Peace and Stability Operations

Our strategy moving forward is to achieve our objectives through three core elements: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition, a civilian surge that reinforces positive action, and an effective partnership with Pakistan. (U.S. Department of Defense)

This paper discusses and defines stability operations, analyzes recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, highlights American weaknesses in conducting stability operations, and applies those lessons to improve America’s ability to conduct stability operations.

This is a reflection on the very first year of the Sixth Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste led by Prime Minister Dr. Rui Maria de Araújo (VICG). The purpose is not to tell the story of a remarkable year of success for our government. That is best left to the judgment of our people. The purpose here is to inform the people about a complex political process, drawing from experiences dating back to the 24-year struggle for national liberation, and to evaluate the decisive role played by Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão. Now in the time of peace, we consider the challenges faced by the coalition that made possible the Fifth Constitutional Government and the more recent convergence of the two major political parties of the country – CNRT and Fretilin. The unconventional way Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão managed his political succession, based on the doctrine of transitional politics, also known as " transitional paradigm " ,2 whereby the older generation of the sixties passes the helm of the country to the younger generation, has been poorly understood. The success of Dr. Rui Araújo's government has made it clear for those skeptics the need to understand this paradigm. The way that Xanana Gusmão has operated, since the time of the struggle for national liberation, referred to in Portuguese as " A Luta " , is also briefly analysed, and the way he handed over the helm of government is discussed. Ultimately, the debate concludes that Xanana Gusmão adopted, and continues to espouse, Frank Sinatra's principle: I do it my way. Xanana's way has so far succeeded in keeping the country peaceful and calm. When we listen to John Coltrane's masterpiece , 'After the Rain',3 we cannot avoid feeling relaxed, peaceful, and so harmonious that we really do not want any change. In spite of many years of small conflicts, Timor-Leste has similarly enjoyed peace and harmony, with no one wanting change to occur in order to avoid disturbing the prevailing sense of peace. This continued until Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, Mandela of Asia, decided to leave his post as Prime Minister in the middle of his term.

Comments and Suggestions for the UK Green Paper on Regulating Private Military Services

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office should be commended for their examination of practical options for the regulation and potential use of Private Military Companies (PMCs).  The concept of private military services understandably strikes emotional chords with many, making rational assessment difficult.  However, attempts at eliminating the trade in military services, while well meaning, are both unrealistic and potentially harmful to the people we should most want to help: civilians caught in conflict. 

Given adequate guidelines and regulations, companies offering military services can do much to address the massive security vacuum people in developing countries endure today.  While there is general acceptance for the use of private security companies to protect mines and oil facilities in areas of armed conflict, it is ironic that protecting people is a concept still jealously reserved for state militaries.  Western governments’ reluctance to use their own capable militaries for humanitarian interventions or international peace operations in even the direst of circumstances has played into the hands of warlords and dictators while allowing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.  PMCs can go where Western militaries fear to tread and protect or even rescue those the World abandons.

Getting to the point where legally contracted companies can robustly enhance armed peace operations requires rational discourse among key actors.  PMCs have always been willing to dialogue with NGOs, academics and others to establish appropriate guidelines for their operations.  Deliberate decisions by a number of key NGOs to exclude PMCs from conferences and discussions on the topic have resulted in a situation where ill-considered attempts to eliminate the industry have been overwhelmed by the worldwide demand for private security services.  As a result, few attempts at rational regulation have been attempted outside of the United States, leaving the private military services industry largely self-regulated.  This underscores the timely and critical nature of this Green Paper.

What is abundantly clear is that the West has largely abrogated any responsibility to directly assist with enhancing security and stability in developing countries, and millions of people are suffering as a result.  If private firms can address this demand for security either by protecting economic assets and humanitarian operations while still making a profit, then they should be supported, not hindered.  In some cases private firms have been all that stood between peace and humanitarian catastrophe.  Legislating these firms out of existence without providing a realistic alternative would be just plain immoral.

Those critical of “PMC peacekeeping” must articulate alternatives.  They must prove that the theoretical potential harm outweighs the enormous potential benefit.  The current reality is that ineffective peacekeepers make for ineffective peacekeeping and absent armies make for unchecked genocides.  PMCs offer a ready and willing option and are prepared to support appropriate regulations on their operations.

This paper will offer an alternative for categorizing these companies, some key issues that should be kept in mind when designing regulations, and briefly discuss the critical role of PMCs in peace operations.

