Military and strategic studies

Against the backdrop of Morini's 2010 article focused on the need to take regional perspectives into account when articulating an Afghan strategy, and in light of the harried 2021 withdrawal, argues for the use of what Dr. Jeffrey Reilly calls, "Strategic Design," taught within Air Command & Staff's Joint All-Domain Strategist Concentration (JADS), a parallel process designed to either validate strategy as received or propose one when it is missing, in preparation for the more familiar operational design process.

Two technological races, drivers of disruptive change and geostrategic (re)positioning of the great powers, are currently taking place: the quantum technological race and the Artificial Intelligence (AI) race. The present article develops a strategic and technological reflection on the meeting point between these two races, this reflection leads us to the Quantum Artificial Intelligence of Things linked to a Quantum Internet of Things, we discuss these two concepts and provide an experimental example of a utility maximizing quantum robot endowed with a Quantum Recurrent Neural Network works on a decision problem, implemented on IBM's quantum computers, this example is used for a reflection on the strategic challenges coming from the QIoT and the QAIoT, ranging from geopolitical challenges to the issue of the technological singularity.

Nell’articolo Fortificazione campale e ordini di battaglia. Un esempio piemontese del 1743, pubblicato nel Fascicolo N. 7 (giugno 2021), della Nuova Antologia Militare viene illustrato un procedimento di contromarcia per file, che avrebbero dovuto attuare le truppe sabaude durante l’azione di fuoco prevista per interdire la progressione di un contingente franco-spagnolo sulle Alpi piemontesi. In seguito a rilievi critici e riflessioni successive si è rivelato opportuno correggere quanto detto in merito alla manovra di contromarcia

Introduction The Mau Mau rebellion surprised the British government in 1952 by its ferocity and its initial success. Although the expectation of a speedy suppression of what appeared to be primitive and atavistic groups without firearms was frustrated, law and order was restored by 1955/6. The duration and protracted effort of the counterinsurgency beg an evaluation of its influence on the fate of Kenya as a colony. Yet, decolonisation did not arrive until nearly a decade later. Hence, the contention over the possible effect of the Mau Mau on the British retreat from Kenya. In the discussion of Kenyan decolonisation, two main approaches can be detected. One, focuses on the processes in Kenyan society, the other on the British establishment. Within the first approach, opinion may range from the assertion that with decolonisation the Mau Mau won a belated victory to the statement that the nationalist struggle during the period of 1956-1963 constituted an alternative to the Mau Mau str...

This reflection on the influence of Napoleon and the consequences of the wars on the major British poets of the Romantic era is meant to illustrate how the reactions of both nobility and commoners are recorded in literature and media. The dual perception of Napoleon as both hero and tyrant and the atrocious suffering of those at home and bloody battles are manifest in the works of the major poets, William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Percy Bysshe Shelly, and especially George Gordon, Lord Byron. Even today, Napoleon transcends precise definition and he has inspired some of the greatest poets in British literature.

La presencia del terrorismo islamista en internet ha cambiado cuantitativa y cualitativamente en los últimos años. Nunca, hasta ahora, había resultado tan fácil acceder a toda clase de propaganda extremista a través de la red, en general, y las redes sociales, en particular, gracias a la web 2.0. El objetivo declarado por parte de organizaciones como Estado Islámico es difundir una ideología y una subcultura de naturaleza extremista que justifica la violencia. Este grupo dirige su atención, sobre todo, a jóvenes musulmanes que habitan en la diáspora occidental. En tal contexto, este trabajo analiza la evolución de la presencia del terrorismo islamista en internet, para lo cual se enfoca en las medidas recientemente aprobadas en Europa para enfrentar esta amenaza de carácter ubicuo, difuso y, a la vez, tremendamente peligroso.

Lethality as a consequence of contemporary Military technologies is an inevitability to exploit and defend against. Weapons development and doctrines must therefore rise above today’s operational needs and seek out future operational possibilities; Militaries must learn to live in the future.

