Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur

Chapter 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur While there are numerous accounts of the conflict surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, scientific analyses of Iranian arms control policy are scarce and either tackle single weapon categories (e.g., Ali 1996) or remain superficial (e.g., Jones 1998, 2012). Bobi Pirseyedi was the first to provide a comprehensive account of Iran’s arms control diplomacy, covering both conventional and weapons of mass destruction in the period from 1979 to 2003. The following sections as well as the analysis of instances of Iranian norm entrepreneurship build on and expand Pirseyedi’s study through their own empirical data (partly published in Wunderlich et al. 2013; Wunderlich 2014, 2017). I share Pirseyedi’s assessment that the lack of attention paid to Iranian arms control policy encourages factual misjudgments, simplifies Iran’s policies, and therefore weakens the West’s negotiation strategy in the long term. I also share his assumption that the main driver for Iranian policies is dissatisfaction with current structures. Yet, while Pirseyedi dismisses Iranian arms control policy first and foremost as political maneuvering and a propaganda instrument (Pirseyedi 2013: 1), I argue that it is also norm-driven and that an understanding of how Iran interprets key norms of multilateral arms control policy and how it seeks to propagate these norm interpretations is key to effective and fruitful diplomatic negotiations. 7.1 Basic Principles of Iranian Arms Control Policy Before discussing three instances of Iranian norm entrepreneurship in the field of WMD arms control, I will briefly delineate the framework within which Iranian arms control policy unfolds.1 Arms control policy is predominantly a matter of the political 1 Information on decision-making and implementation procedures is scarce (Pirseyedi 2013: 4). The Iranian Foreign Ministry maintains a number of political research institutes which, inter alia, discuss arms control policy issues (Posch 2013: 9–11) and prepare information for an English-speaking audience. Yet, most arms control guidelines or position papers exist in Farsi only (but see Shababi 1994). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Wunderlich, Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27990-5_7 139 140 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur elite (Pirseyedi 2013: 182, fn. 56). The decision-making authority rests with the Supreme Leader, while opinion-forming and deliberation processes are more inclusive. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (particularly the Department for Disarmament and International Security), the Ministry of Defense, and affiliated institutions are responsible for diplomatic negotiations, technical issues, and the implementation of arms control policies. Moreover, various government agencies are responsible for implementation, such as the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), whose technical and scientific expertise finds its way into the Supreme National Security Council, the central body of political decision-making. These agencies are also involved in international negotiations, e.g., within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Pirseyedi 2013: 22). The Revolutionary Guards are responsible for the supervision and operational control of Iran’s missile program, the nuclear program, and dual-use technologies (Cordesman and Seitz 2009: 18). Especially in connection with the controversial nuclear program, authors such as Ali Alfoneh have repeatedly pointed to the self-interest of the participating institutions, namely the AEOI and the Revolutionary Guards, describing the latter as “the engine of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program” (Alfoneh 2013: 248). Purportedly, many nuclear scientists have close relations to the Revolutionary Guards, which are even said to have their own laboratories and facilities (Tabatabai 2015)—a fact that has led some to question to whether the political leadership is informed about the exact dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program at all (Chubin 2013: 24). Arms control policy became a topic of public interest with the beginning of Khatami’s term of office, when the political elite put particular emphasis in advocating the narrative of a right to peaceful use of nuclear energy (see Sect. 7.4). As a result, there is a regular public debate on matters of arms control. The use of chemical weapons against the Iranian population during the Iran–Iraq war has also triggered public interest in matters of WMD control; there is a vivid Iranian civil society actively working for the support of victims of chemical weapons attacks (see Sect. 7.2). While the level of activism with regard to Iranian arms control depends on the political preferences of the respective president or foreign minister, the “red lines” of politics continue to be determined by a narrow circle surrounding the Supreme Leader—also with regard to how the nuclear program is depicted in the press (Thaler et al. 2010: 32; Nirumand 2015: 7). However, observers attest to a high level of continuity in Iranian arms control policy, independent of the respective political elite and even dating back to pre-revolutionary times. According to Pirseyedi, “the differences of view in the IRI about arms control policy have dealt more with the means of Iran’s diplomatic operations than with their content or overall direction” (Pirseyedi 2013: 186, fn. 104). Iran is part of all three regimes on the control of weapons of mass destruction: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Shah regime regarded the NPT as a promising instrument to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to soften tensions between the major powers, and to initiate a global (nuclear) disarmament process (the following builds on Etemad 7.1 Basic Principles of Iranian Arms Control Policy 141 1987: 203). Back then, the political elite was not aware of the incisions on national sovereignty that the treaty would bring about; furthermore, the inequality enshrined into the treaty’s structures, meaning that the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) had different rights and obligations, did not trigger meaningful domestic debates. Iran signed the NPT in July 1968 on the day of its submission. With the Parliament’s ratification in February 1970, the country reaffirmed its categorical rejection of nuclear weapons or—broader: weapons of mass destruction in general—as un-Islamic and inhuman (e.g., Khalatbari 1978; Mousavi 1981: 551; Velayati 1994a; Kharrazi 1997: 25; Ahmadinejad 2005; Rouhani 2013a).2 Iranian politicians often refer to an Islamic legal pronouncement—a fatwa—purportedly issued by Khamenei in October 2003, banning the production, storage, and use of WMD.3 In line with its categorical rejection of WMD as un-Islamic, Iran actively supported the efforts to outlaw biological and chemical weapons that had begun in the late 1960s (Pirseyedi 2013: 96). The BWC was signed in April 1972 and ratified by the Iranian Parliament in August 1973, long before the Convention officially entered into force (March 1975). After the removal of the Shah, the revolutionary regime maintained its positions: The use of WMD was considered “a great and unforgivable sin” (Khamenei, cited in European Dialogue 2012). The categorical rejection of WMD seemed as much a religious and humanitarian duty, as it was in the security interest of the country (Velayati 1983; Kazemi Kamyab 1984b).4 Even after the Islamic Revolution, Iran continued to advocate a chemical weapons ban within the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. After it had become victim of massive chemical weapons attacks by Iraq in the wake of the first Gulf War, this commitment intensified (e.g., Fartash 1979; Dabiri 1981; Sheikholeslam 1984; Nasseri 1990b). This experience, and the hesitant reaction of the international community, had a lasting impact on Iran’s arms control policy, which lasts until today (see Sect. 7.1). Tehran signed the CWC shortly after the conclusion of negotiations and its adoption by the UN General Assembly in January 1993. However, it was not ratified until July 2 As provided for in the NPT, Iran concluded a “Safeguards Agreement” with the IAEA in 1973 to ensure that the declared nuclear activities served peaceful purposes. There is a controversy as to whether the Shah, despite his willingness to cooperate, nevertheless wanted to keep the option of a military nuclear program open (see Patrikarakos 2012: 96–103). 3 Then Supreme Leader Khomeini is said to have issued a fatwa outlawing the production and use of chemical weapons already during the war with Iraq. While the fatwa has been repeatedly referred to by religious and political leaders and even put into writing (Iran 2005e; Salehi 2012), skepticism remains regarding the prohibition’s scope and legal status (Eisenstadt 2011; Tabatabai 2014). 4 The data sample comprised a huge amount of statements uttered by revolutionary leaders and state representatives at various forums throughout the entire period of investigation. Reasons of space, however, allow for a selective reference to statements only. 142 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur 1997 due to domestic political hurdles.5 Since then, Iran has been an active member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). While Iran stresses the equality of obligations emanating from the three WMD regimes, the country seems to put a stronger emphasis on measures aimed at eliminating WMD and fostering the peaceful use of technology in contrast to measures aimed at restricting the proliferation of such technologies, which are regarded rather as a means to the end of disarmament (e.g., Gharib Abadi 2011b: 3). Not unsurprisingly given the importance of justice in Iran’s political culture and its historical experiences, Iran places particular emphasis on the “promotional dimension” (Iran 2009c) in all three WMD regimes and especially stresses the strengthening of what it perceives as “inalienable rights” to the peaceful use of dual-use technologies (e.g., for CW Iran 1997; for BW Soltanieh 2001; for NW see Sect. 7.4). Correspondingly, Iran holds that the treaty regimes oblige all State Parties to cooperate for these purposes, and complains about the inadequate implementation of this perceived stipulation accordingly (e.g., Nasseri 1994b; Mottaki 2006). An analysis of Iran’s policies in the respective treaty regimes as well as its position toward core regime norms reveals three thematic priorities of Iranian arms control policy with regard to which Iran showed extraordinary engagement across the individual regimes (for a more detailed description see Wunderlich et al. 2013: 263–272; Wunderlich 2014): (1) the goal of a world free of weapons of mass destruction, (2) equal access to dual-use goods/technology exchange for all contracting parties, and (3) security guarantees and protective measures in the event of a threat or attack with WMD. Sections 7.2–7.4 will focus on these key points of Iranian engagement and assess whether the advocacy shown by Iran meets the criteria of norm entrepreneurship. 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons Iran was one of the first states to call for effective protection and assistance measures during the final negotiations of the CWC. Given that Tehran itself had repeatedly been victim of gas attacks by Iraq, this is not surprising. Indeed, Iran played a leading role in shaping the resulting Article X on measures to support and provide assistance in the event of a chemical weapons attack and has been working to strengthen it 5 Representatives of the Iranian armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards, and conservative politicians feared that the CWC could restrict the country’s military freedom of action. In view of neighboring countries striving for WMD, such as Israel, India, or Pakistan, and due to dissatisfaction with the design and implementation of the CWC, they demanded that Iran should maintain a chemical weapons option. In addition, Iran demanded that the USA and Russia ratified the treaty first (Pirseyedi 2013: 87–91). Ultimately, the Parliament reserved the right to withdraw from the CWC under certain circumstances, i.e., if contractual obligations were implemented incompletely or discriminatively or if peaceful uses of technology was disproportionately hindered. The declaration of reservation is available at http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_ state=109. Accessed 28 August 2015. 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons 143 ever since. Iran’s commitment to the rights of victims of chemical weapons even exceeds the measures laid down in the treaty: On an Iranian initiative in 2006, the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons was established in 2011, underlining the humanitarian mission of the OPCW and drawing attention to the long-term (medical) needs of CW victims. 7.2.1 Background: Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention Even though the Geneva Protocol of 1925 had outlawed biological and chemical weapons as means of warfare, Iraq repeatedly used poison gas against Iranian military positions, but also against the Kurdish and Iranian civilian populations (Tucker 2007: 249–260; 279–286). Even though the international community reacted rather hesitantly at first, this incident was one of the triggers for negotiations on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in 1984, leading to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1997 (see Robinson 1998 on the history of negotiations). The CWC prohibits the development, production, storage, transfer, possession, and use of chemical weapons. It also requires member states to destroy existing stocks, regulates the peaceful trade in chemicals, and contains provisions for mutual assistance when a member is threatened or attacked with chemical weapons. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague, has been entrusted with the verification of the treaty provisions and the coordination of cooperation and aid measures (Kenyon and Feakes 2007). Like other provisions, Article X found its way into the treaty because the developing countries regarded it as a necessary concession and made their acceptance conditional upon its inclusion (Kenyon and Mashadi 2007: 240). But since Article X was introduced into the negotiations relatively late in the early 1990s—and because of the “politicization” (Kenyon and Mashadi 2007: 243) of the debate during the Iran–Iraq war, the provisions contained therein remain relatively vague, particularly with regard to the operationalization and implementation of assistance and protection measures (see Trapp 2014 for a legal interpretation).6 Article X of the CWC grants State Parties the right to receive assistance and protection in the event of an attack or threat with chemical weapons. It also commits them to exchange information on research for protection against chemical weapons. Each Party to the treaty is requested to provide the OPCW Technical Secretariat annually with information on national protection programs. Furthermore, in an emergency, members are requested to provide at short notice one or more protective measures (financial, technical, material, and personnel resources), which are registered by the OPCW. The Technical Secretariat is called upon to assist the states in developing 6 http://www.opcw.org/protection/protection-against-chemical-weapons/. 2015. Accessed 28 August 144 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur national protection measures, inter alia through courses for medical experts or practical trainings. Each State Party is entitled to request assistance and protection from the OPCW should it have been threatened or attacked with chemical weapons. “Assistance” is defined as the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the following: detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures. (Article X.1)7 It is important to note that the measures provided for in Article X relate to future situations in the event of a chemical weapons attack and are primarily intended to provide short-term assistance in acute emergency situations. The provisions only came into force with the entry into force of the CWC 1997 and were therefore not applicable to victims of previous chemical weapons attacks.8 While State Parties agreed in principle on the need for such protective measures, the industrialized countries were careful not to enter into concrete legally binding measures, as they would have had to bear the main burden of the support to be made available. The final text of the treaty (Article X, paragraph 7a–c) therefore lists various options from which State Parties can choose (Kenyon 2000: 9): They can either pay into an assistance fund; conclude a bilateral agreement with the OPCW specifying possible assistance, or inform the OPCW of what measures they will make available unilaterally in the event of a request. Overall, implementation of these obligations was slow (Höhl and Kelle 2003: 18): At the time of writing, 47 out of 190 State Parties have made financial contributions; only 80 have so far implemented one of the three options (OPCW 2016: 18). Only Iran and Peru have concluded bilateral agreements with the OPCW. 7.2.2 Raising Public Awareness Through Normative Framing and Practical Activities As already mentioned, Iran’s engagement for the rights of chemical weapons victims is partly grounded in itself having experienced massive gas attacks without being equipped with adequate protection measures.9 The Iraqi attacks on its own Kurdish population in Halabja in 1988 left a particularly deep imprint to the world. The global public has taken far less notice of the victims among the Iranian civilian population. According to Iranian sources, during the eight-year war, Iraq conducted a total of 600 poison gas attacks (30 of them on inhabited areas in Iran) using various chemical 7 The text of the treaty is available at https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/ download-convention. Accessed 28 August 2015. 8 This was explained to me by former and current employees of the OPCW during the background conversations conducted in May and June 2015; see Interview Khateri 12 May 2015, The Hague; Mashhadi, 9 June 2015; Trapp 31 May 2015. 9 Interview with Hassan Mashhadi, 9 June 2015. 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons 145 warfare agents (sarin, tabun, VX, and mustard gas). Iran claimed over 100,000 dead and injured (including more than 7000 civilians; Mehmanparast 2012). According to the Iranian Veterans Foundation Janbazan, approximately 34,000 Iranians are still suffering from chronic health consequences (OPCW 2008). While Iran already demanded a ban on chemical weapons during the rule of the Shah, the experiences during the war with Iraq fundamentally shaped Iran’s policy priorities, in terms of both the vehemence with which the country has been committed to the complete destruction of chemical weapons ever since and the focus on effective assistance and protection mechanisms. Accordingly, the advocacy for appropriate protection measures figured high for Iran during the CWC negotiations. Iranian delegates called for legally binding protection and assistance measures to be provided by the State Parties in case of an emergency (Kenyon 2000: 9). Tehran considered Article X to be one of the main pillars of the CWC (along with the disarmament norm, the verification norm, and the requirement for cooperation, e.g., Deghani 2009b), even though in its view, the provisions contained therein remained too vague and did not take sufficient account of the rights of the victims of chemical weapons (e.g., Iran 2003; Mottaki 2006; Gharib Abadi 2013). On closer examination, Iran’s engagement in that regard covered two dimensions: Firstly, it was geared toward sensitizing the global public as to the extent of CW attacks, and to assert recognition of Iran’s victimhood. Second, and relatedly, Iran sought to anchor victims’ rights more firmly in the CWC or OPCW through an effective mechanism for providing assistance. With regard to the creation of public awareness, Iranian delegates sought to put Iraq’s norm violations on the agenda of the existing diplomatic forums by reporting on the extent of Iraqi attacks throughout the whole period as well as by calling for diplomatic condemnation of Iraq and firms that had supplied chemical precursors for Iraq’s CW program. For these purposes, Iran launched a massive awareness campaign and also lobbied various international organizations involved in health issues, such as the World Health Organization, and organized bilateral meetings with like-minded countries.10 Iran first reported that Iraq had been carrying out CW attacks from the beginning of the war in June 1981 (Jalali 1981a: 31).11 As the fighting intensified and the Iraqi CW program became more adept from 1984 onwards,12 such references increased. Iranian delegates meticulously listed the number, date, and location of the attacks 10 Telephone interview with Hassan Mashhadi, 9 June 2015. Radio reported the dropping of chemical bombs over the city of Susangerd already in November 1980 (Robinson and Goldblat 1984). According to official sources, Iraq began building a large-scale CW program in 1982 in order to counter Iran’s conventional superiority (UN 2006). The first use of mustard gas is dated back to the summer of 1983. Beginning in 1984, Iraq carried out large-scale attacks with the nerve agent Tabun and mustard gas against Iranian positions (Karsh 1993: 37; Ali 2001: 47–48; Khateri 2010). While sources vary with regard to the exact dates, there is consensus that Saddam Hussein from 1984 to 1986 used unprecedented levels of toxic gas against both Iranian soldiers and civilians. 12 By its own account, Iraq produced some 3850 tons of chemical warfare agents (mustard gas, tabun, sarin, and VX) between 1981 and 1991. Approximately, 3300 tons of agents were weaponized in 11 Tehran 146 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur as well as the agents used. For example, in 1984 then Foreign Minister Velayati described the injuries resulting from 49 gas attacks in 40 Iranian border regions since the beginning of the war as follows: Among these victims, 26 were poisoned, 25 were suffocated, 69 suffered from nausea, 66 became dizzy, 11 had breathing problems, 362 suffered from vision problems with permanent or temporary blindness and 59 complained of skin ailments, while 100 others were severely injured in their testicles and legs. The pictures taken from those afflicted show vividly the traces of wounds, blisters, black and pink skin marks and physical malfunctions. (Velayati 1984: 10) Delegates also vividly reported on the devastating humanitarian, moral, and ecological consequences on both the Iranian and Iraqi sides. Often, statements were accompanied by the distribution of photographs or first-hand reports of chemical weapons victims—forcefully underlining the need for action.13 While in view of the extent of the attacks it is hardly possible to speak of a disproportionate “dramatization,” Iran consciously sought to address the emotions of the audience as illustrated by the following speech on the occasion of the attack on the Iranian city of Sardasht on 28 June 1987—the world’s first large-scale poison gas attack on inhabited territory in which hundreds of civilians, mainly women and children, died or were injured:14 It is very essential that we should all for a moment imagine how a child would behave when he cries hard for survival, and with each cry, lumps of this lethal gas are pumped into his lungs. We should also imagine what the desperate mother could do – prevent the child from breathing, I mean suffocate him, or let her dear one die of mustard gas. (Larijani 1987: 11) Despite Iran’s massive efforts, the attack on Sardasht gained much less public attention than the one on the Kurdish city of Halabja on 16 March 1988.15 Therefore, Iran has spent much energy in redirecting public perception, e.g., through commemoration ceremonies16 and through linking the attack to historical precedents of “crimes against humanity” (Velayati 1988a) such as the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Velayati 1987) or the holocaust (Mashhadi 1988; Velayati 1988a). Iran also sought to influence global coverage of the events, e.g., through distributing information brochures of chemical weapons victims and inviting journalists to different types of bombs, artillery munitions, and missile warheads. About 80 percent of these warfare agents were used from 1982 to 1990 (UN 2006). 13 Interview with the former head of the Iranian disarmament delegation at the CD, 9 June 2015. 14 Iraqi military dropped a total of seven mustard gas-filled bombs. According to official reports, more than half of the inhabitants of the village fell victim to the attacks; http://www.tehranpeacemuseum. org/files/pdf/Sardasht%20gas%20Attack-Foroutan.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 15 The attack is considered the worst toxic gas attack since the First World War—5000 people died, 7000 were injured, and 75 percent of them women and children. 16 In 2011, Iran’s efforts resulted in a decision of the OPCW’s Executive Council to commemorate the annual attacks on Sardasht with an official ceremony. The importance attached to symbolic gestures is also illustrated by the Iranian proposal to name part of the OPCW site after the Iranian city of Sardasht in 2008. http://news/article/opcw-director-general-meets-deputy-foreign-ministerof-the-islamic-republic-of-iran. Accessed 28 April 2017. 