Constituionalism and Constitutional Law

In recent years, scholars have produce literature in constitutional amendments, in particular in analyzing the unamendability phenomenon and its relationship with democracy, abusive and populist constitutionalism. The study of constitutional design is of interest, in large part, because a constitution can be amended and such processes make room for the fundamental questions about legitimacy of the constitutional order, the holder and the locus of sovereignty, especially in those legal orders where a popular legitimated process of altering the constitution is entrenched. Indeed, in some legal orders "We, the People" are called to initiate and/or approve any constitutional change. In this view, the paper brings the reader alongside the "We, the People" claim, stressing, though in restrictive manner, who are "the people", how they act and react, and when their action unveil a(n) (un)constitutional change, in order to draw citizensled constitutional changes grounded on three keywordspopulism, (un)constitutional amendments and constitutionalism. The paper is an invitation to the development of "the people" approaches in a constitutional framework that struck populism as democracy's sentinel.

This monograph aims to examine the doctrine of democracy, issues of
constitutional stability and constitutional developments, legal mechanisms for settlement of constitutional disputes, peculiarities of the official interpretation and direct application of the Constitution, issues of the development of Constitutional Court legal positions, as well as the notion “constitutional identity” and its axiological characteristics. In the result of the study the author draws a number of theoretical conclusions, develops new theoretical concepts on the mentioned issues and presents various practical proposals on the improvement of legislation and law implementation practice.
The monograph can be useful for a wide scope of readers interested in the
issues of constitutional law, theory and philosophy of law, sociology, politics.

The fundamental question addressed is whether there is any compelling or convincing argument (s) vis-à-vis to changing our Human Rights Act 1998 and replacing it with a distinctively British Bill of Rights. The overarching theme of this paper is that our human rights should not be based on what our government finds convenient, acceptable or compatible with its electoral aims. Any change to our Human Rights Act should only serve to further bolster human rights protection and not in any way whatsoever water-down, in this author’s view, the fairly minimalist status quo.

The embodiment of twentieth century constitutionalism, 1 constitutional adjudication appears to be relied upon as an absolute constitutional insurance by many Central and East European countries in their transitions to democracy. Moreover, the absence of a constitutional court or another means of constitutional adjudication has tended to cast long shadows of suspicion over the democratic character of a country. Clearly, however, the existence of a constitutional court is no panacea. The paradox that democracy is to be ensured by the existence of an institution whose democratic legitimacy is quite insecure is largely overlooked. Almost all East European courts pride themselves in playing a most vigorous role in guaranteeing the supremacy of the constitution, the principle of separation of powers and, more than anything else, the rights of the individuals. Constitutional Courts, similarly to Ombudsmen, are new institutions in East Central Europe, and thus untainted

U ustavnopravnom ustrojstvu (Federacije) Bosne i Hercegovine, kantonalne skupštine su jednodomni zakonodavni organi vlasti koji su prvenstveno nositelji ustavotvornih i zakonodavnih nadležnosti u kantonima. Kantonalne skupštine imaju uobičajene funkcije i nadležnosti predstavničkih tijela u složenim državama. No, postoje i izvjesne specifičnosti. Ovaj rad opisuje ustavno ustrojstvo kantona, ulogu kantona u Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine, nadležnosti i funkcije kantona i njihov odnos sa drugim granama vlasti. Rad se posebice se fokusira na strukturu skupština kantona, zastupnike u kantonalnim skupštinama i zakonodavni postupak u skupštinama kantona.

