Aristotle and the good management of pleasure

ARISTOTLE AND THE GOOD MANAGEMENT OF PLEASURE   (The content of this essay is a re-elaboration of some material already published in Italian by the author within his large volume “Aristotle: the art of living; fundamentals and practice of Aristotelian ethics as a way to happiness”, published by Franco Angeli. An overview of the book, with an index and two extensive previews, is available by clicking on the link  https://www.francoangeli.it/ricerca/Scheda_libro.aspx? codicelibro = 495.241 ) INDEX Foreword PART 1 WHAT IS PLEASURE? 1. The debate on pleasure in the Platonic Academy The participants in the debate, 5 - Summary of the positions of the participants in the debate, 5   2. We all seek pleasure All beings tend to pleasure, 6 - Aristotle: the tendency to pleasure is intrinsic to our human nature, 6 3. Pleasure is a good for us The argument of the contrary, 8 – Aristotle’s criticism of Speusippus’ thesis, 8 - Aristotle: distinction between pleasure and good as the end of our actions, 9 4. Pleasure is an act of our soul   Eudoxus: pleasure is the ultimate good/end, 11 - Speusippus and Plato: pleasure is not an end, but a process, 11 - Aristotle: pleasure is not a process, but an act of our soul, 12 5. Pleasure is an instantaneous and accomplished act Pleasure is an instantaneous act, 14 - Pleasure is a totally accomplished act, and therefore it is a good and an end in itself, 15 6. Pleasure accompanies and perfects our every act Pleasure is indissolubly connected to every our vital act, and completes and perfects it, 17 - Human pleasure and divine pleasure, 18 7. The more perfect an act is, the more pleasant it is Our vital acts are perfect when we realize them totally, 21 - Our vital acts are perfect when we perform them without any obstacle, 21 - The more perfect (i.e. realized totally and without obstacles) our vital act is, the more pleasure it gives us, 22 PART 2 MANAGING PLEASURE WELL 8. Pleasure is of various kinds Distinguishing between the various pleasures, 23 - Each type of act has its own ‘proper’ pleasure, 23 – There are different kinds of pleasures, 24 - Each animal species has its own specific function (érgon) and its own characteristic pleasure, 25 - The pleasures towards which the human species tends are very different, 26 9. Absolute goods/ends and ‘apparent’ goods/ends Two fundamental questions, 27 - The theses of the predecessors, 27 - The aristotelian solution, 28 – Absolute goods/ends are the human good by nature, 28 - Subjective and ‘apparent’ goods/ends, 29 – The three broad categories of absolute goods/ends: goods of the soul, body goods, exterior goods, 30 – The virtues, 31 10. The pleasures of different ethical value deriving from the three categories of absolute goods/ends In order to maximize pleasure we must pursue the various absolute goods in the right order given by their different value, 33 - Pleasures derived from the absolute goods of the soul, 34 - For the pleasures derived from certain absolute goods there is an inherent limit, 35 - Pleasures of different value related to the acts of our different faculties , 35. 11. Pleasures really good in absolute, and pleasures that to each person individually may ‘appear’ good Absolutely good pleasures and ‘apparently’ good pleasures, 37 - The ‘apparent’ pleasures related to body goods with an intrinsic limit, 37 - The ‘apparent’ pleasures related to exterior goods with an intrinsic limit, 38 12. Again on the ‘apparent’ pleasures related to body goods and exterior goods with an intrinsic limit The ‘apparent’ pleasures that refer to the goods of the body and their excesses, 39 - What is the limit beyond which the ‘apparent’ pleasures of food and sex lead us to excess?, 39. – It is difficult to avoid excesses in the ‘apparent’ pleasures of food and sex, 40 - The ‘apparent’ pleasures that refer to exterior goods, and their excesses, 41 - ‘Apparent’ pleasures that refer to the goods of the soul are without excess, 42 13. Vicious actions, bad pleasures, and virtuous actions, good pleasures; the vicious person and the virtous person Vicious actions, bad pleasures; virtuous actions, good pleasures, 43 - The vicious and unworthy person, 43 - The virtuous and worthy person, 44 14. The perfect virtuous action (eupraxía) and the perfect pleasure The perfect virtuous action (eupraxía) is totally an end in itself, 45 - The importance of inner intention in the accomplishment of the perfect action, 46 - An ethics based on interiority and authenticity, 48 15. Total virtue, maximum pleasure, happiness The full human flourishing, 49 - The total virtue of goodness and ethical beauty (kalokagathía), 50 - Totally perfect virtuous actions give us maximum pleasure and happiness, 51 - The relationship between maximum pleasure and happiness, 52 - There is no limit to the possible pleasure of the perfectly virtuous person, 54 Abbreviations of the Aristotelian works cited in this essay Categories Catg. De Anima DA De Partibus Animalium PA Eudemian Ethics EE Magna Moralia MM Metaphysics Met. Nicomachean Ethics EN Physics Phys. Politics Pol. Protrepticus Protr. Rhetoric Rhet. Topics Top. Foreward. Aristotle, following in this Plato, See for example Laws, I, 633e-637c. attaches great importance to the role that for us human beings have the pleasant and unpleasant sensations and emotions that we experience in body and soul throughout life. The tendency to seek pleasure (hedonê) and to escape pain (lýpe), both physically and psychically, The Greek terms hedoné and lýpe have a broad semantic field and can cover both the physical and the psychic spheres. Hedoné can have the meaning of ‘pleasure, enjoyment, joy, satisfaction, gaiety, delight, voluptuousness, desire, craving’, and lýpe the opposite meaning of ‘pain, ache, sorrow, grief, affliction, sadness’'. derives from our own animal nature (“pleasure is common to humans and animals”) Nicomachean Ethics (henceforth EN), 1104b, 34-35. and accompanies us throughout our existence. In particular, “pleasure grows with us all from childhood, and therefore it is difficult to get rid of this feeling that is rooted in our lives”. EN, 1105a, 1-3. This is why he believes that any reflection on ethics cannot disregard pleasure and pain as essential yardsticks for the moral evaluation of our actions, EN, 1105a, 4-6 and 10-12; and also Magna Moralia (henceforth MM) , 1204a, 19-31. since “as regards our actions, it is no small thing to experience pleasure and pain in a good or bad way”, EN, 1105a, 6-7. and that “he who makes good use of pleasure and pain will be good, and he who makes bad use of it will be bad”. EN, 1105a, 12-13.     Virtue, therefore, has to do precisely with the correct and excellent management of our pleasures and pains, both physical and mental, while vice, on the contrary, consists in the wrong or bad management of them; EN , 1104b, 29-30 and 1105a, 13-15. and this is particularly true of the virtues and vices of character: “the virtues and vices relating to character have pains and pleasures as their domain”. EN , 1152b, 4; and also 1104b, 8-9. Therefore, if we want to lead a virtuous and happy life, it is essential for us to know how to manage pleasures and pains wisely, since they “extend throughout life, and have great weight and great relevance for virtue and a happy life, since people pursue the pleasant things and flee the painful ones”. EN , 1172a, 25-26. And also with regard to vices “it is because of pleasure that we perform unethical and unworthy actions, and it is because of pain that we refrain from performing ethically fine actions"; EN , 1104b, 9-11. in fact, “people become unethical because of pleasures and pains, [...] pursuing and fleeing the wrong ones, or in the wrong times, or in the wrong ways, or in any other way contrary to (correct) reason”. EN , 1104b, 21-24. Also from these theoretical premises arises Aristotle's insistence on the practical need for a correct education in virtue. Aristotle declares himself in favor of an educational process that, starting from childhood and reaching the threshold of adulthood, is aimed above all at the gradual acquisition of virtuous habits through an appropriate management of pleasure and pain, that is, of pleasant or unpleasant emotions of young people. Given all this, it is not surprising that Aristotle at some point considers it appropriate to examine in depth both the nature of pleasure and its various implications for ethical life. To this end, he sets the discussion along a number of main issues: whether pleasure in general should or should not be regarded as a good for the human being; what exactly is pleasure; whether there are different kinds of pleasure; finally, whether or not the various pleasures are all good for us, and whether or not some pleasure can be our ultimate good/end, that is, our greatest good (tó áriston). EN, 1152b, 8-12. And his analysis also proceeds by drawing on the discussions on pleasure that took place in the Platonic Academy some time earlier. See Enrico Berti's analyses of pleasure in The Debate on Pleasure in the ancient Academy [chap. 6 of Aristotelian New Essays, vol . III, Morcelliana, Brescia 2008] and in Symphilosophein [ Laterza, Rome-Bari 2010, chap. V]. PART 1 WHAT IS PLEASURE? 1. The debate on pleasure in the Platonic Academy   1.1.The participants in the debate The main participants at these discussions were the authoritative mathematician and astronomer Eudoxus, Speusippus, Plato’s nephew and later his successor in the direction of the Academy, Plato himself, Traces of this debate may be found in Plato’s dialogue Philebus , in which Plato’s opinion is also expressed. and most probably also the young Aristotle, who wrote on this occasion a dialogue On pleasure, later lost. The two Aristotelian treatises relating to pleasure, contained in books VII and X of  the Nicomachean Ethics and composed much later, appear to report the main points of the various opinions expressed by the participants during the debate, as well as his more mature thinking on the subject of pleasure. An exhaustive discussion of these issues is contained in Berti’s Symphilosophein , cit, pp. 173-199.   1.2. Summary of the positions of the participants in the debate In general, Eudoxus maintains that “pleasure is the supreme good”, EN , 1172a, 27-28. that is, it is the highest value that we all pursue. His is therefore a hedonistic position, based on motivations drawn from the physiology of living beings. Speusippus, on the other hand, advocates a thesis based on a strong anti-hedonism. He believes that “no pleasure is a good [...]; good and pleasure are not the same thing”, EN , 1152b, 8-10. since according to him the good lies between pleasure and its opposite, pain, both of which are evils. Between these two diametrically opposed theses, Plato places himself in an intermediate position, but with greater sympathy for Speusippus’: some ‘true’ pleasures may be a good, but for the most part they are not ‘healthy’ but rather reprehensible and evil; It is probably this position that Aristotle refers to in EN, 1152b, 10-11 and 20-23. for this reason the power of pleasure must be tempered by wisdom. In any case, the best life is one in which there is a mixture of high pleasures and knowledge, and to make the latter possible it is necessary to avoid the more intense and less elevated pleasures. As to him, Aristotle, as we shall see in detail during our discussion, has a clearly positive assessment of pleasure. Also the thesis that he generally expresses in his works Both in an early work like Protreptricus (henceforth Protr.), and then in his more mature reflections contained in particular in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle constantly appears not to share either the extreme position of those who definitely maintained that pleasure was the supreme good for us, or the equally extreme position of those who totally denied that pleasure is for us a good. is between the opposite positions of Eudoxus and Speusippus; however, while it is strongly critical of the latter, EN, 1172b, 35-1173a, 2. it is closer to that of Eudoxus (to whom he also addresses words of esteem). It is a position, his own, which after all appears to correspond substantially to common sense. On the one hand, pleasure in all its forms is necessary for us: pleasure for us is a good (agathón), a real good (although in the case of certain pleasures we must be temperate); and on the other hand, pleasure as such is not for us the supreme good (thagatón), the ultimate end around which all our thoughts and all our actions would consciously or unconsciously gravitate: this ultimate end for Aristotle is happiness. But in any case, he adds, it is necessary to verify whether pleasure is not “in some way” such an ultimate goal; and indeed – as we shall see later on – for him one of the main components of happiness is precisely the maximum pleasure, that supreme gratification of the soul which is an evident sign of the fact that one is happy.      2. We all seek pleasure   2.1. All beings tend to pleasure The main point of Eudoxus’ thesis, according to which pleasure is for us the supreme good, is based on the observation that “all beings, both those that are endowed with reason and those who are deprived of it, tend to pleasure”, and that each being chooses what is good for it, and especially what is good for it to the maximum. Now, the fact that everyone tends towards the same thing “means that for everyone such a thing is the supreme good (for every being seeks what is good for itself, in the same way as it seeks food); therefore what is good for all beings, and which all beings pursue, is the supreme good (thagatón)”. EN, 1172b, 9-18.       Speusippus  replies by focusing his criticism  on two distinct arguments. First, it is not true that all living things pursue pleasure; it is mainly animals and children who tend towards it, whereas the temperate person flees pleasures and the wise man pursues not pleasure, but only what does not cause pain. EN, 1152b, 15-16 and 19-20.  The second argument is that “what all beings tend to is not the good (ouk agathòn oû pánt'ephíetai)”. 2.2. Aristotle: the tendency to pleasure is intrinsic to our human nature This second argument of Speusippus’, as was to be expected, immediately attracts a harsh reprimand from Aristotle, who with it sees denied a central cornerstone of his ethical doctrine. For example, his most important and mature ethical work, the Nicomachean Ethics , opens precisely with the affirmation that each of our acts “ tends to some good; therefore rightly the good has been defined as that which all things tend to ( tagathòn oû pánt'ephíetai )” ( EN, 1094a, 1-3). He then declares that whoever affirms this “speaks nonsense; for we maintain that what seems true to all is indeed true; and whoever destroys that trust will (certainly) not be able to say things that can be trusted more”. EN, 1172b, 35-1173a, 2. But also Speusippus’ first argument is object of criticism by him: it is not true that pleasure is only sought after by beings without reason, because it is also sought after by those who actually possess reason; EN, 1173a, 2-5. all human beings aim at pleasure, and this appears to demonstrate that each one of us believes that in general pleasure is a good thing. (But of course, adds Aristotle, we must then distinguish between the various pleasures, and assess which individual pleasures are or are not really good for us).  In short, when we desire the various things in the world that appear good to us, ultimatly we all seek pleasure, inner satisfaction: and this is one of Aristotle's basic conceptions about human nature and our irrational faculty of desire. We continously and inevitably experience pleasant or unpleasant sensations and emotions, deriving from both our interaction with the outside world through perceptions, and our inner psychic life (made of memories, hopes, representations of various kinds). And such sensations and emotions stimulate our desire faculty to irrationally escape what appears painful to us, and to irrationally seek what appears to us pleasant, from the physical and/or psychic point of view. In his treatise on the soul (De Anima), Aristotle states that when our mind perceives a pleasant or painful object it reacts by desiring or fleeing, “as if it were affirming or denying” (De Anima, (henceforth DA), 431a, 8-10). It is our very nature, so spontaneously inclined towards well-being and happiness, that pushes us to the escape from pain and the continuous search for pleasure, EN., 1172a, 20-21; Rhetorica (henceforth Rhet.), 1362b, 5-7 e 1364b, 24-27. moving our desire towards action: “whoever possesses the sensation also possesses pleasure and pain, [...] and whoever possesses these, also possesses desire, because desire is a tendency towards what is pleasant". DA, 416b, 3-6; and also 413b, 23-24; 414b, 1-2; 431a, 8-10.   Remarks  A realistic ethics This conception of pleasure has a great importance in Aristotelian ethics: it is a realistic ethics, which takes into account the enormous importance that pleasure has in our lives. After all, for Aristotle ethics is to a large extent a rational management of our continuous search for pleasure (physical and psychic) ​​and of our continuous escape from pain (physical and psychic) . A rational management that does not necessarilconsist of prohibitions, but in a realistic way sees pleasure in a substantially positive aspect.   