William of Ockham

Praca stanowi skrótowy, acz całościowy opis poglądów czternastowiecznego filozofa franciszkańskiego Wilhelma Ockhama na kwestię władzy, tak świeckiej, jak duchownej. Poglądy Ockham ukazane są w kontekście filozofii politycznej dojrzałego i późnego średniowiecza.

This is a dissertation dealing with problem of  William of Ockham's concepts of spiritual and temporal powers. Ockham's ideas are shown in wider context of late medieval political philosophy. [Text in Polish only]

In this volume, Reiner Schürmann develops the idea that, in between the spiritual Carolingian Renaissance and the secular Humanist Renaissance, there was a distinctive Medieval Renaissance connected with the rediscovery of Aristotle. Focusing on Thomas Aquinas’s ontology and epistemology, William of Ockham’s conceptualism, and Meister Eckhart’s speculative mysticism, Schürmann shows how thought began to break free from religion and the hierarchies of the feudal, neo-Platonic order and devote its attention to otherness and singularity. A crucial supplement to Schürmann’s magnum opus Broken Hegemonies, Neo-Aristotelianism will be essential reading for anyone interested in the rise and fall of Western principles, and thus in how to think and act today

La comprensión del concepto de "teología natural" , a lo largo de su multisecular historia, ha sufrido variaciones sustanciales que afectan, sobre todo, a la importante cuestión del denominado "conocimiento natural de Dios" y su correspondiente de acceso del ser humano a la divina Revelación". Tras largos siglos en que la theologia naturalis no era sino filosofía, el concepto —que no la expresión— adquirió su justo significado en la admirable síntesis de santo Tomás de Aquino como conocimiento de Dios fruto de una reflexión en que está presente la divina Revelación principalmente como fundamento de la misma, aunque pueda no aparecer en ella como dato. Analizamos en estas páginas cómo el proceso desencadenado con la reivindicación nominalista a partir de la decadencia de la Escolástica, con Guillermo de Ockham como paladín, se prolonga hasta el siglo XX influenciando de modo decisivo la verdadera comprensión de la teología natural. The understanding of the concept of "natural theology" over the course of its centuries old history has undergone substantial variations, affecting, mainly, the important issue of the so called "natural knowledge of God" and its corresponding "access of the human being to divine Revelation." After long centuries, in which theologia naturalis was nothing more than philosophy, the concept—but not the expression—acquired its rightful meaning in the admirable synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas as the knowledge of God fruit of reflection in which Divine Revelation is present principally as the foundation of the same, even though it may not appear in it as data. In these pages, we will analyse how the process triggered by the nominalist claim since the decline of Scholasticism, with William of Ockham as champion, lived on to the twentieth century, decisively influencing the true understanding of natural theology.

Contrariamente a lo que podría parecer, en la reflexión filosófica y teológica actual se encuentran aún ejemplos vivos de tendencias fuertemente influenciadas por un característico extrinsecismo de raíz nominalista que pretende presentar como normal una verdadera separación material bajo las apariencias de una simple distinción formal entre la razón y la fe en el conocimiento natural de Dios. Los reduccionismos en este ámbito resultan especialmente claros al analizar el concepto de «præambula fidei». Existen dos corrientes principales por lo que respecta a la comprensión de este concepto en el acto de fe: una pretende ver en él una instancia autosuficiente o autorreferencial en relación a la fe, una causa extrínseca al acto de fe; la otra comprende que sólo puede tratarse de una «condición de posibilidad» para el acto de fe, como el terreno lo es en relación a la germinación de la semilla en la parábola del sembrador.

