Rights and Obligations

El presente artículo tiene un objetivo simple y práctico: servir de disparador para el debate que debería darse sobre la relación médico-paciente y la violencia actual que la caracteriza. Y, en última instancia, también constituye un objetivo -un poco más pretensioso tal vez-, el de contribuir a la paz social.

L’indagine svolta ha permesso di fare apparire come meglio condivisibile, tra le varie prospettive in tema di origine della compravendita consensuale romana, quella secondo cui essa sorse come istituto sganciato dalle radici del ius civile. In tal senso, almeno, depongono due ordini di considerazioni. In primo luogo, l’ipotesi sostenuta si può argomentare sulla base del passo di Paolo conservato in D. 18.1.1 e in D. 19.4.1pr.-2, dal quale emerge la convinta opinione del giurista classico, secondo la quale la compravendita consensuale doveva essere qualificata iuris gentium nel senso che i suoi caratteri fondanti erano emersi prima nel ius gentium e, solo successivamente, da esso erano stati recepiti nel ius civile (e non invece nel senso che, come viceversa accaduto per la traditio o per la stipulatio, essa fosse sorta nel ius civile e quindi fosse stata estesa ai rapporti con i peregrini). In secondo luogo, l’opinione può essere motivata sulla scorta di alcune osservazioni di dettaglio, che sono state sviluppate, da cui è sembrato emergere con sufficiente nitidezza che i Romani, in materia di compravendita con i peregrini, a partire da una certa epoca in poi, che si deve probabilmente collocare nel terzo secolo a.C., abbiano ritenuto non più soddisfacente il modello che avevano seguito fin dall’età arcaica. Tale modello arcaico era stato basato su quella che abbiamo potuto definire l’estensione “nei limiti del possibile” della disciplina civilistica ai casi di compravendite che intervenivano tra Romani e stranieri. Si trattava di un’estensione difficoltosa e a tratti anche illogica, dovuta al fatto che il diritto romano era stato pensato solo per la comunità dei cives: solo i Romani potevano avere la proprietà delle cose; solo ai cives era accessibile la mancipatio e pertanto solo per loro aveva senso compiuto la distinzione tra res mancipi e res nec mancipi; conseguentemente, solo per i cives poteva dirsi che esistesse una garanzia automatica dall’evizione in caso di vendita (reale) di res mancipi (in quanto tale garanzia derivava dalla mancipatio). L’estensione “nei limiti del possibile” di una siffatta disciplina ai rapporti di compravendita tra Romani e stranieri aveva prodotto un regime complesso, ma anche spurio e in gran parte contraddittorio, che infine apparve insoddisfacente, ciò che costituì la premessa per il suo superamento.

This study provides a qualitative examination of African American Language (AAL) in use and explores the interaction between phonological, syntactic and rhetorical features of AAL and situational factors related to the event structuring, speaker goals, and audience composition. Data for this research is derived from the speech of four prominent African Americans who spoke during the 2008 State of the Black Union. Analysis of their speech suggests that they use switches to black preaching style to redefine their relationship with audience members. Overall, shifts in style correspond to shifts in interactional framework, suggesting that black preaching style allows the speakers in this study to temporarily cloak themselves with the status and respect associated with black preachers, providing a favorable context for the reception of their message while allowing for the display of their ethnic affiliation with the black community.

Legal norms in themselves do not give rise to legal relations, do not give rise to subjective rights and legal obligations of parties of relationship. In order for public relations, or rather the social ties of members of society to be successfully coordinated with each other in the appropriate legal framework, legal grounds for their emergence are necessary. The ground for the emergence of rights to objects are juridical facts. They mean the consequences of circumstances of reality (factual or legal), with which parties, due to formal legal certainty (contract, custom, court decision, legal norm) link emergence, change or termination of rights, individual competences or entire legal relationship to the relevant object.
Actions are the acts of person characterizing the external expression of his/her will and consciousness as a result of purposeful activity in a social environment governed by law.
The most common ground for emergence of the right to an object related to the action is a transaction, which means the action of a person aimed at establish-ing, changing and terminating civil rights and obligations.
The most widespread ground for the emergence of rights to an object in legal relations of obligations is a contract. In the system of juridical facts, the contract is declared in such lawful actions as a transaction (bilaterally binding one). The contract as a juridical fact is the ground for the acquisition of property right, ensures the transformation of an absolute legal relationship into an obligation one with the subsequent establishment of a new absolute legal relationship. The fulfillment of contractual obligations on the transfer of property into ownership leads to the emergence of property rights for one party (purchase and sale, dona-tion) or for both parties (exchange).
The ground for the emergence of rights to objects is also a legal act. It is under-stood as an action that entails a legal consequence, regardless of whether these actions were aimed at the consequences, which (by virtue of the rule of law) are called, or not. Acts cause legal consequences, regardless of whether the subject was aware or not aware of their legal significance, whether he/she wanted or did not want them to occur.
The above grounds for the emergence of rights to an object are initially caused by the commission of legally significant actions that are not related to the onset of legal and actual consequences in the form of transfer of ownership to another person. The content of a legal act in this case is due to the need to ensure the safety of property of another when it is identified. In the future, the formation of such a configuration of juridical facts as the discovery of property of another, public noti-fication of incidentis and the expiration of the statutory period for ensuring the safety of this property entails the onset of legal consequences in the form of the emergence of a real right to an object.
It should also be noted that a legal act leads to the creation of such real right object as a literary, artistic, musical or scientific work (Articles 437, 451, 458 of the Civil Code of Ukraine), an invention, a utility model, an industrial design (Ar-ticle 462 of the Civil Code of Ukraine), rationalization proposal (Article 484 of the Civil Code of Ukraine), commercial secret (Article 506 of the Civil Code of Ukraine) and other objects of intellectual property rights.
The writing of a poem creates copyright regardless of whether the author was aware of the meaning of his/her actions or not. The motivation of the subject of intellectual property rights is aimed not at achieving the legal consequences stipu-lated by the norm in the form of material remuneration or the acquisition of other property rights, but at the realization of the individual’s own creative abilities.
Illegal actions as a juridical fact (tort) serve as the basis for the emergence of protective legal relations, the content of which is the implementation of the com-pensatory and restorative function of civil law. Tort is the basis for the emergence of rights to such object as a property claim for compensation for material and mor-al damage caused. This is an object of law of a special kind, implemented only in protective legal relations. Its peculiarity, in contrast to other objects of the material world, is that this object is not subject to free circulation in civil law transactions. This is due to the nature of protective legal relations, the essence of which boils down to the need to compensate for the damage caused directly to the victim by the causer, the inextricable connection of such compensation with the personality of the subjects of the tort legal relationship.
The grounds for the emergence of rights to objects juridical facts are unique in their nature. Their uniqueness lies in their singularity, which is caused by the nature of human behavior in social conditions. Depending on the content of the social environment in which they arise, juridical facts are configured according to individual characteristics. Their diversity cannot be reflected normally or doctrinally. It is possible to single out only the general contours in which they find their external manifestation. Such contours are the strong willed nature of the subject of law, which allows us to combine juridical facts in the following algorithms: action event; event action; legal act act of law; legal act event legal act, etc.

