Speciesism

This study was carried out on the mycoflora associated with seeds of different citrus species. Citrus seed material was collected from districts of Punjab, i.e. Multan, Sargodha and Khanpur. Standard methods were applied for the isolation and identification of fungi. A total of 11 fungi including Aspergillus fumigatus, Aspergillus flavus, Dreschslera tetramera, Alternaria alternata, Curvularia lunata, Macrophomina phaseolina, Aspergillus niger, Fusarium solani, Fusarium moniliforme, Rhizopus and Penicillium spp were isolated from the seeds of citrus. For control of isolated seed-born fungi, 3 recommended fungicides such as Ridomil Gold, Bavistin, Score and two chemical Salicylic acid and Boric acid, were used at 20, 30, 40 mg/10 mL and 5, 6, 7 µL/10 mL, respectively and chemical with 20, 30, 40 mg/10 mL. All these fungicide and chemicals significantly reuced with population of all fungi present in naturally infected seed samples. Ridomil Gold and Salicylic acid were found to be the best for the control of seed-born fungi of citrus seed at 40 mg/10 mL. The isolation and identification of different mycotoxins is essential to study health status of the citrus consumers and to safeguard the standards of WTO.

In this essay I will look at the symbolism that meat holds within our ‘modern’ ‘Western’ society. I will begin by briefly introducing the study of food in general within the social sciences, setting a framework of reference for the exploration of meat specifically. In
examining meat I will firstly set the context by turning to the global livestock sector and its relationship with the environment, before probing meat’s physical properties and their
ensuing symbolism, which, as we will see, is the basic foundation for meat’s high culinary and dietetic value in our culture. I will then continue to investigate meat’s symbolism by
asking what place, if any, may meat hold within our wider cultural cosmology, within our systems of social and moral ideas, before drawing some conclusions.

El presente trabajo de investigación busca aportar a la discusión en torno al antiespecismo como posicionamiento político que pone en cuestión la relación existente entre los humanos y los demás animales, hoy determinada por el carácter ideológico de la visión especista predominante. En función de lo anterior, se identifican diversas corrientes que buscan cuestionar la hegemonía especista que impera a nivel global en la relación que desarrolla el ser humano con los demás animales.

No obstante, a raíz de la ineficiencia crítica de las distintas corrientes antiespecistas imperantes, el desarrollo de una propuesta antiespecista de carácter contrahegemónico responde al contexto actual del presente debate. Esta propuesta se entiende como una opción viable para la articulación efectiva del antiespecismo en el escenario de pluralidad de luchas que se manifiesta tras la posguerra. Esta articulación y re significación del antiespecismo busca disputar las nociones ideológicas impuestas por el grupo dominante. De este modo, la presente investigación identifica los principales conceptos que subyacen al antiespecismo, contrastando las corrientes predominantes y diferenciando la funcionalidad de los elementos constitutivos de estas, ya sea como perpetuadoras del especismo, o bien como críticas de éste último, recabando así los elementos necesarios para la elaboración de un antiespecismo contrahegemónico.

Firstly, I want to establish the importance of animals and the question of the species boundary in 'othering' and racism. Secondly, I offer three (not mutually exclusive) kinds of political (and/or) popular objections that have been raisted against considering animals and speciesism - that is, some of the political difficulties involved in pursuing this topic in post-colonial contexts. Thirdly, I focus on the question of representation, and the ways in which two post-colonial writers from Canada and Australia have tackled the issue of the species boundary and speciesism. I am concerned with both the animal and animalistic, that is, with actual animals and the Western human symbolic economies within which they are more or less forced to more or less exits.

This article probes the ambiguity of posthuman heroism by revisiting the remarkable story of Pippi Longstocking. The purpose is to explore with Pippi a non-anthropocentric living in the more-than-human world. Its critical posthumanist analysis is empirically it is based on the American English translation of the Pippi book trilogy from the 1950s, as well as the Swedish TV series produced in 1969. Pippi’s posthuman power here serves to conceptualize a move beyond the anthropocentric savior complex. The analysis exhibits a power used to defy, mock, and resist authority, but always with the purpose of securing agency for Pippi and her community. This power-to, rather than power-over, becomes a creative force that builds a posthuman community between inorganic matter, humans, and animals. In place of heroism to save our planet, Pippi animates how to relate differently to the more-than-human world. She is a productive fantasy, an idea materialized – a posthuman figuration – that extends the notion of community, opens up the demos, and forcefully challenges anthropocentric normativity.

