Philosophy of Happiness and Well-being

Art is commonly thought to promote well-being. However, aestheticians have not considered how art plays this role. Over the past quarter century, there has been considerable research in positive psychology, the empirical study of subjective well-being (SWB). This research has generated robust findings on the factors promoting well-being. In this paper, I consider the findings for SWB in contemporary psychology in order to identify how art supports well-being. I also explore the implications of SWB theory for aesthetic theory and arts policy.

All of us have some preferences about how we will die. We care about such things as what will cause our death, when and where it will happen, who will be with us, how much warning we will have, and how we will experience death. While such preferences are sometimes grounded in a concern for the well-being of others or a desire to promote some social or spiritual cause, preferences regarding one's own death are commonly self-interested or, as philosophers say, prudential. In other words, they are grounded in a concern for one's own well-being. Accordingly, they provide insight into an individual's substantive normative view about what makes a death go better or worse for the one who dies. This is commonly referred to as the theme of the good death. 1 Despite its obvious significance to self-conscious mortal beings like ourselves, It might be thought that there is nothing problematic about the silence surrounding the good death. After all, the silence is only apparent. Most theories of the good life are understood to be comprehensive and pertain to all portions of a life, from beginning to end. So, even if well-being theorists have not explicitly addressed the theme of the good death, they have been implicitly addressing it. For instance, those who defend hedonism (which identifies well-being with pleasure and the absence of pain, broadly construed) are thereby defending the idea that the best death for an individual is the most pleasant, or least unpleasant, death. 4 Likewise, desire-fulfillment theory, perfectionism, and objective list theories each provide their own distinctive picture of the good death. The purpose of this essay is to highlight some commonly held views about what makes for a better or worse death and examine how these views might fit into the existing theoretical landscape. In particular, I explore whether the four leading theories of well-being are able to fully accommodate these popular views about the good death. The findings of my preliminary investigation into this matter are that, by and large, they cannot. If these views about the good death happen to be true, the most popular and widely discussed theories of well-being appear to be inadequate in this domain. Moreover, even if these views are not true, it seems both odd and problematic that commonsense views about the good death have no representation among the dominant theories of well-being.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

This chapter aims to serve as an introduction to the science of happiness, by providing a catalogue of the main questions that have been posed about the topic across millennia. I cover the various answers that have been offered to these questions, by philosophers and more recently by research psychologists. The chapter starts with the questions of what happiness is and how it can be measured, after which I turn to explore the possibility, desirability, and justifiability of happiness. The last portion of the chapter is devoted to the perennial question of how to be happy.

What can a liberal education and especially philosophy accomplish, either theoretically or practically? The question, or insinuation, is familiar to anyone in the liberal arts today. Precisely because it is familiar, we may too casually dismiss it. In his four essays on happiness—“The Epicurean,” “The Stoic,” “The Platonist,” and “The Sceptic”—Hume takes this charge most seriously, and in its most serious form: Can philosophy provide a theory of happiness that does justice to the diversity of human lives? And, if so, can knowing it make one happy, or happier? “The Sceptic” and of the four essays as whole are generally taken to answer with a resounding “no.” I propose, however, that we reconceive “The Sceptic” as a trial of philosophy’s presumption to provide a theoretically true and practically useful account of happiness. The Skeptic’s arguments against these presumptions lead him to conclude no. Yet, within “The Skeptic,” Hume identifies the error that produces this conclusion, and thereby Hume’s corrective to the argument. On Hume’s conception of philosophy, philosophy—and the essay itself—provides a theory of human life and happiness devoid of the usual errors and capable of producing practical benefit.

