table 4-I.-UNIT lider echelon organization(l0lst Airborne) NUMBER GLIDERS 101 8 x CG-4A OF NUMBER TROOPS 44 27 O F NUMBER OF WPNS, EQUIP HHC,
ABN

SUE

15.9 16.9 12.0

8 pilots 8 pilots

4 x Jeeps, 1 x Trl 8 x Jeeps, x 37mm AT

501 Para Inf 8 x CG-4A Rest 502 Para l n f 8 x CG-4A Regt 506 Para l n f 8 x CG-4A Regt 101 Arty 326 Medical 101 Signal 101 Recon TOTALS

+
+

22

8 pilots

5 x Jeeps, 3 x cal Trls, .50

18 28 52

+8
+

pilots

6 x Jeeps, 2

13.1

x Trls,Z x.50

3 x CG-4A
6 x CG-4A 14 x CG-4A 15 x CG-4A
I

3 pilots 6 pilots

1 x Jeep 2 x Jeeps, 2 x Trls 5 x Jeeps, 3 x Trls 12 x Jeeps, 18

7.7 14.9 20.5 25.0

60 +14 pilots 60 +15 pilots

70 x CG-4A

1 311+70 pilots 1 43

2 x Trls Jeeps,

126.0

UNIT
HHC

A.

8 8 8
8

101 501

PIR
502
PIR

506

PIR
101 Arty 326 6 3

MED
101 SIG 101 recon Total A.
8.

11

15 67 53

I
3

Note: Guide to Table 4-2. Number of gliders taking off from England Number o f gliders landing on LZ without incident Number of gliders crash landing on LZ Number of gliders landing i n England Number o f gliders landing i n enemy territory(1inked up a t D+2) Number of gliders unaccounted for(Tugs shot down) Number of troops landed safely on LZ Number of Jeeps/Trailers delivered safely to LZ Number of Standard Unit Equivalents (SUE)

C.

D. E. F.
G.

H.

I.

C a ~ i t a Costs. l Gliders l 0 l s t Airborne Division Seventy x CG-4A a t $19367 each

$1,355,690

Fifty-three x CG-4A a t $19,367 each

$1,026,451

Glider Assemblv Costs l 0 l s t Airborne Division Seventy x CG-4A assembled using 300-man 8-hour shift. Twenty gliders per s h i f t

(28 hours x 300 men)= 8,400 Man-hours

Glider Pilot Traininn Costs l 0 l s t Airborne Division Seventy glider pilots(f1ew single pilot) a t $666.66 per pilot (70 x $666.66)

$46,666.20

Glider Recovery Costs l 0 l s t Airborne Division Fifty-three gliders land without incident; 13.2 percent are recovered end o f Market 19,367

seven CG-4As recoverable, the other forty-six are total loss, cost(46 x

$890,882. t h a t landed safely on

Probable recoverable gliders a t end of f i r s t day assuming ten percent damage o f t h e fifty-three

LZ = forty-eight
$329,239

recoverable; f i v e i n England recoverable;

the following gliders:

Fifty-three recoverable(tota1 loss o f 17) 17 x $19,367 Crew Pav Costs 10lst Airborne Division

Seventy glider pilots a t t h e following grade structure: 1 x 0-4 5 x 0-3

= =

$3,780(1 x 3,780)

=$3,780

$3,000(5 x 3,000) =$15,000

20 x 0-2= $2,250(20 x 2,250)

$45,000

44 x Flight Officers
TOTAL: $180,996

$2,664(44 x 2,664)

$1 17,216

WM
Table 4-3. UNIT

Echelon 101st Airborne Division

--

.ganization of Parachute Echelon l 0 l s t Airborne Number jumpers board of Number jumped 19 18 29 1967 19 18 29 1958 30 of Significant numbers SUE

on jumpers who incident

CMD GRP 101 ABN HHC 101 ABN 101 MP C O 501 PIR

0 0 0
jump injuries, 3 refusals 41 jump injuries, 18 shot i n a/c 29 jump injuries, 2 killed by props

3.8
-.
.

3.6 5.8 163.1

502 P I R

2101

2091

174.2

506 PIR

2190

2183

181.9

HHB Arty 326 Eng 326 MED 426 QM TOTAL

101

C a ~ i t a Costs l o f parachutes l 0 l s t Airborne Division 6,834 x $288

$1,968,192.00

Training costs of oarachutists l 0 l s t Airborne Division 6,834 x $46.66

$318,874.44

Packinn costs for oarachutes l 0 l s t Airborne Division 6,834 main parachutes 6,834 man-hours Pav costs of ~ a r a c h u t eDav for ~ a r a c h u t e echelon 10lst Airborne Division 6,834 parachutists; fifteen percent $110 per month(l025 x $110 $11,220 x 12 months 5,809 $3,833,940

6,834 reserves a t .5 man-hours per parachute

$1 1,22;3) x 12

$134,640.00

annual parachute pay(officet-s)

x $55 per month(5,809

x $55

$319,495.00)

$319,495.00

annual parachute pay

(enlisted)

Recoverv costs oarachutes l 0 l s t Airborne Division 6,834 main parachutes a t sixty percent recovered

4100 recovered; 27:34 recovered

total losses a t $196 each

6,834 reserve

$535,864.00 at seventy percent $188,692.00

parachutes

4783.8

recovered; 2051 total losses a t $92 each

Cost corn~arisonbetween nlider and ~ a r a c h u t e echelons

Table 4-5.-

Cost per SUE(cost element divided by total S.U.E. echelon)

Echelon

o f each

COST ELEMENT Crew/Parachute Pay per SUE Capital Equipment per SUE Training cost to deliver one SUE Assembling/Packing cost per SUE Recovery cost per SUE TOTAL

I l a l s t Glider Echelon I l 0 l s t Parachute

$2038.24 $15,266.77 $525.51 $94.59 $10,032.45 $6,826.81 $3504.61 $567.70 $12.16 $1290.16

I
$27,862.97

I
$12,189.28

COSTS OF 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION

82nd U.S. Airborne Division w i l l land by parachute and glider commencing D-day south of Nijmegen; seize and hold the highway bridges across t h e M A A S River a t GRAVES and t h e WAAL River a t NIJMEGEN; seize, organize, and hold the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEEK; deny the roads in the division area to t h e enemy and dominate key terrain.3 Factors influencina organization o f division General James M. Gavin commanded the 82nd during Market,

Based on his assessment o f t h e Normandy landings, he would parachute his forces on top of their o b j e ~ t i v e s . Gavin ~ used his small force of

gliders for delivery o f antitank weapons as the f i r s t priority as he believed these weapons critical to his mission. Oraanization of the glider echelon 82nd Airborne Division 17 Seatembel;

1 9 4 4

Table 4-6.--Glider

Echelon C ganization(821 O F NUMBER TROOPS 135 O F

Airborne) NUMBER WPNS, EQU l P 8 x 57mm AT, 9 x Jeeps, 2 x trls O F SUE

NUMBER CG-4As

Antitank 8n.