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons 147 Iranian cities affected by CW attacks (Ali 2001: 48).17 Since the country itself did not have sufficient infrastructure to treat injured people, victims were flown to European countries (e.g., Sweden, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland; CBW Events 2007: 5). Already during the war, Iran organized various international medical congresses dealing with the consequences of poisonous gas attacks and the treatment of victims. On these occasions, Iran shared footage and led victims report their experiences (Velayati 1984: 10). Confronting European countries with CW victims was considered an important aspect of moral awareness-raising and regarded as an instrument to enhance negotiations of a CW ban (Velayati 1987: 3). In almost every subsequent speech uttered in the context of the CWC, Iran refers to its victim status and in particular to the long-term consequences of the CW attacks in order to underline its own commitment to the CWC. In 2003, for example, a delegate at the 8th Conference of the Parties to the CWC declared: 13 years after cease-fire between the two countries, hardly a week still goes by without Iranian people losing one of their loved ones to chemical weapons after long years of agonizing pained suffering. Iran sustained 100,000 known victims to the use of different types of chemical agents (nerve agents, blistering agents and mixed agents), 35,000 of them are considered serious, due to suffering from long effects of chemical weapons deployed by Iraq (especially mustard gas). Ten percent of the victims whose cases are serious will have a definite, gradual and agonizing death awaiting them. […] Our experience with chemical weapons has been and will continue to remain very costly to the Islamic republic of Iran in many respects. Therefore, the Islamic republic of Iran has good reasons beyond a mere legal ground to do its utmost in accomplishing the goals of the Convention and implementation activities of the OPCW. (Khoshroo 2003b) Iran’s efforts to raise awareness in diplomatic forums also served to persuade the international community to condemn Iraq’s CW use as a breach of the Geneva Protocol and to hold Saddam Hussein accountable. From 1982 on Iran approached the UN for support and demanded investigations into the incidents.18 Between 1984 and 1988, several inspection missions were carried out which confirmed the use of mustard gas and nerve agents.19 Despite Iran’s massive publicity campaign, however, the reaction of the international community was rather cautious at first (Ali 2001: 50–51): The UN Security Council condemned the use of chemical weapons, calling on both parties to end the conflict and refrain from further gas attacks.20 However, despite obvious evidence that Iraq had used chemical weapons 17 Iran also invested in national education campaigns that were similar in both content and nature to international efforts. Yet, these measures were not included into the analysis because they are of no relevance for assessing global norm entrepreneurship. 18 An overview of Iran’s letters to the UN as well as the resolutions adopted and missions undertaken can be found at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/studies/middle_east.shtml. Accessed 28 April 2017. 19 Besides on-site inspections in Iran, medical experts also conducted clinical analyses of alleged victims brought to European hospitals for treatment purposes. A summary of the results of the UN investigations from 1984 to 1988 can be found in Findlay (1991: 139–143). 20 Iran had already presented a draft resolution in September 1984 in which the Iraqi use of poisonous gas was condemned as a breach of the Geneva Protocol—but due to American opposition this initiative failed (Battle 2003). Security Council resolutions adopted before 1986 contained neither 148 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur against Iran and probably for political reasons,21 the Security Council refrained from assigning clear responsibility to Iraq. Sanctions were not issued. Later, Iranian delegates argued that this cautious reaction—which constituted “an international conspiracy of silence” (Jalali 1981b) from Iran’s perspective—had given Iraq “a carte blanche to continue and intensify its use of these weapons of mass destruction” (Velayati 1988a: 3). To Iran, the consequences of the international community’s passivity stretched way beyond “innocent Iranians,” but put “damage […] to the common human conscience” (Kazemi Kamyab 1984a: 32). Condemning Iraq was framed as a moral duty for “all fair-minded people” (Velayati 1985: 9). Iran also demanded accountability for those Western countries (in particular the UK, the USA, and the Soviet Union) and companies that had supplied Saddam Hussein with the chemicals and technologies needed to set up his chemical weapons program.22 Both with the UN and the CWC, Iranian delegates used naming, blaming, and shaming strategies to condemn the accused countries and firms as “international merchants of death” (Velayati 1984, 1986). A rhetorical move which is often used by Iran consisted in highlighting their duplicity and double standards as illustrated in the following statement: It simply does not make sense that countries crying for humanity, peace and stability are generously arming, assisting and politically supporting such a criminal régime, regardless of its violation of international law and ignorance! Any assistance to the violator with the knowledge of its continuous violations is in itself a crime and constitutes participation in the crime. (Larijani 1987: 12) Iranian delegates continued their demands for accountability and compensation after the war had ended (e.g., Mottaki 2006; Deghani 2009a). In fact, Iran is of the opinion that the CWC contains several regulatory gaps insofar as it neither defines the use of chemical weapons as a war crime (Sheikholeslam 1984) nor contains accountability provisions. Iran is of the opinion that such provisions address the humanitarian dimension and should thus become an integral part of the aid and protection measures available to member states. Furthermore, such provisions are perceived to be basic rights of victims of chemical weapons. Iran therefore repeatedly called on the CWC parties and the OPCW to address this gap, for example, by setting up a working group to investigate CW precursor supplies to Iraq. Tehran called on the Technical Secretariat to publish the names of the 15 countries that had supplied references to the CW attacks nor named Iraq as the aggressor. Only in 1988, following the attacks on the Kurdish civilian population in Halabja, a UN Security Council resolution (A/RES/620) was passed that identified Iraq as aggressor. 21 Fearing that the revolutionary Iranian regime would grow stronger, but also because of their trade relations with Iraq, many Western governments, particularly the USA, were reluctant to condemn Iraq or even impose sanctions. However, after public reporting had addressed the issue, some countries such as Australia, France, Japan, the UK, and later also the USA, restricted chemical trade with Iraq (Ali 2001: 49–50). 22 Throughout the war, Iraq received political support and military assistance from the West. For the development of the chemical weapons program, Iraq needed foreign technologies, equipment, and raw materials, which were officially requested under the pretext of establishing a state pesticide production (UN 2006). 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons 149 Iraq with raw materials for the manufacture of chemical weapons, “so that they will have guilty consciences in their lifetimes. They should also bear the burden of this tragic responsibility” (Gharib Abadi 2010: 2). While Iran’s national interests are obvious, Iranian diplomats stress that that prosecution would also serve to prevent future crimes and that the victims of gas attacks are entitled to see the responsible actors be penalized (Najafi 2007: 13). 7.2.3 Strengthening Article X Through Institutionalization Given its own experiences during the Iraq war, Iran’s commitment to strong protective measures for CW victims already came to the fore in the CWC negotiations in Geneva (Kenyon 2000: 9). In the day-to-day business of other delegations, the issue played only a marginal role, if at all. Apart from Iran, only a few countries were committed to such provisions23 —Iran’s victim status placed the country in a unique position. The Iranian delegation made the scientific expertise that it had built in response to the national treatment of CW victims available during the negotiations by involving medical–technical experts in its national delegation. As Hassan Mashhadi, Head of negotiations and later Director of the OPCW’s Assistance and Protection Branch, explained, Iran was the only country in the negotiations that knew what they were talking about, [the] only country having experienced quite vividly the effects of chemical weapons usage. […] We wanted to make sure we could get some help in treating our CW victims, and that this does not happen again or if so, [that] countries are prepared.24 To Iran, countries that fall victim to the use of chemical weapons or threat thereof “should be assisted in every possible way to combat the effects of these horrible weapons by defensive and protective measures and […] they should be equipped medically to provide care for the victims who have been so afflicted” (Kazemi Kamyab 1984b: 28). In particular, Iran demanded that the Executive Council should react immediately at the request of a State Party which claimed to have been the victim of a CW attack. Without prior political consultations, the Council should automatically send an inspection team and activate punitive mechanisms (Velayati 1990a). After an attack, the other State Parties should automatically be obliged to take predetermined assistance measures as is elaborated in the following remark by then Foreign Minister Velayati: With regard to article X, assistance in cases of use should be mandatory and comprehensive. The comprehensiveness and universality of the convention form the most important point. Upon the request of the Executive Council, following actual use of chemical weapons, when there is a need for urgent assistance, the assistance should be mandatory and automatic. In cases of the threat of use, assistance can be voluntary. (Velayati 1988a: 6) 23 Pakistan 24 Hassan also drafted several working papers on the issue matter (Kenyon and Mashhadi 2007). Mashhadi, telephone interview, 9 June 2015. 150 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur That assistance to CW victims should be automatic and mandatory is justified on humanitarian grounds, “because any delay in providing assistance such as antidotes, medical care and first aid would cost human lives” (Velayati 1989: 6). Accordingly, Iran regretted the weak contractual provisions relating to Article X in the CWC (Naimi-Arfa 1990; Najafi 2007). In particular, Iran did not consider the longerterm needs of victims of chemical weapons to be sufficiently taken into account in the CWC (Araghchi 2007; Deghani 2009b). Article X applies only to future CW attacks, and its provision does not foresee the treatment of CW victims that have been injured due to attacks prior to the entry into force of the Convention (1997).25 Iran’s efforts to provide information on the long-term consequences of poisonous gas attacks have to be seen against this background. Again and again delegates stressed the immense burden that Iran had to bear alone as a result of the poison gas attacks (Najafi 2007: 12). As a consequence in 2006,26 then Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki proposed to establish an international support network for victims of chemical weapons under Article X (Chemical Weapons Victim’s International Funding & Assistance Network). Some states (such as the USA, Meier 2008) warned against extending the mandate of the OPCW beyond disarmament assistance and argued that organizations such as the ICRC were responsible for covering the humanitarian aspects.27 Iran, on the other hand, argued that the CWC also had a humanitarian task as was stressed in Mottaki’s statement: We are not able to make up for those victims who have passed away, but could help alleviate the human suffering of the survivors of chemical weapons. To this end, I submit the establishment of a support network to mobilize international care, addressing their special needs. (Mottaki 2006) The support network would not only strengthen the humanitarian mandate of the OPCW and the rights of victims of chemical weapons, but was also meant strengthen the implementation of the measures provided for in Article X (Ziaran 2008). In 2010, Iran submitted a proposal to the Conference of State Parties (Iran 2010k) which specified the scope of the network’s activities and called on the Executive Council to initiate its establishment. The Iranian proposal foresaw that the OPCW should set up a database, which should interrogate the medical needs of victims of chemical weapons, provide information on assistance offered by member states, and list relevant national, regional, and civil society organizations in the field of victim protection. Furthermore, the network should provide a platform for information and 25 Interview Khateri, 12 May 2015, The Hague. 26 By its own account, Iran had already called for establishing such a network in 2003 (Iran 2010h). 27 The group of Western European and other states feared that the fund could be used politically to link the issue of the long-term consequences of chemical weapons use with possible questions about the responsibility of Western companies for chemical and technology supplies to Iraq. See Interview Mashhadi, 9 June 2015; interview with representatives of the Western group within the OPCW, May 2015. I could only find one speech in which during an Executive Council meeting South Africa on behalf of the African group expressed its support (South Africa 2011). Civil society and the OPCW welcomed the initiative and saw the establishment of the network as reasonable; see interviews with OPCW staff, arms control experts, and NGOs in The Hague in May 2015. 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons 151 communication for victims of chemical weapons and help facilitate the practical coordination of assistance. Those affected should also be given the opportunity to participate in the network, e.g., by providing their experience reports and personal stories. The aid fund to be set up should not only fund information campaigns, but should also provide funds for research, for example, to organize seminars and workshops on treatment methods or for research grants for resource-poor developing countries. State Parties should agree to cooperate in the treatment of chemical weapons victims and facilitate the trade in protective equipment and technologies needed to treat chemical weapons victims. The proposal thus confirmed the support measures already provided for in Article X, paragraph 7. In order to substantiate the need for such a network, Iran referred to the common good: We are of the conviction that establishment of such a network is the least that the States Parties and the Organisation can do in order to display their sympathy for the victims of chemical weapons. This issue is not exclusively related to one country only and that at least several other countries have offered victims in this regard. (Gharib Abadi 2011b: 4) In 2011, the State Parties finally decided to establish an international support network for victims of chemical weapons (OPCW 2011), which was largely in line with Iran’s proposal. To implement the decision, the Parties were called upon to contribute financially to a voluntary assistance fund, to provide medical treatment for victims of chemical weapons in their countries, to organize national awareness-raising campaigns, to exchange information and experience on the treatment of victims of chemical weapons, and to facilitate the trade in materials and protective equipment (OPCW 2013). In 2012, the Technical Secretariat established a voluntary trust fund to finance the network, to which Iran donated 15,000 euros (Gharib Abadi 2012).28 Since 2013, a section on the OPCW web site is providing information on the activities of the network and the history of CW attacks. The web site also provides links to the web sites of (Iranian) NGOs.29 In 2016, a medical manual was developed by experts involved in the network. The handbook covers both acute and long-term consequences of CW use, provides backgrounds, defines terminology, explains first-aid measures, and discusses treatment options.30 While Iran welcomed the establishment of the support 28 So far, the financial contribution of the signatory states has been modest: Iraq has failed to keep its promise of 5000 euros for the aid fund. See interview Khateri, 12 May 2015, The Hague. The OPCW donated a share of the Nobel Peace Prize money of 20,000 euros and Dr. Robert Matthews, winner of The Hague Award 2014 donated 45,000 euros for the network. http://www.gevans.org/speeches/ speech562.html. Accessed 28 April 2017. Iran criticizes the reluctant financial participation and urges particularly those states to make a contribution that supplied Iraq with materials and technology (Gharib Abadi 2013). 29 See https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/victims-of-chemical-weapons-network/. Accessed 28 April 2017. 30 In addition to Iranian experts, scientists from Australia, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the USA were involved in the preparation of the handbook; see https://www.opcw.org/ fileadmin/OPCW/ICA/APB/Practical_Guide_for_Medical_Management_of_Chemical_Warfare_ Casualties_-_web.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 152 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur network, it called on the signatory states to take further practical steps and make further financial contributions to fully activate it (Iran 2013a; Jahangiri 2015). Nevertheless, Iran’s commitment has its limits: The country was relatively reluctant to engage with the Syrian ruler Assad in the summer of 2013 in the case of the confirmed use of chemical weapons (Sarin) against the Syrian civilian population. Iran regularly coordinates its positions in the Executive Council with the Syrian delegation and has tried to prevent condemnation of the allied Assad regime and a referral to the UN Security Council (Lynch 2015).31 Sure, Iran maintains its position that the use of CW constitutes a crime against humanity and condemned the attacks (e.g., Jahangiri 2015). Also, Iranian delegates stress the need for assistance and support for the victims of the attack. For example, Iran demanded the right to use the fund set up for the support network to support civilian victims of “terrorist” chemical weapons attacks (Jahangiri 2015). However, Iran insists that Syrian rebels had used the poisonous gas (FARS News Agency 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iran 2013), even though investigations by the OPCW and intelligence reports suggested that the Assad regime was responsible for the operations.32 In the Executive Council of the OPCW, Tehran repeatedly used disruptive action: In January 2015, it did not even shy away from diplomatic self-isolation in order to prevent a statement initiated by the USA and Russia, in which “serious concern” about the continued chlorine gas attacks was expressed and the Director-General of the OPCW was asked to refer the matter to the UN Security Council.33 For the third time in the history of the OPCW, there was a vote, with only Tehran voting against the decision. Thus, Iran prevented the adoption of effective measures against the continued use of CW gas in Syria and thereby undermined its own commitment to the protection of CW victims. Iran also maintained this position in view of the more recent attacks in Syria in April 2017: While the West, in particular France, holds the Syrian regime responsible for the attack and the USA reacted with a missile attack on a Syrian air base, Iran stands firmly at President Assad’s side together with Russia, who denies the use of chemical weapons and blames rebel groups for it. 7.2.4 Practical Engagement The previous chapters have already touched upon some of the practical activities Iran has undertaken in the context of raising awareness for the extent of CW usage during the Iraq–Iran war as well as for the need for victim assistance. Throughout the whole investigation period, Iran participated regularly in the Conferences of the State 31 Interviews with members of Western countries within the OPCW, 11 and 13 May 2015 in The Hague. 32 See http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/syria/. Accessed 28 April 2017. 33 A member of the Western group within the OPCW reported on the incident during my interview trip to The Hague. 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons 153 Parties. Its level of engagement in the CWC negotiations and the regular meetings can be considered above-average.34 In order to commemorate the victims and to keep the urgency of banning chemical weapons in collective memory (Mehmanparast 2012), Iran puts emphasis on symbolic actions: On the anniversary of the attacks on Sardasht, which coincides with the entry into force of the CWC, several Iranian cities are hosting national commemorations accompanied by events (such as medical congresses, CWC seminars, press conferences, publication of victim statistics, anniversary publications, or international civil society meetings. In 2004, June 28 was declared “National Day for Campaign against Chemical and Biological Weapons” (Najafi 2012). Iran’s donation of a monument to the victims of chemical weapons in the garden of the OPCW in 2012 also aimed to raise moral awareness (Gharib Abadi 2012). During the annual Conference of State Parties, Iran regularly organizes photograph exhibitions on the CW attacks in cooperation with Iranian NGOs and the OPCW. On the same occasions, a delegation of chemical weapons victims travels to The Hague to report on their experiences and long-term consequences. Iran’s active role in efforts to improve protection against chemical weapons is often dismissed by some political observers and Western diplomats as merely imagebuilding, which serves only to satisfy its own interests (e.g., Thränert 2003: 25). However, Iran’s commitment to providing assistance and protection measures in case of a CW attack or threat thereof, as listed in Article X, paragraph 7, is above average. On its web site, the OPCW praises Iran’s practical activities and notes that “[t]he need to manage the treatment of […] a large number of casualties has placed Iran’s medical specialists in the forefront of the development of effective treatment regimes for chemical weapons victims, and particularly for those suffering from exposure to mustard gas.”35 While the country does not participate in payments into the voluntary trust fund,36 for a long time Iran was the only State Party to provide assistance available under Article X in a bilateral agreement with the OPCW—a fact that Iran does not get tired to emphasize and which it uses to call on other states to follow its example (e.g., Gharib Abadi 2010, 2011a). In the pledge, Iran undertakes at the request of a member state to accept up to 50 patients in its hospitals. In addition, two medical expert teams (consisting of five doctors) are to be sent to the attacked country in 34 See background conversations with members of the OPCW in May 2015; telephone interview with Hassan Mashhadi, 9 June 2015 and email conversation with Dr. Ralf Trapp, 31 May 2015. 35 “Genesis and Historical Development”. http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/ genesis-and-historical-development/. Accessed 28 August 2015. 36 To date, only 45 countries have contributed to the aid fund, which has a budget of approximately EUR 1.5 million. This amount may be used by the OPCW in an emergency to assist a State Party. See Interview Khateri, OPCW employee, 12 May 2015 in The Hague. 154 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur such an emergency situation (OPCW 2000a).37 Iran also commits itself to establish a regional training center in which medical courses for the treatment of victims of chemical weapons will be held.38 From 1999 to 2008, Tehran organized a total of nine such courses in collaboration with the OPCW Technical Secretariat.39 In a speech at the 2010 Executive Council meeting, an Iranian delegate explains that due to its own experience, Iran “insists on capacity building and […] making available adequate resources in order to expeditiously meet the needs of the State Parties that have been exposed to chemical attacks.” (Gharib Abadi 2010). Iranian experts and arms control officials also participated in two of the three practical exercises (ASSISTEX) organized by the Technical Secretariat, which served to improve the coordination of assistance and protection measures in chemical weapons attacks.40 The willingness to pass on the expertise of Iranian medical personal on the treatment of CW victims via the OPCW to other countries is seen by employees of the OPCW as an important contribution to the capacity building of the treaty community.41 The scientific/medical expertise in the treatment of CW victims is also made available internationally. To this end, Iranian experts participate in training courses on Article X42 organized by other member states, organize international medical congresses, or occasionally cooperate with international humanitarian organizations and civil society actors.43 At the invitation of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, for example, a Swedish delegation of “Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War” spent 37 The text “Memorandum of Understanding between the OPCW and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the Provision of Assistance” dated 02 July 1999 has been published in OPCW (2000). 38 Interview with Shahriar Khateri, employee of the responsible OPCW department, 12 May 2015, The Hague. 39 No further courses have been held since 2008. According to a member of the Assistance and Protection Branch, it is unclear why Iran suspended them. The OPCW had repeatedly expressed interest in resuming the courses, as Iranian expertise was irreplaceable. See interview Khateri, 12 May 2015, The Hague. Upon request, the head of Iran’s national CWC Supervisory Authority cited as a reason the uncooperative behavior of the Director-General of the OPCW with regard to the allocation of offices within the Technical Secretariat. Apparently, there are no plans to resume the courses in the near future. To be fair, it should be noted that the OPCW has spent less money on capacity building in recent years than before, interview with a former OPCW employee, 09 June 2015. 40 For ASSISTEX 1, which took place from 10 to 14 September 2002 in Zadar/Croatia, Iran provided a medical team of six and a field hospital; https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/ICA/APB/ ASSISTEX_I_%20Croatia_2002/ASSISTEX1_CDQ_2003_No01.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. Iran also participated with a medical team in ASSISTEX 2, which took place from 10 to 14 September 2002 until 14 October 2005 in Lviv/Ukraine, interview Khateri, 12 May 2015. Iran did not participate in ASSISTEX 3 from 6 to 8 July 2010 in Tunisia. 41 Interviews with Shahriar Khateri, 12 May 2015, The Hague; Ralf Trapp, 31 May 2015. 42 The OPCW Technical Secretariat regularly conducts regional assistance and protection trainings in one of the countries of the region. Iran regularly participated in such courses and provided the expertise of Iranian doctors (Chemical Disarmament Quarterly 2008: 22). 43 This is also done by the Baqiyatallah Hospital in Tehran granting scientists from all over the world access to chemical weapons victims and thus contributing to the scientific development of new treatment options (Vick 2012). 