Philosophy of Happiness

This article argues that Rousseau’s autobiographies outline an account of personal happiness as an Epicurean memorial practice. For Rousseau, happiness is secured by an attitude to pleasure cultivated by practices utilizing the powers of memory and imagination. In describing these practices autobiographically, he hoped to teach his readers to avoid the false pleasures of vulgar sensuality and pursue instead the true pleasures of what he called ‘temperate sensuality’. This orienting idea of the autobiographies is a distinctly Epicurean ascetic practice—combatting the constant threat of vulgar hedonism to bring about a new relationship to the self. By reconstructing this account, the article provides a basis to reconsider the relationship between solitude, sociability, and citizenship in Rousseau’s political thought.

Technological progress seems to open ways for redesigning the human organism. This means that the affective system that is built into the brain by evolution can be redesigned with intent. One of the consequences will be that the word progress will get a new meaning. Progress won't be confined to enhancing the conditions of living , but it will change the way we react to the world. These possibilities are explored in a new kind of biological utopism called 'transhumanism'. This school foresees that a restructured human brain will give rise to 'more varied experience, lifelong happiness and exhilarating peak experiences everyday'. This essay considers the reality value of that expectation in the light of the current psychology of affects, in particular of presumed functions of hedonic experience. It is concluded that transhumanism overlooks that happiness will lose its meaning if it is treated as an isolated feeling. The affective system in our brain needs strong ties with the ongoing interaction of the individual with its environment. Making people happier without enhancing the grip on their life will be contra-productive.

This project explores the topic of dependency of happiness on external goods in Nicomachean Ethics. In this project I defend the following thesis: the dependency of happiness on external goods, in EN, is interpreted in the light of its political self-sufficiency, and in the light of our political humanity; this dependency is of three kinds: 1) enhancing-instrumental, 2) constitutive, and 3) subsistent.
The political self-sufficiency of happiness means that, the ultimate good of man, the good of the ruling science of Politics, is self-sufficient based on the self-sufficiency of the city. According to Aristotle, every human being, by nature, is political. The nature of every human being is fundamentally relational. We are what we are, among and with others in the city. This constitutive political human nature functions best only in the city. Based on this political anthropology I interpret the dependency of the human political good on external goods in EN.
https://wipfandstock.com/happiness-and-external-goods-in-nicomachean-ethics.html

Mystics and philosophers across the ages have interrogated ideological systems in search of truth and the good life. Although the human desire for less suffering and more happiness stems from over a million years of our evolving consciousness, the empirical sciences have failed to quantify consciousness or uncover a source of permanent happiness. Objective studies struggle with the epiphenomenal subjectivity of consciousness even as the postmodern reification of a decentered, culturally constructed dualistic subjectivity has devalued mystical ontologies of consciousness. This episteme is changing as contemporary debates about happiness reinvoke our ancestral religious and spiritual philosophies. The sold-out 2019 debate, "Happiness: Marxism vs Capitalism," between Slavoj Žižek and

In this paper, I use comparisons of Freud, Loewald, and Plato to explore what it means to individuate and to desire in a world of frustration, pain, and loss. The metaphors of the "wheel" versus the "ladder" present basic images for Freud's tragic conception of a person's emerging into a world of pain, transience and loss, in contrast to Loewald's sense of individuation as an increasing attainment of individual ego and world enrichment, constructed from metabolized grieved objects. I then argue that Plato's Symposium offers comparable visions of the possibilities of love, and that the juxtaposition of Freud and Loewald can be connected to ancient philosophical considerations. The paper begins by examining the implications of the two thinkers' treatments of the "oceanic state" (primary narcissism), then compares these to the speeches of Aristophanes and Socrates/Diotima. The conclusion touches on the relevance of the juxtaposition to the Platonic distinction between philosophy and poetry.

David Benatar claims that even for the merely possible people with heavenly good lives marred by a single minor harm (however minor), it is better never to come into existence.  So much the more, he claims, it would have been better for actual people. In this article, I firstly try but ultimately fail to make a coherent sense of that claim. I call that claim the Betterness Thesis (BT) – for each human person, it would have been better had she never come into existence. Based on his own hints, I propose to replace BT, whenever needed, with the Regret Thesis (RT) – for each human person, it would be rational to be sorry for herself because of her coming into existence. Subsequently, I lay open and agree with Benatar’s four claims constituting that which he calls the basic asymmetry between harms and benefits. But in his transition from the asymmetry to BT, I find some dubious assumptions. I find them dubious regardless of whether BT is replaced with RT. I conclude by recapitulating why RT is probably false and so does not follow from the asymme-try. I cannot say that about BT as I do not quite know what BT means.

