Thesis Chapters by Kevin Brisson
Over the course of the Great Patriotic War, fought from 22 June, 1941 to 9 May, 1945, there was a... more Over the course of the Great Patriotic War, fought from 22 June, 1941 to 9 May, 1945, there was a dramatic transformation in the way the Red Army conducted battle. From an army on the cusp of annihilation to one that quickly recovered to vanquish the invading forces of Nazi Germany, this resurgence can be traced in part to its mastery of operational art. Moreover, the ever-increasing series of strategic victories which eventually led to Nazi Germany’s final defeat, beginning in late 1942, revealed the importance that offensive doctrine held for the Red Army leaders.
The guiding principles which formed the basis of operational art were proscribed within many of the Red Army’s prewar and wartime theoretical writings, many of which coalesced unto the pages of several Red Army field manuals. However, for the purposes of this thesis, focus shall be assigned to the 1936 Provisional Field Regulations as the primary source for what the author shall later identify as the ten principles of Soviet operational art.
The first chapter will be devoted to explaining how the author utilized various sources in the examination of this subject. In addition to English-language sources, Russian and German primary and secondary materials were extensively consulted. As part of this literature review, comments regarding both the value and shortcomings of these works will be made to show why they were used and to what degree they proved helpful.
The second chapter will seek to discuss all ten principles of Soviet operational art. This will begin by identifying where in the manual these principles are located and how they were supposed to be applied in the context of tactical and operational offensives. This will be followed by a brief look at how each was conceptually developed. A broader understanding of the nature of these principles will require an examination of their respective roles in the planning and conduct of tactical deep battle and operations in depth.
The third major section of this thesis will assess the importance of the aforementioned principles by examining their roles in two major operations. These are: (1) the Smolensk Counter Offensive Operation, 21 July to 7 August, 1941 and (2) Operation Uranus, 19-23 November, 1942. The Smolensk Counterstroke was chosen to demonstrate operational failure when most of the ten principles of operational art were absent. Conversely, Uranus will be to show success when all are present.
Following this shall be the fourth chapter, which will offer a comparative discussion on the differences and similarities in German and Russian military doctrines as expressed by their respective field manuals, namely the 1933 Truppenführung and the 1936 Soviet Polevyye Ustav.
Lastly, the fifth and final chapter will offer a summary conclusion that will address the question of why the German army failed to win the war, even when abiding by a military doctrine similar to that practiced by the Red Army. This will involve a comparative assessment of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin’s abilities as military leaders and their understanding of operational art.
Papers by Kevin Brisson
Over the course of the Great Patriotic War, fought from 22 June, 1941 to 9 May, 1945, there was a... more Over the course of the Great Patriotic War, fought from 22 June, 1941 to 9 May, 1945, there was a dramatic transformation in the way the Red Army conducted battle. From an army on the cusp of annihilation to one that quickly recovered to vanquish the invading forces of Nazi Germany, this resurgence can be traced in part to its mastery of operational art. Moreover, the ever-increasing series of strategic victories which eventually led to Nazi Germany's final defeat, beginning in late 1942, revealed the importance that offensive doctrine held for the Red Army leaders. The guiding principles which formed the basis of operational art were proscribed within many of the Red Army's prewar and wartime theoretical writings, many of which coalesced unto the pages of several Red Army field manuals. However, for the purposes of this thesis, focus shall be assigned to the 1936 Provisional Field Regulations as the primary source for what the author shall later identify as the ten principles of Soviet operational art. The first chapter will be devoted to explaining how the author utilized various sources in the examination of this subject. In addition to English-language sources, Russian and German primary and secondary materials were extensively consulted. As part of this literature review, comments regarding both the value and shortcomings of these works will be made to show why they were used and to what degree they proved helpful. The second chapter will seek to discuss all ten principles of Soviet operational art. This will begin by identifying where in the manual these principles are located and how they were supposed to be applied in the context of tactical and operational offensives. This will be followed by a brief look at how each was conceptually developed. A broader understanding of the nature of these principles will require an examination of their respective roles in the planning and conduct of tactical deep battle and operations in depth. The third major section of this thesis will assess the importance of the af [...]