Witnesses:

William Solis, Director Of Defense Capabilities And Management, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Greg Starr, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State James Kundar, Assistant Administrator For The Near East And Africa, U.S. Agency For International Development (USAID)
Chris Taylor, Vice President, Blackwater USA
Major General Robert Rosenkranz (Ret.), President Of International Technical Service, Dyncorp International
Ignacio Balderas, Former CEO And Current Board Of Directors Member, Triple Canopy
Doug Brooks, President, International Peace Operations Association (IPOA)
Alan Chvotkin, Senior Vice President And Counsel, Professional Services Council (PSC)

UN peacekeeping operations is now routinely deployed in the midst of ongoing conflicts. This trend has been exemplified by three recent UN peacekeeping operations, namely the addition of the Forced Intervention Brigade (FIB) to MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA. What sets them apart from other UN peacekeeping missions is that they have all been specifically designated as ‘stabilisation’ missions. What does ‘stabilisation’ mean in a UN peacekeeping context, i.e. what is the difference between a UN mission that has ‘stabilisation’ in its name and one that does not? And what are the implications for UN peacekeeping doctrine, and specifically its practices around the use of force, of this new trend towards UN stabilisation missions?

The use of contractors to support international policies overseas is not a recent phenomenon. However, increased reliance on the private sector to operate in roles traditionally carried out by government and the military in Afghanistan and Iraq has created apprehension in some academic and policy circles. This essay provides an overview of the modern use of contractors by looking at the different roles that contractors play in support of U.S. foreign policy—from the contentious use of private security companies (PSCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, to security sector reform in post-conflict nations, to logistics and camp servicing for the all-voluntary U.S. military, to rule of law consulting and development aid delivery. It will then move to address a number of concerns that have been raised in the academic and policy communities. Much of the existing literature demonstrates a failed understanding or ideologically driven interpretation of the role and incentives of the private sector, contributing to a flawed analysis from critics. Contractors do not lead; they follow. They do not create policy, but they are critical to implementing important aspects of it, as outlined in comprehensive contracts, designed and guided by governments or international organizations.  Finally, this article will address the issue of extraterritorial accountability, discussing domestic and international legal frameworks and arguing that the stability operations industry benefits from effective legal frameworks. The industry is essential to international policies, and an honest understanding of its role and limitations is crucial to any accurate analysis.

Peacekeeping success does not come from a splendid rebirth of Western interest in these missions, but rather from the unheralded role played by the private sector doing jobs once provided by Western militaries, and from a more realistic and pragmatic approach by the funding states. Sent by donor states, private companies are increasingly providing the missing skills, capabilities and, most importantly, the actual will to carry out international mandates in conflict and post-conflict (CPC) situations. The peacekeeping success stories that get the most play by advocates rarely include the central and growing role the private sector is playing to ensure that success. Private firms filling a myriad of non-traditional roles are creating fundamental changes in the way international peace and stability operations are undertaken. From a humanitarian perspective, this is long overdue.

There is an undeniable instrumentalism to the study of history within military institutions. The temptation to draw broad lessons from the past – universally applicable, but often simplistically derived – is alive and well in armed forces around the world. The broader danger of such instrumentalism is the potential of glorifying past military endeavors. In doing so, we risk making military history a tool of propagandistic mythmaking – a “handmaid of militarism,” in the historian Sir Michael Howard’s memorable phrase. To avoid treating military history as a library of reductive “lessons learned,” as an amplifier for uncritical thinking about the role of military leaders, or as a means of perpetuating popular historical myths, future military officers need to study more than just military institutions, commanders, and soldiers. This is particularly true when studying the history of military occupation, where future military officers must broaden their historical inquiries to include the relationships between military and non-military actors – the civilians, aid workers, international organizations, refugees, wounded and sick soldiers, internees, prisoners of war, and demobilized military forces that make the dynamics of military occupation so complex.

PRIVATE companies are increasingly becoming involved in essential military and security services throughout Africa. Driven by critical need these 'Military Service Providers' (MSPs) are supporting peace-keeping operations, training coast guards and militaries, providing security for mineral extraction ventures in war zones, assisting in post-conflict ordnance disposal, and offering vital protection for humanitarian operations.

Split off from other U.S. regional commands, AFRICOM is the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) new command for Africa and this new customized organization offers enormous opportunities for the continent, particularly if it is able to fully harness the capabilities of the private sector to support its goal of enhancing African stability. The private sector has long supported international policies in Africa with logistics, peacekeeping support, peacekeeper training, demining, heavy aviation, security and many other services. With AFRICOM’s greater focus on African problems, it is likely that the unique capabilities of private companies will be utilized to an ever-greater degree to improve and expand policies that have been helping to provide stability to the African continent.

