Malaysian Politics

This report reviews and categorizes the enormous corpus of knowledge produced by American academic and policy institutions about U.S. relations with the Middle East and other Islamic actors in the international arena. The report identifies five epistemic communities – conservatives, neoconservatives, realists, liberals and the left – and analyzes their discourses and policy recommendations. Finally, the policies that these epistemic communities recommended are evaluated and assessed. The author recommends a mixed-paradigmatic approach that will not only make the United States more effective in the Middle East but also underscore its continuing relevance to the security and the stability of the region and the global order.

The political reality of many countries in the Muslim World is untenable and reforms and change is absolutely necessary. This article argues that use of force and violence for political change is making things worse as one can witness in Syria and Iraq. The article advances a Qur'ānic perspective on the desirability of peace as a goal and peaceful means as instruments of change. The article acknowledges that the Qur'ānic sanction for use of force to defend religious freedom prcludes the advocacy of pacifism but nevertheless the article does make a strong case for privileging peace over use of force.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister and Barisan Nasional (BN) leader Najib Razak in February 2013 was quoted widely in the media as saying that the general elections (GE) in 2013 will the country’s first “social media election”. This paper examines the role of social media in Malaysia’s 2013 general elections and its political impact. Previously, in the 2008 general election, it was widely accepted that alternative online content determined the result. The country’s opposition coalition was credited in using new media to overcome a hostile mainstream media owned by establishment political interests to secure a much improved showing at the polls. Back in GE 2008, the new media electoral landscape was comprised of blogs, party websites and alternative news portals and not really social media as we it know today. In 2008, BN was the clear social media outsider. In fact, BN literally had limited online presence and was said to have underestimated the impact of new media altogether on the electorate’s voting behavior. Fast forward to April 2013, the landscape is very different. BN had made strong inroads onto social media and has carved itself a competitive position. What then has been social media’s political impact on voter behaviour during Malaysia’s 13th general elections?

Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People is the fruit of a three-year collaboration between academics who have chosen Malaysia as their specialty. Defined by its inter-disciplinarity and covering the fields of urban studies, political economy, international relations, political sociology and anthropology, film studies, literature, law and strategic studies, Misplaced Democracy is a path-breaking analysis of Malaysian politics and society during a period of contestation in which many Malaysians seek to re-orient the flow of history which has been going in favour of the ruling party since the country's independence. What is at stake here is the nature of Malaysian democracy itself. Covering topics as diverse as Syariah family law, muslim student activism, connivance militancy, maritime piracy and ownership of Malaysia's corporate sector, Misplaced Democracy seeks to untangle the complexities of contemporary Malaysian politics and society and, through original and unique analyses, tries to unveil the many realities of an emerging democracy embedded in authoritarian practices and rules, describe its ambiguities and its strengths, and contribute to the reinvention of Malaysia.

The form of Islam normatively understood and practised in Malaysia, i.e. Malaysian Islam, has undergone myriad changes since the 1970s as a result of gradual Salafization. Powered by Saudi Arabian largesse and buoyed by the advent of the Internet, this new wave of Salafization has eclipsed an earlier Salafi trend that spawned the Kaum Muda reformist movement. Recent surveys suggest that there has been a rise in the level of extremism among Muslims in Malaysia. While the majority is far from being enamoured by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine that ISIS claims to represent in unadulterated form does appeal to many of them following the decades-long Salafization of Islam in the country. This tallies with media reports on increasing numbers of Malay-Muslim youth harbouring an attraction towards radical Islamist movements such as ISIS. Salafization, referring to a process of mindset and attitudinal transformation rather than the growth of Salafi nodes per se, is not restricted to individuals or groups identified as “Salafi”, but rather affects practically all levels of Malay-Muslim society, cutting across political parties, governmental institutions and non-state actors. It has resulted in Islamist, rather than Islamic, ideals increasingly defining the tenor of mainstream Islam in Malaysia, with worrying consequences for both intra-Muslim and inter-religious relations. Responses to the Wahhabi-Salafi onslaught from the Malay-Muslim ruling elite in Malaysia have been ambivalent, and have had weak counteracting effects on the Salafization process.

Recent media reports have speculated on an impending declaration of an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) caliphate in Southeast Asia. Such an eventuality poses a grave threat to the pluralistic landscape of Southeast Asian societies. Surveys over the past few years have worryingly indicated a rise in the level of extremist tendencies among Southeast Asian Muslims, albeit these tendencies are still at a comparatively low level. The internalization since the 1970s of the Wahhabi brand of Salafism among Southeast Asian Muslims is the major factor behind this apparent shift towards a more radical worldview. The relatively low level of concern over rising Islamist extremism among Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims indicates a worrying institutionalization of radical interpretations of Islam in the general Islamic landscape of both countries. Countering Salafization is rendered difficult by the fact that influential Muslim personalities and elements within Muslim-majority states have themselves embraced aspects of Wahhabism. Between Wahhabism and ISIS, which is but its violent manifestation, lies a short and slippery slope.