"It is usually assumed that being an environmentalist entails upholding the good of everything and everyone. In this
paper though I show how the holistic defense of everything implies disconsidering the suffering and death of a
great number of individuals living in nature when the equilibrium of ecosystems or the preservation of biodiversity is at
stake. I claim that from an anti-speciesist perspective we should reject environmentalism and defend the interests of
animals in nature, avoiding those ecological interventions which are harmful to animals and intervening in natural
processes in ways that can be beneficial to them, even if by doing so we may go against the conservation of natural
equilibrium or biodiversity, just as we do in the case of human beings. This implies that if we are in support of what is
for the good of everything we can’t consistently be for the good of everyone and that if we claim, as we should, that
what is important is the good of everyone (animal liberationism) we can’t also be committed to the good of everything
(environmentalism)."

In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions, that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view.

Richard Ryder, psicólogo clínico británico, es conocido por acuñar el concepto de especismo. Según ha relatado él mismo, sus inspiraciones fueron, por un lado, las luchas que durante los años sesenta se libraban contra el sexismo, el clasismo y el racismo, y por otro, su propia experiencia como psicólogo clínico en torno a la experimentación animal. Ryder no entendía por qué las luchas de los años sesenta no habían considerado a los animales no humanos, ni a los prejuicios que recaían sobre ellos, y al tiempo tampoco podía comprender la tolerancia frente al dolor, el miedo y la angustia-sentimientos no menores a los que podría percibir cualquier humano-en el contexto de la experimentación animal. A continuación, presentamos la traducción al español del primer texto en el que aparece el concepto de especismo, seguido de un comentario titulado "Especismo: 50 años después". Se trata de un folleto escrito por Ryder en 1970 y que circularía inicialmente por la Universidad de Oxford. Lamentablemente, el folleto no tuvo ninguna respuesta la primera vez que fue lanzado; sin embargo, la segunda vez fue puesto a circular con la imagen de un chimpancé infectado experimentalmente con sífilis, obteniendo respuesta por parte de Peter Singer, quien cinco años más tarde popularizaría el término especismo a través de su famoso libro Liberación Animal.

This paper examines how contemporary literary fiction responds to the climate crisis and the attendant call for a seemingly universalist "species view" of human beings. What does it mean to think of the human as a species, how can we find traces of species being in literature, and how do they interact with other dimensions of human lives? To address these questions, the paper confronts recent accounts of historical context, animal characters, and capitalist time with Annie Proulx's Barkskins (2016). As this confrontation shows, Proulx's novel teaches its readers to be a specieswithout ignoring differences of race, class, and gender. abstract © FRAME NO. 29.2 NOVEMBER 2016 | 71 -90

La violencia especista es un problema social emergente a escala planetaria que, lejos de prevenirse o erradicarse, se presenta como un recurso disponible para actuar en sociedad. El objetivo del presente trabajo consiste en introducir el término violencia especista y otorgar claves para su reconocimiento y erradicación. Con este fin, desde una perspectiva integral, se realiza una aproximación a su intrínseca complejidad mediante el abordaje de tres grandes ejes psicosociales: orígenes de la violencia especista, definición de violencia especista y tipos de violencia especista. Con respecto a sus orígenes, se analiza su causa, el Especismo Antropocéntrico, situándola en el contexto de otras luchas sociales afines (contra el Sexismo, Racismo, Nazismo, Homofobia, Transfobia, etc.). A continuación, se justifica la implementación del término violencia especista frente a otras terminologías de uso actual (maltrato animal, abuso, sadismo, crueldad, trastorno mental, etc.), otorgando rigor conceptual. Por último, se aborda un exhaustivo abanico de tipologías de violencia especista agrupadas en cinco dimensiones o escenarios de acción posible, según el tipo de relación violenta que se establezca con los animales nohumanos: violencia directa (física, psicológica, espacial, linchamiento, negligencia, instrumental), indirecta, colateral, estructural (incluye el Especidio) y discursiva. A lo largo de toda la presentación se fomenta el uso pragmático del discurso y se analizan casos prácticos y cotidianos que permiten aprehender la magnitud de la violencia especista presente en la actualidad.

Palabras clave: violencia especista, especismo, animales nohumanos, psicología vegana

Speciesist violence is an emerging social problem on a global scale that, far from prevented or eradicated, is presented as an available resource to act in society. The aim of this work is to introduce the term speciesist violence and provide clues for its recognition and eradication. To this end, from an integral perspective, an approach to its inherent complexity is done by addressing three psychosocial major axes: origins of speciesist violence, definition of speciesist violence and types of speciesist violence. According to its origins and its cause, Anthropocentric Speciesism is analyzed, placing it in the context of other related social struggles (against Sexism, Racism, Nazism, Homophobia, Transphobia, etc.). Then, it’s justified the implementation of the term speciesist violence against other terminologies currently in use (animal cruelty, animal abuse, sadism, mental disorder, etc.), giving conceptual rigor. Finally, is addressed a comprehensive range of typologies of speciesist violence, grouped into five dimensions or scenarios of possible action, according to the kind of violent relationship established with nonhuman animals: direct violence (physical, psychological, spatial, lynching, negligence, instrumental), indirect, collateral, structural (includes Speciecide) and discursive. Throughout the entire presentation, the pragmatic use of discourse is promoted, and practical and everyday life examples are analyzed, allowing to grasp the magnitude of existing speciesist violence nowadays.

