Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique

EIKELAND_Olav_ First International Biennale of Practical Philosophy_ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique, 27-29. April 2018, Rhodos / http://practphil-biennale.aegean.gr/ https://www.facebook.com/events/1385299531519336/ / https://signedevents.net/greece/rodos/1st-international-biennale-on-practical-philosophy/ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique Professor, PhD Olav Eikeland, OsloMet, Oslo, Norway E-mail: [email protected] or [email protected] Key words: immanent critique, dialectics, practical philosophy, philosophical practice Conference axes: the political, the ethical, and the educational In this presentation I will try to explain how the practice in which I have been involved since before ,à ouldà easo a l à eà alledàaàki dàofà philosophi alàp a ti e ,àalthoughàitàisàdiffe e tàin certain respects from what today normally goes by this name. Since, for some, being trained as a philosopher is precondition number one for doing philosophical practice , let me say this first: I defended my PhD in ancient philosophy in 1993. Also, since my title – Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique – raises several questions likeà What is Socratic-Aristotelian philosophy? ,à Why not talk about merely Socratic or Socratic-Platonic philosophy? , Whatàisà i a e tà iti ue ? ,àa dà others, I will deal briefly with some such questions before outlining my own practice. I have dealt with questions like these in other places (1997, 1998, 2008) but they need at least a preliminary clarification here as well. What is Socratic-Aristotelian philosophy? So, why do I call it Socratic-Aristotelian? Why not Platonic as well, or merely Socratic? One reason for not calling it merely Socratic is because, as everyone knows, we only know the historical Socrates through a few secondary but still contemporary sources, mostly Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophánes. The historical Socrates gave rise to many different schools of philosophy, which are not consistent among themselves. Although the approach could be called Platonic, I choose not to, because calling it Platonic obscures the extent to which Aristotle was Socratic. Plato and Socrates are normally mentioned together to emphasize their dialogical approach to philosophy. I want to emphasize how Aristotle too was dialectical or dialogical (cf. Eikeland, 1997, 1998, 2008). Also, according to Gregory Vlastos (1991), Socrates was not an adherent of Platonic transcendent ideas, which makes Socrates not particularly Platonic1. I have tried in my major works (1997, 2008) to show how profoundly á istotle’sàphilosophi alàp a ti eà– both in what he recommended and in what he did in his texts – is Socratic and dialogical related to what Aristotle himself credits Socrates with: induction (epagôgê) and definition (horismós) (Metaph1078b28, 987b1-, PA642a14-b4). The approach is also Aristotelian because Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for not being explicit enough about the principles of 1 Cf. Metaph1078b30-1079a4, 1086a35-b13, MM1182a15-29 & Ph193b37-194a12. 1 EIKELAND_Olav_ First International Biennale of Practical Philosophy_ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique, 27-29. April 2018, Rhodos / http://practphil-biennale.aegean.gr/ https://www.facebook.com/events/1385299531519336/ / https://signedevents.net/greece/rodos/1st-international-biennale-on-practical-philosophy/ dialogue or dialectics2. They did dialectics without knowing exactly what they were doing, i.e. more subconsciously. It was Aristotle who extracted the principles of dialectic from practice. Although not emphasized clearly by Aristotle himself, I believe á istotle’sà philosoph à also works as midwifery (maieutikê) and recollection (anámnêsis) normally associated only with Plato. I tried to show how and why 20 years ago (Eikeland, 1998). So, these are some of my reasons for calling my practice SocraticAristotelian. What is philosophy? The next question I want to touch briefly is:à What is philosophy ?