Many critics of religion insist that believing in a future life makes us less able to value our present activities and distracts us from accomplishing good in this world. In Augustine's case, this gets things backwards. It is while Augustine seeks to achieve happiness in this life that he is detached from suffering and dismissive of the body. Once Augustine comes to believe happiness is only attainable once the whole city of God is triumphant, he is able to compassionately engage with present suffering and see material and social goods as part of our ultimate good.

This is an exploration of Augustine’s idea on achieving “Man’s true enduring Happiness”. This paper traces Man’s journey towards achieving the “Ultimate Happiness”, who is God. The paper discusses Man, a finite being, and his insatiable desire to fulfill himself. Man somehow finds himself incomplete and imperfect. In his will and search that, which is infinite, Man is able to begin such a quest for happiness. Man finds this happiness, this fulfillment in the possession of what is more than himself, of someone beyond himself, God. Only God Himself can bring happiness to Man. He is the only one who can fill the void in Man. True enduring happiness is achieved through Man’s will and reason based on virtue by choosing Eternal things, consequently leading him to God, his Happiness. “My heart is restless, O God, until it rest in you.” as Saint Augustine famously declared.

Chapter I is the Introduction of the paper, this includes the background of the study, statement of the problem, scope and limitation, and the significance of the study. Chapter II discusses Man’s quest for Happiness wherein Man would experience the longingness of something or someone greater than him. And this longingness is called “Man’s insatiable desire”. Here in this journey, he will learn to use his will and reason for him to make the right choices leading him to his true enduring Happiness. This chapter is also about Man’s true enduring happiness. Chapter III is about God, who is the true enduring Happiness and Man returning to God. Chapter IV shows that God fills Man’s void which makes Him the end of Man’s quest of fulfilling his insatiable desire. Chapter V is the synthesis and conclusion of the paper.

The subject of happiness is one of the most important topics in the philosophy of ethics that has attracted the attention of many thinkers and philosophers and has forced them to search for the meaning of happiness. Some theistic philosophers have considered happiness to have different levels and the highest degree of it has been considered as the divine encounter in heaven, among which is Saint Aquinas.But in the meantime, people have become skeptical and have found it very difficult to achieve this kind of happiness, so that many of them have considered this out of reach and think that there is no way to achieve this level of happiness. Therefore, addressing this case and reviewing and analyzing the researches of Thomas Aquinas as a world thinker can help a person to get acquainted with the levels of happiness and find solutions to achieve the highest degree. This article intends to use the descriptive-analytical method to first define happiness from the point of view of Saint Aquinas, and then continues by stating the levels of happiness and offering solutions to achieve true happiness, and ends with a discussion of great happiness. Aquinas emphasizes above all the great happiness that can be achieved in the hereafter and considers that achieving it, in addition to acquiring moral virtues and intellectual knowledge, requires divine grace, which does not include every servant.

The contradictory claims of happiness and duty, like those of live and law, run all through
the history of ethics. The deontologists, 1 champions of duty, express their position through
the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Scholars in this camp do not entirely deny the
claim of happiness, but they want to keep it secondary, as an added bonus for faithfulness
of duty rather than an aim consciously to be pursued. The eudaemonists, 2 champions of
happiness, have also expressed their view.
To achieve happiness is our duty, if happiness is our end, and the fulfillment of such a duty
necessarily results in happiness. That one seeks happiness in the abstract is seen in all one
does. The fundamental question is whether one can reach this kind of happiness or not. Can
one’s pursuit of it be successful? Do all human beings seek happiness? Do people think that
happiness is attainable? Where can one find happiness, if anywhere? These are some of the
questions we shall set out to answer as we study the term happiness.