3. Pleasure is a good for us   3.1. The argument of the contrary A second argument put forward by Eudoxus is the so-called ‘argument of the contrary’: all living beings consider pain to be a thing to be escaped, and therefore an evil; then its opposite, pleasure, will be something to be pursued, and therefore it is a good, that is, a good thing for us. EN, 1172b, 18-20. To this Speusippus replies that “if pain is an evil, it does not follow (at all) that pleasure is a good, because also an evil can be the opposite of an (other) evil, and both such evils can be the contrary to what is neither good nor evil”. EN, 1173a, 6-8; and also 1153b, 4-6. In short, Speusippus maintains that the good consist neither in pleasure nor in pain, but in an intermediate state of equilibrium in which pain and pleasure are absent; these, which are respectively an excess and a defect of the state of equilibrium, are therefore two extremes contrary to each other and also contrary to this intermediate state. An argument, this of Speusippus’, substantially shared also by Plato . It appears to derive from a thesis, supported by both, according to which pleasure and pain are two processes (ghenéseis): A gradual process of change ( kínesis or ghénesis ) consists of a series of acts by which anything or person implements his or her own potential in a shorter or longer time , passing through various and   intermediate stages all aimed at achieving the final result (télos) of the implementation of this potential. For more details see paragraph 5 below. pain is a process of alteration, caused by deficiencies or diseases, of the natural balance of our organism; instead, pleasure is a process of restoring that balance. For this reason pain and pleasure, being both processes and therefore a becoming, are an evil, while the intermediate state of equilibrium is given by our individual nature (essence), and therefore it is a good.   3.2. Aristotle's criticism of Speusippus’ thesis Aristotle points out that, in the case of pleasure and pain, those who object to the argument of the contrary are wrong even from the theoretical point of view. In fact, it is true that sometimes one evil can be the opposite of another evil, and both can be contrary to a good, Categories (henceforth Catg.), 14a, 1-4. This is exactly the case of the Aristotelian virtues of character and virtues of relationship, and the related vices. Aristotle describes these virtues and vices in this way: “there are three dispositions (diathéseis): two vices, one to excess and the other to defect, and one virtue, the middle way; and all of them are in some way opposed to all the others: in fact the (two) extreme terms are contrary both to the average term and to each other, and the average term is contrary to the two extreme terms” (EN, 1108b, 11-15). Thus, for example, in the genre relating to fears and painful things (EN, 1107a, 32-33), one extreme, cowardice, is contrary to the other extreme, recklessness, but both are contrary to the middle term, which is strength of spirit (courage); or again, in the genre relating to material goods and riches, one of the two extremes, avarice, is contrary to the other extreme, prodigality, but both these extremes are contrary to the middle term, which is generosity. but “this can be seen in not many cases, while most of the time what is contrary to evil is a good”. Catg., 14a, 4-6. Furthermore, still more important is that “everyone agrees” in the opinion that pain is an evil, both in itself and because in some way it tends to impede our vital activity. Moreover, it is a concrete and evident fact that all of us “flee pain as an evil and seek pleasure as a good”; if Speusippus were right , we should all spontaneously flee both pain and pleasure. Therefore “pleasure and pain are contrary to each other as good and evil”; EN, 1173a, 5-13. and if pain is an evil, then pleasure is necessarily a good for us, since it is its opposite .   3.3. Aristotle: distinction between pleasure and good as the end of our actions So, pleasure is certainly a good for us. However, Aristotle does not fail to point out that there is a difference between pleasure and good, considered as the ends of our actions. Eudemian Ethics (henceforth EE) , 1235b, 23. To grasp this difference, we must remember what Aristotle says about our faculty of desire (tò orektikón), DA, 433 a , 21-26. which includes all the complex world of our irrational desires and impulses (oréxeis), represented by our emotions (páthe) . Many  of  them  are based on two fundamental desires: greed (cupidity, epithymía) , which blindly attracts us towards things that appear pleasant to us; It is an 'appetite', that is, an irrational tendency of ours towards what suits our nature. and aversion (thymós), Aristotle uses this term in a narrow sense here, since in reality the semantic field of thymós is much wider: in Greek it generally has the overall meaning of ‘soul’, heart’, as the seat of our inner life: passions, wills, thoughts; but also more precisely ‘aversion, indignation, animosity, repulsion, vehemence, anger’. an irrational impulse that pushes us to avert and reject things that cause us physical or mental pain. DA, 431a, 13-14; 432b, 6. And also EN, 1139th, 21-22: “what in thought are affirmation and negation, in desire is craving and aversion”. In short, we tend spontaneously and irrationally to seek pleasure and escape pain, because we tend by our nature to well-being and happiness. However, we human beings are endowed with an intellective soul, and therefore our faculty of desire, even if it is irrational in itself, “shares to a certain extent with reason”, EN, 1102b, 13-14, 25-26 and 30-31; DA, 432b, 3-7. and owing to this is “capable of listening to reason and obeying it” EN, 1102b, 13-14; and also 1098a, 3-5. like the child to his father, EN, 1102b, 32 and 1103a, 3. “actually desiring what reason commands it to desire”. For this reason we are also capable of intentionally formulating acts of rational desire, such as acts of will (bouléseis), by which we pursue the things that appear good to us. In summary, therefore, we irrationally yearn to obtain what appears pleasant to us, but we also have the capacity to rationally want to obtain what appears good to us; EE, 1235b, 19-23; EN, 1111b, 16-18. therefore pleasure (tò hedý) is the purpose of our cravings, while the good (tò agathón) is the end of our acts of rational will. This is therefore the difference between pleasure and good according to Aristotle. And while the other animals, being deprived of reason and therefore acting only on an impulsive and unreflected basis, have cognition only of things pleasant and act only on the basis of  ‘apparent’ pleasure , we humans, having reason too, also have cognition of things good, and therefore act also on the basis of the ‘apparent’ good. It is also necessary to keep in mind that according to Aristotle three are the characteristics (philetá) that attract us in things and people, and which constitute the ends of our choices and our consequent actions: "what we are attracted to is either good, or pleasant, or useful" (EN, 1155b, 20). So the three philetá are the good, the pleasant and the useful: “three are the elements that influence our choices: the fine [ethical beauty], the pleasant and the useful; and three are those that influence our aversions: the foul, the painful and the harmful" (EN, 1104b, 30-32). However, Aristotle adds, we can consider that in the final analysis what is useful for us is in turn only a means of obtaining what is pleasing to us or what is good for us; we can then conclude that only pleasure or good (apparent) are the real ends of all the acts we perform in life on irrational or rational impulses (EN, 1155b, 20-21).  It goes without saying, of course, that the thing that ‘appears’ pleasant or good to us, and that we pursue as an end, is not always pleasant or good in an absolute sense . What's more, very often there can be an interweaving of pleasure and good in the determination of the goals that continously we set ourselves: that is, it can happen that we rationally want and pursue things towards which we were originally driven by irrational desires. In other words, it can happen that we pursue with rational deliberation and reflection things which to us ‘appear’ pleasant and consequently also good, but which maybe are not at all good in an absolute sense . Later on In paragraph 9. we will analyze in greater detail this basic distinction between things that ‘appear’ to us good or pleasant, and things really good or pleasant in absolute.      Hints for reflection When we make a given choice or accomplish a given action that we believe to be motivated by a rational deliberation, it would always be useful to consider carefully whether an irrational desire would not hide behind it, with possible consequent prejudice of our true interest in view of happiness.                                                                4. Pleasure is an act of our soul   4.1. Eudoxus: pleasure is the ultimate good/end A further argument from Eudoxus concerns the goal of our actions in life: the goal that most deserves to be pursued is the one which we do not seek in order to achieve something else, but because it is an end in itself, i.e. it is an ultimate good/end; now, “pleasure is a thing of this kind: in fact no person is ever asked to what (further) end he/she seeks pleasure, because we all assume that pleasure is an end in itself”. EN, 1172b, 20-23. Eudoxus here employs an inductive procedure similar to that used by Aristotle in other places in his work concerning the hierarchy of goods/ends culminating in absolute ends and happiness. To this purpose Aristotle uses a procedure based on the following distinction: on the one hand there are the simple means and intermediate ends, which are all ends that we seek to achieve other ends that are superior to them; and on the other hand there are the absolute ends, which are the ultimate ends that we truly seek for ourselves. A good/end sought for itself is clearly, in the eyes of Aristotle, of a higher level than the others preceding it, and more worthy of choice (hairetón): “it is above all worthy to be chosen that end which we do not choose because of, or in view of, another end" (EN, 1172b, 20-23; 1094a, 16-17; Topics - henceforth Top. - 116a, 29-31); “that good which we choose for itself is more worthy of choice than that good which we do not choose for itself” (Rhet., 1364a, 1-2).   4.2. Speusippus and Plato: pleasure is not an end, but a process Who does not fail to criticize the reasoning of Eudoxus  is once again Speusippus ; and similar objection is also developed by Plato . On the basis of the principle that every change (process) is different from the end to which such process tends, See note no. 32 and paragraph 5. (the process of building a house is of a different kind from the finished house), they object that pleasure is not at all a good and an end for us, because it is just a pleasant process of restoring our physical balance after every painful alteration in a negative sense due to deficiencies or needs of the body (illness, lack of food, and so on). EN, 1152b, 22-23; and also 1173a, 29-31. Therefore our true good/end is only our natural condition of fully restored equilibrium, and certainly not the process that leads to it.   4.3. Aristotle: pleasure is not a process but an act of our soul Aristotle is also of the opinion that in our situations of deficiency and need we actually feel the desire for a restoration of the natural state of equilibrium of our organism (eis tèn physikèn héxin), EN, 1152b, 34. that is, for a process “towards the state of perfection of our own nature (eis tèn teléiosin tês phýseos)”. EN, 1153a, 12; and also 1154b, 1. However, he criticizes the conclusions that Speusippus and Plato draw about the nature of pleasure, and disputes such conclusions in a articulated way. EN, 1174b, 10; Magna Moralia (henceforth MM), 1204b, 4-5. He points out that it is not our body that feels pleasure in the course of the rebalancing process, but the soul (“feeling pleasure is something that happens in the soul”), EN, 1099a, 7-8, and 1173b, 11-13; MM, 120, 24-37. and precisely that part of the soul that remains unaffected by the deficiencies and pains of our physical organism. It is from the activity of this part of the soul that also originates the process of reconstituting our natural condition of balance. EN, 1152b, 35-36, and 1154b, 18-19.  And this happens because the soul of each of us substantially coincides with our natural condition, which therefore possesses an ontological stability and permanence that remains substantially unaltered by states of deficiency and need : In order to understand why Aristotle states that pleasure is an act of our natural condition which always remains - at least for a part of it - unaltered by our bodily needs, one must bear in mind his concept of nature (phýsis). It is the concept on which his ethics in general is based; and, as far as the treatment of pleasure is concerned, it is to this concept that the terms and periphrases (eis phýsin, tò katà phýsin, tò hypóloipos héxeos kaì phýseos, eis tèn physikèn héxin) that he uses to indicate the condition of ordered equilibrium of our organism. In summary, nature in a general sense is for Aristotle the complex of all those beings that have in themselves a spontaneous and dynamic principle of change and movement (arché kinéseos) (Physics - henceforth Phys. -, 192b, 13-14; Metaphysics - henceforth Met. -, 1015a, 18-20). And in particular in each living organism, and therefore also in each of us human beings, individual nature is the form (i.e. the essence) considered precisely in this dynamic aspect through which the organism is generated and grows (Met., 1041b, 31). There is therefore a substantial coincidence between form/essence and the nature of each of us (Phis., 193a 30-31; Met., 1014b, 35-1015a, 19). So it is our nature that determines our characteristics and our way of being and acting: a role of efficient and final cause substantially coinciding with that which Aristotle attributes to the individual soul. “our natural condition (phýsis) lacks nothing” . EN, 1153a, 1-2.  In any case, however, pleasure does not consist at all in the process of reconstitution, because it has a much more general significance: pleasure is the feeling of inner fulfillment that we experience in the soul during each of its activities; EN, 1154b, 18-19. and as for the particular case of a process, “pleasures are accidentally produced in our soul during the process by which we are restored to the state of perfection”. EE, 1218b, 35. Therefore, the various pleasures that we experience from time to ime in life are real acts of our soul, of our natural condition (individual nature). We feel pleasure not because we are in becoming and are involved in a process of rebalancing, but simply, and more generally, because we are alive and in activity : "pleasures [...] are an act and an end, and are produced [... ] because the subject is active ”. EN, 1153a, 9-11; and also 1173a, 31; 1174a, 19. Aristotle believes that this opinion of his is also proven by the fact that there are pleasures that have nothing to do with deficiencies and processes of restoration. Pleasures do not consist of a process, nor are they all connected to a process; [...] and they are not produced because the subject (who feels pleasure) is in the making" (EN, 1153a, 9-10 . In fact, “there are also pleasures that are not preceded by pain or irrational desire, such as those of contemplation”. EN, 1152b, 361153a, 1. And also “the pleasures of learning, and - among the sensitive pleasures - those deriving from smell and many of those deriving from sight and hearing, as well as memories and hopes, are all pleasures not connected with pain [...]; (with regard to them) there has been previously no deficiency for which afterwards there has been fulfillment”. EN, 1173b, 16-20; and also MM, 5-21. Having established this, he is then able to give a definition of pleasure: it is an “act of our natural condition, not impeded”. EN, 1153b, 12-15. This is, however, a first definition because, as we shll see shortly, he will also give a second, more complete one: pleasure is an act that accompanies and completes all our vital activities.  Berti (in Symphilosophein, p. 194) notes precisely that between Book VII and Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics one can notice a difference of points of view: in VII Aristotle states that pleasure is one of our vital acts, while in the X it states that pleasure is an instantaneous and complete act that accompanies and perfects every vital act that we perform.      5. Pleasure is an instantaneous and accomplished act   After rejecting the arguments of Speusippus and Plato  that pleasure, being a process, cannot be a good and an end, Aristotle proceeds to argue positively that, on the contrary, pleasure is indeed a good and an end for us. And to do this he begins by showing that it is something totally opposite to a process: it is an instantaneous act . EN, X, 3.   5.1. Pleasure is an instantaneous act It is appropriate at this point to specify better what is meant by ‘process’ and ‘instantaneous act’, and what Aristotle’s position is in this regard. He states that any act by which we concretely realize our various potentialities can have two different ways of implementation. Met., 1048b, 18-36.  The first way is a gradual process of change (kínesis) consisting of a series of actions. It may be one of the countless processes we see in the natural world, from the growth of a plant to the erosion of a mountain. Or it may be one of the equally countless processes that each of us sets in motion to achieve our own ends, large or small. Aristotle gives some examples of such processes: walking, learning, losing weight, healing, building. Met. , 1048b, 19-20 and 29-30 . All the progress of a process is fully illustrated by Aristotle through the detailed description of the construction of a temple (EN, 1174a, 19-29). For example, if I walk with the aim of reaching my bank, each step is a partial implementation of the aim that does not entirely conclude and perfect the process of my reaching the bank, but is only a partial step; and similarly, if my wife (hopefully) makes a diet to reach 60 kg of weight, she sets in motion a process that has this weight limit as its end, and every single intermediate act of food control is a simple means, a partial implementation of her end. In short, with each intermediate action the ultimate goal (télos) of the process is still unfinished, it is still beyond reach; therefore each of these actions does not yet have the ultimate goal in itself, and for this reason Aristotle calls it ‘imperfect action’ (prâxis atelés). Instead, only the last action in the series, the one that fully implements the end to which the process tends (I set foot in my bank; my wife reaches 60 kg) is an end in itself, and therefore is a perfect action (prâxis teleía). The second way of implementation, on the other hand, is that of a single instantaneous act which, without there having been a previous more or less long process, already in itself constitutes the complete implementation (enérgheia) of its own end. It is therefore a completely different kind of acts, since each act is already in itself accomplished and perfect, because its purpose is directly realized in the act itself. This action, therefore, is an end in itself, that is, it has its own end in itself, and therefore it too is a perfect action (prâxis teleía) which takes place instantaneously and immediately, as out of time. The examples that Aristotle gives in this regard refer to when “one sees”, “one thinks”, “one knows”, “one lives”, “one is happy”, Met., 1048b, 23-26; EN, 1094a, 16-17; 1174a, 6-7. and also exactly to feeling pleasure. EN, 1174a, 16-19.      