Medieval Philosophy/Psychology by John van den Bercken
Draft; to appear in the Br. J. for the His. of Phil.
Alnwick's first quodlibetal question is a reply to Scotus's Quaestio de Formalitatibus, where the... more Alnwick's first quodlibetal question is a reply to Scotus's Quaestio de Formalitatibus, where the latter clarified his understanding of the formal distinction: 'formal non-identity' of the personal properties in God (and of the divine attributes) does not preclude a formal distinction if the latter is conceived as a distinction weakened by the modifier 'formal'.
Alnwick’s first quodlibetal question is a reply to Scotus’s Quaestio de Formalitatibus, where the... more Alnwick’s first quodlibetal question is a reply to Scotus’s Quaestio de Formalitatibus, where the latter clarified his understanding of the formal distinction: ‘formal non-identity’ of the personal properties in God (and of the divine attributes) does not preclude a formal distinction if the latter is conceived as a distinction weakened by the modifier ‘formal’. Whereas Scotus’s Quaestio has been subjected to a detailed analysis by Dumont (2005), there is as yet no such analysis of Alnwick’s response. Alnwick rejects Scotus’s position, arguing that a formal distinction necessarily is unqualified and still threatens to import too much of unwanted realism in the matter at hand. Both Scotus and Alnwick acknowledge that the formal nonidentity reflects the nature of things without falling back to a real distinction. But for Alnwick the right kind of distinction is a qualified distinction that is not a formal distinction.
Outline of Quodl. 3.14:
Is the substance of the soul the same as its power? Utrum substantia ani... more Outline of Quodl. 3.14:
Is the substance of the soul the same as its power? Utrum substantia animae sit ipsa potentia eius?
Rep. 2.16.un: Does the image of the Trinity consist in three really distinct powers of the ration... more Rep. 2.16.un: Does the image of the Trinity consist in three really distinct powers of the rational soul?
This text conveniently summarizes the two or three main positions prevalent at Scotus's time concerning the relation between the soul: Aquinas's view that the powers are accidents really distinct from the soul's essence, Henry of Ghent's view that they are really identical but become diversified through relations, and an ill-defined intermediate position held by several of Scotus's fellow Franciscans. Having rejected these three position Scotus offers his own opinion, in two variants: unqualified identity and real identity together with formal distinction. The latter position appears to be intended to meet the intermediate position (it is detailed much more explicitly in William of Alnwick's Determinatio 16).
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 2018
This paper analyzes the particular notion of the conceptual distinction as elaborated by Alphonsu... more This paper analyzes the particular notion of the conceptual distinction as elaborated by Alphonsus Vargas in his Questions on Aristotle's De Anima, when he addresses the question whether the powers of the soul are really distinct among themselves. Vargas emphatically rejects the formal distinction, both in his Questions on the De Anima in a discussion with the Scotistic Gerald of Odo, and in his Sentences Commentary (1344-45) in a discussion with Scotus and some of the latter's followers. According to Vargas the formal distinction inevitably comes down to a real distinction. Leaning heavily on ideas expounded in the first Quodlibet of his confrère James of Pamiers, Vargas proposes another kind of distinction, to be applied to the relation between the powers of the soul and between the divine attributes. The proposed distinction is conceptual but made necessary by the nature of the thing (distinctio rationis ex natura rei necessitantis). This paper offers a detailed analysis of the meaning and applications of this distinction in Vargas's Questions on the De Anima and Sentences Commentary. The distinction appears not to have met much response. Two centuries later Andreas Bodenstein Karlstadt includes it in his comparative review of the various distinctions developed by Thomists and Scotists, equating it with the conceptual distinction cum fundamento in re. I conclude that Vargas in fact relegates the work done by Scotus's formal distinction to his own brand of the conceptual distinction. The former, which for Scotus is less than fully real, has for Vargas still too much of reality ; his own conceptual distinction mirrors the formal distinction by moving away from the other end of the scale : it is less than fully conceptual. In both cases, however, the relevant distinction is meant to be located at some distance from the theoretically possible endpoints 'fully real' and 'fully conceptual'.
Fordham University Press, 2016
In On Being and Cognition, the first complete translation into English of a pivotal text in the h... more In On Being and Cognition, the first complete translation into English of a pivotal text in the history of philosophy and theology, Scotus addresses fundamental issues concerning the limits of human knowledge and the nature of cognition by developing his doctrine of the univocity of being, refuting skepticism and analyzing the way the intellect and the object cooperate in generating actual knowledge in the case of abstractive cognition. Throughout the work Scotus is in discussion with important theologians of his time, such as Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. Anyone interested in the pertinent philosophical problems will find in this book the highly sophisticated and subtle answers of a giant in the history of thought.