Winning wars accomplishes little if we cannot also win the peace. The strategic goals for which the wars are fought can only be achieved if the follow-on mission leaves an occupied territory more stable and democratic than before. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is the key to achieving such stability.

Since the Warsaw NATO Summit in 2016, the Alliance has the ambition to project stability in areas. The concept of stability policing sets the frameworks for contributing to the creation of a safe and secure environment with more police capabilities, both in post conflict and in pre-conflict situations. The concept originates from the security gap experienced during the Balkan wars. The article deals with the origin and meaning of what is currently called stability policing. A concept that looks at the temporary execution of police tasks in an area as well as the support of the local police with training, monitoring, mentoring and advise. The ACT project to come up with a concept for the end of the year as well as the capacities needed for this concept are described in the article.

In a state-based international order, the state is understood as the best actor to protect its population. With this in mind, UN peace operations often have mandates to extend state authority. However, by their very nature, peace operations deploy to states whose authority and legitimacy are contested. Without a clear definition of what that authority entails, peace operations and host states must constantly negotiate the content and approaches taken in extending state authority, sometimes resulting in tensions between state and mission. This article examines the process of extending state authority in two cases: the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It finds that there are evolving and contesting understandings of state authority across and within peace operations, which can limit mission impact and stress key relationships between peace operations and their host state. The article concludes that there is a need for renewed conversations in the UN as to how state authority is understood and supported by UN peace operations.

"Comprehending the Mission to Advise" provides a practical definition of the duties and responsibilities associated with advising foreign security forces. Despite deploying thousands of servicemembers and civilians to security force missions around the globe to serve as "advisors", no formal definition of the job existed prior to 2019. The lack of a consistent definition contributed to inconsistencies in how advisors were employed and how advising missions were assessed. This article is written from the perspective of an actual advisor and attempts to describe the considerable scope of the actual duties associated with advising and references current U.S. military doctrine and policy related to the mission. The article also offers a method for describing the various types of environments advisors are required to serve in, based on the legitimacy and stability of the host nations.

A web page with PDFs or links to nearly every Journal of International Peace Operations/Stability Operations magazine (JIPO / SOm) produced by the International Peace Operations Association / International Stability Operations Association (IPOA/ISOA) between 2004 and 2013.

The uneven performance of the US armed forces
in anticipating, preparing for and carrying out the
post-conflict phase of Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ has
brought into relief a ‘missing link’ in the US’s
awesome military capability. The operational setbacks in Iraq have also dented the enthusiasm surrounding Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s concept of ‘military transformation’. Having enabled the three-week blitz to Baghdad in 2003, this concept has proven less applicable in the subsequent  stabilisation phase. In recognition of these deficiencies, the US
Department of Defense (DoD) is now seeking to implement a raft of reforms to improve the military’s ability to conduct ‘stability operations’. This constitutes a potential turning point, as the US military has since the Vietnam War focused mostly
on conventional combat.

Book Abstract: In 2007, the Bush administration created a new military presence in Africa—AFRICOM (US Africa Command)—which has been vigorously debated ever since. Some see AFRICOM as the answer to an African security system crippled by a lack of resources, widespread politicization, and institutional weakness. Others claim that the program is nothing more than another attempt by the US to secure its own interests in the region. In African Security and the African Command, contributors with a range of views on the issues examine the objectives and activities of AFRICOM, offering a well-rounded picture of ongoing security challenges in Africa and what might be done to address them.

Startseite > Mit Sicherheitsfirmen den Frieden sichern? Mit Sicherheitsfirmen den Frieden sichern? Die UN heuern für Missionen zunehmend private Sicherheitsdienste an. Humanitäre Einsätze finden häufig in unsicheren Krisenregionen statt. Um dort etwa ihr Personal oder Hilfslieferungen bewachen zu lassen, greifen die Vereinten Nationen zunehmend auf das Personal privater Sicherheitsfirmen zurück. Die New Yorker Denkfabrik Global Policy Forum hat in einer Studie scharf kritisiert, diese Zusammenarbeit schade dem Ruf der Weltorganisation. Branchenvertreter hingegen sehen in der Kritik nur alte Vorurteile gegen die Sicherheitsindustrie. Ein Pro und Kontra. Siddha Hover [1], Doug Brooks [2], Lou Pingeot [3]

Oral comments:
Security Sector Reform in Iraq: Enhancing the Role of the Private Sector