A i r Support

2 2

1 x Jeep, 1

Party 82nd Arty Hqs 82nd Recon co. 82nd Signal Company HHC, 82nd
ABN

x Trl
2 x Jeep

4 x Jeep
3 x Jeep, 3

6 12 50

x Trl
6 x Jeep, 6

x Trls

TOTAL

8 x 57mm,25
Jeeps, 13 Trls

Tabla 4-7.-

Results of

ali

sr Echelon 82nd Airborne

80th A T A i r Spt Party 82nd Arty Hqs 82nd Recon 82nd Signal HHC,82
ABN

0
2

L 2 Trls G-iT

0 0

0
0

6 . 2
1 Jeep 2 Trl

N o h The following items explain the columns of table 4-7. A. Number of Gliders aborting enroute
B. Number of glider shot down over enemy territory

C . Number of gliders destroyed on landing D. Number of gliders severely damaged on landing E .

umber

of troops safely landed on L Z

F. Number o f equipment safely on L Z

G . Standard Unit Equivalents (SUE)

Costs of glider echelon. 82nd Airborne Division C a ~ i t a Costs l for gliders used Fifty CG-4As x $19.367

$968,350

Glider Assembly costs. 82nd Airborne Division F i f t y x CG-4As assembled using 300-man 8-hour shift. Twenty hours to assemble fifty man-hours Glider Pilot Training Costs. 82nd Airborne Division F i f t y pilots(f1ew single pilot) a t cost o f $666.66 per pilot(58 x $666.66) $33,333 Glider recoverv costs 82nd Airborne Division Forty o f f i f t y gliders made landing zone, landing(assumed non-recoverable); $329,239. remainder $561,643 two others destroyed on fourteen damaged on landing, one shot down in enemy territory(loss), CG-4As, a t cost of (20 x 300) shift; 20 gliders per

6,000

seventeen total losses a t $19,367

=
=

Added to t h i s f i g u r e i s t h e thirteen percent recoverable from

(33 x 13 46)

four gliders recovered. The other twenty-nime

were total losses, t h i s means 29(29 x $19,367)

17(17 x $19,367)

$329,239

$890,882 total loss to government.

Glider crew Dav costs 82nd Airborne Division Table 4-8.-Pay Grade Crew Pay Costs(82nd Airborne) Number pilots 0-3 0-2 Flight Officer TOTAL 50 $7,914 $131,904 50 percent 3 12 36 $3,000 $2,250 $2,664 of Annual Pay Total Annual by Grade
$

Percent pay 50 percent of Pay pay as f l i g h t

9,000

$ 27,000 $ 95,904

50 percent
50 percent

Table 4-9.-UNIT

O r @ rization o f Parachute Echelon(82nd Airborne)

NUMBER TROOPS DELIVERED

MAJOR

SUE

EQUIPMENT DELIVERED

82nd Pathfinders Hqs Div 505th PIR 504th P I R 508th PIR 307th Engineers Arty Bn 82nd ABN

38 24 1.910 2,202 2,196 346

0 0 0 0 0

7.6 4.8 159.1 183.5 183.0 28.8 138.8a

0
12 x 75mm Howitzers

376th Para Field 544

12 X 75mm TOTAL 705.6 -L 7,250 %nly 10 o f t h e 12 howitzers could be assembled because o f parachute loads falling i n enemy territory. Telephone interview with Frank D . Boyd, Captain i n the 376th during Market, 28 December 1990, Overbrook,
KS.

Costs of the parachute echelon 82nd Airborne Division Capital costs o f parachubs 82nd Airborne Division 7,250 x $288

$2,088,000

Cost i n Man-hours of ~ a r a c h ~ packinn te 82nd Airborne Division 7,250 x .5 h r per main parachute

3,625 man-hours

7,250 x .5 h r per reserve parachute 7,250 x $46.66 per parachutist

3,625 man-hours

Cost i n training o f parachutists 82nd Airborne Division

$338,285

Cost o f recoverv o f parachutes 82nd Airborne 7,250 main parachutes employed; sixty percent recovered

4350

recovered; government. 7,250

2900 total loss a t $196 each

$568,400

total loss cost to

reserve parachutes employed; seventy percent recovered 2175 total loss $768,500 at $92 each

50'75 to

recovered; government.

$200,100

total

loss

Total parachute cost

Cost o f parachute pav f o r 82nd Airborne 7,250 x fifteen percent officer pay $119,680 6162 x $55 per month $1,436,160($4,066,920

1088 officers a t $110 per month

$338,910

Total annual parachute pay

$338,910 x 12 $5,503,080

$4,066,920

$119,680 x 12

+ $1,436,160) =

t o t a l annual parachute pay

Cost comparison between glider and parachute echelons 82nd Airborne

Cost Element

82nd Glider Echelon

82nd Parachute

Cost c o m ~ a r i s o nD e r m Table 4-11.-Costs Per SUE(82nd Airborne) GLIDER ELEMENT $12,859.80 $442.66 $79.60 $1751.71 $1,751.71 $26,885.37 PARACHUTE ELEMENT $2.959.18 $479.42 $479.49

COST ELEMENT Capital Cost per SUE Training Cost per SUE Assembly/Packing Cost per SUE Recovery cost per Crew/Parachute pay per SUE TOTAL Cost per SUE

-$1,089.14 $7,799.14 $12,326.90

COST O F THE BRITISH FIRST AIRBORNE DIVISION Mission of t h e 1st British Airborne Division The 1st British Airborne Division w i l l land i n t h e vicinity o f ARNHEM, seize and hold t h e r i v e r and canal crossings a t ARNHEM and establish a sufficient bridgehead f o r passage o f t h e Second British ~ r m y . ~

Factors affecting orqanization of s l i d e r a n d ~ a r a c h u * echelonGeneral Robert E. Urquhart commanded the First British

Airborne Division. His mission, as he saw it, was b not only seize t h e bridge a t Arnhem, b u t also to secure his DZs and LZs until his

subsequent lifts arrived. As Urquhart division was being employed the deepest i n t o enemy territory, aircraft.6 he received a considerable amount of

Organization o f t h e glider echelon F i r s t Airborne Division Table 4-12.-UNIT Organization o f Glider Echell ( F i r s t Airborne) NUMBER GLIDERS 1st ABN HQS 10 x CG-4A OF NUMBER TROOPS
LANDED~