El objetivo general es examinar la bibliografía publicada sobre la educación en bioética y su relevancia para la formación humana integral del profesional. Además de una búsqueda selectiva, descriptiva y exploratoria mediante el uso de palabras clave, se analizaron las posturas de autores e investigadores en este tema, y se llegó a la conclusión de que es necesario contar con una visión bioética para fortalecer el desarrollo del ser humano en la educación superior. El texto consta de tres momentos: primero, se revisan de manera breve los planes de estudio establecidos para la formación de oficiales del Ejército (se verificaron cuatro propuestas de formación militar de academias militares de América) y se hace una descripción problematizadora de la realidad bioética; segundo, se analiza la educación en bioética con base en las dimensiones de humanidad, integralidad y vocación militar; finalmente, se establecen resultados y conclusiones del proceso de revisión.

This article takes the current debate between the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches as a point of departure to make its contribution by shifting the focus from the operational and tactical to the strategic realm. To this end, it traces the meanings of each approach to its historical origins, discussing the theoretical underpinnings as to distill the basic tenets and to evaluate to what extent each is suitable to counter an insurgency. The central argument of this article is that while both approaches have different "philosophies," they are two sides of the same coin. Thus, what needs to be taken into account is the strategic dimension and, logically enough, the political, when referring to counterinsurgency as the two will be determinant in which approach is employed.

The presence of Islamist terrorism on the Internet has changed quantitatively and qualitatively in recent years. Never, has it been easier to access all kinds of extremist propaganda through the net, in regular and social networks; in particular, thanks to Web 2.0. The stated objective of organizations such as the Islamic State is to spread an extremist ideology and subculture that justifies violence. This group directs its attention, above all, to young Muslims in the Western Diaspora. In this context, this paper analyzes the evolution of the presence of Islamist terrorism on the Internet for which it focuses on the measures recently approved in Europe to confront this ubiquitous, diffuse, and, at the same time, extremely dangerous threat.

Las pymes son parte significativa de la economia colombiana, pues participan en todos los sectores industriales, entre los cuales el de mayor relevancia es el comercial, tanto por la cantidad de establecimientos como por el volumen de transacciones. En la investigacion de la que se deriva este articulo, se pretendio caracterizar las principales variables que propician la manipulacion de datos financieros en las pymes de Medellin, a traves de un instrumento de medicion disenado por los autores. En este sentido, se definieron las variables dependientes e independientes que fueron objeto de analisis: evasion, elusion y manipulacion de datos. Se evidencio la tendencia a alterar la informacion financiera por parte de las empresas estudiadas, lo cual conlleva una reflexion sobre las causas de este fenomeno y las posibles formas de mitigarlo.

Hilokuah,  Hafeni  Hangula.  The  training  of  officers  in  the  Namibian  Army  and  that  of  the Brazilian  Army:  analysis of the  possible benefits  to the  Namibia  Army  that may  be  gained  by the  training  of  the  Namibian  cadets  at  the  Military  Academy  of  Agulhas  Negras.  Resende: AMAN, 2018. Monograph. This  study  addresses  the  training  of  officers  in  the  Namibian  Army  and  in  the  Brazilian  Army with  a  main  objective  of  analyzing  the  potential  benefits  to  the  Namibian  from  the  training  of Namibian  cadets  at  AMAN,  and  to  compare  the  training  of  officers  in  the  two  friendly  nations, with  the  intention  of  exploring  the  skills  and  knowledge  that  these  Namibian  cadets  will acquire  upon  completing  the  course  at  AMAN  and  how  they  may  be  applied  for  benefit  of  the Namibian Army. The  study  uses  a  bibliographical  methodology  to present an overview of  how the  training  of  officers  in  each  of  the  countries  is  conducted  and  analyzes  the  main  objectives of  the  training  in  each  country,  as  well  as  the  competencies  that  combatants  officers  trained  at AMAN  are  posed  to  acquire  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  officers’  formation  course.  Finally,  it is  concluded  that  the  Namibian  Army  does  stand  to  benefit  from  the  training  of  its  cadets  at AMAN,  however  there  are  certain  aspects  that  can  to  be  improved  for  the  benefit  of  all  the involved parties.
Keywords: Officer Training,  Benefits, Skills/  Competencies, Namibian  Army,  Brazilian  Army, AMAN.

