Obligations to Future Generations

This contribution discusses the emergent field of Intergenerational Justice (IJ) with an aim to drawing new light upon issues in conservation. Several key issues in IJ are discussed that allow heritage conservation to be contextualised. Methods and debates from IJ are described and related to conservation practice. The paper is not an exhaustive review, but identifies links to pertinent issues in conservation.

Der Mensch ist im Zeitalter des Anthropozän mit seiner globalen Wirkkraft zu einem dominanten Einflussfaktor auf den Planeten geworden. Industrialisierung und der darauffolgende Klimawandel, Atomenergie und -waffen mit den damit verbundenen kurz- und langfristigen existenziellen Risiken, Biodiversitätsverlust, Antibiotikaresistenzen, Schadstoffemissionen, demographischer Wandel, Desertifikation, Ressourcenabbau – vieles von dem, was der Mensch tut, ist irreversibel und hat massive Auswirkungen nicht nur auf uns, sondern auch auf zukünftige Generationen. Im Guten wie im Schlechten – nie hatte der Mensch so viel Einfluss auf die mittel- und langfristige Zukunft und zugleich ein solch umfassendes Wissen über die Risiken seiner Handlungsfolgen. Komplexe Probleme wie der Klimawandel, dessen Hauptauswirkungen erst in einigen Jahrzehnten am deutlichsten hervortreten werden, wären heute am wirksamsten zu bekämpfen.
Gestrige und heutige politische (Nicht-)Entscheidungen beeinflussen und binden demnach nicht nur uns, sondern auch zukünftige Generationen, insbesondere ihre Lebensbedingungen, Handlungsspielräume und damit auch Selbstbestimmungsmöglichkeiten. Unsere rechtlichen und politischen Institutionen scheinen jedoch noch nicht an das Zeitalter des Anthropozäns angepasst zu sein. In der Demokratie repräsentieren Abgeordnete das Volk; u. a. über Wahlen werden sie regelmäßig von den Wahlberechtigten verantwortlich gehalten. Entscheidungsberechtigte und Entscheidungsbetroffene sind so nur noch in Teilen identisch, da die ebenfalls betroffenen zukünftigen Generationen heute nicht am demokratischen Willensbildungsprozess teilhaben können. Die herkömmlichen Modelle politischer Repräsentation sehen Konstituenten wie zukünftige Generationen, die heute noch gar nicht existieren, schlicht nicht vor. Der Demokratie wird auch deshalb nachgesagt, sie sei in ihren Vierjahreszyklen zu gegenwartsfixiert und berücksichtige die betroffenen Interessen zukünftiger Generationen bestenfalls ungenügend.
In der politischen Philosophie wird dieser Umstand seit ca. vier Jahrzehnten zunehmend kritisiert. Dabei werden demokratietheoretische, menschenrechtliche, verantwortungsethische und gerechtigkeitstheoretische Argumente angeführt, warum die wohlverstandenen Interessen zukünftiger Generationen schon heute in den politischen Entscheidungsprozess eingebracht werden sollten. Auch wurden zahlreiche Vorschläge entwickelt, wie dies auf einer institutionellen Ebene aussehen könnte. Sie reichen von Parlamentssitzen für Repräsentanten zukünftige Generationen über Zukunftsräte und neue Verfassungsartikel bis hin zu dritten Parlamentskammern.
Nach einer kurzen Einführung in das Thema wird es im Vortrag vor allem darum gehen, real existierende Institutionen vorzustellen, die damit beauftragt wurden, die Interessen zukünftiger Generationen im politischen Entscheidungsprozess zu repräsentieren. Dazu gehören etwa der Ombudsmann für zukünftige Generationen (Ungarn, 2008–11, eingeschränkt bis heute), der parlamentarische Kommissar für zukünftige Generationen (Israel, 2001–06), die Zukünftige-Generationen-Kommissarin (Wales, seit 2016) und der parlamentarische Ausschuss für die Zukunft (Finnland, seit 1993). Als Grundlage für die anschließende Diskussion werden neben den Chancen auch die Herausforderungen der Institutionalisierung solcher neuen Repräsentationsmodelle besprochen, darunter ihre politische Realisierbarkeit und demokratische Legitimität.

The author examines the problem of motivation about future generations. He argues that though many philosophers think that direct motivations are problematic for future generations only, they are not unproblematic for the current generations too, and that the motivation problem can be solved if we consider the idea of “leaving the earth no worse.” He also shows why such an idea should be promoted and can motivate us to work in the best interests of current and future generations. The author also contends that prioritizing the idea of “leaving the earth no worse” is not exclusively anthropocentric.

