Byzantine Warfare

The present article tries to examine some crucial aspects of the political and ideological importance of the Mandylion (Holy Face) and its Translatio from Edessa to Constantinople in 944. By a close survey on the accounts regarding the events of the siege of Edessa by Ioannes Kourkouas and the subsequent Arab-Byzantine treaty in which Mandylion held a central position, emerges the involvement of leading persons in the military and political sphere of the Empire. The accounts on the Mandylion hold a high value from spiritual, ideological and political points of view, as they represent differentiated attitudes towards persons and teams which competed on eitherthe conquest or the maintenace of imperial power in a fragile and crucial political framework. Not surprisingly, the accounts of the contemporary Byzantine texts credit the emperor of the period of their composition with a great role regarding the Mandylion and its reception. As a result, Romanos Lekapenos is credited as the major force for the safeguard of the Mandylion. Interestingly, in texts composed after its entrance to Constantinople in August 944, the Mandylion is credited with prophetic qualities which showed to the future emperor, Konstantinos VII Porphyrogennetos, as a chosen by God Byzantine ruler. On the contrary, the military commander Ioannes Kourkouas is fully disassociated from the procedure of the Translatioin the accounts of the examined texts, whereas Manuel’s narrative on the works and days of the strategos has not been fortunate enough to survive.

The current paper examines the issue of medieval war ethics from the perspective of the Byzantine case-study. The starting-point is a critical approach to the theoretical understanding and the methodological employment of modern analytical concepts, such as ‘war ideology’ and ‘holy war’, in the study of war ethics in the late antique, early and high medieval period. The main goal is to circumscribe the modern theoretical distinction between ‘just war’ and ‘holy war’ and to demonstrate the applicability and the limits of its heuristic employment in the analysis of medieval source material. The first part contains a discussion of theoretical approaches to the terms ‘war ideology’, ‘just war’ and ‘holy war’. The second part is subdivided in two chapters: The first chapter attempts a historical re-evaluation of the religious discourse of the Byzantine sources through the prism of the proposed theoretical model. The second chapter contains an analysis of the socio-political role of peace discourse in the justification of imperial war policies.

ABSTRACT: This chapter addresses the textual relationship between Maurice's Strategicon and its classical antecedents, a largely unexplored question, given that this late sixth-century military treatise has been studied primarily by Byzantine historians and as a foundational document of Byzantine military theory. While the unprecedented vernacular idiom, institutional jargon, technical content and documentary source-material of the Strategicon are consistent with Maurice’s professed intention to write a non-literary elementary compendium, his familiarity with examples of classical military writing is evident in explicit references to ‘the Ancients’, his adherence to the conventions and rhetorical repertoire of the genre and a self-conscious positioning of his treatise in relation to this literary tradition, as well as in conceptual and structural parallelism and similarities of language and/or substance. Without claims to exhaustive Quellenforschung, the paper examines the extent and nature of Maurice’s interaction with ‘the Ancients’ in general, and Aelian’s Tactica theoria and Arrian’s Acies contra Alanos in particular, with a view to differentiating the various ways in which Maurice exploited this classical heritage, whether as conceptual models, sources of technical content, validatory antique authority or allusive literary ornament. Greater clarity in this regard sheds light on the Nachleben of these two classical treatises, Maurice’s methodology, authorial credentials and literary-cultural milieu, and the transmission and reception of Greco-Roman military literature in late antiquity.

KEYWORDS: Maurice’s Strategikon / Strategicon, Aelian / Ailianos, Arrian, Greco-Roman military literature, Late Antiquity, Classical Reception, Late Roman army.

Yannis Stouraitis LEIDEN | BOSTON 9789004355514_Stouraitis_text_proof-03.indb 3 8/1/2018 11:58:56 AM iv Cover illustration: Folio 73v of the Chronicle of John Skylitzes, XIVth century; Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, matritensis graecus, Vitr. 26-2. With kind permission of the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid.

La figura semi-legendaria del conocido como «conde don Julián» es el paradigma del traidor; el personaje que posibilitó conquista de al-Andalus, acabando así con el Cristianismo e implantando la dominación islámica sobre la antigua Hispania. De igual modo que en Ifrīqiya, nos movemos entre la oscuridad y el desconcierto que observamos en las fuentes acerca de los acontecimientos y la cronología de los mismos 1 , lo que ha posibilitado, en buena medida, la creación de una «mitología de la conquista». Quizás esta confusión haya que buscarla en el estado en el que se desenvolvía la política en el mundo mediterráneo de esos momentos, entre fines del s. VII e inicios del VIII.