The task of studying the impact of social class on physical and mental health involves, among other things, the use of a conceptual toolbox that defines what social class is, establishes how to measure it, and sets criteria that help distinguish it from closely related concepts. One field that has recently witnessed a wealth of theoretical and conceptual research on social class is psychology, but geographers' and sociologists' attitude of diffidence toward this " positivistic " discipline has prevented them from taking advantage of this body of scholarship. This paper aims to highlight some of the most important developments in the psychological study of social class and social mobility that speak to the long-standing concerns of health geographers and sociologists with how social position, perceptions, social comparisons, and class-based identities impact health and well-being.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.11.037

La felicità ha da sempre interessato i filosofi, ma negli ultimi sessant’anni se ne stanno occupando anche gli psicologi. Il benessere, il funzionamento ottimale e altri argomenti simili interessano studiosi di vari ambiti, ma anche il pubblico in generale, che ormai ha acquistato una certa familiarità con tali discussioni, tramite internet e i libri di autoaiuto.
Questa ricerca intende esaminare come il discorso eudaimonico si sviluppi oggi anche al di fuori dell’ambito della filosofia morale. Dopo una breve considerazione sul ruolo dell’eudaimonia nel pensiero filosofico dell’antichità e all’interno della teorizzazione etica, si passa allo studio del pensiero di Martin Seligman fino ad arrivare alla nascita della psicologia positiva e alla nozione di felicità intesa come flourishing. L’eudaimonia nel pensiero di quest’autore è paragonata alla concezione classica, allo scopo di mettere in luce alcune similitudini e, al tempo stesso, rilevare delle differenze. Infatti, il presente saggio svolge, innanzitutto, un lavoro esplorativo sulla psicologia positiva, mettendo a disposizione del lettore le due teorie di Seligman sulla felicità e le principali tematiche empirico-esistenziali da lui esposte: le emozioni positive, la resilienza, le virtù, le esercitazioni, il carattere e i suoi punti di forza. Il focus non è tanto quello della “novità” della proposta, bensì quello di valutarne la formulazione, i limiti e gli sviluppi in corso. L’interlocuzione filosofica è sostenuta da elementi presenti all’interno del pensiero classico, sullo sfondo della teoria etica delle virtù che parte dal punto di vista del soggetto agente e lo considera in modo prioritario ma non esclusivo.

This is an article in the philosophy of happiness — but one with an untypical focus. It clarifies the claim of the phenomenologist Dietrich von Hildebrand that (H) high happiness comes especially from loving others, and compares it with the apparently rival Aristotelian claim that (A) high happiness comes especially from contemplating God. The former claim is understood to be about felt love (love defined as an emotional rather than volitional state). Both claims are understood to be about felt happiness (happiness defined as an emotional state rather than a state of objective flourishing). The article argues that, in fact, the two claims are not rival but mutually consistent, since the beloved person can be God, and the contemplation can be a loving one. Both claims are also consistent with scientific evidence, although it is tangential and tentative. Moreover, both claims are plausible, since both are backed up by intuitive explanations of why they should be regarded as true. However, both are in need of a further philosophical or scientific research that could confirm them even more.

The articles in this volume explore the teachings on happiness by a range of thinkers from antiquity through Spinoza, most of whom held human happiness to comprise intellectual knowledge of that which is Good in itself, namely God. These thinkers were from Greek pagan, Muslim, Jewish, and Christian backgrounds and wrote their works in Greek, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin. Still, they shared similar philosophical views of what constitutes the Highest Good, and of the intellectual activities to be undertaken in pursuit of that Good. Yet, they differed, often greatly, in the role they assigned to deeds and practical activities in the pursuit of this happiness. These differences were, at times, not only along religious lines, but also along political and ethical lines. Other differences treated the relationship between the body and intellectual happiness and the various ways in which bodily health and well-being can contribute to intellectual health and true happiness.

სად და რომელ მსჯელობაში შეიძლება გადაიკვეთოს პითაგორას, პლატონის, ეპიკურეს, ავგუსტინეს, ბუდას, დარვინის მემკვიდრეობა, თანამედროვე წარმოდგენები ადამიანის ევოლუციის და ფიზიოლოგიის შესახებ, რა მნიშვნელოვანი გზავნილები შეიძლება ამოვიკითხოთ ამ გაერთიანებაში ჩვენი განათლების და აღზრდის სისტემების მოწყობისათვის და როგორ შეიძლება მივაღწიოთ ბედნიერებას.