The Second World War stands across the 20 th century like a colossus. Its death toll, geographical spread, social dislocation and genocidal slaughter were unprecedented. It was literally a world war, devastating Europe, China and Japan, triggering massive movements of population, and unleashing forces of nationalism in Asia and Africa that presaged the end of European colonialism. The international order was changed irrevocably, most notably in the rise of the two superpowers and the decline of Great Britain. For Australia too, though the loss of life in the conflict was comparatively small, the war had a profound impact. The white population faced for the first time the threat of invasion, with Australian territory being bombed from the air and sea in 1942. 1 The economy and society were mobilized to an unprecedented degree, with 993,000 men and women, of a population of nearly seven million, serving in the military forces. Nearly 40,000 of these were killed in action, died of woun...

Las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, a lo largo de más de 50 años de conflicto armado, han obtenido una experiencia relevante en la compresión de las dinámicas de la violencia y los factores que potencian la conflictividad. Por esta razón, en un nuevo escenario de posconflicto surge como objetivo la internacionalización de las capacidades de las Fuerzas Militares mediante la participación en operaciones para el mantenimiento de la paz (OMP). Resulta relevante, en consecuencia, evaluar las ventajas y desventajas de esta participación de forma prospectiva, entre 2019 y 2023. Para ello, se desarrolla un marco conceptual sobre el rol militar en este campo, se definen las principales capacidades de las Fuerzas Militares de acuerdo con lo planteado en el Plan Estratégico Militar 2030 y se identifican los escenarios de interés a nivel internacional (con prioridad para aquellas zonas de conflicto irregular). Finalmente, mediante la implementación de una metodología prospectiva, se evalúan aquellos factores que pueden aumentar o disminuir el protagonismo de las Fuerzas Militares en escenarios de OMP.

This article examines the persistence of insecurities within Somalia through the development of terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab. Therefore, specific attention will be given to the question: How has Al-Shabaab used the internal social environment present after the collapse of Somalia to their advantage in order to accumulate and project power within Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa? Particular emphasis is placed upon the perception that, as a failed state, Somalia has the potential to serve as a launching point for indigenous terrorist activity within neighbouring states. Al-Shabaab has been known to do exactly that. They have explicitly orchestrated attacks in countries such as Uganda and Kenya in protest of their respective military interventions in Somalia. This issue warrants further exploration, as the majority of the literature discussing the

El objetivo de este artículo es demostrar la necesidad para Colombia de una inteligencia estratégica basada en el aporte de la disciplina histórica para su análisis. Se asume que historia e inteligencia, en cuanto disciplinas, tienden a ser interdependientes, pues incluso en lo metodológico resultan ampliamente complementarias. El aporte historiográfico para el desarrollo de la inteligencia ha sido significativo, tanto para reconstruir la evolución de esta como para contextualizar la inteligencia estratégica. La falta de esta última en Colombia se explica por la adopción del modelo francés de “alta policía” y por una historiografía que ha propugnado el culto a la formalidad del derecho internacional por parte de los dirigentes colombianos.

