Conflict and Cooperation: Campaigns on the Peloponnese in 1264

ACTA BYZANTINA FENNICA ACTA BYZANTINA FENNICA VOL. 4 (N. s.) 2015 Suomen Bysantin tutkimuksen seura Helsinki 2015 ACTA BYZANTINA FENNICA (ISSN1458-7017) ABzF is a refereed journal, published by the Finnish Society for Byzantine Studies. The journal is interested in receiving papers treating the history of Byzantium as well as the history of the Eastern Mediterranean basin in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Period. Contributions may be in English, German, French, Italian and Greek. The acceptance of offered articles will be decided by the editors together with the editorial board. For information regarding the submission of manuscripts, please contact us at: [email protected] Editorial Advisory Board: Leslie Brubaker (University of Birmingham) Björn Forsén (University of Helsinki) René Gothóni (University of Helsinki) Johannes Koder (Universität Wien) Matti Kotiranta (University of Joensuu) Martti Leiwo (University of Helsinki) Alice-Mary Talbot (Dumbarton Oaks) Editors: Björn Forsén, Mika Hakkarainen and Vesa Vahtikari Finnish Society for Byzantine Studies House of Science and Letters Kirkkokatu 6 00170 Helsinki http://www.protsv.fi/bts/BTSacta.html Subscriptions and back issues: TIEDEKIRJA Kirkkokatu 14 FIN-00170 Helsinki Tel+358-9-635 1777, fax +358-9-635 017 Email: [email protected] Multiprint Oy Vantaa, Finland 2015 Contents Antti Lampinen A Helping Hand from the Divine. Notes on the Triumphalist Iconography of the Early Theodosians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Annika Asp-Talwar Constantine Loukites, the Empἷὄὁὄὅ’ΝRight-hand Man in Fourteenth Century Trebizond. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Björn Forsén, Mika Hakkarainen and Brikena Shkodra-Rrugia Blood and Salt: Some Thoughts Evolving from the Topography of the Battle at Dyrrachium in 1081 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Juho Wilskman Conflict and Cooperation: Campaigns on the Peloponnese in 1264. . . . . 85 Kai Juntunen The Image of Cleopatra in Ioannes Xiphilinos’ Epitome of Cassius Dio: A Reflection of the Empress Eudokia Makrembolitissa?. . . . . . . . 123 Contributors Annika Asp-Talwar Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies Arts Building University of Birmingham Edgebaston Birmingham BI5 2TT [email protected] Björn Forsén Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies P.O. Box 59 00014 University of Helsinki [email protected] Mika Hakkarainen Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies P.O. Box 59 00014 University of Helsinki [email protected] Kai Juntunen Department of World Cultures Ancient Langages and Culture P.O. Box 59 00014 University of Helsinki [email protected] Antti Lampinen School of Classics Swallowgate St Andrews Fife KY16 9AL [email protected] Brikena Shkodra-Rrugia Instituti i Arkeologjise Qendra e Studimeve Albanologjike Sheshi “Nënë Tereza” 1000 Tirana [email protected] Juho Wilskman Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies P.O. Box 59 00014 University of Helsinki juho.wilskman@helsinki Abbreviations AJPhil. BF BSA CPh CQ DOP GRBS IstMitt JEA JECS JRA JRS JÖB RE RH MDAI(R) MEFRA TAPA T&M American Journal of Philology. Baltimore (Md.). Byzantinische Forschungen. Amsterdam. The Annual of the British School at Athens. Cambridge. Classical Philology: A journal devoted to research in classical antiquity. Chicago (Ill.) The Classical Quarterly. Cambridge. Dumbarton Oaks Papers. Washington (D.C.). Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies. Cambridge Mass. Istanbuler Mitteilungen. Deutsches Archäologisches Institut. Tübingen. The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology. London. Journal of Early Christian Studies: Journal of the North American Patristics Society. Baltimore (Md.). Journal of Roman Archaeology: An international journal. Portsmouth (R.I). The Journal of Roman Studies. London. Jahrbuch der Östereichischen Byzantinistik. Wien. Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Stuttgart. Revue historique. Paris. Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Römische Abteilung. Mainz. εélaὀἹἷὅΝ ἶἷΝ l’ÉἵὁlἷΝ Ἰὄançaise de Rome. Antiquité. Rome: École française de Rome. Transactions of the American Philological Association. Baltimore (Md.). Travaux et Mémoires (= Centre de Recherche d’histoire et civilisation byzantines) Paris. Juho Wilskman Conflict and Cooperation: Campaigns on the Peloponnese in 1264 This article aims to cast more light on the relatively under-researched subject of warfare in late Byzantine and Frankish Greece by analysing the descriptions of military operations between the Byzantine Empire and the Crusader Principality of Achaia in Morea (the Peloponnese) in 1264.1 Moreover, it will demonstrate that, although relations between the Latins, Byzantines, and even the Turks were generally hostile at this time, 2 these groups could co-operate to a surprising extent, and even showed a readiness for peaceful co-existence. 1 2 This article is, to a large extent, based on my MA thesis Bysanttilaisten ja Akhaian ruhtinaskunnan väliset sotatoimet 1259-83: Tapaustutkimus myöhäis-bysanttilaisesta sodankäynnistä (The War between the Byzantines and the Principality of Achaia 1259-83: A Case Study in Late Byzantine Warfare) at the University of Helsinki in 2007. The thesis is published with an English summary at https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/19600. Other articles based on the same MA thesis are Wilskman 2009-2010; Wilskman 2012a; Wilskman 2012b. The distinction between Greeks and Byzantines, as well as between Latins and Franks, is problematic. The use of these terms varies in the sources and deviates from modern definitions. The original French version of the Chronicle of Morea speaks e.g. about Greeks (les Grex) and the Greek version about Romans (κἱ Ρωηαῖκδ), both of whom modern historians would usually refer to as Byzantines. I have here chosen to use the term “ἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷὅ”Ν iὀΝ ὈhὁὅἷΝ ἵaὅἷὅΝ whἷὀΝ ἙΝ waὀὈΝ ὈὁΝ ἷmphaὅiὅἷΝ ὈhἷΝ pὁliὈiἵalΝ aἸἸiliaὈiὁὀὅ of the group in question, i.e., that they were subjects of the Byzantine emperor regardless of ἷὈhὀiἵΝὁὄiἹiὀέΝἡὀΝὈhἷΝὁὈhἷὄΝhaὀἶ,ΝἙΝὉὅἷΝὈhἷΝὈἷὄmΝ“ἕὄἷἷkὅ”ΝwhἷὀΝἙΝwaὀὈΝὈὁΝἷmphaὅiὅἷΝὈhἷΝ ἹὄὁὉp’ὅΝἷὈhὀiἵiὈy,ΝἶἷἸiὀἷἶΝἴyΝlaὀἹὉaἹἷΝὄἷἹaὄἶlἷὅὅΝὁἸΝpὁliὈiἵalΝaἸἸiliaὈiὁὀὅΝ(whἷὄἷἴyΝἕὄἷἷkὅΝ ἵaὀΝἴἷΝὅὉἴjἷἵὈὅΝὁἸΝἴὁὈhΝὈhἷΝἐyὐaὀὈiὉmΝaὀἶΝὈhἷΝἑὄὉὅaἶἷὄΝὅὈaὈἷὅ)έΝἦhἷΝὈἷὄmὅΝ“δaὈiὀὅ”ΝaὀἶΝ “ἔὄaὀkὅ”ΝἙΝὉὅἷΝiὀὈἷὄἵhaὀἹἷaἴlyΝwhἷὀΝὄἷἸἷὄὄiὀg to Catholic Europeans or their descendants who had settled in the Aegean world although e.g. the author of the Chronicle uses the ὈἷὄmΝ“ἔὄaὀkὅ”ΝmaiὀlyΝἸὁὄΝpἷὄὅὁὀὅΝὁὄiἹiὀaὈiὀἹΝἸὄὁmΝἔὄaὀἵἷέΝἙΝalὅὁΝἵὁὀὅiἶἷὄΝὈhἷΝὈὄὁὁpὅΝὁἸΝ the Principality of Achaia to be Latin or Frankish, although they probably also included Greeks. For a discussion on ethnic terminology and identities, see e.g. Koder 2003; Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007; Vacalopoulos 1970; Jacoby 1973; Lock 1995, 8-9; Stouraitis 2014. 85 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The analysis will be principally focused on the Chronicle of Morea, which was probably first written in the 1320s. It describes the history of the Principality of Achaia and extols the deeds of its Frankish nobility; indeed, the anonymous writer declares that he wrote the chronicle so that the reader or listener could learn from the deeds of excellent warriors. Although unstated, his other motive for writing the book was probably the desire to maintain the spirit of the Frankish community in Greece, which at that time had suffered serious setbacks, by recounting their glorious past. 3 The Chronicle of Morea is a problematic source, since its account of events, particularly those beyond the Peloponnese, is riddled with errors, and its attitude is far from neutral. However, its record of events on the peninsula in 1264 does seem comparatively reliable.4 The Chronicle of Morea has survived in four languages, Greek, French, Italian and Aragonian, although its original language is still a matter for debate. The Italian text is only a poor translation, and thus will not be used in this analysis. Instead, I will mainly quote from the French and Greek versions: the former, Livre de la conquest deΝlaΝprincéeΝdeΝl’Amorée, is an abridged version of the original text; 5 the latter, the Greek Chronicle of Morea, is written in verse and is, despite its language, hostile towards the Byzantines. On occasion, I will also refer to the Aragonian version, Libro de los Fechos, when its account departs from the French and the Greek. Written towards the end of the fourteenth century, Libro de los Fechos differs from the other versions in several respects and reads more like an independent work using the Chronicle of Morea as its main source.6 3 4 5 6 86 Chronicle of Morea 1339-1355. The Chronicle of Morea has received much scholarly attention. The current debates are well summarized by Shawcross 2009. Lurier 1964, 52-53, 59-60; Geanakoplos 1953, 130-131; Wilskman 2012a, 169-172, 193; Wilskman 2009-2010, 132-135, 150-157; Shawcross 2009, 43-44; Treadgold 1997, 916917; Bon 1969, 29-30; Failler 1980, 35-36. Livre de la conqueste § 1. Libro de los Fechos § 726; Shawcross 2009, 42, 265-266, 268-273. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Of the other relevant sources, one should first mention the history of George Pachymeres (1242-c. 1310). Pachymeres was a Nicaean churchmaὀΝaὀἶΝὅἵhὁlaὄΝwhὁΝmὁvἷἶΝὈὁΝἑὁὀὅὈaὀὈiὀὁplἷΝὅὁὁὀΝaἸὈἷὄΝὈhἷΝ“liἴἷὄaὈiὁὀ”Ν of the city in 1261. He is generally considered to be a reliable author, even when documenting the reign of Michael VIII Palaiologos (1259/61-1282), ὅiὀἵἷΝhἷΝὁὀlyΝἶiἶΝὅὁΝaἸὈἷὄΝὈhἷΝἷmpἷὄὁὄ’ὅΝἶἷaὈh,ΝallὁwiὀἹΝhimΝὈὁΝwὄiὈἷΝἵaὀά didly about events. However, Pachymeres is notorious for his use of very difficult language and for his tendency to jump back and forth in chronological order. Furthermore, from his clerical and Constantinopolitan point of view, the military operations in the Morea were unfortunately only of minor importance.7 In addition, other apposite sources include the history of Romania by the Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello the Elder (c. 12701343), papal letters, and the history of the later Byzantine Gregoras. These deal with the war in Morea only in a very cursory manner, but, as we shall see, they offer useful information about the context of the encounter. The war begins Since its foundation after the Fourth Crusade, the Principality of Achaia was a practically independent political entity, ruled by a Frankish prince and his most important vassals. The old Greek leaders and landowners (archons) could keep their lands and customs, but they were excluded from the highest circles of society. The centre of the Principality of Achaia was ὁὀΝaΝplaiὀΝiὀΝὈhἷΝὀὁὄὈhwἷὅὈἷὄὀΝἢἷlὁpὁὀὀἷὅἷ,ΝwhἷὄἷΝὈhἷΝ“ἵapiὈal”ΝχὀἶὄaviἶaΝ was located.8 The southeastern part of the Peninsula resisted the Franks the longest and was only subdued by Prince Guillaume II de Villehardouin 7 8 Pachymeres I, 1; Macrides 2003, 70-72; Lampakes 2004, 21-92. The Peloponnese has four other big coastal plains besides the plain of Achaia. The Taygetos mountain range, where the Slavs lived, is between Messenia and Lakonia, i.e. the southwestern and southeastern plains. The interior of the peninsula is mountainous, but there are also many valleys and plains. 