Future generations, wildlife, and natural resources – collectively referred to as “the voiceless” in this book – are the most vulnerable and least equipped populations to protect themselves from the impacts of global climate change. Domestic and international law protections are beginning to recognize rights and responsibilities that apply to the voiceless community; however, these legal developments have yet to be pursued in a collective manner and have not been considered together in the context of climate change and climate justice. This book first identifies the common vulnerabilities of the voiceless in the Anthropocene era. It then proposes how the law can evolve to protect their interests more effectively through a stewardship-focused and rights-based system derived from the mandate inherent in the concept of sustainable development.

Vertical farming is the urban farming of fruits, vegetables, and grains, inside a building in a city or urban centre, in which floors are designed to accommodate certain crops. These heights will acts as the future farms land and as architects we can shape these high-rises to sow the seeds for the future. The objective of this dissertation was to investigate the feasibility and plausibility of the vertical farming concept in three specific and interrelated research domains. The first research question was to investigate whether enough energy can be generated onsite to meet the needs of the building. The second research question was to investigate the carbon footprint of produce grown vertically and compare that to produce grown conventionally (greenhouse and outdoors). The final research question was to investigate how relevant stakeholders perceive the concept of vertical farming and what they believe are current barriers and opportunities towards uptake of the technology. The purpose of this investigation was to determine ways to supply food to cities in an energy efficient and sustainable manner from both a quantitative and qualitative approach.

What is a vertical farm?
As the world‘s population grows, so does the land required to produce the needed food. The concept of a vertical farm was developed to remedy this crisis. A vertical farm is farms stacked on top of one another, instead of branching out horizontally. Developed in 1999 by Professor Dickson Despommier, the farm uses conventional farming methods such as hydroponics and aeroponics to produce more yields faster.

Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change in general is considered as one of the greatest challenges facing humanity today. The public intellectual, Yuval Noah Harari, has termed this challenge an ‘existential threat’ that can lead to ‘ecological collapse.’
While we are not 100% certain of how the future will look like based on our current behaviors, we do know that the risks are extremely high. The scientific consensus is apparent that human activities, especially those that lead to greenhouse gas emissions, are causing changes in the climate at an alarming rate. The result is not simply that we will experience minor heatwaves or have longer periods of sun tanning at the beach. Rather, there will be cataclysmic effects on our environment as well an increase in societal problems.
To deal with a global problem such as climate change, different methods and frameworks have been proposed. In this essay I aim to analyze an important framework that is based on the language of human rights. It is commonly thought that unborn future generations have some kind of right or claim on the environment and this imposes a duty on the current generation to act in an ecofriendly manner. It is taken for granted that such rights exist and therefore the only discussion is about to how to balance and prioritize those rights with the rights of current generations.
To answer the question of whether governments should prioritize the rights of unborn future generations over the rights of its own citizens when tackling climate change, I aim to first demonstrate some of the pragmatic benefits of adopting a rights-based approach. I will then unpack a major presupposition that this question is based on and which must be accepted before such a discussion can be considered valid: the whole concept of human rights. Thereafter, I will look at some of the challenges in extending rights to unborn future generations and challenge some of its normative basis and suggest that perhaps the framework of rights is not the most efficient way to tackle climate change.

L'architettura è un campo in cui l’intervento umano sul mondo provoca conseguenze rilevanti e durature, spesso materialmente persistenti per centinaia e centinaia di anni. Sarebbe quindi naturale aspettarsi che gli architetti riflettano in abbondanza, per abitudine consolidata, su quali siano i propri obblighi morali nei confronti delle generazioni future . È sorprendente constatare che non è così. L'architettura – come disciplina, come area di ricerca scientifica, come cultura professionale, come pensiero consostanziale ad un agire – non prende solitamente in effettiva considerazione il problema dei nostri obblighi verso le generazioni future. Questo articolo cerca di fare il punto sui modi in cui potrebbe farlo, se volesse.

Derek Parfit originally formulated the Repugnant Conclusion as follows: " For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living " (1984: 388). The blocks in Figure 1 represent two populations, A and Z. The width of each block shows the number of people in the corresponding population, the height shows their lifetime quality of life. All the people in Figure 1 enjoy positive welfare or, as we also could put it, have lives worth living (see well-being). People's welfare is much lower in Z than in A, but since there are many more people in Z, there is a greater quantity of welfare in Z as compared to A. Consequently, although the people in A lead very good lives and the people in Z have lives only barely worth living, Z is nevertheless better than A according to, for example, classical Utilitarianism (see utilitarianism). The Repugnant Conclusion highlights a problem in an area of ethics which has become known as population ethics. The last decades have witnessed an increasing philosophical interest in questions such as " Is it possible to make the world a better place by creating more people? " and " Is there a moral obligation to have children? " The main problem is to find an adequate theory about the moral value of states of affairs where the number of people, their welfare, and their identities may vary. Since, arguably, any reasonable moral theory has to take such aspects of possible states of affairs into account when determining the normative status of actions, the study of population ethics is of general import for moral theory (see also intergenerational ethics; population; potential persons). As the name indicates, Parfit finds the Repugnant Conclusion unacceptable, and most philosophers seem to agree. It has been surprisingly difficult, however, to find a theory that avoids it without implying other counterintuitive conclusions. Thus,