A Constituição Política da Monarquia Espanhola, de 19 de março de 1812, seria conhecida na Espanha como a Constituição de Cádiz. Sua elaboração precoce fez da Espanha um dos primeiros países do mundo a ter sua Constituição escrita. Ela foi o resultado da luta organizada pela sociedade espanhola contra o Imperador Bonaparte e se tornaria o bastião do liberalismo durante a década de 1820 em todo o Ocidente, influenciando países europeus e americanos que lutavam pelo constitucionalismo e a limitação da monarquia. A França, longa aliada, havia coagido a dinastia reinante a entregar a coroa em 1808. A resposta da população foi a resistência organizada. O invasor estrangeiro seria recebido por uma população pronta para o enfrentamento – que resultaria, inclusive, na primeira derrota de Bonaparte em terra –, e por uma elite preparada para organizar um movimento político que culminaria no texto constitucional.
Influenciada pelas experiências francesas e americanas, a Constituição de Cádiz foi um texto liberal. Suas normas estabeleciam a democracia representativa por meio de um sufrágio de quatro graus. Ao contrário das tendências da época, poucos requisitos existiam quanto a rendas ou propriedades. Os espanhóis escolheriam seus representantes, e a eleição seria feita com mais liberdade do que as constituições antecedentes haviam permitido.
A influência sobre a Constituição, no entanto, não foi só a da ruptura e da separação em busca da liberdade. A Constituição de Cádiz também foi marcada pela experiência inglesa, pelo desejo de manter instituições estáveis, respeitando a história e a tradição. Não é por acaso que o seu preâmbulo enuncia que as cortes estavam restabelecendo as antigas leis fundamentais da monarquia, acompanhadas das mudanças oportunas – alterações muito amplas, influenciadas pelo liberalismo. Não seria esquecido o respeito às leis medievais e às tradições do povo. A norma não foi uma simples reação ao sistema anterior, não negaria as suas instituições históricas. Como proferiram os deputados espanhóis, havia séculos as antigas leis já eram a Constituição da Espanha, que agora seria escrita e modificada para atender às necessidades contemporâneas.
Sob os auspícios das ideias dessas três influências – invasão estrangeira, liberalismo francês e respeito ao passado – se reuniriam os deputados, cerca de trezentos. Quase um terço desse grupo era de membros do clero. Os advogados e os servidores públicos formavam um grupo de cerca de cinquenta membros cada, e os militares eram quase quarenta. Os demais grupos sociais eram fracamente representados. Os trabalhos foram conturbados. As discussões envolviam os principais temas do liberalismo, que precisavam ser adaptados para a realidade da Espanha. A Constituição de Cádiz precisaria reger um país sitiado, que manteria o sistema monárquico, era muito religioso, temia um caos como o criado pela Revolução Francesa e, no entanto, almejava criar uma das normas mais liberais e democráticas do seu tempo.
O produto dos trabalhos foi o estabelecimento de uma monarquia constitucional moderada, amplamente limitada pelo principal órgão de representação – as cortes. Esse legislativo, por sua vez, passaria a ser o centro de emanação das leis e das principais decisões da Espanha. Uma profunda igualdade entre os espanhóis foi estabelecida, e apesar de tantos membros do clero, a Igreja perdeu quase todos os seus privilégios, ao lado das demais classes distinguidas anteriormente. Muitos foram os avanços: a liberdade de imprensa, o fim dos tormentos, os direitos individuais à liberdade e à educação, a jurisdição unificada no Estado, o fim das corporações de ofício, a igualdade entre americanos e europeus, a representação proporcional à população, e por fim, a submissão igualitária de todos à Constituição e à lei.
Com a queda de Napoleão em 1814 e a formação da Santa Aliança, a restauração da monarquia teria lugar em toda a Europa, e também na Espanha. A Constituição de Cádiz cairia apenas dois anos depois de viger, com a volta do rei destituído. Os reis voltavam à política com poderes semelhantes aos do passado. Devido à guerra e ao curto período de vigência, especialistas afirmam terem existido poucos efeitos concretos das normas gaditanas sobre a sociedade nesses primeiros dois anos.
A história da norma espanhola não seria tão lembrada se tivesse vigido apenas esses dois anos iniciais. Através da vontade popular e do exército, a Constituição seria reposta em vigência para o chamado Triênio Liberal, entre 1820 e 1823. Nesse período a inspiração foi grande para todo o mundo ocidental: ela era a mais influente Constituição liberal vigendo na Europa. Os outros países haviam voltado a ser governados por monarcas centralizadores do poder político. O liberalismo que restava havia sido restringido na Europa. Na França, governava novamente um Bourbon, apesar das limitações impostas. Por sua história de criação e por ser um bastião de resistência liberal durante a restauração, o texto espanhol foi, então, admirado por outros revolucionários que buscavam os mesmos ideais. A Constituição de Cádiz, a partir desse momento, se tornaria um estandarte de liberdade e fonte de inspiração na busca por igualdade. Na Itália e em Portugal, ela seria mais do que um farol, seria proclamada Constituição, e foi fonte de influência profunda no início das vidas constitucionais desses países.
A influência da Constituição de Cádiz no Brasil foi motivada pela sua importância para o liberalismo durante o Triênio Liberal (1820 a 1823) – coincidente com os anos da independência e da elaboração da primeira Constituição no Brasil (1822 a 1824). A importância do texto espanhol para a história de Portugal e a Revolução de 1820 também foram fatores para que o texto fosse relevante nas origens da independência brasileira. Enquanto a ligação do Brasil com Portugal era forte, a enorme influência espanhola sobre os portugueses gerou efeitos também no Brasil.
Apesar da sua documentada história de influências sobre diversas nações ocidentais europeias e americanas, a Constituição de Cádiz é pouco estudada nos seus efeitos sobre a América Portuguesa. Esta é inspiração do presente trabalho: conhecer as normas liberais espanholas e analisar a extensão da sua influência sobre o Brasil. No primeiro capítulo é feito o estudo do contexto e do teor da Constituição de Cádiz. O escopo é apresentar de maneira sistemática todo o texto da Constituição – com seus trezentos e oitenta e quatro artigos, sendo os mais importantes transcritos nas referências para facilitar a consulta.
O método principal é a pesquisa qualitativa em fontes primárias históricas e em normas. Ao lado das fontes primárias, o acesso aos doutrinadores de Direito Constitucional e História do Direito são utilizados para contextualizar o ambiente e verificar os efeitos jurídicos sobre a norma na Europa.