5 For Thomas Aquinas, economic transactions, as human interactions, cannot be 6 separated from ethics. Since the human being flourishes through virtuous living 7 and strives to flourish, virtues are just as much of relevance to business as they 8 are to every other sphere of human conduct. Moral objectives are neither 9 external nor marginal to economics. Instead, they are fundamental in order to 10 understand central human motivation behind the production and exchange of 11 goods. Business has a social purpose; it is to serve the common good. Thus, 12 Thomas limits the quantitative pursuit of profit by qualitative concerns for 13 human well-being and establishes a hierarchy of life-promoting goods (as 14 ends) that business (as a means) is to procure. On this basis, he develops a rich 15 economic ethics that spells out how business should be informed by virtues and 16 conducted in the light of the idea of social justice. Private property and corporate 17 wealth have to serve all members of society and must be used with respect to the 18 human dignity of each. This, Thomas argues, holds true across time and culture. 19 Irrespective of the requisite specifications that context and circumstance 20 demand, he defends the general orientation of business and the economy toward 21 human well-being and dignity as of global reach and universal validity.

Revista Aproximação - Volume 9 – Edição 2015/01
A Revista Aproximação é uma publicação acadêmica eletrônica especializada em Filosofia. Seu objetivo principal é veicular o trabalho de pesquisa dos graduandos da UFRJ. Estamos abertos, entretanto, a qualquer proposta cujo principal interesse seja o da pesquisa filosófica.

1. Anselmo: uma teologia sola ratione Anselmo (1035Anselmo ( -1109 é, sem dúvida, um dos principais representantes do teísmo medieval, como um teísmo filosófico, porque procurou compreender racionalmente, tão profunda e extensivamente quanto possível, toda a temática vigente a respeito de Deus, da existência e essência, à unitrindade e encarnação. Compreender racionalmente significa questionar para sustentar em razões e Anselmo nunca recuou neste processo, apesar do cepticismo que a sua audácia racional o levou também a experimentar. A questão e a defesa argumentada da existência de Deus desenvolvem-se nos dois primeiros escritos: Monologion e Proslogion. No primeiro, o autor argumenta a favor da existência de Deus, como bem supremo, como grandeza suprema, como ente supremo e como natureza suprema: são as quatro vias anselmianas do Monologion. No segundo, o autor argumenta a favor da existência real e necessária de Deus, como algo maior do que o qual nada possa ser pensado: é a quinta via anselmiana, ou o argumento único do Proslogion.

This paper outlines a few strategies for reading Meister Eckhart’s famous sermon on the first beatitude (Pr. 52). It looks at the political and ecclesiastical background of Eckhart’s teaching on poverty, some ways to manage the role of paradox in his preaching, and how to navigate tensions between the spirit and the letter of his text.

Lecture, Thomas Aquinas College, March 29th, 2019

Martin Luther rejects Aristotelian ethics as being self-centered, but his rejection is based on a misunderstanding of the relation of the faculties of the soul to the goods that perfect them.

En este capítulo defenderé la tesis de que la teoría de la verdad de Ockham es pragmática y pro-oracional. Con lo primero quiero decir que, para Ockham, la verdad no depende de que se establezca una cierta relación semántica (representacional, por ejemplo) entre un enunciado -el truth-bearery su objeto -el truthmaker-, como sucede de acuerdo con las teorías semánticas de la verdad; por el contrario, argüiré que para Ockham la verdad de un enunciado debe entenderse en términos una cierta actitud normativa de parte del hablante en un determinado contexto dialógico. Por otra parte, con lo segundo quiero decir que, para Ockham, el que un hablante declare que un enunciado p es verdadero no es nada más ni nada menos que el que el hablante asevere que p. En otras palabras, mostraré cómo, para Ockham, predicar de p que es verdadero no es decir nada nuevo acerca de p: es simplemente reiterarlo.

