Iraqi Kurdistan Region

Oil corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan arose from US/UK and Turkish patronage systems and clientalism. This investigative paper examines how IOCs and other businesses began preparing the ground in northern Iraq to benefit themselves long before Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 2003. The people of the region have not benefited from the wealth generated by their own natural resources. The swindling has created 5000 new millionaires in Erbil and bolstered the pockets of US and UK politicians, ex-military and SAS personnel and corporate criminals.

IPBD (Iraq Projects Business Development) was set up in the UK in September 2002 by Hareth Zahawi and his son, Nadhim along with  Mahmoud Yousuf in preparation for the invasion of Iraq. They had two other companies called Cupola. IPBD was initially set up to launder American and British military personnel uniforms.

IPBD had $30 million paid into it in January 2003, and $300 million in 2005. It was a major US Contractor under George W.Bush, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Zalmay Khalilzad. IPBD was the first UK company to get into Iraq in April 2003, and they had access to DFI funds and stolen Iraqi gold and oil - just like Erik Prince's Blackwater mercenaries for hire... favoured by Washington and the Bush administration for protecting US interests over those of Iraqis.

This study aimed to determine the prevalence of Thyroid-Stimulating Hormone (TSH) alterations and different types of thyroid dysfunctions in both sexes with no age limitations from variety of sources in Duhok province. In this retrospective cross-sectional study, we screened 25040 suspicious cases of thyroid diseases in a year (2019), retrieving the data from the computers of three clinical laboratories of Duhok City. Following exclusion of 470 cases, 24568 cases were included to categorize the different types of thyroid dysfunctions. The prevalence of TSH alteration was 25.03%, 20.55% of them had a high concentration being statistically higher in females, while only 4.48% was low TSH with equal prevalence among both sexes. Out of 24568 patients, the prevalence of subclinical hypothyroidism was 94.85%, followed by 2.20%, 1.20%, 0.78%, 0.67%, and 0.31% for each of subclinical hyperthyroidism, primary hypothyroidism, central hyperthyroidism, central hypothyroidism, and primary hyperth...

Diviso tra Turchia, Siria, Iraq e Iran, il Kurdistan rappresenta probabilmente uno degli scenari geopolitici più caldi del Medio Oriente. È il territorio di un popolo, i curdi, che vanta più di trenta milioni di persone la più grande "nazione" senza Stato - e che si sta rivelando un attore cruciale della regione. Nelle recenti crisi mediorientali, infatti, il "fattore curdo" si è rivelato una costante fondamentale: dalle guerre in Iraq sotto Saddam Hussein alla lotta contro il cosiddetto Stato Islamico, dal ruolo nei delicati equilibri politici turchi al conflitto siriano. Senza dimenticare che il Kurdistan è una delle regioni più ricche di petrolio. Conoscere i curdi, distinguere le loro istanze autonomiste o indipendentiste, le priorità che ne guidano l'operato nei diversi contesti statali in cui si trovano a vivere, è quindi fondamentale per comprendere cosa stia avvenendo oggi. In questo volume si offre un primo approccio globale alla "questione curda" grazie all'apporto di studiosi internazionali e alla curatela dell'lSPl, uno dei più importanti istituti di ricerca europei.

This article is the Arabic translation (with minor modifications approved by the author) of an English original ("The KRG's Relationship with the Yazidi Minority and the Future of the Yazidis in Shingal") that was published by NRT, a Kurdish media outlet in Iraqi Kurdistan, on January 31, 2017. This Arabic translation was published by NRT on March 19, 2017. Both versions are available on Academia.edu and also appear on the NRT website.