àThis, of course, is a big question. But I think it does matter for the question of philosophical practice. To make it simple enough to present briefly, however, I will stick to my own summarized version of á istotle’sà a àofàha dli gàit (1997, 2008). Practices, including what Aristotle calls poíêsis, khrêsis, and praxis, are either deliberative (bouleutikê) (like praxeis) or calculative (logistikê) (like poiêseis and khrêseis). Deliberative practices are either phronetical like the ethical virtues (aretai êthikai), or not (like cleverness; deinotês). Perfected epistemic practices are deductive (apodeiktikê). Philosophy, however, or the searching, i ui i g,à esea hi g,à efle ti gàp a ti eàofà u fi ished àepistê ê, in fields on the way to perfected epistêmê, is dialectical or dialogical (dialektikê). Deliberative, calculative, and deductive practices move from primary principles or premises taken for granted. According to Aristotle, philosophical dialectics moves to or towards principles and premises, however (Top101b1-4). As both Plato (Rep510C-511E) and Aristotle (Metaph1025b3-19, Ph188b27-303) complain, the conventional sciences usually take their basic principles for granted or as hypothetical, without really giving an account justifying them as starting points for deduction or deliberation. Philosophy, however, discusses the basic premises or principles of all the other activities. My claim – and I think this was á istotle’sà lai àasà ellà– is that this must be done from the inside of these practises, as immanent critique based in performative competence and accumulated, practical experience or empeiría. For some, dialectics with Aristotle is merely opinion-based syllogizing, at best as an exercise to produce formal contradictions or what Aristotle identified as a Socratic refutation or élegkhos. If the meaning of dialogue had been merely to draw formal conclusions from the opinions of either experts or amateurs, however, there would be merely a contextual difference between dialectics and deductive 2 Aristotle claims that dialectic at the time of Socrates did not have the strength to study opposites separately or independently from the question of what something is. This emphasizes: (1) tà koiná or the commons, to which the abstracted opposites belong, have in a certain sense a separate being for Aristotle and require an epistêmê of its own. (2) The discipline studying the commons is called dialectic in several places. Dialectcs and first philosophy overlap. Metaph1078b25-27, 1003b37. Cf. Rh1355a-b, 1394 a 7-9, Top105 a 26, 108 a 7-17, SE170a35-b11, 172b5-8, EE1217b17-19, Ph Book I.i-vii, 184a10b14, 184 b 15-185 a 20, 185a22-186a3, 186a4-189b29. 3 cf. Eikeland, 1997, p. 210-11fn117 and p. 351fn196. 2 EIKELAND_Olav_ First International Biennale of Practical Philosophy_ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique, 27-29. April 2018, Rhodos / http://practphil-biennale.aegean.gr/ https://www.facebook.com/events/1385299531519336/ / https://signedevents.net/greece/rodos/1st-international-biennale-on-practical-philosophy/ inferences. Drawing conclusions from expert opinions is exactly what deductive demonstration does, as presented in Book I of the Posterior Analytics (Top100a27-30, APo74b22-25). But, the proper relation of dialectics to the epistêmai is the inverse or anápalin of this, as indicated in the Eudemian Ethics (1218a16). In general, syllogistics or formal reasoning must take the meaning of its terms for granted and keep them unchanged through the reasoning process. The reason why dialogue is said to be the wa (hê hodós) towards basic principles in all inquiries, however, is that it is a procedure for inquiring, testing, scrutinising, examining, and questioning (exetastikê, peirastikê, erôtêtikê) the existing and mostly taken for granted doxa, or basic assumptions within different disciplines (SE172a21-22, Top101b1-4). What is philosophical practice? What, then, is philosophical practice? Let me start by saying that my intention in commenting on ai st ea à philosophi alà p a ti e is not to criticize but to characterize philosophical practice in order to distinguish my own practice as related but still different. What seems clear, however, is that philosophical practice, also called philosophical counselling, is not the same as either one of the more traditional designations: practical philosophy and practical reasoning. Wolfgang Wieland (1989:8-9) defines the á istotelia à diffe e eà et ee à p a ti alà philosoph à die praktische Philosophie) and p a ti alà easo i g à die praktische Vernunft) in the following way. Practical reasoning is concerned with justifying singular or particular acts in action, as either good, reasonable, or rational in different