Keywords: speciesist violence, speciesism, nonhuman animals, vegan psychology


A violência especista é um problema social que emerge numa escala global, o qual está longe de ser prevenido ou erradicado, portanto, apresenta-se como um recurso disponível para atuar em sociedade. O objetivo deste trabalho é introduzir o termo violência especista e oferecer pistas para o seu reconhecimento e erradicação. Tendo em vista esta finalidade, a partir de uma perspectiva integral, realiza-se uma aproximação em relação à complexidade que lhe é inerente através da abordagem dos três principais eixos psicossociais: origens da violência especista, definição da violência especista e tipos de violência especista. De acordo com suas origens e causas, o Especismo Antropocêntrico é analisado por meio da contextualização de outras lutas sociais que estão a ele vinculadas (contra o Sexismo, Racismo, Nazismo, Homofobia, Transfobia, etc.). Sendo assim, justifica-se a implementação do termo violência especista, ao invés de outras terminologias correntemente utilizadas (crueldade animal, abuso animal, sadismo, transtorno mental, etc.), em virtude de seu rigor conceitual. Por fim, aborda-se uma gama exaustiva de tipologias da violência especista, agrupadas em cinco dimensões ou cenários de ação possível, conforme o tipo de relação violenta estabelecida com os animais não-humanos: violência direta (física, psicológica, espacial, relativa ao linchamento e à negligência ou instrumental), indireta, colateral, estrutural (incluí o Especídio) e discursiva. No decorrer de toda a apresentação, o uso pragmático do discurso é promovido, ademais, exemplos práticos e cotidianos são analisados de modo a nos permitir apreender a magnitude da existência da violência especista na atualidade.

Palavras-chave: violência especista, especismo, animais não-humanos, psicologia vegana.

This is the Draft Table of Contents for my forthcoming book (Lexington--hopefully December 2016): Eco-Nihilism: The Philosophical Geopolitics of the Climate Change Apocalypse.

I post it here to give my readers--for whom I'm tremendously grateful--a preview of the book's themes and argument.

Taking Bram Stoker’s Dracula as its starting point, this essay examines the veg- etarian and vegan politics and identities that are both implicitly and explicitly present in three contemporary popular cultural representations of vampires, Joss Whedon’s 1997–2003 television series Buffy the Vampire Slayer, Stephenie Meyer’s 2005 novel Twilight and Catherine Hardwicke’s 2008 adaptation of it, and Alan Ball’s HBO series True Blood (based on The Southern Vampire Mysteries novels by Charlaine Harris), which first aired in 2008. These texts highlight a shifting cultural discourse of rights, violence, and identity that indicates a moment of profound uncertainty with regard to what it means to be human in a supposedly post-feminist, post-racist, and post-human world.

The argument from species overlap has been widely used in the literature on animal ethics and speciesism. However, there has been much confusion regarding what the argument proves and what it does not prove, and regarding the views it challenges. This paper intends to clarify these confusions, and to show that the name most often used for this argument (“the argument from marginal cases”) reflects and reinforces these misunderstandings. The paper claims that the argument questions not only those defenses of anthropocentrism that appeal to capacities believed to be typically human, but also those that appeal to special relations between humans. This means the scope of the argument is far wider than has been thought thus far. Finally, the paper claims that, even if the argument cannot prove by itself that we should not disregard the interests of nonhuman animals, it provides us with strong reasons to do so, since the argument does prove that no defense of anthropocentrism appealing to non-definitional and testable criteria succeeds.

Este artigo examina o problema do mal na natureza, isto é, a questão de qual é o desvalor presente nesta e se tal desvalor prevalece ou não sobre a felicidade existente nela. O artigo sustenta que este último é o caso. Essa é uma consequência dificilmente evitável da existência de um processo evolutivo em um contexto em que os recursos são escassos. Devido a isso, o sofrimento e a morte prematura são a norma na natureza. O número de indivíduos que vêm ao mundo apenas para morrer de forma dolorosa e em pouco tempo supera amplamente o daqueles que sobrevivem. Além disso, este artigo também defende que a ideia de que os interesses dos animais não humanos não tem que ser considerados como são os interesses dos seres humanos é especista e inaceitável, e que os animais não só têm um interesse em não sofrer, como também em não morrer. Diante de tudo isso, o artigo conclui que as coisas boas presentes na natureza são amplamente superadas pela imensa quantidade de desvalor que há nela, e que deveríamos intervir para reduzir esta quantidade de desvalor naqueles casos em que isso resulta possível.