Income inequality has become one of the more widely debated social issues today. The current article explores the role of progressive taxation in income inequality and happiness. Using historical data in the United States from 1962 to 2014, we found that income inequality was substantially smaller in years when the income tax was more progressive (i.e., a higher tax rate for higher income brackets), even when controlling for variables like stock market performance and unemployment rate. Time lag analyses further showed that higher progres- sive taxation predicted increasingly lower income inequality up to 5 years later. Data from the General Social Survey (1972–2014; N  59,599) with U.S. residents (hereafter referred to as “Americans”) showed that during years with higher progressive taxation rates, less wealthy Americans—those in the lowest 40% of the income distribution—tended to be happier, whereas the richest 20% were not significantly less happy. Mediational analyses confirmed that the association of progressive taxation with the happiness of less wealthy Americans can be explained by lower income inequality in years with higher progressive taxation. A separate sample of Americans polled online (N  373) correctly predicted the positive association between progres- sive taxation and the happiness of poorer Americans but incorrectly expected a strong negative association between progressive taxation and the happiness of richer Americans.

Sanskrit, happiness means Sukha. In Bhagavad Gita, happiness aligns with individual involvement with the "Gunas" (Moreira, 2019). The concept of happiness is found in ancient Greek philosophy. Eudaimonia is used in Greek literature by many Greek philosophers to express the alternative meaning of happiness. While there is a sheer volume of literature on happiness in different disciplines, there is a lack of studies on the Bhagavad Gita subject. The study's fundamental aim is to explore the true meaning of happiness in Greek philosophy, especially happiness in eudaimonia and epicurean term and compare with happiness found in Bhagavad Gita. The study is based on the systematic literature review that focuses on Greek philosophy and Bhagavad Gita's happiness.

The findings suggest that three types of happiness, namely Sttvick, Rajosic and Tamosic, are based on individual actions, desires, perceptions, and intellectual abilities. Anyone who attains sattvic happiness has the highest flow of joy and delight in which individual become oblivious about the world. The study explored the concept of happiness in Hindu scriptures, especially Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita and linked them with the Greek philosophy of Eudaimonia and Epicurean happiness for the first time and provide a practical template of the true meaning of happiness. The study's findings would help an individual to realise the ways real happiness attains in all walk of life, the ways people can bring true delight, Ananda, and happiness.

Art is commonly thought to promote well-being. However, aestheticians have not considered how art plays this role. Over the past quarter century, there has been considerable research in positive psychology, the empirical study of subjective well-being (SWB). This research has generated robust findings on the factors promoting well-being. In this paper, I consider the findings for SWB in contemporary psychology in order to identify how art supports well-being. I also explore the implications of SWB theory for aesthetic theory and arts policy.

In this paper, I will discuss two major criticisms emotional state theory brings against hedonistic theory of happiness. My project will consist in: 1) providing brief accounts of both hedonism and emotional state theory; 2) comparing shortly Mill’s endeavor of utilitarian hedonism and Bentham’s original version of utilitarian hedonism and conclude that Mill’s endeavor makes utilitarian hedonism more observant of the definition of happiness; 3) then I will state and discuss two major criticisms Daniel M. Haybron employs against hedonism and utilitarian hedonism by considering the emotional state view he harbors along with the several problems I find with Haybron’s arguments; and 4) conclude that Haybron’s criticisms against hedonism are warranted even against Mill’s qualitatively strengthened version of utilitarian hedonism, even though Haybron’s version of emotional state theory may be prone to criticism in terms of its distinction between pleasures and affective states. As a bonus, I will briefly mention the results with which Haybron concludes his discussion of emotional state theory about whether emotional conditions of happiness can track well-being better than hedonism does and if it does, how does it do so?

One of the main goals of work and organisational psychology is to promote the well-being and performance of employees. However, the different authors do not agree on the fundamental concept of happiness. The objectives of this paper are to present the enormous contribution of positive psychology and philosophy to the subject of happiness and its influence on labour and productivity, to review several scholars in this field, to highlight the differences among them, and, especially, to find a consensus on the fundamentals of happiness. In fact, the major difference among all the contributions is that there is no unanimity on the fundamental concept of happiness. Whereas some authors see happiness as “pleasure”, others prefer the concept of happiness as  a  mixture  of  “pleasure”,  “engagement”  and  “meaning”,  avoiding  the  definition  of  happiness,  and  hiding  it  behind  the concept of well-being. However, if a consensus were reached, it would represent a concept that could be better managed from the psychological perspective.