At the end of the Second Gulf War in early 1991, the Kurdish people in Iraq rose against Saddam Hussein’s regime by liberating most of the areas inhabited by them. However, within a few weeks, the uprising was crushed. The Iraqi army’s attack on Kurdish cities and villages and its retaliation against the Kurdish forces and civilians led to a mass exodus of the Kurds to Iran and Turkey. The international community’s intervention resulted in the creation of the northern no-fly-zone by the UN Security Council. This facilitated the return of most of Kurdish refugees back to their habitat. But the continued pressure by the Kurds on the regime forced the government to withdraw its forces, as well as the administrative units from parts of Kurdistan in October 1991. The Kurds then filled the vacuum created by holding elections in 1992, and thus began self-governance in the region.The areas under the control of Kurdish authorities since then came to be known as the Kurdistan Region (RG) which was a self-declared federal region in Iraq until 2005 when the Iraqi constitution officially recognized the region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region in Iraq.
The KR is located in north and north eastern parts of Iraq, Syria is to the west, Iran to the east, and Turkey to the north. Its area is 40,643 square kilometers with population of 5,351,276 (estimated). The city of Erbil is the capital of the Region. Kurdish and Arabic are the official languages in the Region. However, Turkmeni, Assyrian and Armenian are also used by the respective communities in some areas. In addition to Kurds a diverse collection of ethnic and religious groups live side-by-side in the Region — including Arabs, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Assyrians, Yazidis, Kakayi and Shabaks. The region is geographically diverse, from hot plains to cooler mountainous areas where snow falls in the winter.

Scholarly literature highlights the systematic actions taken in the modern Middle East to destroy the Kurdish language. With a primary focus on Turkey, scholars have described this process as a policy of linguicide, or language genocide, which is “the extermination of languages, an analogous concept to (physical) genocide.”2 In contrast, similar processes at work in southern Kurdistan (Kurdistan of northern Iraq) have often been described as “linguistic suppression.”3 This paper argues that linguistic suppression does not adequately describe the Iraqi Kurds’ experiences. Rather, linguicide better captures the practices of cultural genocide that have targeted this group. This paper focuses on how the Kurds in modern-day Iraq were subjected to linguicide under the Language Education Policy (LEP) from 1932 to 1991. This policy was established during the monarchy (1921–1958), and advanced through the time of Saddam Hussein’s regime (1979–1991).4 While much scholarly work has associated the process of linguicide with the birth of a nation-state,5 this article further argues that linguicide in the Iraqi Kurdish case predates the formation of the Iraqi nation-state.

US Neocons and Tony Blair's governent used the pretext of WMD to invade Iraq although Saddam Hussein was in full compliance with UNSCOM inspectors. Since the invasion the country has been devastated and plundered, its people murdered, abused and cheated by Western private companies spearheaded by former political and military figures active in undermining Iraq's infrastructure. ISIS was allowed in to seize vast swaths of the country in a cynical policy that backfired but many profited from ISIS's presence in the pillage of Iraq's energy resources and trillions in stolen oil money

This chapter focuses on the Iraqi Kurdish response to the rapid and devastating advance of ISIS. Of course, the Iraqi Kurdish response to the ISIS advance has been a multifaceted, complex, and evolving one that includes military strategy, pragmatic politics, and aspirations of independence. Leaving aside the fact that the ISIS advance has granted the Iraqi Kurds unprecedented access to Iraq’s rich oil reserves and the fact that the initial Kurdish reaction was to ramp up their rhetoric toward complete secession from Iraq, this chapter focuses on two further dimensions of the Iraqi Kurdish response. Firstly, it documents the Iraqi Kurdish seizure of the so-called “disputed territories,” especially
Kirkuk, and their stated intent to hold a referendum on the future of these
regions (effectively to force a resolution to Article 140 of the constitution). Secondly, the chapter documents the Iraqi Kurdish use of the ISIS advance as leverage to enhance Kurdish relations dramatically with the US and Europe via direct military support (including airstrikes and weapons supply) and to become the key launchpad
in the fight against ISIS planned for 2015. The chapter concludes by briefly assessing the efficacy and wisdom of the Kurdish strategy of leveraging the ISIS onslaught to advance their own interests.

Among every threat the community know since the end of the XXI century, water scarcity has been one of the most discussed. Through the two existing paradigm, this master thesis aims to study the relation between the quest for a automous/independant government by the Kurds, also known as "Kurdish Issue" by the state they have evolved in, and the large water scarcity that knows almost every country in the MENA and more specifically in the Tigris-Euphrates bassin river. This work must be thought as a part of the regional instability this region have known for various decades, which has taken a new dimension in 2011. In a world where water disponibility and quality is decreasing, we can ask ourselves whether a population that do not enjoy a minimum of water for its own subsistence is likely to be a danger for the regional stability, and to what degree possessing the control over water ressource can be a political avantage with respect to its neighbourgs.