A presente tese visa discutir qual deveria ser nossa atitude diante dos danos (por exemplo, sofrimento e morte) que os animais não humanos selvagens que se encontram na natureza (por exemplo, selvas e oceanos) padecem em decorrência de processos não antropogênicos (por exemplo, morte por inanição, sede, parasitismo, doenças, predação,
acidentes, deformidades etc.). Deveríamos, nesse caso, não intervir e
deixar a natureza seguir o seu curso? Deveríamos intervir apenas visando alcançar metas ecologistas (por exemplo, a preservação de
espécies ou o equilíbrio ecológico) e fomentar interesses humanos (por
exemplo, vacinar tais animais com vistas a prevenir o contágio de
humanos)? Ou, deveríamos prevenir/minimizar tais danos por
preocupação com o próprio bem dos animais afetados? A hipótese
defendida será a de que existem fortes razões para
prevenirmos/minimizarmos tais danos por preocupação com o próprio
bem dos animais toda fez que fazê-lo tiver melhores consequências do
que não fazê-lo, e também para aumentarmos nossa gama de
intervenções seguras e eficientes ao longo do tempo. Será defendido
também que tal atitude não é meramente louvável, mas, requerida
moralmente, e que, dada a gigantesca magnitude de dano envolvida, tal
problema deveria receber grande atenção.

Palavras-chave: Sofrimento dos animais selvagens. Danos naturais.
Intervenção na natureza. Especismo. Consideração moral dos animais
não humanos. Senciência. Argumento da relevância.

Nous aimons les animaux et, pourtant, nous aimons les manger. Comment supporter cette dissonance cognitive – le « paradoxe de la viande » ? Comment, également, la réduire sans pour autant suivre de fausses vérités ? Cet article analyse les différentes représentations des animaux que nous mangeons. Je défendrai l’idée suivante : si une majorité de gens peut à la fois aimer et manger des animaux sans se poser de questions, c’est en raison de la manière dont les animaux sont représentés culturellement et médiatiquement. J’examinerai les représentations de « l’animal-à-manger » et les différentes stratégies mises en place à travers la publicité pour atténuer et faire taire le sentiment de dissonance cognitive. J’étudierai ensuite comment ces représentations sont contestées par les défenseurs de la cause animale. J’examinerai ici les représentations de « l’animal-à-ne-pas-manger » et les méthodes des activistes végétariens et véganes pour mettre en lumière la dissonance cognitive. Ces deux représentations jouent avec des codes et symboles opposés : d’une part, l’abstraction, la désindividualisation, l’objectification, la naturalisation-normalisation-nécessitation et la caricaturisation ; d’autre part, la déconstruction de ces procédés, la ré-animalisation et le détournement.  Je souhaite ainsi indiquer comment nous pouvons espérer retrouver des représentations culturelles plus justes des animaux, détachées des stéréotypes et de toute idéologie dominante.

Mots-clefs : représentations, viande, animal, dissonance cognitive, spécisme, carnisme, véganisme, publicité, médias, art.

Mémoire de recherche qui explore les liens entre spécisme et sexisme, care et animalisme. Etude de la construction de la subjectivité masculine hégémonique par l'exploitation, l'assujettissement et la consommation des corps femmes, femelles, et racialisés. Perspectives de résistances contemporaines avec la revalorisation d'une contre-histoire végane féministe.

The emotional exchange between so-called “humans” and more-than-human creatures is an overlooked phenomenon in societies characterized by the ubiquitous deaths of animals. This text offers examples of people across diverse disciplines and perspectives—from biomedical research to black theology to art—learning and performing emotions, expanding their desires, discovering new ways to behave, and altering their sense of self, purpose, and community because of passionate, but not romanticized, attachments to animals. By articulating the emotional ties that bind them to specific animals’ lives and deaths, these authors play host to creaturely ghosts who reorient their world vision and work in the world, offering examples of affect and feeling needed to enliven multi-species ethics.

The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper argues that the use of this concept, however common, distorts our understanding of how to behave towards different individuals in different circumstances. When moral status is identified with the interest in living or the capacity for well-being, it becomes an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion. When it is used as a synonym of moral consideration or considerability, in a way that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration, it becomes trivial and confusing. When used, instead, to defend the unequal moral consideration of interests of equal weight, it has several implausible implications. In particular, the claim that unequal status is justified because of the value (either final or intrinsic, or instrumental) of cognitive capacities implausibly entails that our exercising those capacities should have priority over the promotion of our wellbeing. The idea of full moral status is also problematic as it implies the possibility of status monsters. In addition, its use is based in a misconceived way of what it would really entail to have a full status by virtue of having rational capacities. The paper concludes that we have strong reasons to abandon the concept of moral status altogether.

