Scotus on the relation between the soul and its powers

JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !1 John Duns Scotus Rep. 2.16.un. Does the image of the Trinity consist in three really distinct powers of the rational soul? This text conveniently summarizes the two or three main positions prevalent at Scotus’s time concerning the relation between the soul: Aquinas’s view that the powers are accidents really distinct from the soul’s essence, Henry of Ghent’s view that they are really identical but become diversified through relations, and an ill-defined intermediate position held by several of Scotus’s fellow Franciscans. Having rejected these three position Scotus offers his own opinion, in two variants: unqualified identity and real identity together with formal distinction. The latter position appears to be intended to meet the intermediate position (it is detailed much more explicitly in William of Alnwick’s Determinatio 16). See Van den Bercken (2015) for an extensive discussion of this question. Probably due to its reportatio character the text is rather compact and not always clear; I have indicated the places where I found difficulties. Since there is as yet no critical edition of Rep. 2.16, I compared the text printed in Wadding-Vivès (Vivès, Vol. 23, p. 67-77) with the one in two mss generally considered to be reliable witnesses (Thanks are due to Tim Noone for his help here): Ms Worchester 69, ff. 107r-108v, (= W) and Ms Merton 61, ff. 177r-180r, (= M). In general, in comparison with M and Vivès, W offers a more austere version; M and Vivès often make references more precise and frequently add a few words or even a whole phrase. I decided to base the translation on W, noting significant differences with M and the edition (which henceforth will be denoted as just Viv.). The result is of course not a ‘critical edition in translation’, but it nicely illustrates the extent to which copyists tend to intervene in and ‘improve’ upon their base text. Wadding numbers are in square brackets. Paragraph numbers added in order to facilitate presenting the structure of the text and internal referencing. John van den Bercken April 2018. JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !2 John Duns Scotus Does the image of the Trinity consist in three really distinct powers of the rational soul? (Rep. 2.16.un., Ms Worchester 69) Contents Initial arguments 1-6 First opinion: The powers are really distinct from the soul ’s essence and among themselves (as accidents) Arguments 8-13 Authorities 14-17 Refutation of the arguments 18-32 Second opinion: The powers are the same as the soul’s essence but really distinct among themselves (as parts) Authorities 33-34 Refutation 35-39 Third opinion: The powers are the same as the soul’s essence but really distinct among themselves (as relations) Arguments 40-41 Authority 42 Refutation 43-50 Scotus’s opinion First approach: the powers are absolutely the same as the soul’s essence 51-59 Second approach: the powers are the same as the soul’s essence but formally distinct 60-64 Authorities saved by the second approach 65-70 Reinterpreting the authorities given for the first opinion 71-75 Reinterpreting the authorities given for the second opinion 76-79 Conclusion: Reply to the substance of the question 78-80 Reply to the initial arguments 81-84 *** JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !3 Does the image of the Trinity consist in three distinct powers of the soul? [1] Does the image of the Trinity in the rational soul consist in three really distinct powers?1 Initial arguments 1 It does. The Persons in the Trinity are really distinct; therefore in the image the powers representing these persons will be really distinct too. 2 Again. [Aristotle, in] On the Soul II:2 ‘Powers are distinguished in terms of acts, and acts in terms of objects’; but the acts of the intellect and of the will are really distinct; therefore the powers too. 3 Again. If not, the proposition ‘The intellect is the will’ would be true, because real identity is sufficient for it to be true; and then one could say that one wills by the intellect and thinks by the will. 4 For the opposite. Augustine, in On the Trinity XIV:3 ‘For an image of the Trinity we must look there where nothing better is to be found in us’; but if the powers [which make up the image] were other things than the essence, the essence would be better than a power. 5 Again. By its essence the soul is immaterial; so it is by its essence intellective and intellectual; so it is not of an intellectual nature by something other than the essence. And Proclus: because it is immaterial, it can reflect upon itself; therefore, the powers are not really distinguished.4 6 Again. Memory belongs to the image because it represents the Father; and intelligence (intelligentia) because it represents the Word, according to Augustine in On the The Latin word potentia, variously translated as potency, power or even potentiality, is ambiguous. Scotus will clarify its meaning as he deploys the arguments for his own answer to the question. Basically, potentia can refer to a potential, as yet unrealized state of being, or to a principle of acting, a power or faculty. The meaning of the Latin word actus mirrors that of potentia; in one sense it means actuality or an actual state of being, in another it refers to the activity or acts of a power. 1 2 Aristotle, De An. 2.4, 415a16-21 3 Augustine, De Trin. 14.8(1) Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica Prop. 15 ( Ed. Boese, 1987, p. 11). Viv. has: … by its essence intellective and intellectual and intelligent (intellectiva, intellectualis, intelligens). And Proclus says: ‘All that is immaterial can reflect upon itself’; so this [i.e. being able to reflect] is not something other than the essence of the intellectual nature, since the latter is reflexive because it is immaterial; the powers are therefore not really distinct from the soul, nor among themselves. 