This article aims at presenting for the first time a different interpretation
of the origin of part of the archaeological findings from the Bulgarian lands related to the Early Middle Ages armament for close combat and in particular with the swords and their structural elements. On the basis of parallels and reports from artistic and written sources, the examined samples of arms are viewed through the prism of the Arab (Middle East) military art, which undoubtedly influenced the development of
Byzantine military art. It is known that the Eastern Roman Empire (as any empire) is multicultural in its population. A large number of cultures scattered across vast areas of Eastern Europe and Asia are intertwined. This is the reason why we would expect to find the elements of armament, specific for territories far away from Balkans and to relate their occurrence on the lands of First Bulgarian Kingdom with the direct Byzantium influence. Close attention has been paid to the Middle
East narratives, which mention the development of Middle East arms centers during the Early Caliphate – VII – VIII century. The great similarity in the constructive meaning of the Early Medieval cut and thrust weapons and their structural elements found in the territory of the Balkans and Middle Europe with examples from the Middle East, suggests that if not directly imported from Asia Minor /by commerce,
military way or gifts/they were manufactured under Middle Eastern influence and probably represent a derived part of Middle Eastern military art.

ENGLISH ABSTRACT
With the intensive focus on military affairs in the Alexiad provoking contentious theories and much debate, this article investigates more closely the sources of information available to Anna Komnene for her coverage of war during the reign of Alexios Komnenos. Though Anna discloses more about her sources than most Byzantine historians, it is argued that some of these claims, particularly those regarding her own capacity to witness events and converse with veteran participants , are somewhat disingenuous, intended to illustrate her adherence to traditional modes of inquiry and thus gain credence for her history. Without discounting the contribution of oral traditions of storytelling to the Alexiad, the study favours the growing consensus that Anna was more reliant on written material, especially campaign dispatches and military memoirs.
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RÉSUMÉ FRANÇAIS
L'importance accordée par l'Alexiade aux questions militaires a suscité des théories controversées et nombre de débats. Cet article examine de plus près les sources dont disposait Anna Comnène pour son récit de la guerre sous le règne d'Alexis Comnène. Bien que Anna nous renseigne davantage sur ses sources que la plupart des historiens byzantins, on a néanmoins postulér que certaines de ses démarches, en particulier celle concernant sa capacité à rendre compte des événements et de faire parler les vétérans, peuvent s'avérer fourbes, vouées à montrer son adhésion aux modes traditionnels d'enquête et donc à donner plus de crédibilité à son histoire. Sans négliger l'apport fondamental des témoignages oraux dans la rédaction de l'Alexiade, la présente étude privilégie l'opinion majoritaire qui pense qu'Anna s'est davantage fondée sur des documents écrits, en particulier les dépêches et les écrits des militaires.
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RESUMEN ESPAÑOL
Partiendo del hecho de que la extremada importancia que la Alexíada da a las cuestiones militares está provocando teorías polémicas y mucho debate, este artículo investiga con mayor detalle las fuentes de información de que disponía Ana Comnena para cubrir la guerra durante el reinado de Alejo Comneno. A pesar de que Ana revela sus fuentes más que la mayoría de los historiadores bizantinos, argumentamos que algunas de sus pretensiones de haber podido ser testigo de los sucesos y conversado con los participantes en ellos, son de algún modo insinceras y tienen como objeto ilustrar su adhesión a modos tradicionales de investigación y ganar así credibilidad para su historia. Sin descartar la contribución de las tradiciones narrativas orales para la Alexíada, este estudio favorece el consenso creciente de que Ana se apoyaba más en material escrito, especialmente despachos de campaña y memorandos militares.

This PhD dissertation is accessible via the link below.

ABSTRACT

There are arguably two ways of understanding the fundamental processes of military history. One emphasizes unchanging principles in warfare and that conduct of war is largely dictated by the physical realities. The other claims that the ways of war are more-or-less cultural constructs. I approach this “military culture debate” by analysing the land and naval warfare in the area that surrounded the Aegean Sea, which had belonged to the Byzantine empire in the late twelfth century. The period discussed extends from the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) to the early 1420s.