An elderly patient in a care home only wants human nurses to provide her care-not robots. If she selected her carers based on skin colour, it would be seen as racist and morally objectionable, but is choosing a human nurse instead of a robot also morally objectionable and speciesist? A plausible response is that it is not, because humans provide a better standard of care than robots do, making such a choice justifiable. In this paper, I show why this response is incorrect, because robots can theoretically care as well as human nurses can. I differentiate between practical caring and emotional caring, and I argue that robots can match the standard of practical care given by human nurses, and they can simulate emotional care. There is growing evidence that people respond positively to robotic creatures and carebots, and AI software is apt to emotionally support patients in spite of the machine's own lack of emotions. I make the case that the appearance of emotional care is sufficient, and need not be linked to emotional states within the robot. After all, human nurses undoubtedly 'fake' emotional care and compassion sometimes, yet their patients still feel adequately cared for. I show that it is a mistake to claim that 'the human touch' is in itself a contributor to a higher standard of care; 'the robotic touch' will suffice. Nevertheless, it is not speciesist to favour human nurses over carebots, because carebots do not (currently) suffer as the result of such a choice. The Robotic Touch 89 In the residential care home where Maude lives, there are some human nurses and some carebots. Maude only wants human nurses to provide her care. IF MAUDE ONLY WANTED white nurses to provide her care purely on the basis of their skin colour, we would claim she was being racist-so when she chooses a human nurse over a carebot purely on the basis of species membership 1 , why do we not claim she is being speciesist? Two plausible responses are: 1. Humans provide a better standard of care than robots do (making the choice of a human nurse over a carebot justifiable). 2. Robots do not have moral standing because they cannot suffer, and therefore there is nothing morally problematic about choosing a human over a robot. 2 I address the first of these responses and demonstrate that it is unfounded, because some robots are capable of providing a standard of care which is equal to or higher than that provided by human nurses. I further show that it is a mistake to claim that 'the human touch' is valuable simply because it comes from a human being.

Humans often intervene in the wild for anthropocentric or environmental reasons. An example of such interventions is the reintroduction of wolves in places where they no longer live in order to create what has been called an “ecology of fear”, which is being currently discussed in places such as Scotland. In the first part of this paper I discuss the reasons for this measure and argue that they are not compatible with a nonspeciesist approach. Then, I claim that if we abandon a speciesist viewpoint we should change completely the way in which we should intervene in nature. Rather than intervening for environmental or anthropocentric reasons, we should do it in order to reduce the harms that nonhuman animals suffer. This conflicts significantly with some fundamental environmental ideals whose defence is not compatible with the consideration of the interests of nonhuman animals.

Este artículo examina las defensas de la consideración moral de los animales no humanos que pueden llevarse a cabo desde posiciones aristotélicas. Presenta asimismo el modo en el que esta se ha planteado, entre otros, por Steve Sapontzis, Stephen Clark, Martha Nussbaum, Daniel Dombrowski, Bernard Rollin o Nathan Nobis. El artículo no argumenta a favor de una posición neoaristotélica, pero sostiene que quienes acepten esta perspectiva tienen razones para rechazar la discriminación de los animales no humanos.

Many people think we should refrain from intervening in nature as much as possible. One of the main reasons for thinking this way is that the existence of nature is a net positive. However, population dynamics teaches us that most sentient animals who come into existence in nature die shortly thereafter, mostly in painful ways (due to starvation, predation, and other reasons). Those who survive often suffer greatly due to natural causes. If sentient beings matter, this gives us reasons to intervene to prevent such harms. This counterintuitive conclusion can be opposed by arguing (1) that we should not care about nonhuman animals; (2) that other values, such as the existence of certain ecosystemic relations or of untouched wild areas, count for more than the interests of sentient beings; or (3) that intervention in nature cannot succeed. There are, however, strong reasons to reject these claims and to support significant intervention in nature for the sake of animals, despite our deep-rooted intuitions to the contrary.

This article explores how issues of ‘not quite human-ness’ expose the conditions of possibility of being considered human; of human ontology. I refer to these dynamics for identifying sameness and difference as ontological politics of recognition. Tracing the genealogies of passing, I situate passing and Othering socio-political regulation and ideological frameworks for conceptualising ontology. I am particularly concerned
with how the notion of ontology is bound up in questions of race and gender, and with the entanglements of technology and biology that can destabilise apparently fixed boundaries between the (natural/normative) human and its (constructed/abnormal) Others. I identify three trajectories of passing as human in the histories of science
fiction. The first trajectory discusses ontological mimicry: the ways in which the nonhuman attempts to be like the human. The second trajectory addresses how passing as human relies on a Butlerian performativity: doing human-ness by complying with the regulatory frames for appearances and practices. The final trajectory discusses what is at stake in contemporary ontological politics of recognition: a renegotiation of human supremacy through an emphasis on collectivity and collaboration rather that singularity and boundedness.

