Turkey And Europe

The case of the EU points to the need to re-conceptualise the relationship between self and other in the IR literature. I argue that the literature forces us into an artificial choice between the liberal constructivist approach of disregarding the constitutive role of difference in identity formation and the critical constructivist approach of assuming a behavioural relationship between self and other, and therefore cannot account for the diversity in the EU's interactions with various states on its periphery. I identify three constitutive dimensions along which self/other relationships vary to produce or not produce relationships of Othering: nature of difference, social distance, and response of other. I analyse how the EU's interactions with Morocco, Turkey, and Central and Eastern European states are situated differently on these dimensions, and evaluate the question of whether the EU is a postmodern collectivity based on these analyses.

Background The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are grounded in the global ambition of “leaving no
one behind”. Understanding today’s gains and gaps for the health-related SDGs is essential for decision makers as
they aim to improve the health of populations. As part of the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors
Study 2016 (GBD 2016), we measured 37 of the 50 health-related SDG indicators over the period 1990–2016 for
188 countries, and then on the basis of these past trends, we projected indicators to 2030.
Methods We used standardised GBD 2016 methods to measure 37 health-related indicators from 1990 to 2016, an
increase of four indicators since GBD 2015. We substantially revised the universal health coverage (UHC) measure,
which focuses on coverage of essential health services, to also represent personal health-care access and quality for
several non-communicable diseases. We transformed each indicator on a scale of 0–100, with 0 as the 2·5th percentile
estimated between 1990 and 2030, and 100 as the 97·5th percentile during that time. An index representing all
37 health-related SDG indicators was constructed by taking the geometric mean of scaled indicators by target. On the
basis of past trends, we produced projections of indicator values, using a weighted average of the indicator and
country-specific annualised rates of change from 1990 to 2016 with weights for each annual rate of change based on
out-of-sample validity. 24 of the currently measured health-related SDG indicators have defined SDG targets, against
which we assessed attainment.
Findings Globally, the median health-related SDG index was 56·7 (IQR 31·9–66·8) in 2016 and country-level
performance markedly varied, with Singapore (86·8, 95% uncertainty interval 84·6–88·9), Iceland (86·0,
84·1–87·6), and Sweden (85·6, 81·8–87·8) having the highest levels in 2016 and Afghanistan (10·9, 9·6–11·9), the
Central African Republic (11·0, 8·8–13·8), and Somalia (11·3, 9·5–13·1) recording the lowest. Between 2000
and 2016, notable improvements in the UHC index were achieved by several countries, including Cambodia,
Rwanda, Equatorial Guinea, Laos, Turkey, and China; however, a number of countries, such as Lesotho and the
Central African Republic, but also high-income countries, such as the USA, showed minimal gains. Based on
projections of past trends, the median number of SDG targets attained in 2030 was five (IQR 2–8) of the 24 defined
targets currently measured. Globally, projected target attainment considerably varied by SDG indicator, ranging
from more than 60% of countries projected to reach targets for under-5 mortality, neonatal mortality, maternal
mortality ratio, and malaria, to less than 5% of countries projected to achieve targets linked to 11 indicator targets,
including those for childhood overweight, tuberculosis, and road injury mortality. For several of the health-related
SDGs, meeting defined targets hinges upon substantially faster progress than what most countries have achieved
in the past.
Interpretation GBD 2016 provides an updated and expanded evidence base on where the world currently stands in
terms of the health-related SDGs. Our improved measure of UHC offers a basis to monitor the expansion of health
services necessary to meet the SDGs. Based on past rates of progress, many places are facing challenges in meeting
defined health-related SDG targets, particularly among countries that are the worst off. In view of the early stages of
SDG implementation, however, opportunity remains to take actions to accelerate progress, as shown by the catalytic
effects of adopting the Millennium Development Goals after 2000. With the SDGs’ broader, bolder development
agenda, multisectoral commitments and investments are vital to make the health-related SDGs within reach of all
populations.