Ockham's reflection on the omnipotence of God has long been considered as one of the most radical in the field of late-medieval philosophy. This work is aimed to show how this traditional interpretation should be resized in the light of the issue of the odium Dei. The analysis of some passages of Ockham's works will demonstrate that the domain of the potentia Dei is regulated, even according to this author, by some eternal truths which cannot change. God's will, in fact, is supposed to comply with both the necessity of the principle of non-contradiction and the moral nature of His essence. Even in a topic that is often considered as an example of Ockham's voluntarism, the divine intervention will turn out to be firmly anchored to some eternal and uncreated conditions. The Ockhamist analysis therefore does not conflict with the previous philosophical tradition, but it still remains within that cultural horizon.

ed from their material, individuating features. 47 Summa Theologiae I 12.4, ad.3 (IV, pp.120-123). In context, the Latin reads, “Et ideo, cum intellectus creatus per suam naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum in abstractione, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, potest per gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et esse separatum subsistens.” Cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics, 2.1, n.285. Later in the Summa Theologiae Aquinas explicitly states what the proper object is: “the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter” (1.84.7) (V, pp.325-328).

In this paper, I shall inquire into the story of the distinction between God's absolute and ordered power (‘potentia Dei absoluta’ and ‘potentia Dei ordinata’) in the fourteenth century. This period saw the emergence of orientations that would prove decisive for the fate of modernity. In my analysis, I will try to explain the reasons, both historical and doctrinal, for the success of such a distinction as a specifically legal question during this key period. I shall dwell, in particular, on the years from 1316 to the 1330s, under John XXII’s pontificate, explaining the relevant religious and political issues of those times. To this end, I will examine the perspective of John XXII himself in relation to his two great doctrinal rivals Meister Eckhart (†c.1328) and William of Ockham (†1347), and pay special attention to the dispute between the pope and the Franciscans over evangelical poverty.

O objetivo deste artigo é oferecer uma breve introdução ao pensamento político de Guilherme de Ockham. Primeiramente, apresentamos uma sucinta contextualização destacando alguns conflitos ocorridos entre papas e monarcas nos séculos XIII e XIV, bem como duas posições teóricas advindas desses conflitos. Em seguida, expomos sete teses fundamentais defendidas por Ockham, as quais resumem seu pensamento político. Por fim, esboçamos uma reflexão acerca da atualidade do pensamento político ockhamista.

Later medieval thinkers inherited from Augustine two distinct concepts of freedom: the freedom to choose among alternatives, and freedom in a broader sense, which is not about choice, and which hence is compatible with necessity. This essay studies the views of Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham concerning freedom without choice by investigating their responses to four questions: Which are the situations in which there is willing without choice? What explains the lack of choice in these situations? Is the will free in these circumstances? What are the implications for the concept of free will?

Leibniz’s first essay, his dissertation on the principle of individuality, is mainly dedicated to a critique of Duns Scotus’s explanation of individuation. Leibniz’s critique of Scotus and the historical antecedents of the German philosopher’s position have not been studied before. The paper examines Scotus’s and Leibniz’s views on individuation and sheds some light on the doctrinal genealogy that leads up to Leibniz’s position. I argue that Leibniz’s view and his critique of Scotus depend upon William of Ockham and Francis Suárez. Ockham, Suárez, and Leibniz posit that individuals are such by themselves or by their entire entity, rather than by an entity that is only a part of their being (as Scotus’s ‘haecceity’). Furthermore, all three take issue with Scotus’s view for the same reason, i.e. because they reject the formal distinction, a key assumption in Scotus’s account of individuation.

The rhetoric of culture claims that culture makes sense as a trip from aesthetics to rationality to theology. The three legs, obtained through cross sectioning of the route that is conic in its form, determine the three separately homogenous spaces of culture. The question posing to the itinerant is how to traverse the enforced cutting between the sections (on the way from aesthetics to rationality and onward) without losing one’s memory and the merits once gained. How to achieve the personality of knowledge as a scientist? How to integrate rationality with the vectors from the aesthetical and theological sides? What to do with volition that is disposed to act without antecedents, that is, incidentally? The thesis of the present book is that the integrative approach to culture is achievable out of rhetorical stance on it and can be explicated on the basis of distribution of infinity in culture.