4 JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !4 Trinity XV, chapter 6 of the smaller ones;5 but intelligence and memory are not really distinct, therefore, the intellect and the will are not distinct either.6 [2] 7 To this question it has been said that at least two powers, namely the intellect and the will, are really distinct. There are two variants of this claim. The first approach claims that they are really distinct from each other and from the essence of the soul, as accidents that are proper attributes. The other opinion claims that they are really distinct from each other but not from the essence of the soul. First opinion: Thomas Aquinas and followers 8 Arguments in favour of the first view. [Thomas Aquinas] Potency and act belong to the same category; but acts like thinking (intelligere) and willing, are of the category of Quality [i.e. accidents]; therefore, the powers [are accidents] too.7 9 Secondly. According to its essence soul is act; so, if the power to operate is not something other than the essence, then, as long as the latter exists, it is always operating, because just as the essence is the principle of living, so it is the principle of operating according to its essence; just as the composite [of body and soul] is one entity as long as the soul is in the body, so it is always operating. And he adds that it [the soul], insofar as it is essence, is act; but insofar as it is act, it is not in potency; if it is not operating it would be in potency to operate.8 10 Another doctor9 argues for this approach as follows. Taken by itself, one and the same simple created entity cannot be the immediate causal10 principle of different things; yet the operations of the soul are different; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear in the case of 5 Augustine, De Trin. 15, passim 6 M and Viv.: …intelligence and memory are not really distinct, because perfect memory, being a first act [i.e. as preserving knowledge] is a sufficient principle for intellection [i.e. for actual thought]; but the first act and the principle of operating are not really different; so … etc. 7 Aquinas, S. Th. 1.77 a1, in corp. 8 Aquinas, S. Th. 1.77 a1, in corp. In the margin Viv. refers to Hervaeus, Quod. 1.9, but this cannot have been Scotus’s source. Hervaeus lectured on the Sentences at Paris probably in 1302-3 and was regent master in 1307-9; his Quodlibeta are placed at 1307-9 (Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, 2010, vol. 2, p. 884). The First Quodlibet was probably held at Christmas 1307 (Friedman, in Schabel (Ed.): Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, 2007, pp. 434-6). Hervaeus discusses the argument in his Sentences Commentary, Sent. 1.3.4 (Ed. Paris, 1647, f. 38b and 40b), but it can very well have been taken from Godfrey of Fontaines Quod. 8.6, where it’s wording closely matches the one here (ed. Leuven, 1924, p. 65). 9 10 Viv. omits ‘causal’ (reading principium tale in stead of causale) JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !5 matter, where it is less well seen11 that the receptive power is different in the case of different effects; for, although the matter on itself (remota) is the same, something else is required for tailoring (approprians) the matter to this form or that form; so, a fortiori, taken by itself, one and the same simple operative principle (operativum) cannot be the immediate principle of different things. [3] 11 Another doctor12 joins in. A variable accident inheres in a subject through the mediation of an invariable accident inhering immediately; so various operations inhere in the soul through the mediation of a power that is like an invariable accident. The antecedent is clear, because a greater difference comes to be realized by a cause mediating a lesser difference. 12 Another doctor argues as follows. What acts through its essence acts always; so if the soul were to act through its essence, it would act always; so that by which it acts, and not always [as is obviously the case], is not the essence. 13 Again. Just as essence stands to being, so potency [or power] stands to operating; so, by transposing terms: just as being stands to acting, so essence to potency;13 but nowhere being is the same as acting, except in God; so power is not essence.14 14 Again, by referring to authorities. Aristotle in on On the Categories,15 and Augustine in On the Categories,16 place natural power and powerlessness in the second species of quality. Less well seen = minus videtur, in all three witnesses. It is a bit strange to read that something is clear when it is less well seen. Alnwick’s redaction of this question in Op. Ox. 2.16 has: ‘No simple created entity can be the immediate and total principle of different operations; and he proves this where it is best seen (magis videtur): one single and simple [instance of] matter cannot according to itself be the receptive principle of various forms of a different character (alterius rationis), unless by means of some perfections and dispositions determining it to different forms’ (Vivès 13, p. 24b) 11 12 Viv. refers to Giles of Rome, Quod. 3.9. In the Louvain 1646 edition the numbering of Giles’ Quodlibeta is confusing. What is printed as counted as Quod. 3.10 is actually 3.9, and does not deal with the problem at hand. What is printed as 3.11 is actually 3.10 and more to the point, asking Utrum anima sit idem cum suis potentiis (Ed. Louvain 1646, f. 156; the argument is at f. 157a-158b) Cf. Aquinas, QDA 12.s.c.1; S. Th. 1.79.1 resp. WM and Viv. have ita potentia ad essentiam. However, if the proportionalities are read arithmetically, the tranformation is formally not correct. Starting with essentia : esse = potentia : operari (agere), and permuting esse and agere the proportionality esse : agere would imply potentia : essentia. A correct analysis results when the initial proportionalities are changed into esse : essentia = operari : potentia; then the proportionality essentia : potentia is indeed equal to esse : operari. Cf. Alnwick’s redaction of this question (Vivès 13, p. 25a). Anyway, if being and acting are the same, essence and power are the same too. 13 14 Cf. Aquinas, S. Th. 1.54.3 and 1.79.1 15 Aristotle, Cat. 8, 8b25 Thus WM. The pertinent work was erroneously atributed to Augustine; it is included in the latter’s works in PL (vol. 32), under the title Categoriae decem. It does indeed have the remark on the type of natural power and powerlesness (chapter 12, PL 32, col. 1432-33). Viv. does not mention ‘Augustine’s Categories’ but instead refers to ‘Augustine, Liber De Spiritu et Anima’, another text long considered to be a work of Augustine’s (printed in PL 40). Its author is unknown; it may have been compiled by Alcherus of Clairveaux. Anyway, it does not have a remark to the extent that natural power is of the second kind of quality. Viv. adds two more references not found in WM: “Simplicius in his comment on the chapter ‘On Quality’, and Damascene in his Logic”. 16 JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !6 15 Again. In On the Soul I the Commentator says:17 the soul is divided in powers just as as a piece of fruit is divided in colors; colour is an accident of fruit. 16 Again. In On the Trinity XV, chapter 2318 of the greater, Augustine seems to claim that memory and intelligence admit for more and less; so they are not substances.19 17 Again. In On the Fall of the Devil, chapter 8,20 Anselm says that the power of the will is not the soul.21 Refutation of the arguments 18 Yet I say that these arguments are not conclusive.22 19 To the first argument [in n. 8] I say that potency is taken in two senses.23 In one way potency [or power] is a principle of a being (entis) and so it is divided in active and passive potency [i.e. as a principle potency subserves a being’s activity and passivity].24 [4] In another way potency [or potentiality] and act are taken as differences of being (entis) [i.e. potentiality and actuality are different states of being]. 