ways. Practical philosophy, however, is concerned with the clarification of the principles of politics, ethics, and practical reasoning. Practical philosophy is therefore a theoretical discipline. The currently e e gi gà philosophical practice ,àho e e , is not necessarily any of these. It is not defined by having clear theoretical ambitions in any of the fields of practical philosophy. Neither is it defined by its expertise in practical reasoning. The main concern for philosophical practitioners seems to be bringing philosophy back into the agorá where it – at least its ethical and political branches – started with Socrates more than 2000 years ago. Philosophical practice, then, does philosophy, whether it is practical philosophy or practical reasoning, in a different place and context from academia, and outside the current academic discipline of philosophy. I have no problem with this. On the contrary. Compared to the previous philosophers of nature, both Cicero (TuscV.iv.10-11) and Plutarch (GenioSocr580C, AnSeni796E) praised Socrates for bringing philosophy down from the heavens and into the daily lives of everyone. Socratic philosophy was in many ways conceived as a care or cultivation of souls (tôn psukhôn therapeia) as Plato writes in several places (e.g. Sophist 230D, Laws 650B). This part (and others) of the Socratic turn has been my inspiration as well for more than 30 years. Philosophical practice is concerned with bringing 3 EIKELAND_Olav_ First International Biennale of Practical Philosophy_ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique, 27-29. April 2018, Rhodos / http://practphil-biennale.aegean.gr/ https://www.facebook.com/events/1385299531519336/ / https://signedevents.net/greece/rodos/1st-international-biennale-on-practical-philosophy/ philosophical reflection out of the ivory towers back into the everyday lives of people, its concern is philosophy, not as a secluded, academic discipline but as a life-form (P. Hadot-inspired), that is, how does philosophy mesh practically with everyday life and concerns? Hence, philosophi alà p a ti e à e.g.à Schuster, 1999; Marinoff, 2001; Raabe, 2001, and others) has grown as a movement over the last decades in many countries as a way of revitalizing philosophy as aà a àofàlife àth oughà “o ati àdialogue , initiated by Gerd Achenbach in the 1980s, and inspired by Leonard Nelson (2010), Pierre Hadot (1995) and others. It presents itself as an alternative to both a very abstract and academic mainstream (or a al ti form and a very scholarly (or o ti e tal à form of modern philosophy. In my opinion, so far, so good. Thisà philosophi alà p a ti e à hasà atte ptedà toà a eà aà substantial niche for itself outside other practices like psychotherapy, and others, however4. It wants to be a àalte ati eàtoàps hothe ap à a dàps hologi alà ou selli g (Schuster, 1999). And this is where my differences start. Apart from some Dutch practitioners hoà iteàa outà “o atesài àtheàe te p ise (ref.), philosophical practice seems mostly individually oriented, or they set up workshops as a tifi ialàa dàa st a tàgathe i gs àofà interested individuals without any concretely common experience in specific communities of practice. I àspiteàofàtheà a itio àofà e gi gàphilosophi alàtheo àa dà eal-lifeà p a ti e à “ huste ,à : ,à there is ’tà u hàorganizational or institutional context for mainstream philosophical practice. Instead of challenging basic assumptions in the organization and practices of institutionalized professions, or in families and schools, philosophical practitioners are recommended, in the words of Shlomit Schuster : ,à toà o kài àa àope à o- a ’sàla d ài àaà positio àofà eut alit ào à eut alàa eaà et ee à philosoph ,àps holog ,à edi i e,àa dàothe àdis ipli es . It seems like philosophical practice wants to carve out a niche of its own outside the established, institutionalized, and professionalized practices of our kind of societies. As I said before, this is not necessarily a criticism of normal philosophical practice but a characterization. I suspect, however, that although I am in favor of educating people as broadly as possible about philosophy, and in the history of philosophy, and that this may help people privately to choose metaphysical beliefs or make wise life choices, this attempt at carving out a philosophical practice-niche in the left-over interstices between all other disciplines, is a form of selfcastration of philosophy. Cf. Schuster (1999:3) beginning of chapter 1 where she also writes about philosophical practice asà a à alte ati eàtoàps hothe ap àa dàps hologi alà ou seli g . 