Medieval authors generally agreed that we have the freedom to choose among alternative possibilities. But most medieval authors also thought that there are situations in which one cannot do otherwise, not even will otherwise. They also thought when willing necessarily, the will remains free. The questions, then, are what grounds the necessity or contingency of the will’s acts, and – since freedom is not defined by the ability to choose – what belongs to the essential character of freedom, the ratio libertatis. This article studies medieval theories of freedom without choice from William of Auxerre to William of Ockham and their background in Augustine, Anselm of Can-terbury, and Bernard of Clairvaux.

The concept of formal consequence is at the heart of logic today, and by extension, plays an important role in such diverse areas as mathematics, computing, philosophy, and linguistics.

In this dissertation, I trace the roots of this concept in medieval logic from Pseudo-Scotus and John Buridan back to the earliest treatises on consequences, and provide translations of the three earliest known treatises on consequences - two anonymous, a third by Walter Burley.

Chapter one introduces the reader to the dominant philosophical approaches to formal consequence from the turn of the twentieth century to today. After this, I introduce the account of formal consequence advanced by John Buridan, the medieval predecessor to the semantic account advocated by Tarski and his followers.

The second chapter provides a detailed contrast of Buridan's account of formal consequence with those of Tarski, on the one hand, and later classical logic, on the other.

Chapter three examines the account of formal consequence in Pseudo-Scotus. I show that Pseudo-Scotus' account is dependent on that of Buridan, and therefore most post-date it.

Chapter four examines the account of divided modal consequence in William of Ockham. I show that Ockham's divided modalities are not fully assimilable to narrow-scope propositions of classical modal logic; formalize Ockham's account in an extension of first-order modal logic with restricted quantification; and provide a complete account of relations between two-term divided modal propositions on Ockham's account.

Chapter five introduces Walter Burley's thinking about consequences, examining: Burley's division and enumeration of consequences; his distinction between principal and derivative rules licensing good consequences; the relation of the division of consequences into formal and material varieties to Burley's preferred division between natural and accidental consequences; the relation Burley's work bears to Buridan, to the Boethian reception of Aristotle's Topics, and to the earliest treatises on consequences.

The final chapter concludes: highlighting the characteristic marks of medieval and modern approaches to consequences relative to each other; summarizing the various developments that led to the adoption of the account of formal consequence epitomized in Buridan's work; and suggesting prospects for recovering the most promising aspects of the medieval treatments of the topic.

Varios elementos que conforman la ética y la filosofía política modernas, como así también la filosofía del derecho, tienen como precedente al pensamiento de la Edad Media tardía. Nos referimos a la filosofía del siglo XIV, y más específicamente a Guillermo de Ockham. En quien fuera reconocido como el gran “sabio de Oxford” y por ello fundador de toda una escuela de pensamiento, en inextricable relación con su propia biografía, se perciben los primeros motivos liberales y con suma fuerza, la moral voluntarista, los derechos subjetivos de las personas, una teoría política contractualista y, más nítidamente aún y como consecuencia de lo anterior, la separación entre Iglesia y Estado. Al desarrollo de esta temática y sus interrelaciones con su postura epistemológica nominalista nos dedicaremos en el presente artículo.

Since the period of Scholastic supremacy, Realism had been the most accepted approach to philosophy, but only until another medieval philosopher by the name of William Ockham turned the tables on ontology. Seemingly similar to what Aristotle did against his teacher, Plato, Ockham's arguments served as counters to his contemporary thinkers. The dispute lies in Realism's Universal properties, where x is exemplified by both Y and Z, which, in principle, turn out to be of the same kind. The problem revolves around whether x is a single property shared by two or more objects or if it is an individual exemplification. Ockham argued that multiple exemplifications of Universals were complicated, leading to the belief that ontology was inaccessible.