The KRG began rebuilding its economy. Kurdistan entered into a new phase as “double economic sanctions were lifted, i.e. the international sanctions on Iraq, and Saddam’s sanctions against Kurdistan” (Fattah, 2008, 119). in 2006, the president of Kurdistan region signed the Law of Investment, the article 3 (treatment of foreign investors) assured the foreign investors that wish to start business in Kurdistan region that they will be treated equally to national investors, regarding to taxation and they will be entitled to own all the capital of their investments they do in Kurdistan (Gov, 2006). This was a huge step for KRG to attract foreign investors, according to Dr. Zeki Fattah, Senior Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, this liberal economic policy will help KRG prepare to join the global market and establish economic relations with the major economic states (Fattah, 2008).

Despite the promising picture of progress and recent security gains,
Iraq remains in a delicate condition. The longevity and sustainability of the country’s progress will likely depend upon Iraq’s ability to address a complex set of political issues. Among these are the political reconciliation between different ethnic and religious groups; laws needed to regulate the distribution of revenue gained from the country’s natural resources; management of Iraq’s oil reserves; resolution of the long-standing territorial dispute between the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq, including the fate of the oil-rich areas around Kirkuk; the issue of federalism; and the request for amending the Iraqi constitution, especially the articles concerning Iraq’s identity and structure. Although these issues pose the greatest threats to Iraq’s stability, no significant practical measures have yet been taken to resolve them. Iraq remains fragile primarily because the underlying sources of instability
have yet to be resolved. Iraq’s major power brokers (the Sunni,
Shiites, and Kurds) disagree on the nature of the state, its structure, and identity. The current ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq cannot be attributed exclusively to insurgency and terrorism. Indeed, the conflicts and disputes between Iraq’s national/ethnic and religious/sectarian groups constitute the most serious part of Iraq’s predicament. Iraq is comprised of people from many different backgrounds. Acknowledgment of this diversity and respecting the cultural and national differences of Iraq’s diverse groups are the most pressing challenge facing the Iraqi people. This is a challenge that needs to be addressed both constitutionally and institutionally. This book studies all these issues in details and the question of identity in Iraq in details.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, gerek kuruluşunda ve gerekse günümüzde yaşadığı önemli çözülüş sürecinde, çeteleşme biçiminde kuruluşlara gitmekte ve içindeki engelleri olduğu kadar karşısındaki hedeflerini de düşürmek için bu yöntemi kullan-makta da epey ustalaştığı görülmektedir. Mustafa Kemal hareketinin kendisi, dönemin Osmanlı nizamında bir çete ha-reketi olarak ortaya çıkar ve bu o zaman açıkça da söylenir. İttihat Terakkicilik ta-mamen bir çete sistemi altında çalışır. Hele oluşturduğu TeĢkilatı Mahsusa yani o dönemin MĠT‟i, dünyada örneği az görülen ve hatta belki de ilk örneği sayıla-bilecek bir Ģekilde, devletin içinde ama gizli bir çete olarak kendisini örgütlen-dirir. Özellikle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nu dağılış sürecinde ayakta tutmanın temel yöntemi, Teşkilatı Mahsusa‟nın çeteleşme tarzıdır. İmparatorluğun kurtulamayacağı anlaşılınca, aynı çeteler Anadolu‟ya yayılırlar. Kuva-i Milliye adı altındaki teşkilat-lanmalarda oldukça etkilidirler. Mustafa Kemal başlangıçta bunları oldukça kullanır. Örneğin Çerkez Ethem‟in hareketi de, Teşkilatı Mahsusa‟nın bir üyesi olması itiba-rıyla son tahlilde çetedir. Ama eğilimi padişah yanlısı isyancılardan değil, özellikle Bolşevik etkilenmeden ötürü Anadolu İhtilali yönündedir. Ve buna benzer Efeler hareketi de tipik bir çete hareketi olarak anlaşılır. Zaten o zaman ismi de odur.