20 In this second way potency and act belong to the same species and individual and are numerically the same: what first exists in potentiality and diminished being (esse diminuto), is subsequently in act and then has unqualified being (esse simpliciter). And in this [second] sense the minor premise [concerning the acts of thinking and willing] is false, and the intellect will never be something intelligible;25 but the caused act that now has absolute being, was earlier in potency and had diminished being. If in the minor premise one takes act and potency [in the first way, namely] as active and passive principles, an ambiguity arises. 21 If in the major premise, that potency and act belong to the same category, one takes these terms for an operating principle and its effect respectively, the major is false,26 because it is never necessary that a principle of being is of the same category as what is realized by its 17 Averroes, In De Anima 1.92, ad 411b15-19 (Ed. Crawford, p. 123). 18 Augustine, 19 De Trin. 15.23(43) Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 5, 3b33 20 Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil 8 (Davies & Evans, p. 205) M and Viv.: …the power of the will is not the essence, because the will is not a substance; he says: ‘Even if powers are not substances, they are still not nothing’ 21 22 Viv. adds: and they are easily replied to 23 Scotus treats the various senses of potency (or power or potentiality) extensively in his QMet 9 M and Viv. add: as is evident from Metaphysics 5 and 9 [Aristotle, Met. 5 passim, e.g. 1014a7-9, 1019a12 sqq. and Met. 9 passim, e.g. 1046a9-13] 24 Instead of ‘and the intellect will never be something intelligible’ M and Viv. have ‘because a power will not later be its own act’ 25 26 Viv. adds: if the operating principle is taken as a passive principle, it is false too JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !7 operation. This [i.e. being of the same category] is not necessary for a passive principle, because an accident is immediately received in a substance, otherwise there will be an infinite regress. Nor is it true for an active principle, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics VII:27 for a substance to come about (fiat), it is necessary that a substance exists first; but for [an accident like] a quality or a quantity to come about, it is not necessary that the quality is formally in existence first, but only [that it exists] virtually [i.e. can be caused in an entity which is naturally disposed to have that quality, such as a substance]. So an active principle can belong to a different category than what is realized. 22 The major premise is false according to that doctor himself as well.28 For he claims that accidents are in the soul as in a receptive principle, and that they are not of the same category [as the the receptive principle, the substance of the soul]. He also claims that they flow from the soul. So it [i.e. the soul] is an active principle with respect to its powers. Therefore, his major premise is not true of either of the two operating principles [i.e. the active and the passive principle]. [5] 23 The other argument [in n. 9] says: ‘According to its essence the soul is act; so, just as it is the principle of living, it is the principle of operating’. This is true, in one way but not in another way. For with respect to immediacy the analogy holds, for the rest there is difference. For it [the soul] is the principle of operating not in a formal manner but in an effective manner [i.e. as an efficient cause],29 and it [the soul] is the principle of living in a formal manner [i.e. as a formal cause]. 24 As for the addition [in n. 9] ‘If it [the soul] according to its essence is act, then it is, as such, not in potency’. This is true in so far as it is not in receptive potency; but it can very well be in potency to operating. Hence this argument is against them as well, as far as potency with respect to received acts is concerned. For the power that is called ‘possible intellect’ is in potency with respect to the act it receives, and yet it is an act of the soul, for it is an accident of it; and in general a subject is through its substantial form the proper recipient of attributes; and still it is, by its form, in act; thus nothing would prohibit something to be in act with respect to one thing and in potency with respect to another.30 27 Aristotle, 28 Met. 7.9, 1034b16-19 M and Viv. add: when we follow his own understanding of the matter M and Viv. add: as Aristotle says, with respect to operating, in Metaphysics V: Craftsmanship and builder can be reduced to the same principle [Aristotle, Met. 5.2, 1013b6-8] 29 Scotus argues extensively for this claim in QMet. 9.14: Utrum aliquid possit moveri a se ipso (OPhil. 4, pp. 625-674) and in Ordinatio 1.3 nn. 512-523 (Vat 3, pp. 303-314) 30 JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !8 [6] 25 You will say: Before [actual] intellection the intellect is none of the things that exist.31 And the Commentator says that in the domain of intelligible things the intellect behaves as matter does in the domain of sensible forms.32 26 I say that a power in relation to an accident is in potency in a certain sense, but it is also in act in an unqualified sense (simpliciter). So, [the intellect’s] being in potency to an accidental form leads immediately to the conclusion that it [the intellect] is in an unqualified sense rather than [that it is just] in potency. Hence, if [an act of] thinking (intelligere) were to have a corresponding power, it would follow that there would be as many intellective powers in man as there are [acts of] thinking. But this is impossible.33 So, since thinking is an accidental act, it would follow that what is in proximate potency to thinking, is in act absolutely. Therefore Aristotle’s sentence has the following meaning: the intellect [itself] cannot be thought of (intelligi) before other things are thought of. That is: it cannot be first thought of by itself unless a phantasm is thought of first; but it certainly is thinkable (intelligibilis) before thinking. 27 The same goes for the quotation of the Commentator, ‘Just as matter is of itself in potency to all forms, so the intellect is, in the domain of the things that can be understood by it, nothing before the act of intellection’. It concludes to nothing but the fact that it [the intellect] is not right away intelligible by itself. [7] 28 To the other argument [in n. 10], stating that one and the same simple created entity cannot be the causal principle of many things: I say that it is false, when we are talking of an operative principle, be it receptive or active, both in the case of incorporeal things and in the case of corporeal things. The essence of the [incorporeal] soul, which is simple in itself, is the recipient of all its powers, which are of various kinds. Therefore, just as he [Hervaeus] posits a simple recipient, he has to posit that it is the causal principle of different things. The same goes for corporeal things: fire is [an active principle that is] both hot and dry, and none of these by means of the other. 