While Turkey pursued a relatively passive or reactive foreign policy stance during the Cold War era, its post-Cold war foreign policy has been marked by subsequent waves of foreign policy activisim. 1 This article argues that Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period may be conceptualized in terms of three distinct phases: (a) an initial wave of foreign policy activism in the immediate post-Cold War context; (b) a new or second wave of foreign policy activism during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government with a strong emphasis on Europeanization; (c) the current tension between Europeanization and Eurasianism. The roots of the second wave of activism can, in fact, be traced to the pre-AKP era to the crucial Helsinki Decision on Turkey's EU candidacy and the reforms undertaken by the coalition government of 1999-2002 particularly in the aftermath of the deep financial crisis of 2001. However, the AKP era itself has not been homogenous in terms of foreign policy behavior. 2 Our central contention is that there is considerable continuity in terms of foreign policy activism and a multilateral approach to policy making during the AKP era. Yet, at the same time a certain discontinuity or rupture may be identified towards the middle of the first AKP government signifying shift from a commitment to deep Europeanization to loose Europeanization and a parallel shift to what may be classified as soft Euro-asianism.

The promulgation of the Turkish Civil Code of 1926, a nuanced translation of the Swiss Civil Code of 1907, has long been celebrated as an exceptionally thoroughgoing instance of "legal transplantation". Despite their pervasiveness, such assessments cloud appreciation of the multifarious power dynamics at work in the Code's preparation and implementation, especially the mechanisms through which it was made to serve Kemalist ideology’s twofold agenda of "modernising" socio-legal relations while retaining--and, in certain instances, augmenting--those "traditional" practices which early republican legislators and administrators found to be of especial value for their "nation-building" project. The chief objective of this study is to reveal the inadequacies of the Turkish Civil Code’s standard characterisation as a "success story" in comparative legal scholarship. Specifically, I demonstrate that the 1926 Code is best understood as the product of a deeply gendered tension between Kemalism's dedication to a state-driven programme of national "modernisation" and elements of the "tradition" this programme was crafted for the sake of mobilising, radicalising and transforming.

Over the last fifteen years, hundreds of Muslim citizens claiming Armenian descent have submitted petitions to Turkey's secular legal authorities asking for changes to both their name and religion in the public record. In this article, I discuss the name-change cases of Armenian return converts to further the debates on Turkish secularism and to critique the body of scholarship that welcomes the governing Justice and Development Party's legal reforms as a measure of growing religious tolerance. In the article's first part I analyze the historical foundations of the regulation of religion and name changes in Turkey by fully and explicitly engaging with law as a site where minority difference is constructed, authorized, and challenged. The article's second half offers an alternative reading of how tolerance functions as an aspect of the Justice and Development Party's reforms. Based on my investigation of specific legal forms of argument that converted Armenians and their lawyers put forward in today's secular courts, and how legal officers of the state respond to them, I demonstrate that legal reform has shifted the definition of religion as a marker of minority difference in legal space. I argue that the historical context of name change and religious conversion forces the limits of existing understandings of freedom of religion in Turkey, and that this renders visible historical injustices that cannot be resolved simply through the notion of “religious tolerance” in the co

The many faces of the European Council make it a core component of the institutional machinery maintaining relations between the EU and third countries, including Turkey. This chapter identifies the European Council’s roles as the EU’s ‘master of enlargement’, ‘external voice and crisis manager’, and ‘agenda and direction setter’ as its three primary functions that drive the EU–Turkey relationship. The central focus of the chapter is the evolution of the European Council in framing relations with a candidate country—or what many now call a ‘strategic partner’—and the identification of the critical turning points and shifts in the central functions, internal dynamics, and preferences of this key institution. The findings indicate a growing trend toward a more conflictual, relatively hostile relationship between the European Council and Turkey as a result of diverging geopolitical interests—especially in the Eastern Mediterranean—and normative considerations. Furthermore, the analysis reveals an expanding impact of bilateral issues and member states’ individual preferences on the European Council’s role as a driver of EU–Turkey relations. Still, with their powers, the Heads of State or Government are likely to remain a key driver of the future trajectory of the relationship, demonstrating an increased interest in ‘thinking outside of the accession box’ and in framing a relationship model that would safeguard EU–Turkey relations amidst growing disagreements with Ankara.

