ISIL

Since March 2011, tens of thousands of Syrians have disappeared. The majority – though not all – - are young men who have vanished after being arrested or abducted from or on their way to their homes, universities, and workplaces. Left behind are anguished families, unable to grieve their loss and left in a social, financial, and legal purgatory. When, all too seldom, the disappeared return, they carry with them – marked as much on their bodies and minds, as on their memories – stories of horrific abuse. Many come bearing the names of others held with them, often the only evidence of the continued existence of many other disappeared.

This chapter will examine how disappearances became the hallmark of the Syrian conflict. It will trace the initial use of disappearance by the Government during the unrest against demonstrators, political activists, human rights defenders, media workers, doctors, and humanitarian aid workers.  We will then follow the evolution of disappearance as it metastasized into one of the Syrian Government’s most ubiquitous weapons: used against those suspected of disloyalty, family members of political and military opponents, and those who surrendered as cities fell to the Government from 2014 onwards. While lesser in scale, the chapter also analyses the use of disappearance by a diverse number of non-state armed groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.

The chapter will explore the impact of disappearance on the relatives of those left behind – with particular emphasis on the consequences for women and children. It will also scrutinise the rippling effect on Syrian society – and how the epidemic of disappearance is likely to impact on the possibility of securing both justice for the victims, and a lasting peace for all Syrians.

Stredna Azia je v sucasnosti pod tlakom nepriaznivých vnutorných i vonkajsich vplyvov, ktore suvisia s otazkou rastuceho vplyvu radikalneho islamu. Clanok analyzuje faktory vonkajsieho vplyvu tohto nebezpecneho fenomenu, ktorý v sucasnom postsovietskom regione nadobudol na mimoriadnej aktualnosti v suvislosti so vznikom tzv. Islamskeho statu. Niektori obcania bývalých postsovietskych republik Strednej Azie sa výrazne angažovali v bojových akciach „Islamskeho statu“ v Sýrii a Iraku. V suvislosti s jeho ocakavanou vojenskou poražkou sa stale viac hovori o „sýrskej stope“ pri raste vplyvu radikalneho islamu v Strednej Azii. V obsahu clanku je zdoraznena realna hrozba ďalsieho sirenia islamskeho radikalizmu na konkretnych faktoch a v konkretnych krajinach regionu, vratane potreby prijatia opatreni, ktore maju sancu jeho vplyv minimalizovať.

This article attempts to understand the global jihadist movement as a new form of organizational unit, seeking a better understanding and control of terrorism and jihad. It reviews the history of a number of jihadist groups, including the Taliban, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan. The authors tell how “Jihad” has taken on a second meaning that exalts violence, as distinguished from the original meaning that speaks of spiritual self-improvement.

Islamic State relies heavily on the recruitment of foreign fighters. We examine this recruitment from an organizational perspective. We analyze how the process of recruitment of foreigners shapes the adverse selection problem affecting the dissident groups that they join. We also examine the different mechanisms used to maintain the allegiance and compliance of foreigners as opposed to indigenous recruits. More broadly, we analyze how the recruitment of foreign fighters affects the organization. Foreign fighters and local recruits exhibit significant differences in recruitment patterns and motivations for joining IS. This could create problems for the organization. Evidence of such strife, however, is not discernible. Given the information at hand, IS appears to be effectively managing the mix of foreign and local recruits.

In his National Security Strategy (February 2015), President Barack Obama stated that, "the threat of catastrophic attacks against our homeland by terrorists has diminished but still persists. .. Our adversaries are not confined to a distinct country or region. Instead, they range from South Asia through the Middle East and into Africa." However, the President failed to mention that terrorists and sympathizers are already making inroads into the Western Hemisphere as well. An example of this is the nation-island of Trinidad and Tobago. It has been reported that about 100 Trinidadian citizens have gone to Syria to fight along with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/ISIL). According to the former commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General John F. Kelly, in his posture statement before the 114th Congressional Senate Armed Services Committee, "when these foreign fighters return, they will possess operational experience, ties to global extremists, and possible intent to harm Western interests." 1 Therefore, to ignore or take the security of the Western Hemisphere for granted could result in a serious mistake with deadly consequences. This Strategic Insights article examines the role of Trinidad and Tobago as a ground zero in the Western Hemisphere for ISIS/ISIL recruiting and the consequences for the security of the Western Hemisphere, especially for the United States.