Ce mémoire porte sur la relation entre le végétalisme et la tradition culinaire française, et plus particulièrement, sur la manière dont cette dernière est remise en question par le végétalisme. Il s’appuie notamment sur les témoignages de restaurateurs végétaliens, qui livrent alors leurs ressentis sur leur place au sein des restaurants, notamment traditionnels, français. Cette analyse permet alors de mettre en évidence les tensions qui émergent quant à la confrontation de ces deux modèles alimentaires
Dans un premier temps, les deux modèles d’alimentation sont analysés notamment dans les deux rapports différents aux animaux qu’ils présentent. L’importance de la viande et des produits issus de l’exploitation animale au sein de la tradition culinaire française est alors mise en évidence, bien que celle-ci soit en partie due à l’industrialisation massive des produits alimentaires issus de l’exploitation animale. Les fondements spécistes de la tradition découlent ainsi d’un rapport dominant à la nature. À l’inverse, le végétalisme se voit considéré comme une pratique qui traduit une vision plus globale qui considère les animaux non-humains comme des êtres sentients. Par leur capacité à souffrir, les animaux devraient alors bénéficier de droits qui assurent que leurs besoins vitaux sont remplis. La pertinence de la différence comme critère de discrimination et d’oppression des animaux est également remise en question.
Dans un second temps, la fonction de ciment social de la tradition est analysée. En effet, le rituel alimentaire est profondément fédérateur, il est ainsi difficile d’y introduire de nouvelles pratiques. La viande est aliment à forte symbolique, elle renvoie à la fête, au pouvoir et se voit, par sa rareté, être l’apanage des élites, et notamment des hommes. Cet ordre social bien établi se voit alors contrarié par la vision du monde proposée par le végétalisme, basée sur le respect du vivant, l’empathie et l’équité. Les végétalien·nes sortant de manière explicite de la norme, lors des repas, se voient rappelé·es à l’ordre, ou bien stigmatisé·es.
Dans un dernier temps, le végétalisme comme opportunité d’une réappropriation de la tradition est exploré, notamment en faisant converger certaines valeurs issues de la tradition avec des problématiques éthiques qui prennent en ampleur ces dernières années. La consistance morale du végétalisme est également remise en question, à l’heure ou les produits industriels végétaux envahissent les supermarchés et il est toujours associé à une certaine « blanchité » privilégiée. Nous pourrons alors constater qu’une convergence des luttes est nécessaire pour s’inscrire dans une démarche de respect du vivant dans sa globalité, dont le végétalisme peut être une des applications concrètes.

When animal representations and symbols reconfigure and challenge our human status, we are then confronted with a transition from theriomorphism to the so-called “animal question.” This means that, from simple tropes, animal figures become epistemological agents that compel us to reconsider anthropocentrism and highlight the limits of speciesism. Ivano Ferrari’s poetry collections "Macello" (2004) and "La morte moglie" (2013) are, within Italian literature, among the most recent and intense examples of this shift from theriomorphism to the animal question. The poems constitute a type of diary of the period Ferrari spent working in the abattoir in Belfiore, near Mantua. His writing bears witness to the tensions present in the relationship between humans and animals when, both inside and outside of the slaughterhouse, they become respectively executioner and victim, revealing the profound links between cruelty to the animal (interspecific) and cruelty to the human (intraspecific). Ferrari’s poems also show how, precisely in the inhumane space of the slaughterhouse, contact with other animals is possible, a contact that reduces the distance between species caused by anthropocentrism.

This article addresses the uniqueness of Aubrey Beardsley’s late nineteenth-century Poe “illustrations” as works that enjoy a complex relationship with the writer’s theory of graphicality—specifically the dichotomy that exists between exteriority and interiority in both text and image. This essay posits that Beardsley’s use of vague open-endedness (in terms of visual narrative) was deliberately intended to reside in tandem—but not supersede or compete with—the graphicality of Poe’s words. By theorizing the exteriority/interiority binary around two Poesian themes—decay and speciesism—this study seeks to explain how the iconography of Beardsley’s images is at the very crux of graphicality, especially as this concept applies to writing-as-art and the art of illustration.