This of ‘feeling pleasure’ is therefore an act that has not at all the characteristics of a process, since it is a pure act that takes place in us instantly. While a gradual process of change can only occur over time (and therefore more or less slowly or quickly), on the contrary “it is possible to experience pleasure independently of time, since what happens instantly is a whole”. EN, 1174b, 7-9. For example, “it is certainly possible to get to feel pleasure quickly, just as it is also possible to get to feel anger quickly, but it is not possible to feel pleasure rapidly […]; instead it is possible to walk quickly, grow quickly, and so on”. EN, 1173a, 34-b, 2.   5.2. Pleasure is a totally accomplished act, and therefore it is a good and an end in itself The act of pleasure is realized in us not only in an instantaneous way, but also in a complete way : pleasure, not being a process, “is part of those things that constitute a whole and are (perfectly) accomplished” EN, 1174b, 6-7; and also 1174a, 17 and 1174b, 14. in other words, “its essence is accomplished and perfect in every moment of its duration”. EN, 1174b, 5-6. So, while within a process an event is accomplished gradually, getting more accomplished step by step, an act such as pleasure, which is totally accomplished instantly, is already perfect as it is, right from the start and regardless of its duration (even if it can eventually last a long time). This is why Aristotle says that “at no point in its duration could one have a pleasure whose essence would be brought to (total) accomplishment if it lasted longer”. EN, 1174a, 16-19. And if this is so, if pleasure “is a whole” which from the very beginning is the complete implementation of the final result, this means that it is an act that has its own end in itself: it is absolutely not a means by which to obtain something else, but it is a good and an end in itself. “It is evident that the act of pleasure and the process of change are different from each other"; and “from these considerations it is also clear that those who claim that pleasure is a process and a becoming are wrong, since the concepts of 'process' and ‘becoming’ cannot refer to everything, but only to those things which are divisible and which do not constitute a whole”. That is the reason why the pleasures we experience are a good for us, and certainly not an evil. In conclusion, therefore, for Aristotle the feeling of pleasure, whatever its kind - from physical pleasure to the utmost spiritual pleasure - and its level of intensity, is a pure act that is instantly accomplished and perfect, a good that accompanies and completes each other good we enjoy.   Remarks Pleasure is a good So, according to Aristotle all the pleasures we experience are, in general and in principle,a good for us: this is further proof that his conception of pleasure is positive, and at the same time also realistic, in that it takes into account the reality of the facts and the common feeling of us all. Of course, as we shall see shortly, it is necessary to distinguish between the various types of pleasures, and take into account the fact that for some of them there may be counterproductive excesses.   Epicurus and pleasure. Perhaps aware of the discussions on pleasure held at the Platonic Academy a few decades earlier, Epicurus develops his own analysis of pleasure, distinguishing two completely different types of pleasures. There are the ‘mobile’ pleasures, those we all seek, which are full of allurement but insatiable; they continually project us into an illusory promise of future happiness, but for this very reason they are harbingers of disappointment and bitterness. But there is also a ‘stable’ pleasure, to be lived not in the future but in the present moment, and in which, after the vital needs have been met, body and soul are in balance and satisfied: the body has no needs or pains (aponía), and the soul has no distress or perturbation (ataraxía). (And we can also find there an echo of the Aristotelian statement, which we will mention shortly, that “pleasure consists more in stability than in change”).  Hints for reflection ‘Stable’ pleasure is timeless In his description of the ‘stable’ pleasure to be enjoyed in the present moment, Epicurus - despite the difference in the general philosophical approach - appears to take up the Aristotelian doctrine of pleasure as an instantaneous and perfectly accomplished act in every moment of its duration. And for this reason he affirms that the pure ‘stable’ pleasure that we can experience in each present moment is totally satisfying and perfect in itself, regardless of its duration: the perfection that there is in an instantaneous pleasure is equal to the one existing in an entire eternity of pleasure. Therefore it is foolish to hope that in the future, perhaps when we will have satisfied some of our unreasonable desires, we will be better off than we are now and we will have a higher pleasure: the pleasure we can achieve in any present instant is always the same, it is always perfect. Pleasure is timeless, and having experienced a instant of ‘stable’ pleasure is enough to justify our entire life.     6. Pleasure accompanies and perfects our every act   6.1. Pleasure is indissolubly connected to our every vital act, and completes and perfects it After outlining the characteristics of pleasure by stating that it is an instantaneous and perfect act in itself, Aristotle proceeds to illustrate how it originates in us. We have seen before that according to him the pleasures we experience are acts of our soul, and are connected with our vital activities: “the various pleasures [...] are produced because the subject (who feels pleasure) [...] is active”. EN, 1153a, 9-11 . The act of experiencing pleasure, therefore, takes place together with the main activity that we are carrying out and which precisely brings us such pleasure. EN, 1174b, 14 - 1175a, 10. In fact , pleasure is not produced in us in an isolated way, but is an act that always and necessarily accompanies each vital act we put into action. Even our simplest acts, such as walking or feeling, such as looking or hearing, cannot fail to please us; and our higher acts, such as contemplating, gratify us even more. “It is evident that a pleasure arises in correspondence to each sense: for we know that the sensations of sight and hearing are pleasant”; EN, 1174b, 26-27. “there is a pleasure in correspondence to every sensation, and also in correspondence with every reflection and every contemplation”". EN, 1174b, 20-21. In short, Aristotle believes that between our succesful vital activities and the pleasure associated with them there is an indissoluble relationship, such as to make them a single structure: “pleasures are very close to acts and so inseparable and indistinguishable from them, that one might wonder whether act and pleasure are not the same thing”. EN, 1175b, 33-34. Therefore, each of our vital acts, both bodily and psychic, gives us instant pleasure, instant gratification; and on the other hand, “without activity there is no pleasure”. EN, 1175a, 20-21. It could also be said that pleasure, since it completes and perfects every vital act of ours (“pleasure perfects every activity”), EN, 1174b, 23 and 1175a, 21.is a sort of end: “pleasure perfects every act of ours [...] like a sort of end that comes to be added besides, such as for example beauty comes to be added to those people who are in the full vigor of their age”. EN, 1175a, 12-15. Pleasure is the crowning achievement of all our vital activities . And proof of this assumption, Aristotle thinks, comes to us from the fact that “everyone carries out his activity in the ambit of those things, and with those faculties, that he loves most: for example, the musician carries out his activity with his hearing and in the ambit of melodies; the scholar with his thought, in the ambit of the truths to be studied; and so does every other person”. EN, 1175a, 12-15.  Remarks Pleasure completes our acts Our various vital acts are in principle a good for us, since “by nature life is a good” EN, 1170b, 1-2. and living means precisely being active (“life is a kind of activity”). Moreover, as we have seen before, Aristotle criticizes the these of Speusippus and Plato, and states that pleasure is a good for us. It follows that pleasure, so closely connected to our vital acts, is not an isolated good, but a good sui generis in that it complements other goods, as indeed all our vital acts are. Pleasure is therefore a positive subjective resonance that accompanies the good. 6.2. Human pleasure and divine pleasure In the concluding passage of his treatment of pleasure in Book VII of Nicomachean Ethics, EN, 1154b, 20-26. Aristotle describes a radical difference between the type of pleasure enjoyed by human beings and that enjoyed by God.   As for human pleasure , “there is nothing that (for us) is always pleasant in the same way, for the reason that our nature is not simple , but there is also another element inherent in it that makes us corruptible"; and this element causing our corruptibility appears to be the material body as opposed to the soul. Regarding this passage, there have always been differences of views between scholars about the identity of these two elements (with the relative pleasures) in contrast with each other. Some have identified them as body and soul, others as potentiality and act, still others as the irrational and rational part of the soul. In any case, the contrast in question is evoked only in Book VII of Nicomachean Ethics ; instead in Book XI the accent will be focused not on this contrast but on the hierarchy of pleasures and on the ethical choice to be made between them. And since body and soul are contrary to each other and therefore contrast with each other, each of them disturbs and makes inconstant the pleasant acts originating from the other. So in itself our human pleasure is imperfect and therefore can never be constant . And indeed we all know that we humans are not able to experience pleasure - of whatever kind it is - continuously. How can this be explained? It is explained, Aristotle replies, by the fact that, since each pleasure is closely connected to our vital activity at a given moment, when we interrupt the activity pleasure is also interrupted. And the activity is often interrupted because we - like all other living beings - by nature do not have the capacity to carry out our activity in a continuous way, and therefore we periodically get tired, need rest and stop acting. EN, 1175a, 3-6; and also 1154b, 20; 1170a, 6. The profound, metaphysical reason for this incapacity is that, being endowed with a material body with limited energy and immersed in becoming , every activitity off ours require a laborious transition from potentiality to actuality; and the effort we experience is precisely the consequence and the sign of this passage. Met., 1050b, 22-28.   This is also the reason why we feel particular pleasure when we are dealing with new things and new situations, while afterwards pleasure slowly decreases when they are no longer so new. In fact, at the beginning the excitement of novelty drives us to act with a lot of energy with regard to such things, and therefore the pleasure is strong; but then the interest drops, the activity is no longer so intense, and the relative pleasure decreases proportionally. EN, 1175a, 6-10. This means that the human being, precisely because of his intrinsic fragility given by the presence of matter, needs frequent novelties if he wants to keep his level of interest, activity and pleasure high. In conclusion, our nature is not simple owing to our composition of soul and body, and therefore for us humans “the change of all things is sweet, as the poet says, because of a certain bad condition (of our nature) (dià ponerían tiná); in fact, just as a bad person is changeable, so is (that kind of) nature that needs change; a nature which in fact is not a simple or balanced one”. EN, 1154b, 20-31. Instead, divine pleasure is of a completely different nature. The immutable beings, who do not have a material body but are pure actuality, exercise their activity without effort and in a continuous manner, and therefore their pleasure is perennial and without interruption: “if the nature of a being is simple, the same act will be always very pleasant; and for this reason God always enjoys a unique and simple pleasure.” God has neither vice nor virtue, EN, 1145a, 25-26. but he feels pleasure, an eternal, infinite and immutable pleasure in his eternal self-contemplation. And indeed - continues Aristotle - there is not only that act (enérgheia) which is the result of change (kínesis), but there is also that act which consists in pure and simple immutability (akinesía); Every being subject to the changes of becoming necessarily exists in a certain way, i.e. it is actualized, realized, and at the same time it possesses in itself some potentialities through which it is able to give rise to changes in conformity with its essence. On the contrary, God does not have any potentiality in himself, and therefore he is only actuality; indeed, he is the pure Actuality par excellence. Therefore, actuality can also be of an immutable reality, just as it is that of God. and "pleasure consists more in stability than in change" .                   However, the human being is potentially capable of experiencing sometimes a pleasure amalogous to divine pleasure. In effect, “all beings pursue pleasure, but perhaps they pursue not the pleasure they believe, […] but the same pleasure; for all beings have by nature something divine”. EN, 1153b, 30-32. Indeed, in each of the innumerable beings of the world Aristotle sees at work a natural and good tendency to its own perfection and self-realization, a tendency that finds its first source in the divine impulse to the becoming of all things. Aristotle's long experience in observing the behaviour of many living beings (Phys., II, 8), each with its finalistic trajectory of development to its own perfect natural form, leads him to widen his gaze to take into account the world of nature as a whole. And even in the totality of all the innumerable individual natures he sees at work a universal finalism: “in the works of nature [...] finality, and not blind chance, dominates” (De Partibus Animalium, 645 a, 25); and again: “nature does nothing in vain, but always aims at what for everything, within its limits, is the best possible" (De Motu Animalium, 708a, 9-10; and also DA, 432b, 21-23). He does not attribute to nature a unitary intelligence or will, but in it he sees an intrinsic finalism that results from the total complex of all the individual purposes of countless beings, a little like the individual sound of many individual instruments has as a result the sound of an orchestra as a whole. And in the case of the human being, in particular, he sees something more: the presence in us DA, 430 a , 10-15 . of the ‘divine’ active intellect (noûs poietikós); That of the so-called ‘active intellect’ is a subject of great relevance in Aristotle's psychology and ethics, and is also a concept of great interpretative difficulty. Aristotle expressed himself on it in a very succinct way mainly in his treatise on the Soul (De Anima); and indeed it is only in that treatise that the actual concept of active intellect appears for the first time. For more than two millennia the relevant passages have been the subject of profound differences of opinion among commentators, so much so that it has been said that no other passage in ancient philosophy has given rise to so many different interpretations. In any case, it is to this intellect that Aristotle could refer in the passages of his Ethics in which he speaks of a type of intellect that is something divine present in the human being; and since he mentions it as “the intellect by virtue of which everything is made (hó tô pánta poieîn)”. (DA, 430a, 15) commentators have called it noûs poietikós (‘active’, ‘productive’, ‘factive’, intellect). and this presence can allow us to experience “for a short time” Met ., 1072b, 14. and “sometimes”, Met ., 1072b, 25; and also EN, 1178b, 22. in contemplation, a pleasure as close as possible to the absolute, immutable and blissful pleasure of God.     7. The more perfect an act is, the more pleasant it is   We have seen above that, according to Aristotle, pleasure accompanies our every vital act. Now, he adds two important corollaries to this principle. First: a vital act of ours is perfect when we perform it fully, and perform it without hindrance. Second: the more perfect the act, the more profound is the connected pleasure. The examples presented by Aristotle to illustrate this principle relate mainly to our acts of cognitive character, both sensitive and intellectual. Let us see.   7.1. Our vital acts are perfect when we realize them totally The activities that we totally carry out  are those in which the faculty that we employ to act is in good condition, and the object of that activity is the best in relation to that type of activity. EN 1174b, 15-20 and 22-23. Thus, for example, my act of seeing is perfect (i.e. totally realized) if my visual faculty is excellent, and the object I look at is clearly visible and in full light; or again, my act of contemplation is perfect if my contemplative capacity has been well developed by exercise, and the object of my contemplation is the highest; and so on. In other words, our act is all the more perfect the more perfect is the correlation and adeguacy between our faculty and its object. This means that in the faculty there remains no potentiality but is all actualized according to its nature, thus accomplishing in an excellent way all that the faculty can accomplish by its nature. Speaking of the perfection an act of ours, Aristotle distinguishes between the perfection brought about by pleasure, and the perfection brought about by the excellent state of the subject and object. We have seen before that Aristotle affirms that pleasure is like a sort of end: “pleasure perfects each of our acts [...] as a sort of an end that is added on top of it” (EN, 1174b, 31-32). Therefore pleasure, with respect to the vital act to which it is connected, is a kind of final cause. Instead, the optimality of both the faculty of the knowing subject and that of the known object substantially acts as an efficient cause of the optimality of the vital act itself (EN, 1174b, 23-26). 