SUE

O F

NUMBER WEAPONS

OF

and EQUIP 10 x Jeep, 10 Motorcycle

3 3 . 4

43

Recon Sdn Light Regiment 1st ANTITANK BTY 17th Para Field Arty

22 x Horsa 57 x Horsa 21 x Horsa

227 448

22 x Jeep 39x Jeep, 15 x Trl 21 X 61b AT

54.6 110.2

84

94.1

gun, 21 Jeep
8 x Hamilcar,3 x Horsa 16 x Horsa 110 236 16 x 75mm Howz. l8x Jeep, 10 T r l 11 x Jeep 8 x Trl 129.2

9th Field Co,

Royal Engineer 1st PARA BDE Hqs, Airland Bde 1s t Airlanding

3 3 . 4

3 x Hamilcar, 20 x Horsa 10 x Horsa 85 139 6 x S d Car,6 x Jeep 5 x Jeep, 5 x Trl 1 x Hamilcar, 56 x Horsa 1 x Hamilcar, 415 2 x S d Car 15 x Jeep, 10 x T r l 2 x S d Car, 15 x Jeep, 10 x T r l 78.5 78.5 28.8 49.6

Airlanding

56 x Horsa

Table 4-12. UNIT

-- Continued
NUMBER GLIDERS OF NUMBER TROOPS OF NUMBER WEAPONS and EQU lP 8 xJeep,8 trl 52.7 34.4 OF SUE 22 x Horsa

3rd Airlanding

LANDED~ 360

7 x Jeep
181st Airlanding Adm 1st Abn Abn Corps TOTAL and 3 Trls 7 x Horsa 106 22 228 4 x Jeep, 35 Jeep, 3 35 122.5 358 2.908 216 x Jeep, 107 Trl, 10 x S d Car, 16 x Howz,l0 x M . C . , 18 x 884.8 13.1

7 x Horsa
38 x Horsa

W i d e r pilots included in eleven-man squad count, two pilots per glider. C a ~ i t a Costs l o f British F i r s t Airborne Division Gliders A l l of t h e F i r s t Airborne's gliders reached t h e LZ, thirty-nine of the gliders were released early 345 Horsa I I x $47,039 13 Harnilcar x $101,160

, b u t the

cargo reached t h e LZ.

$16,228,455 $1,315,080

Costs of Glider Assembly F i r s t Airborne Division These costs were not applicable.

Costs o f Glider Recovery 345 x 13 percent recovered a t $14,111,700) 13 x 13 percent recovered a t $1,112,760) Total cost to government 358 x 2(dual pilot) 72 x $2,250

forty-five Horsa recovered(tota1 loss o f 3 1 8 0 two Hamilcar recovered(tota1 loss o f eleven

$15,224,460 percent 0-2 equivalent, 90

Cost o f Crew Pay for Glider Pilots(Same formula as applied to U.S.)

716 paid flyers(ten

percent f l y i n g sergeants,paid a t 1/2 rate o f US. Flight officer).

$162,000 x 12

$1,944,000

286 x $1332 x 12 Total crew pay

$15,984 $1,959,984

F i r s t British Airborne Division Cost o f Training for glider ~ i l o t s British glider pilots received eight weeks o f l i g h t plane flying, t h i s 'is assumed to increase t h e cost b y $1,000. Each glider pilot cost $1,666.66

to train.
716 x $1,666.66

$1,193,328.50

Costs o f the Parachute Echelon Table 4-13.-UNIT 12th IND P A R A CO. 1st BN Para Bde 2nd 8N Para Bde 3 r d BN Para Bde 1st BN Royal Eng Para Bde Hqs 4 Admin Company 1st Para Div Hqs Recon Sdn TOTAL Parachute Echelon SUE(First Airborne) TROOPS DELIVERED 210 510 510 510 222 128 56 85 180 2,283 SUE 19.0 46.3 46.3 46.3 20.1 24.0 11.2 17.0 16.3 246.5
.
,

, , , ,

1C 0 S S . ts

F i r s t British Airborne Division

2,283 x $241.80(.reserves n o t used) Costs to Train British Parachutists

$552,029.40

2,283 parachutists x $18.66 per British parachutist

$42,600

Costs of Recoverv for British Parachutes(65 ~ercent.1 2,283 x 65 percent =I483 recovered(800 total loss a t $241.80 each) Total loss to government

$193,440

Costs o f Parachute Pay FOP British Parachutist 2,283 x 15 percent a t officer r a t e pay 1941 x $55 a t enlisted r a t e $451.440

342 x $110

$37,620(x

12 for annual

1941 x $55

$106,755) x 12 f o r annual pay=

$1,281,060

$1,732,500

total annual parachute pay

Costs to Pack Parachutes 1st British Airborne 2,283 x .5 man-hour per parachute

1141.5 man-hours

Com~arisonBetween Parachute and Glider Echelons Table 4-14.--Comparison COST ELEMENT CAPITAL COST G COST TRAIN IN RECOVERY COST ASSEMBLY/PACK COST CREW/PARACHUTE P A Y TOTAL between echelons o f F i r s t Airborne Division GLIDER ECHELON $17,543,535 $ 1,193,328 $15,224,460 N/A $1,959.984 $35,92 1,307 PARACHUTE ECHELON $552.029
$ 46,600

$193,440 1141.5 man-hours $1,732,500 $2,524,569 1141.5 m/hr

Com~arisonBetween Parachute and Glider SUE Table 4-15.

--

Comparison of SUE(First Airborne) GLIDER ECHELON $19,827.68 $1,348.65 PARACHUTE ECHELON $2.239.47 $189.04 $784.74

COST ELEMENT Capital Cost per SUE Training Cost per S.U.E. Recovery Cost per Assembly/PacX Cost per S.U.E. Crew/Parachute Pay c o s t per S.U.E. TOTAL

I
$17,206.66

I
$2,215.17

1
I

4.6 man-hours $7,028.39

$40,598.16

1 $10,241.64

Summarv o f Costs Table 4-16.-UNIT l 0 l s t Airborne Costs per division f o r all f i v e elements per SUE GLIDER $27,862.91 and PARACHUTE $12,189.28 and

94.59 man-hours 82nd Airborne $26,885.37 and

12.16 man-hours $12,326.90 and

79.6 man-hours British 1st Airborne $40,598.16

10.27 man-hours $10,241.64 and

4.6 man-hours Total $95,346.44 and 174.19 man-hours $34,757.85 and

27.03 man-hours

ENDNOTES

l ~ a r Department, "Field Order Number 11," Operation Headquarters, l 0 l s t Airborne Divsion, 13 September 1944, 3.