Human rights are among the most-cited criteria forTurkey’s accession to the European Union. Focusingon how women’s and children’s rights figure ingovernmental reform programs, I explore theinstitutionalization of rights-bearing subjects in theTurkish official realm. Portrayals of women andchildren as innocent, depoliticized victims in needof protection and care are meant to persuade stateofficials to prosecute domestic violence, honorkillings, and child abuse. However, this approachnarrows the category of rights bearers by excludinggroups who do not conform to the image of thehelpless victim. Representations of women andchildren as domesticated rights bearers alsoconsolidate the Turkish state as the locus of “masculinist protection,” reinforcing a moral economy that requires, in return, the grateful obedience of the protected.

Within the politics of nationalism and nation-building, the emigration of ethnic and religious minorities, whether voluntary or involuntary, appears to be a commonly occurring practice. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, modern Turkey still carried the legacy of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious diversity in which its Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities had official minority status based upon the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. However, throughout the twentieth century, Turkey’s non-Muslim minority populations have undergone a mass emigration experience in which thousands of their numbers have migrated to various countries around the globe. While in the 1920s the population of non-Muslims in the country was close to three per cent of the total, today it has dropped to less than two per thousand. This article analyses the emigration of non-Muslim people from Turkey and relates this movement to the wider context of nation-building in the country.

Relying on Foucault's concept of pastoral power, the article scrutinizes the role of religious officers who are employed by Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and serve Turkish Muslim communities in Europe. It investigates how state-led diaspora institutions operate at a micro-level and what they reveal about the state's governmentality outside its territory. In order to parse the pastoral actors' empirically visible agency, the work draws on ethnographic observations of the religious officers' activities in the Diyanet's mosques in Austria. It outlines (i) how Diyanet officers' pastoral practices go beyond the mosques and manifest in a wide range of socio-cultural religious services aimed at reaching diaspora communities, (ii) the relation between Diyanet officers' activities and the Turkish state's extraterritorial practices and discourse aimed to promoting obedience to the authorities and love for the motherland, and (iii) how the interaction between Diyanet officers and the flock shape people's perception of themselves as a community while remapping the boundaries of a Turkish and Muslim belonging in essentialist terms.

As an emerging market economy and a candidate country for EU membership, Turkey has engaged in large-scale international science and research programs and organizations in Europe since the 1950s, and more intensely after its candidacy status commenced at the end of 1999. These engagements, which can be framed as Science Diplomacy (SD) efforts, were motivated by the Turkish government's perception that Turkey needs to become more integrated with the European countries, and must stay abreast of the science and technology developments or risk falling behind other EU candidate countries. The primary purpose of this paper is to explore how the emerging concept of SD helps explain transformations and changes in Turkish Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) policies since 2000, with a special focus on engagements with the EU's science and research programs and European organizations, and subsequently filling a gap in related literature. Europeanization and qualitative content analysis are used as theoretical framework and methodology, respectively, to analyze these engagements. The key findings and conclusions point out that Turkey's efforts to harmonize its science and technology policies with the EU's has paved the way for new funding mechanisms and its participation in Horizon 2020 as an associated country. In addition, using Science and Technology (S&T) cooperation as a soft power has strengthened the public diplomacy of Turkey with the European countries. As a result, increased involvement in STI partnerships with the European countries could help Turkey open new venues for developing its SD. However, despite the mutual economic and political benefit gained through scientific interactions, Turkey is still not using science as a diplomacy tool as effectively as it might to augment its foreign policy. It should be noted that research is one of the very few areas where the relations Turkey and the EU are still cooperating, regardless of growing tensions between the two parties. Thus, Framework Programs and other scientific projects that Turkey has participated in can provide founding experiences of Turkish SD with the EU, and may help Turkey open new venues for developing its SD. Nevertheless, a more resolute political will is needed.