4 4 EIKELAND_Olav_ First International Biennale of Practical Philosophy_ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique, 27-29. April 2018, Rhodos / http://practphil-biennale.aegean.gr/ https://www.facebook.com/events/1385299531519336/ / https://signedevents.net/greece/rodos/1st-international-biennale-on-practical-philosophy/ Immanent Critique So, what could be an alternative philosophical practice? In my opinion, the alternative is immanent critique, and I have already suggested how a Socratic-Aristotelian approach connects to the concept of immanent critique, otherwise mostly associated with the original German form of 20th century critical theory in the Frankfurt School (Lukacs, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas, Negt, and others), and with methodological roots in the thinking of Marx and Hegel in the 19th century. The specific task for philosophy, in the Aristotelian scheme, is the searching, inquiring, researching, efle ti gà p a ti eà ofà u fi ished à epistê ê. It is dialectical or dialogical (dialektikê), searching for differences and similarities, questioning premises and principles taken for granted etc. This means it cannot live outside and between all other forms of practice, however,à eithe ài àa à i o àto e à o à i àaà eut alà o- a ’sàla d àoutsideàothe àdis ipli es. This form of dialogical philosophy belongs inside every other discourse or discipline, searching and raising questions about basic assumptions and definitions, ways of organizing, etc. As Hegel wrote in his History of Philosophy (1971:18: 303), and I have to quote him in German: Das ist die nähere Bestimmung der objektiven Dialektik. In dieser Dialektik sehen wir die enfachen Gedanken nich mehr sich für sich festsetzen, sondern erstarkt, den Krieg in Feindes Land spielen . Hegel compares the task of philosophy to aàki dàofà gue illaà a fa e with words and arguments. Its activity belongs not in a niche or country ofàitsào ou t ,à utài sideà e e à – in Feindes Land. Immanent critique, then, is about pointing out inner inconsistencies and contradictions in positions, schools of thought, ideologies, practices, ways of living or organizing, etc. Dan Sabia (2010) distinguishes between two different forms: What he calls immanent criticism, and immanent critique proper. The first one merely criticises the gap between local norms and realities. It is culture conservative, as when someone criticizes another for not living as a true Christian or Muslim, although their common culture is committed to Christianity or Islam. According to Sabia, immanent critique proper works by means of all kinds of inner differences, tensions and contradictions in any culture. In my opinion, there is still a challenge for this kind of immanent critique, however. As Fotini Vaki asks in a different article (2005:114), ho à fa à [can] critique go by relying only on the recognition of o t adi tio s 5. Ità isà i à da ge à ofà elati is à si eà ità does ’tà e edà i a e tà iti ueà i à transcendental-pragmatic standards at work in any culture or language. To fully show how this might be done, will take more time than is available. As I see it, though, this final step in immanent critique can and must be done by revealing pragmatic o t adi tio sài à hate e à e e 5 à ou t àdialogue Stahl (2013) discusses several more levels of immanent critique and how they might be justified, which I cannot deal with here. 5 EIKELAND_Olav_ First International Biennale of Practical Philosophy_ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique, 27-29. April 2018, Rhodos / http://practphil-biennale.aegean.gr/ https://www.facebook.com/events/1385299531519336/ / https://signedevents.net/greece/rodos/1st-international-biennale-on-practical-philosophy/ works, showing that the positions, cultures, practices, or whatever is being criticized explicitly deny something tacitly presupposed in its own work, as when e.g. Margaret Thatcher famously declared thatà the eàisà oàsu hàthi gàasàso iet ,àtheàtaskà ould be not simply to deny it, but to show how such a claim itself presupposes society,àasàHegel’sàp o essàofàgai i gàe pe ie eài àhisàPhe o e olog àofà Spirit has Geist or Spirit as the unconsciously presupposed but