Market,

2~ornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, (New York: Popular Library, 1977), 217. 3 ~ a r Department, "Field Order Number 11," Operation Market, Headquarters, 82nd Airborne Division, APO 469, 13 September 1944, 3. 4 ~ o r n e l i u sRyan, A Bridge Too Far, New York: Popular Library, 1977, 108. =war Department, "Field Order Number 11," Allied Army, 13 September 1944. 6 ~ y a n , A Bridge Too Far, 112. Operation Market, 1st

CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS A N D RECOMMENDATIONS Answerina the Research Question The research question posed i n the introduction to this study asked whether gliders were cost effective compared to parachutes on '17 September 1944 during the Market airborne operation. The research

question's framework used the five elements of cost selected as a means of measuring cost effectiveness. The five elements were equipment, training, assembly or packing, pay, and recovery. Given these five elements, gliders were not cast effective on 17 September 1944. The analysis shows gliders were almost two and one-half times more costly than parachutes for the United

States' 82nd and 10lst Airborne divisions, and almost four times more costly i n the British First Airborne division and corps headquarters units. This is a simple answer

to

complex

question

of

cost

effectiveness.

While gliders, i n this one airborne laboratory were not

cost effective, the cost elements clearly point to areas that could have been improved. For each of the elements of cost, a more detailed

conclusion for each division i s instructive.

Conclusions for the l 0 l s t Airborne DivEauipment Gliders were an expensive tool. Almost three times as much of the cost elements was spent equipping the same SUE for glider assault. Clearly, the added mobility and firepower carried by the gliders still could not increase the number of SUES to represent the glider as more cost effective than the parachute. The parachute, as used by the 10lst on 17 September 1944,

represented an inexpensive, reliable system f o r airborne assault. The requirement

to

deliver

large

number

of

troops

was

met

most

effectively, from a cost of equipping view, by the T-7 parachute and reserve.

Training The glider provided a more cost effective means of training for airborne assault. This resulted from the small number of glider pilots

needed to support the 10lst glider echelon compared to the requirement

to have qualified parachutists for the parachute echelon. Glider pilots

could be trained at a considerable savings over the costs of training each paratrooper to perform as a parachutist. I n the 10lst glider echelon, the main reason f o r training favoring the glider was single-pilot gliders. Because of the severe shortage of glider pilots, the l 0 l s t gliders were flown with only one rated pilot. The CG-4A called for two pilots, b u t the 17 September missions were flown with one rated pilot a t the controls because of the pilot shortage described i n Chapter Two.

Assembly and Packing The glider echelon required almost eight times as much manpower effort for this cost element. Even though the packing of parachutes wa.s tedious and time consuming, required

i t was insignificant compared to the

assemble gliders. The assembly line

Herculean effort

to

procedures used for the CG-4A

gliders prior to Market resulted from

poor attempts to recover gliders earlier.

E3.Y
Glider pilot pay was considerably less for the glider echelon than parachute pay was for the parachute echelon. The parachute pay alone for the l 0 l s t was three and one-half times more than the total pay for the glider pilots. Paying glider pilots was more cost effective than

paying parachutists for the same combat power delivered.

Recovery The recovery of parachutes and gliders was poor. Accordingly, the replacement costs for both were high. From a cost effectiveness view however, gliders were more expensive to replace. For the lglst, gliders were almost eight times more costly to replace than parachutes.

Conclusions for the 82nd Airborne Division

EtYui~ment As with the 10lst, equipping the glider echelon was more costly than equipping the parachute echelon. I n the 82nd, the glider echelon cost almost four and one-half times more to equip than the parachute echelon. Cost effectiveness then, favors the parachute i n this example. The disparity between the 82nd and the l 0 l s t i s because the 10lst loaded more SUEs on i t s glider echelon, specifically artillery. The

conclusion is, with the expense of the glider, the greater load it can carry for combat power on the ground, the greater its cost

effectiveness.

Training The conclusions for training are almost identical for the 82nd and the 10lst. Again, using single-pilot gliders resulted in a more effective approach to airborne assault. The small number of glider pilots used to deliver a large number of troops and equipment with the attendant value i n SUEs indicates it was more cost effective to train the glider pilots than the parachutists.

Assembly and Packing Identical to the lmlst, the assembly of gliders for the 82nd

required eight times as much manpower as that required for the packing of parachutes t o achieve the same relative capability on the ground. The

glider assembly effort required a tremendous amount of work compared

to the packing of parachutes.

w
Paying the glider pilots cost less than paying the parachutists to achieve the same capability on the ground. For the 82nd, the singlepilot solution assured cost effectiveness. Using only one pilot to f l y the gliders demonstrated that under the daylight conditions of Market, it was the most cost effective approach.

Recovery The same recovery rate for gliders and parachutes as i n the 10l:st resulted i n a higher cost for replacing the gliders abandoned during Market. The 82nd made no effort to recover either parachutes or

gliders to a rate that would have prevented having to buy them again. The unit did not safeguard or attempt to retrieve either gliders or parachutes on 17 September 1944.

Conclusions for the British 1st Airborne

Eaui~ment British gliders, although more capable in delivering payload than

U.S.

gliders, were nine times more costly to employ than parachutes t~

achieve the same capability on the ground. The reason for this was the attendant higher cost per glider for the Horsa I I and Hamilcar. British gliders also were compared against the reliable British X-type parachute. 108

This parachute was more cost effective because it was lower i n price, used no reserve, and was highly reliable. The obvious conclusion i s that reserve parachutes not only increase cost with no increase i n capability, but the reserve parachute may have psychological

effectiveness instead of cost effectiveness.

Training The British approach to training glider pilots as thoroughly as powered pilots drove the costs of their training to a level comparable that o r greater than any rated aviator i n the RAF.

to

When this i s

compared to the training of parachutists qualified from balloons, the British glider pilot program was not cost effective. The same capability for delivering combat power to the ground could be achieved at cost almost seven times less by training

parachutists. This was particularly true considering the British use of balloons, and the balloon's low cost as a training device, when compared
t o the cost of training the British glider pilot who could perform many

missions such as powered pilot o r infantryman.

The British glider echelons launching their assault during Market were fortunate i n that their gliders were delivered w i t h no assembly required. The British parachute packing effort was also smaller than the
U.S.

effort because the reserve parachute was not used, so only half as main and

many parachutes needed to be packed compared with the U.S. reserve parachutes.

m
The British crews during Market flew with two rated glider pilots a t the controls. Accordingly, the glider pilot pay was greater than i n the U.S. glider echelons. Even with two pilots per glider however, the times more costly than glider

parachute pay was three and one-half

pilot pay to achieve the same capability on the ground. From a cost effective view considering pay, the glider pilot W i n s clearly more cost effective. The reason for this i n the First Airborne division was the thousands of parachutists receiving jump pay compared with the several hundred glider pilots, many of whom were NCOs.