This essay discusses two linked aspects of Brigid Brophy’s work as a pro-animal writer of literature. These are her determined usurping of the human hierarchy and prestige that permit violence toward animal life, and her concomitant reliance on the potential of literary-formal creativity to prosecute it. I trace these elements in the text that contains the majority of Brophy’s literary-fictional writing about animals, The Adventures of God in his Search for the Black Girl (1973), discussing the short novel in the form of a conte philosophique which goes by that title and a number of short pro-animal fables that are collected with it. Drawing on archive materials, the discussion situates Brophy’s literary practice in the context of her influential journalism, essays, artworks made with Maureen Duffy, her work in support of early animal rights authors and a recently discovered 1972 Open University interview on the topic of animal rights. A broader aim of the essay is thereby to properly recognize Brophy’s significance in the literary history of contemporary writing that challenges anthropocentric attitudes to animals. Women’s writing is where one must look first for this development, in the work of key figures such as Margaret Atwood, Angela Carter, Maureen Duffy, Patricia Highsmith, Ursula Le Guin, and Alice Walker. Yet, on the literary wing of the academic field of animal studies, which has burgeoned over the last fifteen years or so by discussing such figures, Brophy’s work has been almost entirely forgotten.

Edited by Natalie Khazaal & Núria Almiron (https://brill.com/view/title/58839)

The contributors of Like an Animal challenge most fundamental concepts in the fields of racism, dehumanization, borders, displacement, and refugees that rest on the assumption of humanism. They show how we can bend the arc of the moral universe toward justice at the border. The goal of this interdisciplinary collection is twofold. First, to invite border/migration studies to consider a broader social justice perspective that includes nonhuman animals. Second, to start a discussion if nonhumans maybe refugees of a kind and how humans can address nonhumans’ interests and needs from the perspective of addressing refugee issues. As capitalism and the climate crisis are taking a catastrophic toll on the planet, this timely volume exposes the alternative origins of violence that lie at the heart of the planet’s destruction.

The moral consideration of nonhuman animals and the critique of speciesism have been defended by appeal to a variety of ethical theories. One of the main approaches in moral and political philosophy today from which to launch such a defense is egalitarianism, which is the view that we should aim at favoring the worse off by reducing inequality. This paper explains what egalitarianism is and shows the important practical consequences it has for nonhuman animals, both those that are exploited by humans and those in need of aid in the wild. Egalitarianism implies rejecting speciesism, and in practice it prescribes ceasing to exploit nonhuman animals as well as assisting them. Moreover, because they are worse off in comparison to humans, egalitarianism prescribes giving priority to the interests nonhuman animals. Due to this, egalitarianism gives us extra reasons to defend them beyond those entailed by other nonspeciesist approaches.

Öz İnsan-hayvan arasındaki iktidar ilişkileri, uzunca bir süre akademik literatürde kendine yer bulamamıştır. Hayvanlar, insanlık tarihinin her aşamasında insanın hem fiziksel hem de toplumsal hayatının önemli bir parçası olmuşlardır. Son zamanlarda, eleştirel hayvan çalışmaları olarak anılan disiplinlerarası nitelikteki alan, insan-hayvan etkileşiminin pek çok alanda ne kadar temel olduğunu hatırlatmakta ve sadece insanın özne olarak yüceltildiği yaklaşımları eleştirmektedir. Böylesi bir yaklaşımdan beslenen bu çalışma hayvanın aşağı statüsünün insan-merkezci, türcü bir ideolojiden kaynaklandığını savunmaktadır. Anaakım söylem, bu ideolojiyi hem yaratmakta hem de sürdürmektedir. Hayvanın aşağı statüsü, insanın doğa ve hayvanlar ile kurduğu uyumlu ilişkinin neolitik devrim ve evcilleştirme sonrasında bozulmasıyla başlayan bir sürecin sonucudur. İnsanın hiyerarşik üstünlüğü, insan ve hayvan arasındaki farklara odaklanan bir bakış açısıyla inşa edilmekte ve giderek normalleşen bu aşağı statü yansımasını dilde bulmaktadır. Hayvanların günümüzdeki aşağı statüsü etrafında kurulan hegemonya öylesine başarılıdır ki insan-hayvan arasındaki iktidar ilişkileri sorgulanmaz, normal ve doğal kabul edilir. Bu çalışmada, dilde gömülü olan iktidar ilişkilerini ortaya çıkarmaya, gizli olanı görünür hale getirip toplumsal eşitsizliklerle mücadele etmeye katkı sağlayan eleştirel söylem çözümlemesi yöntemi tercih edilmiştir. Modern dünyada insanın hayvanla girdiği asimetrik ilişkinin en geniş kapsamlı ve en kanlı görüntüsü gıda sektöründe karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, incelenek metin, T.C. Gıda, Tarım ve Hayvancılık Bakanlığı'nın internet sayfasından alınan " Yumurta Tavukçuluğu " ve " Etlik Piliç Yetiştiriciliği " olarak seçilmiş ve bu metinlere Eleştirel Söylem Çözümlemesi uygulanmıştır. Üretim söylemi, meşruiyet sağlama, düzdeğişmece, örtmece ve sessizlik başlıkları altında incelenen metnin eleştirel söylem çözümlemesi kavramlarıyla bağlantıları kurulmuştur. Metin çözümlemesi neticesinde, tavukların söylem yoluyla birer cansız nesneye dönüştürüldükleri, bireyselliklerinin, öznelliklerinin ellerinden alındığı, insanlar tarafından oluşturulan yapay kategoriler etrafında bütün hayatlarının-ve ölümlerinin-önceden belirlendiği, arka plandaki zalim uygulamaların kamufle edildiği ortaya konulmuştur. Söyleme dair bu bulgular hayvanı insandan aşağı tutan insan-merkezci ve türcü bir yaklaşımla tutarlılık göstermektedir.
Anahtar sözcükler: Eleştirel hayvan çalışmaları, agrosanayi, eleştirel söylem çözümlemesi, insan-merkezcilik, türcülük