The paper looks at four pro-ISIS groups in the Philippines --  Abu Sayyaf-Basilan; AKP; the Maute group; and BIFF -- and their links, historical and current, to Indonesia and Malaysia. It then looks at what setbacks for ISIS in the Middle East might mean for extremist violence in SE Asia.

Syarahan ini menyelusuri perkembangan perbahasan dan wacana tentang Islam dan kedinamikan politiknya dalam masa enam puluh tahun (1957-2017), yakni semenjak Malaysia mencapai kemerdekaan sebagai sebuah entiti berdaulat dengan cita-cita untuk mendirikan sebuah negara bangsa. Elemen yang sangat penting dalam wacana ini ialah kedudukan rasmi Islam sebagai ‘agama persekutuan’ dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia dan pada masa yang sama memberi jaminan kebebasan beragama kepda agama-agama lain yang dianuti oleh hampir empat puluh peratus daripada jumlah penduduk Malaysia. Wajah demografi Malaysia menjadi semakin rencam dari sudut etnik dan agama dengan kemasukan Sabah, Sarawak, Singapura bersama Malaya ke dalam Persekutuan Malaysia pada 16 September 1963. Berkait rapat dengan wacana ‘Islam politik’ atau ‘Islamisme’ di Malaysia ialah konsep-konsep ‘agama’ dan ‘sekularisme’ yang saling berinteraksi dan mengalami evolusi makna sebagai lanjutan daripada perbahasan umum yang melibatkan pelbagai pihak seperti para sarjana, ahli politik, birokrat, ulama, aktivis sosial, pengamal media dan pengkomentar media sosial. Hujahan yang dikemukakan di sini ialah makna ‘Islam’ yang difahami oleh pemegang-pemegang taruh (stakeholders) telah mengalami perubahan pesat hasil daripada interaksi aktif semua pihak berkepentingan termasuk organ-organ negara dan masyarakat sivil dengan Islam. ‘Islam’ dalam Artikel 3 (1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan pada 31 Ogos 1957 tidak lagi sama kefahamannya dengan ‘Islam’ dalam dokumen yang sama pada tahun 2017. ‘Islam’ dan ‘Islamisme’ berhadapan dengan konflik atau percampuran maksud. Pergolakan politik yang dialami Malaysia semenjak tiga dekad kebelakangan ini, iaitu sejak kesan kebangkitan Islam menampakkan impaknya dalam landskap politik, ekonomi dan sosial. Situasi ini boleh dikesan susur galurnya kepada kefahaman keagamaan yang lebih tegar yang menggariskan sempadan ketat tentang apa yang disifatkan sebagai ‘Islamik’ berbanding apa yang ‘tidak Islamik.’ Kemasukan elemen tegar dalam wacana Islamisme ini diarus perdanakan di bawah projek-projek Islamisasi pemerintah, dengan reaksi-reaksi berbeza daripada pelbagai kelompok masyarakat. Penularan elemen tegar dalam dasar Islamisasi yang diabsahkan melalui kerangka politik rasmi membawa implikasi mendalam kepda politik Malaysia dalam arena hubungan Muslim dengan bukan Muslim, malahan antara sesama Muslim yang berbeza corak pemikiran dari aliran arus perdana.

Contemporary impressions of Taiwan’s relations with Southeast Asia tend to focus on flows of labor, capital, tourism, and marriage. Countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand carry the impression that they are the origins of cheap, sometimes easily exploitable, migrant labor for employers in Taiwan. Many people in Taiwan also see the former two countries as sources of brides for lower-income men. These same countries, along with Cambodia and, to a lesser degree, Malaysia, are locations where Taiwanese capital is invested in factories for low-cost labor, proximity to Taiwan and China, and the relative absence of political contentiousness for being Taiwanese. With the advent of cheap air travel, Taiwan and Southeast Asia also offer the middle class in these areas options for quick holiday getaways. These interactions and the condescension toward Southeast Asia that sometimes accompany them belie the rich history of interactions that Taiwan and Southeast Asia share.

http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=831

Malaysia’s 14th general election witnessed three different yet related Islamist models offered by three competing coalitions, namely the Barisan Nasional (BN) headed by Prime Minister Najib Razak, the Pakatan Harapan (PH) led by former Premier Dr Mahathir Mohamad, and the Gagasan Sejahtera led by Haji Abdul Hadi Awang of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). All three offered their own visions of Islamism with varying levels and types of inclusivity of non-Muslims as part of a Muslim-led body politic. As it turned out, no choice was totally rejected. Although nationally Malaysians voted to end BN’s 61-year rule in favour of the more ethnically diverse PH, the states of Pahang and Perlis retained loyalty to BN, while Kelantan and Terengganu chose a PAS-governed administration. Amidst national debates concerning corruption and abuse of power, different conceptions of Islamist statecraft retained significance as the electorate went to the polls on 9 May 2018, and this is analysed in the present article.