7 .2. Our vital acts are perfect when we perform them without any obstacle The other condition for an act of ours to be perfect is that it be done in an “unimpeded” way (anempódiston). EN, 1153a, 13-14. The unimpeded activities are those that can be carried out without hindrance or obstacle; in them our energy flows freely, that is, without external or internal impediments that stand in the way of its full unfolding. In fact, the obstacles to an activity can concern both external impediments (lack or scarcity of wealth, support, friends, freedom, and so on), and our personal condition and possible internal hesitations or barriers that we ourselves may have, consciously or unconsciously, regarding our activity. After all, it is obvious that any act of ours, in order to give us pleasure, must succeed in its intent: that is, it must fully achieve the good/end that we propose when we perform that act. Previously we noted that a definition of pleasure given by Aristotle is that of “an act of our natural condition, not impeded”, and that this implies that in order to experience pleasure it is necessary that the act itself be carried out freely and without obstacles: in fact, an act that for any difficulty or impediment whatsoever is not entirely accomplished certainly could not give us satisfaction and pleasure. For example, if I want to identify a distant object clearly, and the presence of fog prevents me from seeing it clearly, I shall not feel pleasure, because my visual act does not reach its intended purpose; and if I am thinking about the solution of a difficult problem and my thinking is disturbed by a strong concern for other reasons, I will not be able to find that solution, and I will certainly not be satisfied; and likewise I will not feel pleasure if my contemplation is hindered by an annoying noise from the outside. And even life in its entirety, even if it is virtuous, cannot be considered happy if it encounters serious obstacles: “a happy life is one that goes on according to virtue and without impediments”. Politics (hereafter Pol.), 1295a, 36-3; and EN, 1153b, 9-12 .   7.3. The more perfect (i.e. realized totally and without obstacles) a vital act of ours is, the more pleasure it gives us Here then is the conclusion of this topic: when an act of ours is perfect, i.e. carried out in a full and unimpeded manner, it cannot fail to give us great pleasure. This is because when the subject who performs the act and the object on which the act focuses “are as they should be” (that is, in perfect condition), “pleasure is intrinsic to the act itself”, EN, 1174b, 33-1175a, 1. and in such a case “pleasure is always present”. EN, 1174b, 28- 31. So the perfection of our act, and the intensity of the pleasure we derive from it, go hand in hand and are directly proportional: the more perfect our vital activity is, the more pleasure it gives us. Pleasure arises “above all (málista)” when the activity is perfect, EN, 1174b, 28- 31. and “the most perfect activity is also the most pleasant activity”. EN, 1174b, 19-20 and 21-22. PART 2  MANAGING PLEASURE WELL               8 . Pleasure is of various kinds   So far we have been discussing pleasure in general, that is to say, the characteristics that each of the various pleasures we experience in life has in common with others; and in conclusion we have seen that, according to Aristotle, pleasure is a good that completes and perfects each vital act that we perform, and that the more perfect the vital act is, the more pleasent it is. However, since the acts we perform are many and very different from one another, it necessarily follows that the pleasures we experience are also many and very different from each other . The task which then Aristotle proposes is to try to distinguish which, among the various pleasures, are the good and the bad ones for us, that is, the right and the wrong ones from an ethical point of view.   8.1. Distinguishing among the various pleasures How to distinguish among the various pleasures? Since each of our vital acts is completed and perfected by a certain pleasure, Aristotle believes that the distinctions that we make among the various acts must also apply exactly to the pleasures that correspond to those acts : “just in the way pleasant things [i.e. acts] are distinguished from one another, so are also distinguished the pleasures deriving from them”; EN, 1153a, 6-7. “just as our acts are different, so are our pleasures also different”. EN, 1175b, 36. Therefore, for example, if an act of ours is good from an ethical point of view, the pleasure connected with it will also be good and ethical.   8.2 . Each type of act has its own ‘ proper’ pleasure  This principle is in fact inspired by the fact that “each pleasure is closely linked to the act that such pleasure completes and perfects. EN, 1175a, 29-30. This is what Aristotle designates as the ‘proper’ pleasure (oikéia hedoné) of a given activity: the ‘proper’ pleasures (and pains) are “those that derive from the activity itself”, EN, 1175b, 21-22. and therefore “for each activity there is a pleasure of its own”. EN, 1175b, 26-27. In other words, each kind of act has its own typical, characteristic pleasure.  To prove this thesis, Aristotle puts forward some arguments. In the first place, every ‘proper’ pleasure stimulates and increases the type of activity to which it is connected: “people who do things with pleasure judge better and act more accurately on everything: for example, those who like to take an interest in geometry become experts in geometry, and understand its various notions better; and the same goes for those who like music, or architecture, or other things; and everyone makes progress in his occupation because he enjoys it. Therefore every pleasure increases activity; and what enhances something, is proper to it”. EN, 1175a, 30, b, 1.      And it also happens, on the contrary, that “the pleasures deriving from other activities are an impediment to (ongoing) activities: for example, if one is fond of the flute and hears its sound, he is no longer able to pay attention to a reasoning that is being done to him, because that sound gives him greater pleasure than the thing he is doing”. EN, 1175b, 1-6. These extraneous pleasures produce almost the same effect as what Aristotle calls pains ' proper ' to a given activity, which tend to make it cease: for example, “if it is painful for one to write, or for another to count, the former will tend not to write, and the second not to count, precisely because such activity is painful to him "(EN, 1175b, 16-24). And for the same reason when we are engaged in two activities the more pleasant one tends to drive the other one away, and the more pleasant it is the more it does it, to the point of making us stop one activity in order to focus all our attention on the other. EN, 1175b, 7-13.   8.3 . There are different kinds of pleasures From all this, therefore, Aristotle draws confirmation of the fact that not all pleasures are of the same species: “the pleasures proper to activities of different species are also of different species", EN, 1175a, 36-b, 1. and therefore it must be concluded that “pleasures differ from one another according to species”. EN, 1173b, 28; 1175a, 22. In fact, “since the pleasure proper to each activity makes it more precise, more long-lasting and better, while (on the contrary) a pleasure extraneous to it makes it worse, it is clear that the various species of pleasures differ greatly from one another”. EN, 1175b, 15-16. In short, pleasure is a genus that contains many different species, and therefore there are pleasures of different types and qualities : for example, we continuously produce acts of sensation and acts of thought that originate from different faculties; therefore also the relative pleasures are of different species. EN, 1175a, 21-28. It is also obvious that pleasures of different species are not commensurable: certainly I cannot compare the pleasure I feel in diving into the sea on a hot day with the virtuous pleasure of doing a right action or having perfect fortitude in a difficult situation. In short, these are acts and relative pleasures that are on very different and not interchangeable levels: it would be at least absurd to ask myself how many dives into the sea I would have do to compensate for the lack of pleasure caused by not having done a right action.    It must be added, of course, that in general “pleasure admits the more and the less” EN, 1173a, 16-17 and 24-28. also within each species of pleasure; therefore a pleasure of a given species can be more or less intense according to the various circumstances and modalities in which the act that provides it takes place. Thus, for example, the pleasure of eating that I feel at lunch is more intense if I am very hungry and the food is particularly of my taste and prepared in the right way; and likewise also for all other species of pleasure.   8.4. Each animal species has its own specific function (érgon) and its own characteristic pleasure According to Aristotle, every being belonging to a given species has its own érgon, i.e. a typical way of operating, an activity which is a natural characteristic of its species , and which is the specific function for which that being is predisposed. This observation applies, for example, to something like a cloak (“there is a function and use of the cloak”), EE, 1219a, 2. or to the various organs in animals (“there is clearly a specific function of the eye, hand, foot, and in general of each part of the body”), EN, 1097b, 30-32. or to each person who carries out a certain profession (the flutist, the sculptor, the carpenter, the shoemaker ... ), as he carries out this profession and at the moment in which he carries it out . And of course, more generally, the typical function for which a given being is predisposed is necessarily connected to the very essence of that being, and represents an aspect of it. Now, the érgon of each animal species not only determines this typical activity, but also its connected characteristic type of ‘proper’ pleasure: “also for each animal species there will be a pleasure of its own, just as there is a function of its own: and it will be the pleasure corresponding to the characteristic acts of its species. And this is evident to whoever observes each species: in fact the pleasure (characteristic) of the horse is different from the pleasure (characteristic) of the dog and (from that) of the human being. [...] Therefore the pleasures of animals of different species are also of different species, and it is logical that instead the pleasures of animals of the same species are not different from one another”. EN, 1176a, 3-9. In short, every animal species naturally tends towards a complex of pleasures that can only be different from species to species: “as Heraclitus says, donkeys would choose straw rather than gold, since food gives donkeys more pleasure than gold”. EN, 1176a, 6-8.   8.5. The pleasures towards which the human species tends are very different In the human species, the issue is apparently more complex. In fact, precisely because of our greater complexity than any other animal species, the particular pleasures that each of us pursues also present greater complexity and differentiation: “everyone pursues pleasure, but not the same pleasures”, EN, 1153b, 30-31. and the pleasures “differ greatly; in fact the same things are pleasant for some people and unpleasant for others, and certain things cause pain and repugnance in some, and pleasure and desire in others”. EN, 1176a, 10-15. And just as - we shall see it better shortly - in pursuing happiness each one of us, according to his own vision of life, is freely oriented towards a particular complex of goods and ends that ‘appear’ worthy of being pursued above all others, so also happens in the case of our inexhaustible search for what ‘appears’ to us as pleasant. Of course, such multiplicity in our preferences for different pleasures is also influenced by different characters, different value systems ​​and individual passions: “each (particular) disposition of character prefers certain fine and pleasant things”, EN, 1113a, 31. and “everyone is delighted with the activity they are passionate about: for example the horse for those who love horses, a theatrical performance for those who love theatrical performances. And in the same way, what is right is pleasant for those who love justice, and in general activities according to virtues (are pleasant) for those who love virtue”. EN, 1099a, 8-11. That being so, it is then a matter for us to try to understand, in this multiplicity and variety of pleasures from which we can be attracted, what are by nature and in absolute the characteristic and proper pleasures of our human species, and to distinguish on this basis what are the pleasures to be sought and what are those to be avoided from the ethical point of view.   9. Absolute goods/ends and ‘apparent’ goods/ends   In order to understand in practice what are, according to Aristotle, the pleasures by nature characteristic and proper of the human species, it is necessary to remember one of the main doctrines relating to Arstotelian ethics: that of the distinction between absolute goods/ends  (goods/ends by nature ) and ‘apparent’ goods/ends; a distinction that is also very important  for distinguishing between the various types of pleasures . (We treat the two terms ‘goods’ and ‘ends’ interchangeably, and linked in a unitary way as ‘goods/ends’, since Aristotle himself states that each end (télos) of ours is always a good (agathón) that we desire: “the end is by nature (phýsei) always a good”; EE, 1227a, 18. “the end is a good in view of which one acts”. Met., 983a, 31-32. He always connects, inseparably, a given end to a given good. Met., 982b, 6 and 10. It can be a material object or an immaterial satisfaction; it can be a result, a specific situation; in short, a ‘thing’ that has certain characteristics, and that has for us a positive ‘value’ that attracts us and that we wish to obtain and possess).     9.1. Two fundamental questions In a well-known passage, Aristotle addresses the issue of absolute goods/ends, taking a position on two closely related and fundamental ethical questions. The first: whether or not there are absolute goods/ends, that is, the human good in an absolute sense (what is really and truly good for us). The second: whether or not our will (rational desire: boúlesis) is by nature (phýsei) always oriented towards such goods/ends in an absolute sense; in other words, whether or not we are naturally led by nature to always pursue ethical and correct goods/ends. And of course, since the real facts do prove abundantly that human beings very often do not behave ethically, it is also a question of explaining this obvious reality.   9.2. The theses of the predecessors Aristotle mentions first of all Socrates' thesis, which was later also shared by Plato with his idea of ​the ​Good-in-itself. They stated that the good in an absolute sense exists, and that the will of each one of us by nature always and unfailingly wants such good: this is in any case the object of our will. And they explained in the following way the fact that people very often want unethical goods/ends: they do not really want to carry out their unethical actions; since our will is always right, people cannot do evil except unintentionally. This is the Socratic thesis of the involuntary nature of evil. And Aristotle criticizes it as contradictory in itself, because it implies that people who perform unethical actions want to perform them but at the same time do not want to perform them. EN, 1113a, 17-19. He then examines the diametrically opposed thesis, the one put forward by some sophists and in particular by Protagoras, according to which there is no good in an absolute sense, and therefore our will has no objective set by nature at all: everyone wants what seems good to him from time to time, i.e. the ‘apparent’ good (tò phainómenon agathón) of that moment. This would explain abundantly the frequent evil and unethical actions of human beings. But here too Aristotle points out an inconsistency : “to one person one thing seems good, and to another person something different; if this were so, the object of our will would always be things contrary to one another ”. EN, 1113a, 20-22.   