The question of majorities and minorities has dominated the Iraqi political scene since the American-led invasion of 2003. As an occupying power, the US enshrined sectarianism in post-Saddam Iraq through divisive policies and structures that continue to pervade the political institution from top to bottom. As a result, what was considered a remedy for Iraq's political ills opened the gates for more sectarian division, the dispersion of religious minorities and power struggles between the main majority groups: Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds. How this deadlock will be resolved is the key question that Iraq is facing as it prepares for an imminent defeat of the so-called Islamic State (Da'sh or ISIS). This paper traces the development of the concepts of majorities and minorities in Iraq's recent history, analyzing the factors that led to the sectarian paralysis of today and exploring possibilities for a post-ISIS political solution that preserves the multi-ethnic, multi-...

The Kurdish struggle in Turkey has evolved over several decades, marked by complex dynamics and historical context. It is important to examine the socio-political factors that have contributed to the Kurdish people's fight for self-determination and their grievances against the Turkish state.

تستعرض هذه الورقة قصة حياة تمثال اللات - أثينا  من محفوظات متحف تدمر (سجل متحفي رقم آ 138/75) وذلك من خلال التقارير البحثية التي نشرتها البعثة الاثرية البولونية والتي عملت على دراسة ومسح معبد اللات أثرياً منذ عام 1975 وحتى ثمانينات القرن الفائت.

This comparative case study investigates the financing typologies of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Turkey. The PKK is a Marxist-Leninist organisation that pursues ethnic separationist policies in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. ISIL is a radical Wahhabi network that aspires to reestablish the Caliphate and restore the 'glory' of Sharia by defeating the 'near' and 'far' enemies. Based on primary/secondary interviews, content analysis of unclassified documents and media coverage on counter PKK/ISIL investigations, this study indicates that both organisations have been highly skilful in exploiting the regional licit and illicit enterprises. Financing methods of the PKK and ISIL were similar in complex regional underground economic infrastructure. However, the PKK has been able to develop much more sophisticated financial infrastructure than ISIL due to a longer life span and existence of specialised cadres in the Middle East and Europe. ISIL has failed to develop advanced financing infrastructure mainly due to a shorter life span, loss of territorial control and the UN-US sponsored international sanctions. Both the Marxists and radical Islamists encouraged illicit trade schemes not only to generate funds but also to avoid taxation by the 'hostile' regimes.

The scope of the maintenance of international peace and security has been increasingly widened by the United Nations Security Council in response to actions taken not only by the Member States but also in some cases by the individuals. In fact, a range of actions and decisions were taken by the Security Council, approximately in the late 1990s and after the so-called 9/11 attacks in the context of combating terrorism, as well as in other contexts against the member States. In consequence, the affected States and individuals had to seek redress from international or national courts on different grounds such as violations of human rights. This has led the domestic courts to develop novel jurisprudence. Thus, it is necessary to pay due attention to the jurisprudence created by these courts. This paper is devoted to analysis an

La caduta di Saddam nel 2003 ha rappresentato l’incipit di una fase di trasformazione dell’ordine mediorientale, nella quale il venir meno di un egemone regionale come l’Iraq ha rappresentato sia un’opportunità che una fonte di minacce per attori in ascesa come la Turchia. Certamente, un tale vuoto di potere ha aperto le porte alla penetrazione turca in territorio iracheno, soprattutto attraverso rinnovati strumenti di soft power combinanti elementi economico-commerciali con richiami etnico-culturali. Al contempo, però, un’aumentata instabilità politico-istituzionale interna all’Iraq ha mantenuto viva, e talvolta rafforzato, la necessità di un approccio militare-securitario da parte di Ankara. Infatti, l’aspra competizione tra vari attori statali e non-statali dagli interessi divergenti, così come il conseguente rafforzamento di pratiche e discorsi settari, hanno rinvigorito l’insicurezza ontologica della Turchia rispetto alle turbolenze del proprio vicinato. Inoltre, è poi fondamentale considerare come i vari sommovimenti storici dell’ultimo ventennio nel contesto iracheno, regionale e internazionale siano coincisi con la lunga ed erratica fase al potere del partito AKP in Turchia, il quale ha contribuito a forgiare un immaginario geopolitico e nuove formule di proiezione esterna. In generale, spartiacque quali la guerra del Golfo, l’intervento statunitense nel 2003, le rivolte arabe del 2011, il referendum del 2017 e i più recenti squilibri interni all’Iraq sono utili cartine tornasole per misurare come permangano tanto linee di continuità quanto periodi riassestamenti nell’approccio turco durante e successivamente all’era Saddam. Alla luce di tali considerazioni, il presente contributo si propone di cogliere tali oscillamenti guardando ad alcune tendenze principali della postura della Turchia in Iraq: (1) la valenza geostrategica, energetica e simbolica del territorio iracheno; (2) l’alternanza tra politiche di buon vicinato e periodi di tensione e securitizzazione a più livelli con Baghdad; (3) la questione curda e le relazioni con Erbil come emblema di pragmatismo, funzionalismo e minaccia esistenziale.