87 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (1246-1278) in 1250. He did, however, have to give the inhabitants of the region special privileges, such as allowing the Slavs of the Taygetos Mountains to continue to perform military service. At the peak of his power Guillaume not only ruled the whole of Morea, but also beyond the peninsula: under his command were the Lord of Athens, the Marquis of Boudonitza, the Triarch of Euboea, the Duke of Naxos, and the Count of Kephalenia.9 ϊὉὄiὀἹΝ ὈhἷΝ 1ἀηίὅΝ ὈhἷΝ ἕὄἷἷkΝ “ϋmpiὄἷΝ ὁἸΝ ἠiἵaἷa”Ν waὅΝ ὈhἷΝ ἶὁmiὀaὀὈΝ power in the region. However, a power struggle occurred when Theodore II Laskaris died in August 1258 and left only an under-aged son as a successor, which resulted in the aristocrat Michael Palaiologos crowning himself co-ἷmpἷὄὁὄΝὁὀΝ1ΝJaὀὉaὄyΝ1ἀηλέΝἦhἷΝϋmpiὄἷΝὁἸΝἠiἵaἷa’ὅΝmaiὀΝὄival,ΝὈhἷΝ Greek ruler of Epiros, exploited the situation and formed an anti-Nicaean coalition that included Prince Guillaume participated. This coalition was defeated in the battle of Pelagonia, where Guillaume and all the nobles in his army were captured by the Nicaeans. 10 According to the Chronicle of Morea, after his victory Michael Palaiologos wanted to buy Morea, but Guillaume initially refused, declaring that it was customary among soldiers to pay ransoms for their freedom. However, after the Nicaeans recaptured Constantinople in 1261, Guillaume agreed to cede fortified towns (including Mistra) in southeast Morea in exἵhaὀἹἷΝ ἸὁὄΝ hiὅΝ aὀἶΝ hiὅΝ mἷὀ’ὅΝ ἸὄἷἷἶὁmέΝ χὅΝ aΝ reward, the emperor gave Guillaume the title of megas domestikos11 and made him godfather to his 9 10 11 88 For the conquest of Morea, see especially Kordoses 198676-136, 150-155. From the studies dealing with the Principality of Achaia, the most comprehensive is still Bon 1969. Lock 1995 provides a good overview of the history of the Franks of Romania in general and Ortega 2012 gives an extensive survey of the elite. For these events see especially Geanakoplos 1953 and Wilskman 2009-2010. According to Sanudo 115 there was a rebellion in Morea after the battle of Pelagonia. If this is true, it must have been very small, because other sources do not mention it. Megas domestikos was a high position in the Byzantine court and the official commander of the army, although, as with other late Byzantine titles, the holder did not always perform the corresponding duties in practice. In the case of Prince Guillaume the title was CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ son.12 This mirrored the old Byzantine tradition of incorporating autonomὁὉὅΝmiὀὁὄiὈiἷὅΝiὀὈὁΝὈhἷΝϋmpiὄἷ’ὅΝpὁliὈiἵalΝὅὈὄὉἵὈὉὄἷΝἴyΝἹiviὀἹΝὈhἷiὄΝlἷaἶἷὄὅΝ a place in the imperial hierarchy.13 Besides his acquisition of Morea and his family ties with the Prince of Achaia,14 Michael Palaiologos perhaps also attempted to slowly assimilate and acculturate the Franks of Morea with the Byzantine Empire and society through mixed marriages. He forced the daughters of the late emperor Theodore II Laskaris to marry insignificant foreigners, one of whom was the Moreote Baron Mahieu de Véligourt. 15 The Byzantines have traditionally been seen as peace-loving and as preferring diplomatic solutions to war. Harris has cited the treaty with Guillaume as evidence that the Byzantine emperors were primarily interested in being recognised as dominant over the other Christian rulers. 16 However, Emperor Michael VIII faced a multitude of threats after the conquest of Constantinople, and in 1262 the Byzantine government was involved in military conflicts on five different fronts. 17 Thus, no matter what the ideological preferences of the emperor were, he had good reasons to reach some kind of settlement with Guillaume. War between the Principality of Achaia and the Byzantines broke out again as soon as the Franks returned to Morea in 1262. Evidently the pope 12 13 14 15 16 17 certainly purely formal (Pseudo-Kodinos 26-28, 204-208; Bartusis 1992, 241; Kyriakidis 2008, 241-258; Panagiotides 2004, 154-165). Pachymeres I, 31; Livre de la conqueste §§ 312-328; Chronicle of Morea 4198-4514; Gregoras IV, 1; Sanudo 125; Libro de los Fechos §§ 296-307.Guillaume was perhaps not the best choice for godfather, because he due to his confession in principle was against the regulations of the Byzantine church (Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 247-248, 251-252). Vryonis 1975, 128-131. Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 248-249. Pachymeres III, 6; 10; Gregoras IV, 4; Failler 1980, 65-77. The barony of Mahieu de Véligourt was among the smallest of the Principality of Achaia encompassing only four knightly fiefs, whereas the largest baronies of Morea had 24 (Livre de la conqueste § 128; Chronicle of Morea 1903-1967). Harris 2003, 22-32, 174-175. For other views of the Byzantine attitudes concerning warfare, see e.g. Kolbaba 1998, 202-221; Haldon 1992; Kanellopoulos and Lekea 2010; Stouraitis 2009, 219-232; 384-387; Kyriakidis 2011, 14-34. Bartusis 1992, 48-57; Failler 1980, 85-103; Failler 1981, 148-173. 89 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ had assured Guillaume and the other Franks that it was not necessary for them to keep promises made during their imprisonment. 18 In fact, Pope Urbanus IV (1261-1264) had plans for the re-conquest of Constantinople and he also tried to assist the Principality of Achaia by promising the same indulgences and privileges for its supporters as for those who helped the Holy Land. Thus the conflict turned into a crusader war. The Venetians promised to transport the crusaders free of charge. The pope also ordered ὈhἷΝ δaὈiὀΝ ἵlἷὄἹyΝ iὀΝ ἕὉillaὉmἷΝ ἙἙΝ ἶἷΝ VillἷhaὄἶὁὉiὀ’ὅΝ ἶὁmaiὀΝ ὈὁΝ ἶἷἶiἵaὈἷΝ themselves to fighting aἹaiὀὅὈΝὈhἷΝ“ὅἵhiὅmaὈiἵΝἕὄἷἷkὅ”ΝἸὁὄΝὈhὄἷἷΝyἷaὄὅ,ΝaὀἶΝ to assist Guillaume by giving him money or Latin soldiers, such as crossbowmen. Nevertheless, at the same time the pope was negotiating for a peaceful solution and a church union with Emperor Michael VIII, suggesting that both parties wanted to keep different options open. 19 Outside Venice and Morea, the papal appeals seem to have had little effect. The Genoese, who were allies of the Byzantines (both were at war against Venice), even helped transport the Byzantine army to Morea. The pope excommunicated them, but it does not seem to have much bothered the Genoese leaders.20 The Byzantines gave privileges to the leaders of the Slavs of Taygetos and the regions of Gardalebos and Tsakonia in southeastern Morea in exchange for military service. 21 As such, the people of 18 19 20 21 90 Pachymeres I, 31. In the Chronicle of Morea it is almost admitted that the Franks started the war (Chronicle of Morea 4513-4649, 5489-5558; Livre de la conqueste §§ 329-337; Geanakoplos 1959, 154-160; Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 202; Failler 1980, 89-103). The fortified places that were ceded to the Byzantines were separated from each other, a fact which makes it unlikely that Michael Palaiologos planned a war in Morea (see also Wilskman 2012a, 172-178). Les Registres de Urbain IV, registre ordinaire nos. 131-132, 231-232, 295, 322-326, 577578, 719-720, 740, 756; Chrissis 2012, 180-200; Setton 1976, 94-100. Annali Genovesi di Cafforo 43-44, 51; Tafel and Thomas no. CCCL; Regesten der Kaiserurkunden no. 1890; Les Registres de Urbain IV, registre ordinaire nos. 182; 228230. See also Barber 1989, 116-117; Chrissis 2012, 189-195. The people of Tsakonia spoke Greek, but because of their peculiar dialect and customs they were frequently considered to be a distinct ethnic group (see especially Caratzas 1976). CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ these areas and those of Kinsterna joined the Byzantines, helping the imperial army to conquer several places in southeast Morea.22 It might be worth noting that these areas had not only resisted the Franks the longest, but had also taken a rebellious stance against the Byzantine government before the Fourth Crusade.23 In addition, at least according to the Chronicle of Morea, Guillaume had to travel to Corinth to persuade both the Latins of western Europe and his own vassals outside the Principality of Achaia to continue to fight for him. 24 The Commander of the Byzantine army in Morea was sebastokrator Constantine Palaiologos, the young step-brother of the emperor.25 According to the Chronicle of Morea, as soon as he had heard that Guillaume had gone to Corinth, apparently in the autumn of 1263,26 Constantine set out from the Byzantine base area in southeastern Morea and marched towards χὀἶὄaviἶa,ΝὈhἷΝὉὀἸὁὄὈiἸiἷἶΝ“ἵapiὈal”ΝὁἸΝὈhἷΝpὄiὀἵipaliὈy,ΝlἷaἶiὀἹΝhiὅ troops along the natural corridor through the peninsula formed by the valley of the river Alpheios. The Chronicle of Morea further states that the inhabitants 22 23 24 25 26 Chronicle of Morea 4571-4663; Livre de la conqueste §§ 330-336; Pachymeres III, 1516; Gregoras IV, 1; Sanudo 125; Wilskman 2012a, 174-178. This is, for example, noted in Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 119-129 and Katsaphanas2003, 103. Chronicle of Morea 4594-4617; 4864-4879; Livre de la conqueste §§ 334-335; Libro de los Fechos §§ 338-358. The Byzantine navy is reported to have ravaged Euboia and the other Latin-held islands, which was probably the main reason why the vassals were unwilling to send troops to the peninsula (Pachymeres III, 15, 17; Les Registres de Urbain IV, registre ordinaire nos. 228-230; “ἙmpἷὄaὈὁὄiὅ MichaeliὅΝἢalaἷὁlὁἹiΝἶἷΝViὈaΝὅὉa”ΝVἙἙἙνΝ Wilskman 2012a, 179, 197-198). In the imperial hierarchy, the sebastokrator held the place immediately after the emperor and the despotes (Pseudo-Kodinos 26). Constantine Palaiologos had held no official position before his step-brother took power, after that he was given a commandership in the east, although the later historian Gregoras erroneously claims that he participated in the battle of Pelagonia (Acropolita § 77; Pachymeres I, 20, II, 13; Gregoras III, 5, IV, 1; Wilskman 2012a, 175; Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit no. 21 498). Failler has suggested that the battle of Prinitsa took place already in 1262 and the battle of Makry-Plagi probably during the following year (Failler 1980, 85-103). Nevertheless, I am not convinced and thus prefer the traditional dating of the events (for arguments see Wilskman 2012a, 174-177). 