29 Likewise, matter is the immediate receptive principle of specifically different forms, because that which is the immediate recipient of a substantial form is either only matter or something together with matter. In the first case, we have what I propose. In the second: since all that belongs to the receptive essence as such is included in the product, there will be two substantial forms34 at the same time in the same thing – what he denies − or an accident will be [included] within the essence of a substance. If that other thing, which is the 31 Cf. Aristotle, De An. 3.4, 429b30-31 32 Cf. Averroes, In De An. 3.5 (Ed. Crawford, p. 387) M and Viv. add: according to Physics III: If having the capacity to be healed and the capacity to be sick would be the same, then being healed and being sick would be the same [Aristotle, Phys. 3, 201a34] 33 34 Viv.: two similar forms JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !9 immediate recipient together with matter, is not a substantial form, but an accident, then that tailoring thing that he proposes will not be a part of the immediate recipient [8] 30 To the other argument [of Giles, in n. 11]], saying that a variable accident is received through the mediation of something invariable: This does not seem to be another argument, unless when something invariable in itself cannot be the immediate recipient of variability. For if something invariable in itself could immediately receive a variable accident, there would be no need to posit that it [the variable accident] is received through the mediation of something else; but if it cannot [immediately receive a variable accident], then there will necessarily be an infinite regress; therefore, the argument has no value. 31 Regarding the other argument [in n. 12] a certain doctor [Thomas] says that nothing acts through its essence, except God alone, and He acts always. It can be said that ‘through its essence’ can be interpreted in two ways: sometimes in contradistinction to [what exists through] ‘participation’, sometimes in contradistinction to ‘by accident’. In the first way, I say that nothing exists through its essence except God,35 for every created entity36 is what it is through participation; understood in this way, what acts through its essence, always acts. In the second way, what acts through its essence, that is: not by accident, not necessarily acts always. Relevant here is what Avicenna says in Metaphysics VI chapter 2:37 some powers (virtutes) are active by their essence, some not. 32 To the other argument [in n. 13], saying that potency [or power] stands to operating as essence to being [or existence]: this is false, for being is really the same as essence, but operating is the effect of a power. But the following is true: potency stands to being able to operate as essence to being; and then no absurdity follows from the permutation of terms. To the authorities will be replied below [in n. 71 ff.]. 35 M adds: because a ray is not a ray by its essence in this way, for every created entity etc. 36 Viv.: every truth and created entity etc. 37 Auicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima siue scientia diuina, 6.2 (p. 305) JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !10 Second opinion: The Old Franciscan School38 [9] 33 Arguments for the second opinion, namely that the powers are really39 distinct form each other but not from the essence of the soul, since they are parts of the soul, as can be seen from On the Soul III ’Concerning the part of the soul…’.40 34 Again. Boethius says in his book On Divisions:41 The soul is divided in powers like a whole is divided in parts. On this score, one may look at Augustine, On the Trinity XV, chapter 7,42 and at Anselm, On the Compatibility of Grace and Free Will, chapter 19:43 that the powers are in the soul in the way members are in the body; therefore. Refutation 35 Augustine seems to be against this view; see On the Trinity IX, chapter 5:44 ‘No part encompasses the whole of which it is a part’.45 36 Again. Parts precede the whole in origin; the powers do not precede the essence of the soul. 37 Again. If they are parts, then they are either integral parts or essential parts. If they are integral parts, then there must be something that is different from them, by which they are one, for integral parts never cause something that is essentially one unless some other formal factor concurs.46 If they are essential parts, then one of them completes (perficit) the other in the way act completes potency [e.g. in the way form completes matter]; and then there must Viv. atributes this opinion to Bonaventure, but the description of the opinion is very sketchy, hardly doing justice to Bonaventure. See Bonaventure, Sent. 2 d. 24 art. 2 q. 1: Utrum intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas, essentialiter different, and also Sent. 1. d.3 p.2 a.1 q.3: Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint idem in essentia cum anima. The refutation given by Scotus much better fits the opinion of John Peckam, also adopted by Peter of John Olivi: ‘quod potentiae sint partes animae constitutivae et quod differunt ab ea sicut partes a toto et sint idem cum ea sicut partes cum suo toto’ (Sent. 2 q. 54; Ed. Jansen 1924, p. 253]). Cf. also, rudimentary, Alexander of Hales, as cited in Künzle, p. 117; See Van den Bercken, 2015. 38 39 M and Viv. omit ‘really’ 40 Aristotle, 41 De An. 3.4 (428a10). Boethius, On Divisions, PL 64, col. 888 (Kretzmann & Stump, p. 33) 42 Augustine, 43 Anselm, De Trin. 15.7(11) De Conc. 3(11) (Davies & Evans, p. 467) 44 Augustine, De Trin. 9.4(7) 45 M and Viv. add: But every one of these potency-parts encompasses the whole essence of the soul 46 M and Viv. add a reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics 7.17, 1041b11-25 JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !11 be one power which is the very lowest to be brought to completion (infimum perfectibile) by another, and consequently, that one is not a power of operating.47 38 One says: matter is receptive with respect to anything, and none [of the powers] with respect to another [power].48 39 Contra. So none of these powers will depend on another to a greater extent than fire does; but these three powers [i.e. memory, intelligence and will] will be one whole act, for it is impossible that something is act if not any part of it is act, for then something that is composed of act and potency could be act wit respect to something else. Third opinion: Henry of Ghent49 [10] 40 The third approach holds that they [i.e. the powers of the soul] are not really distinct from the essence of the soul, nor from each other, in absolute reality, but only through a related thing, since the soul itself does not point of itself to an act.50 According to Metaphysics IX51 a power is distinguished by its act, and conversely; so act and power are relative notions; now, when the essence of the soul is considered under a certain relation (respectus) it is called a certain power, and when it is considered under another relation, it is called another power. 