The paper traces the crucial role of visa policies in externalizing border control. Since the European Union has agreed upon a highly selective visa policy in 2001, most neighbouring countries are (newly) confronted with visa requirements for short-term travel. Because of this standardization of travel opportunities, visa-free travel to the European Union has become a rare and valuable political asset both for third country nationals and their governments. Consequently, visa liberalization became a major issue in bilateral negotiations with the EU over cooperation in migration management and is frequently used as an incentive by the EU institutions. However, the EU is not the only cooperating partner that strategically engages in border and migration diplomacy. As the case studies of Moldova, Morocco and Turkey show, all governments involved use issues of mobility regulation as a foreign policy tool, though with varying success in regard to visa liberalization.

This article seeks to "decolonize" the externalization project of European borders by focusing on the subjectivity of Turkey as being a long-standing candidate country, seeking to be a "regional power" in the Middle East and increasingly moving into undemocratic rule. The study suggests that externalization project of European borders does not only move outwards from the European center, and then straightforwardly get implemented by the passive "others". The case of Turkey epitomizes that the "others" are geopolitical subjects with their counter-discourses and strategies as well as their co-constitutive roles in shaping the very framework of the process. The study adopts an implementation perspective with the aim of providing nuanced local details about how Turkish border guards act, interpret, internalize or challenge the border externalization policies.

Avrupa Birliği (AB) ayrımcılıkla mücadele konusunda gelişmiş bir yapıya sahip olmasıyla beraber LGBTI hakları da bu çerçevede ele alınmıştır. AB aday ülkeleri de bu rejimin bir parçası olmaları ve ilgili politika alanlarında reform yapmaları konusunda AB talepleriyle karşılaşmaktadır. Türkiye de bir AB aday ülkesi olarak bu durumdan bağımsız değilken ülkede LGBTI haklarında 2000'ler süresince bir gelişme yaşanmamış ve hatta bu alan ayrımcılığın sıklıkla tecrübe edildiği bir alan olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu makale 2000'li yıllarda hızını arttıran Avrupalılaşma reformları süresince Türkiye'de LGBTI haklarında herhangi bir gelişme olmadığını ortaya koymakta ve bunun nedenlerini incelemektedir. Makalenin ana argümanı AB'nin bu hassas konudaki etkisizliğinin ve 2000'ler boyunca tek başına iktidar partisi olan Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)'nin LGBTI ile ilgili konulardaki olumsuz zihniyet yapısının LGBTI haklarındaki durağanlığın nedeni olduğudur. Abstract The European Union (EU) has established an advanced regime for non-discrimination and LGBTI rights have been included within this regime. EU * Doç. Dr., Atılım Üniversitesi, gozde.yilmaz@atılım.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-8876-953X.

Background
Accurate childhood cancer burden data are crucial for resource planning and health policy prioritisation. Model-based estimates are necessary because cancer surveillance data are scarce or non-existent in many countries. Although global incidence and mortality estimates are available, there are no previous analyses of the global burden of childhood cancer represented in disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs).
Methods
Using the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2017 methodology, childhood (ages 0–19 years) cancer mortality was estimated by use of vital registration system data, verbal autopsy data, and population-based cancer registry incidence data, which were transformed to mortality estimates through modelled mortality-to-incidence ratios (MIRs). Childhood cancer incidence was estimated using the mortality estimates and corresponding MIRs. Prevalence estimates were calculated by using MIR to model survival and multiplied by disability weights to obtain years lived with disability (YLDs). Years of life lost (YLLs) were calculated by multiplying age-specific cancer deaths by the difference between the age of death and a reference life expectancy. DALYs were calculated as the sum of YLLs and YLDs. Final point estimates are reported with 95% uncertainty intervals.
Findings
Globally, in 2017, there were 11·5 million (95% uncertainty interval 10·6–12·3) DALYs due to childhood cancer, 97·3% (97·3–97·3) of which were attributable to YLLs and 2·7% (2·7–2·7) of which were attributable to YLDs. Childhood cancer was the sixth leading cause of total cancer burden globally and the ninth leading cause of childhood disease burden globally. 82·2% (82·1–82·2) of global childhood cancer DALYs occurred in low, low-middle, or middle Socio-demographic Index locations, whereas 50·3% (50·3–50·3) of adult cancer DALYs occurred in these same locations. Cancers that are uncategorised in the current GBD framework comprised 26·5% (26·5–26·5) of global childhood cancer DALYs.
Interpretation
The GBD 2017 results call attention to the substantial burden of childhood cancer globally, which disproportionately affects populations in resource-limited settings. The use of DALY-based estimates is crucial in demonstrating that childhood cancer burden represents an important global cancer and child health concern.