91 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ of the region, which was called Skorta, 27 immediately joined the Byzantines when they saw ConstaὀὈiὀἷ’ὅΝmiἹhὈyΝaὄmyέΝἙὀΝὅpiὈἷΝὁἸΝὈhiὅ,ΝὈhἷΝ bailli left by Guillaume to protect the region succeeded in defeating the Byzantine army in the battle of Prinitsa. Most of the Byzantines escaped through the forest across difficult terrain and their camp was plundered by the Franks and locals, who in theory were allies of the Byzantines. 28 The abortive battle at Sergiana The winter brought a halt to the campaigns, but, in March 1264, Constantine Palaiologos gathered his army in the area where the river Alpheios begins.29 The army, built around the cavalry, included both mercenaries with foreign backgrounds and native Byzantines, which seems to have been fairly typical of the period. In Morea, the natives were mostly men from Magedon, a district in the eastern frontier zone of Byzantine Anatolia; according to the Chronicle of Morea, 2,000 of them served in the Byzantine army in the Peloponnese.30 Earlier emperors had given extensive privileges to the people of the eastern frontier so that they would defend the Byzantine Asia Minor against the raids of the Turks. However, Michael VIII re-organised the system and required these frontier warriors, such as 27 28 29 30 92 The region of Skorta encompassed the areas surrounding modern Gortynas, Megalopolis and Olympia in the western part of Central Peloponnese. Its inhabitants were known for their rebellious nature (Bon 1969, 363-336; Sansaridou-Hendrickx 2007, 129-131). Chronicle of Morea 1426-1429, 4653-4884; Livre de la conqueste § 92, 338; Libro de los Fechos §§ 349-358; Wilskman 2012a, 179-193. Chronicle of Morea 4880-5027. Pachymeres III, 16; Chronicle of Morea 4555-4558. Libro de los Fechos claims that the megas domestikos came to Morea with 3,000 Greeks and 3,000 Turks (Libro de los Fechos §§ 335-336). Libro de los Fechos however, constantly exaggerates figures given by the older versions of the Chronicle and I do not consider it to be a reliable source concerning the size of the armies. For the composition of late Byzantine armies in general, see e.g. Bartusis 1992, 139-188; Oikonomidès 1981, 353-363; Kyriakidis 2011, 75-135; Pana-giotides-. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ the men of Magedon, to also fight further afield, which seemed to demoralise them. The late native Byzantine cavalrymen usually drew their main incomes from the pronoia-fiefs, but it is unclear if this still applied to the men of the frontier zone after the reformation, or if they had lost their possessions and holdings and had to live solely on their wages. 31 ἦhἷΝἦὉὄkὅΝἸὁὄmἷἶΝὈhἷΝmἷὄἵἷὀaὄyΝἷlἷmἷὀὈΝὁἸΝἑὁὀὅὈaὀὈiὀἷΝἢalaiὁlὁἹὁὅ’Ν army. The Chronicle of Morea claims that 1,500 of them had come to Morea when the war started and made a contract to serve for one year under the Byzantines. These short-term mercenaries were probably Turkomans, Turkish nomads from the frontier areas. 32 Yet Pachymeres uses the term Persikon about the Turkish contingent, which might indicate a permanent unit,33 and that there were several Turkish groups in the Morean army serving under different conditions.34 Indeed, according to the chronicle there were an additional 1,000 soldiers of unspecified nationality that came from outside Morea.35 Contemporaries noted the absence of Latin mercenaries in the Byzantine army in Morea, with Pachymeres claiming that Latins were reluctant to fight against other Latins.36 There are, however, many examples of Latin mercenaries in Byzantine armies engaging fully in wars against other 31 32 33 34 35 36 Pachymeres I, 3-6; Bartusis 2008; Bartusis 1992, 54-57; Oikonomidès 1981, 359-360; Korobeinikov 2014, 237-245, 267-271; Kyriakidis 2009a, 172-173 and Kyriakidis 2011, 152-153, which all give practically the same information. There has been a debate about the nature of the pronoia-fief itself. The most recent and comprehensive account of the institution is provided by Bartusis 2012. Chronicle of Morea 4553-4554; 5723-5735; Livre de la conqueste § 331;Savvides 1990, 168-175.  Pachymeres III, 16; Bartusis 1992, 52-54; Kyriakidis 2011, 112. This was often the practice in the late Byzantine army (Bartusis 1992, 139; Oikonomidès 1981, 355-360). Chronicle of Morea 4629-4638; Livre de la conqueste § 336. Some Byzantine cavalrymen might have ended up serving on foot, because, according to the Chronicle, the Franks took 1,000 horses from the Byzantine camp after the battle of Prinitsa (Chronicle of Morea 4855). It also asserts that the Byzantines had 6,000 cavalrymen in the battle of Prinitsa (Chronicle of Morea 4653-4677), but it does not explain from where those extra 1,500 cavalrymen would have come and I find it unlikely that the archons of southeastern Morea would have been able to provide so many (Wilskman 2012a, 180-185). Pachymeres III, 16. See also Bartusis 1992, 50-51. 93 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Latins,37 ὅὁΝpἷὄhapὅΝἢaἵhymἷὄἷὅ’ΝaὅὅἷὄὈiὁὀΝwaὅΝὁὀlyΝhiὅΝpἷὄὅὁὀalΝὁpiὀiὁὀέΝ Indeed, perhaps the Latin mercenaries were fighting away from Morea in other battles in 1262–1263, since the emperor was then involved in several other conflicts. That said, the declining use of Latin mercenaries, combined with the increasing use of Turks, seems to have been a broad trend in the Byzantine armies of the late thirteenth century. 38 I believe that the explanation lay in the anarchic internal affairs of the Seljuk realm. This unstable situation combined with Mongolian pressure meant not only that the Seljuks began to lose their control over the recruitment of Turks, but also that some Turkomans were pushed into Byzantine territory. There is evidence that the Byzantines tried to deal with this influx by hiring some of the Turks to fight for them,39 which perhaps resulted in there being less money to hire Latin soldiers, causing their numbers to decline. According to the Chronicle of Morea,Ν ὈhἷΝ aὄmy’ὅΝ lὁἵalΝ iὀἸaὀὈὄymἷὀΝ came from Tsakonia, Monemvasia, Skorta and from among the Slavs, 40 37 38 39 40 94 See for ἷxamplἷΝ“Der Brief Kaiser Heinrichs von Konstantinopel vom 13. Januar 1212”, 415-416; Acropolita § 15; Sanudo 139-141; Tafel and Thomas no. CCCLXX; Livre de la conqueste § 270; 279, 296-302; Chronicle of Morea 3591-3608, 3703-3711, 3765-4084; see also Palágyi 2006, 84-92. Kyriakidis has suggested that in the war in the Peloponnese Latins were for tactical reasons not preferred against other Latins (Kyriakidis 2011, 199200; repeated in Kyriakidis 2012, 51-52), but I am not quite convinced (for arguments, see Wilskman 2012a, 185-185, 195). On the other hand in the case of Pelagonia I have held it possible that the Nicaean army was intentionaly built to fit the harashment strategy that Michael Palaiologos had ordered to adopt, thus prefering horse-archers over closecombat cavalry (Wilskman 2009-2010, 145-146, see also Wilskman 2012b, 46-48). Bartusis 1992, 50-51. Nevertheless the use of Latins did not wholy cease. For references to Latin troops deployed by Byzantine armies during the time of Michael VIII, see Pachymeres IV, 27; Danilo 153; Livre de la conqueste § 270, 279, 296-302; Chronicle of Morea 3591-3608, 3703-3711, 3765-4084. Besides the Latins played an important role at sea and under the Latin adventurer Licario, who was a subject of the emperor, in Euboia (Pachymeres V, 27; Sanudo 131-145; Tafel and Thomas no. CCCLXX). See for example Pachymeres II, 24, IX, 9-14; Gregoras V, 5, VI, 8; Choniates 400, 421. Chronicle of Morea 5016-5027. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ who had been picked up by the Byzantine army over the course of the campaign. 41 There might have been thousands of them42 and most likely not even Constantine Palaiologos knew their numbers, since they were not necessarily recorded in any payrolls if they served only for a share of the spoils. That said, it is possible that the Slavs also had some kind of collective military obligation;43 they were experienced fighters with a warlike reputation, and at least some of them wore hauberks. Besides the Slavs, the Tsakones had a reputation for being good quality light infantrymen and Michael VIII settled a number of them in Constantinople, where they served as marines. The weapon of choice for native Morean infantrymen seems to have been the bow.44 After the troops were gathered the Byzantines set out to march on AnἶὄaviἶaέΝἦhἷyΝἸὁllὁwἷἶΝὈhἷΝpὄἷviὁὉὅΝyἷaὄ’ὅΝὄὁὉὈἷΝaὀἶΝpaὅὅἷἶΝἴy,ΝἸὁὄΝἷxample, the mighty castle of Karytaina that was still in the hands of the Franks. The author of the Chronicle of Morea claims that the Byzantines had decided that they would not meet the Latin cavalry with lances in close41 42 43 44 Collecting infantry during the campaign was perfectly normal for late Byzantine armies. See, for example, Acropolita § 43, 58-59; Gregoras IV, 9; Bartusis 1992, 213-221, 256258; Chronicle of Morea 4660-4663; Panagiotides 2004, 69-73, 88, 123-153; Chronicle of Morea 4660-4677; Wilskman 2012a, 180-185. For the military potential of southeast Morea, see Villehardouin [329]; Chronicle of Morea 1715-1725, 4897, 5011, 5501). Generally, historians are very sceptical about the figures given by the Chronicle of Morea about the size of the armies (for example Bartusis 1992, 258-269; Molin 2001, 197-199), but it should be remembered that regions in which practically all able-bodied men are armed can raise very big armies for short periods of time (see Wilskman 2012a, 180-183). Livre de la conqueste § 206; 332; Chronicle of Morea 2901-3042; 4559-4593; Bartusis 1992, 213-217, 257. Pachymeres III, 9, 17, IV, 26; Livre de la conqueste § 206, 261, 696, 823; Chronicle of Morea 1715-1725, 2985-3031, 3512-3514; Acropolita § 81; Caratzas 1976, 78-83; Documents sur le régime des terres 88-89, 99-100. The idea that there were different weapon preferences in the Byzantine and western worlds is nicely expressed in the French version of the Chronicle, when, during a later episode, it classifies the South-Italian infantrymen as spear and crossbowmen and the Slavs of Morea as spear and bowmen (Livre de la conqueste § 823). The hand-held composite bow was the one most typically used by the Byzantines and other natives of the eastern Mediterranean and the steppes. Nevertheless, the Byzantines clearly knew about the crossbow, even if they did not use it as much as the Latins (Babuin 2009, 160-240; Kolias 1988, 214-250; Bartusis 1992, 330-332). 