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Feb 10, 2021
Much has been brought to light in recent decades regarding the oppressive excesses of Joseph Stal... more Much has been brought to light in recent decades regarding the oppressive excesses of Joseph Stalin's secret police, the NKVD. Despite the enormous oeuvre of 1 NKVD was an acronym for Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del or People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. As a law enforcement body, it was responsible for a variety of duties related to state security, which included foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, border security, control of local police, and regulation of prisons. The NKVD's covert activities also involved kidnappings, assassinations, deportations, and mass executions.
Seminar paper which examines the similarities and differences between two important, but often mi... more Seminar paper which examines the similarities and differences between two important, but often misunderstood, concepts in space power: the militarization and weaponization of space and the geo-political implications arising from them. These two terms are often applied synonymously by many mainstream media news sources when addressing issues relating to politics and space. Such erroneous handling can only lead to false assumptions, doing more to compromise accuracy than to present the subject with the greatest degree of clarity and truth it deserves.
Seminar paper which discusses the institutionalization of the Soviet armored program during the i... more Seminar paper which discusses the institutionalization of the Soviet armored program during the interwar period and its collaboration with Wiemar Germany's clandestine efforts to produce their own.
Book Reviews by Kevin Brisson
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2019
One of the features to distinguish the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 from all other wars throu... more One of the features to distinguish the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 from all other wars throughout recorded history was its immense scale. No conflict prior to, during, or since has rivaled the level of mobilization of men and materiel between two combatant nations nor, sadly, of its carnage and bloodshed. Despite this, many events that played a pivotal role in the war’s outcome have yet to be fully understood. Seeking to add greater clarity to this is Aleksei Isaev’s Dubno 1941: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War. This work provides much-needed context necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of the battles that took place among the towns and cities situated within the Western environs of the Kiev Military District during the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa.
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2018
Among the many regions to have witnessed combat during the German-Russian War, 1941–1945, one of... more Among the many regions to have witnessed combat during the German-Russian War, 1941–1945, one of those to have received the least attention is that of the Arctic front. Prize-winning journalist and author Alf R. Jacobsen has sought to address this in his book, Miracle at the Litza: Hitler’s First Defeat on the Eastern Front. In doing so Jacobsen uses a wide range of sources — British and German archival materials, some Norwegian, and an assortment of translated secondary works presenting the Soviet perspective. Through the use of varied sources, he does much to highlight the wider significance of the Arctic theater for the war and uses them particularly effectively to reveal the fragile but evolving relationship between the leaders of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The book also focuses on the bitter feuding among leaders involved in Germany’s northern theater of operations and how, in part, this worked to impair the Wehrmacht’s efforts to achieve a quick and decisive victory. Jacobsen does not ignore British operations in the region, noting, for example, their contribution to Germany’s failure to capture Murmansk, a port that would later prove critical for receiving Lend-Lease aid from the Soviet Union’s Western Allies. Finally, and certainly not least, Jacobsen does not neglect to provide a Soviet perspective, a view conspicuously missing from the Western accounts devoted to this theater of the Eastern Front. When considering Soviet achievements, he shows how Red Army leaders were able to translate tactical victories into operational success, bringing about a favorable strategic outcome in the Arctic theater.
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies (JMSS), 2021
Much has been brought to light in recent decades regarding the oppressive excesses of Joseph Stal... more Much has been brought to light in recent decades regarding the oppressive excesses of Joseph Stalin's secret police, the NKVD. Despite the enormous oeuvre of 1 NKVD was an acronym for Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del or People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. As a law enforcement body, it was responsible for a variety of duties related to state security, which included foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, border security, control of local police, and regulation of prisons. The NKVD's covert activities also involved kidnappings, assassinations, deportations, and mass executions.