Este trabajo busca reflexionar en torno al siguiente problema: ¿cuál es la mejor forma de concebir la felicidad en la filosofía contemporánea? Para ello, dividiremos esta interrogante en dos. En primer lugar, indagaremos si acaso la felicidad es algo similar a lo que los griegos entendían por “eudaimonia”, i.e., una vida buena o digna de ser vivida; o si, en cambio, la felicidad es mejor entendida como un estado de la mente, postura que comienza a recibir mayor aceptación desde los inicios de la modernidad. Nuestra opinión es que actualmente la felicidad se debería concebir de la segunda forma: en primer lugar, “eudaimonia” es un término que está revestido de un innegable componente evaluativo. Esto, sumado al “criterio de pertinencia descriptiva” —según el cual, la definición técnica de un concepto no debería alejarse demasiado de la
concepción cotidiana del mismo— y al hecho de que en el lenguaje vernáculo “felicidad” es de naturaleza eminentemente descriptiva y no evaluativa, nos lleva a concluir que el uso técnico de este término debe ser también descriptivo, coincidiendo así con un estado mental más que con una vida buena.
Una vez resuelta esta dimensión del problema, procedemos a abordar la segunda cara del mismo: si la felicidad es un estado mental, ¿cómo debe describirse ese estado? Las teorías más aceptadas al respecto son el hedonismo con respecto a la felicidad, la satisfacción con la vida como un todo, y la condición emocional positiva. Ninguna de estas propuestas está libre de dificultades; sin embargo, concluimos que la teoría más prometedora es la de la condición emocional positiva, puesto que las incongruencias internas y los inconvenientes que debe resolver son de menor gravedad. De esta manera proponemos que actualmente la mejor manera de concebir la felicidad es como un estado mental que se puede describir como una condición emocional positiva, la cual
consistiría, grosso modo, en la posesión de emociones positivas y/o placenteras, así como también en propensiones o disposiciones de ánimo positivos.

control? This course will consider various philosophers' writings on happiness and the good life from ancient Greece and China to the present day. We will also investigate the way that the contemporary American preoccupation with happiness combines age-old philosophies of happiness with neoliberal capitalism, as well as considering practical strategies for seeking well-being.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Il n'y a pas de préoccupation qui soit plus universelle et intemporelle que celle portant sur le bonheur. Chacun d'entre nous s'accorde en effet pour dire que le bonheur est un bien, et par conséquent, se met à sa poursuite tout en questionnant les modalités de sa mise en œuvre. Or, cette inclination au bonheur et la réflexion qui l'accompagne au sujet des conditions pour l'atteindre sont vieilles comme le monde. A la période hellénistique, et même avant dans l'Antiquité, des conceptions eudémonistes, qui font de la quête du bonheur la fin de l'existence voient le jour. Nous nous concentrerons ici plus particulièrement sur deux courants de pensée ayant proposé leur réflexion concernant les moyens d'atteindre l'eudaimonia : l'épicurisme et le stoïcisme. Leurs théories, deux millénaires après avoir été élaborées, ont encore un immense retentissement de par leur étonnante modernité. Souvent aussi, elles ont été et sont encore vivement critiquées : on a mis en doute la possibilité même que de telles entreprises puissent fonctionner en pratique, et on a dénoncé la vision du bonheur qu'elles défendaient en affirmant qu'il s'agissait là d'un bonheur uniquement illusoire. Mais qu'en est-il vraiment ?

A report that is well worth reading and studying. Studying it will trigger debates about aspects of its methodology. Pity there is no working definition in this study on what is meant by "happiness." This would help to justify any conceptual framework.

ABSTRACT We all want to be happy, but what does that mean? Happy Lives, Good Lives: A Philosophical Examination offers a thorough introduction to a variety of perspectives on happiness. Valuable insights are inferred from both philosophical and scientific research into the nature of happiness, and a range of examples of very different but potentially happy lives are considered. Among the questions at issue: Is happiness only a state of mind, or is it something more? Is it the same for everyone? Is it under our control, and if so, to what extent? Can we be mistaken about whether we are happy? What role, if any, does happiness play in living a good life? Is it sometimes morally wrong to pursue happiness? Should governments promote happiness through public policy? The asking and answering of these questions is valuable not only as an intellectual exercise, but also as a means of gaining practical insight into how best to pursue a happy life.

In Singapore, employee wellbeing researches have been rare except in the last five years where both Gallup and JobsCentral have done researches in employee engagement and employee happiness respectively. Generally Happiness researches have also been severely questioned for its validity and reliability, primarily in the area of determining the ‘right measures for happiness measurements’ rather than the value of happiness measurements. One of the key areas of criticism was the severe lack of objective measures in Happiness measurements. This gap was filled by the Integrated Wellbeing (IWB) Approach adapted from the Five Sheath Theory which constituted both objective and subjective measures.