This article seeks to analyze the evolving development and contestations regarding the interplay of Islam and politics in Malaysia’s public space for a period of 60 years (1957–2017) since its independence as a nation-state. A crucial element in this discourse is the official position of Islam as the “religion of the federation” in the
Malaysian Constitution, which simultaneously guarantees the freedom of other religions embraced by almost half of the country’s population. The population became even more diverse ethnically and religiously upon the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, which replaced Malaya, on September 16, 1963. Closely related to the discourse of political Islam in Malaysia, the evolving concepts of “religion” and “secularism” in Malaysia’s Islamic context have undergone considerable shifts as a result of constant public engagement by an assortment of politicians, commentators, scholars, bureaucrats, and civil society activists. As the argument develops, Malaysia’s interaction with Islam has been essentialized by political interests such that boundaries are hardened between what is considered Islamic and un-Islamic. The increasingly rigid positions adopted by Islamic stakeholders have arguably worsened both interreligious and intra-Muslim relations, with progressive Muslim voices increasingly finding themselves marginalized in the state-controlled political environment.

In the aftermath of Malaysia’s 13th General Elections (GE13), the possibility of imposition of the Islamic penal code of hudud, which had been on the agenda of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS: Parti Islam SeMalaysia) since capturing power in the state of Kelantan in 1990, resurfaced. Circumstances in 2014 however are markedly different. PAS is now a major partner of the People’s Pact (PR: Pakatan Rakyat) opposition coalition, whose roots can be traced back to the Reformasi discontent ensuing from the dismissal of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim from the ruling  United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the government in 1998. The cooperation between PAS, Anwar’s People’s Justice Party (PKR: Parti Keadilan Rakyat) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) within the PR framework has eroded support for the UMNO-led National Front (BN: Barisan Nasional), although it maintains bastions of influence among rural Malay constituencies. Long known for its espousal of a modernist version of Islam which emphasises the substance rather than the form of the religion, UMNO’s conditional backing of PAS’s intention to table two Private Member’s bills for the application of hudud in Kelantan comes as a surprise, but the apparent turnabout may be explained by recourse to pragmatic political considerations.

Islamic education in Malaysia first recorded its presence during the period of the Malaccan Sultanate (1414–1511). Malacca witnessed the birth of prototype boarding schools known as pondok, literally meaning “hut,” in which the master or tok guru assumed full control. Malay students started to study at al-Azhar University in Cairo in the 1920s. Upon returning to Malaya, this new generation of Middle Eastern graduates significantly contributed to the changing face of Islamic education. They converted umumi (general) pondoks into madrasahs, adopting the nizami (structured) system, which combined instruction in Islamic fundamentals with Western-influenced pedagogy and technology. Realizing the deep attachment of the Malays to Islam, the British incorporated some form of Islamic education into Malay vernacular schools. With Malaysia’s independence, centralization of the administration and curricula of all schools that offer some kind of Islamic education has dominated the Ministry of Education’s efforts in the realm of formal Islamic education. There is continuous endeavor to bring an end to dualism between secular and religious education, as manifested in the marriage between Islamic and secular sciences in tertiary-level courses. In 1973, a Religious Education Division (Bahagian Pelajaran Agama) was established within the Ministry of Education to coordinate Islamic education. In 1983, it was renamed Islamic Education Division (Bahagian Pendidikan Islam). In 1995, it was restructured as Islamic and Moral Education Division (Bahagian Pendidikan Islam dan Moral). It has now reverted to Islamic Education Division, and its task is to manage the Islamic educational policy and curriculum, the Arabic-language policy and curriculum, the recruitment and in-service training of Islamic education and Arabic-language teachers, and missionary and leadership training for Islamic education staff and students, and to aid and raise the standards of both national secondary religious schools. Centralization of the administration and curricula of all schools that offer some kind of Islamic education has dominated the Ministry of Education’s efforts in the realm of formal Islamic education. Curriculum has been designed to accomplish the aims of the Islamic Philosophy of Education. There is continuous endeavor to bring an end to dualism between secular and religious education, as manifested in the marriage between Islamic and secular sciences in tertiary-level courses.

This article argues that recurring communal problems in Malaysia can be traced to not only economic and social policies undertaken by pragmatically rather than ideologically-inclined National Front-led governments, but they can also be located to weaknesses of their educational policies which have failed to disentangle Malaysians from colonial knowledge which had epistemologically moulded the conceptions of 'race' and 'nation' as prevalent in Malaysia. The article seeks to show that, despite the apparent success of Malaysia's national education system in producing a relatively large number of skilled and semiskilled workers who went on to form constantly expanding vibrant middle classes, these cohorts of new labour market entrants have largely failed to live up to expectations of them as socially progressive in the way envisaged by Wawasan 2020 – a liberal, rational, inclusive, scientific and progressive Malaysian nation. As a matter of fact, after fifty years, Malaysia's educational system remains unsuccessful in tackling its twin problems before independence – communal and class polarisation. We hereby argue that the Malaysia Education Blueprint 2013-2025, notwithstanding the hulabaloo which accompanied its launching, not only also fails to confront the critical issue of identity and nation-building, but it also lacks credible solutions beyond the colonial-designed educational framework which accepts communal divisions as a fait accompli.