Dissertation (Radboud University Nijmegen) , 2018
Draft, 2018
Alnwick’s Determinatio 16 contains what I consider to be the most detailed and incisive criticsm ... more Alnwick’s Determinatio 16 contains what I consider to be the most detailed and incisive criticsm ever of Thomas Aquinas’s opinion concerning the ontology of the powers of the soul, as well as the most complete (but perhaps less succesful) defense of the alternative view as developed in the Franciscan tradition and culminating in Scotus’s ‘second opinion’ on the matter.
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, 2015
Over the centuries Scotus has been presented as holding that the powers of the soul are really th... more Over the centuries Scotus has been presented as holding that the powers of the soul are really the same but formally distinct. Yet, when expressly dealing with the issue, Scotus gives two accounts: the first asserts absolute identity between the soul and its powers and among the powers themselves; the second argues that the soul and its powers are really identical but formally distinct. So we may ask: why did Scotus offer two accounts, how are they related, and why did the second become dominant in historical surveys? In this paper I address these questions by considering the two accounts in the context of the views of Sco- tus’s immediate predecessors and of scattered remarks found in Scotus’s own writings. I argue, first, that Scotus throughout his career always endorsed the real identity of the powers of the soul as expressed in his first account, and, secondly, that the second account does not overrule the first but merely adds a qualification to the latter by way of concession to the authorities and the views of his Franciscan predecessors. The reason why Scotus became identified exclu- sively with his second account may well be the way this position was elaborated and presented by his associate William of Alnwick.
Drafts by John van den Bercken
Translation of De Rerum Principio 11
Vital Du Four's opinion on the relation between the soul a... more Translation of De Rerum Principio 11
Vital Du Four's opinion on the relation between the soul and its powers is basically the same as that of Henry of Ghent. His treatment is more elaborate and systematic in that he offers a reasoned criticism of the Thomistic theory of a real distinction and develops his own view in two steps: first arguing for the identity theory and then xplaining how it can go together with distinction, not on account of an absolute entity added to the soul's essence but on account of the soul being determined to various classes of objects in terms of relations.
Psychological research by John van den Bercken
Trends in Neurosciences, 1981
European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 2009
Theories of dual cognition assume two distinguishable information processing styles: rational and... more Theories of dual cognition assume two distinguishable information processing styles: rational and intuitive. We discuss how the concepts of rationality and intuition are used in these theories, and the relations of these two thinking styles to personality characteristics. With the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), a questionnaire that assesses personal preferences for thinking either rationally or intuitively, we found clear evidence for the independence of the two thinking styles in a large Dutch sample (N = 774). We also found Conscientiousness to be a significant predictor of a preference for rational thinking and an inverse predictor of intuitive thinking. We also administered the REI and a Big Five inventory to a Spanish sample (N = 141), and present these results next to those of the Dutch sample. We further established the validity of the REI's distinction between rationality and intuition by administering another measure, the Preference for Intuition or Deliberation (PID; , to a subset of the Dutch sample (n = 405). We briefly describe two small studies in which a preference for rationality or intuition, measured by the REI, was found to be related to task behavior. In the general discussion we consider all results together, and compare them to Pacini and Epstein's results. We conclude that a dual-process distinction between rationality and intuition is valid cross-culturally and that a proclivity toward either is reliably measured by the REI, not only in the USA but in Europe as well.
European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 2009
In this study, we investigated the reliability and validity of the Perceived Modes of Processing ... more In this study, we investigated the reliability and validity of the Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (PMPI) by Burns and D'Zurilla, which measures two types of information processing, experiential and rational. We administered the dispositional and situation-specific format of the PMPI to a sample of 64 eating-disorder (ED) patients. In the situation-specific format we manipulated the nature of the situation and the degree of emotional involvement. Results show a good reliability and validity of the dispositional and situation-specific format of the PMPI. The situation-specific format of the PMPI showed that ED patients show more rational than experiential processing in practical situations, and more experiential processing in interpersonal situations. These differences were more pronounced in situations with high emotional involvement. Finally, assessed situation-specific processing styles predicted particular ED-related behaviors and coping styles. The implications of the findings for therapeutic interventions are discussed.
Computers in Human Behavior, 1992
This paper is concerned with the diagnosis of reading and spelling problems of children in regula... more This paper is concerned with the diagnosis of reading and spelling problems of children in regular basic education that have drawn the attention of their teachers or parents and instigated them to request professional diagnostic help. It is the task of psychoeducational diagnosticians to verify the existence or severity of these problems, to identify their causes, and, if needed, to recommend measures for treatment or referral. Diagnosticians are using data obtained in various ways, such as standardized tests, questionnaires, interviews, observations, and case records, and Requests for reprints should be addressed to Edward van Aarle. P.0. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Psychological Assessment, 1995
This study examines the validity of intuitive classifications of experienced diagnosticians, that... more This study examines the validity of intuitive classifications of experienced diagnosticians, that is, the empirical foundation of their intuitive prototypes. Intuitive prototypes of 10 experienced diagnosticians were collected in two tasks and were compared with the empirically based assessment system of T. M. Achenbach (T. M. Achenbach, K. C. Conners, H. C. Quay, F. C. Verhulst, & C. T. Howell,
THOUGHT PROCESS EFFECTS IN DIAGNOSTIC DECISIONS Background: This study tests the influence of dif... more THOUGHT PROCESS EFFECTS IN DIAGNOSTIC DECISIONS Background: This study tests the influence of different response modes (direct, after conscious and after unconscious thinking) in clinical decision making. Recently, we published a first demonstration of unconscious thought effects in this domain, specifically in the complex and error-prone task of diagnostic classification (De Vries et al., in press). The current study describes a follow-up and refinement, in three ways. First, it investigated the role of experience by including experienced clinicians. Second, it included the degree of difficulty of classifications. Third, it included a third (control) condition in which classifications were provided immediately after reading a case description. Methods: We used two written case descriptions. Both cases represented co-morbidity, with a more familiar classification (low difficulty) and a much more unfamiliar classification (high difficulty). Participants were randomly assigned the tas...
Stereotactic and Functional Neurosurgery, 1979
Comput Hum Behav, 1999
In an earlier paper [Van Aarle & Van den Bercken (1992). The development of a knowledge-based... more In an earlier paper [Van Aarle & Van den Bercken (1992). The development of a knowledge-based system for supporting the diagnosis of reading and spelling problems. Computers in Human Behavior, 8, 183–201] a decision-support system for diagnosing elementary reading and spelling problems (CONDALS) was introduced. The system is meant to assist diagnosticians in processing diagnostic information in a methodical way. It is designed to embody a number of guidelines incorporated in a prescriptive framework for diagnostic decision making, the so-called Diagnostic Cycle. The construction of the interface, which entailed our first knowledge aquisition study, was described in the previous paper. The present paper reports on further research activities needed to construct the system. It primarily reports the results of a knowledge acquisition study in which almost all Dutch experts familiar with the current scientific literature and clinical practice participated. The study resulted in a reliable knowledge base of highly agreed upon diagnostic hypotheses, all relating one or more symptoms of reading and spelling problems to one or more factors currently considered to embody the best explanatory power for these symptoms.
Teaching Statistical Methods by John van den Bercken
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Medieval Philosophy/Psychology by John van den Bercken
Is the substance of the soul the same as its power? Utrum substantia animae sit ipsa potentia eius?
This text conveniently summarizes the two or three main positions prevalent at Scotus's time concerning the relation between the soul: Aquinas's view that the powers are accidents really distinct from the soul's essence, Henry of Ghent's view that they are really identical but become diversified through relations, and an ill-defined intermediate position held by several of Scotus's fellow Franciscans. Having rejected these three position Scotus offers his own opinion, in two variants: unqualified identity and real identity together with formal distinction. The latter position appears to be intended to meet the intermediate position (it is detailed much more explicitly in William of Alnwick's Determinatio 16).
Drafts by John van den Bercken
Vital Du Four's opinion on the relation between the soul and its powers is basically the same as that of Henry of Ghent. His treatment is more elaborate and systematic in that he offers a reasoned criticism of the Thomistic theory of a real distinction and develops his own view in two steps: first arguing for the identity theory and then xplaining how it can go together with distinction, not on account of an absolute entity added to the soul's essence but on account of the soul being determined to various classes of objects in terms of relations.
Psychological research by John van den Bercken
Teaching Statistical Methods by John van den Bercken
Is the substance of the soul the same as its power? Utrum substantia animae sit ipsa potentia eius?
This text conveniently summarizes the two or three main positions prevalent at Scotus's time concerning the relation between the soul: Aquinas's view that the powers are accidents really distinct from the soul's essence, Henry of Ghent's view that they are really identical but become diversified through relations, and an ill-defined intermediate position held by several of Scotus's fellow Franciscans. Having rejected these three position Scotus offers his own opinion, in two variants: unqualified identity and real identity together with formal distinction. The latter position appears to be intended to meet the intermediate position (it is detailed much more explicitly in William of Alnwick's Determinatio 16).
Vital Du Four's opinion on the relation between the soul and its powers is basically the same as that of Henry of Ghent. His treatment is more elaborate and systematic in that he offers a reasoned criticism of the Thomistic theory of a real distinction and develops his own view in two steps: first arguing for the identity theory and then xplaining how it can go together with distinction, not on account of an absolute entity added to the soul's essence but on account of the soul being determined to various classes of objects in terms of relations.