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Pleasure and pain are subjective sensations that we experience in body and soul and that have a great importance in our lives: according to Aristotle, in order to have a happy existence it is essential to know how to manage pleasure and pain wisely, because virtue and vice are measured precisely on this.
In principle, pleasure in all its forms is a good for us, because the tendency to pleasure and inner satisfaction is intrinsic to our nature. Pleasure is an instantaneous and complete act of our soul, which inseparably accompanies and perfects each of our vital acts, whether physical or mental; and the more perfect the vital act is, the more pleasant it is.
There are various kinds of pleasures, and since each of them has a different ethical value in view of our happiness, for us it is a question of understanding, with the help of the virtues and in particular of practical wisdom, what are the pleasures to be sought and what are to be avoided.
With every action we perform we pursue a good that personally ‘appears’ good and pleasant to us, but which is not always a ‘true’ pleasure, good and pleasant in absolute terms and according to nature; if that good is really good and pleasant, our action is excellent and virtuous, and if it is not at all, our action is vicious. Actions aiming at goods of the soul (such as the virtues or contemplation) give us pleasures of high ethical value, and with them there is never the possibility of excess; instead actions aiming at goods of the body (such as food or sex) or external goods (such as wealth or power), although being, they too, absolute and natural goods, give us pleasures of less ethical value in view of happiness, and with them there can be excess if we go beyond our natural physical and mental needs. We must therefore, acting according to virtue, pursue in the right measure pleasures relating to all three categories of goods, but giving priority to pleasures relating to the goods of the soul.
Aristotle states that happiness resides in “activity according to virtue”, therefore the more we perform perfect and excellent virtuous actions, the more pleasure we derive from them, and the closer we get to happiness; and if those virtuous actions  are maximally perfect (that is, if they are performed for themselves, without any further end) we can derive from them the highest pleasure. However, even if the highest, pleasure is not the supreme good, the ultimate end of our life: that ultimate end is happiness, of which, however, the highest pleasure of the soul is one of the main components.

Gelukkig zonder Zelfbedrog. Een onderzoek naar zelfbedrog in enkele theorieën over een gelukkig leven. Masterscriptie ter afronding van de Masteropleiding Filosofie aan de Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen (2015).
In het beperkende kader van een scriptie is het uiteraard onmogelijk om een volledig overzicht te bieden van het hele scala aan gelukstheorieën, laat staan van de gevaren van zelfbedrog daarin. Daarom kies ik allereerst voor een een overwegend subjectieve theorie, de Life Satisfaction Theory van Wayne Sumner, waarin tevredenheid met het leven als criterium wordt gebruikt. Als contrast neem ik uit de meer objectief en normatief georiënteerde theorieën over geluk, de deugdentheorie van Julia Annas. Haar theorie is sterk geënt op de opvattingen van Aristoteles en kan worden opgevat als een hedendaagse eudaimonistische theorie. In deze scriptie heb ik onderzoek gedaan naar de dilemma’s en bedreigingen die zelfbedrog kan opleveren voor deze theorieën. Uit mijn onderzoek komt naar voren dat de subjectieve criteria van Sumner in de praktijk niet adequaat genoeg zijn om zelfbedrog uit een subjectief oordeel te weren. In theoretisch opzicht zijn de criteria wel verhelderend omdat er een aantal problemen aan de oppervlakte worden gebracht waar een subject mee te maken krijgt wanneer hij zijn geluk wil beoordelen en zijn tevredenheid met het leven in overeenstemming wil brengen met zijn opvatting over een leven dat daadwerkelijk goed voor hem is.
De meer objectieve theorie van Annas blijkt beter bestand tegen zelfbedrog. Geluk en deugd vormen een onlosmakelijk en dynamisch geheel, waarbij geluk een onbepaalde notie is die verandert naarmate je door oefening en intensieve training van het karakter steeds verder gevorderd (en in ‘flow’) raakt in het deugdzaam handelen, en tot slot wordt beargumenteerd dat dit niet egoïstisch is (zoals wel wordt beweerd).

To those familiar with discussions of eudaimonia in ancient philosophy, but not with contemporary philosophy of happiness and well-being, the difference between happiness and well-being will seem like a difference without a distinction. For a happy life, like a life of wellbeing, seems to be a life that is good or beneficial for the individual -indeed, the summum bonum. The fact that eudaimonia is variously translated as happiness or well-being only reinforces the impression that there is no difference between them. To add to the confusion, some contemporary philosophers use "happiness" to mean well-being (Foot 2001; Annas 2011; Russell 2012; Bloomfield 2014), and some psychologists use "subjective well-being" to mean happiness.

Quality of life, well-being, happiness, contentment, etc. are the terms currently frequented in numerous social surveys. The theorists endeavour not only to find clear-cut definitions of them and identify how those positive feelings come to existence and evolve, but also what those feelings result in. Happiness seems to be an energizing force; it fosters activity and creativity. The paper presents the first-order results of the survey focused on the relationship between subjective feeling of happiness and the activities to which happy people devote their energy most. The categories of activities cover free-time activities, personal development outside profession, professional development, and organisational development. The results of the survey carried out in Slovakia in 2018 show that the most preferable group of activities relates to private life (quality free-time activities, relax, and hobbies), but some other interesting findings are revealed as well.