41 But why is the soul determined to such relations? It is said that the soul is determined to organic relations by the organs. To relations pertaining to active operative powers such as the intellect52 and the will it is determined53 by relating to an object;54 but to Here Scotus does not consider the possibility of a totum potestativum (or potentiale or virtuale), which is in fact the kind of whole the criticized opinion seems to have in mind and amounts to what Scotus himself later (in n. 67 and 76) proposes as the appropriate kind of whole. For a definition of totum virtuale (contrasting it with totum universale and totum integrale) see e.g. Aquinas in S. Th., I, 77, 1, ad 1, or in DSC, 11 ad 2. A very succinct characterization is given by the Franciscan John Pecham (Sent. 1.32) : <Totum> universale quidem adest cuilibet suae parti subiective per substantiam et virtutem; totum integrale suae parti vero <non> [om ed.] adest secundum substantiam nec secundum virtutem; virtuale medio modo se habet, quia ratione simplicis essentiae adest totaliter secundum substantiam cum qualibet potentia, sed non cum tota virtute, quoniam virtus animae ex variis potentiis integratur; et inde totum virtuale appellatur (1918, p. 204). Scotus himself refers to the notion at several places: Rep. 1A.19 n.108-9 (WB 1, p. 561) and Rep. 1A.33 n. 34 (WB 2, p. 319-20). On this see Van den Bercken (2015). 47 48 Viv. has: The matter of the soul is receptive with respect to anything, and none of the powers [is receptive] with respect to another Henry, Quodl. 3 q. 14; Scotus discusses and refutes Henry’s view (as presented in Quod. 3.14) in more detail in QMet. 9.5 49 50 Viv.: … does not point to an external act [anima non dicitur actus extra in stead of actus ex se] 51 Aristotle, Met. 9.8, 1050b3-6 (probably) 52 M and Viv. have: the agent intellect 53 M and Viv. add: either by itself or etc. 54 M and Viv. add: with respect to which these powers are naturally apt to act JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !12 relations associated with a passive operative power such as the possible intellect it is determined by the species it receives. 42 Reference is made to Augustine’s On the Trinity IX, chapter 5:55 that a power is called so in a relative way. And in On the Spirit and the Soul:56 a power [of the soul] is identical with the essence [of the soul]. Refutation [11] 43 But this does not solve the question, which is not about power as it points to a relation (which is what the word ‘power’ tries to say), but about power as an immediate and per se principle [i.e. as something absolute on which the power realtion is founded]. Power of itself means something relative and not something absolute, unless by connotation. Now, what is an absolute principle of operating cannot possibly be a composite of a relation and a foundation, for from such a thing nothing can come that is absolutely one; not even in the divine, where, nevertheless, the relation would go through by (transit per) identity,57 for each [namely identity and relation] holds its own actuality; so [the same applies] much stronger when a relation does not go through by identity. Therefore, since an essential principle is essentially one, it cannot possibly include something absolute and something relative. 44 Again. A power which is the per se principle of operating, is naturally prior to its effect, namely the operation; but a power together with a jointly assumed relation, exists simultaneous with its effect, for under that respect it is the correlate with respect to the operation. [12] 45 Again. A passive proximate power is not a relation, nor does it include a relation; so neither does an active power. The antecedent is clear, for a passive power is an essential part of a composite entity which is essentially one. 46 Again. This doctor claims that the will is really nobler than the intellect; but, since the foundation of these powers is the same, and, as he says, a relation is identical with its foundation, it follows that the one power is not really nobler58 than the other, for the foundation is completely the same. 47 Again. Intellect and will are absolutely identical;59 so they will not be specifically differentiated by a relation. For if they, being absolutely the same, are differentiated by a newly occurring relation to an object of a different kind, the intellect will formally be several powers, and the will similarly, because through a newly occurring relation to a different 55 Augustine, De Trin. 9.5(8) 56 Anonymus, Liber de Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40, col. 782, ad sensum!) 57 Viv.: where the relation only proceeds through identity [reading tantum for tamen] 58 Viv.: the one power is not a reality that is nobler etc. [realitas vs realiter] 59 Cf. n. 58 below JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !13 object, of a different kind [than the first object], the intellect will be differentiated; and the will too, when it is willing different things; just as the intellect [will become differentiated] from the will.60 [13] 48 Again. When he says that the soul is determined to organic powers through the relations of the organs: this is false, because the capacities (vires) differentiate the organs and not the organs the capacities, as something more noble [differentiates] something less noble.61. 49 Again. When he says that the possible intellect is determined by the species it receives, he contradicts himself, for he consciously (ex intentione) denies the reception of species in the intellect. Moreover, according to him, nothing determines the possible intellect except a phantasm. And in the same way he must concede that if the foundations [of relations] are indistinct, the forms [of the relations] will be indistinct too, since [according to him] they are the same in reality. 