9.3. The Aristotelian solution After rejecting these two extreme positions as both unsatisfactory, EN, 1113a, 22-23. Aristotle goes on to present his thesis, which in a certain way represents a compromise between the two: “the good is the object of the human will in an absolute sense and according to truth ( haplôs kaì kat'alétheian ); but the  object of the will of each person is what from time to time  ‘appears’ to her as good (the ‘apparent’ good: tō phainómenon agathón)”. EN, 1113a, 23-24; and also 1155b, 17-26; EE, 1228b, 18-22; 1235b, 25-26 and 30- 32. This Aristotelian doctrine, crucial for the understanding of its ethics, rests on the following fundamental distinction between two types of goods/ends. 9.4. Absolute goods/ends are the human good by nature Aristotle affirms first of all that the our supreme end, happiness, is realized concretely when we enjoy some perfect, absolute, goods/ends which are the presupposition and components of happiness itself. These are absolute goods/ends (téle haplôs) EE, 1235b, 31. The term haplôs indicates that what is affirmed should not be understood in a relative sense, i.e. in a certain context and with certain clarifications, but independently of any context and without any clarification or addition: therefore in an absolute sense, “according to truth” (kat'alétheian) (EN, 1113a, 23-24). For example, Aristotle explains, “if you say that honoring the gods is ethically beautiful, and you add nothing else (to this statement), then honoring the gods is fine in an absolute sense" (Top., 115b, 32-33). which are the “good according to truth”, that is the true, objective good, the human good which by nature  (phýsei) As far as the term phýsei is concerned, when Aristotle mentions one of our characteristics ' by nature', he means that human nature includes equal characteristics in each of us, because we all belong to the human species: in each of us there are specific characteristics innate and common to all, independently of any context and without distinction of times, places, different cultures, and so on. This too, therefore, is an absolute and not relative sense. See for example EN, 1170a, 21; EE, 1248b, 26-27 and 29-30; 1249a, 5 and 7. is - and should be - the object of our will (phýsei bouletón). And indeed these absolute goods/ends are “what is good for us by nature,” and we should love them and seek them both for themselves and because through them we can be happy. Being innate and common ends to each of us, we behave ethically only when we pursue them. In other words, according to Aristotle, ethical principles are firmly rooted  in human nature itself, that is in our nature as a species, which is obviously identical in all of us human beings. Ethical principles are therefore a ‘species property’ of ours, that is, a ‘property in itself' of the human species. Human nature, i.e. our specific nature, is accompanied by numerous species properties that are inextricably linked to it, in an indissoluble and necessary way; therefore species properties are equal in each human being precisely because they belong to all the members of the human species. See for example Met. 1022a, 29-32. Thus, for example, the tendency towards our ultimate ends - happiness, and the absolute goods in which it consists –has its origin in our deepest human nature. And similarly, all our ethical principles and values are an objective and fundamental characteristic that we all have by nature. We are here at the heart of Aristotelian ethics: we behave ethically only when we pursue the absolute goods/ends, because we are by nature ordained for them, of them we have a natural need. And  this is the profound reason why, once in fact pursued and achieved, they are so pleasant (hedéa): they are “pleasant by nature (physei)”, “pleasant in themselves (kath'autás)”; EN, 1099a, 13 and 15. indeed, “they are pleasant in absolute (haplôs)”. EE, 1235b, 32-33.   9.5.  Subjective and ‘apparent’ goods/ends But, in parallel, there are the various subjective goods/ends: they are the ones that from time to time to each one of us individually may ‘appear’ to be good (hekásto tò phainómenon agathón ), EN, 1113a, 23-24. i.e. the “good according to someone (tiní)”; EE, 1235b, 31-32. they are the goods/ends among wich in fact each of us has to choose and pursue with our own will. They ‘appear’ good to each of us personally at a given moment, but may or may not be really good . In the concrete of our daily life we ​​are dealing with the subjective goods/ends, which can be called ‘apparent’ because our cognitive system presents in every moment to our senses and to our thought a myriad of things and possibilities that subjectively ‘appear’ to us (even leading us into error) as good and pleasant. And, as we have seen before, Aristotle states that “the object of each person’s will is what from time to time appears to her as good”. This explains why , since we have a power of self-determination and free choice (“virtue depends on us and so does vice”) EN, 1113b, 6-7. we also have the possibility and the tendency, also founded in our human nature, to forget and and trample (as very often happens) our natural tendency towards the absolute goods /ends. The absolute goods/ends are within us, rooted in our human nature; the subjective goods/ends ‘appear’ to us from the outside, before our eyes and our mind, and it is on them and among them that we are continually called to choose and decide.   9.6. The three broad categories of absolute goods/ends: goods of the soul, body goods, exterior goods In order to identify the various absolute goods/ends, Once identified the ultimate and supreme end, happiness, which is the 'principle' (arché) of ethics because it is in view of it that all our actions begin, Aristotle proceeds to define the components of happiness, that is to say the various absolute goods/ends: the method is therefore that of "first outlining a sketch, and then defining its details" (EN, 1098a, 21-22); in this way “(the principle) [...] is well determined”. (EN, 1098b, 6). those which we by nature are called to pursue, Aristotle - in this following Plato - begins by distinguishing three main categories: external goods, goods related to the body, and goods related to the soul. EN, 1098b, 12-14; Pol., 1323a, 24-27. As for the external goods, Aristotle distinguishes various types. First of all good fame and ‘honor’, which consist in the appreciation of the personal qualities of an individual by others, and the more or less important role attributed to him in society. Very important are also the economic means (or ‘wealth’), i.e. money and all those material objects that allow us to survive and also to live well. Moreover, Aristotle mentions some other external goods particularly important in the society of his time, such as the birth from a good family, numerous and good children, a large number of excellent friends, and so on. Rhet., 1360a, 19 and onwards; EN, 1099b, 2-7. Goods/ends related to the body are health and full possession of the various human faculties; strength and energy ; harmony of the body and pleasantness of appearance; various physical pleasures (including those of food and sex, to be pursued in moderation because they have their own intrinsic limit); and other such things. The goods/ends related to the soul are psychological goods, the most important for our happiness, those from which our most intimate satisfactions and gratifications arise: they are “goods in the most proper and true sense”. EN, 1098b, 14-15. According to Aristotle, central among them are the various virtues, that is, all those excellent characteristics (internal dispositions of mind and thought) which make a human being an excellent human being, and thanks to which he behaves in an excellent way and is therefore happy. And a good of the soul is certainly also that presupposition of virtuous activity represented by freedom of choice, that is, the inner possibility of freely choosing one's life and being creators of one’s own destiny. In conclusion, the many goods/ends included in the three broad categories do not all have the same value and importance in view of happiness: among them the fundamental ones are precisely the goods related to the soul, and in particular the various virtues, to which we will now refer in a nutshell. 9.7. The virtues The virtues, according to Aristotle, are a very important class of habits; that is to say, they are stable and durable inner dispositions (héxeis) Cat., 8b, 27-32. which play a decisive role for the purposes of happiness, allowing the virtuous person to think and act in an excellent and as perfect as possible way. EN, 1106a, 15-24. Therefore, virtue (areté) can generally be defined as a stable state of excellence of the soul, a perfection of character and thought, which is formed within us through the constant repetition of acts which are also excellent. EN, 1098b, 4; 1099b, 9; 1103b, 1-2 and 6-21; 1119a, 27; 1121a, 23: 1151a, 19; 1152a, 29; 1180a, 3 and 15. In this way the virtuous person becomes in the utmost conformity with his own nature, because in virtue her human nature finds full fulfilment and blossoming Phys., 246a, 13-16; Met., 1021b, 20; EN, 1097b, 25-33. (“the human good,” says Aristotle, “consists in an activity of our soul according to virtue”; EN, 1098a, 16-17; and 1177a, 9-12. and again: “happiness is the activity of a perfect life according to perfect virtue”) EE, 1219a, 38.. Aristotle distinguishes three great groups of virtues: EN, 1103a, 3-8 and 14-15; Pol., 1260a, 4-7 and 1333a, 18-19. those relating to our desiring faculty; those relating to our relationship with others; and those relating to our intellectual faculty, both practical and theoretical. The main virtues of the first group (‘ethical virtues’, ‘virtues of character’) are strength of spirit (courage), temperance, meekness, generosity, just ambition and magnanimity; they moderate and stabilize the impulses of our irrational desire, which tends to seek pleasure and escape pain EN, 1104b, 8-11 and 27-28; EE, 1221b, 37-39; 1222b, 9-10; 1227b, 1-2 . . The virtues of the second group (‘relationship virtues’) make us excellent in our relationships with others and also in our relationship with ourselves, considered as ‘another’. EN, 1108a, 11. These are the virtues of justice, friendship, sociability, sincerity. All the virtues of character and those of relationship (with the exception of the virtue of friendship) make us excellent in pursuing the right means between excess and defect, between too much and too little. EN,1106a, 29-b, 4 and 1106b, 36-1107a, 2. And on the contrary, any stable disposition that leads one to deviate by excess or defect from this right measure is a vice EN, 1107a, 2-3.. Finally, the virtues of the third group (‘dianoethic virtues’, ‘virtues of thought’) make us excellent in the two functions of our intellectual faculty: the practical one, concerning knowledge in relation to action, and the theoretical one, concerning pure knowledge about reality; EN, 1139a, 2-15; DA,433a, 14-15. they are the virtues with which we “grasp the true and are never in error”. The virtue of wisdom (in the sense of practical prudence: phrónesis) About phrónesis see EN, VI, 5. is that which helps us to make our life of action excellent and perfect, managing it in the best possible way through correct reason. It regulates and guides the virtues of character and those of relationship (except the virtue of friendship): its task is to direct our behavior in a virtuous sense and to help us to intuit and ‘grasp’ what is good to choose and do, depending on the circumstances, in view of happiness. See e.g. EN, 1140b, 15-16 and 27; 1111b, 32-33. And wisdom (in the sense of science of the supreme causes: sophía), About sophía see EN, VI, 7. for its part, according to Aristotle is the highest among the virtues. It also includes culture in the broad sense, but above all it accustoms us to having excellence in intuition and theoretical reasoning in order to know (eidénai) and contemplate (theoreîn) the depths of reality within us and outside us, including the supreme and immutable principles. See e.g. EN, 1141a, 17-19; and also 1141b, 2-3. With it we can achieve the maximum happiness.   Concluding on the important subject of absolute and ‘apparent’ goods/ends, let us remember once again that absolute goods/ends are within us, rooted in our human nature; while subjective goods/ends ‘appear’ outside of us, before our eyes and mind, and it is on them and among them that we are continually called to choose and decide. 10. The pleasures of different ethical value deriving from the three categories of absolute goods/ends   10.1. In order to maximize pleasure we must pursue the various absolute goods in the right order given by their different value If we keep in mind the three great categories of absolute goods/ends that we have now examined, and also keep in mind the different ethical value that Aristotle attributes to those categories, we can understand that for him the pleasures deriving from our acts that pursue the absolute goods of the soul (tà agathá perì psychèn) have a value that in view of happiness is undoubtedly superior to the pleasures deriving from acts that pursue the absolute goods of the body or the external goods. Pol. , 1323b, 16-17. It is on this basis that Aristotle distinguishes between ‘pure’ pleasures and ‘mixed’ pleasures: the former give us a pleasure that for the purposes of happiness is of a higher level than the latter. For example, the ‘pure’ pleasure we derive from the act of contemplation, which is an act of our soul, is certainly superior to a pleasure such as the physical pleasure of eating, which is a ‘mixed’ pleasure because it is mixed with deficiencies and irrational desires related to the body. EN , 1173a, 23. Aristotle in this case takes up, even with different motivations and conclusions, a distinction already made by Plato. Of course, the various bodily pleasures still represent for us a real and effective good; yet for Aristotle they are a type of pleasure inferior, for the purposes of happiness, to that which accompanies all the excellent activities of our soul. EN, 1154a, 12-13. And this is also true of the pleasures which come to us from the possession of those absolute goods which are the various external goods. From all this derives then the important consequence that, if in view of happiness we wish to maximize the pleasure we derive from the whole of our vital activities, we must pursue the various absolute goods/ends in the right order given by their own different value: while pursuing in the right measure and in the right way the absolute goods belonging to all three categories, we must give priority to the acts (and the related pleasures) relating to the goods of the soul over the acts and pleasures relating to the other two categories. Pol., 1323b, 18-21. 10.2. Pleasures derived from the absolute goods of the soul The goods of the soul never arise from those situations of deficiency, pain and irrational desire that involve the body and of which we have already spoken before; therefore the relative pleasures are absolute and natural pleasures: “pleasures without pain [...] are typical of things that are pleasant by nature, and not pleasant by accident”. EN, 1154b,16-17. The ultimate purpose for which we seek the goods of life is, in the final analysis, to achieve maximum well-being and inner contentment: and indeed all the pleasures we generally experience are something we feel internally, that is, in our soul. Of all the various pleasures, the highest and most valuable are those connected with the absolute goods relating to the soul; and among these, the highest are certainly those connected with the various virtues and virtuous actions, which as we know are the most important goods of the soul. Indeed, it is from virtuous and excellent acts that we unfailingly derive our greatest and deepest pleasures, precisely because virtues and virtuous actions are absolutely pleasant. They are the really pleasant things by nature (tá phýsei hedéa), capable of giving us ‘true’ pleasures, good in absolute: “the absolutely pleasant things are also ethically ‘fine' (tá haplôs hedéa kaì kalá)”. EE, 1249a, 18. The only things that Aristotle calls ‘ethically fine’ are virtues and virtuous acts. Virtuous actions are “pleasant things by nature and not by accident”; and they give pleasure without (previous) pain or sorrow, because they do not presuppose any (previous) deficiency; therefore in their case there can be no excess. Moreover, “pleasant things by nature are those things that stimulate the action of a healthy nature” (EN, 1154b, 15-20): here Aristotle appears to refer to virtuous habits, pleasant in themselves, which stimulate to excellent behaviour those who are in a perfect state of health of body and soul. In addition, “when our condition of natural perfection is re-establishing itself in its fullness, different things give us pleasure from things that give us pleasure when our natural condition is finally re-established. In fact, when it is re-established, we find that pleasant are the things [the virtuous acts] which are absolutely pleasant. On the other hand, when our natural condition is still in the process of restoring itself, we find that pleasant are also the contrary things, [...] none of which is pleasant by nature (phýsei) or in absolute (haplôs); and consequently neither are the corresponding pleasures” (EN, 1153a, 2-6). After all, according to Aristotle excellent activity is gratifying in itself because it satisfies to the utmost the tendencies of our common human nature, and pleasure is therefore an integral element of all virtuous actions, because it is an aspect of the perfection of the soul. Indeed, pleasure is the litmus test of virtuous activity, because cannot be called virtuous he who does not feel pleasure for excellent deeds: “it is not a good person he who does not feel pleasure for fine actions. For no one would say that he who does not rejoice in righteous acts is righteous, or that he who does not rejoice in generous deeds is generous; and so on and so forth also in the case of the other virtues. But if it is so, virtuous deeds will be pleasing in themselves. EN, 1099a, 17-21; and also 1104b, 3-8. 