Helpdesk Question:
What does the literature indicate are the barriers and opportunities for eradicating poverty in Iraq?

Summary:
Despite being an oil-rich, lower-middle income country, poverty remains prevalent in Iraq. This rapid review looks at the recent literature on poverty in Iraq and identifies the barriers to, and opportunities for, poverty reduction and eradication.

The literature indicates that:
◾3.9 per cent of people in Iraq are living in extreme poverty (2012). 18.9 per cent live below the national poverty line (2012), with greater rural poverty than urban poverty. 11.6 per cent of people in Iraq are multi-dimensionally poor (2011).
◾Poverty is significantly higher among larger households, those with less educated heads, women and the young.
◾There are high poverty headcount rates in remote, rural, and sparsely populated areas, although urban and semi-urban areas are often host to more poor people than the poorest parts because of the population size.
◾There are large spatial differences in poverty across, and within, the governorates of Iraq.
◾Poverty reduction has been spatially uneven, falling more in rural than in urban areas in 2007-2012.
◾The wider impact of the current crises is unknown but in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq they have increased poverty in from 3.5 per cent in 2012 up to 8.1 per cent in 2014.

Barriers to poverty eradication include the current financial, security and humanitarian crises, legacies of violence and insecurity, corruption, the brain drain, trade barriers restricting levels of trade and investment, high unemployment and lack of education.

Opportunities for poverty eradication include the use of accurate data to inform poverty policies, ending conflict/peacebuilding, diversifying the economy and strengthening the links between growth, employment and earnings, better targeted social safety nets, improving labour income, shari’ah-compliant and accessible microfinance and growth in the agriculture sector.

This thesis examines the professional notion and attitudes of journalists in Kurdistan region, highlighting improvements in media performances in addition to indicating to the role of journalists in developing democracies and specific conflicts of journalists with societal norms, political and economic interests. Iraqi Kurdistan is an example of democratic transition in the middle of conflict hot zone. The study is based on qualitative interviews with journalists and managers of Rudaw media network.

“Kurdish Islam” – what is that? The adjective is derived from a noun that names a people and their languages living in Eastern Anatolia, Northeastern Syria, Northern Iraq, and Northwestern Iran. However, here it refers to only Iraqi Kurdistan. The noun refers to a religion. What a religion is and what Islam means is a much larger debate, which unfortunately cannot be covered here. For the purposes of this chapter “Islam in Kurdistan” actually refers to Muslim Kurdish society going back to the Tanzimat, an Ottoman set of legal reforms, which organized communities along religious divides. In particular, this article will examine what practices are considered outside of the scope of Islam and why. What constitutes the boundary? Unfortunately, a more detailed discussion of intra-Islamic discourses is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, it will focus on communal boundaries, social structures as they relate to religious institutions and authority, shifting  alliances and their influences on religious beliefs and practices, and, finally, popular practices.

With the demise of the rule of the Ba‘ath party in Iraq, the country’s
Kurdish population faces a new chapter in the political and regional
development of its region. For over a century the Kurds have been
subject to the grand schemes of other powers, denied autonomy, and
have faced the onslaughts of military assaults, economic embargoes,
and the destruction of their native regions.

This publication is intended to provide an outline of some of the
issues affecting the Kurds in Iraq. It provides a brief exploration of
the past’s effect on the present, and of how both the Kurds and the
international community may avoid repeating previous mistakes,
laying the foundations for an internationally recognised autonomous
region committed to pluralistic democracy and human rights.
Such a region would require a commitment to the rule of law and
internationally recognised human rights standards.

Current Issues in Kurdish Linguistics contains ten contributions which span the field of Kurdish linguistics, both in terms of geography and in terms of the range of topics. Along with several works on Kurmanji (Northern Kurdish) and Sorani (Central Kurdish), two chapters shed light on the lesser-known Southern Kurdish language area. Other studies are comparative, and treat the Kurdish language area in its entirety. The linguistic approaches of the authors are a mix of formal and typological perspectives, and cover topics ranging from geographical distribution and variation to phonology, morphosyntax, discourse structure, historical morphology, and sociolinguistics.