The region and era in question are suitable for testing different understandings of military history. It is a geographical and geopolitical region where two major groups of conquerors arrived in the thirteenth century. The Catholic Christian Latins represent the western European ways of war of the time and the military traditions of the Muslim Turks originated from the steppe and from the east. Both settled in the region and founded realms. Therefore, they had to adjust themselves to the environment. Similarly, local Orthodox Christian, mostly Byzantine, rulers had to adapt to the situation.

I compare the composition of armed forces and willingness to engage in battles of the above-mentioned three groups fighting in the region. My study analyses what influence their cultural background had on their conduct in these matters. I provide new information about the warfare of the study era and increase our understanding of why the Ottoman Turks were able to conquer most of the region.

I found that the “culturalist” understanding of military history usually had the best explanatory potential in the scope of my research. The belligerents tried to construct their armed forces and fight their wars in a manner guided by their cultural background. To a certain extent they had to adapt to the local conditions, but in the issues dealt with here it was mainly a question of adapting to the social structures and the adversaries, rather than to the climate and geography of the region. The armies shared a growing number of similarities as time went by, but the influx of troops from outside the region and religious doctrines contributed to differences in the composition of armed forces and thus how wars were waged.

The Ottomans apparently made the best use of the military potential of regions they controlled. This was probably one of the key reasons why they prevailed in the study area. For cultural reasons, the Christian powers tended to neglect the use of certain groups of people in the military. Thus their forces were more often supplemented with mercenaries and allies whose reliability was uncertain and this had adverse consequences, particularly for Byzantium.

As regards engaging in battles, an important issue was how reliable the people living in fortified towns were perceived to be, which influenced how necessary it was to fight in the open. Transporting of siege-equipment, on the other hand, hampered the possibility of  avoiding battles. The Latins showed more battle-willingness in their warfare than the other belligerents in the conflicts of the region. There were cultural reasons behind this. It should nevertheless be noted that there was variation in the battle-willingness of the Byzantines depending on commanders, circumstance, period, and adversary. Much of the Turkish and steppe nomad warfare consisted of raids in which battles were usually avoided. However, battle-willingness was more apparent in the conflicts of the great Muslim dynasties, and when the Muslim leaders faced one another, or when they repulsed invasions of Christian powers in their own regions. This battle-willingness of the Turks could come as surprise to the latter.

In academia.edu you can read the introduction and content. The full work is in the address: https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/335952?fbclid=IwAR2fdr-1l31x5qX2exQLkuHGMRLUqe8mHxNQUe_VFEoHcg7NvygTINZ-1rM

This paper is a continuation of the poster which examines some types of weapons and armors by analyzing written sources which was presented at the conference: "Nouvelles recherches sur l'Arménie ancienne / New Research on Ancient Armenia, Geneva, 8-9 June 2018"
Link to the poster where you can find illustrations to this article - https://www.academia.edu/36769320/Poster_presentation__ARMS_AND_ARMOUR_OF_BAGRATID_ARMENIAN_NOBLEMEN

Schopen / Bekker).-Ioannes Kantakuzenos, Historia I 27 (I 134, 2-18 Schopen).-30 stadia are about 5 km see Schilbach, Metrologie 33-34. 8 Willelmus Tyrensis, Chronicon II 8 (172, 24-30 Huygens): rursus ante urbem in locis liberis et late patentibus constiterunt, ubi habito conflictu inter ecclesiam sanctorum martyrum Cosme et Damiani, que hodie vulgari appellatione dicitur Castellum Boamundi, et palatium novum quod dicitur Blaquernas, quod in angulo civitatis iuxta portum situm est. 9 Mango, Cosmas and Damian 189-191.-The location suggested by Mango is also accepted by Booth, Cosmas and Damian 116 n. 8, and, to a certain degree,

Mountains were always a convenient region, which could be profited from as both a safe refuge protecting from the enemy as well as an opportune starting point of an attack against the enemy's territory. An analysis of works left by Byzantine historians and orators, describing military struggles between the Byzantines and the Bulgarians, which took place at the end of the 12 th and the beginning of the 13 th centuries, prove the above-mentioned role was played by the Haemus range (meaning here the Pre-Balkan and Stara Planina) in the process of recreating the Bulgarian state on the eve of the late Medieval Period. The texts suggest that over the period the mountains were associated by the Byzantines with a lair of rebels, i. e. a place, where their enemies were seeking refuge form the imperial army, and an area from which they would launch their attacks against the Byzantine territory. The Bulgarians, in turn, utilized the naturally protective characteristic of the Haemus itself as well as strongholds constructed therein to turn the region into a stronghold of their independence movement, which was especially important in the initial period of existence of their late medieval Bulgarian state, i.e. still when it was not a well-established political structure.

