Eurasianism wins in Turkey even if ideologue loses election

2017

In the last three decades, Turkey has attempted to build close relationships with Russia, Iran and the Turkic World. As a result, there has been ongoing debate about the extent to which Turkey's international relations axis is shifting eastwards. Ozgur Tufekci argues that Eurasianist ideology has been fundamental to Turkish foreign policy and continues to have influence today. The author first explores the historical roots of Eurasianism in the 19th century, comparing this to Neo-Eurasianism and Pan-Slavism. The Ozal era (1983-1993), the Cem era (1997-2002) and Davutoglu era (since 2003) are then examined to reveal how foreign policy making has been informed by discourses of Eurasianism, and how Eurasianist ideas were implemented through internal and external socio-economic and political factors.

Turkish Studies, 2015

This article discusses the political origins, present-day significance, and implications of the intellectual movement known as "Eurasianism" in Turkey, a movement with Euroskeptic, anti-American, Russophile, neo-nationalist, secularist, and authoritarian tendencies, and including among its ranks socialists, nationalists, Kemalists, and Maoists. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Eurasianism emerged as a major intellectual movement in Turkey, competing against Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and Westernism. Aspiration for a pro-Russian orientation in foreign policy, and a socialist-nationalist, Left-Kemalist government at home are the international and domestic faces of Turkish Eurasianism, which distinguish this movement from others. These orientations and their origins are situated within the history of intellectual movements in Turkey, going back to the Kadro and Yön movements in the 1930s and the 1960s, respectively. Similarities and actual links between Russian and Turkish Eurasianism are also discussed. This article examines the development of a new intellectual movement, Eurasianism, which proposes a radically new definition of Turkey's geopolitical identity. For as long as there have been debates on Turkey's place in the world, Turkish intellectuals characteristically pointed in one of three directions: Arab-Islamic countries to the South, European countries to the West, and the Turkic countries to the East. These three responses ideologically correspond, respectively, to (Pan-)Islamism, Westernism, and (Pan-)Turkism. However, since the end of the Cold War, a fourth group of intellectuals, Eurasianists, who identified Russia to the North as Turkey's most important ally in the world, gained significant visibility and popularity. Eurasianism, with its roots in similar intellectual and political movements in the 1930s (Kadro) and in the 1960s (Yön), already had a major impact on Turkish intellectual and political scene since the end of the Cold War, as this article seeks to demonstrate. However,

Geopolitics, 2009

Middle East Institute, 2019

Turkey’s Eurasianist foreign policy lacks a full-fledged strategy that can realistically be expected to yield positive outcomes for the country, especially when compared to its Kemalist pro-Western counterpart. Despite its rhetorical allure, the anti-Western stance has not translated into a sustainable and prosperous economic model for Turkey. Indeed, Turkey is structurally dependent on a free market economy and deeply-rooted integration with Western institutions such as NATO, the EU, and the Council of Europe.

2019

Mainly associated with the views of the Russian intellectual Alexander Dugin in the post-Soviet period, the idea of Russian Eurasianism advocates the formation of a grand geopolitical coalition between the countries of Eurasia against Western dominance in world politics. In Turkey, it has been particularly attractive for national-patriotic political groups which have favored a rapprochement with Russia due to their discontent with the Turkish governments’ pro-Western policies. Throughout the 2000s, Eurasianism gained new supporters both from the rightist and leftist circles especially during the periods when Turkey faced significant problems in its relations with the West. The goal of this chapter is to discuss the rising appeal of Eurasianism in Turkey in light of the latest rapprochement with Russia. To this end, it will particularly focus on the post-July 15 period which signifies a growing rift between Turkey and the U.S., EU and NATO over a number of issues. The chapter will also explore Dugin’s personal links with the leadership of the pro-Russian Patriotic Party as well as the views of the Turkish political, intellectual and military figures on the strategic rapprochement with Russia in order to understand the real influence of the Eurasianist ideas on this process.

Turkey has always been a fertile environment and an ideological crucible for debate about ‘secularism’ and ‘Islam’, ‘Pan-Turkism’ and ‘Pan-/NeoOttomanism’, etc. These debates and confrontations can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire. In spite of the fact that the newly established Turkish Republic’s main official direction was toward the West, these debates still exist today. For instance, while the Democratic Party (1946–1960) to Justice Party (1961–1980) line and the National Salvation Party (1972–1980) to Welfare Party (1983–1998) line had pro-Ottomanist and proIslamist approaches respectively, the centre-left Republican People’s Party (CHP), by and large, embraced a Western-oriented approach after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey until the early 2000s, even if it seems that the CHP (the main opposition party) has recently lost its enthusiasm toward the Western world and has radiated mixed signals on whether it will continue to support Turkey’s Westernist foreign policy discourse. As a consequence of these debates and confrontations, it should be mentioned that Russian Eurasianism has had some reflections on Turkish society. In particular, the conditions of the post-Cold War era and the recent activism in Turkish foreign policy have put the Eurasianism debates back on the agenda. Various perceptions of this view can be observed in contemporary Turkish politics. In this context, this chapter provides a detailed analysis of the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism. Specifically, the first part of this section focuses on four of the main ideologies which have been dominant in Turkey in shaping the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism since the late 1980s: Neo-Ottomanism, Islamism, PanTurkism and Pan-Turanianism. It is significant to analyse these ideologies as they are four of the main determinants of Turkish domestic and foreign policy directions. Besides, these ideologies have played a vital role during the attempts of Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism to penetrate into Turkey, as his initial Eurasianist thinking was anti-Turkish and it was these ideologies which moulded and added perspectives to the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism. In this sense, the latter part of the section will resent an overview of the discourses of Eurasianism in contemporary Turkish politics.

2022

The Foreign Policy of Modern Turkey: Power and the Ideology of Eurasianism, 2017

Turkey has always had a fertile environment and circles for debates of “secularism” and “Islam” and “pan-Turkism” and “pan/neo Ottomanism”. These debates and confrontations can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire. In spite of the fact that the newly established Turkish Republic’s main official direction was toward the West, these debates still exist today. For instance, while the Democratic Party (1946 – 60) to Justice Party (1961 – 80) line and National Salvation Party (1972 – 80) to Welfare Party (1983 – 98) line had conservative and pro-Islamist approaches respectively, the centre-left Republican People’s Party (CHP), by and large, embraced a Western-oriented approach after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey until the early 2000s, even if it seems that CHP (the main opposition party) has recently lost its enthusiasm toward the Western world and radiates mixed signals on whether it will continue to support Turkey’s Westernist foreign policy discourse.

2012

"The Vanguard" student journal, 2011

This paper discusses the role played by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdögan in propelling Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East.