Atrocity crimes rage today in Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, Burundi and Yemen. Given their potential to establish facts and promote accountability, recently opened United Nations investigations of international law violations in each of these states are thus a welcome, even if belated, development. However, these initiatives prompt questions about their designs, both in isolation and relative to each other. This article describes the investigations into alleged violations in these five states, examines their respective sponsors and scopes, and presents a wide range of questions about the investigations and their implications, including their coordination with each other and their use of evidence in domestic, foreign, hybrid and international courts (such as the International Criminal Court). The article concludes that, while seeking accountability for international law violations is certainly laudatory, these particular investigations raise significant questions about achieving that goal amidst rampant human rights abuses in these five states and beyond. International lawyers, atrocity crime survivors and other observers thus await answers before assessing whether these investigations will truly promote justice.

The main reason for designing a temporary residence complex is the lack of a proper place for temporary settling of Mosul refugees. The poor condition of Mosulians, who were forced to leave their homeland after their city was occupied and destructed by ISIL, and their willingness to return and rebuild their houses, motivated this study to begin. The location of this complex is next to banks of the Tigris River. Since this study might be considered as an architectural design project close to urban planning and post disaster reconstruction subjects, explaining research methodology is not a main concern as it is common in researching projects, but an attempt has been made to use “User Centered Design” method (UCD) on two issues; the “context of using this plan” as well as “user needs”. According to this, some factors related to locating the site such as buffer distances, necessary requirements and features of urban texture and indigenous architecture, equipment's needed to set up this temporary settlement as well as standard minimum spaces for necessary uses were clarified as the context requirements of this plan, while reviewing the literature related to emergency and temporary settlements and previous disaster experiences of camp accommodation lead to the main requirements and needs of users. This infrastructure will have two different areas: the first, named “Urgent Humanitarian Aid”, is thought for receiving and caring the newly arrived returnees, and the second one called “City Reintegration Zone”, aims to reintegrate refugees into society after years of uprooting and will seek to secure a future for families, once they meet their most urgent basic needs in the first area.

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

In August 2014, ISIS fighters attacked the Sinjar region of northern Iraq. Their target: the Yazidis, an indigenous pre-Judaic religious group that ISIS reviles as pagans. Thousands of Yazidi women, men, and children were captured. Those who returned to their community—who escaped, were rescued, or most often, who were sold back to their families—relayed tales of almost-unimaginable atrocities, including the killing of men and older boys, the sexual enslavement and torture of women and girls, and the indoctrination and forced recruitment of young boys. In 2015 and 2016, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria released their respective reports, determining that ISIS committed the crime of genocide, as well as multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes, in its coordinated assault on the Yazidis.

This chapter will examine how the Yazidi genocide unfolded, including the central role that gender played in ISIS's annihilative violence. It explores why ISIS sought to destroy the Yazidi community, and this rationale's roots in the historic and current prejudice against, and othering of, the Yazidis. The chapter delves into diverse responses of the Arab community in Sinjar, noting that the actions of those who joined or otherwise collaborated with ISIS have overshadowed the bravery of those who aided Yazidis to escape. It also probes the controversial collapse of the Peshmerga forces in Sinjar, their withdrawal in the face of the ISIS advance, and the significance of the resulting schism between the Yazidi community and the Kurdish Democratic Party, which dominates the Kurdish Regional Government. Finally the chapter analyses the medium- and long-term impact of the genocide on the Yazidi community, including their continuing search for justice and security in the context of an increasingly politicised Iraq.