With the intensive focus on military affairs in the Alexiad provoking contentious theories and much debate, this article investigates more closely the sources of information available to Anna Komnene for her coverage of war during the reign of Alexios Komnenos.  Though Anna discloses more about her sources than most Byzantine historians, it is argued that some of these claims, particularly those regarding her own capacity to witness events and converse with veteran participants, are somewhat disingenuous, intended to illustrate her adherence to traditional modes of inquiry and thus gain credence for her history.  Without discounting the contribution of oral traditions of storytelling to the Alexiad, the study favours the growing consensus that Anna was more reliant on written material, especially campaign dispatches and military memoirs.

This article deals with the significance of asymmetric warfare in the mountainous terrain during the Byzantine-Arab Wars in the 10th century. De velitatione bellica (the primary source) remains a unique kind of theoretical work which stems from the author’s own experience in minor engagements with enemy raids. The tactics described in the treatise are most likely the result of decades of evolution in frontier warfare on the mountainous Byzantine-Arab border. As such, they are an invaluable testament to the medieval understanding of asymmetric warfare. Thanks to the author of the treatise we know how the Romans/Byzantines repelled enemy invasions and halted the advance of large forces into their own territory. This makes De velitatione bellica a valuable resource, useful for the understanding of the 10th-century conflict between the Byzantine Empire and the Hamdanids.

Fortifications and siege machines of Bagratid Armenia at the end of IX – in the middle of XI century
Фортификации и облоговая техника в Армении эпохи Багратидов

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the appearance and types of fortifications of Ani, Aghtamar, Dvin and other small cities based on fragmentary evidences of Armenian, Georgian, Byzantine and Arab chronicles. The process of transition from wood to stone as the main building material was described.
In spite of defensive character of the Armenian military doctrine, the author deals with the analysis of siege machines which were popular in Armenia in that time and which were used not only for offensive, but also for defensive purposes. Some military tricks which were used by commanders to capture or protect cities also were analyzed.

Die vorliegende Untersuchung über die politische und ideologische Wahrnehmung von Krieg und Frieden in Byzanz in der Zeit vor den Kreuzzügen analysiert das stets aktuelle Problem Krieg aus der Sicht der Gesellschaft einer mittelalterlichen Großmacht. Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, das System von Ideen und Vorstellungen zu zeigen, welches die Wahmehmung von Krieg und Frieden in der byzantinischen Elite und, soweit dies die Quellenlage erlaubt, in allen Gesellschaftsschichten gestaltete.

Im ersten Teil wird das byzantinische Militärwesen aus einem reichsideologischen Blickwinkel betrachtet und analysiert. Die Untersuchung konzentriert sich auf die ideologisch-politische Bedeutung der Entstehung und Entwicklung der so genannten Themenordnung sowie des schrittweisen Überganges vom Themenheer in ein professionelles Heer bis in das 10. Jahrhundert. Im zweiten Teil werden die Überlegungen bzw. die theoretischen Äußerungen der Byzantiner zum Thema Krieg und Frieden, ausgehend von ihren politischen und religiösen Ideen und in Zusammenhang mit ihrer friedlichen (Diplomatie) und militärischen Außenpolitik interpretiert und analysiert.
Die traditionelle Ansicht, dass der Krieg aus der ideologisch-politischen Sicht der Byzantiner als ultima ratio betrachtet wurde, wird in dieser Untersuchung in Frage gestellt. Das byzantinische Konzept der Rechtfertigung des Krieges wird im Rahmen der Frage nach einer differenzierten Wahrnehmung des Friedens neu betrachtet und interpretiert. In diesem Zusammenhang werden die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Krieg und Religion und die Frage nach einem etablierten Konzept des sog. heiligen Krieges in Byzanz zu dieser Zeit im Hinblick auf die ideologische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam kritisch untersucht.