10.3. For the pleasures derived from certain absolute goods there is an inherent limit Now, if virtues and virtuous actions are pleasing in an absolute sense, one wonders whether all other absolute goods/ends are also pleasing in an absolute sense, i.e. always and however pleasing. Obviously, in general terms, for anyone “good things in absolute are pleasant (tà haplôs agathá hedéa)”: EE, 1249a, 18. and in fact none of us would dream of saying that absolute goods/ends such as wealth or health or good food are not pleasant. However, there are some absolute goods (such as some goods of the body and all the exterior goods) for which there is an intrinsic limit, in the sense that if we possess and enjoy them beyond that limit, and therefore more than necessary, they become not good but bad and harmful: “that of which there is no excess is good; instead that of which there is excess is bad”; Rhet., 1363a, 2-3. “the things that are the object of contention and which, in unanimous opinion, are great goods (such as honour, wealth, physical qualities, successes, abilities...) are indeed goods by nature, but they can be harmful to some people because of their (wrong) habits”. EE, 1248b, 27-30. We shall return to this subject in a moment.   10.4. Pleasures of different value related to the acts of our different faculties Also from this point of view, the acts performed by our different faculties give us different types of pleasures, and some are superior to others for the purposes of happiness, because they are more ‘pure’, less bound to the body. The pleasures of thought are purer, and therefore of a higher level, than those of the senses, EN, 1176a, 2-3. because Aristotle believes that our intellect is an immaterial faculty that has no corporeal organ; therefore our acts of thought are pure, because they too are immaterial and not related to the corporeal organism, and moreover they do not depend on any physical contact between the one who thinks and the thing that is thought. Even among our various sensory faculties he sees a difference in purity: sight, hearing and smell are purer senses of touch and taste, and therefore their relative pleasures are of a higher level. EN, 1175b, 36-1176a, 2. This is because, even though they are connected to bodily organs, the visual, auditory and olfactory faculties are more independent of direct physical contact between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, since there is an intermediate element between them (light, air, and so on); therefore these faculties are purer than taste and touch, which instead act by direct contact (and this also has great importance in the evaluation of the vicious excesses of the intemperate person). Finally, even within each of these faculties there can be a further differentiation, because in them “some pleasures are superior to others”. EN, 1176a, 3.   Therefore, for example, contemplating or resolving a complicated theoretical question or even managing a delicate practical situation well, are all acts of thought that give pleasures superior, from an ethical point of view, to those of the senses. And, among the latter, the sight of a beautiful landscape or a magnificent picture, or the listening to a quality concert, give pleasures of a higher ethical level than those deriving from sex or food, even if these - Aristotle recognizes it, as we shall say shortly - can certainly be at the moment more intense and involving than the others. hints for reflection Wisdom and pleasures It is the virtue of wisdom that helps us to compare the various pleasures and choose the best ones from the point of view of the right ethical order. This without forgetting, of course, that precisely wisdom requires that from time to time we should also choose pleasures that are not particularly high. Aristotle’s ethics does not require great sacrifices or arduous limitations: typical of his teaching is the principle that the right measure is needed in everything . And in fact “happy people must possess all three types of goods”, with the relative pleasures. 11. Pleasures really good in absolute, and pleasures that to each person individually may ‘appear’ good Since Aristotle distinguishes between absolute (objective) and ‘apparent’ (subjective) goods/ends, and since good and pleasure are closely related even though they are two different concepts, EE, 1235b, 23. he applies also to pleasures a similar distinction between pleasures that are really good in absolute, and pleasures that may ‘appear’ good to each of us individually. 11.1. Absolutely good pleasures and 'apparently' good pleasures Absolute good pleasures (absolute pleasures, really good pleasures, ‘real’ pleasures) are connected to all things pleasant in absolute, and in particular to virtues and virtuous actions. They are good in themselves because they respond to our deepest human nature, and “are in themselves worthy of being pursued”. EN, 1174a, 10. On the contrary, ‘apparent’ pleasures are those pleasures of life that can subjectively ‘appear’ good to each of us, EE, 1228b, 18-22 and derive from things that may ‘appear’ pleasent to us. As it happens also in the case of goods, all of us in real life find ourselves continually making choices among the various ‘apparent’ pleasures, while the absolute pleasures are inscribed in our interiority and stimulate us internally to pursue them; but - as we know - we do not always follow the path of wisdom. Therefore the ‘apparent’ pleasures which we actually aim at with our actions, may coincide with the absolute pleasures, but may also not coincide at all, as in the very important case of the pleasures deriving from certain goods of the body and from external goods, which all have an intrinsic limit.   11.2. The ‘apparent’ pleasures related to body goods with an intrinsic limit With regard to the goods of the body, a distinction must first be made. Some of them, such as health or strength and energy, have no intrinsic limits; therefore, the more we possess them, the more they give us good pleasures, and the happier we are. On the other hand, pleasures derived from other goods of the body, especially physical pleasures related to food, drink, and sex, have an intrinsic limit beyond which they are no longer good for us. For example, necessary goods such as things to eat and drink, which by nature give us physical pleasure when we consume them, are for us true goods and always good in themselves; but only if we consume them in fair and moderate quantities. If, on the other hand - as it often happens - those things ‘appear’ to us so much pleasant as to push us to desire and consume them more than we need, that is, beyond a certain limit and in excess, they are no longer good for us but can become harmful. And if such ‘apparent’ pleasures push us to make such excesses a habit, this can obviously constitute an obstacle to our well-being, and therefore to our happiness. See for example Enrico Berti, An introduction to Aristotle, Protrepticus (from now on Protr.), Utet, Turin 2000, fragment n. 8. 11.3. The ‘apparent’ pleasures related to external goods with an intrinsic limit Moreover, as far as external goods are concerned, they all have an intrinsic limit beyond which they are no longer goods by nature for us, that is, they are no longer objectively good for us. Pol., 1323b, 7-10. For example, wealth is a good that within a certain limit is necessary for us to be happy; but if it ‘appears’ to us so pleasant that it leads us to go beyond that limit, it can ultimately be a burden for the effort of acquiring, maintaining and increasing it: “the life devoted to gain is a hard and forced life”. EN, 1096a, 5-6. Therefore, “happiness does not consist in possessing many things, but rather in being in a certain (good) condition of the soul”. Protr., fragment n. 2. And the same can be said of the other external goods of which we spoke earlier. In conclusion, with regard to certain goods of the body and to the goods external to us, any excess beyond the right limit can hinder our path to the ‘good life' and to happiness. That is why, if it is true that all natural ends are to be pursued, it is also true that to be happy we must pursue them in the right ways and within the right limit. This is a very important point in the context of Aristotelian ethics, a point that deserves further in-depth analysis. 12. Again on the ‘apparent’ pleasures related to body goods and exterior goods with an intrinsic limit Let us now examine in more detail the categories of absolute body goods and external goods, always with reference to the ‘apparent’ pleasures and the intrinsic limit. 12.1. The 'apparent' pleasures that refer to the goods of the body and their excesses The pleasures of the body are the ‘mixed’ ones, about which we feel deficiencies, pains, irrational desires and the need for restoration processes and remedies. Aristotle puts in particular his attention to the ‘apparent’ pleasures related to food, drinks, and sex; they are those that have to do with our less ‘pure’ senses, that is, those of taste and touch. However, Aristotle also mentions the pleasures connected with the use of the other senses: sight (e.g. pleasures for colours, shapes, paintings), hearing (pleasures for singing and acting) and smell (pleasures for scents of fruit, roses, incense); and he states that even in these cases one can “enjoy them both as one should, and in excess or defect”. However, they do not concern the virtue of temperance or the vices of intemperance and incontinence, strictly understood (EN, 118a, 1-11). Of course, even such pleasures (which Aristotle defines as necessary) EN, 1147b, 24. are good if they are the consequence of good deeds, that is, if we by the virtue of temperance act avoiding excesses. Instead, for Plato the difference between good and bad pleasures is another one: the pleasures of the body are bad, while the pure pleasures of the soul are good. In fact, the problem concerning the pleasures related to the use of senses concerns precisely the excesses in the use of food and sex, which are the typical vices of intemperate and incontinent people. These excesses, says Aristotle, are bad for us in an absolute sense, EN, 1153a, 29-33; and also 1148a, 24 e 1148b, 4; 1152b, 29-30. that is, always and however bad. And more than that, the worst of these excesses are not even pleasant. And in any case, he adds, even if in general the various pleasures of the body - being important absolute goods - should be pursued, they certainly should not be pursued when the actions from which they derive are reprehensible: for example, “good health should be pursued, but not at the price of eating anything”. EN, 1173b, 26-28. 12.2. What is the limit beyond which the ‘apparent’ pleasures of food and sex lead us to excess? If this is the case, if the problem is excess, then what is the limit beyond which one can speak of excesses, as compared with those which excesses are not? Aristotle responds by inviting us to distinguish between the physical pleasures that are precisely necessary (that is, those which remain within the measure of our natural physical needs) and those that go beyond the measure of those needs, and are therefore no longer necessary: “some pleasures are necessary and other pleasures are not; the necessary pleasures are such only up to a certain limit, while their excesses and their defects are unnecessary pleasures”. EN, 1150a, 16-18. See also EN, 1147b, 24-28. Therefore, within the limit of natural necessity those pleasures are “by nature worthy of being pursued” EN, 1148a, 24-25. and are certainly and objectively good for us. EN, 1154a, 13. But they should not be pursued beyond this limit, that is to say in excess (or in defect): “there may be an excess in the pleasures of the body, and the unworthy person is precisely such because she pursues this excess and is not content only with the necessary pleasures; in fact, everyone enjoys in some way good food and wine and the pleasures of sex, but not everyone enjoys them in the right way”. EN, 1154a, 15-18. This limit of the natural necessity corresponds to the intrinsic limit that characterizes those goods of the body that can become harmful if we enjoy them more than necessary, since “that of which there is no excess is good, and instead that of which there is excess is bad”. Rhet., 1363a, 2-3; EN, 1154b, 4-5. So, for example, if my vice of gluttony regularly causes me to eat too much, i.e. beyond my physiological needs, I will obviously gain weight and I may even begin to have health problems; and if I really eat in a completely exaggerated way, this bulimia will aggravate my situation even more, and among other things - as Aristotle points out - it will no longer even give me real pleasure. The same can be said of alcoholic beverages. And as for sex, Aristotle himself, in regard to the inscription on the tomb of the Assyrian king Sardanapalus, with which the king said that in death he was left with at least all that he had eaten and all the libidinous lusts he had satisfied, commented that such an epitaph would be more suitable for the tomb of an ox than that of a king. 12.3. It is difficult to avoid excesses in the ‘apparent’ pleasures of food and sex Now, avoiding excesses in these pleasures can be particularly difficult, since “most of the time it is the pleasures of the body that people join and everyone takes part in them; and since they are the only ones known by everyone, people consider them the only pleasures (that exist)”. EN, 1153b, 33-1154a, 1; and also 1095b, 14-20. And why does this happen? Why do those pleasures of food and sex appear as the most desirable, and often it is difficult to hold back before them? Aristotle replies EN, 1154a, 22-b, 15. that such pleasures have the characteristic of being particularly intense, and therefore are particularly craved by those - and they are the vast majority - who have no other more elevated pleasures to enjoy. Moreover, since human beings’ lives are generally full of pain and sorrow, by reaction to excesses of pain one seeks remedy with excesses of pleasure; and besides, every living being by law of nature is always in labour, and therefore physical pleasures appear to us almost to be an antidote to such a situation. In short, “pleasure, when it is strong, drives away pain, (and this happens) both if pleasure is the opposite (to pain), and if it is any other pleasure; and this is why one becomes intemperate and unworthy”. EN, 1154b, 13-15. Be that as it may, concludes Aristotle, the fundamental point of the whole discourse on these pleasures is that whoever exceeds in this way “loves these pleasures more than their (real) worth (mâllon agapâ tàs toiaútas hedonàs tês axías)”: EN, 1119a, 19-20. they are necessary pleasures, but nothing more; and instead considering them even as the heart of one’s own attentions and interests, often at the expense of other more elevated pleasures, means attributing them more worth than what they actually have, and also means not being able to use right reason and wisdom well. Hints for reflection So according to Aristotle we generally enjoy ‘apparent’ pleasures in the wrong way, because we consciously or unconsciously believe that the pleasures of the body are the only real pleasures, or at least the most important ones by far. This actually leads us to give less impoetance, or at least often to neglect, also higher pleasures, certainly less immediately intense but probably in the long term foreboding deeper and more stable well-being. 12.4. The ‘apparent’ pleasures that refer to exterior goods, and their excesses If the bodily pleasures of food and sex are, within the correct limits, necessary pleasures, how does Aristotle assess the pleasures that refer to external goods such as wealth, success, power, ‘honor’? As we know, these are absolute goods/ends, and therefore they are still “in themselves worthy of being pursued (hairetà kath’hautá)”, EN, 1147b, 24-25 e 29-31; 1148b, 3; and also 1096b, 16-18. and therefore objectively good for us. So they are pleasures which it is entirely right for us to aim for. And indeed, he says, no one is blamed for the fact in itself of yearning for these things and pursuing them, but rather “for the way he does it, that is, for exceeding”. EN, 1147a, 27-28 and 31-32. Therefore the point is always this: the excess. We must not seek these things at all costs and in an uncontrolled way, trying to accumulate as much money or positions of prestige and power as we can. In fact, even such pleasures have - just like the necessary pleasures of the body - an intrinsic limit, beyond which there is excess: “their excesses are bad and to be avoided.” EN, 1148b, 4. We must therefore, through the virtues, pursue them in the right way and keep ourselves within the right limit. And in any case, even if the pleasures deriving from external goods must be pursued, they should certainly not be pursued when the things from which they derive are completely reprehensible “(for example) wealth must be pursued, but not through a betrayal”. EN, 1173b, 26-28. remarks Epicureanism and desires According to Epicurus He appears to take up a Platonic doctrine (in Republic, 558d), and also Aristotelian hints about excesses and limits not to be exceeded (as we have just said). it is necessary to distinguish between natural and necessary desires, natural but not necessary desires, and unnatural and unnecessary desires. The former are desires imposed by vital needs: needs for absolutely necessary primary goods such as eating, drinking and sleeping; they are needs that arise from suffering for the deprivation of these necessary goods, and therefore must always be satisfied. Natural but not necessary desires are those that correspond to our nature but do not arise from real suffering: they are sexual desires, desires for greater pleasure regarding primary needs (better food, and so on), and also for moderate economic well-being; it is necessary to limit them so that they do not exceed a certain limit. Finally, the unnatural and unnecessary desires, which are those inordinate with wealth, power and lust, must be renounced. 