95 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ combat, but instead use bows to shoot the unarmoured horses of their enemies, since the French would be helpless without their mounts. According to the chronicle, this tactic had helped the Byzantines beat the Franks in the battle of Pelagonia, whereas they had suffered a humiliating defeat to a much smaller Frankish army than their own in Prinitsa when they had tried to engage in close-combat. The Chronicle of Morea imagined an old Frankish envoy of the emperor boasting that the Franks were invincible, but acknowledging that the Byzantines could win with cunning.45 Although the Chronicle of Morea’ὅΝ ἶἷὅἵὄipὈiὁὀΝ ὁἸΝ ὈhἷΝ ἴaὈὈlἷὅΝ ὁἸΝ Pelagonia and Prinitsa might be coloured by Latin self-idealisation and by (negative) stereotyping of the Byzantines and Greeks46, it probably was preferable to fight the Franks with bows than to join them in close-combat. At this time a normal Byzantine cavalryman seems to have been more lightly equipped than his Latin counterpart and his horse was smaller. These were disadvantages in close-combat, although the smaller and lighter equipped Byzantine horses, besides being cheaper, were better suited to the hot climate.47 Perhaps an even more significant advantage for the Latins in hand-to-hand combat, particularly in terms of morale, was that many of the Byzantines seem to have accepted the idea of Frank invincibility at close quarters in pitched battles.48 45 46 47 48 96 Chronicle of Morea 4900-5035; Wilskman 2012a, 192. Concerning the Latin view of the Greeks, see for example Carrier 2012; Shawcross 2012. Useful sources about equipment and horses in late Byzantine times are Paléologue 58-59; Babuin 2002, 97-102; Babuin 2007, 119-141; Babuin 2009, 20-250; Heath 1995, 10-35, 42-46; Bartusis 1992, 322-334; Wilskman 2012a, 188-191, 197-198; Kanellopoulos 2011, 265-273. It is worth noting that, at the time of the Fourth Crusade, there might not have been any significant difference between the Byzantine and Frankish heavy cavalrymen (Kolias 2005, 129-1ἁί)έΝἙὈΝiὅΝὉὀlikἷlyΝὈhaὈΝὈhἷΝἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷὅ’ΝlaἵkΝὁἸΝaἴiliὈyΝὈὁΝpὄὁἶὉἵἷΝ and rear large horses was the reason why they did not use them during the thirteenth century. The Franks of Greece could look after their large horses, and it was always possible to buy western horses, or gain them as gifts or booty (Babuin 2007, 122-123; Wilskman 2009-2010, 153). See e.g. Gregoras V, 6. See also Wilskman 2009-2010, 152-153; Kyriakidis 2011, 202203, 211-212. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In spite of certain downsides, the Byzantines might have preferred light equipment and smaller horses because these suited their surprise attacks, skirmishes, ambushes aὀἶΝ ὈhἷiὄΝ ὁὈhἷὄΝ “iὀἶiὄἷἵὈ”Ν mἷὈhὁἶὅΝ ὁἸΝ waὄἸaὄἷέ 49 These are traditionally considered to be their favoured tactics, especially when they fought against the western enemy. Recent research has demonstrated that the Byzantine strategy was actually more nuanced than this, but, for much of the thirteenth century, including the era of Michael VIII, the traditional view largely holds true.50 The army that Michael Palaiologos sent to Morea was especially illsuited to meet the Franks in close-combat, since the Turks and the men of Magedon were probably experienced mainly in skirmishing and raiding in the frontier zone. For people used to such warfare, a Latin heavy cavalry charge must have been a devastating experience. In addition, the defeat at Prinitsa might have shattered the spirits of the Byzantines.51 The Turks were traditionally light and nimble mounted archers, who used manoeuvrability and the longer range of their weapons to avoid closeἵὁmἴaὈΝὉὀὈilΝὈhἷΝἷὀἷmy’ὅΝmὁὄalἷΝaὀἶΝἸὁὄmaὈiὁὀΝhaἶΝἴἷἷὀΝἴὄὁkἷὀΝἴyΝὈhἷiὄΝ quick strikes and rains of arrows. Although thirteenth-century armour seems to have provided reasonable protection against the arrows of the composite bow, few cavalrymen would have had armoured steeds and so their horses were targeted, as such fighters were particularly vulnerable if 49 50 51 Babuin has made the same claim concerning the relation of the Byzantine horses and ἷὃὉipmἷὀὈΝὈὁΝὈhἷΝ“iὀἶiὄἷἵὈ”ΝmἷὈhὁἶὅΝὁἸΝwaὄἸaὄἷΝ(ἐaἴὉiὀΝἀίίἅ,Ν1ἀί-121; the issue is also discussed by Kanellopolous 2011, 271-273). For the traditional view, see e.g. Kaegi 1983, 5-10; Bartusis 1992, 354-357; Kyriakidis 2011, 63-69; Haldon 1999, 35-38, 278. A more diversified image is presented e.g. by Syvänne 2004, 113-117; Birkenmeier 2002, 60-74, 82; Kanellopoulos 2011, 298-307. Wilskman 2012a, 188-191, 196. For warfare on the frontier, see Pachymeres I, 4, III, 12. 97 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ they lost their mount in battle.52 There seem to have been some native Byzantine horse archers in later Byzantine armies,53 so it is quite plausible that the frontier men of Magedon also primarily used this style of fighting. 54 When the Byzantines arrived at the plain of Achaia they found that the Franks had fortified Andravida with ditches. Men who knew the region adviὅἷἶΝὈhἷΝἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷΝἵὁmmaὀἶἷὄΝὀὁὈΝὈὁΝaὈὈaἵkΝὈhἷΝὈὁwὀ,ΝἴἷἵaὉὅἷΝὁἸΝὈhἷΝ“ὀaὄά ὄὁwΝappὄὁaἵhἷὅΝaὀἶΝἵὄὁὅὅἴὁwmἷὀ”έ 55 Instead, the Byzantines went to the area of Sergiana and set their camp about 10 km from Andravida, close to the chapel of St Nicholas of Mesiskli. In response, Guillaume gathered his forces and marched on them the next morning. 56 The place that the Byzantines chose as a battle site was admirably suited to the composition of their army and their preferred tactics. The terrain between it and Andravida was flat and gave their horse archers room to manoeuver. In contrast, the ground became hilly around their camp, allowing their infantry to position itself advantageously against the Frankish attack. Similarly in Pelagonia, the heavy troops of the Nicean army had 52 53 54 55 56 98 See, for example, Mitchell 2006; Chronicle of Morea 1034-1161; 4030-4091; Livre de la conqueste §§ 69-71, 299-304; Acropolita § 61; Thorau 2006, 66, 70-71; Babuin 2009, 160-206. Those who read Finnish can also benefit from Wilskman 2006 and 2007. See, for example, Heath 1995, 24, 46-47; Babuin 2002, 99-100; Babuin 2007, 135; Acropolita § 81; Wilskman 2012a, 189-190; Wilskman 2009-2010, 149. Pachymeres praises the archery skills of the people of Magedon (and other inhabitants of the eastern frontier region), although he does not explicitly say that they were horse archers (Pachymeres II, 20, III, 12, 21; see also Acropolita § 53; Choniates 640). Their life reflected that of the Turkomans (see for example Angold 1975, 26-27, 101; Pachymeres I, 4-6) and in my opinion they might have been able to develop the skills required for horse archery (Wilskman 2012a, 189-190; see also Wilskman 2009-2010, 148-149). ἦhἷΝὈἷὄὄaiὀΝὅὉὄὄὁὉὀἶiὀἹΝχὀἶὄaviἶaΝiὅΝlἷvἷlΝὅὁΝὈhἷΝ“ὀaὄὄὁwΝappὄὁaἵhἷὅ” must have been the result of the Frankish fortification works. Alternatively, perhaps there were plenty of orchards, vineyards etc. Chronicle of Morea 5012-5052; Livre de la conqueste § 339. Regarding the places mentioned in the Chronicle, see Bon 1969, 338-339, 356-357;Dragoumes , 163-168; 259. The unwillingness to attack fortified Andravida has been seen as an indication of ὈhἷΝἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷὅ’ΝiὀaἴiliὈyΝὈὁΝἵὁὀἶὉἵὈΝὅiἷἹἷὅ (Nicolle 2007, 47-49; Molin 2001, 225-226). However, Byzantine sources themselves suggest that they were quite capable of conducting aggressive sieges (Wilskman 2009-2010, 138; Kanellopoulos 2011, 326-331; see also Kyriakidis 2011, 170-175, 186-187; and for siege weaponry Babuin 2009, 253-280). If the Byzantines lacked siege equipment at this point, it might have been the result of losing the camp at Prinitsa (Wilskman 2012a, 192). CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ stayed in the mountains while the light horse archers harassed the enemy in the plain.57 Nonetheless, in spite ὁἸΝ ὈhἷΝ Ὀἷὄὄaiὀ’ὅΝ aἶvaὀὈaἹἷὅΝ ἸὁὄΝ ὈhἷΝ Byzantines, Guillaume was prepared to battle. Sources describing the warfare of the Franks against the Crusader States in Greece give several examples of nearly suicidal charges made by them, although it is necessary to be cautious as regards the reliability and accuracy of the descriptions.58 This is contrary to the mainstream view in modern research concerning medieval warfare in western Europe, which emphasises that pitched battles were usually avoided, with leaders relying instead on fortifications, siege warfare and raids, although this opinion is currently being questioned.59 In fact, warfare in Frankish Greece and in the Latin East in general might have differed from that of western Europe. John France has suggested that the methods of warfare in the Crusader States of the Holy Land were unusually aggressive, arguing that the Latins of the Levant (and the Franks of Romania) needed to maintain their reputation for ferocity and that their equipment was better suited for close-combat than that which the enemy used.60 Additionally, their distrust towards the Greeks billeted in the castles might have made the Franks reluctant to rely on fortifications.61 Cohesion was the most important single factor in determining 57 58 59 60 61 Acropolita § 81; Wilskman 2009-2010, 145-149. Some examples are Pachymeres IV, 31; Sanudo 133; Chronicle of Morea 1710-1750, 3812-4091, 4678-4863; Livre de la conqueste §§ 285-305; Choniates 603-604; Villehardouin [321]-[329]. For a discussion, see e.g. Gillingham 2004; Rogers 2002; Villalon 2010. France 1999, 92-93, 150-151, 217-221. As far as we know the weapons and equipment of the heavy cavalry in the Crusader states of Frankish Greece were similar to those in contemporary western Europe (Ortega 2012, 345, 383-386, 538; Wilskman 2012a, 188189). Nicolle 2007, 46. For examples of unreliable garrisons or people of fortified towns, see Villehardouin [333]-[346], [393], [399]-[401], [415]-[421]; Choniates 612-614; Livre de la conqueste §§ 801-816. The skills of the Byzantines in siege warfare might also have made the Franks reluctant to retreat behind the walls. It should also be noted that chivalric values seem to have been at the heart of the Latin culture in the Crusader States in Greece (see especially Ortega 2012, 276-277, 288-292, 341-401). Perhaps they were rather more idealistic and more ready to follow military codes of honour than several leaders of western Europe were. 99 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ the effectiveness of a medieval army,62 and this was an advantage the Latins often had over the heterogeneous late Byzantine armies. With all probability this was also the case at Sergiana. According to the Chronicle of Morea, Guillaume separated his allagions (divisions) and formed three batailles (lines). He had both infantry and cavalry,63 so three successive cavalry batailles plus infantry behind them would have been a likely battle formation for the Latins. 