The Battle of Vimy Ridge is almost exclusively considered a land battle where aircraft played minor roles in scouting and counter-battery work. Meanwhile, a parallel but separate air battle known as “Bloody April” was waged overhead where German pilots enjoyed significant technical and geographic advantages over their opponents resulting in very high losses for the British and French flying services. In reality, the ground and air battles were inextricably linked. The Royal Flying Corps under Major-General Hugh Trenchard made great strides towards the development of a modern air campaign. Prior to the battle, aerial reconnaissance provided crucial information for planning the battle, bombing raids were staged to interdict the battlefield, and attempts were made to blind the Germans by destroying their kite balloons. During the battle itself, contact flights ranged over the battlefield to provide communications from the front, continuous artillery patrols were flown which helped to d...

This article explores the use of crowdsourced volunteer battalions by the Ukrainian government in response to Russian aggression in the Donbas region. It examines the weakness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, contributions of civil-society, and the creation, development, and combat operations of volunteer battalions. The use of crowdsourcing provided the emergency military force that the Ukrainian Government needed to stabilise the Donbas region in the face of the 2014 Russian-backed separatist offensive. The article concludes by raising concerns that the negative consequences of crowdsourcing war, while mitigated by actions taken by the Ukrainian Government, have the potential to return if the situation in Ukraine deteriorates.

This paper aims to stimulate a debate on how Violent Conflict (VC) is obstructing the success of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It briefly examines progress with the MDGs in Africa using officially published United Nation (UN) Reports and global MDG monitoring information. It also provides readers with a preliminary exposition on how violent conflicts pose the greatest challenges to progress with achieving the MDGs. It argues that violent conflict makes chronic poverty even worse – from household to national levels. The paper warns that many countries in Africa will fall far behind in attaining the MDGs by the targeted date of 2015 unless African states and regional institutions such as the African Union can put a decisive end to the current conflicts and address the threat of new conflicts. Having presented comparative evidence from various countries (those on track to meet the MDGs and those lagging behind), the significance of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and pe...

December 2005 speech in Winnipeg.“You don't defend national sovereignty with flags, cheap election rhetoric or advertising campaigns” proclaimed the future Prime Minister,“you need forces on the ground, ships in the sea and proper surveillance”(3). This speech set the scene for a renewed government focus on Arctic sovereignty. It also foreshadowed how the issue was to be dealt with. In the years to follow, the government announced a series of significant plans for new Arctic defence programs: a new icebreaker, new patrol craft, a ...

On 16 February 1943 a meeting was held in Tripoli attended by senior American and British officers to discuss the various lessons learned during the Libyan campaign. The focus of the meeting was a presentation by General Bernard Montgomery. it is clear that operations in the Western Desert had a significant impact on the development of British and American tactical air doctrine in the Second World War and beyond. Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, commander of the Northwest Africa Tactical Air Force (previously the Desert Air Force) made a presentation to the assembled group of generals and other senior officers. Coningham made some very important statements in his speech and his ideas were to become the cornerstone of American and British tactical air doctrine for the rest of the war, and indeed, into the post-war period. These statements made by Montgomery and Coningham were to become the basis for Anglo-American tactical air doctrine for the remainder of the war, and indeed, ...

People are often locked into cognitive traps because it is in the interests of certain individuals and groups to sustain one pattern of belief rather than another." 1-Gareth Morgan "Organization is an attempt to order the intrinsic flux of human action, to channel it towards certain ends, to give it a particular shape, through generalizing and institutionalizing particular meanings and rules." 2-Haridimos Tsoukas and Robert Chia Over the past decade, traditional military planning methodology and doctrine has gained an unlikely dance partner-the ambiguous, conceptual, and controversial process called 'design.' 3 Although I will expand in this article on what exactly