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons 155 a four-day research stay in Tehran to investigate the long-term health consequences of Iranian soldiers and civilians exposed to poisonous gas attacks in the 1980s (NTI 2008).44 According to a member of the assistance and protection branch of the OPCW, however, Iran’s involvement has decreased since 2008. Table 7.1 illustrates the range of Iranian activities in relation to assistance and protection measures:45 7.2.5 Assessment According to the criteria set up for the purposes of this study (see Sect. 5.2.1) Iran’s commitment to the protection of victims qualifies as norm entrepreneurship: Dissatisfied with the inadequate protection and assistance provided by the international community and in view of its hesitant reaction to Iraq’s repeated poisonous gas attacks, Iran actively advocated the establishment of protection and support norm for those affected by chemical weapons. In addition, Iran considerably contributed to the shaping of Article X by providing its own experience and competences. Even after the CWC came into force, Iranian diplomats continued to support the institutional strengthening of victim protection. Ultimately, Iran even succeeded in institutionally expanding the protection and support norm for chemical weapons victims: With the establishment of the assistance network, State Parties extended the scope of the OPCW’s tasks to humanitarian concerns and recognized the need for regulation with regard to the long-term needs of victims of chemical weapons in principle. Throughout the entire period under investigation, Iran played a prominent role— also in comparison with other countries—in establishing Article X and later in strengthening it. It is true that, in addition to Iran, other countries were also involved in the design of protection and support measures. On the basis of its own experiences, however, Iran acquired a unique position, which it was able to skillfully insert into the negotiations through active norm entrepreneurship. As shown above, the Iranian activities corresponded to the characteristics of typical norm entrepreneurship, both with regard to the strategies used for the normative framing and the practical measures. The extent of national resources (in particular medical expertise) used by the Iranian government to strengthen Article X is particularly striking. 44 Iranian NGOs are involved in such measures. However, in a country like Iran governmental approval is necessary for international civil society exchanges. Therefore, such measures are seen as an indicator of government activities. 45 Information on Iran’s practical activities stems from secondary literature, primary sources, interviews, the annual reports of the OPCW as well as information from the CBW Bulletin (http:// www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/pdfbulletin.html. Accessed 28 April 2017) and the two journals Chemical Disarmament Quarterly and OPCW Today published by the OPCW. 156 Table 7.1 Practical activities to support chemical weapons victims Date and title Description Actions within the CWC 1999 “Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the OPCW on the provision of medical emergency assistance teams and treatment of chemical weapons casualties at Iranian hospitals according to Article X (7b)” 2006 Proposal to establish a support network 1999/05/15–20, “First Course on Medical Defence against Chemical Weapons,” 22 participants from 15 State Parties 2000/5 2000/10/23–26, 23 “Third Course on Medical Aspects of Defence against Chemical Weapons,” participants from 19 State Parties 2002/10/14–17, 14 participants from 12 State Parties 2003/5/26–30 “Sixth annual course on the medical aspects of defense against chemical weapons,” International Medical Center for Training and Treatment against chemical Weapons (IMCTTCW), 25 participants from eight State Parties 2004/4/17–21 2004/10/9–13 “Course on Aspects of Defence Against Chemical Weapons,” Teheran 2006/11/4–8, “Eight Course on the medical aspects of defense against chemical weapons,” 22 participants from 21 State Parties 2008/11/5–9, 22 participants from 21 State Parties The courses are organized by the National CWC Supervisory Authority of Iran, the Ministry of Health and the Janbazan Veterans’ Foundation in collaboration with the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW and are hosted at the International Medical Center for Training and Treatment against Chemical Weapons (IMCTTCW) in Tehran. They are intended to provide basic knowledge about chemical weapons and their effects as well as information about protective measures, including detection options for chemical attacks, comprehensive protection and treatment measures as well as necessary decontamination measures Description of the course in the invitation to member states by the OPCW: “The aim of the course is to provide an opportunity for participants to receive advice from Iranian doctors who have previously treated casualties of chemical weapons on the battlefield […] and who continue to provide medical care for them. This, it is intended, will enable participants to increase their understanding of the problems they may encounter during national or international responses to incidents involving chemical weapons. Participant also receive information on assistance and further training available through OPCW” (OPCW 2000b) During the courses, participants also meet victims of chemical weapons; participating medical personnel are given the opportunity to attend clinical training seminars in Iranian hospitals in which chemical weapons victims are examined with regard to long-term consequences. Participation in interactive, computer-based simulation courses is also planned National medical trainings in cooperation with the OPCW (continued) 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur Type of activity Type of activity Date and title Description Nationally held (international) conferences 1983 Medical Congress in Tehran 1984 Medical Congress 1986/03/17–18 “Seminar on chemical and biological warfare,” Shiraz University 1995/03/15 “Seminar on the study of the effects of chemical weapons,” Kowsar Health Complex, Teheran 1997/10/22 “Seminar on the adverse consequences of using chemical weapons against Iran” 2002/10/14 Seminar “Medical defences for chemical weapons,” Bagiatallah Medical Sciences University 2004/06/30 Congress “Review of the Consequences of Application of Chemical Weapons” 2007 Two medical congresses in Mashhad and Isfahan 2007/10/22–23 International Seminar “The use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran, its impacts and consequences” 2008/10/22–23 Seminar “The Consequences of Chemical Weapons Attacks against Iran” 299/11/13 Workshop on prevention and medical operations during chemical, biological and nuclear attacks 2004/03/15 Seminar “Use of Chemical Weapons: Backgrounds and Outlooks” Conferences dealing with the consequences of poison gas and the treatment of patients, during which participants also meet victims of chemical weapons attacks 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons Table 7.1 (continued) (continued) 157 158 Table 7.1 (continued) Type of activity Date and title Description Scientific events 1999 Opening of the International Centre for Training and Treatment of the Victims of Chemical Warfare in Teheran 2007/01/20 Teheran Invitation of the Swedish section of the “International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War” by the Foreign Ministry to spend four days conducting research on chemical weapons victims Participation in various Pugwash meetings and invitation of international NGOs to national conferences Occasional involvement or participation in seminars with civil society within the framework of the OPCW Invitation and support for cooperation between Iranian and Japanese NGOs Symbolic actions 1999/03/16 Commemorative publication of the government-related magazine Kayhan International on the occasion of the commemoration of the poison gas attacks on the Kurdish city of Halabja 2007/05/09 Seminar on “the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the EIF of the CWC” as well as various memorial ceremonies 2000/10/22 “Seminar on contents of CWC” Issue of a special stamp and a special publication to mark the tenth anniversary of the CWC 2007/06/30 Opening of the “Peace Park and Museum” in Tehran, which mainly exhibits works of art dealing with the Iraqi chemical weapons attacks 2009 in the lobby of the World Forum Conference Centre in Den Haag Photograph exhibition at the OPCW within the framework of Conferences of the State Parties (continued) 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur Meetings with international civil society Type of activity Date and title Description 2012/11/26 during the 17th conference of the State Parties to the CWC Foundation of a memorial to the victims of chemical weapons in the OPCW garden in The Hague Commemoration Since 2004 every year on 28 June in various Iranian ceremonies cities 2007/05/09 “Commemoration Ceremony with the attendance of Iranian officials and head of foreign missions and embassies in Tehran” Commemoration of the mustard gas attacks on the Iranian city of Sardasht Commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the CWC and the 20th anniversary of the attacks on Sardasht 7.2 Iran’s Support for Victims of Chemical Weapons Table 7.1 (continued) 159 160 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur Table 7.2 summarizes Iran’s norm entrepreneurship according to the established criteria. 7.3 Iran’s Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament As one of the three “pillars” of the NPT, nuclear disarmament can be considered as being a fairly entrenched norm. Yet while the overall validity of the norm of nuclear disarmament is hardly disputed, its concrete meaning and the behavioral consequences resulting from its normative provisions have been subject to contestation ever since the NPT was negotiated. Since its accession to the treaty, Iran has expressed its commitment to nuclear disarmament and sought to strengthen the norm (or more precisely, the meaning it attaches to it) through discursive and practical means. 7.3.1 Background: The Norm of Nuclear Disarmament in the Context of the NPT The norm of nuclear disarmament enshrined in Article VI of the NPT requires each State Party to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.46 The wording remains rather vague, which opens the possibility for contestation regarding the exact requirements and the scope of the normative obligations (Burford 2015). Whether the normative commitment comprises concrete disarmament steps and how progress on this issue should be measured has been the subject of a dispute between NPT members for years (e.g., Joyner 2011; Kmentt 2013; Müller and Wunderlich 2018). Four times in the history of the NPT, discontent among non-nuclear weapon states with the implementation of the disarmament norm has also prevented the adoption of a consensual final document (1980, 1990, 2005, and 2015). Basically, two interpretive positions can be discerned: With the exception of China, the nuclear weapon states and their allies hold the view that the NPT primarily serves to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament are of secondary relevance (hereinafter Müller 2012: 4–5). In contrast, the states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in particular argue that the NWS are not fulfilling their contractual obligation to disarm and plea for a treaty-bound path to nuclear disarmament. For the NAM, the elimination of nuclear weapons is a legal and moral obligation that must be implemented 46 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article VI, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/ 2005/npttreaty.html; 25 June 2018. 7.3 Iran’s Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament 161 Table 7.2 Overview of the respective characteristics of norm entrepreneurship based on Sell and Prakash (2004: 153) in the case of “protection for victims of chemical weapons” Norm entrepreneur case 1: Effective protection and assistance for victims of chemical weapons Period 1980–until today Trigger (extrinsic/intrinsic) – Own experiences during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s Problem definition – Existing protection and assistance measures for states attacked or threatened by chemical weapons are insufficient and ineffective – The long-term consequences of CW use are not sufficiently anchored in the (moral) consciousness of the international community Preferred solution – An effective mechanism to assist victims of chemical weapons in the framework of CWC Normative framing – Aid as a humanitarian measure – Moral responsibility of the international community, especially in the context of the involvement of Western companies in Iraq’s chemical weapons program; ending double standards – Commitment to chemical weapons victims as a moral commitment – Mitigating the long-term consequences of the use of chemical weapons also serves the common good National interests – Assistance for own victims, especially with regard to the long-term consequences of the use of chemical weapons – Condemnation and sanctioning of Iraq; putting an end to CW attacks – Demonstrating responsibility of Western companies for chemicals and technology supplies to Iraq and thereby preventing future activities in this area – Strong Article X as a security guarantee for possible future CW attacks Applied strategies – Massive awareness campaign using naming, shaming, and blaming as well as emotionalization – Symbolic actions – Capacity building Resources – Technical and medical expertise – Practical support – Financial resources (continued) 162 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur Table 7.2 (continued) Norm entrepreneur case 1: Effective protection and assistance for victims of chemical weapons Allies – NAM states – Various civil society actors – OPCW (personnel) Normative transformation? – Strengthening and specifying the norm of victim protection, in particular with regard to the long-term consequences – Contribution to moral awareness Substantial change? – Establishment of the support network by the OPCW 2011 Breaches or doubts about the credibility of the norm advocacy? – Political support for the Syrian regime, even after alleged use of poisonous gas against the Syrian population independently of the global security situation. This interpretation is also shared by Iran: Reaching general and complete disarmament is regarded as primary objective of the UN bodies dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation. Instead of advocating an international order based on the deterrent potential of nuclear weapons, Iran advocates a security order in which weapons of mass destruction play no role and military force should only be used for defensive purposes (“defensive security scheme”; Velayati 1992, 1994b; Nasseri 1993). In a speech in 1993, a delegate to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament argued that the aim should not be to reduce, but rather to eliminate nuclear arsenals. In analogy to the START treaties between the USA and Russia, which aimed to reduce strategic offensive arms, he instead called for a “STOP treaty, i.e., Strategic and nuclear arms Out of our Planet” (Nasseri 1993). The NWS and many of their allies reject such a “big bang approach” (Müller 2012: 4) and advocate incremental disarmament steps instead . While the NAM argues that nuclear disarmament must be pursued independently of the political security situation, the nuclear weapon states argue that the current context is simply not ripe for “global zero” and demand that certain preconditions be in place before meaningful disarmament can occur. Irrespective of this discursive rift, NPT member states have made quite significant efforts to work out a common language since 1995, resulting in the specification of Article VI (Müller et al. 2013: 55; Müller and Wunderlich 2018: 345–347). For example, the document on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”47 adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference confirms that the NPT was designed to ensure the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and not merely negotiations “in good faith” (Tannenwald 2013: 302–303). It also interprets Article VI as prescribing the prompt conclusion of a Comprehensive 47 Decision on Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2); http://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/prin_obj.htm. Accessed 28 April 2017. 7.3 Iran’s Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament 163 Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the start of negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapon purposes (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, FMCT), and systematic measures to reduce nuclear arsenals on the part of the NWS (Dhanapala 2005).48 During the 2000 RevCon, States Parties agreed on “13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts towards complete disarmament”49 including the reduction of substrategic nuclear weapons, enhancing transparency, the irreversibility of disarmament measures, and an “unequivocal commitment of the NWS to abolish nuclear weapons (Simpson 2001). In 2009, on the initiative of the UK, the NWS began regular consultations in order to build the transparency and confidence regarded as being necessary conditions for nuclear disarmament. In 2010, the measures adopted in 2000 were updated in an “action plan”50 containing a total of 22 concrete disarmament steps, including restrictions on the development of new warheads, reducing the alert status of nuclear arsenals, progress with the ratification of the CTBT, and the revival of the UN disarmament machinery, in particular the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, the nuclear weapon states were “encouraged” to enter into negotiations on legally binding security guarantees and asked to report regularly and in a systematic manner on their arsenals and the disarmament steps they had actually undertaken (Johnson 2010). Also outside the NPT, various proposals to strengthen the disarmament norm have been underway. Although the Conference on Disarmament remains blocked, the UN disarmament machinery has been reactivated when in 2010, on initiative of Austria, the UN General Assembly commissioned an open-ended working group to draw up proposals to advance multilateral disarmament negotiations (A/RES/67/56 of 2010). In 2013, the UN General Assembly held its first high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament (A/RES/67/39 of 2013). In parallel, a coalition of non-nuclear weapon states and civil society actors initiated the so-called “Humanitarian Initiative”, which emphasized the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons use and invoked a new level of urgency for banning these weapons (Sauer 2015). With the support of more than two-thirds of the NPT membership, the initiative pushed the idea of a legal “ban” on nuclear weapons (Kmentt 2013) and ultimately led to the conclusion of the “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” in July 2017. Proponents of the ban see it as closing a legal gap by unequivocally confirming the illegality and illegitimacy of continued adherence to nuclear weapons by the NWS (among others Thakur 2017; Ritchie 2018). Certainly, the prohibition treaty has further specified the disarmament norm enshrined in Article VI of the NPT. 48 This view was reinforced in 1996 when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the threat and use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law and confirmed the existence of a disarmament norm. Following that decision, some observers argued that Article VI acquired the status of customary international law (e.g., Joyner 2014). 49 The “13 steps” are contained in the final document of the 2000 NPV Review Conference: NPT/CONF.2000/28 (part I), para. 15, 14–15. 50 Available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/ revcon2010/FinalDocument.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. 164 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur 7.3.2 Iran’s Normative Framing: Nuclear Disarmament as Humanitarian Mission Iran’s demand for universal and comprehensive nuclear disarmament has become a foreign policy mantra which is reflected in the rhetoric of the foreign policy elite and that of the Supreme Leader himself. A qualitative analysis of the content of Iranian speeches and working papers during the NPT Review Conferences and within the UN bodies concerned with disarmament (First Committee, Conference on Disarmament, UN Special Sessions on Disarmament 1978, 1982, 1988) shows that Iran has consistently advocated the implementation and strengthening of the disarmament norm. The constant rhetorical activation or confirmation of the disarmament norm serves to emphasize the importance attached to it. At the same time, Iran tries to anchor its particular interpretation of Article VI and the obligations resulting from it into the final documents of NPT Review Conferences. Iran perceives the mere existence of nuclear weapons as constituting a threat to world peace. Thus, in its view, only the complete abolition of these “antihuman weapons” (Mousavi 1981: 551) would guarantee safety for humankind. Even though Iran’s arms control policy is also guided by security and status considerations (Pirseyedi 2013: 126), the religious and moral rejection of weapons of mass destruction represents a continuous element of Iranian rhetoric that goes back to prerevolutionary times (e.g., Fartash 1975; Khalatbari 1978). Until today, “Iran considers the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its very basic principle” (Iran 2005a). If security concerns are raised, they are usually embedded in humanitarian reasoning. At the height of the Cold War, the Shah regime called for an end to the arms race and repeatedly warned of a “nuclear holocaust” (e.g., Ghods Nakhai 1961: 84), a recurrent phrase that was used until the late 1990s (e.g., Velayati 1996: 27; Khamenei 2010). Consequently, Iran welcomed the fact that in 1996, the International Court of Justice classified the threat of nuclear weapons or their use as being contrary to international law, and has ever since referred to the advisory opinion on a regular basis (e.g., Zarif et al. 1996; Kharrazi 2000; Iran 2005a). Notwithstanding the fact that Iranian delegates officially emphasize the equivalence of the NPT’s three pillars and resulting obligations, Article VI is repeatedly described as the most important contractual obligation, with nuclear disarmament being the treaty’s overarching goal (e.g., Nasseri 1990a: 19; Iran 2005d, 2010a). In order to document this to the outside world, in 2010, Ahmadinejad even proposed renaming the NPT as “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Treaty (D.N.P.T.)” (Ahmadinejad 2010b). Iran considers the disarmament obligation of the nuclear weapon states to be a quid pro quo—and thus a matter of justice—for the non-nuclear weapon states to renounce a nuclear option, and argues that nuclear abolition must take place independently of the goal of general and complete disarmament (e.g., Aram 1962; Fartash 1975: 47; Dabiri 1980b: 119; Iran 1990). 7.3 Iran’s Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament 165 7.3.3 Iranian Support for Measures Aimed at Facilitating Nuclear Disarmament Iran primarily advocated a strengthening of the disarmament norm through rhetorical affirmation or activation of Article VI and the obligations that in Iran’s view result from it. In addition, together with other non-nuclear weapon states, Iran supports various measures which are seen as being necessary steps on the way to a nuclear weapon-free world—most of which have been agreed upon by the treaty community as a whole or have been initiated by other countries. Iran is particularly strongly committed to promoting the entry into force of a comprehensive test ban treaty. In fact, the country played an active role in establishing the anti-test norm. The Shah regime had already spoken out in favor of banning all nuclear weapons tests in the 1960s, a measure that was regarded a necessary condition for ending the nuclear arms race (e.g., Ghods Nakhai 1961; Aram 1962). In 1963, a limited test ban treaty was passed, which banned nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, under water and in space, but allowed underground nuclear tests to continue. Iran regarded this as being inadequate and advocated a comprehensive and non-discriminatory ban on explosive and non-explosive tests under international control (e.g., Fartash 1979; Dabiri 1980a; Mashhadi 1988; Zarif 1991; Nasseri 1994a). Iran was actively involved in the CTBT negotiations that began in 1994 (by presenting various draft treaties) and was particularly active in developing verification procedures and establishing a worldwide seismological monitoring network ((International Monitoring System, IMS; see also Johnson 2009: 103–104; Pirseyedi 2013: 131–136) in the framework of the so-called Group of Governmental Experts (GSE). In this context, Iran offered to set up various (seismological) monitoring stations in the country (e.g., Nasseri 1994a; Velayati 1996).51 Nuclear testing was framed not only as a security threat, but also as a threat to the environment and health. According to Tehran, existing test sites were to be closed and the associated infrastructure to be irreversibly destroyed (e.g., Mashhadi 1987). In the final round of negotiations in February 1996, Iran presented its own draft treaty (Iran 1996a) which contained a comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions but allowed “peaceful nuclear explosions” under certain conditions. The preamble to the Iranian draft text even included a commitment to nuclear disarmament within a certain timeframe. With the draft, Tehran wanted to explore possible compromises (Velayati 1996). And indeed, Rebecca Johnson (2009: 103) concludes the Iranian draft helped the Disarmament Conference to reach agreement on a treaty text. Yet Iran was of the opinion that the final treaty text did not reflect the negotiations correctly. Together with India, it unsuccessfully tried to prevent the final report from being forwarded to the UN General Assembly (Johnson 2009: 138; Pirseyedi 2013: 136). Notwithstanding these shortcomings (in particular with regard to the provisions on entry into force and the disarmament commitment), Iran signed the CTBT in 51 At present (November 2018), Iran operates a seismic monitoring station in Tehran and two further aid stations in Kerman and Shushtar. A radionuclide station and an infrasonic station are planned. See http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/station profiles/. Accessed 28 November 2018. 