50 And when he refers to Augustine, On the Trinity IX, I say that the latter understands the things he is talking about as being different in the way what generates and what is being generated are different. And he is not only talking about a formal principle, but about the very entity that generates, including the relation; but relations alone cannot distinguish really absolute things. Scotus’s view: First approach [14] 51 I say therefore, to the question, that one must stick to paucity where a multitude is not necessary; and to possibility where impossibility cannot be proved; and to nobility in nature where ignobility cannot be proved. Now, the immediateness of the first act in relation to the second act is a mark of nobility, as is evident in God; and it cannot be proved that in creatures the second act cannot come immediately from the first act, as is clear, since the arguments for proving it are sophisms; so one must rather advance paucity which dignifies nature, than multiplicity which is not necessary and does not dignify it. 52 Again. If an operation runs through mediators, then the agent reaches its goal more immediately62 when there are less mediators than when there are more; now, since a rational creature can reach its goal more immediately than if one posits mediation between power and operation, the former is the better state of affairs.63 60 Viv. omits ‘just as … the will’ M and Viv. add: Cf. On the Soul I: the limbs of a deer are not different from the limbs of a lion except in so far as the soul [of the former differs] from the soul [of the latter]. [Averroes, In De An. 1.53, on Aristotle, 407b20-24 (Ed. Crawford, p. 75)] 61 62 Viv. erroneously prints mediatius 63 Viv. has: than if one posits that a power mediates between the essence and the operation, the former etc. JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !14 [15] 53 Again. An operation of an agent that is not immediately received in it [the agent], is not a proper operation of it; but if intellect and will are different from the essence [of the soul], then the acts of seeing and loving God are not immediately, and (what is more) not per se received in the essence of the soul; because, if these powers were separated from the essence of the soul, like quantity from its subject [as is the case in the Eucharist], then the intellect could stil be made perfect through the beatific vision; and then an accident would formally be beatified, and not just the rational creature; then, be it that the essence of the soul and these powers are conjoined, the soul will still be beatified only by accident, like a wall is white through the surface; so this mediation would greatly demean the nature [of the soul]; but it is not so with operating, because it is contradictory that the soul is beatified and not operating. 54 Again. An act at a level lower than the rational soul can be the immediate principle of operating, otherwise there would be an infinite regress; therefore, it [i.e. being an immediate principle] is not incompatible with soul for the reason that it would not be in the nature of its perfection, since it does fit something less perfect.64 Nor is it a reason for the soul to be imperfect because it [i.e. being an immediate principle] fits something more perfect [than the human soul], like God.65 [16] 55 Again. Some substances are generated univocally, or at least from another substance; so the substantial form will be an immediate principle of acting, for the formally produced end term cannot be nobler than the active principle itself. 56 You will say: true, the active principle is a substance, but it acts by means of an accident. 57 Contra: at the very moment of generation a substantial form is immediately induced in matter; but no accident is connected with (attingit) such passive principle [as matter is]; so at the moment of generation it [the substantial form] does not act through any mediating accident; but immediately, through the substantial form, and there is no contradiction here.66 Therefore. [17] 58 I say, therefore, that intellect and will are not really distinct things.67 It can be maintained that they are the same in reality and in thought (re et ratione).68 Hence, several 64 Viv. adds: this is evident in the case of heat and active qualities I.e.: the fact that ‘being an immediate principle’ is proper to God does not mean that it would be something of an imperfection for the human soul 65 66 For ‘and there …’ Viv. has: and there are no successive steps (non est ibi gradus) Scotus here focuses on the identity of intellect and will, but he also holds that memory and intellect are one power: ‘memoria et intelligentia sunt una potentia’ (Ord. 1.27, n. 18; Ed. Vat. 6, p. 71). So in fact his identity claim involves the conventional Augustinian triad of memory, intellect and will. 67 M and Viv.: ‘… they are completely the same in reality and in thought (re et ratione). Or that the essence of the soul, in reality and in thought completely indistinct, is the principle of several operations, without a real distinction between powers that would be parts of the soul, or accidents or relations (respectus). Hence etc.’ 68 JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !15 things can very well be the effect of something that is in reality one and wholly the same and unconstrained (illimitatum) entity and still a per se principle and a cause of several things, not as if they include a relation and that the powers by themselves have no distinction at all; but in so far as they include relations, they are distinguished by reason; but this relation is not of the nature (ratione) of the principle per se. Nor does it follow from this that the intellect is the will, because they are not posited as per se principle unconditionally (absolute), but only under a certain respect. 59 This approach cannot be refuted by reason. For just as God, who is absolutely without any constraint and completely the same in reality and in thought, is immediately the principle of different things, so something that is unconstrained in its own way, though not unconditionally as regards its products, can be completely the same in reality and in thought, although the products are diverse. Scotus’s view: Second approach [18] 60 Because the foregoing approach does not save as many authorities as an other can do, I present an alternative approach. I say that the powers are not different things, but are unitively contained in the essence of the soul.69 61 Unitive containment is discussed by Dionysius in On the Divine Names V.70 Unitive containment does not apply to something that is completely the same, in the sense that something that is completely the same contains itself unitively; nor [does it apply] to what remains completely distinct. So it requires unity and distinction. 