While the case for veganism may be argued to be beyond debate, ending the exploitation of nonhuman animals remains hindered by the ubiquity of speciesism. This paper therefore explores the resilience of the speciesist order in two related contexts: the cultural reproduction of speciesism, including the ridicule of veganism; the applicability of Cohen’s sociological theory of denial to the exploitation of nonhuman animals. In so doing, the paper points towards intersections between speciesism and other forms of oppression, which may in turn help to inform effective vegan activism and prevent veganism from being marginalized as a “single issue."

When we follow the origins of the sense of morality and its unfolding in different human societies, we can find, at its center, the problem of violence and the means to avoid it, diminish it or control it. Therefore, through a study of reality and our biological aptitudes for altruistic behavior, we can see the importance of empathy for human and scientific development. Bioethics seeks precisely to diminish the damage caused by man to other animals and to himself. And considering the importance of empathy and perception for the recognition of animal suffering, people who limit their moral considerations to the boundaries of their human community tend to be more indifferent to the suffering of these animals. Thus, a society that represses our moral considerations and jeopardizes our mental health can at some point produce a population indifferent to suffering, making acts of violence common, contributing to inhuman education, and, in a specific case, can also contribute for an inhuman science. Guided by Bioethics, this article presents some of the biological and philosophical contributions to moral consideration with non-human animals, and had as objectives; to evaluate the knowledge and opinions of university students regarding ethics and animal experimentation in their due courses, to verify the existence of relationships between the opinions and empathy responses of beginners and finalists regarding animal experimentation, and to verify the existence of relations between the variations in empathy responses to speciesism

La Violencia Especista es una violencia social que reproduce los parámetros de complejidad atribuidos a cualquier violencia social ya conocida en la actualidad. El presente artículo realiza un análisis diacrónico y sincrónico crítico de la violencia especista evidenciando los grados de (in)visibilidad que la caracterizan, su nexo con el Especismo y el rol que ocupa el Veganismo como estrategia de erradicación y acción social.

Palabras clave: violencia especista, especismo, veganismo, psicología vegana, estudios críticos animales, antiespecismo, análisis del discurso.

Se asume habitualmente que a los seres humanos se les debe dar una consideración moral preferente, cuando no una prioridad absoluta, sobre los miembros de otras especies. Esta idea ha prevalecido de manera general en el debate moral y político. Con todo, también ha sido disputada desde diferentes perspectivas normativas. Consideremos, por ejemplo, la teoría de los derechos. Como es sabido, Tom Regan (1983) ha defendido que todo individuo que es sujeto de una vida tiene valor intrínseco, con lo que satisface una condición suficiente para la plena consideración moral. Otras teóricas y teóricos han sostenido que a los animales deben serles reconocidos derechos sobre la base de otras perspectivas, como la kantiana, tal y como lo ha defendido Christine Korsgaard , o la contractualista, como lo ha hecho Mark Rowlands (1998). El antropocentrismo ha sido igualmente disputado desde las teorías basadas en el carácter. Por ejemplo, Stephen Clark (1977) ha argumentado que difícilmente puede alguien ser un agente moral virtuoso si desconsidera los intereses de ciertos individuos, bien por la especie a la que pertenecen, o bien por otras características que consideraríamos irrelevantes cuando se trata de actuar hacia los miembros de nuestra propia especie. Y lo mismo se ha afirmado desde la ética del cuidado. Teóricas como Josephine Donovan (2007) han argumentado que alguien no puede ser una agente cuidadora ("caring agent") si ignora la grave situación en la que se encuentran los animales no humanos. Además, el antropocentrismo ha sido también cuestionado desde otras teorías que * Este artículo fue publicado en Ávila Gaitán, Ivan Darío (comp.). La cuestión animal(ista). Bogotá: Desde Abajo Ediciones, 2016: 327-340. Una versión anterior de este texto fue publicada originalmente en Inglés con el título "Equality, Priority and Nonhuman Animals" en Dilemata 14, 2014: 225-236.