This paper explores Ockham's counter-argument, considered to be the most tenable position from the 20th century onwards. However, from the writer's point of view, Ockham's Trope Nominalism was not a total rejection of Realism, unlike other forms of Nominalism. Thus, the conclusion is that his ontology is a Neo-Realism, inviting thinkers to a simpler access to identity. The writer also discusses the significance of spatiotemporal, a cognitive property of the perceiver rather than the object perceived, which sets limits to properties that are fundamentally opposed to Realism. Additionally, it proves individual existence grounded in individual properties or tropes, serving as publicly displayed warrants.

Stephen E. Lahey, in his 1998 article entitled "William Ockham and Trope Nominalism," dismantles the ontologist behind the simplification of properties, presenting an argument against the universal exemplification of Realism. Ockham, influenced by Aristotle, became successful with his ontological contention, leaving an impression on the writer regarding how he made philosophy more accessible. Although Ockham's ideas did not successfully influence the majority during medieval times, as proven by the growth of religion, his name created a significant impact during the 20th century onwards, making his philosophy vital and fresh. (TN shortened for Trope Nominalism in the following sections.)

Il presente lavoro intende indagare in maniera esaustiva ed esauriente il concetto di “tempo” all’interno della filosofia teologico-metafisica del frate francescano Guglielmo di Ockham (1285-1348). Il tempo, nella prospettiva del Venerabilis Inceptor, va letto sotto una precisa logica terminologica ed esso è irreale. Il tempo per Ockham è un complexum, un ente di ragione, che si realizza e trova specifico compimento sotto una proposizione. Ockham, che apre la via moderna, presenta numerosi aspetti originali sulla tematica del tempo, affrancandosi da Aristotele e prendendo le distanze dalla riflessione del suo periodo. Il tempo per Ockham è irreale e vengono analizzate alcune interpretazioni come quella di Prior, sino ad arrivare al concetto di futuro ramificato. La lettura proposta nel saggio tenta alcune “ipotesi” di avvicinamento alle moderne teorie sulla temporalità, come quella di McTaggart e Bergson.

Se abordará la incidencia del tema del pecado original y su consecuencia inmediata, la Caída del hombre, en el pensamiento político bajomedieval. Se analizarán y compararán dos miradas divergentes. Por un lado, la de Tomás de Aquino, que intentaría aminorar los efectos que produce el pecado original en la vida de los hombres. Por el otro,  la de Guillermo de Ockham, quien considera que existe una ruptura profunda entre el antes y el después de la Caída. Mientras que el dominico se fundaría principalmente en un razonamiento aristotélico, el franciscano se inclina por el aspecto teológico de la cuestión. Se tendrán en cuenta, asimismo, el contexto histórico en el que estos últimos actuaron y los proyectos políticos en los que estarían implicados en forma directa o indirecta. El foco estará puesto en la búsqueda de relaciones entre el pecado original, el dominio político y la jerarquía, sean estas de carácter negativo o positivo.

In recent years, many scholars have bemoaned the gradual demise of traditional virtue ethics, and its eventual replacement in the later Middle Ages by divine command theory. Where virtue ethics nurtures a capacity for spontaneous moral judgement, this theory turns on adherence to ordained duties and laws. Thus, virtue ethicists among others have tended to object to the theory on the grounds that it undermines the role of the moral agent in moral adjudication. In this article, by contrast, I will argue that there is a way of construing divine command theory, which is not susceptible to this critique. To this end, I will turn to the work of first-generation Franciscan scholars, who affirmed the necessity of human understanding of divine commands and the complete freedom of the will to observe them.

William of Ockham frequently mentions a distinction between two modes of cognition: in se and in alio. The aim of this chapter is to show that this distinction raises some important problems for his philosophy of mind and more broadly for his nominalism. The main issue is the possibility of an externalist theory of mental contents. For, Ockham affirms that no material substance is cognized in se. But if only accidents are cognized in se does this mean that material substances are necessarily cognized in alio? How could this “something else” lead us to the cognition of something we have never experienced? The difficulty here is how we should understand his view concerning the acquisition of simple substance concepts like “man” or “horse.” On the one hand it seems that we have no direct acquaintance with substances. On the other hand, he says that these concepts, equivalent to simple natural kind terms in the mind, directly refer to singular substances thanks to external relations of causality and likeness, on which their signification is based. This chapter suggests that the evolution of Ockham’s theory of concepts during his career is probably the key for our understanding of this crucial distinction.