É possível obter um conceito de Autoridade que esclareça como autoridade e poder interagem no Direito? O problema se justifica na necessidade de categorias para avaliar fenômenos jurídicos e políticos. Utilizamos da obra de Hannah Arendt como marco teórico, por sua abordagem diferenciada da questão. Partimos da revisão bibliográfica da obra arendtiana e das suas fontes, encontrando conceitos-chave e perspectivas renovadas sobre autoridade como parte de um sistema jurídico-político. A hipótese confirmada é que a autoridade coloca manutenção e modificação da ordem em harmonia, vinculando passado e futuro pela tradição, enquanto aumento da comunidade política vinculado ao momento constituinte fundador.

since the burden of proof in economic crimes and especially corruption cases is beyond a reasonable doubt, we are all aware of the inadequacies that this doctrine of adjudicating justice has intramedullary failed to absolve this menace in society. it is by this reason that I intended to suggest a slight change in the doctrine of application to balance of probabilities, in that case, we shall be able to weed out this menace.

The Theses LVI belong to a series of hitherto unpublished early manuscripts of the Dutch humanist and jurisconsult Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) that were acquired by the University of Leiden in 1864. It is not certain when the Theses were written, but preliminary research on the physical manuscript and the sources cited indicate two possible windows. The first is around 1602-1605, that is roughly at a time when Grotius was also working on his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Iure Praedae Commentarius). The second dating places the genesis of the manuscrbipt around 1613-1615.
In the context of Grotius’ writings, the Theses LVI assume an important position for several reasons: They raise questions about state formation, the duty of citizens to the state and the right of political resistance in far greater detail than in any other work of the celebrated Dutch humanist. The Theses LVI also feature important reading notes that yield priceless insights into the sources that Grotius directly consulted and their influence on his ideas. The manuscript grants modern scholars a unique glimpse into the working mind of its author. Evidence points not only to the ferocious haste with which Grotius wrote his works, but also the occasional sloppiness of his reading and research habits."""

On October 22th, 2020 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal made a judgment on the legality of abortion (case K1/20). The Tribunal has decided about the unconstitutionality of abortion in the circumstances of malformation or serious disease of a foetus . The decision has triggered mass social protests and heated debates – of both political and academic nature – in its aftermath.
The paper analyses some aspects of this ruling from the legal-philosophical perspective. More precisely, it argues that the Polish constitution, while warranting the protection of the life of “every human being”, is underdetermined in that respect and that constitutional court, when facing underdeterminacy of this kind, may choose among three possible approaches. Alas, the Polish Tribunal has adopted none of them. In conclusion, it is suggested what should be an adequate approach for a constitutional court to deciding complex moral and/or political problems.

Resumo: O presente texto tem por objetivo lançar uma luz na função e no papel que a Constituição de 1988 normatiza para o Poder Judiciário. Ao contrário do que um senso comum possa aparentar compreender, antes de tudo, o Judiciário deve assumir e desempenhar uma função contramajoritária, não podendo sucumbir para as "vozes das ruas" e acabando por se transformar em um representante de tais interesses. Dessa forma, pretende-se demonstrar que tal argumento, sustentado por membros da doutrina constitucional brasileira, como o Min. Luís Roberto Barroso do STF, é completamente equivocada e apresenta riscos e déficits democráticos. A crítica a tal posição será realizada a partir da teoria jurídica construída por Ronald Dworkin e sua tese do direito como integridade. A presente pesquisa assume uma perspectiva metodológica hermenêutico-crítica a partir da revisão da literatura sobre o tema.