The present volume is the first of its kind in bringing together contributions from a relatively large number of linguists, working in a diverse range of frameworks and on different aspects and varieties of Kurdish. As such, it attests to the increasing breadth and sophistication now evident in Kurdish linguistics, and is a worthy launch for the new series Bamberg Studies in Kurdish Linguistics (BSKL).

Irak Türkmenleri denildiği zaman hafızamızda ilk olarak Kerkük ve Musul canlanır. Fakat Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun dağılmasından sonra maalesef Türkler için hüznün ve acının adeta merkezi haline gelmiştir. Bu acılar dokunaklı bir şekilde halk edebiyatına ve o bölgenin türkülerine de yansımıştır;

“Yıktılar kal’amızı
Sürdüler balamızı
Daha can boğazdayken
Çektiler sâlamızı
Ah Kerkük yüz ah Kerkük
Her zaman yüz ak Kerkük
Ölseydim düşmeseydim
Men senden uzak Kerkük...”
 
Türkünün dizelerinden de anlaşılacağı gibi Türkmenler maalesef kaderine terkedilmiş ve geçen yıllar boyunca adeta bir mum gibi yavaş yavaş bölgede asimile politikaları ile erimektedirler. Bu konuya değinmeden önce bölgedeki Türk varlığını incelemekte fayda vardır. Türklerin Irak’a ilk girişleri H. 54 / M. 674 tarihlerine kadar uzanmaktadır. Emevi Halifesi Muaviye tarafından Horasan’a gönderilen Ubeydullah bin Ziyad ile Buhara prensesi Hatun emrindeki Türk kuvvetleri arasında yapılan çarpışmadan sonra bir barış yapılmıştır. Bu barıştan sonra Ubeydullah yanına aldığı Türk askerlerini Irak’a götürüp, Basra’ya yerleştirmiştir. Türklerin Irak’a gelişleri Abbasi döneminde, Halife Memun ve Halife Mutasım’ın iktidarı sırasında meydana gelen siyasi gelişmelerden dolayı daha da sıklaşmıştır. Emevi ordularında olduğu gibi Abbasi ordularında da yer alan Türkler, üstün savaşçı yetenekleri ile maharetlerinden dolayı üst mevkilere getirilmişlerdir. Ayrıca H. 211 / M. 836 ’da Halife Mutasım’ın emriyle Türk kumandanı Türk hassa askeri için Somerna şehri kurulmuştu. 25 Aralık 1055’te Bağdat’a giren Selçuklu hükümdarı Tuğrul Bey Büveyhoğulları’nın Irak’taki hakimiyetine son verilmiştir. Tuğrul Bey Bağdat ve Oğuzların yayıldığı Irak’ı Selçuklu Ülkesine katmıştır. Bu tarihten sonra Oğuz boylarına mensup birçok Türk, bu bölgeye yerleştirilmiştir. Böylece bölgede Büyük Selçuklular ile Türk hakimiyeti başlamıştır. Türklere daha önce yalnızca Etrak (Türkler) diyen Araplar, “Etrak-u Bağdat” (Bağdat Türkleri) demeye başlamışlardır.  1258 Moğol istilası ile Abbasi hilafeti son bulmuş, bölge Moğolların eline geçmiştir. Ayrıca bu bölgede Moğollarla birlikte çok sayıda Türk askeri gelmiştir. 1258 – 1336 İlhanlılar, 1338 – 1360 Celayirliler, 1360 – 1469 Karakoyunlular ve 1470 tarihinden itibaren de Akkoyunlular hakimiyetinde kalan bölge 1508 yılında Safevilerin eline geçmiştir. Safeviler’in Çaldıran’da (1515) Yavuz Sultan Selim Han’a yenilmesi ve Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Han’ın da 1534’te Bağdat’ı almasıyla bugün Irak olarak anılan bölge Osmanlı hakimiyetine geçmiştir. Osmanlılar Irak’ı, Bağdat, Basra, Musul, Şehrizor ve el-Ahsa olmak üzere beş bölgeye ayırarak idare ettirmişlerdir. 