166 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur September 1996 when the treaty was opened for signature. While Iranian delegates have ever since continuously advocated for its swift entry into force, Iran itself has not yet ratified the treaty—and says it will do so only when the USA has ratified the CTBT. Iran also took part in several other measures aimed at strengthening nuclear disarmament and contributed its own proposals to the debate. During the 2010 NPT Review Conference, President Ahmadinejad proposed that an independent body be entrusted with the preparation of guidelines to operationalize the obligations resulting from Article VI and that a temporary disarmament plan should be submitted (Ahmadinejad 2010b). The demands went well beyond the measures provided for in Article VI: Ahmadinejad called for the suspension of any research, development, or modernization of nuclear weapons. To underline the urgency of his demands, he also proposed renaming the NPT the “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Treaty (D.N.P.T.)” (Ahmadinejad 2010b: 6) and placing disarmament obligations at the center of the non-proliferation regime. However, the proposal has not been taken up again, either by other member states or by Iran itself. In line with the position of the non-aligned countries, Iran also advocated the idea of a time-bound framework for disarmament as early as the 1970s and 1980s (Fartash 1975: 48; Dabiri 1980b; Zarif 1999; Iran 2010a, among others). In this context, Iranian delegates reaffirmed Iran’s positive attitude toward a future Nuclear Weapons Convention.52 Iranian diplomats have repeatedly pleaded for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to be set up and given a negotiating mandate within the Conference on Disarmament (Velayati 1995; Ahmadinejad 2010b, among others). Beginning in 2005, Iran submitted a draft resolution to the CD, which reaffirmed these demands and resulted in corresponding UN resolutions.53 In 2011 and 2013, Iran co-sponsored draft resolutions (A/C.1/66/L.42 and A/C.1/68/L.36) calling on UN member states to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention. Iran also actively participated in the UN General Assembly’s Open-Ended Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament (Daryaei 2013; Iran 2013c) which was established in 2012, while in September 2013, it attended the first High-Level Meeting of the UNGA on Nuclear Disarmament, which was initiated by non-aligned countries (under Iranian chairmanship). President Rouhani presented a three-point plan, which was finally adopted by the UN General Assembly (A/RES/68/32 of 2013 and follow-up resolution A/RES/69/58 of 2014). Therein, Rouhani proposed declaring 26 September the “International Day for the Complete Abolition of Nuclear Weapons”. The intention was that the international community should use this day to reaffirm its commitment to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons (Rouhani 2013b). He also reiterated his call for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention to begin swiftly within theConference on Disarmament. Consequently, Iran participated in the negotiations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that commenced in March 2017, and voted in favor of its adoption on 7 July 2017. 52 For example by supporting the relevant action plan that the non-aligned countries submitted during the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NAM 2010). 53 See A/Res/60/70 of 2005; A/Res/62/24 of 2007; A/Res/64/31 of 2009 and A/Res/66/28 of 2011. 7.3 Iran’s Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament 167 7.3.4 Naming, Blaming, and Shaming of the Nuclear Weapon States Iran advocated a strengthening of the disarmament norm not only through rhetorical affirmation of Article VI and supporting measures to foster nuclear disarmament. It also used a strategy that norm researchers subsume with the label “naming, blaming, and shaming,” i.e., fierce criticism directed toward the nuclear weapon states, and above all the USA, for not living up to their disarmament obligations as stipulated in Article VI. Iranian politicians perceive the adherence to nuclear weapons as a continuation of imperialism and thus as a morally reprehensible attempt by the NWS to attain hegemony. Iran therefore frames its commitment to a world free from nuclear weapons in the tradition of anticolonialism (e.g., Dabiri 1980b; Mahallati 1983; Mashhadi 1986). During the 1980s in particular, Iranian speeches were charged with calls for non-aligned countries not to run counter the doctrine of nuclear deterrence by developing their own nuclear weapon capabilities. Instead, Iran called into question the symbolic value of nuclear weapons as status objects and advocated a commitment to multilateral disarmament. The fact that Iran linked its willingness to accept further non-proliferation measures to the proper implementation of Article VI (e.g., Dabiri 1980b; Zarif 1995; Iran 2010a) should be seen in this context. A central element of Iran’s advocacy for strengthening the disarmament norm is therefore the persistent naming, shaming, and blaming of the nuclear weapon states’ combined misconduct. Criticism regarding inadequate treaty provisions and the lack of implementation of the nuclear disarmament norm on the side of NWS have been a central element of Iranian speeches since the first NPT Review Conference in 1975.54 Two thematic clusters can be discerned. First, Iran complained that in practice, the nuclear weapon states have hardly taken any disarmament steps (e.g., Dabiri 1980b; Kharrazi 2000, 2005b; Ahmadinejad 2010b). These accusations were already voiced in the UN disarmament bodies before the NPT came into force and were linked to the demand for general and complete disarmament (e.g., Pahlavi 1970; Fartash 1975; Mahallati 1983; Mashhadi 1987). Besides inadequate implementation of the obligations resulting from Article VI, Iran also missed progress with regard to efforts that had been agreed upon in final documents as follow-on or additional measures to foster nuclear disarmament (i.e., negotiations of a CTBT, politically binding negative security assurances, a NWFZ in the Middle East; Dabiri 1980b; Velayati 1990b: 49–50, 1995). Second, Iranian delegates criticized the nuclear weapon states for upgrading and modernizing their arsenals both quantitatively and qualitatively (e.g., Dabiri 1980b; Shahabi Sirjani 1985b; Nasseri 1990a; Moradi 1995; Kharrazi 2005a). 54 Earlier, the Shah regime had criticized the superpowers’ continuing arms race and their unwillingness to enter into serious disarmament negotiations (e.g., Hoveyda 1972: 3). Although moderate in tone and careful not to blame the superpowers all too clearly, Iran called on them to live up to their responsibility. 168 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur In Iran’s reading, the lack of implementation of the disarmament norm not only constituted a violation of the Treaty; it also hindered the universality of the NPT (Fartash 1975; Dabiri 1980b: 120; Mahallati 1988). Over and over again, Iran criticized the mismatch between words and deeds of the “Nuclear Greats” and objected that “the participating governments are really hypocritical […] no one is interested in reducing the burden of the arms race, but rather that each state or group of states is seeking only to disarm the others, while ensuring the maintenance of its own weapons mix” (Fartash 1977: 59, 58). In 1985, an Iranian delegate lamented the fact that the gap between perception and expectation which had existed during the first five years of the Treaty had widened considerably. […] Through the continuing nuclear arms race and the lack of any serious negotiations to halt and reverse it, the nuclear-weapon States had continued to undermine the expectations and good faith upon which the non-nuclear-weapon States had relied when they had acceded to the Treaty. The non-nuclear-weapon States had been humiliated by the abuse of their trust and confidence. (Shababi Sirjani 1985a: 181) Consequently, in Iran’s view, it would only be a matter of time before the nonaligned countries no longer felt bound by their treaty obligations. In fact, it claimed that the irresponsible attitude of the NWS called into question the continued existence of the treaty regime (e.g., Fartash 1975: 48; Iran 1990; Nasseri 1990a; Kharrazi 2005a). While Iran welcomed the bilateral disarmament negotiations between the USA and the USSR (SALT I and SALT II) that took place in the 1970s and late 1980s (Mashhadi 1986; Velayati 1988b), the country regarded several practices as violating the provisions laid down in Articles I and II of the NPT: The adherence to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, particularly the stationing of nuclear weapons on allies’ territory and the concept of nuclear sharing (Dabiri 1981; Velayati 1988b). The stalled negotiations over the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and the refusal of the NWS to accept legally binding negative security assurances were also repeated causes for Iranian criticism. However, it is above all “the lack of a clear commitment to a zero option by all nuclear-weapon states” (Zarif 1995: 5) that Iran complains about time and again. Iran shifted its strategy from criticism to blackmail when it announced that its approval of the indefinite extension of the 1995 treaty would depend, among other things, on progress on the disarmament issue. The nuclear weapons tests carried out by China and France in 1996 had been interpreted as an indication of the lacking will to disarm of the nuclear weapon states and as a warning signal that the NNWS would lose any means of exerting pressure by agreeing to the indefinite extension of the NPT (e.g., Nasseri 1995). Ultimately, Iran did not suit the action to the word. After all, the “Principles and Objectives” adopted at the 1995 Extension and Review Conference as well as the resolution calling to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East were regarded as appropriate means to strengthen nuclear disarmament. In addition, the “package proposal” consisting of the indefinite extension, the resolution on the Middle East, and the “principles and objectives” put the responsibility of the NWS on record (Nasseri 1995). At the 2000 RevCon, then Foreign Minister Kharrazi noted “a mix of satisfaction and frustration” (Kharrazi 2000) with regard to the implementation of these decisions. 7.3 Iran’s Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament 169 In particular, he deplored the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate (even though following diplomatic practice, he refrained from naming these countries), and he warned against a new nuclear arms race: Despite the ever-growing call for nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapon states have shown no sign of relenting. They still believe that holding on to extremely risky nuclear arsenals would secure them a prominent international status forever. It should be noted that the NPT has never meant to perpetuate a permanent classification of some states as nuclear-weapon states. (Kharrazi 2000) In his speech, he blamed the South Asian nuclear tests on frustration with the lack of progress in disarmament. This would have become clear from intensive discussions with both countries, which Tehran had undertaken with the purpose to persuade them to stop their activities (Kharrazi 1998: 3). Iran welcomed the “13 steps” set out in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference which included a “clear commitment” by the nuclear weapon states to disarm their nuclear arsenals. Iran once again reiterated the view that “nuclearweapon states have an international obligation to cease the manufacture of nuclear weapons, liquidate all their existing stockpiles and eliminate nuclear weapons and their means of delivery from their national arsenals” (Kharrazi 2000: 3). In the following years, criticism of the non-implementation of these measures was thus fierce. It became much sharper for various reasons: Due to the escalating nuclear crisis and in order to reverse the accusations put forward against Tehran, but also in response to the increasingly hostile US position on nuclear disarmament since George W. Bush had taken office in 2001. During the NPT preparatory conference in April 2003, the USA accused Iran of secretly working on an own nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s Deputy Secretary of State Ali Khoshroo responded with a series of sharp rhetorical counter-questions which are a prime example of Iranian naming, blaming, and shaming: How many nuclear weapon states other than the United States have prescribed the use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts and developed new types of nuclear weapons compatible with its combat scenarios? None. Which other nuclear weapon states have named non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT as the targets of their nuclear weapons? None. Which other nuclear weapon states have sought to utilize outer space for nuclear purposes more than the United States? None. How many NPT nuclear weapon states other than the United States have legally rejected the CTBT and practically doomed its future? Why did the United States through its unilateral withdrawal from the ABM and its abrogation of step 7 of the 13 steps threaten the strategic stability of the world? Which NPT party other than the United States has left such a record of undermining so many international instruments, on disarmament and other issues alike? None. (Khoshroo 2003a: 12) While in the past, Tehran had adhered to the diplomatic practice of not citing individual states by name,55 a tendency to officially name the USA is observable 55 An exception is the reference to Israel’s suspected nuclear weapon status and the related demand that Israel should abandon its nuclear weapons program and join the NPT as NNWS. During the Iran–Iraq war, there are also repeated passages calling explicitly for Iraq to be condemned. Usually, more general terms such as “the nuclear weapon states” or “a certain nuclear weapon state” are used. 170 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur concurrent with the escalating nuclear crisis between Iran and Western states. For example, during the 2005 NPT RevCon, then Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi not only complained about the lack of progress in implementing the “13 steps” adopted in 2000, but also officially criticized “that the legacy of Mr. Bolton remains to be pursued and pronounced in this Conference by stressing that the USA does not have particular obligations under Article VI of the treaty” (Iran 2005d: 5). He also accused the nuclear weapon states of having violated the spirit and letter of the NPT: First, by upgrading the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines; second, by reversing the principle of the destruction of nuclear weapons toward their decommissioning; third, by terminating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and fourth, by adhering to concepts of nuclear sharing. Kharrazi also mentioned the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of third countries, the continued nuclear cooperation with Israel, the rejection of the CTBT, and the blockade of the negotiations on an FMCT. He saw additional indications in the development of new types of nuclear weapons and in the lacking willingeness to negotiate security assurances for nonnuclear weapon states (Kharrazi 2005a). Iran’s closing statement, in which then UN ambassador of Iran, Javad Zarif, demanded “[a]ny increase in nuclear capability should equal a reduction in political credibility,” made that point even clearer. He obviously blamed the USA for having caused the failure of negotiations through its “obstructionist moves” (Zarif 2005). It is striking that no equivalent mention is made of the modernization programs of the non-Western nuclear weapon states. This could simply be interpreted as an indication of Iran’s traditional anti-Americanism. Yet it also shows that Iran’s criticism (and particularly its fierceness) is related to the nuclear crisis. In fact, there are indications that Iran’s references to double standards and the NWS’s hypocrisy, in particular that of the USA, are increasing to the extent that Iran has been accused of violating treaty obligations. In this vein, an Iranian delegate lamented in 2008: Those who hypocritically preach that others should comply are themselves guilty of serious non-compliance in the context of article I, II, IV and VI of the NPT and the agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. That has given rise to the pervasive concern that some nuclear-weapon States have no genuine will to accomplish the disarmament part of the NPT bargain. (Al Habib 2008) In 2010, on the occasion of the “Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,” revolutionary leader Khamenei even accused the USA of having committed unforgivable war crimes through the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (“a major nuclear crime,” “the ultimate nuclear offence,” Khamenei 2010). At the same conference, Ahmadinejad called for the expulsion of the USA and other nuclear weapon states from the IAEA and the establishment of an international body to implement and monitor the nuclear disarmament process (Al Arabyia 2010; Rajiv 2010). However, this proposal also did not lead to a more far-reaching initiative. During the 2010 NPT RevCon, Iran put the blame for the failed 2005 RevCon on the disarmament hostility of “certain Nuclear Weapon States” (Iran 2010e), i.e., the USA and France. In a working paper, Iran once again accused the NWS of failing 7.3 Iran’s Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament 171 to comply with their treaty obligations,56 and their adherence to the doctrine of deterrence is described as a threat to humanity: The continued existence of thousands of such bombs in the stockpiles of the United States and other nuclear powers has kept the fate of civilization and of humanity itself under horror and panic. By insisting on keeping nuclear bombs or merely decommissioning part of them, nuclear-weapon States themselves are the source of proliferation. As long as one nuclearweapon State or nuclear power outside of the Treaty insists on maintaining the nuclear option, the other nuclear-weapon States will do the same, and this vicious circle will never end. Thus the non-nuclear-weapon States that have already forgone the nuclear option are rightly asking why these terrible weapons exist. Under what circumstances and for what purpose would the use or threat of use of the world’s most destructive mass-terror weapons be justified. (Iran 2010g) Tehran’s vehement criticism continued throughout the conference, clearly surpassing that of the always critical non-aligned states (Johnson 2010). Teheran’s fierceness almost led to the failure of the conference, when it rejected the wording of the final declaration because it would paint too “rosy” a picture of disarmament progress (Iran 2010e). Iran was not willing to see President Obama’s efforts on “Global Zero” as a positive step toward nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, it felt that since he had entered into office, the US efforts to disarm had continued to diminish. 7.3.5 Practical Activities in Support of Nuclear Disarmament As already mentioned, Iran is actively engaged in the multilateral disarmament discourse. This is demonstrated by the numerous speeches in the relevant UN bodies: Nuclear disarmament is addressed in almost every statement. Tehran’s participation in the 1978, 1982, and 1988 UN special sessions on disarmament and the initiation of the first high-level meeting of the UN General Assembly on disarmament issues in 2013 also demonstrates the importance Iran attaches to the issue. An evaluation of Iran’s voting behavior in the First Committee and the UN General Assembly shows that the country continuously supported resolutions dealing with nuclear disarmament. Iran has also occasionally sponsored draft resolutions. During the NPT preparatory and review conferences, Iranian delegates also called for nuclear disarmament with above-average vigor. Independent observers attest that Iran has a comparatively high degree of activity with regard to nuclear disarmament: For the period from 2007 to 2015, Iran clearly leads the list of speeches on the subject of nuclear disarmament drawn up by the NGO Reaching Critical Will with 38 statements.57 Since 2002, Iran has also been complying with the transparency measure set 56 The USA, France, and Great Britain are explicitly mentioned, whereas China and Russia are not referred to. 57 For comparison, here are the quotas of some particularly disarmament friendly countries: Austria 15, Brazil 22, Egypt 20, Germany 10, Ireland 3, Mexico 23, Sweden 8, South Africa 21, New Zealand 24. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/profiles, 28 November 2018. For the analysis, I 172 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur out in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which calls on states to report annually on their implementation of Article VI.58 The Japanese Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (CPDNP), which has been evaluating state commitment to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear safety since 2012, places Iran in the lower midfield of all countries analyzed.59 In addition to rhetorically reaffirming the nuclear disarmament norm in multilateral forums, Iran undertook some unilateral activities aimed at promoting nuclear disarmament. Not surprisingly, Iran also criticizes the inadequate disarmament practices of the nuclear weapon states on a national level, e.g., in the context of Friday prayers, in speeches by the Supreme Leader or in the form of research work and publications by think tanks close to the government.60 Rather than providing scientific expertise, these measures are intended to influence international opinion. Two international disarmament and non-proliferation conferences held in 2010 and 2011, for example, stated that they were pursuing the goal “[to] examine the current challenges towards the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments and finding mechanisms to realize the lofty goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world” (Iran 2010f). In the context of these conferences, Iran presented itself as “a forerunner in the global campaign against nuclear armaments” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iran 2010) and continued its criticism of the lack of disarmament practice in the nuclear weapon states. For example, President Ahmadinejad called for future disarmament negotiations to be convened by non-nuclear weapon states such as Iran (Ahmadinejad 2010a). The conference ended with a 12-point communiqué reaffirming several measures geared toward fostering disarmament, i.e., the entry into force of the CTBT and the adoption of a comprehensive, legally binding nuclear weapons convention.61 A follow-up conference held in June 2011 reflected the setting and central contents have refrained from quantifying the proportion of text passages relating to the issue of nuclear disarmament in comparison with the total amount of text itself. Firstly, the completeness of the data basis could not be guaranteed, as not all documents were accessible (in particular for the early review conferences). Secondly, the analysis showed that Iran referred to this aspect in almost every speech or working paper, thus also placing other issues in the broader context of nuclear disarmament. 58 See the annual reports on the implementation of Articles VI: Iran (2004, 2005a, 2007b, 2008a, 2009b, 2010f, 2012, 2015a, b, c). 59 The (rhetorical) commitment to nuclear disarmament is evaluated in the categories “Commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons”; “Role and significance of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies and policies”; “CTBT”; “FMCT”; “engagement in research and development for verification of measures of nuclear weapons reductions”; “irreversibility”; “disarmament and non-proliferation education and cooperation with civil society” (Hiroshima Report 2012, 2014). A problem is that in some cases participation in initiatives whose membership is circumscribed to an inclusive circle is also evaluated—which negatively affects the level of Iranian engagement (as well as that of other countries who are excluded from such arrangements). 60 Examples for publications by governmental think tanks are Shahabi (1994); Zarif et al. (1996) or the overviews on the homepages of the Center for Strategic Research and the Institute for Political and International Studies: http://www.csr.ir/center.aspx?lng=en and http://www.ipis.ir/index.aspx? siteid=9. Accessed 28 November 2018. 61 See http://cms.mfa.gov.ir/cms/cms/Tehranicd/en/ConclusionofDiscussion. Accessed 2 November 2014. 7.3 Iran’s Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament 173 of the previous year.62 Both conferences took place in the presence of (selected) civil society (i.e., international disarmament experts and NGOs concerned with the issue), which Iran had invited in advance. Throughout the entire period under investigation, it is striking that Iran—at least rhetorically—seems to be clearly committed toward working together with civil society actors (e.g., Zarif 2005). The country also made repeated attempts to approach international disarmament initiatives and in these contexts to promote its own activities or collaborative proposals which it supported.63 7.3.6 Assessment In conclusion, the rhetorical commitment and practical activities which Iran deployed to foster nuclear disarmament correspond to the indicators for norm entrepreneurship set out in Sect. 5.2.1: Throughout the entire period of analysis, Iran has been committed to strengthening the disarmament norm. Together with like-minded actors, Tehran promoted the implementation of the proposed measures within various institutional forums and at various levels (national, regional, international). Iran expressed its dissatisfaction with the implementation of the disarmament norm by the nuclear weapon states through repeated verbal criticism. Iranian delegates also took every opportunity to denounce the misconduct of the nuclear weapon states, which Tehran considered to be a violation of treaty obligations. Yet the analysis shows no indication that Iran aimed to undermine current regime structures as suggested by alternative explanation 1. While it made repeated use of naming, shaming, and blaming, these were primarily directed against the lack of disarmament efforts by nuclear weapon states. The country used destructive strategies to underline its demands (e.g., initiation of counter-events, deconstruction of opposing frameworks, verbal provocation, and stigmatization). By that, it wanted to hold the nuclear weapon states accountable and demanded that they act in compliance with the norms—its activities were thus aimed at strengthening the disarmament norm. This also disproves the validity of alternative explanation 2: Iran’s engagement was not merely a reaction to an international norm, which was perceived as a threat to its own autonomy and countered with the formulation of subsidiary norms. It is true that the lack of implementation of Article VI was criticized as hegemonic behavior and power politics of the nuclear weapon states. But rather than being based on alternative normative meanings, Iran’s efforts to strengthen the disarmament norm were closely linked to the meaning enshrined in the NPT. While the case at hand seems to qualify as Iranian norm advocacy, it has to be noted that the norm entrepreneurship was comparatively weak. Iran made use of the typical framing strategies and, in addition, resorted to various practical activities 62 Key topics were the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East and the conference in Helsinki scheduled for 2012. According to participants, the first priority for Iranian government members was to demand Israel’s unconditional accession to the NPT; confidential participation report of a Western NGO representative. 