This study of the status and peace-time functions of Byzantine soldiers (300-1200) examines diverse interactions between military personnel and civilian society. Acknowledging various categories and shifting contemporary definitions of “soldier”, a survey of socio-cultural backgrounds, modes of recruitment, terms of service and institutional environments distinguishes differences in rates and methods of remuneration, fiscal-legal privileges, socio-economic standing and professional identities. The vexed question of military landholdings becomes of pivotal significance for locating soldiers in agrarian society. Official spheres of military-civilian relations include policing and internal security, enforcement of religious policies, interventions in imperial politics and regional economic impact. Broader consideration of military sociology explores how the presence and behaviour of soldiers, on and off duty, affected the socio-economic patterns, cultural complexion and power relationships of urban and rural communities, and reflected soldiers’ varying levels of integration into civilian society, through origin, kinship, property and culture, mirroring longer-term changes in the composition of Byzantine armies.

This article aims to cast more light on the relatively under-researched subject of warfare in late Byzantine and Frankish Greece by analysing the descriptions of military operations between the Byzantine Empire and the Crusader Principality of Achaia in Morea (the Peloponnese) in 1264, especially the battle of Makry-Plagi. Moreover, it will demonstrate that, although relations between the Latins, Byzantines, and even the Turks were generally hostile at this time,  these groups could co-operate to a surprising extent, and even showed a readiness for peaceful co-existence.

"The subject of the article is what the descriptions about the battle and campaign of Pelagonia 1259 between “The Empire of Nicaea” and the coalition formed by the “The Despotate of Epiros”, The Principality of Achaia and the Kingdom of Sicily could tell us about the late Byzantine warfare. The poor attachment of the people involved to their leaders’ cause seems to have largely defined the campaign of Pelagonia. The cities of Macedonia had no great interest in making sacrifices in order to support the Epirotes against the Nicaeans or the other way around. The most decisive factor in the outcome was that the coalition, laid on weak foundations, collapsed as a result of quarrel. In Nicean army on the other hand the commanders were most likely chosen because of their loyalty to Michael Palaiologos not because of their military expertise.

Early in the campaign the Nicaeans made swift winter attack and they also conducted their sieges in aggressive way. These seem to have been quite typical methods of war for Nicaeans. The other methods that Nicaeans used encountering the coalition were more traditionally Byzantine. Apparently they tried to have first a diplomatic solution and find allies (Hungary and Mačva). When the coalition gathered its forces the Nicaeans avoided pitched battles and used harassment, different kind of stratagems and other “indirect” methods of war. The Nicaean army relied heavily on horse-archers, some of them probably natives of the eastern frontier region of the realm, and I find it possible that the army was intentionally customized for the harassment strategy. The late Byzantine military system that relied on the large scale use of mercenaries from different nations made this flexibility possible. The negative side of this system was the potentially poor cohesion of the heterogeneous armies and difficulties to control them. The coalition apparently adopted more aggressive, battle seeking strategy. The main reason for this was probably the difficulty to keep large and expensive army in field for a long time.

According to one description the Nicaeans used battle formation that consisted of several successive cavalry batailles with the infantry behind them. The battle order was very similar to many other Byzantine battle orders that we know from 6th century onwards and the one that the Latins normally used (also in the battle of Pelagonia). Choosing this battle formation probably derived from the assumption that the cavalry would have the active role in the battlefield and the infantry passive. The late Byzantine infantry was often recruited during the campaign and was probably not very effective in open field.

In the conflict between the Epeiros and Nicaea the battle of Pelagonia was above all defensive victory. Despotes Michael held the support of his people and kingdom of Sicily. Nicaea-Byzantium could however achieve territorial gains from The Principality of Achaia, because the ruler of the later was captured."

N THE SPRING of 622, the emperor Heraclius set out from Constantinople into Anatolia for his first campaign against 1 Exp.Pers. 2.150: A. Pertusi, Giorgio di Pisidia, Poemi I Panegirici epici (Ettal 1959) 102-104; repr. Carmi di Giorgio di Pisidia, with a different Italian transl. by L. Tartaglia (Turin 1998).

Alexios I Komnenos belongs to the most important emperors of the Byzantine history. Yet, in many respects, this period still remains an underdeveloped field of study. This paper attempts to review one of the aspects of his reign, namely his capabilities as a military commander since he owed much of his success in restoring the fortunes of Byzantium to his strong military background. In order to succeed in the final evaluation, most of the relevant military events during Alexios Komnenos' life and career in which he took personal part will be briefly reviewed and taken into consideration. Particular cases where Alexios Komnenos was allegedly responsible for a serious military defeat will be discussed in more detail (e.g. battle of Dyrrachion in 1081 and battle of Dristra in 1087) in order to assess whether it was solely Alexios Komnenos' responsibility , or whether the causes of defeat were not result of his faulty decision-making as a military commander.