After toppling the 61-year dominant Barisan Nasional through a historic election victory in May 2018, expectations are high for the new ruling government led by Mahathir Mohamad and the Pakatan Harapan to fulfil their promises for socio-economic reforms and regime change in Malaysia. But what have been the institutions of the prevailing regime that need to be reformed and changed? This article offers a critical review of the evolving development agendas since the 1990s of the successive governments of Mahathir Mohamad, Abdullah Badawi, and Najib Razak, each couched in different catchphrases: Wawasan 2020, Islam Hadhari, and 1Malaysia. A close reading of these programs suggests that their substance articulates two persistent logics: the ruling elite’s constant requirement for political stability enforced by a strong state; and, the need to adapt to the demands and opportunities of accumulation in specific phases of Malaysia’s capitalist development in the context of globalization. The analysis reveals the attempts at maintaining authoritarian neoliberalism, or a neoliberal economy embedded in an authoritarian polity, as the de facto social regime in contemporary Malaysia. By examining policy documents, speeches, and news reports, the article discloses how this regime had been enunciated or reified in public discourses, policies, and actions of the respective administrations.

It is said that the media can set what the public perceived as important. This study has used a quantitative survey in order to understand the effect of agenda setting theory in the Malaysian context. Studying a total of 1500 eligible voters from various ethnic groups in Malaysia (Malay, Chinese, and Indian), 17 important issues were identified. Overall, the study found media agenda had a significant correlation with the public agenda, indicating that the media can influence what the audience perceived as important. This study also suggested that race had no influence on the media’s coverage of concerned issues.

The situation in Southeast Asia brings attention not only to the regional countries, but also to the great powers. The growing People’s Republic of China’s economy and military especially causes concern regarding the stability of the whole Southeast Asia region. Smaller Southeast Asian countries may be overwhelmed by China. Amongst these countries is Malaysia, which tries to secure its national interest in the region, especially in the South China Sea. Malaysia faces some maritime
security threats caused by its stakes in the Spratly Islands dispute. The article attempts to elucidate the contemporary condition of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), especially in the field of warships. Moreover, the study tries to answer the question of why the RMN is an important branch of the Malaysian Armed Forces and plays a vital role in securing Malaysian safety.
The article is divided into two parts. The first describes the problems which Malaysia faces in the field of maritime security. The second elaborates the assets of the RMN, mostly in major combatant
ships. This paper concludes with a summary of the RMN’s major vessels that have been and will be developed from 1990 to 2025.

Most Muslim-majority countries have legal systems that enshrine both Islam and liberal rights. While not necessarily at odds, these dual commitments nonetheless provide legal and symbolic resources for activists to advance contending visions for their states and societies. Using the case study of Malaysia, Constituting Religion examines how these legal arrangements enable litigation and feed the construction of a 'rights-versus-rites binary' in law, politics, and the popular imagination. By drawing on extensive primary source material and tracing controversial cases from the court of law to the court of public opinion, this study theorizes the 'judicialization of religion' and the radiating effects of courts on popular legal and religious consciousness. The book documents how legal institutions catalyze ideological struggles, which stand to redefine the nation and its politics. Probing the links between legal pluralism, social movements, secularism, and political Islamism, Constituting Religion sheds new light on the confluence of law, religion, politics, and society.

The Salafi ulama (religious scholars) in Malaysia have seen their
religious and political influence amplified over the last five years. Operating within a newly formed organization, the Pertubuhan IlmuwanMalaysia (ILMU) and the newly augmented United Malays National
Organization’s (UMNO) young ulama wing, Salafi scholars play a key role in providing Islamic legitimacy to the government and defending it against the opposition Islamist party, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). The decision by Salafi scholars to support the Malaysian government is striking given their hardline views on the implementation of Islamic laws and their opposition to democracy. This paper seeks to understand the reasons for the Salafi ulama’s support for UMNO. It argues that the Salafi ulama’s involvement in UMNO is due to a convergence of interest between the two groups and as part of a strategy by the Salafi ulama to expand their influence at both the state and societal levels. The paper examines the religious-political positions of the Salafi ulama on issues such as the Islamic state, the implementation of Islamic laws and democratic political system, and argues that they are opposed to the current state of religious affairs and the political structure of the Malaysian state. Nevertheless, the
ulama are working within UMNO to change the political system. For  UMNO leaders, the Salafi ulama form an important group that could defend the party against religious attacks from PAS and provide the party with greater religious credence.