62 Now, there are two kinds of unitive containment. One way obtains when a lower entity contains higher essential elements (essentialia), and then what is contained is of the essence of the container. For example, it is the very same reality (realitas) from which the difference in whiteness [i.e. a degree of whiteness] is taken, and the proximate category, like [that it is a] color, and the sensible quality [that it is visible], and [that it falls under the category of] quality; and although these items are different things, they would be unitively contained in whiteness. Another unitive containment71 occurs when a subject unitively contains things that are like attributes (passiones), just as the attributes of a being (entis) are not things (res), differing 69 See also Rep. 1A.33.1 n. 34, where Scotus clarifies the way the powers of the soul are identical to the essence of the soul, and QMet 9.5 nn. 18-35, where Scotus also discusses the relation between powers and essence in the framework of his concept of unitive containment; the latter is discussed elaborately in QMet 4.2 nn. 143, 152-176. The exact source of Scotus’s continentia unitiva is not clear. Cf. Gilson (1952, 2005), p. 506, note 3.. For further references, see the editorial notes at Scotus’s QMet. 4.2 n. 161 (OPhil. 3, p. 360). 70 The difference between the two variants is that in the first the unitively contained items reflect hierarchically ordered nested concepts, whereas in the second the attributes are of equal standing. 71 JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !16 from the being itself; for whichever [of them] is given,72 it is [at the same time] a being and true and good. So we must say either that they [i.e. the attributes ‘true’ and ‘good’] are not different from the being, or that the being does not have real attributes – which is against what Aristotle explicitly says in Metaphysics IV.73 Yet these real attributes are no more of the [being’s] essence, nor quidditatively the same, than if they were something different.74 63 Therefore, the powers are formally or quidditatively not identical to each other or to the essence of the soul; and yet they are not different things, but they are the same by identity (idem identitate). Hence such things have a distinction according to their principal intelligible content (rationes), the kind of distinction that would be a real [formal W] distinction if it were distinct things (res distinctae).75 [19] 64 So the principles of willing and intellection exist immediately in the second moment of nature, and these principles are unitively present in the essence of the soul, which exists in the first moment of nature, like unitively contained attributes. Reply to the the authorities 65 In this manner the authoritative statements can be saved, when they seem to say that they [the powers] are distinguished really - this is true: formally. 66 And so the powers are said to well up (ebullire) from the essence of the soul, according to the Commentator in Ethics X, and to flow from (effluere) the essence, according to the common view. 67 And so we can save the testimonies of Dionysius in On the Divine Names, and of other authors. And [the powers] can be called parts of the soul, for none of them tells the whole perfection of the containing whole;76 and the parts are called so because if the soul would have only one power it would be less perfect than it is now. 72 For ‘whichever … given’ Viv. has: ‘whenever [a thing] is specified’ (determinetur instead of detur) 73 Aristotle, Met. 4.2, 1003b21-22 Nec tamen magis sunt reales passiones de essentia, nec idem quidditative [idem quidditati Viv.], quam si essent res alia. This enigmatic sentence may perhaps be paraphrased as follows: ‘The attributes unitively contained in a being are real, but they are no more associated with the being’s essence or quiddity than distinct things would be.’ The point seems to be that the attributes’ being unitively contained in the being does not mean that they are quidditatively the same as the being’s essence (or as each other) - a somewhat convoluted way of asserting real identity and formal distinction. 74 Cf. M and Viv.: … such things have a distinction according to their formal intelligible content (rationes formales), the kind of distinction that would be a real distinction if they were different things and really distinct 75 M and Viv. have: And so we can save the testimonies of Dionysius in On the Divine Names, and of other authors, who claim that the powers are intermediate between substantial and accidental forms, and that they proceed from (egrediuntur) the substance of the soul, which makes it possible for us to say that the powers (virtutes) are parts of the soul. For their [i.e. the powers’] nature means full perfection for the container. 76 JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !17 68 Things that are contained do not always contain each other, sometimes even none of them contains any other. For in the divine both essence and relation are supposed to be contained and the essence contains the relation, but not conversely.77 69 In the case at hand: the intellect does not contain the will, nor conversely. So they are the same by identity (sunt ididem indentitate) only because they are in the containing entity, not because they are identical among themselves, as are the divine attributes, which are not only the same as to their identity,78 but also among themselves. 70 Similarly, because each person in the divine is intrinsically infinite, he contains intrinsically every absolute perfection that is present in the other person; but the intellect does not in that way contain memory: they merely go together (solum concomitantur).79 Hence the image must fall short of the Trinity, as Augustine states On the Trinity XV chapter 7:80 in the the image things are not as in the Trinity. [20] 71 As to the authorities adduced for the first view [in n. 14]: I say that they are equally plausible for the opposite. Hence in On the Trinity IX chapter 581 Augustine says that powers are not accidents. And On the Soul II82 has: if the eye were an animal, seeing (visus) would be its form. So he suggests that a power is not really different from the essence, since it is its form. And concerning an axe he says: if it were a natural thing, sharpness would be its form. And in Metaphysics VII83 and in Meteorology IV:84 anything will be called singular when it has the power to operate; otherwise it is not called so, unless equivocally, as in the case of an eye that has been pulled out; but when an accident has been lost, it will not be called so unless equivocally.85 72 So when it is said in The Categories that natural powers are in the category of quality, I say that a power which is of the second species of quality, is a principle of easily acting; it is not a natural power in the absolute sense, nor related to acting well or wrongly, it is rather some ease in using that power. And that is what Aristotle says. For according to that authority we call someone a runner or a boxer, because he easily uses the power to run. And so skill and cleverness are such powers of the second kind of quality. M and Viv.: For although in the divine there are in a supposit [i.e. in each divine person] both essence and relation, the essence contains the relation, but not conversely. 