I diritti umani appaiono ormai oggetto di una tutela frammentata e diffusa tra Carte e Corti nello scenario internazionale. Sul piano formale, infatti, da una parte la tutela “rigida” delle Costituzioni nazionali dovrebbe garantire il “nucleo duro” di principi e diritti fondamentali vigenti negli Stati. Dall’altra, con una forza normativa variabile nei diversi sistemi, le Carte sovra e inter-nazionali corroborano, indeboliscono o espandono la tutela costituzionale di quelle stesse situazioni giuridiche, in un’ottica di omogeneizzazione dei diversi ordinamenti nazionali.
Il compito di dare “sostanza” a tali operazioni spetta naturalmente alle giurisdizioni. Il formante giurisprudenziale, che piaccia o no, sembra difatti l’unico capace di garantire, caso per caso, le incessanti istanze di giustizia provenienti dalla realtà sociale. Istanze, queste, tese a dare concretamente senso e significato ai diritti umani sempre più “contaminati” dagli approdi della ricerca scientifica.
In questo scenario a “dialogare” di certo sono le Corti, ma non sempre le Carte. I giusdicenti appaiono infatti i protagonisti principali delle integrazioni ordinamentali nello scenario c.d. multilevel, mentre, paradossalmente, gli “antagonisti” sembrano essere, non di rado, proprio i legislatori. In tema di tutela dei diritti umani, dunque, l’impressione è che nei fatti sia la politica del diritto (dei legislatori nazionali) a creare attriti all’espansione del diritto (politico) formato dai giudici in conformità al diritto sovranazionale.
Partendo dall’assunto che nella realtà della dimensione giuridico-costituzionale il diritto è frutto di questo fisiologico dialogo/scontro tra legislatori e giudici (quella che, in altre occasioni, si è avuto modo di definire co-produzione normativa), nel paper si proverà a spiegare tale fenomeno prendendo come oggetto di studio la metamorfosi della “famiglia” a seguito del progressivo riconoscimento dei diritti vantati dalle coppie omoaffettive.

Partindo de uma publicação recente de Luiz Edson Fachin, o artigo desenvolve uma crítica ao direito civil-constitucional brasileiro, problematizando a relação entre dogmática jurídica e incerteza normativa no Estado democrático de direito. Ao contrário do que se poderia pensar, a renovação da civilística brasileira promovida desde os anos 1990 tem funcionado – essa a hipótese – mais como fonte de incerteza normativa do que como fator de estabilização e direção do sistema jurídico. Isso se deve a inconsistências metodológicas da proposta civil-constitucional, exemplificadas pela narrativa histórica equivocada por meio da qual ela se legitima e pelas contradições internas de sua “releitura” do direito privado. A principal inconsistência, no entanto, reside na sua visão substancialista do fenômeno jurídico, marcada pelo recurso sistemático à “força normativa dos fatos” e à “constituição haurida da realidade humana e social”. O texto conclui apontando os riscos institucionais desse substancialismo jurídico, enfatizando o elevado grau de discricionariedade judicial que permite e, consequentemente, de incerteza normativa que produz.

Despite concerns regarding its practical utility the convention of individual ministerial responsibility remains central to any analysis of the British constitution. The convention forms the ‘buckle’ in the relationship between parliament and the executive. It is widely acknowledged that throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the executive has gained the ascendancy in this relationship. Consequently, the enduring centrality of the convention rests not in its use by parliament as a tool with which to scrutinise the executive but, conversely, as a tool used by the executive to dismiss reform proposals that threaten its dominant position. This article reviews the way in which British government developed and particularly how this evolution gave primacy to a convention that contained mutually supportive yet contradictory strands. It then demonstrates the core argument of this article by examining two case studies ‐the introduction of freedom of information legislation and the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights. The article concludes by considering the wider implications of the continuing centrality of ministerial responsibility and the paradoxes and challenges it presents.

The paper considers the role of the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament of Finland in the preliminary constitutional control in the State. The author investigates the competence, procedures, issued acts of the Committee, key problems of its activity. The examples of a number of  Committee’s Statements are given, which are connected with the issues of implementation of ECHR and EU Law in the Republic of Finland.

It is important to realize that the concept of ‘constitutionalism’ is more than the term ‘constitution’ loaded with material contents. Constitutionalism does not refer simply to having a constitution, but to having a particular kind of constitution, however difficult it may be to specify its contents’. Constitutionalism asks for a good or legitimate constitution.

In many European countries are being held constitutional debates. The search for a broader form of participation of all social forces with a new, so-called governance, the struggle for autonomy, regionalism and federalism, they all have different organizational models, but all follow - each in its way - a common goal: citizens want to be able to identify with their community better, they want to find – in an increasing globalized world - a new identity and the ability to participate, at the regional level, on the decision making process, or - to illustrate it in an emotionally loaded term - find a new home.
Also in Italy are held debates on a constitutional reform for years. After the war the Italian Constitution has been inspired by a great democratic and social challenge. But the structure of the state is very centralized. There exist regions but their competences have always been poor in the past. The five special regions with an autonomous statute play a particular role - they enjoy far-reaching autonomies. They are exceptions in this system and have to struggle for their authority.  South Tyrol in particular had to fight a long time for its autonomy.
Since the early eighties Italy has worked hard on its system to improve the role of the regions. In 2001 the parliament succeeded in creating a constitutional reform. Its improvements are projected directly onto the special statutes. Further reforms are under way. The constitutional court takes up a rather centralized standpoint. Nevertheless, the new constitution has increased the autonomies in Italy. A lot of that has, however, not been achieved in South Tyrol's long-lasting struggle for autonomy. Italy is still a long way from being a federal state, but it has taken an important step in that direction. The beginnings of federalism in Italy have also improved the autonomy of the special regions and the autonomy of South Tyrol and Trentino.

Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die Verf-Diskussionen um neue Forme n demokratischer Teilhabe, der lange Weg Italiens vom Zentralstaat zu zaghaften föderalen Ansätzen, die direkten Eingriffe in das formal unveränderte Autonomiestatut: In vielen Ländern Europas finden Verf-Diskussionen statt. Die Suche nach einer breiteren Form der Beteiligung aller gesellschaftlichen Kräfte mittels einer neuen, sogenannten Governance, das Ringen um Autonomie, um Regionalismus und Föderalismus, sie alle stellen unterschiedliche Organisationsmodelle dar. Sie verfolgen aber alle – jedes auf seine Art - ein gemeinsames Ziel: Die Bürger wollen sich mit ihrem Gemeinwesen besser identifizieren können, sie wollen in einer immer größeren, globalisierten Welt, eine neue Identität und Entfaltungsmöglichkeit auf regionaler Ebene finden, mitwirken und mitentscheiden können, oder  - um es mit einem gefühlsbeladenen Ausdruck zu verdeutlichen - eine neue Heimat finden.
Auch in Italien finden seit Jahrzehnten Debatten um eine Reform der Verf statt. Die italienische Verf ist von einem großen demokratischen und sozialen Auftrag beseelt. Der Staatsaufbau allerdings ist zentralistisch. Es sind Regionen vorgesehen. Diese hatten aber wenige Zuständigkeiten. Eine Sonderrolle nehmen die fünf Regionen mit Sonderstatut ein. Sie verfügen über weitreichende Autonomien. Sie sind Ausnahmen vom System und müssen um ihren Wirkungsbereich kämpfen. Besonders lange dauerte das Ringen um die Autonomie in Südtirol.
Seit Beginn der 80er Jahre bemüht sich Italien um mehr Föderalismus. Im Jahre 2001 gelang eine Verf-Reform. Diese projiziert die Besserstellungen auch in die Sonderstatute. Weitere Reformen sind im Gang. Der VfGH nimmt mit seinen Auslegungen eine eher zentralistische Haltung ein. Trotzdem hat die neue Verf-Ordnung für die Autonomien wesentliche Erweiterungen gebracht. In den schwierigen Verhandlungen um die Südtiroler Autonomie konnte vieles davon nicht erreicht werden. Italien ist zwar noch weit davon entfernt, ein Bundesstaat zu sein, hat aber einen wichtigen Schritt in diese Richtung gesetzt. Damit hat der föderalistische Ansatz, der sich in Italien durchsetzen konnte, auch die Autonomie der Sonderregionen und die Autonomie Südtirols und des Trentino wesentlich erweitert.
In seinem Buch „Südtirols Autonomie und die Verfassungsreformen Italiens“ analysiert Peterlini die Auswirkungen der Verfassungsreformen auf die Südtirol Autonomie und beschreibt die bisher ungeschriebenen, aber in der Tat erfolgten Änderungen am Südtiroler Autonomiestatut. Wenn wir heute das Büchlein „Das neue Autonomiestatut“ in die Hand nehmen, das das Landespresseamt herausgibt, ist der Inhalt zwar formal das Statut von 1972, entspricht aber nicht mehr der realen Autonomie – betonten die Redner bei der Buchvorstellung. Peterlini hat nun, wie mit einem Projektor die Verfassungsreform von 2001 und die Verfassungsurteile in das Statut hinein projiziert, die neuen Zuständigkeiten herauskristallisiert und ergänzt, genauso wie die neuen Verfahren für die Gesetzgebung des Südtiroler Landtages. Wer also das Autonomiestatut in seiner neuesten Fassung lesen will, auch das was nicht geschrieben steht, aber gültig ist, was praktisch hineinprojiziert  werden muss, findet im Buch Peterlinis die neueste Fassung der Autonomie, betonte Durnwalder.


Sintesi in Italiano
Il libro esamina il lungo cammino istituzionale e le riforme costituzionali in Italia e i loro riflessi sugli Statuti speciali e in particolare sull'autonomia dell'Alto Adige. Analizza le tappe più importanti dell’Italia da un assetto centralista verso un approccio con principi federali, gli effetti e le modifiche non scritte inserite di riflesso nello Statuto speciale del Trentino Alto Adige.
La Costituzione Italiana nell’enunciazione delle libertà fondamentali, dei diritti e doveri dei cittadini, nei rapporti etici - sociali, economici e politici e nella partecipazione agli organi istituzionali è ispirata da una grande missione democratica e sociale. Al contrario invece l’assetto istituzionale dello Stato come previsto dai Padri Costituenti nel 1948 aveva e ha bisogno di una modernizzazione per tenere il passo con gli Stati più avanzati. L’assetto era fortemente centralistico. Erano bensì previste le Regioni, però con poche attribuzioni e per lungo tempo non furono attuate.  Una posizione particolare rivestono le cinque Regioni a statuto speciale. Esse dispongono di un’ampia autonomia, ma rappresentano comunque un’eccezione all’interno del sistema e si trovano pertanto in una permanente situazione di conflitto con lo Stato centrale per la conservazione delle proprie competenze. Nel caso dell’Alto Adige/Südtirol questo conflitto è durato particolarmente a lungo.