Cost Effective Summarv Lord Kelvin once observed, "Large increases in cost with

questionable increases i n performance can be tolerated only for rac:e horses and fancy women."l Perhaps gliders fall under Kelvin's remark

t 4 0 , when seen across all five elements of cost used i n this study, b ~ ~ t
several salient issues surface from glider and parachute employment on

17 September 1944.
Most important were the related issues of equipping and

recovering the glider force. Gliders were treated as expendable aircraft during the assault phase of the airborne operation, b u t transformed into critical recoverable items afterwards. Parachutes similarly suffered the same fate. The difference was the capital costs for the gliders. Gliders cost too much for a single use.
If gliders were t r u l y a single-use

aircraft, then they should have been designed with only one assault i n mind. This was not done.

If however, gliders were envisioned as multiple mission assault aircraft, the recovery rates should have been higher i n an attempt to r e t u r n many gliders to service as possible. This did not happen as many gliders were abandoned on landing zones and others friendly troops or enemy action. The solution would destroyed

by

have been a

concerted, coordinated attempt to immediately recover as many gliders as the tactical situation allowed. The recovery of only 350 gliders from the entire Market operation points to this expensive t o leave behind. Many parachutes were left behind also, but a significant deficiency. Gliders were

too

conclusion from the British use of the X-type parachute can be made. This parachute was more cost effective than the U.S. T-7 parachute and

its reserve. The conclusion i s that a single, highly reliable personnel

parachute i s more cost effective than a main and reserve parachute combination. The issue of training the glider or parachute force from this study provides two straightforward conclusions. First i s the single-pilot technique used by the U.S. the CG-4A glider pilots. Although a two-pilot aircraft, i n combat, by a single-pilot. The

was successfully flown,

training implication i s obviously that it was

more cost effective t o

single-pilot aircraft during this operation. Second, the British use of balloons to qualify parachutists reduced costs with no apparent decrease i n effectiveness. Regarding the glider assembly and parachute packing, the

conclusion i s that the assembly of the CG-4As required huge assets i n manpower and time. These manpower assets could have contributed to
11 1

Market besides putting gliders together. The British, while not having t o transport Horsa and Hamilcar gliders from the United States, did have the judgement to assemble their gliders at the factory and test f l y them enroute to airborne units. The conclusion regarding pay i s that it cost a lot to have highly qualified individuals for an airborne assault capability. Whether thoeie individuals are a small number of glider pilots o r the thousands crf troops receiving jump pay i s a subject for further study, b u t i n thfs study the glider pilot was more cost effective i n terms of pay. Although gliders were not found to be cost effective, b u t th-is

study holds historical, operational, and future significance. These areas contribute to the body of knowledge about airborne operations.

Studv Recommendations The five elements of cost used i n this study should be used for accurate measurement of any assault system. While this study focused
0.1

a single day of a major airborne operation, the five elements of cost could be applied to any major assault by air, land o r sea. The Standard Unit Equivalent
(SUE)

be

used for

study

in

comparison of weapons systems. The SUE used i n this study measured the value of selected weapons systems against the value of a rifle squad. Similar comparisons could be developed from other weapons and assault systems. The $5,000 glider model described i n this study represents a

retrospective view of a cost effective system of airborne assault. Tho lesson for future planners i s that a design that accounts for cost and i s

112

capable of providing a tactical use on the ground a t lower cost w i l l be more cost effective.
If t h e requirements for gliders could have been

formulated early i n the war i n terms o f mission and duration, t h e $5,000 glider could have been achieved.
A clear statement o f the required

operating capability and capital cost limit i s mandatory i n any assault system. Sianificance of Conclusions

Historical significance As a review of the tactics and techniques employed by the F i r s t Allied Airborne points.
All

Army

during

Market,

this

study

reinforced several

three

division

commanders with

organized their

their

glider mission

and and

parachute echelons available aircraft.

i n accordance

assigned

M a j o r considerations were the expected size of the

enemy force on the ground,

size of

drop and landing zones,

and

requirements f o r speed i n seizing objectives.

If t h e British had used i t s leading glider echelons to land closer

to the division's objective o f the Arnhem bridges. This was within the
capability of the British glider force, and suitable landing zones were available. attention. For the U.S. divisions, more artillery could have been delivered on the initial assault. I n examining the glider loads o f the U.S. 82nd and Selection o f landing zones should have received greater

10lst Airborne divisions, more SUES could have been achieved by the glider echelons if more artillery went 113 i n on September 17th. The

subsequent weather problems prevented a significant amount of combat

power from reaching the divisions i n time. More SUES and hence, mol-e combat power could have been delivered by increasing the number af 75mm pack howitzers o r 37mm anti-tank weapons going i n on the 17th.

This would have also been i n accordance with guidance from leaders such as General Gavin who gave an order of priority for what types of equipment were important for a glider to carry. The recovery issue has already been addressed, b u t deserves

mention again here. The Market gliders, most for sound tactical reasons, were essentially abandoned. These same gliders however, became critical

to future operations. So critical, that an attempt was made i n December

of 1944 to retrieve any l e f t i n Holland for trapped paratroopers at Bastogne, Belgium use i n resupplying the during the German's

Ardennes Offensive. Perhaps an effort to recover these gliders earlier would have greater results later than leaving them behind.

Operational Sinnificance Operationally, this study provides important conclusions

fcr

training and equipping airborne forces.

I n equipment, the lesson ,is

clear. Leaders i n airborne units must consider safeguarding parachutes and other pieces of airborne equipment having any potential for future use. I n training, the British use of balloons to qualify parachutists provides an example of a cost effective means to accomplish training. . t i s important because the same capability was achieved by using balloons as the U.S. achieved by using aircraft. The savings i n using balloons
114

were considerable, and no evidence existed that the British parachutists were any less capable than U.S. parachutists i n jumping from aircraft.

Future Sinnificance This study does recommend bringing back the glider. If however, the glider was reexamined as a strategic, tactical, or special operations a i r l i f t concept, lessons from this study w i l l prevent the s h e mistakes made i n 1944 from happening again. I n consideration o f the cost of gliders, design-to-cost would assure cost effectiveness such as the technology

$5,000

glider described i n

this study. I n the era of composite material technology, low-observable stealth aircraft, and small suites of lightweight countermeasures

equipment, the survivable glider i s well within reach, b u t at what cost? The answer i s i n a design-to-cost approach that determines how many

times a glider i s used, and designing the glider with that number i n mind. For example, if a glider i s used j u s t once, why have a landing hundreds of uses as i n a conventional

gear designed to withstand

aircraft? The Germans began to see this early i n World War II when they studied what components of their gliders most frequently were

broken i n landings. They accordingly concentrated only on making those parts that failed the most. The Germans realized it was not cost broke on

effective to replace entire gliders when only the wheels gliders under normal conditions.