During the 2013 Gezi protests in Turkey, volunteering health professionals provided on-site medical assistance to protesters faced with police violence characterized by the extensive use of riot control agents. This led to a government crackdown on the medical community and the criminalization of “unauthorized” first aid amidst international criticisms over violations of medical neutrality. Drawing from ethnographic observations, in-depth interviews with health care professionals, and archival research, this article ethnographically analyzes the polarized encounter between the Turkish government and medical professionals aligned with social protest. I demonstrate how the context of “atmospheric violence” –the extensive use of riot control agents like tear gas– brings about new politico-ethical spaces and dilemmas for healthcare professionals. I then analyze how Turkish health professionals framed their provision of health services to protestors in the language of medical humanitarianism, and how the state dismissed their claims to humanitarian neutrality by criminalizing emergency care. Exploring the vexed role that health workers and medical organizations played in the Gezi protests and the consequent political contestations over doctors’ ethical, professional, and political responsibilities, this article examines challenges to medical humanitarianism and neutrality at times of social protest in and beyond the Middle East.

This study applies unique data on three-generation migrant and non-migrant lineages to assess how assimilation and intergenerational transmission theories hold up for attitudes on gender equality in the context of Turkey–Europe migration. Information on migration histories of families and gender equality attitudes is collected for over 800 families. Based on those data assimilation and retention theories and theories on intergenerational transmission as a means to reproduce cultural attitudes among migrant families are tested from a dissimilation-from-origin perspective: how do migrants and their descendants differ from non-migrants from the same area of origin. The results of this study support concepts that focus on context- and path-dependency: segmented assimilation is shown in the form that the more traditional migrants who move back to Turkey have children with more traditional views than comparable people without migrant ancestors (retention). At the same time, among lineages that settle in Europe, migration seems to speed up the assimilation process of becoming more supportive of gender equality. Moreover, the youth that grew up in Europe is hardly influenced by the parents' attitudes, whereas the ones growing up in Turkey are. This supports the idea of migration being a transmission belt for intergenerational transmission.

Among Syriac Orthodox Christian migrant communities in the Netherlands, liturgical performance is a site of controversy over where and how to draw a boundary between “religious” and “ethnic” identity. Tensions materialize in discordant singing styles and modes of performance, echoing complex historical encounters with Dutch, Syrian, and Turkish secularisms. These encounters, I argue, have refashioned the liturgical tradition's role as a central axis of ethnoreligious social life and kin relations across the diaspora. Secular state practices shape a diasporic sensory culture that is met with a distinct form of vocal agency. Syriac Orthodox liturgical experiments show how the voice can transform the sensorial interface between human subjectivity and social intelligibility, in turn transforming how categories of secular modernity—whether ritual, art, ethnicity, or politics—are distinguished and lived.

This article explores the reconfiguration of the bureaucratic field and the recalibra-tion of the terms of hierarchy and distinction that go into establishing bureaucraticauthority and governmental legitimacy in Turkey—a process prompted by the coun-try’s pending accession to the European Union (EU). Accession to the EU hingeson a substantive reorganization of the governmental field in Turkey according to European standards of good governance that emphasizes human rights and moreegalitarian, cooperative state–society relations. Focusing on human rights training programs for state officials and government workers, I argue that the human rightsagenda of the EU challenges the traditional role of state officials in Turkey as ed-ucators of the people by portraying them as subjects who are themselves in need of education and reform. As their traditional hold on the markers of modernity arecontested in EU-sponsored training sessions, Turkey’s bureaucratic actors are com- pelled to recalibrate their proximity to halk (the common people) and to base theirclaims to governmental legitimacy on being of the people rather than standing above them.