Testimony of the International Peace Operations Association

25 April 2007

Doug Brooks, President


Thank you for the opportunity to provide an industry perspective on the critical issues highlighted in this hearing.  The role of the private sector is too little understood and too often treated with suspicion. 
About ourselves: The International Peace Operations Association is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental association of services companies providing critical services to stability and peace operations worldwide. 
With more than thirty member companies providing services including training, logistics, security, aviation, mine action, and medical support we represent a demand-driven industry providing cost effective services in some of the most dangerous environments imaginable.  This testimony will provide some background information and explain why our government utilizes these companies to enhance policies and ways the government can be a smart client.
First I want to be clear: The leadership, initiative, and oversight of the training effort must come from the governments of the United States and Iraq.  While some of the actual training can be done by U.S. military and government employees, a significant portion of the expertise, resources and hundreds of experienced long-term personnel doing the hands-on training and mentoring are necessarily going to come from the private sector.  This is a concept where an effective public-private partnership is simply indispensible.  Indeed, it is inconceivable that success could be achieved any other way.   
Attempting reconstruction and redevelopment in the face of an ongoing conflict is necessarily difficult and nothing quite like the operation in Iraq has been attempted in the past.  The closest parallel might be the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam, which did show a surprising degree of success in the face of constant attacks by the Vietcong – but only with an astonishing level of national commitment which we do not see today. 
While there are a number of actions that can be taken to improve the training process, the ultimate success of Iraq depends on dramatic political improvements in that country as well.  Simply put, a professional security sector is not a replacement for a functioning government and it is inconceivable that a functioning government could survive for long without a reliable security sector.
The private sector has been very active in the training process and if called upon is able increase its role even more.  In the years since 2003 much has been done to increase and improve security sector training capacity.  At the same time, much has been done to address contractual and oversight problems that are inevitable in any operation on this scale.  We need to get it right, the private sector is playing a critical role and will be an essential player - during and beyond any withdrawal. 


Why use the private sector at all?
1. Contractors are cost effective.  Contractors are veterans and ex-cops that live along side military personnel in the same dangerous and rough conditions.  They provide astonishing degrees of experience and expertise, they usually stay in country longer than troops, and surprisingly, they cost the government far less in the long run.  U.S. troops have some astonishing capabilities, but they cost somewhere around $15,000 per month per soldier in Iraq.
2. Contractors have staying power.  Military personnel have to be rotated in and out while contractors can serve multiple years and the companies can establish greater continuity of programs and doctrine. At the same time, they are remarkably resilient.  As we say, contractors are risk managers - not morons!  Early predictions by pundits that the private sector cannot operate in dangerous environments have been pretty thoroughly dispelled.
3. Companies are accountable.  Contracts can be and are sometimes modified, penalized or cancelled based on performance and changing conditions.  Companies must answer to government Contract Officers providing guidance and oversight and obtain government licenses to do military or police training.
4. Contractors themselves can be held accountable.  The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) allows the U.S. government to try individuals in Federal courts for felonies.  This law has been on the books for several years but the Department of Justice is only now beginning to exercise it appropriately in Iraq.  (UCMJ mention.)
5. Contractors can expand their operations.  Companies are able to tap into huge pools of expertise and most companies have databases of thousands of individuals with a full array of skills, expertise, experience, languages and capabilities, which can be brought to bear in support of policies.
Areas for improvement:
1. To maximize value both the Department of State and Department of Defense must improve oversight capacities and capabilities in general.  This is a common refrain, and one that the industry strongly supports.  Good oversight benefits both companies as well as clients, and problems with oversight has been the number one complaint of IPOA member companies since 2003.
2. Contract coordination between government departments needs to be improved.  Companies are concerned that DoD Contract Officers and DoS Contract Officers do not communicate enough nor do they operate with the same rules, creating costs and complications which have negatively impacted performance.
3. Quality matters.  Too much emphasis is placed on contract price when better quality companies are more effective at achieving policy objectives.  Contracts awarded with too much emphasis on price can reward marginal companies and undermine more experienced and professional firms.  IPOA members agree to abide by industry Code of Conduct and want credit for that.
4. The means of law enforcement can be improved.  Impartial investigations into allegations of corruption and abuse benefit the larger industry in the long run. 
We have the best supported and supplied military operation in history in Iraq.  And this fact is largely due to imaginative and effective use of the private sector.  There are lots of things that can be fixed and improved, but we should not ignore that basic fact.
Private companies are being contracted to support and enhance government policies.  There is no reason that we cannot demand that they live up to high professional and ethical standards.  From an industry perspective, we fully support effective oversight and accountability.
And getting this aspect right is something you folks can sure help with.
I look forward to your questions.