This article argues that Islam Hadhari, as a model for development officially inaugurated during the administration of Malaysia’s fifth prime minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003–9), encountered failure. Its lack of success was significantly due to the rise of Islamist conservatives, who deliberately interpreted Islam Hadhari as a political instrument to impose Islamization from above in a manner not conducive to living in a spirit of peaceful coexistence in a multi-ethnic society. While on the one hand it promoted an Islam that cherishes the values of inclusivity, moderation and inter-religious tolerance, on the other hand Islam Hadhari unfortunately triggered defensive responses from Islamist conservatives. This ad hoc conservative alliance comprised religious leaders associated with the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), state religious functionaries, scholars affiliated to the opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS: Parti Islam SeMalaysia) and Islamist non-governmental organizations. The rise of this Islamist conservatism aggravated ethno-religious relations during Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s premiership, leading to the setbacks experienced by his government in the general elections of 2008. By then, the death knell had been sounded for Islam Hadhari. It was steadily consigned to the graveyard of history by the administration of Najib Razak, who took over from Abdullah in April 2009.

At the heart of it, this research paper asks the question: Why did genocide not occur in the aftermath of race riots in Malaysia in 1969?

I propose that two interlinked factors played their parts in deescalating conflict. Firstly, British divide and rule policy during the colonial era segregated ethnic groups such that violence tended to be concentrated in urban areas where the population were mixed. Even in these areas, ethnic groups still tended to gravitate towards each other, such that government responses were targeted and could cordon off key areas. Secondly, the government tightly controlled media, freedom of movement, and freedom of information such that rumormongering was curbed and the spread of negative sentiment was directed towards a certain segment of opposition politicians. The thread connecting all the two is in government response: The authorities acted swiftly to consolidate power and opportunistically targeted opponents; violence was a means to power, provided it was carefully and selectively applied, and always under control. Thus, the May 13 riots did not escalate into genocide as the government retained control over the ebb and flow of violence, and applied extreme discrimination in its use of force.

A Saudi and UAE-driven campaign to isolate Qatar and by extension Iran puts non-Muslim Arab states in a bind and tests the degree of Saudi soft power garnered in decades of massive spending on the propagation of anti-Iranian, anti-Shiite Sunni Muslim ultra-conservatism.

Published as Postill, J. 2014. A critical history of internet activism and social protest in Malaysia, 1998-2011. Asiascape: Digital Asia Journal 1-2: 78-103.

NB. THIS IS A DRAFT. SEE PUBLISHED PAPER HERE: https://www.academia.edu/6023457/A_critical_history_of_internet_activism_and_social_protest_in_Malaysia_1998-2011

This article asks two related questions. First, to what extent has internet activism shaped social protest in Malaysia from the late 1990s to the present? Second, what can the history of internet activism and social protest in Malaysia tell us, if anything, about the 2011 global wave of protests? To address these questions I first compare Malaysia’s techno-political path with that of two very different ‘emerging economies’, South Korea and Brazil, in order to contextualise the subsequent discussion. I then distinguish three key moments in Malaysia’s eventful history of internet activism and social protest, namely the 1998-1999 reformasi movement, the electoral ‘tsunami’ of 2008 (in which the ruling coalition lost its two-thirds majority) and the Bersih 2.0 rallies of 2011. I argue that Bersih 2.0 is best explained as both the latest episode in a series of uniquely Malaysian techno-political events and as a local variant of the global wave of protests of 2011 – a wave in which techno-libertarians such as hackers, online journalists and technology lawyers, as well as ordinary citizens using social media, played an important part. The article ends with a summary and with suggestions for further research.

For a better part of the 20th century, scholars who studied religion held the opinion that religion would gradually lose its public significance in the face of modernisation. However, events in the past few decades have proved otherwise. From the Iranian Revolution to the role of Catholicism in political conflicts throughout Latin America in the 1980 have patently demonstrated religion still plays an important role in the public sphere. This thesis takes the position that religion still remains an important precinct in the public life and politics of contemporary Southeast Asian societies. Using the case of Malaysia, I argued that not only did the country experienced religious revivalism across the various faith communities despite the rapid modernisation that was taking place here but also it did not retreat to the private sphere. Indeed, it facilitated the entry of religion into the public sphere. Islamic revivalism in the late 1970s among the Malay-Muslim community witnessed the call by certain quarters of the community for the Islamisation of the state and society. This in turn has egged the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional government to implement its own Islamisation policy in order to maintain its hegemony over this critical group in society. The resultant policy has brought about an increasing intrusion of the government not only into the Muslim religious field but also into the non-Muslim religious field. As a result, non-Muslims began to experience a growing restriction not only of their religious spheres but also of their everyday lives. Not surprisingly, they began to turn to religion as a political resource in an attempt to find some sort of political footing to negotiate this increasing restriction. Focusing on the Christian community in Peninsular Malaysia, this thesis seeks to study the ways in which this community used religion to create space that enable them to manoeuvre the increasing intrusion by the government into their religious sphere and everyday lives. This thesis takes the position that religion provides a focal point in mobilising people to respond to the social and political circumstances which they find themselves in. Indeed, the central theoretical position forwarded by this thesis is that religious based contestations/conflicts in the public sphere are due to the tensions that arise out of the pursuit of modernity.