Good evening and thank you for inviting me. It is always a pleasure to return to Calgary and a special pleasure to be invited to give the annual Ross Ellis lecture. I had the good fortune to research and write about the Calgary Highlanders while a number of Col. Ellis' friends and comrades were able to discuss the storied events of 1944-45 with me. I have interviewed hundreds of veterans and heard many stories about leadership and courage but none more impressive than the tribute his comrades paid to Ross Ellis. You will be pleased to know that my 1990 book The Brigade: The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade 1939-1945, which draws upon these interviews, has been published in the United States bringing the story of the Calgary Highlanders, Black Watch and Maisonneuves to an American audience. 1 When David Bercuson invited me to present the 2008 Ellis lecture he indicated that I was to address contemporary security and defence issues but he and his colleagues were kind enough to let me approach this task as an historian who believes that studying the past can help us to think more clearly and analytically about the present and future. History may only teach the most obvious of lessons but there is no limit to the questions it raises. What I propose to do tonight is to examine the decisions taken by Prime Minister Sir Robert Laird Borden and Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie in the last years of the Great War and then raise some questions about foreign and defence policy in the era of Prime Minister Harper and General Hillier. Canadians who followed international events had debated the possibility of war with Germany for some years before 1914 but few of them connected the assassination Canadian spokesmen who from the first emphasized Canada's national responsibility.

Much has been brought to light in recent decades regarding the oppressive excesses of Joseph Stalin's secret police, the NKVD. Despite the enormous oeuvre of 1 NKVD was an acronym for Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del or People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. As a law enforcement body, it was responsible for a variety of duties related to state security, which included foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, border security, control of local police, and regulation of prisons. The NKVD's covert activities also involved kidnappings, assassinations, deportations, and mass executions.