Terrorist attacks can instigate widespread and long-lasting fear. Mass media can enforce fear by framing the events and affecting their perceptions. We implemented a news experiment to investigate the fear-triggering effects of different types of terrorist threats. We manipulated the type of terrorist group in three scenarios: a homegrown Islamist group, a foreign Islamist group, and a domestic far-right group. The fourth group served as the control group. The data were collected in early 2017 from Finland (N = 2,024), Norway (N = 2,063), Spain (N = 2,000), France (N = 2,003), and the United States (N = 2,039). Social psychological determinants of fear, including prejudice, trait neuroticism, and trust, were analyzed with separate hierarchically implemented linear regression models. The results showed that in Finland and France, fear was higher in groups primed with jihadist scenarios. Prejudice was associated with fear related to jihadist news across all of the countries. Instituti...

(CPCRS) and International Organization of Migration (IOM) collaborated on research on violent youth mobilization and the recruitment efforts of armed groups in Ninewa Governorate. The primary goals of this research were the following: to understand how conflict has affected communities, including the current tensions; to understand and help mitigate "push and pull factors" of mobilization into armed groups; and to discern best practices for stabilization and resilience programming by the aid community. The four locations are a mix of urban and rural environments in Ninewa Governorate that collectively host IDPs from Mosul and displaced Shebak, Yezidi, and Christian communities. The study used qualitative research interviews with host community members, IDPs, community leaders, and armed group members in each location, followed by focus groups with community members and IDPs. The study found that motivations for armed group recruitment are complex, interconnected, and relate both to economic concerns (a need for livelihood) and grievances related to previous experiences of marginalization and/or discrimination. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM.

ISIS attacked Ramadi and Fallujah in the early days of January 2014, and while Fallujah fell at once with no visible resistance, it took protracted fighting and a three-day surge by ISIS before Ramadi fell on May 17 the same year. Through the application of social movement theory to the cases, I argue that it is possible to provide an understanding of the processes that led up to the two different outcomes, by looking at the Sunni Protest movement in Anbar throughout 2013. I argue that to understand the rise of ISIS, it is important to look beyond the group itself. It is necessary to include environmental dynamics, intramovement relations and the influence of outside actors in the analysis. This study finds that internal competition of frames caused Ramadi and Fallujah to develop differently. Fallujah was more receptive to extremist frames, while moderate frames resonated best in Ramadi. State repression and violence confirmed the dominant and extreme frames in Fallujah perfectly. The repression also affected Ramadi negatively, but not as much as in Fallujah. The radical flank effect increased the difference by affecting how the government handled the movement in general and how the government handled the cities specifically. As the Iraqi security forces pulled away from the cities after clashing with protesters in late December, the local councils inserted themselves as the governing bodies of Ramadi and Fallujah. Because Ramadi had remained relatively moderate, it was not in its interest to cooperate with ISIS, thus siding with the Iraqi security forces in fighting the extremists. Fallujah, on the other hand, which had been increasingly radicalised throughout the year, had no problem cooperating with ISIS. Fallujah let ISIS into the city, and that is why ISIS was able to enter unopposed in January 2014. First of all I want to thank my wife Kristin for unconditional love and support. This would not have been possible without you. To my wonderful children Sofie and Sigmund: I hope you forgive me when you grow older and realise that it is unusual for 6 and 8 years olds to learn about Anbari tribal dynamics and insurgents over dinner. To my supervisor Anne Stenersen: Thank you for all you help and interesting discussions. Your guidance has been invaluable.

The Syrian crisis is quite important for Middle Eastern Security dynamics because it has gradually transformed the entire regional order. There are many regional states involved. Moreover, the crisis has seen how foreign involvement became a new norm for the semantics. The placement of Turkey and Iran and the formation of a trifecta between Russia-Turkey-Iran are of large value. The added plunge of China in Syria is going to have certain impacts for both Middle East and China. Furthermore, non-state actors have a role to play as well. All in all, the regional order and the security milieu give an insight as to the multiple impacts for the region due to the lingering Syrian Crisis. Crisis. he international order at all times, remains highly elusive. Similarly, the regional order is no different because it is something which cannot be at one time calculated as a whole and is abstract. Middle East is a valid example because its regional order is full of significant cracks and craters a...