Wenn sich der politische Philosoph Heinrich Meier mit dem Werk Rous-seaus befaßt, tut man gut daran, auf Überraschungen gefaßt zu sein. Denn es steht zu erwarten, daß sich seine Deutung klar und deutlich von den üb-lichen Rousseau-Interpretationen abheben wird. Und so ist es auch im Falle des vorliegenden Bandes, den der bekannte Herausgeber der Gesammel-ten Schriften von Leo Strauss 1 und des Rousseauschen Diskurses über die Ungleichheit 2 als Ergebnis seiner jahrzehntelangen Beschäftigung mit Rousseau vorlegt. Wenn eben davon die Rede war, Meier befasse sich mit dem Werk Rousseaus, so ist jedoch gleich eingangs eine Präzisierung an-zubringen: Denn Meier konzentriert sich in der ersten Hälfte seines Buch auf einen Text von Rousseau, den er gerade nicht mehr als Teil des " Werkes " von Rousseau im eigentlichen Sinne versteht, der also gewissermaßen schon jenseits des Werkes steht, wenn er auch in vielfältiger Weise auf je-nes bezogen bleibt. Was damit gemeint sein kann, bedarf freilich der Erläu-terung, weshalb noch darauf zurückzukommen sein wird. Dieser Text ist das Buch mit dem Titel Les rêveries du promeneur solitaire, das jüngst auch in einer neuen Übersetzung ins Deutsche vorgelegt wurde. 3 Dieses Buch

This paper proposes a quantitative philosophy of happiness (QPH) based on:
(1) some proposed happiness scores applied on the “system of dreams” (SD) associated with each human person (HP) in part (and defined as a personal hierarchy of material and/or spiritual “dreams”/wishes);
(2) a quantitative version of Pascal’s wager (PW);
(3) a model of collective approach of Divinity in the Christian definition.
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Davidson and Kolnai in different ways emphasise that practical syllogistic reasoning can only tell one that one has a reason to do or not to do something.  It cannot adjudicate between conflicting reasons.  It can tell one the means to certain ends but not which ends to pursue.  This paper considers possible responses to this predicament.  What if anything can be done to put deliberation - the 'weighing' of competing reasons - on  a rational basis?

Happiness. – Three approaches to, or indeed notions of, human happiness can be distinguished – joy, wellbeing, and blessedness. Combining phenomenological and historical methods, the article explains the essence of each and offers brief historical sketches of their reception in western society. (1) The first section discusses “happiness as joy – the happy person as the one who enjoys the moment”. This notion of happiness has deep roots in human culture. It exists in two forms – one communal, exemplified by festivals and feasts celebrated by communities, and one private, often experienced by individuals or couples and frequently associated with love, erotic fulfilment and tears of joy. (2) The second section considers “happiness as shalom – the happy person as the one who enjoys wellbeing”. In philosophy, this notion was developed by Aristotle; in the Bible, the description of Job before and after his suffering offers a good example. Both Aristotle and the Bible describe “shalom” as a state characterised by prosperity, health, and stability. Historically, the priorities within the list of items that belong to wellbeing change. Several shifts can be discerned: the first one, associated with the Renaissance, derives human wellbeing from work and the active life; the second one, in the eighteenth century, brings an increased appreciation of material goods; the third one, around 1800, places much emphasis either on friendship or, increasingly, on marriage and family. Toward the end of the twentieth century, new priority is given to health and the experience of an ecologically sound environment. (3) The third section offers an analysis of “happiness as blessedness – the happy person as one who enjoys spiritual goods”. According to this notion, the thinker is the one who is truly happy. In antiquity, philosophers were known as individuals who preferred spiritual goods to material ones, and this preference was supported by Plato, Aristotle, Diogenes, and Plotinus. Biblical texts such as Psalm 4 point in the same direction – the friendly presence of God fills a human heart with more joy than the consumption of material goods. In modern times, John Wesley defined true happiness – “a supernatural sensation, a divine taste” – as deriving from spiritual awakening and rebirth.