Appeasement was a foreign policy of pacifying an aggrieved country through negotiation in order to prevent war. The prime example is Britain’s policy toward Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the 1930s. British Prime Minister, N. Chamberlain sought to accommodate Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and took no action when Germany absorbed Austria in 1938. When Hitler prepared to annex ethnically German portions of Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain negotiated the notorious Munich Agreement, which permitted German annexation of the Sudetenland, in western Czechoslovakia. The idea behind appeasement was Christian pacifism - peaceful rather than violent or belligerent relations should govern human intercourse; arbitration, surrender, or migration should be used to resolve disputes. Pacifism became widespread as a reaction to the scale of killing in the WW I and the use of universal male conscription, and gained further support after the creation of nuclear weapons. However, the Holocaust, and other industrial scale abuses of human rights, caused many to think that there could be cases when war was the least-bad course of action. Appeasement was a huge mistake on the part of the Allied nations. It is what caused WWII to occur on an even larger scale than WWI as it allowed Nazis to gain an enormous amount of power and time, posing a threat to all of Europe. Appeasement emboldened Hitler’s aggression as he gained increased confidence after annexing each new piece of land without any intervention by the League of Nations. Appeasement led to WWII. As Hitler continued to invade territories and build a military capable of fighting a major war—despite the Treaty of Versailles—Britain and France allowed him to continue, hoping he would leave them alone if they left him alone. As Sikorski (2008: 14) noted, ''In Western Europe, our friends like to say that they went  to war for Poland in 1939. What actually happened was that Britain and France declared war, but then did not lift a finger to help us.'' Although allied help came late, appeasement, provided the Allies with more time to prepare for war. The idea that the Munich Agreement had restored peace fooled the Allies into a stagnant state since none of them were fully prepared for the war when it arrived. Some people saw Communism as the biggest threat to European stability. They thought that Germany could act as a buffer, especially as Hitler was very anti-Communist, besides Britain was not ready for war. In reality, the policy of appeasement is what allowed Hitler to successfully transfer troops to the Rhineland in 1936 which led to further military actions (eg the annexation of Austria). Hitler later said that the march into the Rhineland was one of the most stressful periods of his life since he knew that if the French opposed them they were not strong enough to put up a decent resistance and would have to withdraw. If the Allied nations had intervened collectively at this point in time, then perhaps Germany’s increasing military aggression could have been suppressed and WWII could have been averted (or at least reduced in size). But the policy of appeasement gave Hitler what he wanted and nurtured Germany's confidence in Hitler’s plans of European domination. The annexation of new lands by Germany contributed to the increase in German strength. For example, the Rhineland provided Germany with stronger defence of its borders and Austria provided Germany with gold, weapons, soldiers, and deposits of iron ore (which resulted in the increased production of munitions). All of these things that increased Germany’s strength and contributed to the enormous scale of destruction in WWII when the direct clash happened. Appeasement was a mistake as it provided the public and politicians with the misconception that peace was restored and war averted when Germany’s demands were met. This prevented people from realizing Hitler’s true goals (world domination — as stated in 'Mein Kampf') and taking action to stop him earlier on. The Allied leaders had simply been tricked into a passive state by Hitler. Appeasement was a mistake since it allowed Germany to make agreements with other countries (which Germany was not allowed to do according to the Treaty of Versailles), increasing German confidence in its military dominance. For example, nothing was done in 1936 when the Rome-Berlin Axis formalized the alliance between Italy and Germany. Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. This occurred because Russia observed that the allies had not stood up to Hitler when he had invaded Czechoslovakia, he thought that the allies would adopt the same nonchalance if Hitler attacked Russia. So, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was made. This pact (in which Russia and Germany secretly agreed to divide Poland between them) permitted Germany to invade Poland, effectively starting WWII. It also increased Germany’s influence in Europe to the east and temporarily removed a major power from the Allied side. All of this contributed to the enlarged scale of destruction and death during WWII. Appeasement was a mistake since it failed to achieve its one goal, keep the peace. Chamberlain, felt it was his duty to ''strain every nerve to avoid a repetition of the WWI.'' Even if the Allied leaders themselves had decided earlier on that military action was necessary, it is quite likely that they would not have had enough volunteers to sustain a proper military campaign. The citizens of Allied nations mainly supported the policy of appeasement and were not willing to go to war over small, new, foreign lands that they had never heard of before in their lives. At that time, many people did not see Hitler as a threat and very few outside of Germany knew what he was really planning (although he had outlined many of his ideas in 'Mein Kampf'). Many politicians thought that if Germany could regain its national pride and the territories it had lost after WWI then perhaps a war could be avoided. Perhaps it would have been possible to influence the public opinion through propaganda in order to garner support for stopping Hitler. Then maybe the Allies could have set up an armed force large enough to stop Hitler in the Rhineland (since his forces were weak there). However, the Allied leaders themselves had little idea of Hitler’s true intentions, so they likely had similar opinions to the public at the time and did not wish to engage in armed conflict. The Allies had decreased their armies after the end of WWI while Germany had started doing just the opposite once Hitler came to power. The Allies needed more time. Lastly, many people believed that Nazi Germany was a necessary asset in holding back the communists from Europe and the rest of the world. Appeasement was quite popular, people did not yet understand the magnitude of Hitler’s plans for all of Europe, they feared the start of another world war. Appeasement seemed a pragmatic option that will keep the peace. People naively believed in Hitler's promises underestimating military expansionism. Instead, allied leaders should have put in place an immediate threat of crippling economic sanctions, a robust force posture and an assertive strategy. Above all, the Allies should have prepared a united front and a response - when attack occurs on one country others are ready to stand up in collective self-defence to quickly disarm an aggressor. The absence of a firm Western response only encouraged Nazis to act aggressively without impunity. When dealing with an opportunistic aggressor that will continue to make demands, including the seizure of territory, as long as the costs and risk of doing so are manageable, coercive strategies work better than reassurance/appeasement ones. Martin Wight (1978: 137, 143) was right, “War is inevitable, but particular wars can be avoided.'' Appeasement could have been avoided, instead it dictated when and how WW II started and it likely influenced both the length and magnitude of the war (considering how long it took for the Allies to get involved, had there been an earlier action much of human suffering would have been prevented). The lesson on how to prevent small wars turning into world wars - appeasement of any kind, notably concessions to dictators, only fed their appetites. Appeasement caused tensions to build up for far too long, thus resulting in a war that affected much of the globe. It impacted much of the 20th Century through the foreign relations that it created. Tense Russian-American relations originated from the decision to appease Hitler. Appeasement was simply the dire circumstances of the war that eventually threw them together. After the end of the war, these tensions increased, resulting in the Cold War and the deadly nuclear arms race that threatened world peace once again. It is important to understand the meaning of appeasement and its implications to properly assess and act on future world conflicts.