Islam was officially installed as the religion of the Federation of Malaya upon independence on 31 August 1957, and retained as such after the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. Since then, political stakeholders have not shied away from making the most of Islamic symbols, practices and institutions towards achieving national economic development or regime maintenance. Driven by hegemonic considerations, they largely ignored intra-Muslim religious variations. The religious uniformity of Malays, all of whom were Muslims by law, were literally taken for granted and served as a politically expedient vehicle for Islamic-based political mobilization by the Malay-dominated regime. Pluralist conceptions of Malaysian society were accepted only insofar as they pertain to Muslim-non-Muslim distinctions. At the core of the government's efforts to infuse the Malaysian polity with Islamic alternatives for socio-political arrangements is a gradual process of syariahization. However, owing to arbitrary interpretations of the syariah (Islamic law) by Malaysia's official Islamic gatekeepers, syariahization resulted in state-manufactured denial of freedom of religious expression to non-conformist Malay-Muslims. Until today, Muslim non-conformists are not allowed to adopt, let alone to propagate, different forms of Islam that run afoul of the version upheld by an officially sanctioned version of the syariah. As reflected by the case of the Sufi-inspired Darul Arqam movement, government-imposed syariahization has resulted in the violation of fundamental human rights of Malay-Muslims, regardless of the fact that the syariah itself may not have been clear-cut in determining the boundaries between religious orthodoxy and unorthodoxy in prescribing punishments for dissent.

In May 2018, Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional (BN) lost power for the first time since the country’s independence. Although the opposition finally succeeded in assuming the reins of government after three failed attempts since 1990, the aspired for ‘two-coalition system’ did not emerge. Like previous opposition coalitions that disintegrated after electoral defeat, BN is fast melting down and is now reduced to a rump of its Malay nationalist core, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Officially born in 1974, BN was expanded from its centrist forerunner Alliance, which suffered an electoral setback in 1969 under centrifugal competition. As a permanent grand coalition designed to contain opposition, BN had resiliently survived on a crafty manipulation of communal anxieties of ethnic Malays and Chinese. As unintended consequences, BN had, however, radicalised opposition in first-past-the-post elections and become vulnerable to implosion after electoral landslides. Pakatan Harapan now seemingly emerges as the new dominant coalition, with centrifugal competition from ethno-religious and regional-nationalists.

KEYWORDS: Malaysia, Elections, First-Past-The-Post, One-party Predominance, Permanent Coalition, Consociationalism

Political risk assessments are always provided by human input--country experts--at base.  This study compares an assessment of Malaysia's political risk by one country expert with the assessment of 35 knowledgeable Malaysians and foreign business people in Kuala Lumpur in 2014. Subjects are corruption, democracy, race, impact of Islam, and more.

1.1 Pengenalan Setelah sekian maklum, Negara Malaysia telah dipimpin oleh Barisan Nasional sejak dari tahun 1955 yang sebelum ini dikenali sebagai Parti Perikatan.Sewaktu menjadi kuasa pemerintah, Barisan Nasional telah menjadi kuasa utama yang dominan. Pada waktu ini, Kuasa kedua yang menjadi penentang kepada BN adalah parti pembangkang seperti Pakatan Rakyat (PR) yang dianggotai oleh Parti Islam Semalaysia (PAS), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) dan Democratic Action Party (DAP). Tidak ada parti gabungan yang mampu menggugat suara majoriti BN semenjak pilihanraya yang pertama melainkan pakatan rakyat.Justeru itu, kuasa kedua boleh ditafsirkan sebagai parti pembangkang yang kuat di dalam Malaysia iaitu pakatan rakyat. Selain daripada kerajaan dan pembangkang, muncul pula satu kuasa baru yang dipanggil kuasa ketiga yang mungkin akan menggugat kedua dua belah pihak dan mungkin menjadi ancaman baru untuk pihak kerajaan BN mahupun pakatan rakyat untuk memenangi pilihanraya.Namun, kuasa ketiga yang akan dibincangkan nanti tidak semestinya parti politik, ia juga boleh diterjemahkan sebagai suatu organisasi atau kumpulan atau individu yang mampu mempengaruhi masyarakat khususnya yang berkaitan dengan politik, ekonomi dan sosial. Keputusan PRU ke-13 akhirnya menunjukkan BN memenangi 133 kerusi, Pakatan Rakyat, yang dianggotai DAP, PKR dan PAS, pula mengumpulkan 89 kerusi Parlimenmenambah tujuh kerusi berbanding lima tahun lalu.Berikut ialah pemerhatian terhadap keputusan akhir tersebut. Pakatan kehilangan Kedah. Ketiga-tiga negeri PR yang lain -