63 Email conversation with a participating scientist 20 July 2011; see also Press TV (2010). 174 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur that meet the criteria of norm entrepreneurship. However, in several respects, Iran fulfilled these requirements only weakly during the period of investigation: For example, it participated only selectively in some of the measures aimed at strengthening nuclear disarmament. Iran is one of the most ardent supporters of disarmament within the Non-Aligned Movement and has shown above-average commitment. However, Iran’s activities do not stand out from the mass of non-aligned countries and are surpassed, for example, by the proactivism of Egypt, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa (e.g., Hanson 2012: 57; Wunderlich et al. 2013). This is particularly evident from the fact that the latter are trying to adopt bridge-building positions and are participating in heterogeneous initiatives that specifically seek to overcome the North–South divide by working out consensual solutions. Iran’s cooperation with civil society has also been extremely selective—which also has to be alluded to the NGOs themselves, who—for several reasons—often shy away from cooperating with Iran (Westberg 2010). Apparently, some regard it as too risky to endanger their own objectives by cooperating with an alleged norm breaker. That Iran’s norm entrepreneurship in this case is rather weak is further underlined by the fact that some proposals put forward by Iran seemed to be mere symbolic politics—they caused a furor in the disarmament debates but were not taken up again. An example is Ahmadinejad’s suggestion in 2010 to establish guidelines for the implementation of Article VI. Does this mean that Iranian norm entrepreneurship is less relevant or even to be disqualified due to competing (and more active) norm entrepreneurs? Or is it irrelevant to the quality of norm entrepreneurship that there are other “competing” actors who are committed to strengthening a norm? These questions will be taken up again in the concluding chapter. Table 7.3 summarizes Iran’s norm entrepreneurship with regard to nuclear disarmament according to the criteria for norm entrepreneurship discussed in Sect. 5.2.1. 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment Iran holds the view that the NPT guarantees non-nuclear weapon states a right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment. While Tehran’s advocacy for such a right can be traced back to the Shah era, the formal recognition of this right is a central element of the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West that started in 2003. Over the years, Iranian diplomats have carefully crafted a “narrative avowing Iran’s right to nuclear energy” (Farhi 2009: 3), which is used as justification for the mastery of the full nuclear fuel cycle. At the same time, this right is framed as a central norm of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and as serving the common good of all treaty members. Iran’s engagement is not aimed at building a new norm. Rather, Tehran seeks to implement and codify its own interpretation of the norm of technological cooperation (which it claims to be the originally intended meaning of the norm) into the discourse. Eventually, Iran intends to specify the meaning of the norm. 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 175 Table 7.3 Overview of the respective characteristics of norm entrepreneurship based on Sell and Prakash (2004: 153) for the case of “nuclear disarmament” Norm entrepreneur case 2: Iran’s commitment to strengthening the norm of nuclear disarmament Period – Demand existed already prior to the establishment of the NPT – Within the NPT: 1979 until today Trigger (extrinsic/intrinsic) – No concrete reason; general religious/moral/security concerns against WMD and increasing frustration at the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament by the NWS Problem definition – According to Iran the nuclear weapon states are not fulfilling their obligation of Article VI to disarm their arsenals completely and irreversibly under international control – Interim measures until general and complete disarmament has been achieved are not implemented or blocked by NWS Preferred solution – Implementation of Article VI by complete abolition of NWS’ nuclear arsenals; ideally by adopting a nuclear weapons convention with a certain timeframe – Strengthening Article VI through interim measures, e.g., CTBT, FMCT, transparency measures Normative framing – Holding on to the possession of nuclear weapons is immoral, un-Islamic, inhuman, and illegal – The best protection against the use of nuclear weapons is disarmament – Moral responsibility of the international community, in particular the nuclear weapon states which have a special role due to grand bargain enshrined in the NPT; ending double standards National interests – National interests in the Middle East (Israel’s nuclear status, regional hegemony) – Disarmament as a cover for secret nuclear weapons capabilities? – Political interests: criticism of the USA as the “arch-enemy” Applied strategies – Fierce naming, blaming, and shaming as well as emotionalizing language – Rhetorical demands – Public relations – Cooperation with like-minded states and civil society (continued) 176 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur Table 7.3 (continued) Norm entrepreneur case 2: Iran’s commitment to strengthening the norm of nuclear disarmament Resources – Diplomacy – Scientific expertise Allies – NAM states – Civil society actors Normative change? – Specification of the obligations resulting from Article VI, but not as a credit for Iran’s commitment. However, Iran had its share in further inciting displeasure among the non-aligned regarding the NWS’ unwillingness to disarm Substantial change? – With regard to the specific norms supported by Iran (CTBT and the Nuclear Weapons Convention), no progress can be attributed to Iran’s activities Breaches or doubts about the credibility of the norm entrepreneurship? – Accusations regarding the establishment of a secret nuclear program associated with violations of safeguards obligations – Inconsistencies regarding perceived or discontinued policy initiatives – Exemplary proposals were not followed by follow-up actions/initiatives 7.4.1 Background: The Controversy Over the “Inalienable Right to the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy” In order to make sense of Iran’s advocacy, it is necessary to understand the norm dynamics within the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly with regard to the controversy surrounding the relative hierarchy and meaning of the NPT’s core norms which impose different rights and obligations on the member states: (1) Articles I and II form the core of the non-proliferation norm: Nuclear weapon states pledge neither to transfer nuclear materials and technologies to nonnuclear weapon states nor to assist them in developing nuclear weapons. NNWS undertake to refrain from acquiring, developing, and possessing nuclear weapons. In order to verify compliance with this obligation, they agree to subject all fissile materials in their possession to IAEA verification measures (safeguards) (Article III, 1). (2) Article IV acknowledges the “inalienable right” of State Parties to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It also calls for the “fullest possible exchange” of nuclear-related information and technology between NWS and NNWS (norm of technological cooperation). Article III, 2 states that civilian nuclear technology and fissile materials may only be exported to countries which are subject to IAEA safeguards. 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 177 (3) Finally, in Article VI, State Parties commit themselves to pursuing nuclear disarmament. Originally, treaty negotiations focused on curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament and technological cooperation in the civilian uses of nuclear technology were not mentioned in the early drafts between the Soviet Union and the USA (on the history of negotiations, see Shaker 1980: vol. 1–3). However, the NNWS demanded concessions for the renunciation of a nuclear option and for voluntary submission to the IAEA inspection regime. In return, NWS were required to commit themselves to disarming their arsenals and facilitating exchange and cooperation in the realm of civilian uses of nuclear energy. This was meant to prevent the NPT enshrining a policy of “nuclear apartheid” (Singh 1998). Consequently, Article IV codifies the “inalienable right of all the Parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II”. State Parties agree to “facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. Furthermore, member states are requested to cooperate with the aim of further developing the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Particular reference is made to the “needs of the developing regions of the world”.64 There is disagreement, especially with regard to the meaning and scope of the provisions formulated in Article IV (Franceschini 2012), particularly as to whether “research, production and use of nuclear energy” includes a legal right to access enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology. Attempts by non-nuclear weapon states to explicitly include language on such provisions in the treaty text were not successful (Shaker 1980: 293–299). Against this background, it has been argued that there is no right to uranium enrichment (and reprocessing) simply because the treaty does not explicitly refer to it (e.g., Ford 2009; Makovsky and Misztal 2012; Sherman 2013). Others counter that what is not explicitly prohibited is allowed (e.g., Joyner 2013: 289; Beeman 2013).65 The controversy also affects the implementation of the norm of technological cooperation. Questions arise as to what extent technologically advanced states are obliged to make sensitive technologies available and under which conditions nuclear exports are to take place. Supporters of a rather restrictive interpretation of Article IV call into question the existence of an unconditional legal right to enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Basically, three “camps” can be distinguished: 64 Apart from the discriminatory division into nuclear haves and have-nots, a second asymmetry of the NPT is that about three dozen states possess sophisticated nuclear capabilities, while those of the majority of treaty members are limited (Franceschini 2012: 3). This is why it is particularly important for the latter to implement the arrangements set out in Article IV, i.e., to enable cooperation. Controversies reign especially with regard to the scope of trade in civilian nuclear energy. 65 Confusion results from the fact that the “inalienable right” formulated in Article IV is conditional upon the State Party behaving in conformity with the obligations set out in Articles I and II: These prohibit the parties from any activities aimed at the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons. In particular, it is contested which measures already violate the requirement laid down in Article II not to “manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. 178 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur (1) The majority of states hold the view that compliant NPT member states may develop full fuel cycle capabilities for peaceful purposes. In the 1970s, this position was particularly advocated by Western nuclear energy countries, including Germany (Fey et al. 2014). Indeed, Article IV, paragraph 2 links the “inalienable right” to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to behavior in “accordance with Articles I and II,” which prohibit State Parties to produce, acquire, and proliferate nuclear weapons. Conversely, deviant NPT members forfeit these rights. Yet, it is unclear who decides about compliance or/non-compliance: Some NPT members, particularly those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement (Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2012: 104), argue that a state’s legal right of access to sensitive technologies depends solely on the IAEA’s judgment, i.e., if it could be proven beyond any doubt that a country had violated its safeguards agreement with the IAEA or its NPT commitments. A precedent for proponents of this position occurred in November 2006, when the IAEA rejected a request for technical assistance from Iran and suspended a great deal of its cooperation program with the country with reference to doubts about Iran’s compliance with its NPT obligations and violations of UN resolutions (Boureston and Lacey 2007). Other states, e.g., those belonging to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), hold that the decision to grant access to sensitive technologies ought to be the matter of the respective exporting country. Since 1977, members of the NSG are obliged to exercise restraint when trading in ENR technologies (Strulak 1993: 3). (2) The US government favors a particularly strict model of “technology governance” (Franceschini 2012: 6). According to this view, Article IV contains some legal loopholes that non-nuclear weapon states could exploit to develop military capabilities under the guise of civilian use of nuclear energy. They therefore demand strict trade restrictions for proliferation-related technologies and materials (e.g., Ford 2009: 24). In 1978, the USA supported by several Western countries decided that nuclear trade would only be conducted with countries whose activities would be subject to full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. Several other measures were introduced that aimed at restricting trade in sensitive technologies (Müller et al. 2013: 56). Today, the USA still follows a restrictive approach in the form of bilateral trade agreements and measures for the export of ENR technologies within the NSG (e.g., Müller et al. 2014: 27). In light of these policies, “the Bush administration distorted the nature of the peaceful uses pillar to make it appear as a gift rather than an obligation” (Graham 2012: 138). In 2004, George W. Bush even proposed that NSG members should “limit access to and control of sensitive technologies to an exclusive group of established technology owners” (Bush 2004). Ultimately, this attempt to reinterpret Article IV (Lantis 2015; Tannenwald 2013) failed—Bush abandoned his position during his second term of office. The proposal had created too much resistance, especially among non-aligned NSG members such as Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. (3) A third “camp” argues that a country’s right to enrichment depends on its needs. Accordingly, only non-nuclear-weapon states with large nuclear energy pro- 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 179 grams would have a right to access ENR technologies. All other cases, i.e., enrichment or reprocessing without requirements, are seen by proponents of this position as an indication of military intentions (e.g., Singh 2014). The view that access to ENR technologies should be subject to certain conditions is particularly contested by the non-aligned NNWS, who refer to national sovereignty rights and the right to development. In their view, enrichment and reprocessing should be regarded as unconditional, i.e., truly “inalienable” rights of all NPT member states and therefore non-negotiable. They interpret Article IV as entailing an obligation to cooperate, which legally obliges nuclear advanced states to facilitate trade in dual-use goods. What is today a position of the developing countries has historically been of concern to Western holders of nuclear technology. The attempt by the USA to strictly limit access to and trade in sensitive nuclear goods and technologies was regarded as illegal and discriminatory by countries such as Germany and Belgium (Shaker 1980: 293–299; Müller et al. 2013: 55–56; Fey et al. 2014). Today, it is primarily non-aligned countries that reject restrictive export control regimes, proposals to limit access to ENR technologies, and considerations on the multilateralization of the fuel cycle (Joyner 2011: 59). While only few of them support Iran’s position that export controls in and of itself are to be rejected as discriminatory means, most NAM states accept measures such as making export conditional upon the acceptance of fullscope safeguards. Yet their argumentation rests on their belief that Article IV entails an inherent right to the full fuel cycle and that the development of ENR technologies is a matter of national sovereignty. Accordingly, it must not be made dependent on the credibility of their respective nuclear energy policies or withdrawn on the pretext of non-compliance (Franceschini 2012: 6–7; Tannenwald 2013: 306–308). Despite the political and scientific controversy that has been simmering for years, the international community has so far failed to reach consensus on “Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs” (Ford 2009). In this context, Iran’s persistent commitment to a right to uranium enrichment can be seen as an attempt to contribute to the specification of Article IV. 7.4.2 Iran’s Narrative of “Nuclear Rights” in the Context of Its Nuclear Program Iran’s advocacy for the right to the full use of peaceful nuclear energy, including sensitive technologies, can be traced back to pre-revolutionary times and is closely linked to the development of indigenous nuclear capabilities.66 Shah Reza Pahlavi aspired to transform his country into a model of modernity (Pahlavi 1968: 132–133). 66 Iran is not the only country that interprets Article IV of the NPT as entailing an inherent right to enrichment and reprocessing. Today, Brazil, Mexico, and Romania in particular share this concern. During the treaty negotiations, Western countries such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland had spoken out in favor of more explicit language (Shaker 1980: 293–299). Back then, Iran was not yet a member of the negotiation forum and thus did not participate. 180 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur At a time when nuclear energy was considered synonymous with scientific progress and an expression of “Western” lifestyle (which the Shah desperately tried to imitate; Patrikarakos 2012: 43), Iran initiated a comprehensive nuclear energy program in 1957. The West, especially the USA, played a major role in the development of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. After Iran had promised to use the supplied materials and technologies exclusively for peaceful purposes, comprehensive civilian nuclear cooperation began in 1974 covering technical assistance as well as the supply of enriched uranium. With the support of various foreign suppliers, Iran slowly developed its own capacities and nuclear expertise and soon began exploration of national uranium reserves (Etemad 1987: 205)—the first stage of the fuel cycle. The Shah (and the revolutionary regime that succeeded him) justified the nuclear program with reference to economic reasons, energy diversification, the necessity to keep up with technological progress, and an expression of national sovereignty (Pahlavi 1968: 307–308; Etemad 1987: 209–210; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran 1994: 242). According to Akbar Etemad, the first president of the AEOI and “father of Iran’s nuclear program” (Nufer 2012), the Shah had been interested in building his own fuel cycle, which he saw as a sovereign right, from the start (Etemad 1987: 222). The foundations of Iran’s narrative of nuclear rights can already be found in early speeches by Iranian delegates during NPT and IAEA conferences. Statements contain repeated references to the importance of Article IV, the inclusion of which in the treaty document constituted the necessary condition for developing countries to accede to the treaty (Ameri 1975: 269; Fartash 1975). Iran placed particular hope in the IAEA, the primary task of which was perceived to be to support the member states in their use of civil nuclear energy. Importantly, the Shah regime advanced the view that trade in civilian nuclear materials and technologies should only be made with countries that accepted IAEA safeguards (Pirseyedi 2013: 119). The language used by the Shah regime can be described as moderate when compared with that of the Islamic regime that was to follow. Back then, systematic and repeated references to the “inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” were almost completely lacking. This is surprising given the fact that the cooperation granted to the Shah by the West was not unlimited. Concerned about a risk of proliferation, the USA was skeptical about Iran acquiring domestic ENR capacities right from the start. It therefore insisted that additional bilateral controls be carried out in addition to IAEA safeguards (Milani 2010). Indeed, the AEOI not only began to explore uranium mining and research on laser enrichment in 1976; the Shah had also expressed interest in plutonium reprocessing. Eventually, however, he gave in to Western pressure and refrained from establishing a national ENR program, even though rhetorically, he adhered to the idea of an inherent right (Milani 2010). With the 1979 Islamic Revolution, nuclear cooperation with the West came to an abrupt end (Etemad 1987: 208), although nuclear research, particularly with regard to the exploration of uranium deposits as well as mining and conversion continued (partly without informing the IAEA). The USA stopped supplying highly enriched uranium and in subsequent years thwarted various cooperation projects between Iran and non-Western supplier countries (e.g., Argentina or China). 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 181 Due to the increased demand for energy and the efforts to further expand national technical and scientific expertise on nuclear issues, the nuclear program was officially relaunched in 1982. The Iranian regime, which due to its radical stance faced international isolation, tried in vain to win cooperation partners for the completion of its nuclear infrastructure. The start of a national enrichment program in 1985 has been justified by Iran as a reaction to the systematic denial of access to nuclear technology by the West.67 From that time on, the nuclear program became an integral part of the selfdefinition of the Islamic Republic (Patrikarakos 2012: 169). For the revolutionary regime, it was a symbol of resistance against Western hegemony. 1985 was the first time that Iran in a speech at the IAEA General Conference referred to its “inalienable” right to a civil nuclear energy program explaining […] that all countries had the right to plan, implement and develop peaceful nuclear programmes, having regard to their own resources, needs and priorities, and that they had likewise an absolute and unlimited right of access to supplies, services and know-how in the domain of nuclear science and technology. […] All States should respect the rights and decisions of others relating to fuel cycle programs as well as the policies adopted by others for the peaceful use of nuclear energy; the conditions for the transfer of technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of countries wishing to benefit from that technology. (Amrollahi 1984; my emphasis) Due to international trade restrictions, Iran turned to the network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan from which it purchased blueprints and components for gas centrifuge enrichment plants. From 1987 to 1993, Tehran secretly conducted intensive research and development in the field of centrifuge technology.68 Since official Western procurement channels were denied, the regime sought nuclear technology cooperation with China and—after Beijing had succumbed to American pressure—with Russia until it was stopped in 1995 (Patrikarakos 2012: 196–204). In 2002, an Iranian opposition group, the People’s Mujahedin, revealed that the regime had already begun construction of a heavy-water reactor in Arak and an enrichment plant in Natanz during the 1990s.69 In subsequent years, it became apparent that Iran had over a longer period of time and repeatedly violated its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (for an overview El Baradei 2011: Chaps. 5, 9, 11, 12).70 Although the country continued to adhere to the rhetoric of peaceful uses of nuclear 67 See http://nuclearenergy.ir/history/. Accessed 2 November 2014. Unfortunately, the web site has now been put offline, but it can be reconstructed via Internet archives such as the Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org/). 68 Iran justified its behavior by saying that the centrifuges had been used to produce fuel for the operation of the Bushehr reactor, which at that time had been destroyed by Iraqi attacks. See nuclearenergy.ir/history. Accessed 2 November 2014 or Amrollahi (1986) and Soltanieh (2008). 69 This is not illegal in itself, but falls within Article IV, which allows research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, Iran would have been obliged to inform the organization of the facility, at least 90 days before it was to be equipped with nuclear materials. After the revelation, Tehran argued that there was no such reporting obligation and that it had intended to inform the IAEA later that year (IAEA 2003). 70 For an overview of IAEA reports on Iran’s nuclear program see http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/ focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports. Accessed 28 April 2017. 