Nel suo libro „Südtirols Autonomie und die Verfassungsreformen Italiens“ (L‘Autonomia dell‘Alto Adige e le riforme costituzionali in Italia) Peterlini illustra l'impatto delle riforme costituzionali sull'autonomia del Trentino Alto Adige e descrive le innovazioni nello Statuto, non ancora scritte, ma in realtà in vigore in base alle riforme costituzionali.0
“Se prendiamo in mano l’opuscolo “Il nuovo Statuto di autonomia”, edito dalla Provincia, troviamo che il contenuto rispecchia formalmente il testo dello Statuto del 1972, ma in verità non corrisponde all’autonomia reale” – sottolineò il Presidente Durnwalder. Peterlini pertanto irradiò come con un proiettore le innovazioni costituzionali e le sentenze della Corte nello Statuto, cristallizzando e aggiungendo le nuove competenze e procedure per la legislazione del Consiglio regionale e provinciale. Chi vuole leggere lo Statuto nella sua versione più attuale, anche quello che non è scritto ma è in vigore, trova nel libro di Peterlini lo Statuto in forma aggiornata, aggiunse Durnwalder.


Keywords:

Autonomie / Autonomiestatut / Föderalismus / Governance / Italien / Regionalismus / Regionen / Sonderstatut / Südtirol / Südtirol Paket / Trentino / Verf / Verfassungsreform / Zentralismus / Zuständigkeiten / Steuerföderalismus

Alto Adige / Autonomy / Autonomy Statute / Centralism / Competences / Constitution / Constitutional Reform / Federalism / Fiscal Federalism / Governance / Italy / Package for South Tyrol / Region / Regionalism / Special Statute / Special Autonomy / South-Tyrol / Trentino

Autonomia / Statuto di Autonomia / Statuto speciale / Federalismo / Governance / Italia / Regionalismo / Regionalismo / Statuto speciale Trentino Alto Adige / Alto Adige / Südtirol / Pacchetto / Trentino / Costituzione / Riforma costituzionale / Centralismo / Sussidiarietà / Federalismo fiscale

Did the promulgation of the Indian constitution on 26 January 1950 make a difference to the lives of most Indians? This article argues that contrary to existing scholarly and popular belief, the adoption of a written constitution with a bill of rights and judicial review transformed the relationship between the citizen and the state and emerged as a new field of practice. It does so by mapping the growth of judicial review of executive action through a series of similar challenges under Articles 32 and 226. Examining the trial of rebels and malcontents in Bengal, Hyderabad, Bombay, and Saurashtra during the early years of the postcolonial republic, it teases out how colonial governmentality responds to the institution of a written constitution. The article demonstrates that the constitution came to be utilized as a resource and a venue to challenge the continuation of the colonial practice of special tribunals and exceptional procedures. Judicial remedies made constitutional governance a two-way process, where citizens could insert themselves into a conversation on state practice. Constitutional law became grounded in uncertainty as the results in very similar cases varied widely. However, it was this uncertainty about constitution law that gave it legitimacy and attracted widespread participation by the state and citizens.

In the interests of maintaining the independence of the English judiciary, it is prudent to consider whether the system of judicial recruitment is safeguarded now, when it has previously been so heavily influenced and reliant upon members of the executive. 

The CRA 2005 transformed distortions in the system to better control the authorities dealing with judicial appointments, realigning inequalities to better represent the diversity of the British populace. Recently however, the Act has come under fire for employing obstructive and unnecessary provisions which hinder it from meeting its goals of increased inclusion and fair, transparent assessment.

The theory of unamendability identifies a simple yet fundamental distinction between primary constituent (constitution-making) power and secondary constituent (constitution-amending) power. The latter is limited by unamendability and the former – perceived as the people's democratic constitution-making power – is unlimited by unamendability. This article develops the distinction by supplementing it with a further one, between various shades of secondary constituent powers along a 'spectrum'; a theoretical construct that links constitutional amendment procedures and limitations which ought to be imposed upon constitutional amendment powers. According to this spectrum theory, constitutional systems are polymorphic: the more similar the democratic characteristics of the amendment powers are to those of the primary constituent power, the less it should be bound by limitations; and vice versa: the closer it is to a regular legislative power, the more it should be fully bound by limitations. This examination is an important step towards a theory of unamendability.