64 This kind of formation was especially suitable for cavalry battles that were often characterized by successive attacks and counterattacks until the army with the last reserve won.65 According to my estimation, Guillaume might have had between 400 and 1,500 heavy cavalrymen with him at Andravida, depending mainly on how much support was sent by his vassals outside the principality. The Chronicle of Morea does not mention it, but Sanudo claims that Guillaume received significant help during the war.66 The Latin heavy cavalrymen of 62 63 64 65 66 See especially France 1999, 70-76, 136, 150-186, 204-229. Livre de la conqueste § 340; Chronicle of Morea 5052-5056. The term allagion was used about several different military units in armies in Romania regardless of their ethnical origin. The allagions in the Chronicle of Morea usually had c. 300 men. Allagion was also used as a synonym of bataille as part of a battle formation (see especially Hendrickx 1992). Chronicle of Morea 3998-4013; Livre de la conqueste §§ 294-296; 300; Libro de los Fechos § 272; Wilskman 2009-2010, 153-154; Paléologue 92-93; Contamine 1980, 380382; Wilskman 2012a, 188. For the nature of cavalry battles, see for example Goldsworthy 1996, 235-244; Syvänne 2004, 155-160; Hildinger 1997, 165-167. The most effective formation against the attack of horse archers would have been a hollow infantry square. Heavy cavalry would have been inside and ready to make counter-attacks. Managing this formation, however, required much skill and training (Bennett 2001; Wilskman 2009-2010, 149-150). The Principality of Achaia usually sent contingents of 400-500 heavy cavalrymen on campaigns outside the peninsula (Chronicle of Morea 6888-6890, 8841-8846; Livre de la conqueste § 613, 962; Sanudo 107; Wilskman 2009-2010, 139-141; Wilskman 2012a, 179, 186) and the figure corresponds neatly with the probable number of fiefs in the Principality of Achaia (Bon 1969, 114; Ortega 2012, 370-371). It should be noted that one knightly fief could provide more than one heavy cavalryman (Chronicle of Morea 1977-1989; Livre de la conqueste §§ 129-131; Les Assises de Romanie § 67). The Duchy of Athens might have been able to send 300 cavalrymen and the ruler of Kephalenia and Zakynthos could perhaps have sent 100. Sanudo claims that one of the triarchs of Euboia sent money enough to pay 400 cavalrymen (Pachymeres IV, 31; Sanudo 125; Chronicle 100 CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ the era were also accompanied by numerous armed and armoured servants67 that evened out the numerical superiority of the Byzantines, which may itself have been exaggerated by the author of the chronicle. It is impὁὅὅiἴlἷΝὈὁΝἵalἵὉlaὈἷΝὈhἷΝὅiὐἷΝὁἸΝἕὉillaὉmἷ’ὅΝiὀἸaὀὈὄy,ΝalὈhὁὉἹhΝὈhἷΝἴiὅhὁpὅ of Romania might have given him Latin mercenaries, particularly crossbowmen, and there might also have been Greek infantry and cavalry among his men.68 The Chronicle of Morea describes Kantakouzenos, 69 commander of the first Byzantine division, as a praiseworthy soldier and as being armed with a bow, quiver and mace.70 The reference to this first unit indicates that the ἵhὄὁὀiἵlἷ’ὅΝaὉὈhὁὄΝὈhὁὉἹhὈΝὈhaὈΝὈhἷΝἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷὅΝwἷὄἷΝὉὅiὀἹΝaΝἸὁὄmaὈiὁὀΝὁἸΝ 67 68 69 70 of Morea 8863-8875; Livre de la conqueste § 617; 962; Wilskman 2009-2010, 140). Other Euboians and the possible additional men collected by Guillaume in an emergency, might be added to these figures. See for example I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina no. XXIII, LXXXIX, 329; Contamine 1980, 161-162. For Greeks serving in the army of the principality, see e.g. Acropolita § 81; Chronicle of Morea 3512-3514; 3960; Livre de la conqueste § 261-262; Documents sur le régime des terres 65-115. Concerning the early phase of the war, Libro de los Fechos has included a story about Greek vassals of the Frankish baron of Karytaina; they were loyal and brave warriors, whom the Byzantine commander vainly tried to separate from their lord (Libro de los Fechos §§ 313-331; Wilskman 2012a, 175-176). The Peloponnese was not a noticeable source of soldiers for the Byzantine army in the era preceding the Fourth Crusade (Ilieva 1993, 184, 189-192; Birkenmeier 2002, 31, 56, 126, 157-171, 232-233) and the Latin conquest clearly had not demilitarised the Greeks in the main areas of Frankish Morea, perhaps quite the contrary. No other sources besides the chronicle describe a person identifiable as Kantakouzenos. Failler suggested that he might be the megas domestikos Aleksios Philes, who, according to Pachymeres, was the second sub-commander of Constantine Palaiologos. His wife was from the Kantakouzenos family and, like the Kantakouzenos of the chronicle, he died in Morea, although in dissimilar circumstances (Failler 1980, 95-99). More likely, however, is that he was a combination of Philes and Constantine Palaiologos, the latter of whom is constantly and erroneously labelled megas domestikos in the chronicle. Livre de la conqueste § 341; Chronicle of Morea 5059-5062. For weapon terminology, see Babuin 2009, 99-111. The terminology that the Greek version of the Chronicle uses about the units in Sergiana is very confusing. The prince separates his allagions and forms three syntaxeis (in the French version batailles). On the other hand Kantakouzenos commands the first allagion of the Byzantines and its syntaxeis. I will assume that the terms are used interchangeably. 101 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ successive batailles. This was probably one of their most common formations, with horse archers often forming the first bataille, as seems to have been the case in Sergiana.71 At the start of the battle, Kantakouzenos rode between the armies. Libro de los Fechos claims that he was conducting reconnaissance on the orders of the commander of the army, whereas the French and Greek versions allege that he came just to taunt the Franks about their small numbers and performed horse tricks by changing his mount. The prince urged his men not to break ranks, but when Kantakouzenos and his horse fell the Franks rushed forward to kill the rider and seize the mount. When the other commanders of the Byzantine army saw their best fighter being slain they became disheartened, and ordered the trumpets to be blown and the troops to retreat. The Franks did not follow, because the prince was warned that the horse archers might still be dangerous. 72 WhilἷΝὈhἷΝἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷὅ’ΝὄἷaἵὈiὁὀΝὈὁΝ the killing of one sub-commander may seem exaggerated, the death or capture of a commander was, in fact, often the ἵaὉὅἷΝὁἸΝaὀΝaὄmy’ὅΝἶἷἸἷaὈΝiὀΝ Medieval times.73 The Turks switch sides If the Chronicle of Morea’ὅΝaἵἵὁὉὀὈΝiὅΝὄἷliaἴlἷ,ΝὈhἷΝἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷΝἵὁmmaὀἶἷὄΝ believed that the conquest of Andravida was to be a decisive blow to the 71 72 73 For a more detailed discussion about the late Byzantine battle orders, see Wilskman 20092010, 153-156; Wilskman 2012a, 194; Kanellopoulos 2011, 307-318. Chronicle of Morea 5063-5099; Livre de la conqueste §§ 341-345; Libro de los Fechos §§ 341-346. According to the Libro de los Fechos, the Franks would have attacked and killed many Byzantines before the rest could escape to the mountains and the thickets. It also places the encounter before the battle of Prinitsa (Libro de los Fechos §§ 338-358). These claims are, however, unlikely, as it is almost impossible to believe that the earlier versions of the Chronicle would have been silent about Frankish success. Besides, Libro de los Fechos also gives false information about a church building related to the battle (Coulson 1996, 50). For example, in 1281 the Byzantines defeated a Latin army in Berat by capturing its commander during a skirmish (Sanudo 145; Pachymeres VI, 32; Gregoras V, 6). 102 CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ morale of the Franks. The Byzantines would have had little chance of keeping Andravida, since there were still a number of Latin castles in the region. Even if their object was simply to raid the Frankish heartland, their advance to the plain of Achaia and their readiness to engage in a pitched battle was ὃὉiὈἷΝaΝὄiὅkyΝὉὀἶἷὄὈakiὀἹ,ΝἷὅpἷἵiallyΝwhἷὀΝὁὀἷΝἵὁὀὅiἶἷὄὅΝὈhἷΝἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷὅ’Ν reputation as cautious soldiers. Perhaps the following events provide an explanation for their actions. After retreating, the Byzantines laid siege to the town of Nikli, which occupied a strategic position in central Morea. At this point, the Turks began to complain that they had not received any pay for six months; evidently they had also served past their contracted time. According to the Chronicle of Morea, the Byzantine commander refused to pay and claimed that the Turks had not fought, but rather enriched themselves through plundering. He was perhaps referring to the pillage of the Cistercian monastery in Isova that was carried out by one Turkish allagion the previous year.74 In response, the Turks maintained that the Byzantines had not let them fight, and a group of one thousand Turkish cavalrymen – led by two fighters called Melik and Salik – left the camp and travelled back to Andravida, where they expressed their willingness to join the Franks. Guillaume was happy to accept their offer and sent Ancelin de Toucy as his representative to them. Ancelin belonged to the Latin nobility of Constantinople and he spoke both Greek and Turkish, which is said to have delighted Melik.75 74 75 Chronicle of Morea 4664-4473, 4791-4795, 5095-5116, 5720-5729; Livre de la conqueste §§ 345-348. At some point before 1267, the Greeks also destroyed a Latin nunnery in Messenia. The nuns moved after that to southern Italy (Le pergamene di Conversano nos. 5-9; Ughelli, 706-712). For the strategic position of Nikli, see e.g. Alexopoulos1951, 111-112. Chronicle of Morea 5117-5284; Livre de la conqueste §§ 347-359; Sanudo 127. It should be noted that, according to the numbers given by the Chronicle of Morea, there were far fewer Turks who switched sides than those who had come to Morea. Furthermore, Sanudo claims that only part of the Turkish fighters abandoned the Byzantines. This all supports the notion that there were several different kinds of Turkish units in the Byzantine army. Libro de los Fechos claims that the Turkish leader had contacted Ancelin de Toucy, whom he knew, in advance (Libro de los Fechos §§ 360-362). 