77 78 Viv. adds: in something else 79 Viv. omits ‘they merely go together’ 80 Augustine, De Trin. 15.7(11), 15.22(40) 81 Augustine, De Trin. 9.4(5) 82 Aristotle, 83 Reference not found 84 Aristotle, 85 De An. 2.1 (412b10, 412b18) Metereology 4.12 (390a10-13, 389b31) In the last two sentences Viv. misses ‘unless’ (twice!) JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !18 73 To the other point, of the Commentator [in n. 15], that the soul is divided in powers like a piece of fruit in taste and colour: I say that the soul is not completely formally the same as a power; nor is the full perfection of the soul completely explained by one power; so the metaphor holds in one respect but not in another respect. [21] 74 To the other point, Augustine’s saying [in n. 16] that the powers admit of more and less: I say that the previously mentioned86 skills (habilitates), which are natural powers, admit of more and less, and they are accidents of the second kind of quality. Such is Augustine’s understanding. Or one can say that he is talking of the powers as they underly their acts, not as they are in themselves. This is evident from book X, chapter 18, where he says that ‘they are one mind and one substance’;87 and so the inequality that he puts forward in On the Trinity XV, regards them as they underly acts. 75 As to Anselm, in On the Fall of the Devil [in n. 17], I say that he does not assume that they [the powers] are not substances; but he says that even if they are not substances, they still are not nothing.88 76 To the authorities for the second view. When it is said [in n. 33] that they [i.e. the powers of the soul] are parts of the soul: this is clear: they are called parts because none of them implies the full perfection of the soul. 77 The same reply clarifies the words of Boethius [in n. 34], that it [the soul] is divided as a whole [is divided] in parts: for no part exhausts the full perfection of the soul. 78 What has been said above also clarifies the meaning of Augustine [cited in n. 55]. 79 To Anselm, in On the Compatibility [in n. 34]. When he says that they [the powers of the soul] are like members in the body, that is true: there is some similarity. However, going from corporeal things to spiritual matters, one always goes from a larger multitude to a larger unity. It is therefore, not necessary that the diversity of powers in the soul is as large as [it is] in members of the body. Conclusion [22] 80 To the substance of the question, therefore, I say that the image of the Trinity in the rational soul does not consist in really distinct powers of the soul. For an image primarily represents a whole, and in this respect it differs from a trace, which represents a distinct quantitative part, and represents the whole only inferentially.89 86 Here Viv. reads ‘secondary’ (secundae, in stead of supradictae) 87 Augustine, De Trin. 10.11(18) W and M add: From this we do not have that he wants them not to be substances, for he only says to an opponent ‘and if it were so, they still would not be nothing’. 88 89 Scotus discusses this topic extensively in Ord.1.3 De Imagine (Vat. vol 3) JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !19 81 So I say that the soul by itself90 represents the image and the divine persons with respect to the unity of the essence; it does not in the same way represent the trinity of the persons, except in so far as it has different relations (respectus), according to those who put forward such relations. 82 Alternatively, one can say that the soul according to its three powers represents the Trinity of the persons with respect to a formal diversity, without a real diversity. So it is less91 representative of the trinity of the persons than of the unity of the essence. Hence, in view of its powers it represents unity, and in view of its acts, it represents a certain distinction. In the powers, therefore, there is virtually a real distinction, but not formally; in the acts there is formally a real distinction.92 [cf. n. 84] Reply to the initial arguments [23] 83 To the first initial argument. I say that there is in the soul not a full-blown image unless at root (in radice). But the soul represents the Trinity as it underlies its three powers with the unity of its essence, not through really distinct powers. 84 To the other argument. I say that it is not necessary that the distinction between powers is as strong as that between acts. For a virtual93 distinction between the powers is sufficient for a real distinction between acts. After all, the power of seeing exists as one power but handles several colours. 85 To the other argument. When it is said that the following is true: ‘The intellect is [the same as] the will’, I say that it is not. For intellect names [points to?] a nature as under this respect, will as under that respect; or [it names a nature] as in one concept or another.94 86 Or one can say that, however much they are really identical in the essence of the soul, they still are distinguished quidditatively or formally; and that difference precludes predicating the one of the other. So if [the powers of ] intellect and will are considered apart (abstrahantur) from from what can affect the intellect and the will (ab intellectivo et volitivo) [i.e. the objects of the intellect and will] and if there is some formal distinction [between the powers], then the one is not predicated of the other, just like animality is not predicated of 90 Viv.: ‘by its essence’ (per essentiam) instead of ‘by itself’ (per se) 91 M has: It is no less etc. [non istead of ideo] Thus W and M. Viv. has: In the powers, therefore, there is really a distinction virtually, (est distinctio realiter virtualiter vs. est distinctio realis virtualiter), not formally; in the acts there is a real formal distinction (realis formalis vs realis formaliter) 92 93 M and Viv.: ‘formal’ instead of ‘virtual’ Thus, enigmatically, W. The point may be that intellect and will represent different aspects of a rational nature (operating deterministically or freely) and are named accordingly. M has, even more enigmatically: ‘…will as under that respect or as in concept’. Viv. does not help either: ‘… will as under this or that concept.’ Cf. the next paragraph. Alternatively: The point may be that an object is an object of the intellect under an aspect that is different from the aspect under which it is the object of the will (verum vs bonum: the aspects are formally distinct). 94 JDS Rep. 2.16.un. !20 humanity, although it is included in it. But on account of the real unity of the powers in the essence of the soul the following proposition will be true: what affects the intellect is [the same as] what affects the will.95 And if intellect and will are considered apart from that which is the cause of their unity, none of the two is truly predicated (verificatur) of the other . *** 95 Viv. has: in being a cause (in causa), what moves the intellect, etc.