This article seeks to contribute to the study of migration and religion in two EU countries, Croatia and Italy, by examining the impact of religiosity and cultural identification on negative attitudes toward immigrants. In many European societies, the increasing diversification within different levels of society stemming from recent migrations has turned immigrants’ reception and integration into a key issue, whereby migrants are often perceived as a threat to the dominant religion and culture, thus aggravating the process of migrant integration within society. Our article follows recent empirical research on migration and religion, which determined that higher levels of religiosity are positively correlated with negative out-group attitudes. Conducting quantitative research in Croatia (N = 603) and Italy (N = 714) and based on the analysis of primary data, firstly, we assess whether there is an association between negative attitudes towards immigrants depending on different degrees...

The objective of this qualitative study is to raise awareness of the online presence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram by analyzing and comparing their social media activities. The decision that the above-mentioned terrorist organizations shall be selected for inclusion was based on the fact that (I.) they are active in Africa, (II.) they are currently or affiliated with three of the deadliest international terrorist groups in the continent and (III.) they use social media in order to achieve their goals. I conclude that social media is used by all three of the studied terrorist organizations with special attention devoted to mainstream social media platforms, namely Twitter, YouTube and-to a lesser extent-Facebook. Additionally, AQIM, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram seem to have primarily used social media for propaganda purposes, although it was also utilized as a recruitment tool, albeit to varying degrees. Finally, I believe social media can also be used for coordination and funding by the studied terrorist groups; although the small amount of publicly accessible evidence entails qualitative problems, indicating the fact there is room for further research.

Most work on post-2003 Iraq has focused, from a political science perspective, on the nature and role of the state, the American invasion and foreign military interventions, and the discourse of actors in power. This has fueled analysis in terms of fragmentation and sectarian divisions, categories that this body of literature has participated in constructing. Following recent studies on the social dynamics of daily life in the context of conflict and insecurity (Das, 2006 ; Beck, 2012), the objective of the present panel is to bring together researchers whose work, resulting from long-term investigations in the field, propose bottom-up approaches, thereby detaching themselves from the context to better understand the situation in which the Iraqis act. Communications will address different aspects of what would make up the ordinary life of the inhabitants, paying particular attention to experiences, subjectivities and affects. This methodological and theoretical bias will allow us to question the practices, capacities and logics of action of individuals, while reinvesting common themes in political science through that which is familiar, close, and intimate.

Branding caliphate. ISIS, Al‑Baghdadi and the new era of global jihadism In Summer 2014 Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al‑Sham declared a caliphate in Iraq and Syria. By referring to the marketing technique of branding the author analyzes how the caliphate is created in the public space. In this case branding recalls the classical techniques used by Islamists (takfir, fighting bida’), but also means such things as using new information technologies and sophisticated forms of violence. The marking success of caliphate is the bigger that it is innovative, is an Utopia that became real and supports negative Western stereotypes about Islam.

Since the Turkish offensive into Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) held territories in October 2019, local Kurdish media reports of the Turkish intelligence agency’s operations to free ISIS affiliates have started to ring alarm bells. And increasingly, Turkey’s relationship with ISIS affiliates operating in Syria have come into question.

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Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza stosunku obywateli włoskich do wyzwań społecznych - politycznych i ekonomicznych, ocenianych z punktu widzenia własnej (nie) religijności. W toku prowadzonych badań zastosowano dwie metody: porównawczą, który pozwala wykazać różnorodność poglądów grup społeczno-religijnych, a także statystyczną, zakładającą podejście ilościowe i jakościowe. Realizacja wskazanego celu została oparta na przyjęciu hipotez badawczych potwierdzonych następnie przez zgromadzony materiał. Po pierwsze, w wielu kwestiach poglądy wierzących są zgodne z opiniami niewierzących a odległe w stosunku do oficjalnego stanowiska Kościoła. Po drugie, poglądy ludzi deklarujących się jako wierzący różnią się, co dowodzi, że religia nie jest podstawowym punktem odniesienia dla oceny zmian systemu politycznego. Można przy tym zauważyć odejście od obrazu jednorodnego kulturowo. Przywoływana religijna homogeniczność włoskiego społeczeństwa stoi w opozycji do rosnącej liczby osób deklarujący...