103 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Military campaigns in western Europe were often suspended due to financial difficulties, but the Byzantine tendency to use large, sometimes quite uniform, mercenary contingents made running out of money especially risky. The desertion of the Turks in Morea was neither the first nor ὈhἷΝlaὅὈΝὈimἷΝὈhaὈΝὈhἷΝἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷΝἹὁvἷὄὀmἷὀὈ’ὅΝἸailὉὄἷΝὈὁΝpayΝ mἷὄἵἷὀaὄiἷὅΝ led to the latter turning their weapons against their former masters. 76 However, a shortage of money might have led the Byzantines to seek a swift conclusion to the conflict in Morea by attacking the heartland of the Franks in the autumn of 1263 and in the following spring. This explanation challenges the common assumption that open battles were usually avoided in late Byzantine warfare due to a lack of resources.77 One can also note that the Genoese-Byzantine convoy to Morea had been defeated by the Venetians in the summer of 1263, which apparently made the Genoese reluctant to sail there, thus weakening the contact and supply lines of the Byzantines.78 Moreover, Turkomans were pouring into Byzantine territory at this time, so men were needed to defend their homelands, particularly in the volatile region of Magedon.79 Presumably soon after the desertion of the Turks, Constantine Palaiologos left Morea and put the megas domestikos Alexios Philes and parakoimomenos Makrenos in command.80 In the imperial hierarchy, 76 77 78 79 80 The Fourth Crusade and the Catalan Company are famous examples. The use of mercenaries has, at times, been justified in modern research (see e.g. Heath 1995, 20-21; Kyriakidis 2009b, 209-211; Kyriakidis 2011, 101-104). It is indeed true that the natives were not always so reliable themselves, that mercenaries could possess useful skills, and that they usually served without trouble as long as they were paid. Nevertheless, for a diminishing Empire struggling constantly with financial problems, the use of mercenaries, especially as autonomous and coherent units, was, in my opinion, highly problematic. Another issue is whether the Byzantine government had any real alternatives but to use mercenaries, especially when their need of troops was acute. See, for example, Bartusis 1992, 354-357; Kyriakidis 2011, 63-64; Haldon 1999, 35-38. Wilskman 2012a, 193-194; Annali Genovesi di Cafforo 51-52; Dandulo 311-312; Canal II, XXIX-XXXVI. Pachymeres III, 21. Pachymeres III, 17. According to the Greek and French versions of the chronicle, the ἷmpἷὄὁὄ’ὅΝ ἴὄὁὈhἷὄΝ paὄὈiἵipaὈἷἶΝ iὀΝ ὈhἷΝ ἴaὈὈlἷΝ ὁἸΝ εakὄy-Plagi and was captured, yet it is unlikely that this happened, as the Byzantine sources (and probably Sanudo) make no 104 CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ megas domestikos was the higher of the two titles.81 There is no information as to whether Constantine took part of the army with him or not, although it is worth noting that his step-brother, John Palaiologos, stabilised the situation in Magedon in the same year,82 perhaps with the help of men returning from Morea. According to the Chronicle of Morea, those men that remained in Morea fared badly in the battle of Makry-ἢlaἹi,ΝaὅΝἕὉillaὉmἷ’ὅΝ army captured 354 archons and sebastoi and more than 5030 other men.83 It is possible that the author of the Chronicle defined cavalrymen as archons. The personal retinues of the Byzantine commanders84 and the wealthy native Moreotes might have been enough to create a force of around 350 men. Nevertheless, we do not know whether these 354 men were the total cavalry force present at Makry-Plagi. It should be noted that the cavalrymen probably had a better chance of avoiding capture than the infantry. The battle of Makry-Plagi According to the Chronicle of Morea, the Turks, who had joined the Franks, wanted to attack the Byzantines immediately. The Turks claimed that they had learned through magic that there would be a battle against the 81 82 83 84 mention of it. The Libro de los Fechos tries to reconcile the contradictory information by claiming that he escaped after the defeat (Libro de los Fechos §§ 371-372; see also Zakythinos 1932, 39-40; Bon 1969, 132). Pseudo-Kodinos 26-28; Macrides, Munitiz and Angelov 2013, 55. It is unclear what kind of military experience Philes and Makrenos had before they came to Morea. The latter might perhaps have been John Makrenos, who participated in the war against Epiros during the 1250s, or Georgios Makrenos, who was doux of Thrakesion in 1256 (Acropolita § 49; Kasapides 1998, 239; Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit, nos. 16358-16359; Regesten der Kaiserurkunden nos. 1839a-b). ἢaἵhymἷὄἷὅΝἙἙἙ,Νἀ1έΝἔὁὄΝὈhἷΝἶaὈἷΝὁἸΝJὁhὀΝἢalaiὁlὁἹὁὅ’ΝἵampaiἹὀ,ΝὅἷἷΝFailler 1980, 8792. Chronicle of Morea 5457-5465. Livre de la conquest only mentions [ἁἯλίΝ“ὅἷvaὅὈaἶἷὅ”,Ν “aὄἵὁὀἶἷὅ”ΝaὀἶΝaΝὀὉmἴἷὄΝὁἸΝὁὈhἷὄΝpἷὁplἷΝ(Livre de la conqueste § 378). The title of sebastos was at the very bottom of Byzantine court hierarchy (Pseudo-Kodinos 32; Macrides, Munitiz and Angelov 2013, 462-463). For the armed retinues of Byzantine aristocrats, see especially Bartusis 1992, 221-234. 105 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ megas domestikos and that he would be beaten. Guillaume agreed to attack and the army marched through Messenia to encounter the enemy, with the Turks riding ahead of the Franks. After a four-day journey the Turks arrived at Mountra, where they again used magic to discover that the battle would take place the next day.85 The description in the Chronicle of Morea iὅΝaὀΝiὀὈἷὄἷὅὈiὀἹΝἷxamplἷΝὁἸΝhὁwΝὈhἷΝεὉὅlimΝἦὉὄkὅ’ΝὄiὈὉalὅΝwἷὄἷΝὅὈillΝἵὁὀά sidered to be quite pagan in nature during the thirteenth century (or the fourteenth century, when the chronicle was written). Melik, Salik and some other Turks rode to the Franks and told of their premonition. When the Turks had returned to their camp, Guillaume organised a meeting with the Franks, in which Ancelin de Toucy said that he had heard from his spy that the Byzantines had marched to Veligosti and prepared an ambush in Makry-Plagi.86 This is an approximately seven kilometre long defile that forms a natural route through the mountains and hills separating the plains of Messenia and Megalopolis (in the latter of which the town of Veligosti was located). The Byzantine army probably now needed to rely mainly on the light infantry provided by the natives of Morea, while the Latin-Turkish army had at least a formidable cavalry, although the sources say nothing about its infantry during this campaign. It was, therefore, better for the Byzantines to seek an encounter in difficult terrain, where the cavalry would not be able to use its manoeuvrability and 85 86 Chronicle of Morea 5260-5308; Livre de la conqueste §§ 360-363; Libro de los Fechos §§ 364-367. It is not certain how the Byzantines were sure enough of the route the Franks would take to plan to intercept them in Makry-Plagi. Perhaps they had spies, but Bon has alternatively suggested that the Byzantines were on their way to attack Messenia (Bon 1969, 422). If he is right, the Latin nunnery in Messenia might have been destroyed in this attack. Chronicle of Morea 5309-5333; Livre de la conqueste §§ 361-364. Libro de los Fechos does not mention the spy. It also claims that the Byzantine commander devised the ambush with a Greek from Skorta, i.e. a local (Libro de los Fechos §§ 364-369). I concur with the current consensus that the Makry-Plagi of the chronicle is the northern MakryPlagi defile, where the modern village of Derveni lies, not the narrow southern MakryPlagi as Moundreas claims (Moundreas 1976-1978, 187-195). On place names and topography, see van Leuven 2010, 52-68; Demetriades 1998, 240; Bon 1969, 422-425; Buchon 1843, 485-487; Dragoumes 1921, 178-196; Breuillot 2005, 202-204).  106 CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ where the horse archers could avoid close-combat.87 In fact, the area of Makry-Plagi might have been wooded, giving the Byzantines a further advantage.88 Although Pachymeres does not mention the battle of Makry-Plagi directly, he does potentially provide an explanation for how the Franks came to hear about the Byzantine tactics. He writes that Philes and Makrenos were captured on the same day and, after the former died in imprisonment, his mother-in-law – ὈhἷΝἷmpἷὄὁὄ’ὅΝἷlἶἷὄΝὅiὅὈἷὄΝϋὉἶὁἵiaΝ– accused Makrenos of treason. Connecting these events to the battle of Makry-Plagi, it is possible that Makrenos might have been duplicitous and passed covert information on to the Franks. Indeed, he wanted to marry Theodora, the daughter of Theodore II Laskaris and widow of Mahieu de Véligourt, who lived in the court of Guillaume and supported the war of the Franks against εiἵhaἷlΝ ἢalaiὁlὁἹὁὅέΝ ϋmpἷὄὁὄΝ εiἵhaἷlΝ ἴἷliἷvἷἶΝ hiὅΝ ὅiὅὈἷὄ’ὅΝ aἵἵὉὅaὈiὁὀὅΝ and blinded Makrenos upon his return. 89 Blinding and mutilating were common punishments deployed against his political opponents;90 they were not used to reprimand military incompetence. While Pachymeres seems to think that Makrenos was innocent, 91 there are other factors that support the idea that he was a traitor. He was noteworthy among the military commanders of the earlyΝpaὄὈΝὁἸΝἢalaiὁlὁἹὁὅ’Ν reign, in that he neither had close connections, such as relatives, to the empἷὄὁὄ’ὅΝἸamilyΝὀὁὄΝὈὁΝὈhἷΝἵiὄἵlἷὅΝwhὁΝhἷlpἷἶΝhimΝὈakἷΝpὁwἷὄέ92 Furthermore, 87 88 89 90 91 92 Kanellopoulos (2011, 100, 299-300) has also drawn a similar conclusion, i.e., that due to the departure of the Turkish cavalry, the Byzantines wanted to have the engagement on rough terrain. When I travelled to the area in August 2008 the hills were barren, but earlier visitors reported that there were plenty of forests (Bon 1969, 422; Buchon 1840, 722). Pachymeres III, 17. Pachymeres III, 10; VI, 24-25. The main purpose of Pachymereὅ’Ν ἶἷὅἵὄipὈiὁὀΝ ὁἸΝ ἷvἷὀὈὅΝiὀΝεὁὄἷaΝ miἹhὈΝhavἷΝ ἴἷἷὀΝ ὈὁΝ criticise Michael Palaiologos as an ungrateful ruler (Lamprakes 2004, 78-79). The Chronicle of Morea claims that he was the cousin of the emperor and it is also suggested that he received the title of parakoimomenos when Michael Palaiologos took power (Chronicle of Morea 4556-4558; Livre de la conqueste § 331; Kasapides 1998, 107 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ with his ties to the Byzantines, Ancelin would have been a suitable contact in the Frankish army for Makrenos.93 ἔiὀally,ΝεiἵhaἷlΝVἙἙἙ’ὅΝlἷἹiὈimaἵyΝaὅΝ ruler was not fully accepted, and there was discontent towards his regime. 