This article stems from a single puzzle: how can constitutional amendments be unconstitutional? Adopting a combination of theoretical and comparative enquiries, this article focuses on the question of substantive limitations on the amendment power, looking at both their prevalence in practice and the conceptual coherence of the very idea of limitations to constitutional amendment powers. The article constructs a general theory of unamendability, which explains the nature and scope of amendment powers. The theory of unamendability identifies and develops a middle ground between constituent power and pure constituted power, a middle ground that is suggested by the French literature on ‘derived constituent power’. Undergirding the discussion, therefore, is a simple yet fundamental distinction between primary constituent (constitution-making) power and secondary constituent (constitution-amending) power. This distinction, understood in terms of an act of delegation of powers, enables the construction of a theory of the limited (explicitly or implicitly) scope of secondary constituent powers. The theory of unamendability aims to clarify the puzzle of unconstitutional constitutional amendments.

This article reflects on the limits of “post”-apartheid constitutionalism through an extended theoretical discussion and close reading of the Constitutional Court decision in City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum and Another 2016 (6) SA 279 (CC). It focuses in particular on how South Africa’s history of colonial conquest, white supremacy and racism – and the nation’s failure to reckon with that history – introduced a “constitutional irresolution” in the case.  Developed by Emilios Christodoulidis as a critique of constitutional optimism in all its forms, “constitutional irresolution” describes what happens when constitutionalism, because of its institutional and rigid character, is unable to address political or legal contestations which challenge its own terms and norms. In this article, this irresolution is then related to the work of Mogobe Ramose and specifically his critique of how the negotiated settlement and transition of the 1990s followed a path of democratisation, which not only negated the exigency of decolonisation and historical justice but also resulted in the “constitutionalisation of the injustice arising from the unjust war of colonisation”. Since City of Tshwane raised questions concerning race, belonging and the still colonial character of South African spaces, mind-sets and power relations, it illustrates the persistence of the colonial-apartheid past into the constitutional present. Among other things, I take this blurring of the divide between the past and the present to be an exposure of the limits, or irresolution, of “post”-apartheid constitutionalism and “post”-apartheid jurisprudence.

This paper analyses the way the term " constitutional identity " is understood and applied in the case-law of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The Tribunal first used this term in the Treaty of Lisbon decision to demarcate limits of the state power to confer competences to the European Union. In this context, the Tribunal reaffirmed that membership in the EU is a form of self-limitation and the contemporary form of expressing national sovereignty. In the following discussion, the paper presents decisions in which the constitutional identity of Poland denotes the axiological equivalence or convergence with the EU legal order, or conversely, divergence from common constitutional standards. These standards, setting out the core of the EU constitutional identity, are based on the protection of fundamental rights, rule of law, and democracy. We examine the application of constitutional identity as convergence and divergence on the examples of the right to respect the private and the family life and the right to a fair trial. Yet, we argue, it is the recent constitutional crisis surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal which shows the Polish constitutional dispensation. Failing to cooperate with the European institutions with regard to legal reforms affecting the rule of law the Polish government is not merely insisting on its constitutional identity, but trying on the " old clothes " of national sovereignty.

This is a chapter from "The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution" edited by Sujit Choudhry & Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta (2016)

This chapter examines the place of the right to freedom of speech and expression within Indian constitutionalism. After reviewing the classical normative arguments for free speech, it considers how the domain of speech is related to colonial continuity, sedition, and public order. It discusses the scope of Article19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution with
respect to free speech, as well as the Indian Supreme Court’s successes and failures in its efforts to expand the domain of speech. It explores the democracy argument as the primary justification used by the courts in free speech cases, and its consequences.

Finally, it looks at the standards for determining reasonableness, hate speech, and obscenity, and argues that the idea of a deliberative democracy must be supplemented with the concept of agonistic politics to enrich and strengthen the free speech tradition that has evolved in the past six decades

This essay develops Kant's theory of reform to theorize racial justice reform. I assess the function of Kant's philosophy of race as part of his nonideal theory of justice, which offers a racist pragmatic anthropology that uses the concept of race to determine the practical effectiveness of legislative reason. His philosophy of race defends a teleological account of the natural history of the human species to fulfill the requirements of justice and assumes that certain racial groups have failed to develop their innate capacity for legislative reason. I show that we need an alternative Kantian nonideal theory of justice that demonstrates how legislative reason actualizes practical freedom. Rather than appeal to anthropology, I expand Kant's model of public reason to advance racial justice reform under the conditions of partial compliance to the requirements of justice in a profoundly nonideal republic such as the U.S. I then showcase the promise-and limits-of the a priori ideals of citizenship and publicity for racial justice reform and introduce the ideal of interracial civic fellowship to guide the public use of reason in nonideal circumstances.