Getting the strategy right does not guarantee a successful outcome, but all other things being equal it certainly stacks the odds in favour of one. The Soviet Union was strategically prepared for war in June 1941, but poor operational-strategic deployment and operational and tactical failings allowed the Wehrmacht to achieve far more through operational and tactical competence than perhaps need have been the case. Nonetheless, despite poor operational-strategic deployment and operational and tactical inadequacies during Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army was able to survive the summer and autumn of 1941, after which a combination of improvements at the operational and tactical levels and superior resource mobilization stemming to a large extent from strategic planning made German victory increasingly improbable. Soviet strategic planning and ideology were closely related. For the Soviet revolutionary project that stemmed from the October 1917 revolution there were ultimately two possible outcomes-worldwide revolution or capitalist defeat of the sole beacon for international communism. 1 For the ideologically committed the second was of course not an option for the revolutionary project as a whole-even if the Soviet Union was defeated and the doubters of 1917 who argued that revolution in Russia was premature were vindicated, it would only be a matter of time before revolution came.

The Oka Crisis is viewed by many as a definitive moment in Native-Canadian relations. However, the deployment of 4,500 personnel of the Canadian Forces (CF) to Kanesatake and Kahnawake during Operation SALON overshadowed the deployment of the CF to Akwesasne over three months earlier under Operation FEATHER/AKWESASNE. Using a variety of sources, the majority of which were secured through the Access to Information Act, and personal interviews, this article examines not only Operation FEATHER/AKWESASNE itself, but its direct relationship to the events at Kahnawake and Kanesatake during the Oka Crisis while highlighting the differences of Canada’s complex internal security legislations. The CF operation at Akwesasne, lasting seven months (1 May to 5 December 1990), has been wholly neglected by scholars in its own context but also in the historiography of the “Indian Summer” of 1990. It is the forgotten front of the Oka Crisis.

The issues of missile proliferation have attracted serious attention at the end of the last century as this threat had suddenly emerged endangering the leading global democracies. The traditional instruments of coping with it in the past have proved to be unsatisfactory in controlling the proliferating urges of certain problem states, including Russia. This article, while briefly tracing the genesis and analyzing the periods of Moscow’s missile-related dealings, suggests some innovative ways to stem the Russian proliferation threat, real or virtual - with the view of completely eliminating this topic as a potential irritant in global nonproliferation and Russia’s interrelationship with the West. The author attempts to evoke a thesis that the entire “chapter” of the Russian missile proliferation threat with its periods and specific cases might be a by-gone problem of the country’s readjustment period which has been completed with the advent of Putin’s administration.

My PhD research in general looks at the strategies of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in international affairs, and specifically examines the strategy of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (Sea Shepherd). As part of my research into the strategy of Sea Shepherd, I undertook fieldwork where I engaged in participant observation on board the Sea Shepherd vessel the Bob Barker as it took part in ‘Operation No Compromise,’ from December 2, 2010 to March 6, 2011. The Bob Barker spent 95 days at sea, and was at the heart of an action-packed campaign, Sea Shepherd’s seventh campaign against Japanese Antarctic whaling and its most successful campaign to date. What follows is a collection of the e-mail updates which I sent home to friends and family throughout the duration of the campaign, via my partner who acted as intermediary.

... 10, Issue 4. THROWING A WRENCH INTO THINGS: THE STRATEGY OF RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM Teale Phelps Bondaroff, University of Calgary Introduction: The current focus on Islamic terrorism has resulted in a lack of awareness of other forms of terrorism. ...