182 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur energy, doubts arose due the lacking economic rationale for the nuclear program, a deteriorating regional security context, and increased arms expenditures and political threats by Iran. There was also growing concern about Tehran’s intentions because efforts to clarify the situation were blocked by Iran with political maneuvering and deception (El Baradei 2011: Chap. 5).71 Ultimately, the USA and Europe sought to persuade Iran to abandon its enrichment program.72 Beginning in 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors had adopted several resolutions calling on Iran to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities until outstanding questions on the military dimension of its program had been resolved. In 2006, the Security Council also imposed a comprehensive sanctions regime, including travel restrictions, trade embargoes, and financial measures. It also contained references to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, should Iran fail to comply with the required enrichment stop (Davenport 2012). In February 2008, the IAEA announced that there was no evidence that Iran was still working on a military dimension (IAEA 2008). Similarly, a report by the US National Intelligence Council in December 2007 concluded that it was “highly likely” that Iran had maintained a nuclear weapons program until the fall of 2003 but “almost certainly” had not re-started it (New York Times 2007). The revelation of undeclared nuclear activities not only provoked the ongoing crisis between Iran and the West. It also prompted Iran to demand and promote the right to uranium enrichment even more intensively than before. Faced with accusations that its nuclear program violated international law, President Khatami launched a massive campaign, which linked elements of Iran’s argumentation into a systematic narrative of nuclear rights. Iran’s quest to control the complete fuel cycle was basically framed as a legitimate and unconditional right of a member state of the NPT. In Iran’s view, the nuclear activities undertaken were within the civilian uses of nuclear energy permitted by the NPT. Enrichment and reprocessing were not explicitly prohibited in the NPT and were therefore allowed. In 2004, Khatami demanded “that our right to enrichment be recognized by the international community because it is our legal right and in accordance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” (quoted after Fathi 2004). IAEA and UN Security Council resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment activities were regarded as violating Article IV and as a means to deny Iran “a natural right to possess the fuel cycle” (Rouhani 2005). The issue of enrichment soon became the crux of the multilateral nuclear negotiations that lasted for more than ten years. The tension between the West’s desire to put 71 It took almost six months for the IAEA to gain access to the facilities in Arak and Natanz. In the years that followed, Iran withheld information and used tactical maneuvering. In the course of the attempts to clarify the situation, even more dubious activities came to light, e.g., the supply of construction plans for P-2 centrifuges by the Khan network (IAEA 2004a) or experiments with polonium-210, which can trigger a chain reaction necessary for a nuclear explosion (Patrikarakos 2012: 280–281. 72 How to achieve that aim was contested. While Europe pleaded for diplomacy, Washington favored strong condemnation and a referral of the case to the UN Security Council. In the eyes of some Europeans, by resuming enrichment activities, Iran had not violated its NPT commitments but the safeguards agreement with the IAEA (El Baradei 2011: Chap. 9; Patrikarakos 2012: 255–263). 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 183 a halt to Iran’s enrichment program and Iran’s insistence on the formal recognition of a right to uranium enrichment was already evident in the first phase of negotiations between Iran and the EU3 (France, Germany, and the UK). The “Tehran Declaration” of October 2003, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities and to sign and voluntarily implement the IAEA Additional Protocol (BBC 2003), put on the record a vague right of Iran to develop civilian nuclear energy within the framework of the NPT. However, the text remained as vague as the NPT on the question of what exactly this right entailed. In the “Paris Agreement” of November 2004, the three European states reaffirmed their readiness “[to] recognize Iran’s right under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the treaty, without discrimination” (IAEA 2004b). In return, Iran agreed to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities from mid-2004 to July 2005 and reaffirmed its willingness to cooperate and allow inspections by the IAEA.73 Yet the West, especially the USA, continued to demand “zero enrichment” and in August 2005 called on Tehran “not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water power and research reactors” (Governments of France, Germany and United Kingdom 2005). All attempts to resolve the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program by diplomatic means eventually failed because the positions regarding the right to uranium enrichment seemed irreconcilable: Tehran insisted on the formal recognition of its narrowly defined nuclear rights and refused to give up uranium enrichment altogether. The West was not willing to let this happen (Mousavian 2013).74 During the presidency of Ahmadinejad, Iran’s position became even more rigid. In light of the lack of progress in the negotiations, the political leadership criticized the concessions to the West, suspended the IAEA Additional Protocol until Iran’s right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was recognized (Patrikarakos 2012: 309), and resumed uranium enrichment in 2006 (the decision had already been made during Khatami’s term of office). At that time, all Security Council members plus Germany (“EU3+3”) were involved in the negotiations to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran. In Iran, the nuclear program had long since acquired symbolic status. Notwithstanding disagreement as to the concrete negotiation strategies, there was broad political consensus regarding the claim to a legal right to the full fuel cycle (Farhi 2009: 4). In April 2006, Tehran finally achieved a breakthrough in uranium enrichment up to 3.5%. President Ahmadinejad proudly announced “Iran has joined the 73 In the meantime, Iran’s nuclear program continued to make progress. In 2005, Rouhani, the chief negotiator at the time, admitted that Iran had entered into concessions only in areas in which there were no more technical problems. The main aim had been to gain time in order to make progress in mastering the full fuel cycle and to prevent a referral to the UN Security Council (Rouhani 2005). 74 A nuclear proposals timeline published on the government-related Web site http://nuclearnenergy.ir shows that "Recognition of Right to Enrichment" was a recurring element of Iran’s negotiating position; http://nuclearenergy.ir/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/negotiationsfinal. jpg. Accessed 2 November 2014. Apart from agreements in October 2003, February and November 2004, however, offers from the West did not include the required recognition so that Tehran refused the proposals. In addition, the USA has long called for a ban on enrichment as a precondition for negotiations. Iran, on the other hand, was at best willing to accept a (temporary) suspension as a result of negotiations. 184 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur club of nuclear countries” (quoted in CNN 2006) and declared that the country would continue to expand its enrichment activities. The government declared the day as “National Day of Nuclear Technology” and placed it in the context of the fight against discrimination. In the words of then president Ahmadinejad: “[Western nations] have tried their utmost to prevent Iran from going nuclear, but Iran has gone nuclear. [….] Nobody will be able to stop it” (Ahmadinejad quoted according to Deutsche Welle 2013). The slogan “Nuclear energy is our inalienable right” became the mantra of the entire Iranian population (Vick 2012). The right to uranium enrichment had become a question of national identity. In a gesture of goodwill, Iran informed the IAEA of the existence of a hitherto unknown underground uranium enrichment plant in Fordo in 2009. Yet when the request to the IAEA for the supply of 20% enriched uranium for medical purposes and a suggestion to exchange reactor fuel with Russia failed, Iran announced in February 2010 that it planned to enrich uranium to 20% (Patrikarakos 2012: 353). During the 8th NPT Review Conference in May 2010, Tehran unexpectedly agreed to a fuel swap deal arranged by Turkey and Brazil. In a joint declaration, Iran agreed to hand over 1200 kg of low enriched uranium to Turkey and to receive 120 kg of 20% enriched uranium in exchange from the USA, Russia, France, and the IAEA (Iran et al. 2010). The statement even referred to “the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination” (Iran et al. 2010). However, as the West continued to insist on zero enrichment, this agreement also failed. As a result, neither UN resolutions nor a tightened sanctions regime or acts of sabotage (such as the Stuxnet cyberattack) prevented Iran from steadily expanding its enrichment program from 2009 to 2012. In 2010 and 2011, negotiations between Iran and the EU3+3 again failed because Tehran made unlimited access to the full fuel cycle and the right to uranium enrichment a precondition for any negotiated solution. In 2012, for the first time, the West offered Iran the prospect of “allowing” enrichment at a low level (Richter 2012). With the inauguration of President Hassan Rouhani (who had been chief negotiator in the nuclear dispute from 2003 to 2005), new hopes were awakened for a solution to the nuclear crisis. In 2013, after decades of hostility, direct bilateral talks between Iran and the USA took place for the first time. In November 2013, the negotiating parties reached a milestone on the way to a solution to the nuclear conflict: Iran and the EU3+3 agreed on the so-called “Geneva Action Plan” (EEAS 2013). As a result, in April 2015, Iran agreed to substantially reduce its nuclear program and to implement far-reaching transparency measures (e.g., limiting the extent and degree of enrichment and verification). In return, the EU and the USA wanted to gradually relax sanctions. There were, however, differences of opinion as to how the text of the agreement relates to Iran’s right to uranium enrichment. The wording does not explicitly recognize a legal claim. It simply states: “a comprehensive solution […] would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters” (EEAS 2010: 4). Nevertheless, Iranian government representatives celebrated the agreement as a milestone. In 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 185 a television address, President Rouhani declared: “Iran’s right to uranium enrichment on its soil was accepted in this nuclear deal by world powers. Let anyone make his own reading, but this right is clearly stated in the text of the agreement that Iran can continue its enrichment” (Rouhani, quoted in USIP 2013b). President Obama, on the other hand, reaffirmed: “In terms of the end state, we do not recognize a right for Iran to enrich uranium” (quoted in USIP 2013a). And Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed this position: “There is no right to enrich. We do not recognize a right to enrich. It is clear, in the […] NPT […] it’s very, very [clear] that there is no right to enrich” (quoted in Blake 2013). At the end of July 2015, the negotiating parties finally succeeded in reaching a “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA). The comprehensive action plan not only marked the breakthrough in the crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. It can also be interpreted as an at least implicit success of Tehran’s efforts to gain a recognition of its right to uranium enrichment. In fact, the agreement represents a win–win situation for both sides: For the first time, Iran agreed to massive concessions which severely limit its nuclear energy programs and practically rule out the path to a nuclear bomb (e.g., Kerry 2017).75 In return, the agreement holds that the “successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes […], and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT” (JCPOA 2015: 3). With that formulation, the West “accepted Iran’s right to a peaceful use of nuclear energy and thus also the right to enrich uranium and agreed to the suspension of sanctions” (Nirumand 2015). Iranian politicians also interpret the agreement in this sense. The government stated: “After 22 months, the government consolidated Iran’s right to enrichment” (The Guardian 2015). The subsequent UN Resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015 formally codified Iran’s right to uranium enrichment and was interpreted as another means of recognition (Zarif 2015). While the JCPOA was specifically tailored to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis, it is safe to assume that it has broader implications (see already Meier 2014). 7.4.3 Normative Framing at the International Level While Iran’s advocacy for nuclear rights has to be seen in the context of its own nuclear program, Iran’s engagement goes beyond the domestic context and is explicitly embedded in a common-good-oriented normative framework. 75 Iran agreed to reduce the number of centrifuges from 190,000 to 6000 for a period of six years; to keep only 300 kg of the 12,000 kg enriched uranium in the country over a period of 15 years; to modify the heavy-water reactor Arak, so that it becomes unusable for weapons purposes; to suspend enrichment in the Fordo underground research facility for a period of 15 years and use centrifuges only for research purposes. It is allowed to retain Natanz as the only enrichment facility and to enrich uranium to only 3.67% over a period of 15 years. The agreement also provides for comprehensive IAEA verification measures. In addition, Iran agrees to allow inspections of military installations, subject to certain conditions. In the preamble, Tehran also renounces forever the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. This obligation is unprecedented and goes beyond the provisions of the NPT, which in Article X contains a withdrawal clause (Müller 2015). 186 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur At the international level, especially within the IAEA and the NPT, Iran demands unhindered access to peaceful nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment: Whereas Article IV of the NPT is seen as providing the legal framework, the IAEA is considered responsible for facilitating the widest possible exchange and cooperation in this field. Consequently, from 1975 onwards, Iran regularly refers to the relevance of Article IV and the importance of the IAEA’s technical assistance program in both forums (e.g., Fartash 1975; Amrollahi 1983; Nasseri 1990b; Amrollahi 1994; Kharrazi 2000; Iran 2010g). As indicated in the previous section, Iran assumes that as a member of the NPT, it has a legitimate right to master the full fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. Iranian delegates also claim that the NPT in Article IV, paragraph 2 obliges nuclear developed countries to cooperate with the respective materials and technologies and they frame this provision as a matter of equitable justice and a moral requirement (Fartash 1975; Amrollahi 1985; Nasseri 1990a; Ayatollahi 1995a; Kharrazi 2000; Iran 2010d). The “inalienable right” is interpreted as an inherent right that is unconditional and non-negotiable, and of which a state cannot be deprived. That speeches uttered during the reign of the Shah lack systematic references to a legal right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can probably be explained by the fact that at that time, nuclear cooperation with the West was relatively unhindered. Iran opposes trade restrictions imposed by strict export control measures based on a restrictive interpretation of Article IV, which it regards as a politically and economically motivated violation of the “spirit and letter of the NPT” (Aghazadeh 2004). Non-proliferation measures designed to limit the risk of proliferation of sensitive technologies are regarded as a reinterpretation of treaty norms and an attack on inherent rights. For example, a working paper presented by Iran to the NPT Review Conference in 2005 states: “The interpreting of Article IV in a way that limits the rights derived from this Article to mere ‘benefits of nuclear energy’ is clearly in contravention of the very wording of the treaty and is totally unacceptable” (Iran 2005c: 3). Besides being illegal, the denial of “nuclear rights” is also regarded as discriminatory. In 2010, President Ahmadinejad complained that none of the non-nuclear weapon States has ever been able to exercise their inalienable and legal rights for peaceful uses of nuclear energy without facing pressures and threats. […] One of the gravest injustices committed by the nuclear weapon States is equating nuclear arms with nuclear energy. As a matter of fact, they want to monopolize both the nuclear weapons and the peaceful nuclear energy, and by doing so to impose their will on the international community. The aforementioned issues are all against the spirit of the NPT and in flagrant violation of its provisions. (Ahmadinejad 2010b) Consequently, from Tehran’s point of view, all NPT treaty members should benefit equally from the exchange and cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In fact, as an Iranian delegate put it during the IAEA General Conference on 1991 “[t]he so-called ‘new world order’ could only be meaningful if mankind were able to benefit from the progress of technology without prejudice. All men should have an equal share in the benefits of modern technologies and […] in their potential risks” (Amrollahi 1991: 31). Against this background, Iran stylizes itself as fighting for collective concerns and embeds its argumentation in a collective action frame 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 187 that is particularly shared by non-aligned countries. Indeed, Tehran sees itself as “a model depicting the capability of a nation to resist pressure, to preserve independence, and to break the scientific monopoly of some arrogant powers,” as the Vice President and Chairman of the Iranian nuclear energy organization, Dr. Fereydoun Abbasi, declared to the IAEA in 2012 (Abbasi 2012). In order to make up for their delayed development, developing countries are regarded as particularly dependent on cooperation in the civilian uses of nuclear technology. Contrary to its own rhetoric of fair treatment, Iran therefore calls for preferential access rights to be granted to these countries (e.g., Amrollahi 1985, Soltanieh 1990a; Iran 2000a, 2005c). Iran has also repeatedly demanded that special assistance funds be set up by the IAEA and urges the Director-General of the organization to report on the implementation of technology transfers—the denial of which Iran considers to be a violation of Article IV.76 In its argumentation, Iran repeatedly refers to metanorms, such as the right to development and national sovereignty. Time and again, Iranian delegates demanded that the international community “[respect] the national choices, decisions and policies of all States Parties to work in all safeguarded nuclear activities, including fuel cycle without discrimination” (Iran 2010d: 4). The same formulation can be found in joint declarations of the NAM, in their respective national statements, but also in final documents of past NPT Review Conferences. References to the right to economic and technological development are even more frequent. For example, in 2005 Kharrazi declared that “[t]he inalienable right of the States to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes emanates from the universally accepted proposition that scientific and technological achievements are the common heritage of mankind” (Kharrazi 2005b: 4). In a speech to the UN General Assembly, President Ahmadinejad even linked scientific and technological development with human rights: How can one talk about human rights and at the same time blatantly deny many the inalienable right to have access to science and technology with applications in medicine, industry and energy and through force and intimidation hinder their progress and development? Can nations be deprived of scientific and technological progress through the threat of use of force and based on mere allegations of possibility of military diversion? We believe that all countries and nations are entitled to technological and scientific advancement in all fields, particularly the peaceful technology to produce nuclear fuel. Such access cannot be restricted to a few, depriving most nations and by establishing economic monopolies, use them as an instrument to expand their domination. (Ahmadinejad 2005) What appears to be a rhetoric of self-assertion on the domestic level can be perceived of as an element in the discursive counter-hegemonic struggle against imperialism. Restrictive non-proliferation measures are interpreted by Iran as attempts by industrialized countries to create a monopoly on the production of nuclear fuel—a strategic and critical commodity (Aghazadeh 2006). In a speech to the IAEA, Head 76 While Iran was initially open to the possibility of multilateral fuel arrangements (e.g., Amrollahi 1986), it became increasingly skeptical about such considerations. Even against the background of its own experience, Tehran argues that one cannot rely on international promises. In 2010, then Iranian IAEA ambassador Soltanieh described plans to establish fuel banks as “nuclear apartheid” (quoted in CNN 2010) which would further exacerbate already existing discrimination. 188 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur of the Iranian nuclear energy organization Abbasi describes Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities as “an intellectual gift to all humanitarian nations in the world and a beginning to peaceful cooperation aimed at human beings’ welfare and health” (Abbasi 2012). Figure 7.1 shows how often Iranian delegates linked the “inherent right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” to specific framings such as “injustice/discrimination,” “technological/scientific development,” “national sovereignty,” “counter-hegemonic resistance,” “security,” and “national interests” in NPT and IAEA speeches in the period under investigation (total number: 163).77 The demand for access to Iran’s full fuel cycle was most frequently framed as an inherent right to be granted unconditionally (122 mentions).78 The legal claim is often linked to justice-based arguments and to the norm of technological cooperation, which (in Tehran’s view) stems from Article IV of the NPT (injustice/discrimination 59, technological/economic development 46 mentions). The claim to a legal right was least often backed with security-related or interestbased arguments (2 and 1 mention, respectively). Ultimately, it is always in the national interest to demand the right to civilian use of nuclear energy. However, the analysis shows that this motive is firmly embedded in normative reasoning aimed to foster the common good. It is striking that Iran’s advocacy for a right to uranium enrichment within the IAEA and NPT intensified in parallel to the escalating nuclear crisis. Some experts see this connection as an indication that Iran’s commitment Framing Inherent right (In)Justice/ Discrimination Technological/ Economic development National sovereignty Counter-hegemonic resistance Security Interests Number of mentions Fig. 7.1 Frequency of thematic links between the legal claim to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the analyzed NPT and IAEA documents 77 This figure does not claim to be complete, as I did not have access to all statements/documents issued by Iran. For the analysis, I drew on verbatim records provided by Iran where possible. In some cases, especially for the early NPT documents, only summary records were available. 78 The coding scheme is available upon request. 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 189 is mainly motivated by interests (e.g., Farhi 2009; Tabatabai 2012, 2014). However, Iran has advocated this right since the Shah’s time and justified its advocacy above all with common-good- and justice-related arguments. The frequency with which Iran sought to strengthen the “inalienable right of all State Parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination” (Iran 2010d) through activation in speeches and working papers rose sharply over the period of investigation parallel to the beginning of the nuclear crisis (2003), as Fig. 7.2 illustrates.79 As the nuclear crisis intensified, the passages justifying the Iranian enrichment program as an exercise of “sacred rights” grew longer, increasingly specifying the scope of Article IV from Tehran’s point of view. For example, a working paper presented at the 2005 NPT Review Conference states: ‘Peaceful purposes’ is the only limit the Treaty lays on the exercise of the inalienable right of States parties to nuclear energy. Neither the NPT negotiations nor the text of the Treaty even slightly imply any limit on any specific field of nuclear technology, including the enrichment and fuel cycle fields. The practice of the States parties is also a confirmation of this understanding of the Treaty. (Iran 2005c) Fig. 7.2 Verbal references to the “inalienable right” to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (number of mentions from 1958 to 2010) 79 The figure shows this trend over time. The comparability of the primary data is only limited: During the NPT Review Conferences, which are held periodically every five years, a large number of speeches and working papers are presented, resulting in an accumulation of nominations in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 (no references could be found in 1975, 1980, and 1990). In contrast, IAEA General Assemblies are held annually and only last a few days. Here, it was only in 1985 that Iran first referred to its “inalienable right”. At the time of the evaluation, no statements were available for the most recent NPT Review Conference 2015. Politicians involved in the negotiations explained the decline in the framing of “inalienable rights” from 2005 to 2010 with the fact that Iran has put all available diplomatic resources into resolving the nuclear conflict and has thus made fewer statements in both forums in purely quantitative terms during this period. See interviews with Soltanieh, 25 April 2012, Vienna; Mousavian, 3 May 2012, Vienna. 