O livro analisa o princípio da igualdade como vedação à discriminação indireta no regime constitucional de 1988. Para isso, em primeiro lugar, busca-se assentar as premissas teóricas que, lastreadas nas teorias da justiça como reconhecimento, permitem identificar três funções do princípio da igualdade. Estas funções são a ruptura de privilégios e honras; a expansão do Direito por meio da inclusão de grupos vulneráveis e do respeito às suas demandas existenciais básicas; e a pluralização dos horizontes de valor por meio do deslocamento, para o Direito, de demandas tradicionalmente associadas a ideias de desempenho e mérito. Fundado nestas três funções da igualdade, sustento que o princípio da igualdade perante a lei deve ser concebido como um princípio de vedação à discriminação indireta – qual seja, a discriminação que se revela na realidade dos fatos como consequência de atos aparentemente neutros, gerais e abstratos. Partindo desta afirmação, o trabalho se volta para o estudo específico da vedação à discriminação indireta no direito comparado, de modo a traçar os fundamentos que permitirão ilustrar os mecanismos de superação desta forma de discriminação à luz da Constituição de 1988. Por fim, pretende-se apresentar uma proposta de análise da discriminação indireta voltada para a promoção da igualdade como reconhecimento, considerando três etapas e suas peculiaridades: a demonstração de um caso de discriminação indireta prima facie, a análise da justificação da discriminação indireta e a possibilidade de acomodação ou adaptação razoável.

Militant democracy is an attempt to defend democracy against totalitarian parties that would use democratic procedures to rise to power. This article is focused on the consistency of the concept of 'militant democracy' . I argue that what militant democracy defends is not the democratic procedure itself but rather certain rights and the rule of law, and that those elements may in fact be compromised by democracy. This applies both if the democratic procedure is concerned and if democracy is interpreted as a reflection of the will of the people. Those elements may be upheld, but democracy is to be mitigated rather than fortified in order to do so.

At the heart of this study is the idea of constitutionalism; its promise, conception and deployment in South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional discourse; and ultimately the need for its re-imagination if it is to be part of advancing a truly decolonising liberatory project.  A core premise of this study is that there exists, in post-apartheid South Africa, a stark discursive disjuncture between what has emerged as a hegemonic liberal democratic constitutional discourse and the discourse of liberation that served as the ideological pivot of the anti-colonial struggles.  Animated by this premise, this study asks why it is that liberation as a framing set of ideas has either played no part or exerted so little obvious influence on how post-apartheid South Africa self-comprehends and organises itself in constitutive terms?
Recognising that the formal end of colonial-apartheid as a system in 1994 inaugurated a seismic shift in the country’s constitutional discourse as the notion of constitutionalism took centre stage, this study seeks to problematize this idea by examining its underlying assumptions, connotations and import as deployed in mainstream South African academic and public discourses.  In doing this the study aspires to offer a novel perspective that shifts the fixity of the conceptualisation of constitutionalism by amplifying the point that how one chooses to conceptualise constitutionalism has profound implications for what one understands to be the function, scope, ambition and possibility of a constitution. 
Crucially, the study seeks to advance a historicised, yet non-ideological understanding of the emergence of modern constitutionalism.  This, the study argues, is necessary if the real constitutive work and worth of constitutions of different types and thrusts is to remain open to critical engagement as well as fostering the possibility of constitutional imaginings of new, different forms of society or social ordering.  As the study works towards responding to the core question it poses, it embarks upon a critical historiography of South African constitutionalism from the 1910 Union constitution to the present one.  It does this in an attempt to demonstrate that some of the challenges faced by the current constitution are, profoundly influenced, if not directly produced, by legal, structural, cultural and economic continuities rooted in the past, with race being a central axis around which South African constitutionalism has been imagined, enacted, opposed and resisted.  In so doing, the study seeks to demonstrate that despite the indisputable paradigmatic shift ushered in by the fall of colonial-apartheid, on current evidence that shift has been unable to displace nor disrupt the many continuities that remain stubbornly etched into the South Africa’s constitutive DNA inherited from earlier racially exclusive and exploitative constitutional expressions.
Engaging South African constitutionalism from a critical historical perspective, the study turns its attention to the emergence and eventual ascendance of transformative constitutionalism as arguably the mainstream conception of contemporary South African constitutionalism.  The study argues that transformative constitutionalism, whilst claiming radical far-reaching means and ends, has established limited intellectual and programmatic horizons focused on litigation. From within this discourse, it is argued, there is little or no evidence of other work directed at inculcating institutional or structural power shifts or innovations beyond the courts and lawyering.  Ultimately, the study argues that transformative constitutionalism is an inadequate framework through which we can begin reimagining South African constitutionalism and its attendant political, social and cultural dynamics in a more emancipatory and inclusive ways.
Finally, in light of the discursive disjuncture identified earlier, the study concludes by turning its attention to the notion of liberation.  It does this in an attempt to reveal liberation thought’s constitutive potentialities through its political, social, economic, and cultural dimensions that exist as the epistemic underpinnings of the visions of liberated societies and states as imagined and put forward by the likes of Steve Biko, Amilcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon amongst others.