Leo Suryadinata's The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond is a very welcome addition to the discussion of ties between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and ethnic Chinese living beyond its borders. Suryadinata makes the case in the book that as the PRC becomes more globally prominent, it is increasingly blurring lines in its treatment of PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese overseas. This claim comes amid allegations of growing PRC efforts to mobilize ethnic Chinese communities abroad to serve its national interests, be they economic, political, or strategic. These concerns are not new and are in fact a throwback to the past. They give the book an added timeliness and importance.
For much of the Cold War, ethnic Chinese communities in non-communist parts of Southeast Asia faced the suspicion of being a possible subversive fifth column for the PRC, especially if they seemed left-leaning. Such perspectives diminished as the PRC engaged in economic reform from the late 1970s, eschewed radical revolution, and passed a nationality law in 1980 clearly demarcating non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese abroad from PRC citizens. Recent reports of PRC efforts to lobby and police opinion in foreign countries using members of local ethnic Chinese communities ranging from Europe and North America to Oceania and Southeast Asia have again brought these long-dormant issues to the fore.1 This is an issue on which Suryadinata has previously written, and he provides readers a brief reminder of these themes in Chapter 3.2 [End Page 151]
An Awkward Closeness
Suryadinata organizes the book into four parts. Part I (Chapters 1–3) discusses the PRC's rise to prominence from the 1980s till the present, changes in ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, and the organization of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO). The OCAO is the government body responsible for managing official ties with ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, be they PRC citizens abroad or ethnic Chinese who do not hold PRC citizenship. Within these pages, Suryadinata introduces his main observation—that Beijing seems to be reverting to its older policy of reducing distinctions between PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese in foreign jurisdictions. The key motivation behind this move, according to Suryadinata, is PRC efforts to advance and protect its interests and concerns overseas.
Part II (Chapters 4–8) examines how the PRC responds officially to events outside its borders that affect ethnic Chinese and PRC citizens. Each chapter contains a case where ethnic Chinese come under threat from developments outside China and assess the PRC position. Beijing's reaction to the 1998 anti-Chinese race riots in Indonesia and violence in the South Pacific, Middle East, and Africa indicates a willingness to evacuate PRC citizens, especially those who work for PRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 2014 anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam, triggered by a Beijing-initiated escalation in its maritime dispute with Hanoi, suggests that the PRC is not above placing its citizens overseas in danger for the pursuit of more important interests.
However, contrasting PRC responses to incidents involving ethnic Chinese in Malaysia and Myanmar point toward an evolution in Beijing's position. Beijing responded to alleged ill-treatment of its citizens by Malaysian police in 2005 as well as political pressure, even violence, toward ethnic Chinese Myanmar citizens in the Kokang region along the PRC border in 2015 with diplomatic entreaties. Such actions resulted from Beijing's desire to maintain positive official relations with Malaysia and Myanmar. Threats against ethnic Chinese Malaysians in 2015, in comparison, saw the then-PRC ambassador to Malaysia publicly expressing an intention to protect these co-ethnics even though this was tantamount to intervention and divided local opinion. This step appears to portend an effort by Beijing to extend influence over non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese communities overseas, even at the risk of upsetting foreign governments.
The next four chapters in Part III examine the ways domestic considerations in the...

This paper details the construction of the pig and the pig industry in Malaysia. It argues that a pattern of "animal-linked racialization" continually polices the boundary between the dominant, elite Malay-Muslim hegemony and the comparatively less powerful Chinese pig farmers. Often subtle and implicit, such beastly racialization, drawing frequently from religious and nationalist tropes, renders visible the taboo subjects of race and racism in Malaysia. While a simplistic form of beastly racialization in relation to the pig industry is held by the political elites and non-Chinese community, one cannot say that such a racialization has produced or sustained distinct racisms. Nonetheless, it is through the process of beastly racialization that we unravel the seemingly random acts of coercive policies that, taken in their entirety, threaten to stymie the future viability of the industry and continue to accentuate the visible social-cultural disjuncture between the two biggest ethnic groups in Malaysia.