1623’te bölge tekrar Safeviler’in eline geçmiş ve Safeviler binlerce kişiyi katletmişlerdir. Sultan IV. Murad Han’ın 1638’de Bağdat’ı tekrar geri almasıyla Kasr-ı Şirin Antlaşması yapılmış ve kesin sınır çizilmişti. Böylece Musul-Kerkük bölgesi de dahil olarak I. Dünya Savaşı sonuna kadar bölge Osmanlı hakimiyetinde kalmıştır. Sonuç olarak Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Han ve Sultan IV. Murad Han zamanında Anadolu’dan getirilen çok sayıda Türk de bölgeye yerleştirilmiştir. I. Dünya Savaşından itibaren Irak’ın işgal edilmesi ve 1926 Musul Meselesi görüşmeleri sonucu Musul ve Kerkük’ün Irak’a bırakılmasıyla Musul ve Kerkük Irak’la birlikte İngiliz sömürgesi haline gelmiştir. 1920 – 1932 yılları arasında Irak’ın İngiliz Mandası altında bulunduğu dönemde Türkler baskı ve zulüm dolu bir devre yaşamışlardır. Irak’ın 1932 ’de Milletler Cemiyeti’ne kabul edilip bağımsızlığına kavuşmasından sonra da Irak Türkleri rahat yüzü görmemiş, baskı ve şiddet daha da artmıştır. Bütün bu baskı ve sindirme politikalarının Irak’ta bulunan Türk varlığını yok edemediği 1937 Sadâbâd Paktı’yla ortaya çıkmıştır. 27 Haziran 1937’de imzalanan Sadâbâd Paktı için bölgedeki Türkler büyük bir sevinç yaşasalar da pakttan sonra polis tarafından yapılan işkence ve zulme maruz kalmışlardır. II. Dünya Savaşı’nın sıkıntıları sebebiyle savaşı sakin geçiren Türkler savaştan sonra yeni bir katliamla karşılaştılar. 1946 yılında Gavurbağı’nda Kerküklü işçiler polis kuvvetleri tarafından yaylım ateşine tutulmuşlardır. Yine Bağdat Paktı’nın imzalanacağını duyan Türkler, bölgelerinde büyük bir sevinç yaşamışlardır. Fakat yine paktın imzalanmasından sonra Türklere yapılan baskılar artmıştır. Irak’ta 14 Temmuz 1959 Cumhuriyet’in birinci yılı kutlamalarında sokağa dökülen Kerkük Türkleri komünistler tarafından katliama uğramışlardır. 3 gün süren bu katliamda soydaşlarımız inanılmaz derecede zulüm ve işkenceye maruz kalmışlardır. Yaklaşık 1500 yıl kadar bu topraklarda varlığını gösteren Türkler I. Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra batılı devletlerin bölgedeki çıkarlarından dolayı sistematik olarak çeşitli haksızlık, baskı ve katliama uğramışlardır. Emperyalist güçlerin özellikle yer altı bakımından zengin olan kuzey Irak’taki emellerinden dolayı bölgede yaşayan Türkler birçok zorlukla karşılaştıysa da bunlar karşısında Türk hükümeti ise maalesef hiç bir etkinlik göstermemiştir.

Discussion about Kurdish independence both inside and outside
Kurdistan too often remains limited to the moral argument: Do the
Kurds deserve independence? Is it not their right? It may be, but
that is not what this monograph is about. Whether or not the Kurds
win independence is ultimately a question for the Kurds. What the
current debate misses, however, is that, if the Kurds achieve their
national aspiration, it will not be the end of the story but rather its
beginning. Seldom, however, does this discussion occur in Kurdistan,
let alone in the West.