This article attempts to reconstruct a late Byzantine low-level war, namely the conflict in the Morea during 1267-1289, which took place between the Angevins and their vassal, the Principality of Achaia, on the one side, and the Byzantines on the other side. This conflict offers a case of relatively well-documented late Byzantine low-level warfare. Special attention is given to the economic and demographic consequences of war for Morea, for the building of fortresses, and to the idea put forward in previous research that the war in Morea needlessly took resources away from the defense of Anatolia – thus contributing to the loss of the area to the Turks.

"""The author of the study correlates the narrative of the panegyric (entitled On the military deeds of the renowned protostrator) composed by Manuel Philes, the Byzantine court poet active at the end of the 13th and at the beginning of the 14th c., which was devoted to military victories of protostrator Michael Doucas Glavas Tarchaneiotes with a fragment of the historical work penned by Nicephorus Gregoras and entitled Roman history.
Both the specified narratives describe the protostrator’s building activities in the area of the Haemus Mountains (i.e. the Stara Planina and Sredna Gora), where he would construct fortresses earlier destroyed during the military campaign against Bulgaria in the years 1278–1279. The author attempts to prove factual correctness of  both the Byzantine texts and achieves the goal even despite contrary opinions present in the scholarly modern literature published so far. He identifies the fortresses mentioned in both the Byzantine texts with the remains of military structures extant in the above-specified area, i.e. the Stara Planina and Sredna Gora. Moreover, the author of the article specifies a possible period of the execution of the repair works. Finally, he puts forward a new hypothesis concerning the actual delineation of the border between Byzantium and Bulgaria in the years 1279/1280 – 1304."""

The experience of war of the common people in the medieval East Roman Empire is a
topic related to hotly debated issues such as collective identification and attachments,
or imperialism and ecumenical ideology. This paper attempts a bottom-up approach to
the way warfare was perceived and experienced by provincial populations based on the
analysis of selected evidence from the period between the seventh and the twelfth
centuries. It goes without saying that the treatment of the topic here could not be
exhaustive. My main goal was to problematize the relationship between the objectives
of imperial military policies and the pragmatic needs of common provincials for
protection of their well-being.

Byzantium was heir to a tradition of Greek and Roman military literature stretching back to the fourth century BC, which was manifest both in the collection, editing and adaptation of surviving texts from classical antiquity and in the composition of numerous new treatises devoted to warfare on land and sea. This broad genre always exhibited a diversity of content, style, language and approach, reflective of different categories of author and reader. Originating in a research project to prepare a full critical edition of Nikephoros Ouranos’ Taktika (c.1000), conventionally acknowledged as the longest and last representative of this literary and intellectual tradition, this paper explores the subsequent and more obscure history of this genre in the Late Byzantine period. Aspects of continuity are discernible in isolated instances of military writing, specifically a tactical opusculum by the scholar-courtier Michael Psellos (c.1050s-70s) and evidence for a lost work by the general Michael Doukas Glabas Tarchaneiotes (c.1297-1305/8), and in a partially overlapping but distinct genre of advisory literature (Kekaumenos, c.1075-8; Theodore Palaiologos, c.1326/7). The investigation addresses the more difficult question of the Late Byzantine audience(s) of military treatises, as reflected in evidence for aristocratic education and literary culture and in what can be inferred from manuscript production and ownership. In particular, these criteria show the continued esteem accorded to Greco-Roman ‘classics’, notably Ailianos’ Taktika Theoria (c.106-13 AD). More generally, they highlight the socio-cultural function of this genre as a component of the schooling, identity and perspectives of Late Byzantine military and civilian elites, over and above whatever practical utility these texts might (or might not) have possessed as ‘technical’ or ‘scientific’ literature. The discussion introduces some hitherto unexploited manuscripts in the Topkapı Palace Library (TSMK G.İ. 19 and 36).

(This paper was originally presented at the First International Conference on the Military History of the Mediterranean Sea, Fatih Üniversitesi, Istanbul, 26-28 June, 2015).