94 Clearly, Michael believed that Makrenos might betray his army to the Franks in order to gain support for a power struggle in Byzantium. According to the Greek and French versions of the chronicle, Ancelin de Toucy suggested in a war council that the Turks should be pulled back from the vanguard, since they might panic and lead the army to disaster. Ancelin would instead attack first with his own bataille, the Turks would come after him and the prince would command the last bataille. When the bataille of Ancelin had marched on foot to Makry-Plagi he ordered them to stop for a while and made a speech to his men. 95 When the Franks had arrived at Phonemenos 96 and begun to ascend a hill there, superior Byzantine forces, led by Kaballaritses, 97 suddenly appeared from behind the crest and forced the Franks to retreat to around 200 metres away, to bow (or crossbow) range. According to the Chronicle of Morea, Ancelin made an encouraging speech to his men and launched a momentarily successful counter-attack, with lances and swords, up to the crest of the hill. However, according to the Greek version, the other Byzantine troops heard the noise of the battle and rushed to help, their numbers forcing the Franks to retreat once more. Ancelin then rallied his men 93 94 95 96 97 239). However, if he had family ties with the emperor, Byzantine sources would surely have mentioned them (Lurier 1964, 204). Ancelin de Toucy was a relative of both the emperor and Guillaume. He was captured in Pelagonia and probably gained his freedom by promising to let the Nicaean troops into Latin-held Constantinople. However, he did not keep this promise (Acropolita § 81, 83; Geanakoplos 1953, 137-141; see also Ortega 2012, 380-383). See for example Pachymeres I, 6; I, 29; II, 8; II, 15; II, 34-35; III, 10-14; III, 19; III, 2326. Chronicle of Morea 5316-5372; Livre de la conqueste §§ 364-368. The place name is obsolete, so the exact location of the encounter cannot be determined with certainty. There are, however, a number of hills and valleys in the area of northern Makry-Plagi where the troops could have hidden. This could be either Alexios or Michael Kaballarios. Both later participated in the war in Thessaly and died in battle. Pachymeres (IV, 31; V, 27) praises them as brave men. 108 CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ again and they made a second counter-attack with swords. This time the Byzantines panicked. In addition, the Turks arrived and began to pursue the enemy. Those Byzantine units still waiting in ambush fled. 98 The Aragonese version of the chronicle offers an alternative account of the battle, asserting that the Turks formed the first bataille with Ancelin as their commander. Guy de Tremullay commanded the Franks in the second bataille, and the prince commanded the third. When the Byzantines ambushed his bataille in the middle of the mountains Ancelin encouraged the Turks to fight; seeing his bravery they stayed firm and fired their arrows, and the second bataille came to aid them. The Byzantines from the ambush were being overpowered, so their commander came with the rest of the Byzantine army to help out, but they were ultimately defeated when Prince Guillaume attacked with the third bataille.99 Hence, the Franks won because they brought the last group of reserves to the battle. The description of Libro de los Fechos sounds most reliable. It would have been more convenient to put the light cavalry in the vanguard. Besides, Ancelin did not originally belong to the Morean nobility, but he spoke Turkish, which makes it likely that he was in command of the bataille of foreigners rather than one of locals. Also, Sanudo claims that ὈhἷΝ ἦὉὄkὅΝ playἷἶΝ aΝ ἶἷἵiὅivἷΝ ὄὁlἷΝ iὀΝ ὈhἷΝ viἵὈὁὄyΝ aὈΝ “ἐὄἷὀiὐὐa”Ν (ἢὄiὀiὈὅa),Ν which he might have understandably confused with that of Makry-Plagi, as the two battles were fought close to each other in time and space, and decades before the time he was writing.100 Finally, the author of the Chronicle 98 99 100 Chronicle of Morea 5375-5413. The French version shortens the battle, claiming that the first Frankish counter-attack caused the first Byzantine bataille to panic and the other two batailles waiting in ambush to flee too. Ancelin needed to send two men to hurry the Turks along, but the latter killed and captured a number of the enemies upon their arrival (Livre de la conqueste §§ 364-372). Libro de los Fechos §§ 369-372. Sanudo 127. The fact that the Aragonian version is probably the most reliable one has not received sufficient attention, nor has it been clearly stated by previous scholarship, although some researchers have emphasised the importance of the Turks or pointed out that their role may have been belittled by the author of the Chronicle of Morea (Geanakoplos 109 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ of Morea has a tendency to glorify the deeds of the Franks and so might have exaggerated their heroics in this victorious battle. It seems that the Byzantines had one bataille in ambush behind a hill and two other batailles behind (or perhaps even flanking) it. Their positions reflect instructions for laying an ambush in a Byzantine manual of skirmish warfare written in the late tenth century. This states that the soldiers should be divided into three groups; the first group would feign a rout and lead the enemy into the ambush of the second group; if the enemy proved to be too strong and escaped, then they would fall into the clutches of the third group, which would also be lying in ambush.101 However, in Makry-Plagi both the second and the third groups seem to have rushed forward to help the first one, and it is prudent to consider whether this was the intention or whether it was the result of confusion or even betrayal.102 Confusion is perhaps the most probable explanation; although the warriors in Morea might have been skilful, it is unlikely that they were well-disciplined or that they were a cohesive whole. Furthermore, the Latins and Turks were known to sometimes feign retreat, so perhaps the Turks used such a tactic in Makry-Plagi to pull the Byzantines from their ambush positions and expose them to the counter-attacks of the Latin heavy cavalry. Indeed, some kind of trap is possible, because, judging by the amount of prisoners taken, the victory was reasonably comprehensive.103 101 102 103 1959, 174; Ortega 2012, 373-374, 380-381; Kyriakidis 2012, 53-54; Kanellopoulos 2011, 99-101). “ἥkiὄmiὅhiὀἹ”Ν§ 17. Kanellopoulos has similarly used Makry-Plagi as an example of the ἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷΝmὁὉὀὈaiὀΝwaὄἸaὄἷΝἶἷὅἵὄiἴἷἶΝiὀΝὈhἷΝ“ἥkiὄmiὅhiὀἹ” (Kanellopoulos and Lekea 2009, 75-78). One possibility is that the Byzantines thought that the Turks were alone. However, if this wἷὄἷΝ ὈhἷΝ ἵaὅἷΝ ὈhἷὀΝ ὈhἷΝ ἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷΝ ἵὁmmaὀἶἷὄὅ’Ν wὁὉlἶΝ havἷΝ ἵὁmmiὈὈἷἶΝ aΝ vἷὄyΝ ὅἷὄiὁὉὅΝ reconnaissance error. Runciman has claimed that the Turks, who followed the Franks, found a secret path that enabled them to attack the Byzantine rear (Runciman 1980, 38). This is possible, although I am not aware of any source that would confirm it. 110 CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Aftermath of the battle of Makry-Plagi The Chronicle of Morea claims that, after the battle, the victorious army maὄἵhἷἶΝὈὁΝVἷliἹὁὅὈi,ΝwhἷὄἷΝὈhἷΝpὄiὅὁὀἷὄὅΝwἷὄἷΝἵὁὉὀὈἷἶέΝἕὉillaὉmἷ’ὅΝmen found that they had captured 5384 men, plus the Byzantine commanders – the megas domestikos Makrenos and Kaballaritses – who are said to have ἴἷἷὀΝἸὁὉὀἶΝhiἶiὀἹΝiὀΝaΝἵavἷΝὀἷaὄΝὈhἷΝἴaὈὈlἷἸiἷlἶέΝἦhἷΝἵapὈὉὄἷΝὁἸΝὈhἷΝἷὀἷmy’ὅΝ leaders especially delighted Ancelin de Toucy, as it meant that, according to the chronicle, he could exchange them for his brother, who had been captured by the Byzantines.104 At their imploration, Guillaume agreed to grant the rebellious archons of Skorta mercy; he also invited the leading imprisoned Byzantine commander to visit and treated him with courtesy, even though he was kept in chains. After the meeting the Byzantine prisoners were divided between different castles according to their rank. 105 Philes died in captivity, but Makrenos and plausibly Kaballaritses were exchanged for Latin prisoners.106 The fate of the rest of the Byzantine army is unknown.107 104 105 106 107 Chronicle of Morea 5411-5465; Livre de la conqueste §§ 373-380. According to the Chronicle of Morea, he needed high-ranking Byzantine prisoners for the exchange. This is surprising, because at least the Byzantines and the Franks of the Holy Land were familiar with the practice of exchanging one high-status prisoner for several less important ones (Acropolita § 79; Friedman 2002, 36-37, 43-44, 158-161). During the later phase of the war, the only prisoner exchange about which we have detailed information is that of four high-ranking Latins for four Byzantines (Minieri-Riccio, 3 December 1283; I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, XVII, CXIX, 766, 769; Wilskman 2012b, 60). Chronicle of Morea 5466-5583; Livre de la conqueste §§ 377-385. Pachymeres III, 17. The sources do not refer to the liberation of Kaballarizes, but if he is one of the two Kaballarios that Pachymeres later mentions, then he probably gained his freedom as a result of an exchange or the payment of a ransom. For more discussion about the possible fates of the prisoners of the thirteenth-century Franco-Byzantine wars, see Wilskman 2009-2010, 157-161; Wilskman 2012b, 49-51, 60. It is also possible that, at this time the noble Frankish ladies given to the Byzantines as hostages as part of the 1262 peace agreement were sent back (evidently unharmed) to the principality (Chronicle of Morea 4343-4562, 7301-7335; Livre de la conqueste §§ 501504; Libro de los Fechos §§ 381-399; Hendrickx 2007, 367-369; Wilskman 2012b, 5051). 