Hellenistic Moral Philosophy

The exhortation, “No longer drink only water, but use a little wine on account of your stomach and your frequent ailments” (1 Tim 5:23) is commonly seen as a rejection of extreme asceticism (as if it were an after-thought to the instructions regarding marriage and diet in 1 Tim 4:3), and treated with some perfunctory observations on the medicinal use of wine in antiquity. In this study, after discussing (a) the problems with the common reading of 5:23 as anti-ascetic polemic, I discuss (b) the literary context of instructions regarding how a youthful Timothy is to interact with older men, (c) the medicinal use of wine in terms of ancient humoral theory, (d) the application of humoral theory to youth and wine, and (e) abstinence from wine within a philosophical training regimen. I argue that in its context this verse makes sense as advice for a young minister.

Il piacere e il dolore sono sensazioni soggettive che sperimentiamo nel corpo e nell'anima e che hanno una grandissima importanza nella nostra vita: secondo Aristotele, per avere una esistenza felice è fondamentale saper gestire con saggezza piaceri e dolori, poiché la virtù e il vizio si misurano proprio su questo.
In linea di principio il piacere in tutte le sue forme è un bene per noi, perché la tendenza al piacere e alla soddisfazione interiore è intrinseca alla nostra natura. Il piacere è un atto istantaneo e compiuto della nostra anima, che accompagna e perfeziona in modo inseparabile ogni nostro atto vitale, fisico o psichico; e quanto più l’atto vitale è perfetto, tanto più è piacevole.
Ci sono varie specie di piacere, e poiché ciascuna di esse ha un suo diverso valore etico ai fini della nostra felicità, si tratta di capire, guidati dalle virtù e in particolare dalla saggezza pratica, quali siano i piaceri da ricercare e quali invece da rifuggire.
Con ogni atto che compiamo noi perseguiamo un bene che personalmente ci ‘appare’ buono e piacevole, ma che non sempre è un piacere ‘vero’,  buono e piacevole in assoluto e secondo natura; se quel bene è realmente buono e piacevole, l'atto è virtuoso, e se invece non lo è affatto, l'atto è vizioso. Atti che mirano a beni dell'anima (come ad esempio le virtù o la contemplazione) ci danno piaceri di alto valore etico, e con essi non c'è mai la possibilità di eccedere; invece atti che mirano a beni del corpo (come il cibo o il sesso) o a beni esteriori (come ad esempio la ricchezza o il potere), pur essendo anch’essi beni assoluti e naturali, ci danno piaceri di minor valore etico ai fini della felicità, e con essi può esservi eccesso se andiamo oltre le nostre naturali necessità fisiche e psichiche. Dobbiamo perciò, agendo secondo virtù, perseguire nella giusta misura piaceri relativi a tutte le tre categorie di beni, dando però priorità ai piaceri relativi ai beni dell'anima. 
Aristotele afferma che la felicità risiede nella “attività secondo virtù”, quindi quanto più compiamo azioni virtuose perfette ed eccellenti tanto più piacere ne ricaviamo, e tanto più ci avviciniamo alla felicità; e se esse sono massimamente perfette (cioè se sono compiute per esse stesse, senza alcun altro fine ulteriore) ne ricaviamo sommo piacere. Tuttavia, anche se sommo, il piacere non è il bene supremo, il fine ultimo della nostra vita: tale fine ultimo è la felicità, di cui comunque il più elevato piacere dell'anima è uno dei componenti principali.
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La formule cicéronienne natura aut voluntas associe deux des contributions les plus originales de la philosophie hellénistique et romaine à la pensée éthique et politique occidentale. Les six premiers chapitres examinent éléments fondamentaux de la théorie stoïcienne de la natura et de la loi naturelle, en montrant que les Stoïciens ont inauguré une nouvelle conception de l’éthique dans l’Antiquité gréco-romaine – une idée qui était appelée à culminer avec la théorie de Kant.  Les chapitres portant sur les Épicuriens discutent ensuite la manière dont leur conception du plaisir et de la mort a forgé une notion de voluntas qui est aux origines de la notion moderne de libre arbitre. Les développements des deux derniers chapitres entendent montrer de quelle manière ces conceptions originales de la natura et de la voluntas sont devenues des piliers fondamentaux de la pensée éthique et politique des débuts de l’époque moderne .