This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

I ONAY Evren BARUT tarafından hazırlanan "Irak Kürt Bölgesel Yönetiminde Dış Politika ve Güvenlik Ekseninde Türkiye Algısı" başlıklı bu çalışma, 25/07/2013 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda (oybirliği / oyçokluğu) ile başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından Uluslararası Güvenlik anabilim dalında Yüksek Lisans tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir. II TELİF HAKLARI BEYANNAMESİ GÜVENLİK BİLİMLERİ ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE Yüksek lisans tezi olarak sunduğum bu çalışmayı bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yol ve yardıma başvurmaksızın yazdığımı, yararlandığım eserlerin kaynakçada gösterilenlerden oluştuğunu, bunlardan her seferinde yollama yaparak yararlandığımı belirtir; bunu şerefimle beyan ederim. Enstitü veya başka herhangi bir mercii tarafından belli bir zamana bağlı kalmaksızın, tezimle ilgili bu beyana aykırı bir durumun tespit edilmesi durumunda, ortaya çıkacak tüm ahlaki ve hukuki sonuçlara katlanacağımı bildiririm. III ÖNSÖZ Bu tezi, rahmetle andığım sevgili babam Necati BARUT'a ithaf ederken, tezin hazırlanması ve yazımı aşamasında manen her türlü desteği gösteren ve yardımlarını esirgemeyen sevgili annem Nimet BARUT, kıymetli ablalarım, yeğenlerim, dostlarım, değerli abim Recep BARUT, tez danışmanım Doç. Dr. İ. Dinçer GÜNEŞ, Erbil Özel Sema Hastanesi'nde görevli Dr. Sami SELBEST, Selahattin Üniversitesi Tarih bölümü öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Aziz BARZANİ, Erbil Işık Üniversitesi İşletme Fakültesi öğretim görevlisi Sn. Fatih CURA ve İçişleri Bakanlığı AB ve Dış İlişkiler Dairesi Başkanlığı'nda birlikte görev yaptığım değerli çalışma arkadaşlarıma en derin teşekkürlerimi sunarım.

One highly prominent aspect of ISIS’s program of destruction in Syria and Iraq that has come to the media attention recently is their program of cultural heritage destruction that took the form of smashing artifacts in archaeological museums, iconoclastic breaking and bulldozing of archaeological sites, dynamiting of shrines, tombs, and other holy sites of local communities, and burning of libraries and archives. In this paper, I focus on ISIS’s destruction of archaeological heritage. I argue that this destruction can be seen as a form of place-based violence that aims to annihilate the local sense of belonging, and the collective sense of memory among local communities to whom the heritage belongs. Therefore, heritage destruction can be seen as part and parcel of this scorched-earth strategy described above. I also argue that the Islamic State coordinates and choreographs these destructions as mediatic spectacles of violence aimed at objects and sites of heritage, and these spectacles take place as re-enactments or historical performances that are continuously and carefully communicated to us through ISIS’s own image-making and dissemination apparatus that increasingly utilizes the most advanced technologies of visualization and communication. I will also pose questions about the relatively weak responses from the archaeological community around the world that rarely went beyond the stereotypical expression of “dismay” to ISIS’s heritage destruction. At the same time, I will try to answer the why and how of ISIS’s dislike of archaeological heritage in the context of late capitalism.

The defeat of the Islamic State coincides with the emergence of a series of crises for the Kurdistan region of Iraq that were postponed by the arrival of the fight against Islamic State extremists. These problems include territory disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, internal rivalries between Kurdish factions, internal controversies over independence, Iranian and Turkish pressures, an economic crisis, and the massive challenge posed by an influx of refugees. The war on IS united many factions, bringing in foreign military and economic assistance, however it also accelerated and highlighted problematic issues in Iraq, such as the ascendency of Shi'i militias, which pose a challenge for the otherwise successful and stable Kurdish region. Can the KRG step up to these challenges amidst declining U.S. influence in the region?

The consequences of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq will doubtless be
debated for years to come. One result, however, is already clear: the long
suppressed nationalist aspirations of the Kurdish people now dispersed
across four states—Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria—have been aroused,
perhaps irrevocably, by the war. Already in Iraq, Kurdish regions, which
have benefited from Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, have consolidated
themselves into a federal region. The Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) is a reality and a force for further Kurdish empowerment as it
seeks to incorporate other Kurdish-majority areas and the oil-rich Kirkuk
province in particular into its domain. The KRG’s existence and demands
have already alarmed all of Iraq’s neighbors and the Baghdad government.