190 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur Iran also sought to strengthen its cause by referring to the wording of the consensually adopted final documents of earlier review conferences, which confirmed the “inalienable right of all the State Parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination”. That this should take place “in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the treaty” was, however, not mentioned (e.g., Iran 2005c, 2010b, 2015d; Salehi 2013). Iran’s effort to further consolidate its narrative of nuclear rights is also reflected in the language of working papers that Iran periodically submitted to the main committee III of the NPT which deals with peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The genealogy of the formulation of the title of these papers signals that Tehran tried to specify and anchor the scope of Article IV in the contractual language of the review conferences: Until 2008, the papers traded under the name “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”. In 2009 and 2010, the title was “Peaceful research, production and use of nuclear energy”; since 2012, the working paper has been entitled “The inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” (Iran 1998, 2000a, 2005c, 2007a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010d, 2012, 2013b, 2015d). 7.4.4 Blaming and Shaming Iran also sought to back up its norm advocacy by criticizing the in its view inadequate implementation of the commitments set out in Article IV. Two clusters can be discerned: First, Iran, together with other non-aligned states, complained that instead of cooperating in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, NWS and nuclear advanced countries were establishing export control bodies outside established treaty structures, thus restricting national sovereignty rights and undermining the provisions laid down in Article IV. Complaints were already made during the first NPT Review Conference in 1975 by the (pro-Western) Shah regime that the provisions of Article IV “had been largely ignored” (Fartash 1975). In 1990, the Iranian delegate described the extent of technological cooperation granted as “minimal and, in many cases, discriminatory” (Nasseri 1990a). Iranian delegates within the IAEA were concerned about a shift in “balance between its promotional and verification activities” (Ayatollahi 1995a; Iran 2005b). In order to ensure “that the technological cooperation program remains firm, sustainable and predictable” (Iran 2005b), Iran called on the international community to provide the Technical Cooperation Fund with the necessary financial and human resources (Iran 2000a). Developing countries so far had not benefited from the granted benefits of civilian nuclear energy. They were also confronted with “growing and often insurmountable constraints […] imposed by the industrialized countries” (Nasseri 1990a)—a criticism that dates back to the time of the Shah as well (Hoveyda 1977: 13). Instead of complying with their treaty obligations on technological cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, nuclear weapon states would try to reinterpret Article IV: 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 191 In past few years [sic!], some efforts have been made to undermine the main principles of the NPT in order to change it to a single-goal treaty. In this context, unfortunately the nuclear disarmament obligations have been totally overlooked and access to peaceful nuclear materials and technologies has been denied. At the same time, obligations of the NNWSs [sic!] on non-proliferation have been overemphasized as if the NPT has no other provision. With such an approach, certain countries have tried to impose more extreme and deeper restrictions on access to peaceful nuclear technology and sought to monopolize such technology only to NWSs [sic!] and a few staunch allies even in some cases if they are non-parties to the NPT. (Iran 2010c) Iran was particularly critical of Bush’s (2004) proposal “to limit the access to peaceful nuclear technology to an exclusive club of technologically advanced states under the pretext of non-proliferation” (Kharrazi 2005a). Trade restrictions justified as non-proliferation instruments would ultimately limit the legitimate and inalienable right (Velayati 1995) to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The in Iran’s view exclusive and arbitrary composition of most export control bodies complicated matters further (Kharazzi 2000). Iran therefore called for the abolition of closed door clubs that would operate “on an informal and secretive basis” (Baeidinejad 1995: 24) outside formal treaty structures. Instead, the existing export control bodies should be replaced by “transparent international mechanisms with the participation of all States parties to the Treaty” (Ayattollahi 1995b: 10–11). Iran also called for the establishment of international procedural mechanisms that would sanction infringements resulting from the lack of implementation of Article IV and regulate how technology transfer denials should be compensated (e.g., Nasseri 1990a; Iran 2008c, 2010b). This leads to the second cluster of criticism identified in the analysis: Tehran accuses the Western supplier states, especially the USA, of applying double standards and interpreting the central norms of the NPT according to their own preferences: It claims that while countries such as Iran are excluded from trade in civil nuclear technology on the basis of false accusations, Western states engage in trade with nonNPT members, thus undermining the credibility of the treaty regime and violating the non-proliferation norm enshrined in Articles I and III of the NPT (e.g., Fartash 1975; Dabiri 1980b; Amrollahi 1985).80 In this context, Iran also regularly complains about the tacit acceptance of Israel’s nuclear weapons capability and subsequent trade agreements (e.g., Aghazadeh 2004: 5). Iranian delegates also vehemently criticized the US “nuclear deal” with India in 2008. By lifting the supply embargo against India imposed in 1998, the NSG was giving the country access to legal trade in civilian nuclear technology. This “infamous decision” (Iran 2010b) was regarded as a violation of core NPT norms (especially Article III, paragraph 2), but above all a de facto recognition of India as a nuclear power (Iran 2009a, 2012, 2015d). 80 See also interviews with Soltanieh, 25 April 2012, Vienna; Mousavian, 3 May 2012, Vienna. 192 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur 7.4.5 Practical Activities The importance that Iran attaches to advocating the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is aptly illustrated by the amount of speeches devoted to the subject as well as in the working papers on the subject, which are regularly presented to main committee III at NPT RevCons. In addition, Iran supported all relevant draft resolutions on this subject presented to the UN General Assembly.81 Iran’s practical engagement also comes to the fore with regard to pledges to implement existing programs for technological cooperation more adequately. Already during the Shah’s time, Iranian delegates called on IAEA member states to allocate resources to the Technical Cooperation Fund and they regularly emphasized Iran’s voluntary contributions in that regard (e.g., Etemad 1974: 2; Ameri 1975). Later, criticism regarding IAEA structures prevailed: Iran demanded that the departments entrusted with verification tasks, i.e., the safeguards department, should be financed from the regular budget and not via extra-budgetary contributions in order to prevent politically motivated withholding of payments (e.g., Soltanieh 1984; Ayatollahi 1995a; Iran 2000a, 2010d). In the same vein, Iran supported the establishment of a special aid fund for developing countries (Ayatollahi 1995b). However, it did not partake in other initiatives, such as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) set up in 2000 or the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) founded in 2010, which aimed to provide extra-budgetary contributions to support the IAEA’s work on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In addition to providing financial resources, Iran promoted its interpretation of nuclear rights through public outreach and cooperation with like-minded states. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, this included industrialized NNWS who were also concerned that restrictive non-proliferation measures could hinder their economic and technological development and strengthen the nuclear weapon states’ monopoly on the civilian use of nuclear energy. In April 1977, Iran hosted the Iran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology with the aim of bringing together supplier and recipient countries. The objective was to provide joint advice on how to deal with the increasingly restrictive non-proliferation policy, in particular the recently founded NSG. The event was organized jointly with the American Nuclear Society, the European Nuclear Society, and the Nuclear Society of Japan, and it was the first conference worldwide to deal with the topic of nuclear technology transfer from an economic, technical, and political perspective. Iran played an active role, drawing particular attention to developing countries’ “legitimate needs for technology transfer” (Etemad 1977: 17). Export control measures were not criticized per se; in order to secure supply, Iran even considered them to be useful. However, as the head of 81 From 1977 to 1980, a UN resolution on “Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development” was put to the vote (A/RES/32/50 of 1977; A/RES/33/4 of 1978; A/RES/34/63 of 1979; A/RES/35/112 of 1980). From 1981 to 1997 there was a resolution on “United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” (A/RES/36/78 of 1981; A/RES/37/167 of 1982; A/RES/38/60 of 1983; A/RES/39/74 of 1984; A/RES/40/95 of 1985; A/RES/41/21/212B of 1986; A/RES/42/24 of 1987). 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 193 the AEOI made clear, they should be developed collectively and be “consistent with the ideals of the NPT and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency” (Etemad 1977: 17). The Iranian speakers (in particular the head of the AEOI) harshly criticized the “club diplomacy” (Etemad 1977: 18) and the discriminatory approach of the supplier countries, which they considered to be aiming at consolidating their monopoly position (Etemad 1977: 17, 18; Hoveyda 1977: 13–4). The approximately 500 participants from 41 countries, including government officials, scientists, industry representatives, and IAEA staff, were unable to agree on a final declaration. Nevertheless, the nuclear “emerging countries” present were able to clarify their position vis-à-vis the USA and formed a strategic alliance.82 Iran also actively participated in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation process initiated by the US government, which took place from 1977 to 1980 (Barnaby 1980; Skjöldebrand 1980). Together with Germany and France, Iran chaired Working Group 2 on enrichment availability (Commission of the European Communities 1980). Iran had also placed its hopes in the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE), which was convened in 1980 by a resolution of the UN General Assembly (UN A/RES/32/50 of 1977). Already during the meetings of the Preparatory Committee, however, Iran expressed criticism of the lack of willingness of the nuclear weapons states to cooperate (Amrollahi 1983: 18–19) and felt disappointed when the participants failed to agree on principles of international cooperation (Soltanieh 1990a, b: 306). Iran also used national platforms to promote its right to uranium enrichment, e.g., in Friday prayers or speeches by the revolutionary leader.83 Under Rouhani’s presidency, Iran launched a massive (digital) publicity campaign in this context. In November 2013, a web site was launched dedicated to the topic of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—in Iran, but also in general.84 Even though the Iranian government never officially admitted to operate the web site, observers saw it as a part of the massive public diplomacy campaign. The web site, the design and language of which is aimed at a Western audience, does not only provide a detailed account of the development of the Iranian nuclear program (“the nuclear saga”).85 It also addresses controversial and legal issues as well as historical facts and figures which are accompanied by extensive visual material and ideological content, for example, a commemorative section for the murdered nuclear scientists. At the same time, Iran launched a Twitter and Facebook campaign in which high-ranking politicians campaigned for Iran’s “nuclear rights”. For example, through his official Twitter account, Rouhani stated that the government does not intend to “retreat one iota 82 In May 1977, a follow-up event entitled “Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle” took place in Salzburg. Another follow-up conference that Iran had agreed to host in 1981 fell victim to the Islamic Revolution and was instead held in Geneva without Iranian participation. 83 See a compilation “The Supreme Leader’s view on nuclear energy”, available at http://farsi. khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=101,442. Accessed 28 April 2017. 84 See http://nuclearenergy.ir. Accessed 2 November 2014. 85 This is the title of the opening banner on the web site http://nuclearenergy.ir. Accessed 2 November 2014. 194 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur from protecting rights of Iranian nation incl. right to peaceful nuclear technology”.86 The campaign also served to demonstrate Tehran’s determination to the West and domestic political critics. A video message from Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in which he justified Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, can also be seen in this light.87 National activities were also directed at Iran’s allies and the world public. In April 2010, Iran hosted the Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and NonProliferation. Under the motto “Nuclear Energy for Every-One, Nuclear Weapons for No-One”88 Iran advocated the two NPT norms that the country regards as central: nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the conference was also interpreted as an attempt by Tehran to restore its own credibility (before international and national audiences alike) and to prevent further sanctions (Rajiv 2010). Observers have argued that Iran had intended the conference to counter the USA-initiated “Nuclear Security Summit,” which had taken place only a few days earlier in Washington and for which Iran had been denied participation (Butters 2010; Posch 2013). For its own summit, Iran had invited around 60 states, in particular those from the Non-Aligned Movement and representatives of international and regional organizations as well as NGOs.89 In addition to nuclear disarmament, which has been dealt with in Sect. 7.3, questions of nuclear cooperation were of particular importance. In his opening speech, Ayatollah Khamenei addressed the developing countries in the region directly and described them as “thirsting for peace, security and progress” and as “hav[ing] the right to ensure the economic position and prosperity of the future generations” (Khamenei 2010). Iran once again stylized itself as a frontrunner of the developing countries: Doubts about the peaceful intentions of Iran’s nuclear program and about countermeasures such as sanctions were presented as a means “to hold back the nations of the region from paying serious attention to this natural and important right of theirs” (Khamenei 2010). In contrast, the Iranian president reaffirmed “the inalienable rights of nations under article IV of NPT in having the nuclear fuel cycle” (Ahmadinejad 2010a). In the final declaration which was registered as an official document at the IAEA (2010), the conference president reaffirmed the legal right of access to the full fuel cycle (Mottaki 2010). Other (non86 Hassan Rouhani, 25.2.2014 (11:34 a.m.) tweet: “To dear ppl of #Hormozgan: Gov will not retreat one iota from protecting rights of Iranian nation incl. right to peaceful nuclear technology”. Similarly Rouhani, Hassan (Hassan Rouhani). “As NPT signatory, what we pursue in the final#nuclear agreement is for #Iranian nation to exercise all its rights under international law.”, February 23, 2014, 9:15 a.m. Tweet. 87 http://www.youtube.com/watcz?v=Ao2WH6GDWz4. Accessed 28 August 2015. 88 The conference program, a list of participants, and individual speeches can be found on the homepage of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://cms.mfa.gov.ir/cms/cms/ Tehranicd/en. Accessed 28 August 2015. 89 The list of participants circulating on the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not correspond to the actual composition. While Tehran had not even invited the USA because of the lack of diplomatic relations, the EU refused to participate, as Iran apparently wanted to deny it an active role that went beyond being present at the opening ceremony (Westberg 2010). According to participating NGO members, Western countries would have participated in the 2011 follow-up conference, but only “incognito,” email conversation with a participating scientist 20 July 2011. 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 195 aligned) states and the spokesman of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation also supported this view (Ihsanoglu 2010; Natalegawa 2010). In June 2011, Iran held a follow-up conference, which also linked the demand for universal nuclear disarmament with a right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This topic became particularly controversial in view of the accident at the Japanese nuclear power plant Fukushima in March 2011. Despite the obvious dangers of nuclear energy, Iran continued to advocate an unrestricted right of full access to the fuel cycle.90 Table 7.4 illustrates the range of activities that Iran conducted in order to enforce the perceived right to the full fuel cycle:91 7.4.6 Assessment In summary, Iran’s strong commitment to the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the right to uranium enrichment, can be qualified as norm entrepreneurship according to the indicators set out in Sect. 5.2.1. Even though Tehran was not directly involved in the negotiations on the design of Article IV in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, it actively promoted the recognition of nuclear rights to which it sees itself (and the entire treaty community) entitled. Throughout the entire period under investigation, Iranian delegates actively promoted their interpretation of the NPT, according to which the NPT contains an inherent right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including sensitive technologies, and a requirement for cooperation on the side of technology holders. Iranian delegates tried to discursively anchor this interpretation in the various arms control forums. They also tried to put their favored wording to the record in the politically binding final documents and other official statements. 90 Unfortunately, I could not find speeches or press releases for the follow-up conference. The information cited here is based on background discussions with participating civil society representatives, e.g., email conversation with a participating scientist on 20 July 2011 and conversations during the preparatory commission for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2012. 91 Due to the scope of the topic, it was not possible to search all potential sources for indications of Iranian activities regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The information listed here is based on interviews, evaluated primary sources within the IAEA and the NPT Review Conferences, IAEA annual reports, and a literature analysis. Iran also contributed to the Technical Cooperation Fund through voluntary financial contributions (Ameri 1975; Etemad 1974). In cooperation with the IAEA, the country also organized a series of technical workshops and training courses, in particular on medical nuclear research. In addition, Iranian delegates reaffirmed their willingness to make their nuclear expertise available to other states (Salehi 2009, 2010). The annual reports give an overview of each country’s activities within the IAEA in the area of technical cooperation. See https://www. iaea.org/technicalcooperation/Pub/Ann-Reports/index.html. Accessed 28 April 2017. Since these activities did not serve directly to advocate the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, they are not listed in Table 7.4. 196 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur Table 7.4 Practical activities of Iran with regard to the right to uranium enrichment Title/type of conference Date and location Description National conferences International seminar on civil nuclear programs financed by AEOI 29 October 1986 in Ramsar at the Caspian Sea Nationally hosted international conferences International Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology 10–14 April 1977 in Shiraz and Persepolis First Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 2010 Second Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 2011 Conference in response to the establishment of the NSG; participants expressed their opposition to further restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology In addition to the NAM, also Western, nuclear energy holders participated Organized by: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran together with the Japanese Atomic Energy Society, American Nuclear Society and the European Nuclear Society International conferences attended by Iran International Fuel Cycle Evaluation 1977–1980 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 23 March–10 April 1987 In doing so, Iran relied on all of the typical strategies of norm entrepreneurship specified in Sect. 5.2.1. It is particularly striking that the Iranian government not only rhetorically promoted its interpretation of the norm, but also invested massive national resources in order to implement its nuclear rights narrative in practice. Even though Iran is not the only country that has advocated a right of access to the full fuel cycle and that sees a requirement for cooperation stemming from Article IV, Iran’s commitment can be described as outstanding. Iran’s activities also meet the criteria for proactivism—a central element of norm entrepreneurship—set out by Becker et al. (2008: 820): Tehran did advocate the propagated norm (interpretation) in various forums and across various audiences. Its commitment continued throughout 7.4 Iran’s Advocacy for a Right to Uranium Enrichment 197 the entire period under investigation and even dates back to the time of the Shah regime. It has to be admitted, though, that the international conferences on the subject organized by Iran are less impressive, with a 33-year break between 1977 and 2010. However, this can at least partly be explained by the deterioration in international relations as a result of the Islamic revolution and the nuclear crisis. Overall, the degree of activity rose in parallel with the nuclear crisis in the 2000s, and from the mid-1990s on, the Iranian government began to systematically develop its nuclear rights narrative in an effort to change the meaning of the current norm. However, the country has by no means been interested in destroying the norm. The use of naming, shaming, and blaming and destructive tactics do not contradict this. While the secret development of an own enrichment program and proven violations of Iran’s safeguards agreement cast some doubts on Iran’s credibility as a norm entrepreneur, this behavior can also be interpreted as being part of its advocacy. Iran’s willingness to fully investigate past breaches of norms in the course of the nuclear agreement negotiated in July 2015 also does not indicate that the country seeks to overthrow existing structures. Consequently, part of Iran’s behavior regarding the propagation of the nuclear rights narrative can be interpreted in light of the second alternative explanation: Tehran interprets the interpretation of norms by NWS and the Western supplier countries as unjustified interference with national sovereignty rights. Iran tries to counter the denial of the right to uranium enrichment and the denial of access to corresponding technologies with an alternative norm interpretation. The normative framing of the nuclear rights narrative also contains elements that refer to norm subsidiarity (national sovereignty; counter-hegemonic resistance; injustice; discrimination). Nevertheless, Tehran’s commitment goes beyond purely reactive behavior. This is demonstrated by the resources deployed by Iran—in particular its attempts to convince norm supporters—and on the other hand by the continuity of engagement over time (as well as regime type) and arms control forums. Table 7.5 summarizes Iran’s advocacy for a right to uranium enrichment along the criteria for norm entrepreneurship: 7.5 Strategies and Resources of Iranian Norm Entrepreneurship In the previous sections, I discussed three empirical cases in which Iran has made disproportional efforts to establish or strengthen global norms. All of these cases— albeit to various extents—meet the criteria of typical norm entrepreneurship as set out in Sect. 5.2.1. What then are the peculiarities of Iranian norm advocacy with regard to the strategies and resources used to foster its normative aims? First, and maybe most importantly, Iran’s activism rests on an exceptionally high level of scientific and technical expertise which has provided the country with considerable influence. For one, Iranian delegates have used their knowledge as a resource in negotiations both in the process of agenda setting as well as with regard to putting 198 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur Table 7.5 Overview of the relevant characteristics of norm entrepreneurship based on Sell and Prakash (2004: 153) in the case of “right to uranium enrichment” Norm entrepreneur case 3: Iran’s advocacy for a right to uranium enrichment Period – Already during the reign of the Shah; within the NPT: 1970 until today Trigger (extrinsic/intrinsic) – Development of an indigenous nuclear energy program Problem definition – According to Iran, Article IV of the NPT contains an inherent right to the full fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing capabilities – Non-proliferation measures aimed at restricting sensitive technologies constitute discriminatory measures in Iran’s view and violate the requirement for cooperation laid down in Article IV Preferred solution – Full implementation of Article IV and official recognition of the right of each contracting state to full access to sensitive technologies – The abolition of discriminatory export control bodies and all trade barriers through discursive and political integration and norm linkage Normative framing – Access to nuclear technology as part of a right to development, particularly for disadvantaged developing countries – Access to nuclear technology as an act of equitable justice for the abandonment of a nuclear