Pleasure and pain are subjective sensations that we experience in body and soul and that have a great importance in our lives: according to Aristotle, in order to have a happy existence it is essential to know how to manage pleasure and pain wisely, because virtue and vice are measured precisely on this.
In principle, pleasure in all its forms is a good for us, because the tendency to pleasure and inner satisfaction is intrinsic to our nature. Pleasure is an instantaneous and complete act of our soul, which inseparably accompanies and perfects each of our vital acts, whether physical or mental; and the more perfect the vital act is, the more pleasant it is.
There are various kinds of pleasures, and since each of them has a different ethical value in view of our happiness, for us it is a question of understanding, with the help of the virtues and in particular of practical wisdom, what are the pleasures to be sought and what are to be avoided.
With every action we perform we pursue a good that personally ‘appears’ good and pleasant to us, but which is not always a ‘true’ pleasure, good and pleasant in absolute terms and according to nature; if that good is really good and pleasant, our action is excellent and virtuous, and if it is not at all, our action is vicious. Actions aiming at goods of the soul (such as the virtues or contemplation) give us pleasures of high ethical value, and with them there is never the possibility of excess; instead actions aiming at goods of the body (such as food or sex) or external goods (such as wealth or power), although being, they too, absolute and natural goods, give us pleasures of less ethical value in view of happiness, and with them there can be excess if we go beyond our natural physical and mental needs. We must therefore, acting according to virtue, pursue in the right measure pleasures relating to all three categories of goods, but giving priority to pleasures relating to the goods of the soul.
Aristotle states that happiness resides in “activity according to virtue”, therefore the more we perform perfect and excellent virtuous actions, the more pleasure we derive from them, and the closer we get to happiness; and if those virtuous actions  are maximally perfect (that is, if they are performed for themselves, without any further end) we can derive from them the highest pleasure. However, even if the highest, pleasure is not the supreme good, the ultimate end of our life: that ultimate end is happiness, of which, however, the highest pleasure of the soul is one of the main components.

[publication in Dutch, for an English version of the text, please send me a private message]
The Pauline concept of pistis (faith, trust, persuasion) is in most scholarly evaluations either diagnosed as having an especially Jewish origin, alien to Hellenistic vocabulary, or as originating in Greek semantics, alien to similar Old Testament notions. In both cases, a distinction is made between the meaning of ‘trusting reliance’ or ‘faith in’, that is, pistis with a personal, relational object, and the meaning of ‘intellectual assent’ or ‘faith that’, that is, pistis with a cognitive, propositional object. In this essay, an alternative possibility is suggested by considering the use of pistis as a fundamental attitude (ēthos) as it was developed in Hellenistic philosophy, combining relational and cognitive elements. The argument is based on sources that belong to the diverse philosophical traditions that flourished throughout the Hellenistic age, including Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Platonism. They demonstrate that pistis played a significant role in the central endeavour which these philosophical schools had in common, that is, gaining a good fundamental attitude or ēthos. The author argues that precisely in the conception of pistis as a fundamental attitude, Hellenistic philosophy and the Pauline letters share a common ground. Moreover, it is through this shared horizon that Paul’s use of pistis can be understood in a broader way, encompassing both cognitive notions (proof, persuasion, assent), and relational aspects (trust, reliance, loyalty).

Whereas 2 Cor. 3.1-4.6 is traditionally understood as a polemic against Judaeans and the Mosaic law, a close examination of its rhetoric of moral freedom in light of nearly contemporaneous philosophers, and Philo of Alexandria in particular, necessitates a different conclusion. As part of his self-depiction as a sophos, Paul critiques Moses’ mediation of the law by invoking Stoic philosophical traditions which relativize slavery and freedom and assert that written codes of law are insufficient for freedom in order to claim that Moses limited divine revelation. In this way, Paul casts Moses’ mediation as a foil for his mediation of the gospel, which allegedly does not limit revelation but affords freedom apart from the written law. Paul never castigates the law or Judaeans; instead, he critiques Mosaic mediation in order to bolster his own authority as a mediator of divine revelation.

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