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Thesis Chapters by Kevin Brisson
The guiding principles which formed the basis of operational art were proscribed within many of the Red Army’s prewar and wartime theoretical writings, many of which coalesced unto the pages of several Red Army field manuals. However, for the purposes of this thesis, focus shall be assigned to the 1936 Provisional Field Regulations as the primary source for what the author shall later identify as the ten principles of Soviet operational art.
The first chapter will be devoted to explaining how the author utilized various sources in the examination of this subject. In addition to English-language sources, Russian and German primary and secondary materials were extensively consulted. As part of this literature review, comments regarding both the value and shortcomings of these works will be made to show why they were used and to what degree they proved helpful.
The second chapter will seek to discuss all ten principles of Soviet operational art. This will begin by identifying where in the manual these principles are located and how they were supposed to be applied in the context of tactical and operational offensives. This will be followed by a brief look at how each was conceptually developed. A broader understanding of the nature of these principles will require an examination of their respective roles in the planning and conduct of tactical deep battle and operations in depth.
The third major section of this thesis will assess the importance of the aforementioned principles by examining their roles in two major operations. These are: (1) the Smolensk Counter Offensive Operation, 21 July to 7 August, 1941 and (2) Operation Uranus, 19-23 November, 1942. The Smolensk Counterstroke was chosen to demonstrate operational failure when most of the ten principles of operational art were absent. Conversely, Uranus will be to show success when all are present.
Following this shall be the fourth chapter, which will offer a comparative discussion on the differences and similarities in German and Russian military doctrines as expressed by their respective field manuals, namely the 1933 Truppenführung and the 1936 Soviet Polevyye Ustav.
Lastly, the fifth and final chapter will offer a summary conclusion that will address the question of why the German army failed to win the war, even when abiding by a military doctrine similar to that practiced by the Red Army. This will involve a comparative assessment of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin’s abilities as military leaders and their understanding of operational art.
Papers by Kevin Brisson
Book Reviews by Kevin Brisson
The guiding principles which formed the basis of operational art were proscribed within many of the Red Army’s prewar and wartime theoretical writings, many of which coalesced unto the pages of several Red Army field manuals. However, for the purposes of this thesis, focus shall be assigned to the 1936 Provisional Field Regulations as the primary source for what the author shall later identify as the ten principles of Soviet operational art.
The first chapter will be devoted to explaining how the author utilized various sources in the examination of this subject. In addition to English-language sources, Russian and German primary and secondary materials were extensively consulted. As part of this literature review, comments regarding both the value and shortcomings of these works will be made to show why they were used and to what degree they proved helpful.
The second chapter will seek to discuss all ten principles of Soviet operational art. This will begin by identifying where in the manual these principles are located and how they were supposed to be applied in the context of tactical and operational offensives. This will be followed by a brief look at how each was conceptually developed. A broader understanding of the nature of these principles will require an examination of their respective roles in the planning and conduct of tactical deep battle and operations in depth.
The third major section of this thesis will assess the importance of the aforementioned principles by examining their roles in two major operations. These are: (1) the Smolensk Counter Offensive Operation, 21 July to 7 August, 1941 and (2) Operation Uranus, 19-23 November, 1942. The Smolensk Counterstroke was chosen to demonstrate operational failure when most of the ten principles of operational art were absent. Conversely, Uranus will be to show success when all are present.
Following this shall be the fourth chapter, which will offer a comparative discussion on the differences and similarities in German and Russian military doctrines as expressed by their respective field manuals, namely the 1933 Truppenführung and the 1936 Soviet Polevyye Ustav.
Lastly, the fifth and final chapter will offer a summary conclusion that will address the question of why the German army failed to win the war, even when abiding by a military doctrine similar to that practiced by the Red Army. This will involve a comparative assessment of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin’s abilities as military leaders and their understanding of operational art.