The Swiss-Syrian Marxist academic Joseph Daher’s sweeping study, Syria After the Uprisings, represents an important contribution to our political and historical understanding of Syria’s Revolution. The book principally investigates the resilience of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in the face of a popular revolution that began nearly nine years ago, in March 2011, as part of the uprisings that spread throughout much of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), starting with Tunisia in December 2010.

Bu çalışmada amaç; özgürlük ve güvenlik dengesi çerçevesinde, zorlayıcı (coercive) ve uzlaştırıcı (conciliatory) terörizmle mücadele araçlarının günümüzde uygulanabilirliğini araştırmaktır. Çalışmada öncelikle özgürlük ve güvenlik dengesi kavramı incelenmiş, zorlayıcı ve uzlaştırıcı terörizmle mücadele yöntemleri araştırılmış, söz konusu yöntemlerin günümüzde uygulanabilirliği örnekler üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir.

Impreso en España-Printed in Spain Editorial Círculo Rojo apoya la creación artística y la protección del copyright. Queda totalmente prohibida la reproducción, escaneo o distribución de esta obra por cualquier medio o canal sin permiso expreso tanto de autor como de editor, bajo la sanción establecida por la legislación. Círculo Rojo no se hace responsable del contenido de la obra y/o de las opiniones que el autor manifieste en ella. El papel utilizado para imprimir este libro es 100% libre de cloro y por tanto, ecológico. A mi familia 9 La sawha es una corriente radical influida por la obra de Sayyid Qutb.

We investigate differences in the psychological aspects underpinning Western mobilisation of two terrorist groups by analysing their English-language propaganda. Based on a computerised analysis of the language used in two English-language online magazines circulated by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda (i.e., Dabiq and Inspire), we found significant differences in their language—the ISIS’ language being higher in authoritarianism and its level of religiousness. In a follow-up experimental study, we found that being high in religiousness and authoritarianism predicts more positive attitudes towards the language used by ISIS, but not towards the language used by al-Qaeda. The results suggest that ISIS’ propaganda may be more effective in mobilising individuals who are more authoritarian and more focused on religion than that of al-Qaeda. These findings are consistent with the behaviour observed in recent homegrown terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe.

Significant literature has concluded that Islamic-terrorist activity in the Middle East and in Europe had increased drastically since the beginning of the implementation of the Bush Doctrine in 2001 after 9/11, with the rise of ISIS. However, little is known about the causal mechanism that links between the Post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy and the rise of new terrorist organizations, particularly the Islamic State in Iraq. Hence, the focus of this study is to process trace such mechanism. It will also explain why the War on Terror has produced totally opposite results from those it was originally intended for. Finally, this study is a within-case analysis that might be a microscopic observation of the imperial American behavior in the Middle East. This study relies on explaining outcome process-tracing methodology, and employing oral and historical accounts, archives and statistical data. I argue that the War on Terror, precisely the period of the Bush’s presidency (2001-2009), to be t...

Significant literature has concluded that Islamic-terrorist activity in the Middle East and in Europe had increased drastically since the beginning of the implementation of the Bush Doctrine in 2001 after 9/11, with the rise of ISIS. However, little is known about the causal mechanism that links between the Post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy and the rise of new terrorist organizations, particularly the Islamic State in Iraq. Hence, the focus of this study is to process trace such mechanism. It will also explain why the War on Terror has produced totally opposite results from those it was originally intended for. Finally, this study is a within-case analysis that might be a microscopic observation of the imperial American behavior in the Middle East. This study relies on explaining outcome process-tracing methodology, and employing oral and historical accounts, archives and statistical data. I argue that the War on Terror, precisely the period of the Bush’s presidency (2001-2009), to be t...