12.5. Absolute pleasures which refer to the goods of the soul are without excess. Of course, all absolute ends which are goods of the soul are always good for us, and in their case there is no inherent limit such as that relating to some pleasures of the body and those relating to external goods, a limit beyond which they can become harmful. Goods such as the ability to make the right decisions, or knowledge, contemplation, or communion with reality, and so on, are goods that the more we possess and enjoy them, the happier we are. Therefore, with the absolute pleasures of the soul there is never the possibility of exceeding: “pleasures without pain are without excess”, EN, 1154b, 15-16. and therefore we can enjoy them indefinitely. Thus, for example, in theory we could enjoy indefinitely and without harm a pleasure such as that of contemplation, if in concrete terms our intrinsic limitations as human beings composed also of matter did not place a limit, not ethical but metaphysical and physiological, to a continuous exercise of it. 13. Vicious actions, bad pleasures, and virtuous actions, good pleasures; the vicious person and the virtous person 13.1. Vicious actions, bad pleasures; virtuous actions, good pleasures When we pursue a pleasure that personally ‘appears’ good to us and which coincides with a truly good absolute pleasure, the act with which we pursue it is a virtuous, good and ethically correct act; if it does not coincide, the act is vicious, bad and ethically wrong. And our act, consequently, will be followed by an actual pleasure that will also be good or bad: “since our acts are different from one another in goodness and wickedness, and some of them are worthy of being pursued (hairetá), others are to be shunned (pheuktá), and still others are neither, This incidental specification is important, because in this way Aristotle recognizes that there are also acts of ours (and related pleasures) that are essentially 'neutral' from an ethical point of view; he spends no further words on this point, but one can think that many such cases take place in the concrete life of each of us. the same goes for the pleasures (connected with them); [...] therefore the pleasure connected with virtuous and excellent acts is good, while that connected with vicious acts is bad”. EN, 1175b, 24-26. In this way Aristotle outlines what for him is the most important distinction between the various species of pleasures: that between good pleasures that derive from virtuous actions and bad pleasures that derive from vicious actions: “pleasures differ for the species: in fact, pleasures that derive from ethically fine acts are different from pleasures that derive from ethically reprehensible acts”. EN, 1173b, 28-29. Between these two classes of pleasures there is a profound difference, a difference of species; and he who is unable to grasp this difference is the unworthy person (phaúlos), whereas he who is able to grasp it is the worthy person (spoudaîos). 13.2. The vicious and unworthy person The vicious and unworthy person mistakenly considers as true and absolute pleasures those ‘apparent’ pleasures towards which her irrational cravings drag her, and therefore pursues pleasures that “are not good in the absolute sense (ouk agathái haplôs)” EN, 1153a, 29-30. and that derive from things that “are not pleasant by nature (mè phýsei hedéa)”. EN, 1099a, 11-13. Moreover, the completely vicious individual may even be mistaken to the point of pursuing ‘apparent’ pleasures whose excesses are potentially harmful (pháulai) for himself: EN, 1152b, 29-31; 1235b, 30-1236a, 14. Plato had already pointed out that there are, in addition to pleasures worthy of praise, also pleasures to blame, and pleasures that prove harmful to health (EN, 1152b, 10-11 e 20-22; 1173b, 20-21). a typical example today are the pleasures of drugs, alcohol, and so on. In these cases the ‘pleasures’ are in fact not even pleasant: “the most reprehensible among pleasures [...] are not (really) pleasant; in fact, even if they are pleasant for unethical people, one should not think that they are (really) pleasant, except for them; just as one should not think that are (really) healthy or sweet or harsh the things that are healthy or sweet or harsh for those who are sick”. EN, 1173b, 21-24. The vicious person is the one to whom “those things that the worthy person detests are pleasant”; and of this no wonder, continues Aristotle, because “there are many corruptions and base actions in human beings; and in reality those things are not even pleasant, but they are pleasant for those people who find themselves in that (vicious) condition; therefore it is clear that one cannot say that are (real) pleasures - except for corrupted individuals - those pleasures that we all consider shameful”. EN, 1176a, 19-24. 13.3. The virtuous and worthy person Of course, we all would like to be able to recognize the naturally good and pleasant things, and to compare the various ‘apparent’ pleasures afterwards choosing the best ones. In any case, there is someone who knows how to do this: it is the worthy person (spoudaîos), who, guided by the virtue of wisdom (phrónesis), chooses the things that are pleasant by nature and through them experiences ‘true’ pleasure, absolute pleasure. EN, 1170a, 14-16 e 21-22. The worthy person is the one who knows how to pursue those ‘apparent’ goods/ends which coincide with absolute goods/ends; and similarly he is also able to choose those 'apparent' pleasures which coincide with absolute pleasures: “if virtue and the worhy person as such are the measure of all things, then are (truly) pleasures those things which ‘appear’ to her (to be pleasures), and are (truly) pleasant things those things of which she rejoices”. EN, 1176a, 15-19. Therefore only the virtuous person is always able to fully enjoy all ‘true’ pleasures, absolute pleasures, without exception: “what is good by nature, [...] for the virtuous person is good and pleasant in itself”. EN, 1170a, 14-16. Of course, Aristotle also observes, for the person who already possesses the virtues all the absolute goods/ends without distinction are pleasant, because with wisdom she knows how to manage her thoughts and behaviour in such a way as to avoid any excess or wrong deed: “for the righteous person (epieikés) and for the wise person (phrónimos) the same things that are good in absolute are also pleasant in absolute (tà autà haplôs agathà kaì haplôs hedéa) [...]: for such persons are pleasant those things (i.e. absolute goods/ends and ethically fine actions) that conform to their internal (virtuous) dispositions”. EE, 1235b, 32-1236a, 14. In short, “those things that are really pleasing by nature are also pleasing for those people who love ethically fine actions; and pleasing by nature are precisely virtuous actions, which are therefore pleasing both for such persons and in themselves”. EN, 1099a, 13-15. 14. The perfect virtuous action (eupraxía) and the perfect pleasure We cannot be happy and experience maximum pleasure if we are isolated from ourselves and from the world, since happiness is a good that we can only achieve together with other people; and in fact we are fully realized only when we have a relationship of integration with reality and life. For this reason we need excellent habits such as the virtues, since, as we know, Aristotle states that happiness lies in “activity according to virtue”. And this also means that in order to achieve complete happiness and inner satisfaction we need, on the one hand, the inner possession of the whole complex of virtues, that is, total virtue (kalokagathía); and on the other, the accomplishment, on the basis of such possession, of perfectly virtuous actions in all areas of our life. Therefore, let us now begin by analysing the characteristics of perfectly virtuous actions, destined to give us perfect pleasure, and the importance of the interior intention in evaluating the perfection of virtuous acting (eu práttein). 14.1. The perfect virtuous action (eupraxía) is totally an end in itself We have previously noted that absolute goods/ends are ultimate, innate and common ends for all of us, and they are also ends in themselves (kath'autá) because we seek and love them spontaneously not to obtain further goods/ends, but only for themselves since they correspond to our deepest natural needs. Among them, as we know, are included the various virtues, which are absolute ends essential for our happiness. Therefore, each virtue too is an end in itself; and, as we shall now see, it is also an end in itself, if it is perfect, the virtuous action that comes from virtue. We recall all this because Aristotle assigns a particular value, that is the maximum ‘intrinsic value’, to everything that in the human field is worthy of being pursued (hairetón) solely for itself and without any other end: in his eyes it represents perfection. The virtuous activity that has its purpose in itself to a maximum extent is what most distinguishes the virtue of wisdom (sophia) and contemplation (theoría). In fact, contemplation according to Aristotle represents the purest and most evident example of perfectly virtuous action for its own sake: "it alone is loved for itself" (EN,1177b, 1-4), and “according to everyone's opinion it excels in its value and aims at no other end than itself, and has in itself its own pleasure". (EN, 1177b, 19-21). Moreover, the theoría is a perfect action also because it is an immediate act and in itself entirely accomplished (práxis teleía), which - as we noted earlier - already has its purpose in itself. Therefore, a virtuous action is perfect (and therefore it is an eupraxía) only when it is totally an end in itself, “Eupraxía is an end in itself”: EN, 1140b, 6-7; and also 1139a, 35-b,4. that is, it is accomplished for itself, without any other end. Therefore an eupraxía is an action that has in itself its own end; and the more perfect it is, the more pleasure and true satisfaction we derive from it. A totally perfect eupraxía represents the best example of virtuous action that we human beings are able to perform. 14.2.The importance of inner intention in the accomplishment of the perfect action All this means, in other words, that the eupraxia must be perfect from the point of view of the inner intention of the person who performs it. A very important theme is presented here then: that of the interior intention (motive, interior reason, proaíresis) which moves us when we perform any external action (prâxis); interior intention which is the object, the intentional purpose (tò proairetón), which we have in mind and which motivates us to the action itself. Now, this intentional end may coincide, but also not coincide, or coincide only partially, with the objective end that by its nature our action should have (tò praktón), because in principle these two types of end should coincide. For example, if I perform a given action that outwardly appears virtuous (for example, I give a concrete help to a friend in need), such an action of mine is truly virtuous, i.e. it is truly dictated by my virtues of friendship and generosity, only if in performing it I do not have in mind other goods/ends to obtain (such as, for example, showing my generosity to common friends and acquaintances, or to obtain from the friend in need something in return, or to follow a religious precept, or other such purposes), but I have the one and only precise inner intention to give help and benefit the friend, which corresponds precisely to the very nature of such action. In other words, my friendly and generous action is truly virtuous, and it is a eupraxía, only if I perform it intentionally - that is, consciously, voluntarily and deliberately - solely for its own sake, that is, for the intrinsic purpose of performing it as such. If, on the other hand, my inner intention is to show my generosity, my action on the outside appears virtuous, but it is not really virtuous, because it is only accidental (i.e. it happens to appear virtuous, but in reality it is not essentially virtuous, or it is only partially so). EE, 1249a, 14-16. And this is because the ethicality of each act is measured exclusively on the inner intention, that is, on the object (proairetón) of the voluntary choice that lies behind it. EN, 1138a, 13-35. Another example is given by Aristotle himself when he argues that there are people who, while performing righteous actions, are not inwardly righteous: they do everything that is right to do according to the virtue of justice, such as observing the laws, but they do it involuntarily, or out of ignorance, or for some other reason, but not because they have the inner intention of actually performing those actions as righteous. EN, 1144a, 13-17. Therefore, in conclusion, the perfection of a virtuous action depends on the purity of the inner intention of the one who performs it. And in fact, says Aristotle, “there is an inner way in which a good person performs the actions required by each virtue: performing them by choice, that is, having as (intentional) end the very actions she performs”; EN, 1144a, 17-20; EE, 1249a, 13-14. And again: “the object of the virtuous action [...] is an absolute end (télos haplôs); in fact the virtuous action (eupraxía) constitutes (in itself) the end, and the interior intention has this end as its object" (EN, 1139b, 2-4). and again: “those activities by which no other end is sought other than the activity itself are worthy of being pursued for themselves; and all agree that actions conforming to virtue, (that is) doing what is ethically ‘fine’ and virtuous, are (indeed) part of the things worthy of being pursued for themselves.” EN, 1176b, 6-9; e 1174a, 6-7. remarks A very complex distinction It is often not at all easy to identify, in other people and even in ourselves, what is the true inner intention that animates a given decision or action. There can be many different emotions and intentions that occur simultaneously in the soul, with different shades and gradations of importance, not to mention that often unconscious impulses can influence judgment and behavior. If in any of our actions we can have not just one intention in the soul but many and all at once, clearly distinguishing between them requires a great capacity for introspection. For example, if I reprove my son for a fault of his, I can have both the intention of reminding him of a rule of behavior (and this corresponds to the objective purpose that such an action of mine by its nature should have), and instead - or in addition - the intention of affirming my power over him, or of showing others that I am an energetic parent, or of satisfying my wife, and so on. Therefore, it is very complex to distinguish whether a given external action of ours has been originated by a truly virtuous inner intention: the only judge here can only be the inner forum of each one’s conscience, refined by a gradual widening of one’s own awareness. 14.3. An ethics based on interiority and authenticity Aristotle synthesizes his conception of eupraxía by affirming that true virtuous actions are not only such because “they possess certain certain (exterior) characteristics, but also if the one who performs them does so with certain dispositions of mind: first off all if he performs them being aware of them; secondly if he performs them choosing them in a deliberate way, and choosing them in a deliberate way for themselves; and thirdly if he performs them with firm and unshakable determination”. EN, 1105a, 28-33.And all these inner dispositions of mind “are the determining element”: for example, “righteous and moderate is not he who performs actions (righteous and moderate), but he who also performs them with the spirit with which righteous and moderate people perform them”. EN, 1105b, 3-9. And of such dispositions of mind there is also a revealing sign: the pleasure or displeasure one feels when one performs certain actions. For example, “he who abstains from physical pleasures and feels satisfaction and pleasure in this (abstention) is temperate, whereas he who grieves (for this) is intemperate; and he who faces terrible things and feels satisfaction in them, or at least does not grieve for them, is courageous, whereas he who grieves for them is cowardly”. EN, 1104b, 3-8; and also 1099a, 17-21. In passages such as these Aristotle proves to be the most remarkable advocate of an ethics firmly founded on interiority and on the authenticity with himself of the one who chooses and acts. In fact, an essential element of his ethics, that is, the perfect virtuous action, is based on the authenticity of an individual, who carries out that action having it as an end in itself; and that action, even if it derives from habit, is not performed automatically but must flow from the interiority of the person, since it is a deliberate and knowingly intended action. remarks Aristotle, Kant, and the perfect ethical action It seems important to note that, even if the two ethical conceptions of Aristotle and Kant are altogether very different, there may be similarities with regard to a basic characteristic of the perfect ethical action. According to Aristotle we carry it out having as an end the virtuous action itself and its ethical excellence (and in the last analysis, as a connected end, happiness). According to Kant, instead, we perform it out of duty under the inner impulse of the categorical imperative. However, they both believe that the ethical action should be performed for itself, and not for a further purpose (Aristotle) or for a merely hypothetical imperative (Kant). Of course, in Kant's conception the influence of the Prussian culture of duty is evident, as in the Aristotelian conception the influence of the Greek morals of beauty, which since the time of Homer considered ‘fine’ those behaviors that could arouse praise and approval in public opinion. 15. Total virtue, maximum pleasure, happiness Let us now move on to examine the characteristics of the total virtue, which brings us maximum pleasure, in order to finally assess what is, according to Aristotle, the relationship between maximum pleasure and happiness. In fact, after noticing the overall importance that Aristotle attributes to pleasure within the framework of our existence, a final question might arise spontaneously: could the maximum among our pleasures be our ultimate good/end? Not only a good (agathón), then, but the supreme good (thagatón)? And in what relation then would such maximum pleasure be with happiness? 