weapons option upon accession to the NPT – The maintenance of an indigenous nuclear energy program is a question of national sovereignty; restrictive non-proliferation measures are rejected as interference with national sovereignty – The application of double standards in trade with non-NPT members is unfair National interests – Mastery of sensitive technologies possibly with the aim of building a nuclear weapons capability, both status and security interests – National self-sufficiency and avoidance of external dependencies with regard to own energy supply – Political interests: Criticism of the USA as “arch-enemy” also serves to strengthen its own identity and role, securing power; counter-reaction to accusations that Iran is secretly striving for an atomic bomb (continued) 7.5 Strategies and Resources of Iranian Norm Entrepreneurship 199 Table 7.5 (continued) Norm entrepreneur case 3: Iran’s advocacy for a right to uranium enrichment Applied strategies – Rhetorical demands and affirmation of Iran’s interpretation of Article IV – Public relations and digital campaigns – Critique through naming, shaming and blaming – Thematic link (nuclear disarmament, criticism of Israel) to established (meta)norms (right to development, national sovereignty, justice) – Cooperation with like-minded countries Resources – Diplomacy – Scientific expertise – Capacity building Allies – In the 1960s and 1970s emerging Western nuclear energy holders; thereafter primarily NAM states Normative transformation? – Reaffirmation of the right to uranium enrichment as part of Article IV in final documents of the Group of Non-Aligned States and in various agreements between the West and Iran (although very vague in wording) Substantial change? – In the negotiations with Iran, the West has now deviated from the position of zero enrichment and has recognized Iran’s right to uranium enrichment. Nevertheless, the West is trying to avoid a precedent and extending Article IV in the context of the NPT to include a right of access to sensitive technologies – Still no obligation to cooperate Breaches or doubts about the credibility of norm entrepreneurship? – Accusations that Iran has built up a secret nuclear weapon program associated with violations of safeguards obligations – Close entanglement of the nuclear rights narrative with national interests and intensification of the demands parallel to the nuclear crisis suggest purely strategically motivated action 200 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur emphasis on issues which Iran felt should gain priority. This became particularly apparent during the final round of negotiations of the CWC92 : In contrast to all other State Parties and as a corollary of the Iraqi gas attacks, Iran had built considerable medical–technical expertise in the treatment of chemical weapons victims and with regard to protective measures. This led to Iran playing a decisive role in the formulation of Article X of the CWC. But Iran not only surpassed its non-aligned fellow states with its high degree of technical and political competence. The Iranian delegation was also one of the largest among non-aligned states, if not the largest at certain times (and with technical expertise that was otherwise only available to some of the Western European countries).93 These resources enabled Iran to actively participate in numerous expert groups on all aspects of the CWC. Iran’s influence is also evident in the fact that Hassan Mashhadi, who had led the Iranian delegation during the CWC negotiations, was released for work within the Preparatory Commission of the OPCW. He became Head of the Department for Government Relations and Political Affairs from 1993 until 1997. Later, he built up the Assistance and Protection Branch of the OPCW, which he headed until 2006. Iran’s expertise also stretched to the UN bodies dealing with nuclear disarmament as well as to the NPT. During NPT Review Conferences, for example, the country was generally one of the most active and strongest delegations in terms of numbers and was represented by high-ranking government representatives—mostly at presidential level, at least at foreign minister level.94 In addition, Iran’s above-average scientific and technical expertise allowed the country to assume influential offices such as the chairing of working groups or negotiations.95 Observers also attest great negotiating skills to Iran. In interviews, several individuals who were involved in multilateral arms control negotiations highlighted that Iranian delegates were usually exceptionally well prepared, equipped with extensive technical and scientific knowledge and often one step ahead of other negotiating parties.96 Iran’s geostrategic position as well as the expertise which it was willing to share also gave the country an influential position within the Non-Aligned Movement (Ogilvie-White 2012: 261; Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2012: 31).97 In relation to the cognitive resources and personnel which lay the groundwork for Iran’s norm entrepreneurship, the country invested in the practical support of 92 The following information is based on conversations with Ralf Trapp, 31 May 2015, and Hassan Mashhadi, 9 June 2015. 93 See interview Trapp, 31 May 2015. 94 See http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/profiles. Accessed 28 April 2017 and talks with observers of the negotiations during field research at the OPCW in The Hague in May 2015. 95 For example, Iran assumed the role of “friends of the chair/president” during the 1978 special session on disarmament or in the NPT negotiations in 1995 or 2010, interviews with Soltanieh on 25 April 2012; Kmentt 24 April 2012; Mousavian 18 March 2015. 96 Interviews with various IAEA staff members who had been involved in the negotiations with Iran (14 March 2012, 16 and 17 April 2012, Vienna) and various arms control officials who participated in CWC and NPT negotiations. 97 Interview Trapp, 31 May 2015. 7.5 Strategies and Resources of Iranian Norm Entrepreneurship 201 favored norms: An unparalleled example of this is the capacity building in the context of the treatment of possible chemical weapons victims. In addition, the Iranian government also supported scientific analysis regarding the treatment of chemical weapons victims, studies on nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which the country also made available internationally. By contrast, the financial support that Iran provided to the organizations in charge of implementing the relevant treaty norms was rather modest. With regard to both IAEA and OPCW, Iran’s financial contributions are only average. Yet in the IAEA, Iran belongs to the group of countries which constantly call for increases in the organization’s budget for technological cooperation. Bridge-building activities, which are identified in the literature as typical for norm entrepreneurs, do not belong to the standard repertoire of Iranian diplomats. An exception are efforts to mediate between India and Pakistan after both states had conducted nuclear weapon tests in 1998 (Kharrazi 1998; Ziaran 1998). As will be discussed in more detail below, by contrast Iran often assumes a spoiler role and tends to follow its normative mission rather uncompromisingly. In order to convince potential addressees of the actual validity and normative and practical necessity of Iran’s favored norm (or interpretation thereof) and to anchor and institutionalize these into the discourse, in all three cases Iran made ample use of prototypical norm entrepreneurial strategies: In order to convince followers, Iranian diplomats pursued active lobbying and formed strategic alliances with like-minded states and occasionally with civil society actors. Moreover, Iran resorted to framing strategies to highlight the urgency of its concern and to put pressure on actors that held other opinions. Some components of the framing used by Iranian delegates (diagnostic, prognostic, motivational framing; emotionalization/dramatization; normative fit; reference to metanorms; naming, blaming, and shaming; rhetorical activation) have already been discussed in the previous sections. Therefore, the following paragraph focuses on the common features of the collective action frames used by Iran. In all three cases of Iranian norm entrepreneurship, Iran’s normative framing can be described as collective action frame, which consists of three components: firstly, the description of the current normative structure as an untenable because unjust state of affairs; secondly, the formulation of an active component to overcome it; and thirdly, the construction of dichotomous identities (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997). Iran’s argumentation was particularly linked to framings which were shared by the non-aligned countries. In all three cases, Iran related the need and urgency to change the respective normative structure to perceptions of injustice. As shown in Sect. 6.3, the pursuit of global justice is deeply rooted in Iran’s political identity. Iran’s self-stylization as a “standard bearer of a just government” (Sadjadpour 2009: 10) was also conceivable in its norm advocacy: Particularly in the context of the NPT, Iran’s norm entrepreneurship was directed at leveling formal and informal privileges of the nuclear weapon states and their allies, above all the USA and Israel. Tehran criticized in particular the discriminatory, unbalanced structure of the NPT, and the lack of implementation of contractual obligations (nuclear disarmament and access to the full fuel cycle). Iranian diplomats also criticized the application of double standards regarding coop- 202 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur eration with non-NPT-members and the interpretation of core norms of the NPT. In the case of the protection of chemical weapons victims, Iran also deplored the application of double standards: For example, the fact that Western companies had supplied Iraq with chemical precursors and materials, but were not held accountable, or that Saddam Hussein escaped sanctions, even though Iraq had (repeatedly) violated the Geneva Protocol. The Iranian government used justice-based arguments not only to justify the development of its indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. It also considered the full implementation of the norm of technological cooperation, including the right to sensitive technologies, and the strengthening of the disarmament norm as a central element of the bargain underlying the NPT. The lack of implementation of both norms is considered to be unjust and a violation of the treaty. Tehran blamed the nuclear weapon states and developed nuclear energy holders which in its view had a special moral responsibility toward the treaty community as a whole, and the disadvantaged countries in the global South in particular. In all three cases, Iranian delegates used belligerent rhetoric to highlight the magnitude of grievances. They actively named, blamed, and shamed the nuclear weapons states, in particular the USA for the failure to implement their disarmament obligations (NPT and CWC) and—in Iran’s view—for misinterpreting core norms (i.e., nuclear disarmament and the norm of technological cooperation). Israel has also repeatedly been the focus of fierce criticism. But Iran not only demanded justice and equal treatment for itself. The country also sees itself as an advocate of developing countries in the fight against discrimination and Western dominance (Wunderlich et al. 2013: 263–272). Iranian argumentation is embedded in and can thus be connected to traditional principles of non-aligned states such as independence, national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, antiimperialism, and compensatory justice. This is particularly evident in the fight for what Iran perceives to be its “nuclear rights,” i.e., access to sensitive technologies. Even though the non-aligned are probably the most important reference group of Iran, even with regard to its norm advocacy, Iran’s position within the non-aligned countries is not uncontroversial. Some NAM members have been quite skeptical about a possible military dimension of the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, Ogilvie-White (2010) rightly observes that the non-aligned were relatively united in their criticism of how the West has approached Iran in the long-standing nuclear conflict. From the perspective of the NAM, it has to be seen as yet another unlawful encroachment on national sovereignty if the nuclear weapon states deprive them of basic nuclear rights—especially if these rights are granted to other members and non-parties to the NPT whose nuclear programs are not even under IAEA safeguards. So while the justice motive constitutes the most important frame referred to by Iran, Iran’s normative framing also relates to other metanorms, i.e., national sovereignty and—in the case of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology—the right to development. What is also striking, though not surprising given the interrelated nature of the phenomena at hand, is that Iran actively creates linkages between the propagated norms: For example, statements aimed at strengthening the disarmament norm generally include references to the inalienable right to cooperate in the peace- 7.5 Strategies and Resources of Iranian Norm Entrepreneurship 203 ful uses of nuclear energy. The following statement aptly demonstrates such linkage strategies: The world is currently witnessing discrimination. On one hand, using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is limited while at the same time, countries which possess nuclear weapons do not allow nations to access nuclear energy. These countries allow themselves to use nuclear weapons and announce that they will not hesitate to use these arms against other nations. This can lead to a collective effort. The international community would like to set in motion a real move to enjoy nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and for national development. We are witnessing big threats by possessors of nuclear weapons. They are boldly threatening to use nukes. Any use of nuclear weapons to harm humanity is condemned.98 It is striking that Iran tried to demonstrate its competence and credibility as committed actor and norm entrepreneur across all arms control fields by invoking its own status as a victim of chemical weapons. Corresponding references can be found not only in speeches within the CWC, but also in those aimed at strengthening the norm of technological cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the disarmament norms within the BWC and NPT as well as in the various UN forums. In addition to these prototypical strategies described in the literature on norms entrepreneurship, however, Iran also relied on a number of other more confrontational strategies and tactics that resemble the “negative” or destructive strategies identified by Bob (2012: 34): blockade and dragging techniques, repeated disruptive maneuvers and interventions, procedural filibuster, rhetorical derailments, and diplomatic blackmail strategies. They seem to be primarily aimed at discrediting opposing positions which are perceived as unfair, sabotaging negotiations, and successfully asserting one’s own position. In line with these more confrontationist strategies, in all analyzed cases, in the propagation of favored norms, Iran showed little willingness to deviate from its principles. It repeatedly risked the failure of negotiations and thus isolated itself rather than deviating from its positions. For example, in 1995 Iran made its approval of the unlimited extension of the NPT conditional on the nuclear weapon states’ willingness to give greater prominence to the disarmament norm and the norm of technological cooperation (even though Iran did not follow these announcements when the conditions were not fulfilled). Also, several NPT Review Conferences almost failed to adopt a consensual final document because of Iranian opposition. In 1985, for example, Iran threatened to block consensus if no mention of the Iraqi attack on the Iranian nuclear facility Bushehr was included in the final document (Iran 1985; Shababi 1985b). In 1995, Iran’s displeasure led to an almost two-hour delay in negotiations in the face of a reaffirmation of the Israeli— Palestinian peace process contained in the resolution on the Middle East (Rauf and Johnson 1995: 30). In 2010, too, the adoption of a consensual final document almost failed due to Iran’s refusal to accept what was regarded as weak language in the field 98 Statement of then spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry, Ramin Mehmanparast, during an interview with the Iranian state television station PressTV on the sidelines of the “Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 2010” on April 28, 2010 (quoted from Press TV 2010). 204 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur of disarmament (Johnson 2010: 4; Müller 2010: 8).99 Some Iranian politicians, e.g., the chairman of the parliamentary committee responsible for national security and foreign policy, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, even launched the withdrawal from the NPT as a means of exerting pressure on the nuclear negotiations with the West (Mousavian 2012: 74–75).100 Although Tehran’s strategies in dealing with the nuclear crisis must be separated from arms control diplomacy,101 the issue is closely linked to Iran’s advocacy of a right to uranium enrichment. Former chief nuclear negotiator Rouhani warned in a speech to the United Nations in May 2005 that: termination of fuel cycle activities as demanded of Iran means you have killed the NPT. If you take out Article IV, all developing countries will step out of the treaty. […] Termination is war between the North and the South. The Americans say forget about Article IV, forget about the disarmament promised in Article VI […]. The U.S. today is trying to create a second discrimination, one between those that have peaceful nuclear technology and those not allowed to have peaceful nuclear technology. (Rouhani 2005, cited after Perkovich 2005) Although less pronounced, Iran also resorted to destructive strategies in the context of the CWC, insisted on voting procedures, even if it became apparent that Iran would cast the only negative vote, or tenaciously blocking consensus decisions (although this did not directly concern the propagation of the protection norm for chemical weapons victims). Some observers have described Iran’s recourse to confrontational or destructive strategies as “uncompromising radicalism” (Müller 2011: 225) or “diplomatic obstructionism” (Pirseyedi 2013: 136). Such behavior is also regarded as characteristic of Iran’s insidiousness, “reducing Iran’s arms control diplomacy to political maneuvering” (Pirseyedi 2013: 1). With respect to the cases under investigation here—and leaving out the nuclear crisis—it must however be acknowledged that cooperative and confrontational strategies seem to balance each other out. While 99 This was also confirmed by former Iranian IAEA Ambassador, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, in an interview with the author on 25 April 2012 in Vienna. In both cases, a compromise solution was found at the last minute: In 1985, the Australian delegation persuaded Iran to add the reference to an appendix to the final document; in 2010, the non-aligned under the leadership of Egypt succeeded in persuading Iran to compromise. In 2010, Iran was also concerned with preventing condemnation or criticism of its nuclear programme (Müller 2010: 8). Rebecca Johnson therefore ascribes to Tehran a strategy of “block[ing] without being blamed” (Johnson 2010: 4). 100 So far, however, no such statements have been made in government circles. On the contrary, Tehran was keen to reject concerns and underline its commitment to the NPT (Shirazi 2013). 101 In interviews when I asked about Iran’s “destructive strategies,” I was repeatedly reminded by arms control experts and IAEA representatives that a distinction must be made between Tehran’s behavior in the nuclear negotiations and its arms control diplomacy. What Tanya Ogilvie-White calls “belligerent approach to nuclear diplomacy” (Ogilvie-White 2012: 149), i.e., “making and breaking commitments, playing cat and mouse with the IAEA and international negotiators, periodically appearing to climb down, and all the while pursuing an independent nuclear deterrent” (OgilvieWhite 2010: 120), applies exclusively to the former. An IAEA staff member who was involved in the Iran negotiations said: “Iran is only obstructionist, where the military dimension of its program is concerned, and by the way, which party would not?” On the multilateral level, by contrast, Iran has presented itself as a skilled and sometimes difficult negotiating partner, but by no means exclusively acts as a troublemaker. Background talks with IAEA staff and representatives of various groups of States, 14 and 16 March 2012, 16 and 17 April 2012 in Vienna. 7.5 Strategies and Resources of Iranian Norm Entrepreneurship 205 Iran’s confrontational stance increased under President Ahmadinejad, both his predecessor Khatami and his successor Rouhani adopted a much more moderate tone and conciliatory political style. It thus seems more apt to interpret Iran’s recourse to strategic disruptive maneuvers as an expression of “shrewd diplomatic and procedural maneuvering” (Rauf and Johnson 1995: 32) and thus negotiation skills. At the end of the day, Iran mostly bowed to compromise solutions, sometimes winning concessions, thereby preventing the failure of negotiations. As one interview partner put it: “They are tough negotiators, super prepared but not obstructionist [and] not the ones who prevent consensus at the end of the day.”102 This is also backed by observations of several participants of CWC conferences who reported that Iran had played a key role in negotiating compromise solutions during the three review conferences.103 As far as the selection of organizational platforms is concerned, Iran has located its norm entrepreneurship most of all within the UN arms control architecture. Above all, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament provided a platform to point out the lack of implementation of individual treaty norms. Iran also actively participated in the establishment of the CWC and the OPCW. Since the respective treaty regimes came into force, these have been the main forums for Iran’s commitment. Outside the treaty regimes, Iran also acted as a norm advocate through various practical activities. For example, Iranian delegates engaged in what has been described in the literature as rhetorical “activation” (Rublee 2008), both at the national and regional levels. Iran used the regular summits of the Non-Aligned Movement— the country’s main reference group—to promote the propagated norms and their interpretation. In all three cases under investigation, the analysis revealed speech patterns in which Iran emphasized or reaffirmed its close ties to the non-aligned countries. Iran worked closely with NAM partners in all arms control forums. Within the movement, Iran belongs to the hardliners and therefore stands out from the majority of the non-aligned because of its much more aggressive rhetoric (Ogilvie-White 2010, Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2012: 15, 34; Wunderlich et al. 2013: 2). This notwithstanding, strategic alliance with non-aligned states rests on adherence to principles such as national sovereignty, independence from external interference, anti-imperialism, and aversion to discriminatory regime structures. Also with regard to substance, most non-aligned states take positions similar to those advocated for by Iran, i.e., the demand for time-bound nuclear disarmament or for the broadest possible technological cooperation in the peaceful uses of dual-use technologies. This is particularly true for Iran’s commitment to the right to uranium enrichment which gained broad NAM support.104 In addition to Iran, other developing countries 102 Background conversation with a member of the EU3 negotiating team. compromise of the first review conference was negotiated by the USA, the UK, Iran, and India. The agreements reached at the second conference were agreed by a group of 23 states in which Iran and India played key roles. See interview Soltanieh 25 April 2012; Trapp 31 May 2015. 104 Indeed, Iran’s nuclear rights narrative is not novel: India took this position during the treaty negotiations. New Delhi finally refrained from membership of the NPT because it feared that the treaty could establish a kind of new “nuclear apartheid regime”. Other non-aligned states were also actively involved in the wording of Article IV during the treaty negotiations, such as Romania. 103 The 206 7 Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur also have an interest in access to the fuel cycle (e.g., South Africa), or they already have such technologies (such as Argentina and Brazil). It is therefore that Iran was able to repeatedly present itself as an advocate of the non-aligned (Wunderlich et al. 2013: 266; Wunderlich 2014). All cases under investigation here show that Iranian diplomats sought support for their positions primarily through informal multi- and bilateral meetings at various diplomatic levels. Iran has repeatedly used NAM meetings to put favored issues on the organization’s agenda or to gain support for its proposals. For example, the final communiqué adopted at the 16th Non-Aligned Summit in Tehran confirmed Iran’s interpretation of Article IV of the NPT as “including the inalienable right of each State Party, if it so decides, to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle in accordance with its rights and obligations under the treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (NAM 2012: 64). Even Egypt, a traditional rival of Iran for leadership within the non-aligned and for supremacy in the region, repeatedly defended Iran’s claim to the establishment of the complete fuel cycle (Arms Control Association 2008). In the CWC, too, Iran primarily sought the support of the nonaligned countries, but seemed also prepared to enter into temporary tactical coalitions with like-minded states if this seemed expedient.105 As far as cooperation with civil society is concerned, the conclusion is more ambivalent: Although Iran rhetorically reaffirmed its efforts to cooperate with civil society actors on several occasions, foreign NGOs and experts were invited to national conferences in all three cases and organized NGO briefings during the review conferences. However, some observers believe that this is mainly lip service, as cooperation is predominantly superficial in nature.106 References Abbasi, F. (2012, September 17). Statement to the 56th Session of the IAEA General Conference, GC/56/OR.1, Vienna. AEOI (1977). 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