111 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ According to the Chronicle of Morea, after the victory Guillaume called together a meeting of the leaders of the army. They decided to attack the Byzantine-held territory in southeastern Morea and to siege Mistra using the town of Lakedaimon (Sparta) as a base, since it was still held by the Franks. Their army poured into the Byzantine territory and pillaged the countryside. By this time, the Greek population of Lakedaimon had mostly left the town and moved to Mistra, so Guillaume populated the town with new Frankish settlers, whom he could trust more. It is said that the prince planned to spend the winter in southeast Morea, but, before even a month had passed, he heard that the people of Skorta had again rebelled and besieged two castles.108 According to the Chronicle of Morea, Guillaume left men and supplies in Lakedaimon and returned to Veligosti. He held a meeting with the Frankish leaders, and they decided that it was too risky to attack Skorta, which was a mountainous region full of difficult terrain. Instead, they offered the task to the Turks, promising that the latter could keep everything that they plundered. The Turks were happy to agree to the plan and irrupted into Skorta from three different places with the help of local scouts. They pillaged and murdered everyone who did not beg for mercy; those that did so were brought to Guillaume. The archons of Skorta escaped to the mountainὅΝ aὀἶΝ pὄὁmiὅἷἶΝ ὈὁΝ ὅὉἴmiὈΝ ὈὁΝ ὈhἷΝ pὄiὀἵἷ’ὅΝ ὄὉlἷΝ aἹaiὀ,Ν whἷὄἷὉpὁὀΝ hἷΝ agreed to call the Turks back. 109 The campaign in Skorta shows that terror tactics were considered the best way to deal with an enemy that could rely on difficult terrain and guerrilla warfare.110 Since the prisoners were 108 109 110 Chronicle of Morea 5584-5635; Livre de la conqueste §§ 385-359. Chronicle of Morea 5636-5705; Livre de la conqueste §§ 389-395. A similar strategy was followed in comparable situations: e.g. by the Anglo-Normans in their wars against the Celts and by the Crusaders in the Baltic region (France 1999, 189193, 203; Strickland 2006, 117-127, 139-140). 112 CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ brought to Guillaume, the Turks do not seem to have been entitled to take them as part of their booty. 111 According to the Chronicle of Morea, Guillaume returned to the plain of Achaia and allowed his troops to return home. Melik informed him that the Turks would also now return to Anatolia. The prince begged them to remain for another half a year, because he was planning a new campaign in the spring. Melik, however, announced that he had originally made a deal with the Byzantines to fight for one year and that two had passed already. The prince yielded to his wish, although some of the Turks decided that they wanted to stay in Morea, where they were baptised, and two of them even received knightly fiefs and Frankish wives. 112 Nevertheless, their assimilation was not completely smooth and, from the period after the death of Guillaume in 1278, there were problems with both the fiefs ceded to the Turks and substitute payments offered to them. Evidently, the Latins also had problems with payment to other mercenaries as well, which caused robberies and some desertions to the Byzantine side. 113 No source claims that Guillaume actually carried out the attack against the Byzantines in spring 1265, which perhaps implies that he might have been considering a more diplomatic solution. In fact, according to Sanudo, the Byzantines had suggested that the son of Emperor Michael could marry the daughter of Guillaume. The prince had no sons, so this meant that his territories would fall under the control of the Palaiologos dynasty. The 111 112 113 On the other hand, it seems that, during the fourteenth century, the Byzantines were prepared to allow their Turkish allies/mercenaries to keep Christian prisoners as slaves (see, for example, Cantacuzenus II, 32; see also Kyriakidis 2009a, 169-172). Kyriakidis also argues that the desertion of the Turks to the Latin side in Morea underlines the importance of booty as a motivating factor for the mercenaries, and that excluding them from the spoils could cause problems with them (Kyriakidis 2009a, 172, 175). Nevertheless, according to the chronicle, the problems with wages, rather than being prevented from ἵlaimiὀἹΝἴὁὁὈy,ΝlἷaἶΝὈὁΝὈhἷΝἦὉὄk’ὅΝἶἷὅἷὄὈiὁὀέ Chronicle of Morea 5706-5738; Livre de la conqueste §§ 396-397. Libro de los Fechos claims that also Melik stayed in Morea (Libro de los Fechos §§ 361-364). I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina XXIII, XCVII, 199; Minieri-Riccio, 8 May 1283; Hopf 1867, 317-318; Chronicle of Morea 8523-8529; Wilskman 2012b, 49, 58-61. 113 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Frankish barons of Morea, however, refused to accept this settlement. 114 ἦhἷΝὁἸἸἷὄΝὁἸΝmaὄὄiaἹἷΝwaὅΝpὄὁἴaἴlyΝpaὄὈΝὁἸΝεiἵhaἷl’ὅΝἷὀἶἷavὁὉὄὅΝὈὁΝpἷaἵἷά fully resolve the conflicts of the Byzantine Empire during the early 1260s. Of these peace efforts, especially important was the truce that the emperor made with the Venetians in June 1265.115 The treaty deprived the Principality of Achaia of its most important ally and might have made Guillaume ready to reach a settlement. Low-level warfare between the principality and the Byzantines continued until peace was reached in 1289; even then, the cessation of hostilities remained short and was hampered by armed incidents.116 The Byzantines subdued what was left of the principality by 1430, just a few decades before the Ottomans conquered the peninsula. Conclusions The problematic composition of the Byzantine army was integral to the fortune of its campaigns in 1264. Occasionally, such as in Pelagonia and Berat, it achieved victorious outcomes against the Latins, but in Morea the heterogeneous Byzantine force showed its worst side. It was too expensive, unreliable and lacked cohesion. The initial march to Andravida and the willingness to engage in battle was contrary to the cautious approach normally associated with the Byzantines and the pattern they usually followed in their wars against the Latins in this era. That said, one can of course note that they quickly gave up on the idea of pitched battle at Sergiana, at least judging from the Chronicle of Morea. The Byzantines had left behind fortresses controlled by the Latins and they could not have held Andravida for long, so they had probably hoped to intimidate the Latins to surrender. 114 115 116 Sanudo 129. Pacta Veneta 10: I trattati con Bizanzio no. 2. For a closer description and analysis of this phase of the war, see Wilskman 2012b. 114 CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: CAMPAIGNS ON THE PELOPONNESE IN 1264 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ It is notable that Guillaume was willing to engage in battle twice, although on both occasions the terrain favoured the enemy. Possibly the Franks considered the Byzantines to be too much of a threat in their heartlands, just as the Byzantine commanders might have calculated. I consider it also possible that the Franks of Romania were inclined to use more aggressive methods of warfare than was customary in western Europe. At Makry-Plagi they also had an expendable and evidently battle-willing supplement of Turks, who plausibly carried the main burden in the battle. The Byzantines were probably forced to be so aggressive because they could not afford to pay the Turks. Besides which, the frontier region – from where a large part of the expeditionary corps hailed – was under serious attack from the Turkomans, and the sea routes to Constantinople were also threatened. The unreliability of mercenaries was a typical issue in Medieval armies, but the late Byzantine tendency to rely on large coherent mercenary units made it particularly troublesome. Morea in 1264 was neither the only nor the worst case when the mercenaries deployed by the Byzantines turned against their employers owing to a lack of payment. The Latins also had difficulties in paying for mercenaries during the war, but because they mainly relied on fief holders, the repercussions were less grave. It was the support of locals that seems to have been an essential element in the ἐyὐaὀὈiὀἷὅ’ΝὅὉἵἵἷὅὅἷὅέΝ A good example of this was the Byzantine use of local infantry in Makry-Plagi, which might also have contributed to their decision to attempt aὀΝamἴὉὅhΝiὀΝmὁὉὀὈaiὀὁὉὅΝὈἷὄὄaiὀέΝχlὈhὁὉἹh,ΝὅὉἵhΝ“iὀἶiὄἷἵὈ”ΝmἷὈhὁἶὅΝὁἸΝ warfare are usually considered more typical for them than instigating pitched battles. It is notable that, during the wars between the Latins and the Byzantines in the latter half of the thirteenth century, the Byzantines generally gained victories when they were defending territories they had 115 JUHO WILSKMAN _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ already conquered, and suffered defeats when they were on the offensive.117 The failure at Makry-Plagi is an exception to this pattern and was probaἴlyΝaΝὄἷὅὉlὈΝὁἸΝὈhἷΝἷὀἷmy’ὅΝkὀὁwlἷἶἹἷΝὁἸΝwhaὈΝwaὅΝwaiὈiὀἹΝἸὁὄΝὈhἷmέΝἙὈΝiὅΝ impossible to say if it was Makrenos who told the Latins about the ambush, but at least the emperor believed him to be treacherous, and the sister of John Laskaris was also supporting the Latins. The alliances did not simply follow ethnic lines: note, for example, that the Anatolian Muslim Turks, who participated to the campaign in Morea, seem to have been far from fanatical gazis.118 Some of them were even ready to accept baptism, although there might have been problems with their assimilation. Furthermore, the Byzantine emperor, who was involved in a number of conflicts, apparently wanted to draw the principality under his sphere of influence in a peaceful way and perhaps also to slowly assimilate the Franks into Byzantine society. Before his death, Prince Guillaume seems to have been ready to acἵἷpὈΝ ὈhἷΝἷmpἷὄὁὄ’ὅΝὁvἷὄὈὉὄἷὅ,ΝaὀἶΝὈhἷΝpὁpἷΝalὅὁΝ tried to make his own peace proposal. The Byzantines and Latins could obviously accept peace and live side-by-side; the only question was only under what conditions this would happen. 117 118 I made this notion in a presentation about avoiding pitched battles in Byzantine warfare against the Latins during the thirteenth century, where I argued that the preference to rely ὁὀΝhaὄaὅὅiὀἹ,ΝamἴὉὅhἷὅ,ΝaὀἶΝἶἷὀyiὀἹΝὅὉppliἷὅΝmiἹhὈΝἴἷΝaΝἹὁὁἶΝmἷὈhὁἶ,ΝiἸΝἶἷἸἷὀἶiὀἹΝὁὀἷ’ὅΝ own territory. It is however more problematical if one is on offensive and the heavy siege machines would have made it difficult to conduct swift manoeuvers as usually required by a strategy of avoiding battles (see also Wilskman 2012a, 196). The issue of whether the Turkish warriors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were dedicated fighters of Islam (gazi) or merely interested in mundane gains is lively debated in Ottoman and Turkish studies (see e.g. Wittek 1938; Darling 2000; Lowry 2003). 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