O problema dos universais (gêneros e espécies) é tão antigo quanto a própria Filosofia e, embora tenha assumido diferentes nuances ao longo da história, em todos os tempos sempre esteve associado à especulação ontológica concernente ao ser enquanto ser. Com efeito, o fisicalismo pré-socrático, o dualismo platônico e a ousiologia aristotélica nada mais foram do que distintos desdobramentos da ciência do ser e, por conseguinte, da mesma questão dos universais. Todavia, a problemática como tal foi formulada na Isagoge de Porfírio, no século III d. C., e à luz da tríplice indagação proposta por esse autor, os filósofos medievais retomaram os textos de Platão e de Aristóteles na tentativa de encontrar uma solução satisfatória. Guilherme de Ockham, no início do século XIV, proporá uma resposta sui generis: fundamentando-se na Metafísica do Estagirita sustentará que os universais não possuem existência ontologicamente real (antirrealismo), mas, ao contrário, são conceitos mentais ou, ainda, nomes que se referem a uma coletividade de seres individuais (nominalismo). Desse modo, o pensamento ockhamista realiza uma desconstrução do estatuto ontológico dos universais reduzindo-os ao plano epistomológico-lógico-linguístico. Para melhor elucidar as concepções do Princeps Nominalium, se apresentará, inicialmente, a evolução do problema e, em seguida, se analisará um excerto extraído da sua Exposição ao Livro dos Predicáveis de Porfírio, isto é, o Comentário à Isagoge.

Certos debates do passado podem parecer a nós, separados deles por séculos de distância, como meras e vãs logomaquias de acadêmicos desocupados. Entretanto, se os estudarmos a fundo, constataremos que muitos tiveram um significado ideológico importante, por colocarem em questão o sist.ema de valores da sociedade em que acont.eceram. Este foi certamente o caso do debate a respeito da pobreza nos séculos XIII e XIV; como procurarei demonstrar 1 •

This paper investigates Ockham’s claim that there is a diversity of suppositions of a mental term. First, it summarizes the hitherto research in Ockham’s theory of concepts (understood as natural signs) and the theory of mental language ascribed to him (Part 1–2). Secondly, it describes his theory of supposition, focusing on the interpretation of this theory which describes it as a device for interpretation of propositions (Part 3). Thirdly, the paper examines the problems which arise from combining Ockham’s theory concepts and his theory of supposition (Part 4–7) – namely, the problems concerning the nature of mental proposition, the question of mental syncategoremata, and of equivocation in mental language. Part 8 then reveals the absurdity of understanding the supposition of a mental term as an instrument for interpretation of mental propositions. Finally, I propose a new interpretation of the whole issue, based on Ockham’s early commentary on the Sentences (Part 9). According to this interpretation, the diversity of supposition of a mental term is not triggered by the need of distinguishing various meanings of a mental propositions, but by Ockham’s nominalistic theory of science.