15.1. The full human flourishing Obviously, only those who are already in a condition of maximum virtuous perfection can regularly and effortlessly perform perfectly virtuous and truly enjoyable acts. In the case of human beings, the full development of their ethical capacities and their full human flourishing through the excellence of thought and behaviour means having acquired excellent qualities of the soul, as well as the constant habit of exercising all virtues through perfect virtuous actions in all areas in which they are called to choose and operate. It requires, in particular, the highest excellence in the performance of the specific human function (érgon antrópou), that is, in the use of the intellectual faculty and especially of the two highest virtues of thought: wisdom (in the sense of phrónesis), which guides all practical virtues, and wisdom (in the sense of sophía), which seeks theoretical truth out of pure love of knowledge, and whose crowning-piece is contemplative activity. These two virtues of thought, together with all the other virtues, culminate in the overall virtue of goodness and ethical ‘beauty’ (kalokagathía). 15.2. The total virtue of goodness and ethical beauty (kalokagathía) Aristotle's conception regarding this perfect virtue EN, 1124a, 4. and those who have come to possess it, is set out in an enlightening passage in which he draws a distinction between those who are good (agathói) and those who are not only good but also ethically ‘fine’ (kalokagathói): “there are those who believe that one should (certainly) possess virtue, but always having as an end the goods of nature [the absolute goods/ends]; therefore these are good people, since they aim at things good by nature; however, they do not possess kalokagathía, because they are not used to perform ‘fine’ actions (tá kalá) for the actions themselves (di’autá); on the contrary, those who are both good and ethically ‘fine’ choose (precisely) such kind of actions”. EE, 1248b, 39-1249a, 4. Precisely on the basis of this passage, a literal translation ('goodness and ethical beauty') of the Greek word kalokagathía is chosen here, even though we recognize the validity of other translations presented by scholars, such as ‘sum of all virtues’, ‘perfect virtue’,’'total virtue’. In this passage therefore Aristotle wants to emphasize that he who possesses the virtue of goodness and inner ‘beauty’ aims at performing only perfect virtuous actions (eupraxíai), i.e. ‘fine’ actions to be performed for the actions themselves, EE, 1248b, 34-36. for the only pleasure of performing them without aiming at other ends (even in the case they would be absolute ends). It can be understood then why this virtue - being the one that makes it easy to perform any virtuous action as an end in itself - is to be considered the overall result of all the partial virtues, i.e. the total virtue EN, 1144a, 5-6. of the soul as an end in itself. EE, 1220a, 3-4; and also EE,1249a, 16; EN, 1124a, 4 and 1144a, 5-6. The kalokagathós therefore has in himself the nobility of one who has achieved an absolute inner ‘beauty’, EN, 1179b, 10. i.e. a perfect harmony in the possession of the various virtues and in their actualization in virtuous actions. If Aristotle uses the term ‘beauty’ to indicate virtues and perfect virtuous actions, it is also because he considers that “the supreme forms of beauty are order and symmetry” (Met., 1078a, 36-b, 1; and also EE, 1218a, 21-23). And virtues are precisely stable and ‘orderly’, harmonic, dispositions (héxeis) of the internal elements of our soul. And also virtuous actions, which are the perfect fruit of these orderly dispositions, possess in themselves the characteristic of beauty, since according to Aristotle beauty can certainly be found in actions too (Met., 1078a, 31-32). Clearly, this ‘beauty’ (i.e. order and harmony) of virtues and virtuous actions is a beauty of an ethical order. But it is also a beauty of a natural order, because according to Aristotle all nature is interwoven with order and harmony and is therefore ‘fine’ (so that “nothing that is against nature is fine”: Pol., 1325b, 9-10.). And fine is also everything that refers to nature, such as precisely virtues and virtuous actions, which are both fine and natural because they find their origin in our deepest and common human nature. And the perfectly virtuous activity of the kalokagathós, of this “perfect and blessed” person, represents the model and paradigm of the activity, and of the connected pleasure, which are characteristic of the perfect human being, of the ‘true’ human being. Instead, all the other innumerable human activities - and the related pleasures - that we all pursue, are characteristic of the human being “only in a secondary sense and to a lesser degree”. EN, 1176a, 24-28. This is Aristotle's definitive word on the hierarchical differentiation of activities and pleasures from an ethical point of view. And - concludes Aristotle - precisely owing to such a harmonious possession of the virtues, the kalokagathós also possesses the capacity to pursue and obtain in a way that is not harmful, but rather in the right way and easily, the other absolute goods/ends, the great goods of life: wealth, health, power, EE, 1249a, 4-10. and even implicitly the greatest pleasure and happiness, as we shall now see. 15.3. Totally perfect virtuous actions give us maximum pleasure and happiness We have seen before In paragraphs 6 and 7. that all our vital activities give us pleasure, and that the more perfect they are, the more pleasure they give us. Now, this proportionality also applies to our virtuous acts: they obviously already have the characteristic of being excellent in themselves, and yet they too can reach a lesser or greater level of excellence and perfection, and thus give us a lesser or greater level of pleasure. In other words, the more perfect is the exercise of the virtues, the greater the good we derive from it in the form of pleasure. Therefore, the more my inner intention (proairetón) in carrying out a virtuous activity corresponds to its objective purpose (praktón), the more perfect this virtuous activity is and the more pleasure and satisfaction I derive from it. As we have already seen before, if I am perfectly virtuous, I take pleasure in that particular excellent action that I perform and in the fact that it is virtuous in itself. Thus, if I perform a just deed, it gives me all the more pleasure the more I perform it only as a just deed and therefore for the sake of justice in itself, and not for other reasons. And again, if on that day at lunch with friends I voluntarily abstain from eating too much for the sake of temperance alone, I shall derive great pleasure from my virtuous behaviour. And the same is true in the case of any other virtuous action (and of course it is particularly true in the case of contemplation, which, we already know, is the purest and most complete example of perfectly virtuous activity for its own sake). Now, those who regularly perform perfectly ‘fine’ actions certainly perform them as an end in themselves, but of course they also know that implicit in them there is a very great pleasure which, if it keeps constant in a person who has made of virtue a rule of life, leads to self-realization and happiness: “happiness has been identified quite rightly with the fine action”. Pol., 1325b, 14-15; and Phys., 197b, 5. And indeed the virtuous person pursues the absolute ends (virtues included) both for themselves and because they involve happiness: “we choose honor, pleasure, intellect, and every virtue, both for themselves and in view of happiness, because we think that through them we can be happy”. EN, 1097b, 2-5. Therefore, happiness is not an further aim that comes to be added to the perfect eupraxía, but is its crowning-piece . Summing up, therefore, the more perfect from the point of view of the purity of inner intention is a virtuous action, the more perfect it is and the more perfect is the inner pleasure and happiness it can bring us. This is a very important point of Aristotelian ethics. HINTS FOR REFLECTION The real pleasure Normally we are led to think that the greatest pleasures come from things that are somehow external to us, such as sex with that person, unexpected wealth, promotion to a more important position, and so on. Aristotle overturns this approach, and affirms that the greatest pleasure comes to us from constant excellence of thought and behavior, accomplished only for the excellence itself and without any other end. Our well-being, and to the limit happiness, do not therefore derive from external causes, but from our firm inner intention to do what is good because it is good. 15.4. The relationship between maximum pleasure and happiness If actions performed according to perfect virtue give us maximum and perfect pleasure and therefore also happiness, it is because through them we perfectly realize our typically human capacities and potentialities: when through perfectly excellent actions we completely realize ourselves as human beings, we obtain a state of deep gratification and maximum inner satisfaction; and we are happy. This deep fulfillment is pleasure; but what then is the relationship between pleasure and happiness? It is a theme that had already been the subject of reflection in the Platonic Academy, and which Aristotle takes up again in the Nicomachean Ethics by exposing his more mature thought on the subject. He states first of all that pleasure in general is certainly a real and necessary good for us, but it is not our supreme good and ultimate goal in life: this supreme good and goal of all our actions is, and remains, happiness. However, there is a very close relationship between happiness and maximum and perfect pleasure, since the latter is a constitutive element of happiness: “happiness is the most good, most beautiful, and most pleasant thing, and these characteristics cannot be separated”; EN, 1099a, 24-25; e EE, 1214a, 1-8. in other words, one cannot be happy without experiencing pleasure. And the reason is clear: every perfect activity brings 'true' pleasure; happiness is given by an altogether supremely perfect activity, and therefore it is also supreme pleasure. For its part, pleasure in its essence is not identical with happiness, Pleasure is not identical to happiness for at least two reasons. First, we pursue happiness always for itself, and never with the aim of achieving some other end. Instead, we pursue all the various absolute goods/ends (and among them pleasure) certainly for themselves, but also in view of happiness, “thinking that through them we can be happy” (EN, 1097b, 2-5). Second, pleasure is not our only end in life, whereas happiness ultimately is. For example, we would certainly choose to exercise our various vital faculties, even if no pleasure should come from it (EN, 1174a, 4-8); this means that for us living is an end in itself, even if no pleasure should come from it. but is certainly a good that always accompanies happiness and is an indispensable complement to it. This is probably the reason why Aristotle even goes so far as to say that “pleasure in some way (pos) is the supreme good”. (EN, 1153b, 25-26). And this is perhaps also the real sense to attribute to a previous passage of his that has always been the object of divergent interpretations by scholars. In that passage he states that “even if some pleasures are bad, [...] some pleasure (tis hedoné) could be the supreme good” (EN, 1153b, 12-14): a position, this one, apparently similar to Eudoxus’ hedonism. He arrives at this conclusion by arguing in the following way: happiness consists in the exercise of one or more (virtuous) activities conducted freely and without obstacles, and such activities are maximally desirable (hairetotáten); but this is the definition of pleasure, which is also a free and unimpeded act (EN, 1153b, 9-12); and from here in the passage under discussion he comes precisely to say that “consequently some pleasure could be the supreme good”. However, he continues immediately afterwards by reiterating that pleasure is only one component, however indispensable, of happiness: “it is for this reason that everyone believes that a happy life is a pleasant life, and strictly connects pleasure and happiness; and this is very reasonable” (EN, 1153b, 14-15). And besides, Aristotle reiterates several times this very close relationship between pleasure and happiness: he says, for example, that some pleasure must necessarily be part of happiness, because otherwise the life of those who are happy could also not be pleasant but painful, EN, 1154a, 1-4. and this would clearly contradict the common opinion about the character of happiness: “happiness is an end in itself, and by everyone’s opinion it is accompanied by pleasure and not by pain”. Pol., 1338a, 5-6. See also EN, 1096a, 1. remarks Happiness, perfection, pleasure Against the Aristotelian view that all our acts must be measured by the yardstick of our happiness, which is always accompanied by pleasure and joy, an important objection has been raised on several occasions. It states that personal happiness considered as one’s own supreme good can only be sought in a selfish way, in an interested way; in other words, Aristotelian ethics would elevate selfishness, self-interest, to the supreme ethical norm, with an obvious contradiction. Instead, the supreme good should be pursued in itself, objectively, without interested reasons; that is, we should aim for perfection only because it is good, without any interest in pleasure. This is an objection that appears to consider only the subjective aspect of happiness, i.e. precisely pleasure. And on this basis some philosophers (e.g. Kant) have interpreted the Aristotelian doctrine of happiness as a search for pleasure alone, and have therefore accused Aristotle's ethics of hedonism. Actually Aristotle affirms that we are happy only if we perform our human function perfectly, and it is precisely this that gives us the maximum pleasure: it is the perfect realization of our potentialities that gives us that profound fulfilment which is the pleasure. So happiness has this objective aspect which is the perfection, to which pleasure (joy) is connected. And the two aspects are inseparable; you cannot have one without the other. Aristotelian ethics asks us to aim for perfection for itself, because it corresponds to our nature and therefore is a good in itself; it follows from this that the criterion of one’s own happiness is not a selfish criterion, but is based on the natural ultimate goal of the perfect realization of ourselves. And indeed it would be selfish to want perfection only because it gives pleasure, but it seems correct to want perfection even if it gives pleasure. Aristotle therefore does not at all question whether the decisive element of our happiness is the perfect activity or the perfect pleasure. In his eyes this is a false problem, since he believes that these two elements are always indissolubly united; therefore, if we want to aim at our ultimate goal, happiness, we must aim at the perfect realization of ourselves together with the total satisfaction it brings. To say that we have happiness as our ultimate goal is to say that we exist to achieve our complete perfection and have joy (pleasure) in it. We are made to realize ourselves, to fulfil ourselves, to have the perfection of our being; and by realizing ourselves we feel joy. Human nature is made for happiness. 15.5. There is no limit to the possible pleasure of the perfectly virtuous person Virtues are goods relative to the soul which - we know - are always good for us and have no intrinsic limit: there can never be excess in the possession of virtues, EN, 1154a, 13-14. and one can work indefinitely to make them more and more stable and fulfilling. For this reason there is no limit to the possible pleasure of those who are ever more perfectly virtuous. And maximum is the pleasure that accompanies a perfect activity according to the two most important virtues: practical wisdom (phrónesis) and contemplative wisdom (sophía). The person who has acquired the overall perfect virtue of kalokagathía and continues to perfect ethical ‘beauty’ throughout his or her life experiences in himself or herself a profound pleasure that comes from the very fact of being virtuous, and which is the natural result of the ethically ‘fine’ actions that he or she has chosen and continues to choose to perform: EN, 1099a, 7-21; 1104b, 3. and in such activities “happy persons spend the greatest part of their lives and with the greatest continuità”. EN, 1100b, 15-16. In this way the perfectly virtuous person experiences an immense joy of living EN, 1170a, 19-b, 8. and of being himself/herself, EN, 1166a, 23-29. and his or her life is entirely interwoven with pleasure: “pleasure is produced only in action; therefore, he who is truly happy will also live in the most pleasant way as possible”; EE, 1249a, 19-20. “for virtuous and blissful people life is immensely desirable, and their existence is blissful to the highest degree”; EN, 1170a, 27-29. and “the life of such persons need not at all add pleasure as something attached, but possesses pleasure in itself”. EN, 1099a, 15-16. We believe that these definitive words can be considered the best conclusive remark by Aristotle on the subject of virtue and happiness, and altogether on the art of living proposed by him. remarks “Their life is sweet in itself” With regard to people who live according to perfect virtue, Aristotle also states that “their life is sweet in itself”. EN, 1099a, 7. Purely on account of comparison, and to note that even in areas geographically and culturally quite distant from each other some basic human experiences prove to be really similar, it may be interesting to observe how the same expression concerning the sweetness of life recurs in a passage from the Vedas, the oldest Indian scriptures and the very basis of Hinduism: “for those who live according to the eternal Dharma / the winds are full of sweetness; / the rivers send sweetness; / and so also the plants may be full of sweetness for us. / Sweet may be the night and sweet the dawns; / and sweet may be father heaven for us. / May the tree of the forest be full of sweetness for us, / full of sweetness may be the sun, / and full of sweetness may every human being be for us”. Rig Veda, I, 90, Y. 55