This paper explores the case for system change as theorised by the idealist/humanist tradition in International Relations theory with the most explicit example of Alexander Wendt’s constructivism, as the difficult to accomplish, yet creative solution to the climate crisis. The paper aims to offer an innovative, original account of the climate crisis based on studies of specific authors within constructivism, international political economy and philosophy. The paper excels in examining the significance of a complex issue that has been 'a tough nut to crack' as clearly as possible summarizing a lot of complex information into a well-organized synthesis of ideas by relying on meditative flow followed by objective analysis and policy recommendations. Climate change is persistent just as the predominant theory of International Relations, Realism, is. To solve it, scholars have to change paradigm. Although among the top leadership, progress within the existing global climate governance architecture is steadily proceeding in averting the worst security impacts of climate change by attempting to significantly reduce global carbon emissions, there is also a common perception among societies that action happening within the system is disappointingly slow, even considered ineffective. Despite the existence of several solutions such as: 1) climate negotiations within the system of global governance focused on significantly reducing global carbon emissions, 2) the commitment within the private sector, that is, a hundred companies in the world that produced 70 percent of the world’s emissions, 3) introducing of the carbon tax, 4) reforming capitalism, 5) giving more credibility to the scientific community and scientific solutions and 6) politicising the issue to the point when people can vote for climate leaders who make climate as the number one priority; none of the above offers a sufficiently comprehensive or lasting solution. The idea is to introduce radical solutions that could have a massive, exponential impact. The unconventional solution offers a more spontaneous way out of the problem. The research problem is the most profound issue humanity has ever attempted to solve in the history of civilization, arguably requiring a complete transformation of the system. It comes down to the conscious evolution of human species to act in time since the climate clock will soon be surpassing tipping points which make humanity close to transgressing planetary boundaries after which cataclysmic climate change occurs alongside the increased risk of conflicts over water, migration crises, food shortages and humanitarian disasters. Paper consist of an introduction, the chosen method, educational research on creativity is explained; a brief overview of constructivism where the possibility of system’s transformation is explained; an overview of the system change theory; an evaluation of whether system change is a viable way forward; plus section explaining pathways of advancing civilization to the next level followed by conclusions. A major, analytical finding is that with people’s power inspired by hope even the most difficult, seemingly impossible is possible. Agency, the capacity to make things happen to envision and enact change, can bend and shove the structure. The majority of people have bought into the false idea that we have to serve, and behave, and be enslaved else chaos will engulf the world. We need to carry out objective analysis of the situation to the point where people believe in change and make change happen. If the majority of people continue as up to this point, then the fate of the whole planet might be in peril. Why are so many so submissive? Why are they so forgiving to gangsterism and horrendous evil done to the planet by the autocratic and corrupted politicians, 'big fish' who impudently swim in the water of the system. The answer may be that the established structure of the system is not only very entrenched but also increasingly sophisticated in its perfection of subliminal mechanisms of control of the people and exploitation of the planet. It is not only through the action or inaction of authoritarian tyrants or grandiose, imperialistic thinking of obsessive dictators or through press releases and the enforced idiocy of television, the drama of the dying world has been turned into a soap opera for most people. People do not understand that climate change is their story and that they will be in one way or another affected by climatic changes. At the end, all will be affected. Earth must be healthy and Nature benign again. Our Lady of Fátima on 13th May 1917 asked for the Consecration of Russia to Her Immaculate Heart, and the Communion of reparation on the First Saturdays. If Her requests are heeded, Russia will be converted, and there will be peace; if not, she will spread her errors throughout the world, causing wars and persecutions of the Church. The good will be martyred; the Holy Father will have much to suffer; various nations will be annihilated. ''In the end, my Immaculate Heart will triumph. The Holy Father will consecrate Russia to me, and she shall be converted, and a period of peace will be granted to the world.'' (Santos, Fatima in Lucia's Own Words I, 2003: 123–124). There must come a moment for penance, repentance, turning back to God, prayer and belief in salvation of one's soul. Humans cannot be happy without God in our lives. There must come time of global, spiritual awakening, accepting the beauty of the Earth, rejecting militant conquests, enslavement of humanity under repressive doctrines which justify militarily invasions, conforming to rapacious materialism and secularism. There is a need for cleaning up of the system, giving a second chance to the planet, draining of the water, getting rid of the ageing 'big fish' swimming in the dirty water of system - climate-denialist politicians who do not respect the ecological balance with nature. The rise of the movement is inevitable when the machinery or machinations of the unjust structure of the system become so odious, and so exposed that people are willing to strive for change and force the re-evaluation of the situation. The forces of the status quo weaponize gangsters in the system who want to thwart change. As Steffen (2022) noted, ''We need a politics of boldness and possibility, one that brings people and institutions together to achieve spiky successes and strong ruggedization.'' Somebody has to stand against the unfair structure of the system, defend trees, and somebody has to make the point: we disown our past, and we will start living according to our own inner being and create our own future. We will not allow the past to create our future…. And, it could be done by marching for the Earth, claiming our vision, our being, our intuition and acting from that without regret inspired by hope. More recently, a broad array of influential climate action advocates started to demand immediate, disruptive changes to destroy fossil fuel demand and drop emissions in decisive ways. Change comes from the people - to beat a machine, change the structure of the system with a movement. Climate change is a global, multi-generational threat featuring impacts that lie entirely outside anything that modern humanity has ever experienced. Indeed, the most sustainable society is the one which passes forward the best possibilities to future generations. Justifiably, the issue of global climate change has moved to the centre of the international agenda. Actively, rapidly and deliberately driving high-carbon industries out of business is an unavoidable step in every real climate action strategy. Those industries do not deserve our sympathy. It is their own predatory delay over decades that has led to their on-rushing demise. Martin Luther King, Jr. (Address to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference on August 16, 1967) reminded, ''the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” Change takes a long time, but it does happen. Energy transition from addictive and dirty fossil fuel structures is inevitable. As François Jacob said, ''It is hope that gives life meaning. Hope is based on the prospect of being able one day to turn the actual world into a possible one that looks better.'' Thus, ''let us remember that there is a creative force in this universe, working to pull down the gigantic mountains of evil, a power that is able to make a way out of no way and transform dark yesterdays into bright tomorrows.'' (Martin Luther King, Jr, “Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution.” Speech given at the National Cathedral, March 31, 1968). In the service of the above, this paper constitutes a modest, cutting-edge, interdisciplinary policy-relevant research with the aim of exposing a pertaining political problem through an experiment with Gordian-knot, style-resolved, possible creative solutions leading to cascading dynamics of solution activating momentum.