The issues are far from being settled. If ignored or badly handled,
Kurdish aspirations have the potential to cause considerable instability
and violence in Iraq and beyond at a particularly delicate time.

Since 2005, Iraq 1 recognizes an autonomous Kurdistan 2 region in the north of the country. That region is run by the Kurdistan Regional Government 3 . It seems that the current situation is the outcome of decades of political and military efforts that were made to secure the self-rule by the Kurdish minority, who are estimated to be more than 6 million, and make up between 17 and 20% of the population in Iraq.

Disgusted with ISIS, some Kurds turned away from Islam following the fall of Mosul in 2014. Many became atheists, while others sought comfort in Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism, according to converts, was the “original” religion of the Kurds before they embraced Islam. In 2015, two Zoroastrian centers opened in Sulaimani, both of which are recognized by the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. Notably, neither has tried to recreate Zoroastrianism the way it is currently and has been historically practiced in Iran and South Asia. Instead, they have created their own versions of Zoroastrianism, which is nationalist, postmodern, and liberal. Kurdish Zoroastrians argue that the reason Kurds are “backward” is Islam. They seek to rectify the present situation through a Kurdish “authenticated” and “original” form of Zoroastrianism. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork at these two centers, the present article examines this new religious movement in Sulaimani, an important city in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. It analyses the rise and distinctiveness of Kurdish Zoroastrianism looking at how Zoroastrian Kurds articulate their views on Islam, women’s rights, human rights, and Kurdish independence.

This dissertation talks about the history of the challenging nature of the conflict between Shias (Shiites), Sunnis and Yazidis that theologians, historians, social and political scientists of the world are facing these days in the Middle East, with a special focus on northern Iraq (Kurdistan). It explores the way these three groups have engaged with each other over the years. Broadly, the literature used in this dissertation articulates that Shias and Sunnis, being the major political, religious and social force of the region, have always dominated, exploited and persecuted Yazidis, but this study transverses the history through literature and empirical experiences to find out the cause and effect of the conflict. It digs deeper into the physical, emotional and strategic struggles of these opposing groups that affected their past, is affecting their present and will affect their future. For ages, the blame games of conventional domestic structures and fascist ideologies have damaged all the parties and especially the weaker ones. They are often pushed against the wall, and have faced discrimination and even ethnic cleansing. This study aims to focus on the reason or force behind the conflict and what impact it has left on the regional peace and the peace process around the globe. This interdisciplinary research highlights and inquires the nature of this conflict and the interrelationship between political, religious and social forces of the region that have reached to this extreme where not only the regional peace has perished, but the international peace is also in jeopardy.

The regional transformations resulting from the outbreak of the Arab upheavals, the onslaught of ISIS and the coming apart of historical boundaries anticipate a very different Middle East in the years to come. Another factor of instability could be the independence referendum for Iraqi Kurdistan planned to be held in 2016 and then postponed due to the ongoing battle for Mosul: Israel backs Erbil's nationalist claims and one can imagine that in the event of a secession, Israel could be one of the first countries to upgrade ties to open relations. Israeli-Iraqi Kurdish relations have nestled amongst escalating conflicts and religious and ideological cleavages since the 60s. They have identified military, intelligence and energy cooperation as a way to bypass precarious regional equilibriums and granitic hostilities. Today, these cross-border policy solutions could have positive spillovers across the whole region, encouraging political dialogue through mutual economic interests and trade.

This paper focuses on the impact of the war and subsequent occupation (2003–2011) on Iraq’s heritage, documenting the most significant and devastating instances of heritage damage and destruction that occurred. Moving forward, this chapter continues with a discussion of the grave challenges facing Iraqi heritage beyond the withdrawal of US military forces in the form of various groups - from jihadist networks such as the 'Islamic State' through to various sectarian actors. It also discusses the threat to heritage sites from development, neglect, and inexpert and haphazard excavation, preservation, protection, and restoration. Despite this troubling scenario, this chapter also examines the extent to which the Iraq conflict was a turning point for major Western military operations and the development of CPP programs which aim to better prepare military personnel for protecting cultural property in future conflicts.