Why must we keep our promises? Promising is one of our most familiar practices, and yet, this question still remains to be philosophically perplexing. The problem is that promising just seems to be so mysterious; we utter some words, or shake hands, and therein we undertake an entirely new set of normative obligations.

The task of this essay is to explain exactly how these promissory obligations come to exist. A classic starting-point for such an explanation has been some form of promissory instrumentalism. That is, philosophers (following Hume) have attempted to explain promissory obligation in terms of the instrumental utility of such a practice. Promissory obligations, according to such an account, exist just because it is instrumentally useful to us that they exist.

Promissory instrumentalism, however, has been subjected to serious criticism. David Owens (2011) has purported to show that instrumentalism about promising just fails to reflect our intuitions on specific cases. Obligations, according to Owens, can exist even without instrumental practices. More recently, Stephen Darwall (2011) and Margaret Gilbert (2011) have argued that promising consists in bipolar obligations, and that instrumentalism cannot account for this particular feature. The result of these criticisms is that promissory instrumentalism does not seem to provide a viable answer to our original question.

The task of this essay, then, is twofold: first, to outline exactly why instrumentalism provides such an appealing explanation of promissory obligation; and, second, to give a satisfactory answer to the problems outlined above. In brief, this essay aims to provide a new defence for an old explanation of promissory obligation.

With respect to the first task, I argue that instrumentalism best fits the normative profile of promissory obligation for two reasons: (i) promising shares many prima facie similarities with other instrumentalist institutions; and (ii) instrumentalism offers the most plausible explanation of the normative powers involved in promising.

With respect to the second task, I show how Owens' objection can be avoided by formulating promissory instrumentalism in terms of Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism. I then consider the problem posed by Darwall and Gilbert, which the Rawlsian account does not obviously answer. I show, however, that the problem can be explained away according to the practice-internal rules of the Rawlsian account.

My final formulation of the Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism, therefore, satisfies both of the above tasks; it possesses the normative strength of promissory instrumentalism, and offers new responses to serious objections.

The major technological developments in recent decades have led to a significant increase in the role of multinational companies (MNCs) in an international framework. This episode has been accompanied by debates about the status that these entities have in international law. Among the most frequent discussions between scholars is their legal personality. Therefore, this research paper focuses on an overview of the literature on the State as a subject of international law and the status of MNCs in international law.

Uitkeringsperioden kunnen korter zijn naarmate klanten zich beter aan hun plichten houden. Daarvoor hebben ze wel voldoende informatie nodig over de rechten en plichten. Naast enige mate van controle dienen klanten zo min mogelijk belemmering te ervaren bij de naleving van de regels.

UWV laat jaarlijks een onderzoek onder haar klanten uitvoeren om hun kennis te meten van de rechten en plichten die bij een uitkering horen. De meeste respondenten stellen dat zij de informatie over rechten en plichten goed kunnen vinden en begrijpen. Over het algemeen is dat beeld stabiel over de jaren 2006 t/m 2009. Klanten met een WW-uitkering zijn relatief het best op de hoogte van zowel hun rechten als hun plichten; klanten met een Wajong-uitkering het slechtst. De toegang tot de benodigde informatie is dus goed. Het doorgeven van wijzigingen via internet is voor sommige klanten niet gemakkelijk. Gezien de toename van e-dienstverlening verdient dat aandacht. Zestien procent van de respondenten is echter onbekend met de plicht na een jaar WW een passend werkaanbod van UWV te accepteren. De controlebeleving onder de respondenten is hoog. Wel lijkt het alsof men verwacht dat een controle vooral anderen zal treffen.