Ο πόλεμος είναι το τελευταίο κυριολεκτικά σημείο, στο οποίο θα ανέμενε κανείς να συναντήσει τη γυναίκα σε μια ανδροκρατούμενη, γεμάτη στερεότυπα κοινωνία όπως αυτή του Βυζαντίου. Ωστόσο, η σχέση των γυναικών με το σύνθετο φαινόμενο του πολέμου ήταν στενή, και οι βυζαντινοί συγγραφείς ανέδειξαν τις ένοπλες συρράξεις ως υπόθεση τόσο ανδρική όσο και γυναικεία.
Οι Βυζαντινές δεν αποτέλεσαν ποτέ μάχιμο τμήμα των εκστρατευτικών σωμάτων, δεν γυμνάστηκαν κατάλληλα, δεν οπλίστηκαν από το συμβατικό οπλοστάσιο της εποχής τους και δεν βρέθηκαν στην πρώτη γραμμή. Συνόδευσαν όμως τους συζύγους τους στην εκστρατεία όποτε κρίθηκε απαραίτητο, συνέδραμαν δυναμικά στο έργο αξιωματούχων και στρατιωτών ή τροποποίησαν επιτελικούς σχεδιασμούς. Υπερασπίστηκαν τις πόλεις ή τα κάστρα τους επιδεικνύοντας εξαιρετικά προσόντα και δεξιότητες και ως λεία των νικητών υπέστησαν τα δεινά επακόλουθα της ήττας. Στα μετόπισθεν ανέλαβαν υπέρμετρες ευθύνες μένοντας εκτεθειμένες σε ποικίλους κινδύνους.
Τα έμφυλα χαρακτηριστικά τους προβλήθηκαν άλλοτε με θετικό και άλλοτε με αρνητικό πρόσημο εκ μέρους των συγχρόνων τους, οι οποίοι σε αρκετές ιστορίες πολέμου ανέδειξαν τον έρωτα ως ρυθμιστή των εξελίξεων.
Όταν οι Βυζαντινοί γνώρισαν τις γυναίκες των αντιπάλων τους είτε ως μάχιμες στα στρατόπεδα είτε ως επικεφαλής των κρατών τους αναμετρήθηκαν ή συμμάχησαν μαζί τους. Εκείνοι που κατέγραψαν αυτές τις «συναντήσεις» δεν μπόρεσαν να κρύψουν την έκπληξή τους και επέτρεψαν να διαφανεί η απαρέσκειά τους.
Παρόλο που ιστορικοί και χρονογράφοι της εποχής δεν τοποθέτησαν πάντοτε τις Βυζαντινές εκεί όπου έδρασαν και συχνά αποσιώπησαν την παρουσία τους, αποδεικνύεται ότι οι γυναίκες εμπλέκονταν σχεδόν σε όλες τις εκφάνσεις του πολέμου, στο μέτρο που αναλογούσε στο φύλο τους και όπως συνέβαινε σε κάθε τομέα δραστηριότητας στις μεσαιωνικές κοινωνίες.

Preparation and organization of the military campaign of the army of Bagratid Armenia (end of 9 – mid. 11 c.).
Підготовка та організація військового походу армії Багратидської Вірменії (кін. ІХ – сер. ХІ ст.)
Подготовка и организация военного похода армии Багратидськой Армении (кон. IХ - сер. XI в.)

Introduction. The history of early medieval Armenia is often studied in the context of struggle between Byzantine Empire and the Arab Caliphate for Armenia and the Caucasus in general. When the Caliphate began to win this fight, as for example at the beginning of the VIII сentury, Armenia immediately became a part of Caliphate. However, the strengthening of Byzantium and the Arabs’ weakening in the second half of the ІХ century led to the change of geopolitical situation in the Caucasus, which allowed Armenians to create an independent Bagratid Armenian state.
Armenian Kingdom (884/886–1045/1064) was a decentralized state with a highly developed suzerain-vassal relationship where some princes (ishkhan) recognized the power of the king of the Bagratid dynasty only in matters of war and peace. In contrast to Armenia, Byzantine Empire didn’t have a feudal type of army and maintain their military forces from the state treasury.
In spite of the actual fragmentation of the state, representatives of the royal dynasty of Bagratids created a flexible system of gathering troops and their movement, relying on developed suzerain-vassal relationship to protect the borders of the state from Muslim incursions and Byzantine intervention.
Purpose. On the basis of fragmentary evidences of the Armenian and other chronicles, the aim of this article is to reconstruct the process of a military campaign – from the gathering of troops, camp organization, intelligence and food supply issues to the location of troops on the battlefield and tactics.
Results and Originality. Military campaigns began in spring and lasted until late autumn and the Bagratid king or other trusted person was involved in the preparation and organization. The king directed the creation of a camp which was surrounded by palisade and moose and divided into sectors where separately housed troops of separate princes.
On the battlefield Armenians used a standard (sometimes with certain modifications) disposition of troops: avant-garde, center with flanks and rearguard. Although the other system was equally popular, when the troops «were not stationed according to the rules of military art, but around their suzerain, with whom they came to the battlefield». The main military unit – cavalry (azats) were located in the avant-garde and rearguard. Also, Armenian army didn’t know state centralized food supply, so army independently acquired it during campaigns.
In most military conflicts against Muslims (especially turks), the Armenian troops wanted to avoid battles on the plains, because in this case the advantage would be on the enemy’s side, which had maneuverable equestrian archers that allowed them to conduct a distant battle for a long time. This forced Armenians to use the tactics of defensive battle, luring the enemy to the mountains, which offset the possible numerical superiority of the Muslims and didn’t allow them to fully use maneuverable equestrian archers.
Conclusion. The prospect of the research is to attract and compare all available Armenian, Georgian, Byzantine, Arab and other chronicles to create an overall picture of the military history of Armenia, which will help to better understand social-economical and political situation in region and further events in the history of Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia (1080–1375).