Purpose – The continuation of globalisation and liberalisation processes has prompted the restructuring of many national and local property markets. The research examines the evolution of Istanbul’s retail property market to identify how global and local agents engage with one another to produce a unique “glocalized” outcome.

Design/methodology/approach – The morphogenetic approach is adapted and applied to analyse the dynamics of market change. The focus is on the character and behaviour of national and international market actors and how they interact with the wider political economy. The research uses a combination of elite interviews, document analysis and corporate case studies to obtain empirical evidence.

Findings – The liberalisation of the Turkish economy heralded the entry of the first international companies into Istanbul’s retail property market in the 1990s. International involvement expanded rapidly after 2004,
accelerating the process of market re-structuring. However, while the number of global buy-outs increased, the expansion of local property companies–and the establishment of some international/national corporate partnerships–was even more marked. This resulted in a “glocalised” market with a strong and distinctive local culture.

Originality/value – Istanbul has been a major centre of trade for millenia. This is the first substantive analysis of the recent restructuring of the city’s retail property market. Previous research on market maturity
and market evolution has paid limited attention to the dynamics of change. The paper describes the use of a process-based theoretical framework (morphogenesis) that was explicitly designed to analyse structural shifts in socio-economic conditions through an examination of the characteristics and behaviours of the actors involved.

Following a poststructuralist theorising of identity in international relations, which argues that identity is relationally and discursively constructed through foreign policy, this article attempts to analyse the way in which the European Commission discursively constructs European identit(ies) in its relations with Turkey around the theme of ‘security’. The study utilises the methodological tools of critical discourse analysis in analysing the speeches and field interviews conducted with European Commission officials, in examining the way in which they construct ‘Europe’ in relation to the security implications of Turkish accession. The article’s findings challenge the argument that Europe is moving beyond the modern state to resemble a postmodern order, and problematises the designation of the Commission as a ‘cosmopolitan’ actor in EU enlargement policy.

This article examines the increasing relevance of Islam and religion in the institutional arrangement of the EU post-Maastricht and the future policy implications for the complex political system of the EU. By adopting a combination of qualitative methodologies that are theoretically rooted in historical institutionalism and in a systemic view of the EU, the paper studies the emergence of Islam and religion as policy issues in two institutional settings, the European Commission and the European Parliament, during the 1990s and up to the first decade of the twenty-first century. The analysis shows a growing attention to faith communities on the part of the Commission, in the post-Maastricht context, culminating in the elaboration of semi-official avenues for encounter and dialogue with religious groups. It also indicates how, in turn, these semi-official practices and the ideas behind them have gradually imposed themselves upon multiple levels of the EU political system, thus opening up an institutional space in the EU for consultations with and 'informal policies' towards faith communities, both within and outside the EU borders.

The current stalemate between the EU and Turkey directly affects much policy implementation, ranging from democracy to the economy. In terms of escaping from this crisis, the current proposed solutions seem to be only effective in a handful of areas. Concerning Turkey's Europeanization, there is certain inertia. In a fraught period, transport policy is a surprising success story, with its stability and continuation in the alignment process. This study investigates the main reasons and driving forces behind this curious case. The changing dynamics between different periods has not only changed the background factors but also contributed to a progressive approach, which has once again showed the importance of domestic political preferences when it comes to Europeanization. Avrupalılaşmada Farklılaşan Eğilimler: Türkiye'nin AB Ulaştırma Politikalarına Uyumu Özet Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye arasında günümüzde yaşanmakta olan sorunlar demokrasiden, ekonomik ilişkilere kadar birçok konuyu etkilemektedir. Krizden çıkış için öne sürülen çözüm önerileri sadece birkaç alanda etkili olabilmiş ve genel daralmayı çözememiştir. Avrupalılaşma konusu ise sürekli gerilemenin yaşandığı *

Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Armenia and Turkey are two neighboring countries that share a 311 km of land border. Official relations between them, however, remain antagonistic as they never established diplomatic relations, and the land border remains closed. All the past efforts to normalize relations and eradicate the standoff have foundered. This article engages with several methodological problems and (mis)perceptions that persist in existing interpretations of Armenia–Turkey relations and examines their impact on the current deadlock. It particularly discusses the questions of the closed border, its relevance to the conflict in Karabakh, the importance of disentangling the process of normalization from reconciliation, and its impact on past normalization initiatives. The article argues that critical rethinking of several deep seated conceptions and approaches could expand our understanding about the roots of the present rift and propose avenues for resolving the impasse.

This chapter analyses debates about alcohol in the early twentieth century in Turkey and the introduction of alcohol ban in 1920. The focus is on founding members of the anti-alcohol organisation Hilâl-i Ahdar Cemiyeti (the Association of Green Crescent) and their arguments for the alcohol ban. The author explains with this analysis the role of the Islamic principle of abstinence in debates about alcohol and the influence of Western prohibitionist and eugenic ideas on the emergence of anti-alcohol movement in Turkey. She argues that religious circles used Western concepts of alcoholism and alcohol ban to maintain their vanishing authority in the definition of daily life norms. The study contributes to understanding of the process of secularisation and of the denominationally defined nationalism during the transformative era of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Republic of Turkey.

After reviewing the emergence of Turkish Euroscepticism in the context of the evolution of Turkey–European-Union relations between 1963 and 1999, the paper analyses party and popular Euroscepticism after 1999. The Turkish case appears to confirm the Taggart– Sitter thesis concerning the strategic Euroscepticism of opposition parties. The exception of the Kurdish nationalists suggests that strategic Euroscepticism does not apply to ethnic minority parties. In Turkey there is both ‘soft’ Euroscepticism (centre-left parties) and ‘hard’ Euroscepticism (nationalist and Islamist parties), the latter usually based on identity. At the popular level, identity Euroscepticism revolves around four key issues: national sovereignty; morality; negative discrimination; and Europe’s alleged hidden agenda to divide and rule Turkey (the so-called ‘Sevres Syndrome’).

Liberal approaches to regional integration, including neoliberal variants preoccupied with institutional cooperation, have informed scholarship on European integration for a long time. They still do today, and for good reason: their problematization of economic actors and resources offers a welcome departure from the static diplomatic accounts of high level politics, while at the same time allowing for an analysis of the state (and its role in integration) that, occasionally, corresponds more closely to actual policymaking (instead of offering merely a normative account of state behavior). When they first emerged some decades ago, they neatly combined an appreciation for the salience of state interests in allowing for (or inhibiting) intra-state cooperation and combined that with an acute understanding of the important role that markets, technology, and interdependence between firms and states had come to play in contemporary efforts toward regional cooperation. Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) has managed to achieve the status of a 'baseline theory' on the subject of

The extant literature has made a rich contribution to our understanding of the low levels of public support for Turkey’s EU bid within the EU-15 and the EU-27, but the Central European perspective on this issue has not gained much attention. This article seeks to explain why there has been an unsupportive public opinion on this issue in the Czech Republic, through semi structured elite interviews and a qualitative content analysis of selected print media. It offers an analytical framework derived from sociological and discursive institutionalism. It argues that the historical/cultural context in the Czech Republic has created an informal institution built around the norms of “othering” Muslim societies like Turkey (sociological institutionalism). Second, this institution both enables and constrains the “discursive ability” of the media in communicating these issues to its audience (discursive institutionalism). Since the media—as a political actor—mostly acts to maintain this institution and does not critically debate it, the public opinion of Turkey as the “cultural other” remains as a dominant perception.