This chapter claims that the notion of human dignity provides an overarching normative framework for assessing the ethical and legal acceptability of emerging life sciences technologies. After depicting the increasing duality that characterizes modern technologies, this chapter examines two different meanings of human dignity: the classical meaning that refers to the inherent worth of every individual, and the more recent understanding of this notion that refers to the integrity and identity of humankind, including future generations. The close connection between human dignity and human rights is outlined, as well as the key-role of dignity in the human rights instruments relating to bioethics. The chapter concludes by briefly presenting the challenges to human dignity and human rights posed by neurotechnologies and germline gene editing technologies.

The proliferation of harmful incidents affecting humanity’s future calls for increased effectiveness in international law. Events causing real or hypothetical harm, also trans-generational harm, constitute new realities which must be taken into account. These incidents are both complex and extremely serious. At present several possibilities are opening up to strengthen the process of recognising crimes against future generation. The environmental aspect of human rights, as well as the prevalence of social initiatives, will doubtless contribute to the support of this emerging process. Nevertheless it remains essential to weigh up the “pros and cons”. Other approaches are also possible such as: the defence of common global assets, reinforcing international law about catastrophic events or again invoking international law relating to future generations. One thing remains certain: international law is now entering a new era of deep and far-reaching transformation.

Multiple anthropogenic environmental crises present themselves as morally problematic. Views of intergenerational ethics typically attempt to give account of to whom we owe obligations, what we owe them, and how we should act to satisfy these obligations. I address what it could mean and what we should do on the assumption that present generations are moral failures vis-a-vis the global environment and thus will deliver to future generations a significantly degraded world they don't deserve.

Environmental Values is an international peer-reviewed journal that brings together contributions from philosophy, economics, politics, sociology, geography, anthropology, ecology and other disciplines, which relate to the present and future environment of human beings and other species. In doing so we aim to clarify the relationship between practical policy issues and more fundamental underlying principles or assumptions.

La crise sanitaire et ses conséquences réactualisent la question des générations telle que Karl Mannheim l’avait formulée au tournant des années 30 : les périodes de déstabilisation sociale peuvent créer selon lui une « condition de génération » propice à l’émergence de mouvements générationnels et à l’accélération du changement social. Pour mieux identifier ce défi des générations et les enjeux politiques qu’il soulève, ce chapitre propose de décrypter la façon dont la crise sanitaire vient affecter la condition juvénile en France, ainsi que la structure des inégalités qui la traversent.

This article examines the view that the interests of future generations should be taken into consideration in decisions likely to affect them. In particular, it has been argued that the interests of future generations should be represented in local, national or international political decisions. This view is analyzed in terms of justice-seeking and democracy-seeking arguments and the extent to which the representation of future generations will promote the respective values of justice and democracy. In order to promote democracy, such representation must be consistent with the criterion of democratic inclusion. Assuming that democratic inclusion is conceptualized in legal terms, the representation of future generations is consistent with democracy only to the extent that they are likely to be bound by the decisions made today. It is shown here that future generations are not bound by the decisions made today. Thus, it follows that representing the interests of future generations in political decisions is not consistent with securing democracy for the living generation. The intergenerational problem is therefore one where the demands of justice and democracy may conflict.

This chapter explores the possibility of extending Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach to the question of ecological obligations to future generations. It is argued that we can extend capability protection to future generations, but this leaves open which resources such a theory is to leave to future generations. The chapter argues that the influential views of Rawls and Solow, that these resources should be conceived in terms of ‘total capital’, cannot be accepted by a capability approach, because of their assumption of substitutability between natural and human-made capital. It is proposed that a CTJ best fits with a combination of two ecological approaches: the ecological space approach and Herman Daly’s resource rules.

In a situation of climate injustice, where those who have contributed the least to climate change are facing its most dire consequences, litigation is sometimes the only effective means of enhancing transparency and ensuring accountability.  When such litigation address an alleged governmental inaction (or insufficient action) in the climate change field, complex questions related to the role of the judiciary and the separation of power arise. The difficulty with litigation for climate change inaction is the court’s reluctance in overstepping its scope of authority by requesting governments to enact better regulations for climate change adaptation and mitigation. The role of courts in adjudicating climate change litigation for governmental inaction is examined through a comparative analysis of selected recent climate change cases.  An analysis of Urgenda Foundation v Kingdom of the Netherlands indicates that a constitutional right to a healthy environment positively influences a finding of justiciability, while the case of Leghari v Republic of Pakistan shows the inclination of judges from competitively authoritarian regimes to fill the institutional vacuum left by the other branches. A review of recent atmospheric trust litigation in the United States, such as the case of Juliana v United States, in light of older American jurisprudence on climate change litigation, leads to the conclusion that courts have the possibility to decline to hear politically sensitive matters by manipulating nebulous concepts of justiciability and standing. While a litigious approach is indeed ad hoc and reactive, the impact of legal mobilization brings political pressure to better regulate and indirect pressure on the industry to reduce emissions. Despite the legally disruptive nature of climate change litigation, judges, within the bounds of the legitimate possibilities at their disposal, must decide on legal questions, no matter their political implications.

Tags: Climate change litigation; justiciability; standing; government inaction; climate justice; accountability; Urgenda; Juliana et al; Leghari

Existing institutions do not seem well-designed to address paradigmatically global, intergenerational and ecological problems, such as climate change. In particular, they tend to crowd out intergenerational concern, and thereby facilitate a “tyranny of the contemporary” in which successive generations exploit the future to their own advantage in morally indefensible ways (albeit perhaps unintentionally). Overcoming such a tyranny will require both accepting responsibility for the future and meeting the institutional gap. I propose that we approach the first in terms of a traditional “delegated responsibility” model of the transmission of individual responsibility to collectives, and the second with a call for a global constitutional convention focused on future generations. In this paper, I develop the delegated responsibility model by suggesting how it leads us to understand both past failures and prospective responsibility. I then briefly defend the call for a global constitutiona...

Climate change raises a number of questions of intergenerational equity. One – and the one that attracts the most attention – is the question of what obligations people have to future generations not to engage in activities that will trigger dangerous climate change, and thereby impose harms on people in the near and distant future. The question of what we owe to future people is of critical importance when determining mitigation policy for it bears on when any generation should mitigate and by how much. The economic literature on this issue has tended to approach these questions by drawing on the idea of a 'social discount rate'. My aim in this paper is to examine the normative force of the considerations that are employed to determine the social discount rate. To do so, I will distinguish between three kinds of consideration invoked in analyses of discounting, assessing in each case their plausibility and their implications for climate change policy. The three kinds are, respectively, Pure Time Discounting, Growth Discounting and Opportunity Cost Discounting. I shall defend the following three claims: A. Pure Time Discounting gives us no reason to delay taking action to mitigate climate change (or for adopting a more gradual approach when implementing mitigation policies). B. Growth Discounting and Opportunity Cost Discounting can only justify very limited justification for delaying action to mitigate climate change. However, C. Growth Discounting-might (subject to two conditions), give us reason to pass on some of the costs of mitigating climate change (and adapting to climate change) to future generations.

This essay presupposes no prior knowledge of social contract theory and clearly outlines the contracterian position at the outset. The paper then evaluates the strength and weakness of social contract theory in a 'broken world'; where human beings are struggling to survive due to climatic conditions and technological failure. The second half of the essay deals with problems around multiple human generations entering into a social contract. With a specific focus on the 'non-reciprocity problem'. The social contract theories of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes are all touched upon. As well as the views of contemporary scholars.

The political representation of future generations would change the relationship between public decisions and the members of democratic political systems. In this paper we examine the implication of these changes on the responsibility of the living members for the future effects of current polices with special reference to climate change. The claim defended is that the collective responsibility of the living members for future outcomes diminishes when public decisions are made less responsive to them. In order to explain why this is the case a ‘participatory account' of collective responsibility is developed according to which collective responsibility is premised on the extent to which public decisions depend on their members. The paper concludes with a discussion on the grounds for valuing collective outcome responsibility and why the conflict between this norm and the claim that future generations should be granted political representation poses fundamental questions about the value of democracy.

There is a tension between democracy and sustainable development: While democracies are jurisdictionally limited by national borders and are committed to the current interests of voters, the concept of sustainable development transcends these spatial and temporal boundaries. Regarding the intertemporal dimension of sustainability, the urgent issue of intergenerational justice is philosophically well-addressed. But what is still missing is an elaborated conceptual and argumentative link both to political science and to real-world democratic politics. Adapting concepts of democratic theory, this paper establishes the conceptual foundation for analysing how to consider the interests of future generations in our present-day democratic institutions.

First, it is laid out what is meant by future generations, and why it is so difficult to take their interests into account today. Second, the so-called non-identity problem is discussed and rejected. Third, it is demonstrated that future generations will be causally and legally affected by the political decisions of today, and therefore, that ignoring the respective policy impacts violates the democratic all-affected principle. Fourth, with this it is shown that the issue of future generations is an issue of deficient political representation. Therefore, the concept of proxy representation is being developed to encompass not yet present constituents such as future generations. Based on this, a list of real-world “proxy representatives” of future generations is presented.

Questions about the current generation's moral duties to future generations are increasingly relevant. Many contemporary environmental problems like nuclear waste storage, climate change and species extinction are projected to have effects hundreds or thousands of years into the future. Non-renewable resources are finite, and, once wilderness areas are destroyed, future generations will never be able to enjoy them. The concern that the current generation is placing unjust burdens on future generations is also expressed in debates about the sustainability of public pensions, old-age medical schemes, and in often heated debates about government spending and the national debt.

This paper discusses the handicapped child case and some other variants of Derek Parfit's non-identity problem. The case is widely held to show that there is harmless wrongdoing, and that a moral system which tries to reduce wrongdoing directly to harm ("person-affecting morality") is inadequate. I show that the argument for this does not depend (as some have implied it does) on Kripkean necessity of origin. I distinguish the case from other variants ("wrongful life cases") of the non-identity problem which do not bear directly on person-affecting morality as I understand it. And finally, I describe a respect in which the handicapped child case is puzzling and counter-intuitive, even on the supposition that it is a case of harmless wrongdoing. I conclude that the case is "hard": it will take more than the rejection of person-affecting morality to remove its puzzling character.

In recent years there has been significant attention accorded to the right of children to a healthy environment, including in litigation. Frequently cited in these efforts is the principle of intergenerational equity devised by Brown Weiss in 1989. The principle remains largely rhetorical however, and is frequently conflated with the rights of 'future generations' (often taken to mean those 'yet to be born'). The position of children in relation to future generations remains somewhat unclear. This may be overshadowing the potential for legally tackling the climate crisis via the promising route of children's rights. This article considers intersections between intergenerational equity, children's rights and the rights of future generations. It is emphasised that intergenerational rights are children's rights. Relying on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Childand particularly the best interests principlewill be crucial both for securing climate justice, and ensuring that justice is children's rights based.

Environmental ethics has a palette of theories concerning values involved in the relationship between humans, future humans and the non-human world. We shall examine some of these and find many of them flawed. In the process we shall attempt to refute the argument of the last man on earth, the argument from marginal people and the so-called Parfit’s paradox. Regarding the source of moral protective obligations, we conclude that there is no naturalistic inherent value and that there is for humans only in their contractual commitment to rules. However, animals will not be excluded from morally relevant consideration, since there is a back door for compassion in any ethics that ground negative duties.  This back door gives a strain of contiguity between caring and upholding rights. The relationship between these calls for a distinction between the near and dear and the far and many. It also raises the question of the limits of human responsibility for suffering, which brings us to consider Peter Wessel Zappfe’s pessimistic diagnosis of the human condition.

Politikwissenschaftliche Analyse demokratischer Nachhaltigkeitsinnovationen für zukünftige Generationen | Political science analysis of democratic sustainability innovations for future generations
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Zukünftige Generationen werden von den Folgen heutiger Politik betroffen sein, sind aber in der Regel von den institutionalisierten Formen demokratischer Willensbildung ausgeschlossen. Aus Sicht des demokratietheoretisch wirkmächtigen Betroffenheitsprinzips, demzufolge alle, die von politischen Entscheidungen betroffen sind oder sein werden, in diesen repräsentiert werden sollen, erscheint dies als problematisch. Die in der Literatur daher vielfach erhobene Forderung, zukünftige Generationen heute politisch zu repräsentieren, führt die moderne Demokratie geradewegs in eine Aporie. Dies liegt zum einen an der sog. demokratischen Gegenwartspräferenz, die, angetrieben durch den Wahlzyklus, den Fokus der Politik auf kurzfristig vorzeigbaren Nutzen für die Wähler lenkt und die genuinen Interessen noch nicht existierender zukünftiger Generationen weitgehend ignoriert. Zum anderen liegt die Ursa-che hierfür in den Standardkonzepten politischer Repräsentation, die mit ihren Kategorien wie ‚Wahlen‘, ‚Autorisierung‘ und ‚Verantwortlichhalten‘ kontemporär nicht existierende Konstituenten wie zukünftige Generationen nicht erfassen können. Zukünftige Generationen können heute nicht politisch partizipieren.
Nichtsdestotrotz existieren ab den 1990er Jahren zahlreiche Institutionen, die die Interessen zukünftiger Generationen in den demokratischen politischen Entscheidungsprozess einbringen. Als Beispiele wären hier der Zukünftige-Generationen-Kommissar für Wales, die parlamentarische Kommission für zukünftige Generationen in Israel, der Ombudsmann für zukünftige Generationen in Ungarn und einige Nachhaltigkeitsinstitutionen zu nennen. Ihre Existenz überrascht und ist ein erklärungsbedürftiges Puzzle, da die Akteure des politisch-administrativen Systems (PAS) nach der These der demokratischen Gegenwartspräferenz keinen Anreiz haben, die Institutionalisierung solcher potenziell die Gegenwartspräferenz reduzierenden Institutionen zu unterstützen. Kates (2015) geht sogar davon aus, dass solche Institutionalisierungen nur dann möglich sind, wenn vorher über eine Modifikation der Rahmenbedingungen derselben die Gegenwartspräferenz des demokratischen Anreizsystems deutlich reduziert wurde.
Die Aporie, das Puzzle sowie der Befund, dass die politische Repräsentation zukünftiger Generationen zwar bisher in der Philosophie, kaum aber in der Politikwissenschaft erforscht wurde, motivieren die Fragestellung der Arbeit: Wie können zukünftige Generationen in der heutigen Demokratie politisch repräsentiert und wie kann die Aporie der Demokratie bezüglich zukünftiger Generationen reduziert werden? Zur Beantwortung der Forschungsfrage werden zunächst die Ausgangspunkte der Aporie genauer untersucht. Anschließend wird, aufbauend auf Rehfelds (2006) allgemeiner Repräsentationstheorie, das Konzept der Proxy-Repräsentation entwickelt. Der Begriff lehnt sich an den statistischen Proxy-Begriff an und hebt die Eigenschaft der Konstituenten der Proxy-Repräsentation hervor, selbst nicht mess- bzw. ansprechbar und zugänglich zu sein. Proxys sind als Vertreter zukünftiger Generationen dann alle Institutionen, die Proxy-Repräsentation betreiben, also deren Interessen in den politischen Entscheidungsprozess einbringen. Mithilfe der im Zuge der Konzeptbildung entwickelten Kriterien wird das Feld nach Institutionen durchsucht, die sich als Proxys verstehen lassen. Die 29 so identifizierten Proxys werden in Kurzfallstudien mithilfe von Dokumentenanalysen analysiert und nach der Höhe ihres Wirkungspotenzials in eine deduktiv entwickelte Typologie eingeordnet. Es stellt sich heraus, dass nur sechs der 29 Proxys über ein (eher, sehr) hohes Wirkungspotenzial verfügen. Um das Puzzle ihrer Institutionalisierung näherungsweise auflösen zu können, werden mithilfe einer modifizierten Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) die Rahmenbedingungen der Proxys mit hohem Wirkungspotenzial untersucht. Die Figur der demokratischen Selbstbindung sowie verschiedene modifizierte theoretische Ansätze der vergleichenden Policy-Analyse dienen hierfür vor dem Hintergrund der demokratischen Gegenwartspräferenz als theoretische Anker. Der überraschende Befund der fs/QCA ist, dass hin-sichtlich der Rahmenbedingungen keine systematischen Kausalitätsmuster identifiziert werden können und keine systematischen Unterschiede zur Institutionalisierung von Proxys mit niedrigem Wirkungspotenzial vorliegen. Kates These wird daher in Zweifel gezogen: Die Institutionalisierung von Proxys, die potenziell die demokratische Gegenwartspräferenz zugunsten zukünftiger Generationen und zuungunsten der Handlungsfreiheit heutiger Politiker reduzieren könnten, ist auch unter ungünstigen, gegenwartspräferenzinduzierenden Rahmenbedingungen möglich. Insgesamt liefert die Arbeit zahlreiche theoretische und empirische Erkenntnisse zu der Frage, wie die Aporie bearbeitet und zukünftige Generationen heute politisch repräsentiert werden können.

Is the self-determination of future generations impeded by lasting constitutions, as Thomas Jefferson suggests? In this article it is not only argued that the opposite is true, but also that the question misses the point. It is demonstrated that the very demand for future generations’ full self-determination is self-contradictory, and that it is impossible to achieve. Applying the all-affected principle to future generations, it is shown that we will always affect them, and that we should employ an attitude of ‘reflective paternalism’ towards them. With the help of new institutions reviewed in this article, the interests of future generations could be introduced into today’s political decision-making process. The role of constitutions is to provide the prerequisites for democratic self-determination and potentially also to facilitate the institutional empowerment of future generations.

Michael Rose’s Zukünftige Generationen in der heutigen Demokratie: Theorie und Praxis der Proxy-Repräsentation (Future Generations in Today’s Democracy: Theory and Practice of Proxy Representation) is an ambitious and fascinating work. It provides a new conceptualisation of the representation of future generations and it also delivers the most extensive empirical study of institutions for the representation of future generations available to date.

Role of Lala Har Dayal in the Ghadar Movement has not been property analyzed and determined. Some historians simply state that he was the founder of the Movement while others suggest it otherwise, but none of these was conclusively finalized based on facts. Ghadar Movement was started by the Indian immigrant in 1907 on the West (Pacific) Coast of North America. Within a span of 7 years, at the beginning of First World War, about 8,000 of them left their homes and hearths came to India to free it from the British rule. The Ghadar Movement did not succeed but it sowed the seeds for the future generations of revolutionaries to get motivation from its plans and deeds.

In recent years, scholars have deployed fiduciary concepts to explain or illuminate a dizzying array of public law regimes and institutions. To name but a few, this array includes constitutional law, administrative law, common law constitutionalism, international law, international human rights law, the law of judging, the law governing legislators, the law governing indigenous peoples, the law of armed conflict, national security and emergencies law, and international refugee law. The sheer range of topics treated may give the impression that there are few, if any, new frontiers in public fiduciary law. I argue that quite the opposite is true: the frontiers of public fiduciary law are vast and open. They are so because public fiduciary theory, within its domain (the domain of public law), is an interpretive theory of everything. I suggest that the theory underlying public fiduciary law is a theory of everything with respect to public law because the theory illuminates the salient features of the representative structure of public fiduciary relations. The most general normative implication of this representative conceptual structure is that office holders are under an obligation to exercise their power in a manner that can be understood as in the name of or on behalf of the persons subject to it. With this theory in place, we can explain why the frontiers are wide open in every sphere of public law—national, international, cosmopolitan, and transnational—and why they are just as expansive with respect to public fiduciary law and its relation to democracy, future generations, alternative theoretical frameworks, and jurisprudential inquiry. Indeed, the new frontiers of public fiduciary law are not simply open and expansive. They are also inviting.

Proti generacizmu. Oris pojmovanja pravičnosti do prihodnjih generacij. Povzetek Človeštvo se nahaja v globalni ekološki krizi v povezavi s podnebnimi spremembami, kar izziva ustaljene oblike političnega mišljenja in delovanja. Razpravo o pravičnosti apliciramo na prihodnost, pri čemer razumemo čas in naravno okolje kot skupno vez med ljudmi iz različnih časovnih obdobij. Generacijo, ki živi danes, postavimo v odnos z generacijami, ki bodo živele v bližnji in bolj oddaljeni prihodnosti. Pojem »generacizem« nam omogoči pokazati neustreznost odnosa do prihodnjih generacij kot eno izmed oblik diskriminacije. Z uničevanjem globalnega okolja pripadnike prihodnjih generacij postavljamo v krivičen položaj na podlagi človekovega časa rojstva. Čas v tem smislu razumemo kot eno izmed arbitrarnih okoliščin, ki ne zadostuje za temelj razlikovanja med ljudmi. Zagovarjamo pojmovanje medgeneracijske pravičnosti, ki nalaga državi odgovornost za uveljavitev ukrepov za zaščito okolja, tako da zaščiti prihodnje generacije in odpravi generacizem iz naše družbe in gospodarstva. Vpeljemo t.i. zeleno državo, ki naj na temelju pravičnosti do prihodnjih generacij uveljavi ukrepe za zaščito okolja. Ključni pojmi: podnebne spremembe, generacizem, medgeneracijska pravičnost, zelena država, John Rawls.