У статті реконструйовано процес збору вірменських військ у разі військового конфлікту. Проаналізовано особливості облаштування та оборони табору, роль сторожової служби та розвідки, а також визначено джерела забезпечення армії продовольством. Подано кілька схем розташування військ на полі бою, акцентуючи увагу на тому, що вірмени найчастіше займали оборонну позицію, ставлячи основну ставку на складний природній рельєф місцевості. Ключові слова: Багратидська Вірменія, Візантія, тактика, військо, похід, армія, сюзеренно- васальна система.

Димидюк Д. Підготовка та організація військового походу армії
Багратидської Вірменії наприкінці ІХ – всередині ХІ ст. / Дмитро Димидюк //
Вісник Черкаського університету. Серія: Історичні науки (напрям: Історія та
Етнологія). – Черкаси, 2017. – №4. – С. 50–58.

[Dymydyuk, D. (2017). Preparation and organization of the military campaign
of the army of Bagratid Armenia at the end of the IX – in the middle of the XI c.
Visnyk of the Cherkasy Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University. Series history and
ethnology. 4, 50–58 (in Ukr)].

Irene di Bisanzio, unica donna ad assumere il titolo imperiale maschile, è conosciuta soprattutto per aver sconfitto l’iconoclastia, riportando la Chiesa d’Oriente in comunione
con tutte le altre. Per questa ragione venne proclamata Santa e ricordata come colei che salvò l’unità del mondo cristiano. Forse non tutti sanno però che Irene fu anche e principalmente
una donna di governo e di guerra, che non esitò a uccidere il figlio e altri nemici politici per perseguire quello che riteneva
essere il bene dell’Impero. Una donna di potere e di fede che può essere compresa a fondo solo prescindendo dalla mentalità moderna e cercando di interpretare lucidamente
una società estinta, quale quella bizantina.
Nicola Bergamo, dottorando presso l’EHESS di Parigi, racconta in questo libro la vita di un’imperatrice, Santa e madre figlicida.

The text discuss the question of human attitudes facing the miseries of war on the basis of an excellent piece of Byzantine rhetoric art from the third decade of 10th c. Throughout the first three chapters of the oration, concerning the peace treaty of 927 between Byzantium and Bulgaria, the author built up the image of war itself as well as of a suffering human who had become a witness to the violence inflicted to the soil, temples and villages, as well as and first of all to humans during war operations. And although that image was in many aspects a clichй of the Byzantine literature through multiplying the images of suffering, present in other similar works, it referred to the deeply rooted pattern of such feelings, based on the experience of many generations of Byzantines themselves and of the humankind in general. So, despite being, in some ways, a customary topos it reflected the possible or perhaps actual human experience of meeting with violence. The text present and characterize the attitudes and emotions which accompanied the Byzantine author he had experienced (or at least said he had), being a witness and hearing the relations of atrocities of a fratricidal war.

Numerous Antique and Byzantine works on polemology included detailed instructions how to act and fight in the mountains. Polemological works mentioned the role of the cavalry and infantry in the military activities in such an area. They also presented information about setting up ambushes in passes and discussed ways of fighting battles in the mountains. These advices were of great significance, especially when the Byzantine army was to cross the mountains located in a foreign area or gorges protected by enemies.