Ontology Fundamental and Transcendental Philosophy

The paper examines the limitation of the ontology and of the question of Being in Heidegger’s writings of the late Twenties. I shall analyze, in particular, the distinctions between Fundamental Ontology and Metontology (discussed in the lecture course of 1928 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik) and between Problem of the Being and Problem of the World (in the lecture course of 1928-29 Einleitung in die Philosophie): in both the cases appears a complex and circular relationship between the two distinguished poles, which is also a sign of a tension in Heidegger’s thought. In the final part of the paper I will focus on the ambiguous presence/absence of the cosmological question in Heidegger’s work.

Nuestra situación histórica es de muy alta complejidad donde el sentimiento general es la falta de esperanza, la soledad y la pérdida del sentido.
De ahí la conveniencia de realizar una investigación de estatura metafísica sobre la temática del don. Al parecer del filósofo mexicano Alberto I. Vargas nuestra crisis contemporánea no se reduce a una crisis social y ni siquiera a una crisis ética sino a una crisis antropológica. Este es el momento histórico del ser personal, y con él, del don y la gratuidad. Hoy se requiere una comprensión novedosa del juego social que tenga como eje central la lógica del don y el crecimiento personal.
Partiendo de una valoración antropológica de la modernidad y siguiendo la narrativa de la teoría de juegos el autor realiza una original exploración sobre la libertad y la intimidad humana que se torna de sumo interés.

-- Abstract:  Did Schelling Discover the Higher Logical Types of Being? Also Syntheses of the Unconscious as Anti-Aufhebung and as the Renaissance Episteme.

-- Key Words:  Potencies, Meta-levels of Being, Fundamental Ontology, Continental Philosophy, Schelling, Foucault, Deleuze, Foucault, Proto-Existentialism

-- Note: Schelling_01_20210302kdp04a New version

Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fink:

This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.

Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.

Аннотация: В статье показано, что проблема логики является одной из наиболее важных проблем в фундаментальной онтологии Хайдеггера. В связи с этим здесь реконструировано хайдеггеровское понимание отношения онтологии и логики, а также очерчен проект деструкции логики у него. Здесь также рассмотрен тезис о многообразии способов бытия и понятие опредмечивания в контексте онтологического генезиса логики. Кроме того, в статье более подробно прослежен ход деструкции логики по путеводной нити понятия истины от истины суждения до истины как разомкнутости человеческого сущего. В заключение говорится об отношении философа к современной символической логике и поднимается вопрос о возможности философского суждения после хайдеггеровской деструкции логики, приведшей к опознанию оппозиции истории и логики как онтологически несостоятельной.
Ключевые слова: М. Хайдеггер, фундаментальная онтология, деструкция логики, различие способов бытия, опредмечивание, разомкнутость, оппозиция логического и исторического.

The Destruction of the Logic in the M. Heidegger’s Ontology
Summary: It is shown in the article that the problem of logic is one of the problems of very importance in Heidegger’s ontology. The Heidegger’s interpretation of the relationship between ontology and logic as well as his project of the destruction of logic are discussed here. The author of the article treats also the thesis of multiplicity of ways-of-being and the notion of objectivication (Vergegenständlichung) in the context of ontological genesis of logic in Heidegger. Furthermore, the path of the destruction of logic is traced here on the ground of the notion of truth form the truth of judgment to the truth as disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of human Dasein. The conclusion of the article is dedicated to the Heidegger’s attitude toward the symbolic logic and to the question of possibility of a philosophical judgment after Heidegger’s destruction of logic, namely in the context of his reduction of the opposition of the logical and the historical.
Key words: M. Heidegger, fundamental ontology, destruction of logic, multiplicity of ways-of-being, objectivication, disclosedness, opposition of the logical and the historical.

Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fink:

This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.

Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.

Аннотация: В статье показано, что Хайдеггер отличает философию как науку о бытии (онтологию) от онтических видов деятельности человека, направленных на сущее. Основанием для этого выступает тезис онтологической дифференции, т.е. разведения бытия и сущего. Впрочем, в отношении бытия речь в онтологии Хайдеггера может идти в двоякой перспективе: как о бытии и как о смысле бытия. В первом случае говорится о факте смутного понимания бытия, во втором – о его конкретной идее. Получить таковую – задача научной онтологии, согласно Хайдеггеру. В статье ставится вопрос о том, каково основание для различения бытия и его смысла, о способе присутствия смысла бытия. Путем к ответу на эти вопросы здесь признается реконструкция хайдеггеровского наброска теории смысла и аппликации ее результатов к проблеме смысла бытия. С точки зрения Хайдеггера, смысл оказывается не чем-то стоящим за бытием, не присутствующим самим по себе. В завершении статьи обозначены проблемы, обусловленные данным решением философа.
Ключевые слова: бытие, сущее, смысл бытия, понимание, истолкование, онтология, Хайдеггер.

Patkul, A. The Problem of the Meaning of being and the Project of the Doctrine of the Meaning in M. Heidegger’s Ontology
Abstract: It is shown in the article that Heidegger differentiates the philosophy as the science of being (ontology) from ontical types of human activities, which are directed to that-which-is. The basis for such distinction is the principle of the ontological difference, i.e. the one between being and that-which-is. However, Heidegger speaks about being in two different perspectives. One the one hand, he speaks about being in the context of the fact of its vague understanding. On the other hand, he speaks about the meaning of being, i.e. about its concrete idea. The aim of the scientific ontology is the clarification of such idea. The question is posed in the article, where is the ground of Heidegger’s distinction between being and meaning of being. The possible way to find the solution of these problems is in the reconstruction of the Heidegger’s project of the existential-ontological doctrine of the meaning as well as in the application of the outcomes of such reconstruction to his notion of the meaning of being. In Heidegger’s opinion, the meaning of being is not something what would stay beyond the being itself. It does not present per se. As conclusion, the problems, which are connected with this Heidegger’s thesis, are pointed in the article.
Key words: being, that-which-is, the meaning of being, understanding, interpretation, ontology, Heidegger.

Heidegger argues that traditional ontology cannot but fail to capture the fundamental phenomenon of the environment (Umwelt) due to the derivative and overly theoretical character of its categorical apparatus. However, the relationship between traditional ontology and the environment is, at closer look, more complex than it seems, for philosophical categories are ultimately the outcome of abstractions operated on the most fundamental features of the environment itself. Throughout the 20s, Heidegger engages in a genealogy of ontological categories, tracing them back to the environment, i.e. to the world of our everyday experience, the set of pre-categorical practices that characterize life. The analyses of the productive comportment and of the reflection of the Dasein are two of the most representative examples of such a genealogy. This paper shall both highlight the potential of the genealogic enterprise and show the reasons which make its effective realization ultimately impossible – such reasons are connected to the nature of the genesis, the status of the Dasein and the primacy of the question of Being.