A future glider could employ such concepts as discard-at-failure

maintenance where a failed component i s economically discarded.

115

This

reduces costly spares, record keeping, high-skill maintenance and other costly functions associated with other aircraft. A no-adjustment dedgn could also be used as a goal for a future glider. prevents the increased chance of error with each Such a design adjustment or

maintenance action. Such goals would greatly reduce the capital cost of a glider. While a true expendable aircraft i s probably beyond current technology, a cost effective glider is within -reach. Several other

concepts from this study are equally important. As shown i n the SUE comparisons, a glider i s most cost effective when it provides some capability greater than the t u g aircraft. The CQ-4 glider could not carry the same number of troops as the C-47 aircraft, b u t it made up for this by carrying artillery, jeeps, and other valuable equipment not capable of delivery by the C-47.
A future glider must

provide more capability than available by existing aircraft. One capability a future glider would provide i s a low-cost method of delivering tanks to future contingency locations. The future glider could be designed to carry one or more armored vehicles and towed behind a C-5 or C-141 aircraft. Such gliders could theoretically glide a landing zone from 20 miles o r more.2
A question for the fielding of such a glider i s who would s i t a t

t o

the controls? Both the Army and A i r Force would have an interest i n such a glider, b u t as a matter of doctrine, the A i r Force should f l y it:. The A i r Force pilots who f l y this glider should be trained cargo pilots with the glider as an additional aircraft qualification. This i s the most cost effective approach because the pilot could be employed as a tu3 pilot also.
A

possible

alternative
116

for

transport

gliders

is

remot?

controlled f l i g h t f o r gliders carrying only tanks o r other equipment. These could be flown from the cockpit of the t u g aircraft.

relations hi^ to Previous Studies

A Model f o r success

The studies described i n Chapter Two did not detail the elements of cost for a specific operation as this study does. The elements of cost i n t h i s study point out areas f o r improvement. These areas, if improved could have demonstrated t h e glider was more cost effective than t h e parachute. Although highly speculative, if the U.S. could have designed requiring almost no

a glider with a capital cost of less than $5,000

assembly, the glider echelon would have been cost effective as defined by this study. For example, if Table 5-1 for t h e 82nd Airbor.nels glider glider, the glider

echelon i s compared with a like table using a $5,000 results as more cost effective as shown i n Table 5-2.

Table 5-I.--

Cost per

E UE(82nd Airborne 17 September 1944)

GLIDER ECHELON $12,859.80 $442.66 $79.60

COST ELEMENT Capital Cost per SUE Training Cost per SUE Assem bly/Packing Cost per SUE Recovery SUE Crew/Parachute per SUE Total Pay Cost per

PARACHUTE ECHELON $2,959.18 $479.42 $10.27

Table 5-2.--

Glider Model f o r Cost Effectiveness(82n'd Airborne) GLIDER ECHELON $3320.05a $442.66 $10.00 PARACHUTE ECHELON $2,959. 18 $479.42 $10.27
-.

COST ELEMENT Capital Cost per SUE Training Cost per SUE Assembly-Packing Cost per SUE Recovery Cost per

~2888.44~

$1,589.14

Crew/Parachuta per S.U.E.

Pay

$1,751.71

$7,799.14

$8402.86 Total $12,326.88 aAssumes a cost o f $5,000 per glider using 50 gliders c a r r y i n g 75.3 S.U.E.

busing a recovery rate o f 13 percent of the 50 gliders recovered, the remainder replaced a t a cost o f $5,000 each. As t h e introduction to the glider equipment problem explained in Chapter One, the U.S. glider procurement program in World War II was glider however, was probably

not a well coordinated plan. The $5,000 well within the reach o f U.S. firms

manufacture. By employing woodworking

not involved i n the war e f f o r t as t h e British did, and using less

metal except i n the nose and floor sections, a $5,000 cost might have been possible. If t h e $5,000 glider had been delivered i n a configuration suited f o r rapid, low-skill assembly it could have been assembled i n less time than was used by the assembly lines employed i n England. The glider mechanic's time could have been spent preparing the glider for f l i g h t instead of putting t h e pieces together. Another caveat f o r the glider program would have been to establish a number f o r the assault landings a glider could log before it was considered expended. As an example, eight major combat glider assaults were flown i n World War 1 1 . ~ Using t h i s f i g u r e plus two extra flights f o r training, t h e $5,000 glider could have had a service l i f e o f ten assaults.
A similar model f o r a cost effective glider can be constructed

using the parachute echelon from the 10lst Airborne on 17 September 1944. The 10lst parachuted successfully 6,809 parachutists t h a t day.

For purposes o f t h i s study, assume t h a t the CG-13, a forty-passenger glider, o f which 81 were i n Europe during Market, cost $11,000.
The

savings are not only i n equipping costs, b u t t h e attendant savings i n fewer glider pilots t o t r a i n and overall fewer gliders t o purchase.

Assume also that each glider

has two ratad glider

pilots,

and the

recovery rate i s f i f t y percent for the 171 gliders required

to dellvor

the 6,809 parachutists the 10lst parachuted in Market on 17 September

1944. This theoretical $11,000 glider also requires five men working five
hours to assemble it. Table 5--3. Cost to Deliver 6,809 by Parachute or Glider based on 10lst Parachute Echelon i n Market. COST ELEMENT Equipping Training Assembly-Packing Paying Recovery TOTAL

6,809 Glider Troops

I

6,809 Parachutists

$1,881.000 $1 13,482 4275 man-hours $883,260 $940,500 $3,818,242

and

$1,968,192 $318.874 6,834 man-hours $3,833,940 $724,556

4275 $6,845,562

and

6,834

man-hours man-hours Note: Not included in the glider column are the 342 glider pilots who could increase the combat strength on the ground by 28.5 SUE 'if employed as infantry. Although the model i n Table 5-3 i s a simple one assuming a

$11,000 forty-place glider, it does demonstrate that cost effectiveness

was possible i s glider costs could have been reduced and recovery rates increased. The limiting factor i n using glider's for airborne assault was i t s cost effectiveness. The glider demonstrated it could land combat power-more combat power than the parachute, and land
it

quietly

and

accurately. The glider's cost and its low return on that cost prevented

it from being effective when compared to the parachute as a means for

airborne assault. What about f u t u r e airborne assaults? Given t h a t parachute assault
w i l l remain a capability o f U.S. forces, does t h e glider concept offer any

increase i n capability today? The glider certainly does offer increased capability if cost effective issues such as the ones raised i n this study are used as a measuring tool. If a cost effective glider were developed,
it would give t r u e

forced e n t r y capability to all Army forces. No longer tied to the expense of parachute delivery, all Army divisions could conduct a forced entry i n hostile territory. If the tank-carrying glider were perfected, it would give armor forces a reach not presently available. other benefits as well. I n an era ~f long range missiles and chemical weapons being viewed as "poor-man's nukes" i n reference to their lethality a t less The glider offers

cost, the glider also has a role i n this form of warfare as well. The glider could become a "poor-man's strategic airlift." The same

components are present i n the glider concept. The glider would offer greater capability a t less cost allowing a poorer nation t o possess

greater a i r l i f t capability a t a tactical and strategic level than available i n present systems. I n cost alone, the glider if properly developed, could offer

tremendous payoff to nations less capable of paying for expensive forms of aircraft, j u s t as was done by the Germans after World War I.