In English School theory, the putative change from an international society of states to a world society of individuals is usually associated with the diffusion of a benign form of cosmopolitanism and the normative agenda of solidarism. Consequently, the notion that world society might enable alternative expressions of transnational politics, independent from international society, remains underdeveloped. Drawing on the literature of contentious politics and social movements, this article challenges orthodox accounts and suggests that the global proliferation of digitally mediated linkages between individuals and nonstate actors constitutes a fundamental challenge to traditional dynamics of interstate communication in the form of the diplomatic system. This provides an opportunity to reconceptualize world society as an alternative site of politics distinct from mainstream international society and generative of its own logic of communication, mobilization, and action. The 2011 events in Egypt and the ongoing digital presence of the socalled Islamic State are used to demonstrate how massive increases in global interaction capacity are transforming the pathways for political contention and collective mobilization worldwide.

The chiefdom concept is one of the most productive in social anthropology and<br> political evolution. It helps to deeply understand the process of complication of<br> society's structure and the development path from stateless society to early<br> states. However, even when states spread everywhere, chiefdoms still remained<br> political and administrative actors. At present one can find some features of<br> chiefdoms in developing countries (e.g., in some regions of Africa) and in different<br> kinds of organizations especially in illegal and terrorist ones. Thus, using<br> chiefdom theories one can clarify a few basics of such kind of organization<br> as well. Therefore, it makes sense to show how such chiefdom-like structures<br> preserve and develop the features of ancient polities within them.<br> Thus, in the modern world, along with states, one can find numerous alternative<br> social and political organiz...

The article presents the results of the study into the rhetoric of youth in Dagestan about those who left for ISIL. The authors reconstruct the everyday discourse of “leaving for ISIL” among the youth in the region, presented by Russian authorities and media as one of the leading regions in terms of the number of ISIL followers. The research focus is not on the public forms of the construction of social problems, but on everyday talk, in particular on the claims made in the course of in-depth interviews. The study is based on the constructionist research program developed by Peter Ibarra and John Kitsuse and focuses on the identification of the discursive means of problematization used by Dagestani youth in relation to “leaving for ISIL” and young people “leaving.” The young Dagestanis occasionally use the rhetoric of endangerment, including the metaphor of a “virus.” However, the dominant rhetoric is the rhetoric of unreason. The terms used in the description of those who “left for ISIL” correspond to this idiom’s vocabulary. The image of manipulation, which is central for the rhetoric of unreason, is detailed by constructing the image of the “recruiter.” One of the identified features of the talk of the “leaving for ISIL” was episodic, that is, different from the previous and subsequent phrases and utterances of young people in accordance with the official discourse, supposedly in order to protect themselves from a possible suspicion of sympathy for ISIL. However, the rhetoric of unreason indicates a lack of social distance between young Dagestanis and those who have “left.” Informants express regret and sympathy in relation to their families and link “leaving for ISIL” with unemployment. The informants’ speech suggest the need for the development of social policy, education, and employment opportunities in Dagestan, rather
than the strengthening of repressive measures.

The Arab Spring uprisings occasioned a great social and political change within the ambience of the Maghreb and the Middle East thus leading to disarticulation of the social and political infrastructure of that region. This state of affairs has nourished the germination and growth of antisocial groups consisting of political Islamists, terrorists, urban gangsters amongst others. Unfortunately this acute social malaise is diffusing from the Maghreb into the sub-region especially the West but not exempting the East. This paper therefore interrogated this process and found that due to the largely unadministered and neglected borderlands of the sub-region terrorists and other undesirables infiltrated the region. The paper also found that apart from terrorism, other notorious activities were taking place in these ungoverned spaces such as smuggling, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, drug and gun running etc. The paper thus concluded that since terrorism has become a global issue the federal government should extend its diplomacy to include the West in its campaign against Boko Haram.

Ongoing Syrian War is one of the most important historical event for both the Middle East and the world in recent history. Regional and international powers with their proxies has shaped not only Syrian politics, economy, and international relations, but also neighbors of Syria, such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq, and the roles of world powers such as the United States of America and Russia. The rise and threat of transnational jihadist organizations is one of the crucial consequences of the war, and foreign fighters has become a contentious issue in Western and Arab worlds. With Syrian War, transnational jihadist course found a new haven, and its impact is perceived throughout the Middle East. In this respect, Syria’s neighbor Lebanon has become a fertile ground for jihadist groups and this country’s Palestinian question has become mor complex. Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon has emerged as a safe haven for transnational jihadist organizations, and in particular, for jihadist w...