The current research was a quantitative research which collected primary data. The data was gathered via an online survey and was analysed using a descriptive style. The conclusion of the research was that the Singapore workforce was happy, contrary to earlier research findings.

Table des matières

1. Perspectives aristotéliciennes
A) Les composantes de l’âme chez Aristote
B) Les vertus aristotéliciennes
B.1 La Sophia
B.2 La phronesis
C) Quid de l’eudaimonia chez Aristote
D) Statut de la vertu « la plus excellente et la plus parfaite »

2. Commentaire moderne : critique de Destrée, P.
A) Trois interprétations possibles
B) L’interprétation inclusiviste
B.1 La vertu parfaite comme vertu complète
B.2 La complétude comme critère du bonheur
B.3 Le bonheur comme vie
B.4 Le bonheur complet
C) Critiques de l’interprétation inclusiviste

3. Conclusion

This chapter aims to serve as an introduction to the science of happiness, by providing a catalogue of the main questions that have been posed about the topic across millennia. I cover the various answers that have been offered to these questions, by philosophers and more recently by research psychologists. The chapter starts with the questions of what happiness is and how it can be measured, after which I turn to explore the possibility, desirability, and justifiability of happiness. The last portion of the chapter is devoted to the perennial question of how to be happy.

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The soul, duly prepared by exhortation to the study of true philosophy, finds herself in gradually advancing to the greater from the less. It should be noted that the one-paragraph reference to Olympiodorus herein (p. 9), while perfectly congruous with the exposition, is strictly impossible as he was in fact much posterior in historical time to Iamblichus. This editorial interpolation was mistakenly left in the final draft years before it was subsequently uploaded, an error for which the editor apologizes. No reader has ever noticed or objected to this mistake, and so we are not going to correct it now. Undoubtedly, neither Iamblichus nor Olympiodorus would object in spirit, for they were not mere philologists, and both of them are quoted correctly herein. They are in fact spiritual brothers and work together in this presentation for the true benefit of souls. It is like the friendly table talk between Callimachus (d. 240 B.C.) and Heraclitus portrayed in a beautiful and philosophically accurate woodcut published in 'The Dial' just before it ceased publication about a century ago--it could never have happened but it should have and (at least in the mind of Callimachus) did indeed occur, or so the artist surmised.

Nihilism poses grave problems for those who seek directives to lead their lives. In this article, the three most important ways to deal with nihilism are inquired, with an emphasis on their credibility. Both nihilism from a metaphysical perspective and the emphasis on pleasure from nihilistic considerations are given attention. The acceptance of nihilism can have far-reaching consequences, which are evaluated at various points. Nietzsche’s approach must also be considered. He accepts what he calls a sort of nihilism, but as a means to ‘new’ values. This alternative to nihilism is examined no less critically than the other two stances.

This chapter approaches the question of biopolitics in ancient political thought looking not at specific political techniques but at notions of the final aim of the political community. It argues that the “happiness” (eudaimonia, beatitudo) that constitutes the greatest human good in the tradition from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas is not a “biopolitical” ideal, but rather a metabiopolitical one, consisting in a contemplative activity situated above and beyond the biological and the political. It is only with Thomas Hobbes that civic happiness becomes “biopolitically” identified with simple survival; for modernity, as Hannah Arendt puts it, mere being alive becomes the greatest human good, and happiness is understood as a subjective “quality of life.” In both models, the political realm is a means to an end. Arendt draws our attention to a neglected third alternative to both the classical/metabiopolitical and the modern/biopolitical ideals: “public happiness” consisting in political participation itself.

English translation of Theses ex ethic. Arist. ad Nicom. de summo fine hominis (Geneva: Jacob Stoer, 1600).

Gaspard Laurent (1556-1636) was professor of Greek at Geneva from 1597. According to the 1559 statutes of the Academy, the Greek professor was tasked with explaining a philosophical book on ethics—“a book of Aristotle or Plato or Plutarch or of some Christian philosopher”. Laurent produced a number of ethical disputations, and among the first is the work translated here.. This disputation consists largely in an exposition of Aristotle on happiness from books I and X of Nicomachean Ethics.