Borrowing the Copenhagen school’s lexicon of desecuritization, the present paper appraises the EU’s role as a desecuritizing agent for Turkey, with a particular focus on security speech-acts about ‘Kurdish separatism’ and ‘political Islam’. Taking up the illustrative cases of silencing the military and abandoning limits to
freedom of speech reflected in EU-Turkey accession documents, this paper
observes the ways in which the EU membership conditionality has been an important catalyst for Turkey’s desecuritizations; yet argues that the EU’s impact is limited due to the necessities of the interplay between various desecuritization agents/processes as well as the existence of EU conditionality efficacy factors.

The end of the Cold War and the European Union's (EU) decision to enlarge to countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) while leaving Turkey out of the new enlargement queue sparked a rising academic interest particularly in the role of identity in EU-Turkey relations in the late 1990s. As Turkey's accession process progressed between 1999 and 2005, debates on the desirability of Turkish accession intensified in the EU. As the prospect of accession became more real, the opposition also began to be increasingly based on the grounds that the country posed a profound challenge to the European project due to the perceived ambiguities over Turkey's 'Europeanness'. It was explicitly and increasingly voiced, most prominently by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, among others,

The aim of this article is to understand why the EU opted to conclude the ‘EU–Turkey refugee deal’ in March 2016 in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, despite the fact that the agreement deeply contradicts fundamental EU values and norms. The article seeks to explain the outcome—the conclusion of the EU–Turkey refugee deal—by analysing not only the ability of EU institutions to shape decisions, but also their motivations, ideas and preferences in justifying the EU’s actions in responding to the refugee challenge. It is argued that the deal results from ideational and power struggles between supranational (the European Parliament and the European Commission) and intergovernmental institutions (the European Council and the Council of the European Union). It is demonstrated that while the former put forward normative arguments, the latter invoked security as a main concern to avoid internal divisions between Member States. This article also reveals that such ideational and power struggles have consequences for the EU’s identity. Theoretically, the article builds on the new intergovernmentalist claims and on the normative/ civilian power literature. Empirically, it explores the usage of normative justifications by EU institutions and points to inter-institutional tensions in framing the EU’s response to the refugee challenge.

This article reviews the literature on state socialization in the context of Turkey’s European Union (EU) accession and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Rationalist and constructivist approaches are considered in order to examine Turkey’s past opposition to norms that characterize the EU’s CFSP, the interest‐driven nature of its strategic culture, its foreign policy and the particular challenges of its EU accession process. In presenting the arguments that Turkey has been putting forth to avoid full socialization, it is concluded that prospects for Turkey’s socialization are grim due to the regulatory nature of this pillar.

You will find chapters 1 and 2 to this book that focuses on the western Balkans in the period 1800-1912, in particular on the peoples and social groups that subsequent national histories would later identify as Albanians, providing a revisionist exploration of national identity prior to the establishment of the nation-state. Isa Blumi posits that such an identity was politically mobilized, and, that prior to the 1912 Balkan war it was culturally opaque and ideologically fluid. In relation to the competition among various state and power structures, be it in the shape of great power intervention, attempts at building new states, or the Ottoman political center, Blumi shows that Ottoman reforms were successful in encouraging most state subjects to commingle local interest with the fate of the empire itself, meaning that parochial concern for the survival of the immediate community, as it transformed over time, was directly linked to the survival of the Ottoman state.

The Turkish party law (TPL) has thus far been studied only in isolation. We do not have any knowledge of where it stands compared to other party laws. This study fills this gap by comparing the TPL with other European party laws. It codes the TPL according to the categories of party regulation that exists in the current literature and finds that the TPL is the third-most heavily regulated party law in Europe. While it is particularly keen on regulating the ‘activity and behavior’ and ‘programmatic identity’ of parties similar to Ukrainian and Spanish party laws, it is significantly behind in regulating the ‘party finance’ and ‘external oversight’ compared to other European countries. This article discusses the implications of these findings on contemporary Turkish politics, arguing that the TPL's thick definition of an ‘anti-system party’ contributes to the current democratic recession in Turkey.