Recommendations for Further Study Strateaic, tactical, and s ~ e c i a o~erations l use Perhaps the glider could be brought back and could contribute V n each o f the three areas o f airlift requirements. The three areas,

strategic, tactical, and special operations, were all served by some type of glider use i n World War II. For each of these areas, a future glider could possibly serve. For strategic airlift, the glider could offer a cost effective

airframe for moving tanks to contingency areas. The glider could be

o designed to carry a tank and equipment. This glider would not need t
be used i n an assault role, b u t could cheaply be towed behind C-5A and C-141 B aircraft overseas. I n tactical airlift, prepositioned gliders could provide in-theater airlift for some troops and equipment at a considerable savings of having fleets of C-130 moved overseas. O f course, the t u g aircraft still would need to arrive in-theater, b u t the glider could provide back-up tactical airlift.
If current doctrine assumes that the Army's only airborne division

is the only u n i t providing a forced entry capability and that forced entry capability exists because of the parachute, then look a t the coot of maintaining a parachute division. This study has already shown the huge costs of training, equipping, and paying the parachute force.
A t

division level, this cost is significant, and the capability i s only i n one division. Perhaps gliders could give a forced entry capability to any division. Gliders could carry troops and equipment of any of the Army's 122

several light divisions on a forced entry mission, and probably with the same capability and less cost. The most significant contribution a future glider could have i s to the special operations forces. The units have a requirement for swift

and silent entry into target areas. A well designed, cost effective the glider could serve as a stealth platform of significant capability.

In

each of these areas, a feasibility study similar to the strategic

a i r l i f t concepts study examined i n Chapter One would serve to develop a future glider. This study should have cost effectiveness as i t s charter and stealth technology as its ultimate goal. World War I I glider-tug combinations Another recommendation is the study a various glider-tug

combinations employed i n World War I I. Various mixes of fighter aircraft and attachments for gliders would provide an revealing historical study. Glider Pilot use The glider pilot was the most interesting component of this study. The Army never had a clear idea of what his role, mission, and function was i n combat. This author has interviewed several and was struck by

the lack of guidance most glider units received. One thing i s clear however, the World War I I glider pilot was brave beyond measure and flew an expedient aircraft under demanding conditions. The glider pilot frequently fought i n ground combat and many times his only reward was
to strap himself i n another

glider bound for action.

Although many

authors have told his story, the glider pilot's ground combat role would provide an historical study of a particularly elite group of flyers.

Elements of Cost What about the elements of cost used i n this study? As a tool for the measurement of cost effectiveness, they are suitable for other assault systems as well as the glider and parachute. A l l five elements accurately measured the cost of glider and parachute assault while at the same time quantifying relative combat power by using the SUEs. What the

SUEs and the five elements of cost provided was the benefit of coupling combat effectiveness with cost effectiveness.
If the same amount of

combat power i s p u t on the ground by either a glider or parachute echelon, then the least expensive system i s the recommended choice. The elements of cost provided the mechanism for this decision. These same cost elements could apply to other assault systems as well.

Summary This study has examined two methods of airborne assault, the glider and the parachute. These methods were compared to each other using a combat model. This model was the Market airborne operation conducted on 17 September 1944 by the First Allied Airborne Army into enemy territory i n Holland during World War 11. Five elements of cost were selected as the yardstick to measure the effectiveness of the glider and parachute echelons as they were actually organized and employed i n the airborne assault. From the perspective of these elements of cost, the glider fell short of the parachute as a coat effective assault system.
124

The major reasons f o r the glider airborne laboratory as a cost

not performing i n the Market system compared

effective

to

the

parachute was its high cost and low recovery rates. This resulted i n the glider being a expensive piece of airborne equipment that required almost complete fleet replacement after each operation. Reasons for the

glider's high cost were a scandalous procurement program and a poor early vision of its intended employment. The low recovery rates resulted from airborne planners failing to appreciate the utility of the glider as a reusable i t e m of airborne equipment. Several areas of comparison between glider and parachute employment i n the this study are important f o r cost effectiveness. The British use of the X-type parachute and wooden gliders were effective. The huge costs of paying an airborne division surfaced i n this study as well as the hidden costs of assembling gliders and packing parachutes t o

achieve a vertical assault capability. I n summary, the glider as compared with the parachute i n the f i r s t day of Market was not cost effective.

ENDNOTES

R. Augustine, Aueustine's Laws. l~orman 1986), 131.

(New York: Penguin Books,

2~dwin C. Parrish I I I, "Glider Delivery of the M1 Abrams," unpublished article submitted to &my magazine, 11. 3~oug Wilmer, "Glider Pilot" i n USA Airborne Fiftieth Anniversary 1940-1990. (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 1990), 386.

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Periodicals and Art-

Conley, Manuel. "Silent Squadrons." 15, Number 4, June 1983, 12-21.

American History Illustrated

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Fisher, Ernest K. "Evolution of U.S. Airborne Doctrine.". Review, Volume 51, Number 5, (May 1971), 68-74.

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Flanagan, Edward M. "Death of t h e Glider." I n f a n t r y School Q u a r b z ! Volume 38, Number 1 , (January 1951), 90-99. Gavin, James M. "The Future o f Airborne Operations." Volume 27, Number 9, (December 1947), 3-8. Military Re.vie&

Horn, William K. Editor and Publisher, Silent Wings. Dallas, Texas: Silent Wings Incorporated, Volumes 17-18. Huston, James A. "Thoughts on t h e American Airborne E f f o r t i n World War I I." M i l i t a r y Review, Volume 21, Number 1, (April 1951), 3-14. Janes Defense Weeklv, "The Case For The Ultralight." (17 November 1990), 987. Lewis, Robert D . "Pegasus Bridge-- Prelude to D-Day." Special Warfare, Volume 2 , Number 2, F o r t Bragg, N.C.: J.F.K. Special Warfare Center and School, (Spring, 1983), 42-45. Maire, Roman W. "Airborne Cargo." I n f a n t r y Journal, Volume LXIV, Number 2, (February 1949), 13-15. Seaman, Mark. "Pegasus Bridge." Strategv and Tactics, Number 122 (November-December 1988), 19-23.