Ockham considera in accordo con la dottrina cristiana che Dio abbia una prescienza infallibile dei futuri contingenti. Pertanto sviluppa il suo punto di vista sulla verità e sui futuri contingenti e lo usa per risolvere i problemi sulla predestinazione e sulla prescienza di Dio. Qui però si presenta il problema del fatalismo. Per spiegare cos'è il fatalismo in una frase: se qualcuno ha agito in qualche modo doveva agire così; e se qualcuno agirà in qualche modo deve necessariamente agire così. Aristotele , nel De interpretatione, 9 , argomenta così: ogni proposizione, sia concernente il passato sia concernente il futuro, è o vera o falsa. Si consideri la proposizione concernente il futuro: domani pioverà alle 7. Questa proposizione è vera o falsa. Se è vera niente potrà impedire che domani pioverà alle 7, se è falsa domani non pioverà alle 7 e niente potrà impedirlo. Quindi, se è vero ora e da sempre che domani pioverà alle 7, allora necessariamente domani pioverà alle 7; e se è falso ora e da sempre che domani pioverà alle 7, allora è impossibile che domani pioverà alle 7. Ockham, nel suo commento al De interpretatione, 9, cerca di riportare in vita la contingenza, annullata nel mondo fatalistico e necessario generato dagli esiti di tale argomento, riflettendo sulle nozioni di modalità, verità e falsità. Le modalità in questione non sono logiche ma reali: 'piove' è contingente se e solo se 'piove' ha validità e 'non piove' ha validità ; 'piove' è necessario se e solo se 'non piove' non ha validità; e 'piove' è impossibile se e solo se 'piove' non ha validità. Da un lato, la validità è considerata causalmente: se qualcosa è sufficiente causalmente a favore di 'piove', 'non piove' non ha validità e 'piove' è necessario; ma laddove non ci sia sufficienza causale a favore di 'piove' e di 'non piove', entrambi hanno validità e 'piove' è contingente. Dall'altro, la contingenza è indeterminatezza ontologica, poiché laddove i contrari hanno validità, la validità di 'piove' non permane dopo che 'non piove' sia diventato realtà a tutti gli effetti. Quindi, Ockham asserisce che solamente gli eventi, le azioni e le relazioni passate sono necessari, non nel senso che i loro contrari siano logicamente impossibili, ma nel senso che le cose non possono andare più diversamente da come sono andate . 1 Ockham attribuisce ad Aristotele la visione della proposizione come ciò che può essere vero o falso a seconda della sua adeguatezza o non adeguatezza alla realtà. 2 Ma laddove le proposizioni sui futuri contingenti abbiano una doppia validità così deve essere anche per i loro valori di verità. 3 Dato che le cose (eventi ,azioni e relazioni) sono determinate o indeterminate solo in un istante prestabilito, allo stesso modo le proposizioni corrispondenti sono vere o false in modo determinato o indeterminato, non in modo assoluto, ma in un istante prestabilito. 4 Le proposizioni sui futuri contingenti,dato che riguardano il futuro, non saranno né vere né false in modo determinato. Ciò non significa per Ockham che una proposizione disgiuntiva sui futuri contingenti manchi di valori di verità. Anzi, essa è sempre vera o falsa, poiché i futuri contingenti corrisponderanno in un modo o in un altro, all'istante futuro in questione. 5 Ockham ricostruisce la fallacia del primo argomento fatalista di Aristotele in questo modo: ciò che accade per caso non è determinato ad essere da una parte della contraddizione piuttosto che dall'altra. Pertanto, se sarà così o non sarà così, non accadrà per caso ma necessariamente. 6 Ockham espone la fallacia del secondo argomento di Aristotele in questo modo: l'argomento si basa sulla proposizione che una

Guilherme de Ockham (1284?-1347?) se tornou célebre na História da Filosofia pelo frequente e rigoroso uso do Princípio da Parcimônia (ou Princípio da Economia), o qual, em razão disso, passou a ser conhecido, simplesmente, como Navalha de Ockham. Tal princípio, com efeito, que na formulação do próprio Venerabilis Inceptor se encontra em diversas passagens de sua Opera Philosophica et Theologica, consiste no axioma lógico-metodológico segundo o qual "a pluralidade não deve ser postulada sem necessidade" (pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate) ou, ainda, que "inutilmente se faz por mais o que se pode fazer por menos" (frusta fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora). Vejamos dois excertos extraídos do Comentário à Física de Aristóteles, nos quais, analisando essa obra aristotélica, Ockham apresenta de modo inequívoco qual seja seu entendimento acerca da função lógico-metodológica desse princípio: