Nietzsche’s evaluation on Men of Ressentiment

The premise for Nietzsche’s ressentiment is his argument “no subject behind the deed,” which eliminates the “could have done otherwise” scenario that renders the masters responsible for the slaves’ suffering. This paper explores Nietzsche’s arguments on the association between the doer and the deed, and in addition, the concept of ressentiment in relation to such association. This paper underscores that without a proper interpretation of the argument “no subject behind the deed,” the notion of ressentiment can never be plausible.

Most contemporary scholarly work on posthumanism and transhumanism rests on the idea that both perspectives are part of an ontological continuum. This article, however, acknowledges and explores the differences between them. In order to prove that evident theoretical –and, therefore, practical– differences exist between both positions, a genealogy of their development from the 1980s is proposed. The definition of the two different ontologies associated to each of the discussed positions is followed by an analysis of the consequences that this theoretical separation would have for research. This paper also lays out a revision of their epistemologies and their ethical and practical implications. To conclude, we offer a contextualized justification of why the two discussed positions are actually antithetic, and how considering them as such would be useful for future research in the field.

ABSTRACT
This article investigates how Gabriele D’Annunzio’s The Triumph of
Death brings together Nietzsche’s ideas and Wagner’s music and
interweaves them with the motifs of literary Decadence and the
author’s own particular sexual politics. The novel is an experimental
text striving to be a Gesemtkunstswerk, an integrated work that
incorporates music, painting, poetry, regional folklore, and private
thoughts about personal and national power. I discuss the novel’s
themes of violent sexuality and the anxiety of powerlessness and
explore their implications for the fascist political aesthetics in which
D’Annunzio played a pioneering role.

ABSTRACT: Christian nationalism, a long-running and arguably increasingly influential political force, appears to consist mainly of an open set of affectively charged but cogni-tively underdetermined concepts and images that are capable of being constituted in a number of widely divergent forms. Despite this potential variety, the various instantia-tions of Christian nationalisms documented by the anthropology of Christianity tend to have similar features, even as they are actualized in quite different milieux and understood as being responses to quite different threats. Drawing on ethnographic work in the United States, this article argues that this recurrent crystallization of Christian nationalism into the specific form under certain conditions—the adoption of a temporally ambivalent eschatology, an ethics oriented around mimesis, and, most of all, an outward-facing ressentiment—works to self-catalyze the production of a racialized Christian nationalism that envisions itself at once as an entitled majority and as an embattled minority.

This paper considers how Canadian settlers - particularly in predominantly white, rural, and deindustrialized areas - are formed as political subjects invested with an extreme sense of having been injured or made fragile. From this supposed injury settlers engage in a politics of aggression and rancour that regularly targets Indigenous peoples. Developing Nietzsche’s concept ressentiment, I suggest that the processes of subject formation within Canada’s settler colonial project produces subjects who are unwilling and perhaps unable to articulate a politics that contests oppressive power, instead reproducing it.
These reflections on settler anger are grounded in a discussion of an ongoing dispute between the Saugeen Ojibway First Nation and the Township of South Bruce Peninsula over ownership of Sauble Beach. I highlight the ways in which reactionary populism is used by local politicians to evacuate the emancipatory power of popular unrest by intertwining the legitimate grievances of poor and working people suffering under neoliberalism, with an active reinvestment in processes of colonial dispossession that strive to erase, marginalize, and remove Indigenous peoples.

The first time that Nietzsche crossed the path of Dostoevsky was in the winter of 1886–87. While in Nice, Nietzsche discovered in a bookshop the volume L’esprit souterrain. Two years later, he defined Dostoevsky as the only psychologist
from whom he had anything to learn. The second, metaphorical encounter between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky happened on the verge of nihilism. Nietzsche announced the death of God, whereas Dostoevsky warned against the danger
of atheism.
This book describes the double encounter between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. Following the chronological thread offered by Nietzsche’s correspondence, the author provides a detailed analysis of Nietzsche’s engagement with Dostoevsky from the very beginning of his discovery to the last days before his mental breakdown. The second part of this book aims to dismiss the wide-spread and stereotypical reading according to which Dostoevsky foretold and criticized in his major novels some of Nietzsche’s most dangerous and nihilistic theories. In order to reject such reading, the author focuses on the following moral dilemma: If God does not exist, is everything permitted?

Nietzsche thinks health and strength are essential for the progress of culture, society and 'the type "man"' (BGE 62). He argues that such progress is inhibited by our contemporary life-denying value system. This is because contemporary morality is steeped in Judeo-Christian thinking which, Nietzsche says, represents a hatred of all things healthy, strong and powerful. This paper examines the arguments which Nietzsche gives in support of this view. I first introduce Nietzsche's concept of the 'will to power'. I then present the dimensions on which Christian morality and the impulses of the will to power intersect and lead to the degeneration of life. These are the ways in which Nietzsche thinks Christianity 'sickens', or 'weakens', people. I aim to present the feeling of powerless hatred, or 'ressentiment' as the unifying feature of Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality. I conclude by outlining Nietzsche's method for '*f+reedom from ressentiment' (EH Why I am so Wise: 6).

Se o cristianismo representa a negação absoluta da vida, então é somente mediante uma maldição plena e absolutamente radical do cristianismo que a vida pode ser afirmada de uma maneira igualmente plena e absolutamente radical, pois é somente pelo combate que a vida se supera, e quanto maior o inimigo, maior a superação.

MORAES, E. C. Além da metafísica e do niilismo: a sabedoria trágica de Nietzsche.

Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia), Universidade Federal de Goiás. 2013.

Esta dissertação de mestrado tem por objetivo refletir sobre a filosofia de Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), compreendida como tentativa de superação tanto da metafísica quanto do niilismo. Destaca-se a valorização nietzschiana de um pensamento dotado de senso histórico, fiel ao devir ininterrupto do real, o que implica em uma cosmovisão
semelhante à de Heráclito. Defende-se que a posição peculiar de Nietzsche na história da filosofia moral consiste na análise crítica da multiplicidade de diferentes valorações morais, sempre remetidas a suas fontes humanas (demasiado humanas). Através da atenção às circunstâncias e condições de surgimento, desenvolvimento e ocaso dos diversos ideais, valores morais e doutrinas religiosas, procuramos mostrar como Nietzsche constitui uma filosofia que rompe com a noção de valores divinos e imutáveis, além de des-estabilizar crenças em verdades absolutas. De modo a ilustrar o método genealógico nietzschiano em operação, investigam-se fenômenos como o ressentimento e o ascetismo, re-inseridos no fluxo histórico e compreendidos a partir de seus pressupostos psicológicos, fisiológicos e sócio-políticos. Com base em ampla pesquisa bibliográfica da obra de Nietzsche e comentadores (como Jaspers, Wotling, Rosset, Giacoiua, Moura, Ferraz, dentre outros), argumenta-se que a filosofia nietzschiana realiza uma ultrapassagem da cisão platônico-cristã entre dois mundos, além de uma superação do dualismo entre corpo e espírito. Procura-se descrever como a filosofia anti-idealista de Nietzsche, avessa ao absolutismo e ao  sobrenaturalismo, age como uma “escola da suspeita”, convidando-nos a um filosofar liberto de subserviência,
credulidade e obediência acrítica à tradição. Explora-se também a temática da “morte de Deus” e da derrocada dos valores judaico-cristãos, além da concomitante escalada do
niilismo, no contexto de uma filosofia que busca sugerir e abrir novas vias para a aventura humana ao mobilizar conceitos como amor fati, além-do-homem e “fidelidade à terra”. Nietzsche é compreendido não somente em seu potencial crítico, demolidor da tradição idealista e metafísica, mas também como criador de uma sabedoria trágica e dionisíaca que se posiciona nas antípodas tanto dos ideais ascéticos quanto dos ideários niilistas.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Friedrich Nietzsche, Sabedoria Trágica, Crítica à Metafísica, Niilismo, Ética.

El presente libre se encuentra conformado por diversos caminos interpretativos que guardan un concepto en común: el espíritu libre. La dificultad de definir que entiende Nietzsche por espíritu libre se debe precisamente a que se trata de un concepto que no puede ser determinado bajo un único punto de vista. Por el contrario, el espíritu libre se manifiesta de tal o cual manera según lo que demanda la circunstancia en la que se encuentra. Limitar en palabras al espíritu libre es atentar y entrar en contradicción contra su esencia danzarina. El espíritu libre mantiene una conexión directa con el nihilismo, el ultrahombre, la voluntad de poder y la doctrina del eterno retorno. Cada ensayo es un viaje en el cual se interpela al lector desde una perspectiva distinta, pero con una misma pregunta de fondo: ¿somos artistas de nuestra propia vida?

La Genealogia della morale si presenta al lettore come un compatto ma articolato crocevia di temi e di problematiche del pensiero di Friedrich Nietzsche. L'opera è caratterizzata da una particolare unità tematica, ma è al tempo stesso ricca di spunti che offrono accessi a questioni di non secondaria importanza e che, nel loro complesso, definiscono la trama di un pensiero che manifesta la propria ricchezza e originalità al lettore più accorto. Di tale ricchezza rende conto il presente volume, attraverso una serie di incursioni nel testo di Nietzsche che, illuminando alcuni passaggi cruciali della Genealogia della Morale, rendono conto della rilevanza filosofica di quest'opera e del ruolo che essa gioca nella storia del pensiero occidentale.

Bu çalışmanın amacı, ahlak ve duygular dünyasında bir takım olup bitenlerin temelinde bulunan ressentiment’ın Friedrich Nietzsche ve Max Scheler tarafından nasıl ele alındığını ve değerlendirildiğini incelemektir. Çalışmamıza temel oluşturması açısından Nietzsche ve Scheler’in felsefi görüşlerine de ana hatlarıyla yer verdik. Ressentiment kavramı üzerine yapılan etimolojik araştırmalarla başladığımız bu çalışmada, felsefe tarihi kitaplarından, filozofların ahlak üzerine görüşlerinin bulunduğu çalışmalardan ve ressentiment kavramının incelendiği çeşitli kaynaklardan yararlandık. Ancak çalışmamız boyunca kendimize temel kaynaklar olarak, Nietzsche’nin yazmış olduğu Ahlakın Soykütüğü ve Max Scheler’in hınç duygusunun sosyolojik ve fenomenolojik bir analizini sunduğu; bu duygunun kökenini, kültürdeki ve toplumsal yaşamdaki yerini incelediği Hınç (Ressentiment) adlı kitabını belirledik.

In this essay I evaluate a new and influential interpretation of Nietzsche's idea of the slave revolt in morality. This interpretation was first proposed by Bernard Reginster and has since been extended by R. Lanier Anderson and Avery Snelson. Citing textual evidence from Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morality , these scholars have argued for the counterintuitive view that nobles, not slaves, instigated the slave revolt in morality. This is because Nietzsche says that nobles create new values, introduces priests as nobles, and claims that priests began the slave revolt. However, against this new approach I argue that these scholars neglect important evidence from these same texts in which Nietzsche claims that the psychologically slavish can also create values, assumes that politically subordinated nobles can lose their psychological nobility, and asserts that the slave revolt was instigated by psychologically slavish priests. I also argue that these scholars ignore Nietzsche's related claims that the priestly peasant Luther renewed the Jewish slave revolt against re-ascendant Roman nobles and that the plebeian philosopher Socrates led a slave revolt in morality against the Athenian nobles. Thus, it turns out that none of the leaders of the slave revolt were noble and that one of them was not even priestly. I conclude with a defense of the traditional and straightforward view that Nietzsche always conceived of the slave revolt in morality as an act of revenge by oppressed people who are politically and psychologically ignoble.

Horkheimer e Adorno pensano innanzitutto a Sade e, meno plausibilmente, a Hobbes e de Maistre (Canetti concorderà su questo punto). 3. Mi permetto di rinviare al mio Studi sull'idea di potenza. Le radici giuridiche e teologiche della tradizione culturale dell'Occidente, ora in e. castrucci, Convenzione, forma, potenza. Scritti di storia delle idee e di filosofia giuridicopolitica, Giuffrè, Milano 2003, vol. ii, pp. 929 e passim, circa le valenze in campo teorico-politico dell'antropologia filosofica spinoziano-nietzscheana. Già nel suo importante scritto di storia delle idee del 1963 Roman Schnur avvertiva circa l'opportunità di raccogliere materiali «per la fondazione di un'antropologia politica i cui requisiti corrispondano a quelli che Arnold Gehlen ritiene essenziali ai fini di un'antropologia generale»

Die umfangreiche, dem Thema Fjodor Mikhailovich Dostoevskij und Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche gewidmete Fachliteratur bekundet die Intensität, mit der zu diesen zwei Denkern, seit Georg Brandes 1887 mit Nietzsche in Kontakt kam1, im folgenden Jahr Vorlesungen über seine Philosophie an der Universität Kopenhagen hielt2 und Essays über ihn3 und Dostoevskij4 veröffentlichte, aus den verschiedensten 1 Nietzsche kannte den Namen Georg Brandes seit 1883, wie seine Briefe an Ernst Schmeitzner vom 13. 3 Die nach seinen Vorlesungen über Nietzsche veröffentlichte Schrift hatte den Titel Aristokratisk Radikalisme. En Afhandling om Friedrich Nietzsche, in: Tilskueren. Maanedsskrift for literatur, samfundsspørgsmaal og almenfattelige videnskabelige skildringer, Aargang 7 (August 1889), 565-613. Später hat Brandes sie in: Essays: Fremmede Personligheder, Kopenhagen 1889, 151-244 publiziert (Der Text ist jetzt zu lesen in: Hauke Reich, Rezensionen und Reaktionen zu Nietzsches Werken 1872-1889, Berlin [u. a.] 2013, 814-852). Die deutsche Version des Brandes-Textes erschien 1890: Aristokratischer Radicalismus. Eine Abhandlung über Friedrich Nietzsche, in: Deutsche Rundschau, 16 Jg., Bd. LXIII, Heft 7 (April-Juni 1890), 52-89, Georg Brandes, Nietzsche, Berlin 2004, und die geplante Neuausgabe Georg Brandes, Vorlesungen über Friedrich Nietzsche (1888)/Aristokratischer Radikalismus (1889/90), dän.-dt. Ausgabe (Nach den Vorlesungsmanuskripten und dem Erstdruck herausgegeben und kommentiert von Per Dahl und Gert Posselt, Basel, im Erscheinen). Dank einer Übersetzung von Vera Mikhailovna Spasskaja wurde der Aufsatz 1900 in Russland bekannt: Russkaja mysl, 11 (1900), 130-153 und 12 (1900), 143-161. 4 Siehe Georg Brandes, Fjodor Dostojevski (1888), in: Ders., Indtryk fra Rusland (Eindrücke aus Russland), Kopenhagen 1888, 407-456 (Georg Brandes, Udvalgte skrifter. Unter redaktion af Sven Møller Kristensen. 6. Bind: Russisk og tysk litteratur, Kopenhagen 1986, 29-55). 5 Nikandr D. Tikhomirov, Nietzsche i Dostoevskij (cherty iz nravstvennogo mirovozzrenia togo i drugogo), in: Bogoslovskij vestnik, 7-8 (1902), 505-534; Lev Schestov, Dostoevskij i Nietzsche (Filosofia tragedii), St. Petersburg 1903 (dt.: Dostojewski und Nietzsche: Philosophie der Tragödie, über. von Reinhold von Walter, Köln 1924); Harald Schjelderup, Dostojewski og Nietzsche, in: Litteraturen.

This article offers a critique of a widespread political discourse that distinguishes 'resentment' from 'ressentiment', legitimating the former and dismissing the latter. This distinction not only incorporates some reactive sentiments at the cost of the depoliticisation of others, but also obscures the conditions of political action and judgement as such. Why is it necessary to protect the socio-political order from the risk of moral corruption in these terms, and for whom? First, a historical distinction is made between three problems that play a key role in the evaluation of the reactive attitudes: those pertaining to their rationality, their authenticity, and their justness. It is then argued that the first two problems are ill-posed. These problems concern differences in degree, and are therefore prone to the relativism of what, retrospectively, can be called 'the resentment-ressentiment complex'. The true problem with retributive passions concerns a difference in kind, not between resentment and ressentiment, but between active affects and passive or reactive affects. This Nietzschean 'demoralisation' of established discourses on the reactive attitudes by means of a historico-systematic reorientation leads to the concluding claim that while moral sentiments and political actions are always entangled, only the latter constitute the ground of social justice.

This paper provides a Confucian account of recognition. In contrast to contemporary recognition discourse (inspired by the Hegelian account of recognition) which emphasizes equal and reciprocal recognition, Confucianism regards the virtuous agent as one who affords recognition to others without seeking recognition for themselves. There is reason to take seriously the Confucian alternative to contemporary recognition discourse. Critical scholars of colonialism have pointed out how the politics of recognition between colonizer and colonized perpetuates the structure of unequal recognition. The comparative perspective on recognition that Confucianism offers will highlight the problematic assumptions that, I argue, actively shape misrecognition in practice.

At the end of his life, Gilles Deleuze famously mentioned that his last book was to be called 'Grandeur de Marx'. While it is unlikely that he ever started to actually write such a book, its title reminds us of an outspoken political text of Deleuze entitled 'The Grandeur of Yasser Arafat'. The aim of this contribution is to explore and define this concept of grandeur. After some initial remarks on 'Deleuze's aristocratic posture' and its supposedly problematic relation to actual politics, my strategy will be to develop two paradoxes, the paradox of health's intrinsic relation to illness and the paradox of glory's intrinsic relation to shame, and then relate both paradoxes to the ethical imperative of Stoicism that grandeur lies in becoming worthy of the event. I conclude with some brief reflections on what could be the grandeur of Marx.

The intersection between the Eastern European rabbinate and Russian religious thought has yet to be addressed adequately in academic scholarship. A key example of this intersection was Rabbi Shmuel Alexandrov (1865-1941), a maverick rabbi and intellectual whose fascinating writings are all but neglected. This article focuses on the influence of the Russian "God-Seekers" on Alexandrov’s thought and on the common ground that underlies that influence. The article also examines how Alexandrov used the God-Seekers’ idea of the neo-religious Übermensch to advance his own individualistic and anarchistic ideas, and how those ideas took shape in Alexandrov’s later writings.

Against the dominant interpretation that Pessoa is a modernist, one who is aiming at a certain self-construction, albeit a construction of the self as multiplicity, it is argued that Pessoa is a post-modernist who dissolves the notion of the self. To get a better understanding of what exactly is involved in self-construction we turn to the philosophy of Nietzsche, which highlights a certain kind of unity as essential to having a genuine self.  We then turn to interrogate the Nietzschean imperative to self-construction and, with several of Pessoa’s heteronyms in mind, question whether having a self really is a pre-condition for creativity, as Nietzsche seems to claim, or whether the imperative to self-construction is really underwritten by a commitment to the overcoming of ressentiment.

I develop a new approach to “resentment” and its role in moral life in early Confucian and modern Western thought, in particular Strawson, Scheler, and Nietzsche. In contrast to modern European discourses of recognition and resentment discussed in the first sections of this chapter, undoing resentment in oneself and in others is a primary element of becoming an ethically exemplary person in early Confucian ethics. Contemporary Western ethical theory routinely relies on the assumption that symmetry and equality are the primary means of undoing the psychological and social fixation involved in resentment, but the asymmetrical recognition of the priority of the other person is necessary for undoing and letting go of resentment in early Confucian ethics. The author(s) of the Analects recognized both the pervasiveness of resentment under certain social conditions and the ethical demand to counter it both within oneself and in relation to others through self-cultivation and ritual propriety. Confucian ethics consequently encompasses a nuanced and realistic moral psychology of resentment and the ethical self-cultivation necessary for dismantling it in promoting a condition of humane benevolence (ren). Benevolence is oriented toward others even as it is achieved in the care of the self and self-cultivation.

SENA, Allan Davy Santos. Nietzsche e a moral da compaixão. 2006. 54 f. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (graduação) - Universidade do Estado do Pará, Belém, 2006.


Estudo que tem por objetivo promover uma reflexão sobre os valores ocidentais, a partir da indicação de como Nietzsche interpreta a compaixão, mostrando quais as implicâncias disso em sua crítica feita ao cristianismo; e apresentar, outrossim, a proposta de Nietzsche para o surgimento de uma vida abundante de força e saúde mediante a negação da compaixão como virtude. Adotou-se como metodologia a pesquisa bibliográfica de natureza qualitativa, dentro de uma abordagem interpretacionista, pautada no interacionismo simbólico, desenvolvido por George Mead (1934) e Herbert Blumer (1969). Verificou-se que Nietzsche concebe a valorização da compaixão como virtude algo pernicioso, pois apresenta um perigo incomensurável para a vida enquanto superação de forças ao tornar o olhar sobre a mesma rancoroso e doentio. Para Nietzsche, o cristianismo representa uma negação da vida, algo nascido do ressentimento perante a efetividade, um aniquilamento da vontade de viver e dos valores vitais em favor de um mundo imaginário, criado por aqueles que não suportam as dificuldades inerentes ao mundo real e desejam vingar-se dele. Sendo assim, Nietzsche vê a compaixão como a virtude cristã por excelência, o fundamento de toda a sua moral, justamente porque é mediante os afetos compassivos que a vida é negada plenamente.  Destarte, segundo Nietzsche, a compaixão não deve, em favor de uma vida ascendente, ser louvada e exigida como máxima moral, pois, longe de eliminar o sofrimento, tende a aumentá-lo e conservá-lo, impedindo, assim, que a vida se supere por meio do combate efetivo aos males. A crítica que Nietzsche faz à moral da compaixão, e conseqüentemente ao cristianismo, pode se tornar um instrumento de enorme valor para a prática docente do profissional licenciado em Ciências da Religião, pois tal crítica obriga a que se reflita gravemente sobre a legitimidade dos valores e convenções vigentes na sociedade ocidental. 

Palavras-chave: Nietzsche. Moral. Compaixão. Cristianismo.

Nietzsche ends the section 30 of The Antichrist with the following statement, which reinforces the thesis that the evangel of Jesus is the result of a morbid hyperexcitability and a will to pleasure proper of weakness: “– The fear of pain, even of infinitely minute pain – that can end in no other way than in a religion of love...” To understand this sentence, it is necessary to turn to the posthumous fragment 14 [130] of spring of 1888, in which Nietzsche did a sketch of an attempt of a demonstration of this argument.

Vita contemplativa, vida ativa e cultura As reflexões sobre arte, cultura e indivíduo durante a fase inter-mediária do pensamento de Nietzsche, em especial, em Aurora e Gaia Ciência, mostram um pensador cético em relação à realização de um pro-jeto alemão para uma cultura forte, conduzida pelo livre pensamento, pela criação artística dos indivíduos, pelos rumos da ciência sem que, contudo, houvesse um total esfriamento do espírito ou manipulação dos sentimentos, das forças e energias individuais. Este trabalho busca mostrar que Nietzsche, mesmo apresentando uma possível via para a cultura em Humano, demasiado humano, constatou que o mau da cultu-ra que, segundo pensadores dos séculos XX e XXI, entre eles Adorno e Horkheimer 1 , assola a sociedade contemporânea, tinha seu gérmen na crise cultural derivada das transformações sociais de seu tempo.

Ongoing discussion of this paper here: https://www.academia.edu/s/cf13d33860?source=link
Philosophy – whether traditional or contemporary – has nothing to say about the human metaphysical predicament, and cannot even offer a basic phenomenology of the human condition. Part of the problem is the ongoing confusion as to what philosophy actually amounts to, and what it can achieve. It is necessary to demystify philosophy, and have it restricted to the discipline of critical thinking, and it should not be thought of as possessing any substantial theoretical content of its own. It is a method, a skillset, a series of techniques, not a repository of various highbrow theories, whether about mind, epistemology, ontology, cosmology, science, or anything else. Metaphysics is an entirely distinct and separate field of inquiry, and concerns the human predicament, and ultimate human fulfilment, and it is to this end that critical thinking skills can usefully be applied. The purpose of this short study is to give some help to those hoping to gain an insight into the metaphysical realms of their being, and who would like some guidance with regard to those formal and academic disciplines supposedly geared to dealing with that very subject.

The meaning of negativity within the context of interpretative practices is likely to unravel, thus manifesting different or even divergent heuristic strategies. However, these have been equivocally referred to as negative hermeneutics, an expression that occurs in the discourse of authors such as Ricœur and Jameson. This “negative,” either challenging or complementing “positive” hermeneutics, has consequences for the thought of “literary science,” if there is such a thing and such a possibility.

This essay contributes to and reframes the preliminary scholarly
assessments of President Donald J. Trump’s appeals to rage,
malice, and revenge by sketching the rhetorical dimensions of an
underlying emotional-moral framework in which victimization,
resentment, and revenge are inverted civic virtues. I elaborate on
the concept of ressentiment (re-sentiment), a condition in which a
subject is addled by rage and envy yet remains impotent,
subjugated and unable to act on or adequately express
frustration. Though anger and resentment capture part of Trump’s
affective register, I suggest that ressentiment accounts for the
unique intersection where powerful sentiments and self-serving
morality are coupled with feelings of powerlessness and
ruminations on past injuries. Thus, shifting focus from the rhetoric
of resentment to that of ressentiment explains how Trump is able
to sustain the affective charge of animus without forfeiting the
moral high ground of victimhood to his audience’s “oppressors”—
Democrats, the press, criminals, immigrants, foreign adversaries,
welfare recipients, the Me Too movement, “globalists,” and racial
Others.

‘Art Criticism versus Poetry: An introduction to Adrian Stokes’s “Pisanello”’, Comparative Criticism, v. 17 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, September 1995), 133-160 and ‘Pisanello: First of four essays on the Tempio Malatestiano at Rimini’, ed. Richard Read with footnotes and 17 b. & w. illustrations, Comparative Criticism, v. 17 (September 1995), 161-207, with 19 b&w illustrations. This first publication of the unpublished section of Adrian Stokes's essay on Pisanello, dropped by the editors of the Hound & Horn journal with the enigmatic promise 'To be continued,' is introduced in terms of Stokes's polemically prose answer to the poetry of Ezra Pound's Cantos where Pisanello's early Renaissance medals are concerned. Stokes's hypnogogically literal ekphrases (conveniently illustrated next to relevant passages here) are informed by discursive tensions between prose and poetry that implicate major modernist authors of his day, Victorians such as Ruskin, Pater, Symonds and Wilde, and in particular the Nietzchean polarities of nobility and ressentiment. The politics surrounding the absence of the second half are explained and recent interpretations of its absence are refuted.

This paper is a philosophical analysis ofHeidegger and Nietzsche's approach tometaphysics and the associated problem ofnihilism. Heidegger sums up the history ofWestern metaphysics in a way which challengescommon sense approaches to values education.Through close attention to language, Heideggerargues that Nietzsche inverts thePlatonic-Christian tradition but retains theanthropocentric imposition of ‘values’. Ihave used Nietzsche's theory to suggest aslightly different definition of metaphysicsand nihilism which draws attention to theontological parameters of human truths as astruggle between competing sets of conflictingor contradictory values (perspectives) thatopens space for rethinking and re-educatinghuman possibilities. How this openness willshow up in educational theory and practice isonly beginning to be evoked. The twophilosophers indicate an approach to issues ofmorality, decision making and knowledgeproduction which may surprise and disconcerttraditional views. As the forefathers ofpost-structuralist thinking, Nietzsche andHeidegger offer a critique of Humanism whileretaining the Renaissance tradition ofpositioning education as the well spring ofvalues in society. It is through the generationof new knowledges, the development of critiqueand the nurturing of character that societyreformulates itself in relation to the earth.The ethical evaluation of these new forms ofknowledge is crucial to the creative and caringregeneration of the human environment, asopposed to the corrosive adoption ofconsumerism and usury.

I suggest that, although the nonsensicalist challenge (obviously) matters, it has, at least in its Wittgensteinian form, been widely ignored.  On the other hand, those who still adhere to nonsensicalism (mainly Wittgensteinians) have been equally remiss in their failure to examine its presuppositions.