Swing, Joseph L. "The Airborne Outlook." Penasus (April 1950): 13-15. U n ~blished u Materials

Volume 15, Number 4

Alley, Herman L. Battery commander, 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion and Market participant. Letter t o author, Brownwood, Texas, 16 December 1990. Boyd, Frank, D. Command liaison officer, 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion and Market participant. Letter to author, Overbrwk, Kansas, 16 December 1990. Elliot. P.J.V. Librarian, Hendon Royal A i r Force Museum. Letter to author, Hendon, London, England, 5 March 1991. Foot, H . W . Archivist, Museum o f Army Flying. Letter to author, Middle Wallop, Stockbridge, Hampshire, England, 24 March 1991. auemelata, Charles F. A i r Depot Group, ETO. Letter to author, Bellevue, Ohio, 22 December 1990. Moen, Arnold. Parachute officer, 82nd Airborne Division and Market participant. Telephone interview with author, Madison, Wisconsin, 3 January 1991. Mrazek, James E. Author and glider authority. Bethesda, Maryland, 25 January 1991. Letter to author,

Parrish, Edwin, C. Ill. "Glider Delivery of t h e M1 Abrams." unpublished article submitted to Armv magazine, December 1990. Randolph, Tipton S. National Secretary, World War I I Glider Pilots Association and Market participant. Telephone interview with author, Freehold, New Jersey, 3 January 1991. Samek, Michael J. Assistant operations officer (Glider Operations), 51st Troop Carrier Wing. Letter to author, New York, New York, 16 January 1991. Schmidt, Charles D. Jr. T r w p Carrier Group, Pacific. Lowell, Ohio, 8 January 1991. Letter t o author,.

Shettle, Charles G . "British Airborne Doctrinal Lecture Notes." British School o f Land/Air Warfare, 25 January 1954, i n Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, F o r t Leavenworth, KS. 66027. Wilmer, Doug. Author and glider authority. Telephone interview with author, Conyers, Georgia, 3 January, 1991.

Wootton, Angela M. Department of Printed Books, Imperial War Museum. Letter to author, London, England, 19 March 1991, Other Sources "Some Problems i n Cost Analysis." Research Paper P-186, Abert, J.C. Washington: Institute for Defense Analysis, Research and Engineering Support Division, June 1965. Augustine, Norman R. -ustine's Laws. New York: Penguin Books, 1986.

Ayling, Keith. They Fly To Fight. New York: D Appleton-Century Company, 1944. Blair, Clay. Ridgwav's Paratroo~ers. New York: Doubleday and Company,

1985.
Blount, Charles W. Glider pilot, 61st Troop Carrier Squadron i n World War II. Independence, MO. 64052. Brucer, Marshall. A Historv of the Airbor_neCommand. Sharpsburg, Maryland: Antietam National Museum, 1989. Chatterton, George. Wings of Peaass. Nashville: The Battery Press, 1982. Conway, John P. Combat Glider Historian. 4143 Holly, Kansas City, MO.

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Craven, W . F . The Army A i r Forces i n World War I I . Volume I1 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. Dank, Milton. _The Glider Ganq. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott Company,

1977.
Devlin, Gerald M. k r a t r w ~ e r ! The Saga of U.S. Armv and Marine Parachute and Glider Combat TrOODS During World War II. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Devlin, Gerald M. Silent Winqs. w i t h a foreward by General William C. Westmoreland. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Emme, Eugene M. The l m ~ a c of t Air~ower.New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand and Company, 1959. Ferguson, Gregor. The Paras: British Airborne Forces 1940-1984. London: Osprey Publishing, 1984. Flanagan, E. M. The Anne&. Novato: Presidio Press, 1989.

Gavin, James M. On To Berlin. New York: The Viking Press, 1978.

133

Gavin, James M. 1947.

Airborne Warfare. Washington: Infantry Journal Press:. Box 775, Terrell, Texas.

Glider Pilot Museum. P.O.

Hagen, Louis. Arnhem Lift. Edinburgh, England: Morrison and Qibb, 1953. Hickey, Michael. Out of the Sky. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1979.

" The Role of Costs i n Army Hoeber, Francis P . and Karahere, Alvin. Allocation of i t s Resources." S t a f f Memorandum, Chev y Chase, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office,, 16 November 1953.
Hubbert, Christopher. The Battle of Arnhem. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962. Huston, James A. Out of the Blue. West Layfayette, Indiana: Purdue University, 1972. McDonough, James L. and Gardner, Richard S. Skv Riders: Historv of 327/401 Glider Infantry. Nashville: The Battery Press, 1980.

the

McQuillen, John A. "American Military Gliders i n World War II i n Europe." Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University, 1975. Miksche, Ferdinand 0. par at roo^^. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1949. Mrazek, James E. Fighting Gliders of World War II. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. Pappalardo, Bruno. Search Department, U.K. Public Records Office. Letter t o author. Chancery Lane, London WC2A, and Ruskin Avenue, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU. Ryan, Cornelius.
A Bridge Too Far.

New York: Popular Library, 1977.

Stanton, Shelby L. Order of Battle. United States A r m y World War II. Novato: Presidio Press, 1984. Taylor, H. A. A i r s ~ e e dAircraft S i n c e m . London: Putnam and Company, 1970. Thetford, Owen. Putnam, 1962. Aircraft of the Roval A i r Force Since 1918. London:

Urquhart, Robert E. Arnhem. London: Pan Books Limited, 1960. Weeks, John. Airborne Equi~ment:A Historv of its DeveloDinent. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1976.

Wilmer, Doug.

"Glider Pilot," i n USA Airborne Fiftieth Anniversar 1940-1990. Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing Company, 1%

-@f

the 81st T r o o ~ Carrier-adron T.eI1 Wolfe, Martin. Green Liqht!-of Their Story. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989. Wright, Lawrence. The Wooden Sword. London: Elk Books Limited, 1967.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST Catherine H.T. Foster, COL 8760 Chestnut Circle Kansas City, MO 64131 Charles W. Blount 1404 W. 28th Terrace Independence, MO 64052 Combined Arms Research Library U S . Army Command and General Staff College F o r t Leavenworth, K S 66027-6900 Defense Technical I nformation Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22314 Edwin C . Parrsih I l l U.S. Army Recruiting Command F o r t Sheridan, IL 60037-4000 Frank D. Boyd Box 138 Overbrwk, K S 66524 Hendon Royal A i r Force Museum Hendon, London N W 9 5 1 1 Imperial War Museum Lambeth Road London SEl 6HZ
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