นโยบายภูมิบุตรา (Bumiputera)  เป็นนโยบายที่มีลักษณะของการให้สิทธิพิเศษบางประการกับชาวมลายูและชนพื้นเมืองเดิม ตามที่มีบัญญัติไว้ในรัฐธรรมนูญของสหพันธรัฐมาเลเซียเพื่อเป็นหลักประกันทางด้านสังคมและเศรษฐกิจของประชากรในกลุ่มที่เรียกว่า ภูมิบุตรา ซึ่งประกอบด้วยชาวมลายูและชนพื้นเมืองเดิม รัฐบาลมาเลเซียภายใต้การนำของพรรคแนวร่วมแห่งชาติ (National Front) มองว่าสถานะทางเศรษฐกิจของกลุ่มภูมิบุตรายังอยู่ในระดับที่ต่ำกว่ากลุ่มประชากรอื่น ๆ จึงยังคงให้การสนับสนุนนโยบายดังกล่าวนี้ เพราะสำหรับพรรคแนวร่วมแห่งชาติแล้วนโยบายภูมิบุตรายังคงมีนัยสำคัญต่อการครองตำแหน่งในการบริหารประเทศ เนื่องจากกลุ่มภูมิบุตราเป็นประชากรส่วนใหญ่ของประเทศซึ่งมีผลต่อการเลือกตั้งเข้ามาเป็นรัฐบาล จนอาจกล่าวได้ว่าประชากรกลุ่มนี้เป็นฐานเสียงสำคัญของพรรคแนวร่วมแห่งชาติซึ่งพรรคจะต้องให้ความสำคัญ จากผลการเลือกตั้งในระยะสองสมัยที่ผ่านมาในปี 2008 และปี 2013 ปรากฏชัดถึงความเปลี่ยนแปลงทางการเมืองมาเลเซียที่น่าสนใจคือ พรรคแนวร่วมแห่งชาติซึ่งเป็นรัฐบาลปกครองมาเลเซียมากว่า 50 ปีได้รับคะแนนเสียงสนับสนุนน้อยลงจนไม่สามารถครอบครองที่นั่งส่วนใหญ่ในสภาได้อย่างที่เคยเป็นมา สะท้อนให้เห็นถึงความนิยมที่ลดลงต่อพรรคแนวร่วมแห่งชาติอย่างต่อเนื่อง และสาเหตุประการหนึ่งก็มีปัจจัยมาจากความไม่พอใจต่อการดำเนินนโยบายภูมิบุตราเพราะเป็นการเอื้อประโยชน์อย่างไม่เป็นธรรม และไม่สอดคล้องกับแนวทางการปกครองในระบอบประชาธิปไตย ในขณะที่ชาวมาเลเซียในปัจจุบันจำนวนไม่น้อยเริ่มให้ความสำคัญกับการเมืองที่ปราศจากการยึดติดทางชาติพันธุ์หรือนโยบายเชื้อชาตินิยม และมีแนวโน้มที่จะสนับสนุนพรรคการเมืองฝ่ายค้านซึ่งชูนโยบายทางสายกลางที่ไม่คำนึงถึงเชื้อชาติ ทั้งนี้ ถึงแม้ว่ารัฐบาลมาเลเซียจะได้พยายามแก้ไขปัญหาความเหลื่อมล้ำทางสังคมและเศรษฐกิจของคนทั้งสามเชื้อชาติผ่านนโยบายต่าง ๆ ตลอดมา เพื่อปรับโครงสร้างทางสังคมใหม่และกระตุ้นการขยายตัวทางเศรษฐกิจอย่างยั่งยืนและเท่าเทียม แต่กลับไม่ประสบผลสำเร็จเท่าที่ควรทำให้นโยบายภูมิบุตราจึงนับเป็นนโยบายหนึ่งที่ท้าทายต่อการแก้ไขปัญหาและการสร้างเอกภาพสำหรับมาเลเซีย

Public policy is one of the youngest interdisciplinary subfields in the social sciences, yet one of the most promising in terms of its social relevance. Existing research on public policy has developed precise, albeit limited, measures of social well-being. Additionally, this research has generated analytical frameworks that elucidate how people make life choices under varying political, institutional, and policy arrangements (Manuel 2006). Still, while research on public policy has made major analytical and methodological improvements, it has largely ignored intersectional theory (Hancock 2007; Hankivsky and Cormier 2011). ...

A round table on freedom of religion and belief sponsored by the Commonwealth Initiative for Freedom of Religion and Belief was organized in Kuala Lumpur on February 5-6, 2018, and attended by faith leaders, parliamentarians and other stakeholders. This paper summarises and connects issues raised in the Round Table with additional inputs from the author.

Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad (1937-2010) was a sufi leader best remembered for the controversies surrounding his eschatological teachings which led to the Malaysian government’s banning of his organization, Darul Arqam, in 1994. Loved by admirers but reviled by the state, Ashaari’s influence cut across ethnicity, nationality and religion. While the transnational dimensions of Ashaari’s activities were well-known, aspects of ethno-religious pluralism in his thought, as conveyed in a multitude of written works published independently, have mostly escaped the attention of analysts and casual observers alike. With contemporary Malaysian Islam being invariably understood via ethnically slanted lenses, it would not have occurred to most people that a Malay-Muslim religious personality would actually subscribe to pluralistic conceptions of society which are liable to be interpreted as undermining conceptions of Malay-Muslim hegemony dearly held by the ruling establishment of the day. This article seeks to bring to the fore features of Ashaari’s thought which exemplifies integration between Sufism and political realities as conditioned by nation state-defined categories.

Ch.2 of A Harding, The Constitution of Malaysia: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). The book is part of Hart Publishing's book series 'Constitutional systems of the word'. This chapter is offered as a sampler. For the whole book, see Hart Publishing's website, and bookshops in Kuala Lumpur.
The chapter explains how executive power has grown in Malaysia and serves the changing developmental state.