immanently submerged and subconscious engine. I have tried to show how Aristotle works in this immanently critical way in previous texts (Eikeland 1997, 2008). I can only indicate it aguel àhe eà àlisti gàso eài po ta tà at h o ds àfo àapp oa hesà and concepts he uses. First of all, his approach is dialogical through always starting with éndoxa or prevalent opinions among competent or a majority of people. He always starts his critical inquiries f o à hatàisà fi st-fo àus à t àp ôtaàp òsàhê as ,à hi hà ea sàho àthi gsàappea àtoà e. He shows how e e o eàusesàspo ta eousl à utàu s ste ati all à hatàheà allsàt àkoi ,à ea i gà theà o o s àofà speaking and thinking. He shows how every praxis is necessarily and internally related to a normative sta da dàofà easu e e tà alledà eupraxia ào à aretê ,ài.e. good practice or virtue, and also in many other ways. The point is that immanent critique has to work from somewhere within the machinery of society or some form of practice. Even this can be shown to have been a concern with Aristotle (Eikeland, 2008). Philosophical practice or counselling, however, seems to want to work in the empty spaces or interstices where the gears are released, and the engines of society run idly. But immanent critique cannot work in a void or vacuum outside other practices as mainstream philosophi alàp a ti e àsee sà to want. It must work from within other practices. Immanent critique cannot proceed in separation. It is like a virus , or better and more positively, it’sàaà fa ilitato àa dà atal st àofàallàki dsàofàp o esses. Two substantial fields for philosophical practice Over the last 35 years, besides studying ancient philosophy, my way of practising philosophy has been mainly by means of this Socratic-Aristotelian utà e tai l àalsoàHegelia à immanent critique , working especially in two important fields hi hàIà o side àpa tàofàtheà e gi eàofàso iet : 1) social research methodology, 2) work life studies and development in Norway. Although I share many of the concerns of mainstream philosophical practice, I have chosen not to join. Insufficiencies of social research methodology and the method of methodology Concerning the first of these 1), there are at least two mutually relatively independent roads to follow: A) By showing concretely the insufficiencies of ordinary empirical methods of mainstream social science, and B) by showing that the methods of research methodology is not empirical as normally 6 EIKELAND_Olav_ First International Biennale of Practical Philosophy_ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique, 27-29. April 2018, Rhodos / http://practphil-biennale.aegean.gr/ https://www.facebook.com/events/1385299531519336/ / https://signedevents.net/greece/rodos/1st-international-biennale-on-practical-philosophy/ u de stoodài à ode às ie eà utà o eàlikeàaàfo àofà efle i eàlea i gàf o àp a ti eào à àdoi g .àI have discussed both in several previous publications, but I cannot go into any details here. Listing some of them will have to suffice (cf. Eikeland, 1985, 1995, 2006a). Concerning road A), there are both a) data-p o le s àa dà àp o le sà ithàe pla atio sào ài te p etatio s.àData-problems are e.g. a.i) the intrinsic bias – both theo -depe de à a dà theo -satu atio à – of observation at a distance, already described through the idols of Francis Bacon several hundred years ago [idola tribus, idola specus, idola fori, idola theatri], a.ii) the reactivity of research methods – whether interviews, observations, or experiments – where the methods themselves intervene, influence, and distort the results artificially, and 1.iii) the non-observability of the typical researched subjects like organizations, states, souls, power, participation, cultures, regions, etc., none of which anyone has ever seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched directly. Problems of explanations and interpretations are e.g. b.i) the challenge of theory-pluralism (P.Duhem / A.Naess) called the Rashomon syndrome in cultural anthropology (Heider, 1988), b.ii) the underdetermination of theories by data as analysed by W.v.O.Quine also known as the problem of induction, b.iii) the problems of falsification (modus tollens of K.Popper) where the difficulty is knowing which of many premises to discard, b.iv) what the Scholastics called explaining obscurum per obscurius (from Aristotle), b.v) the status of background knowledge in the explanans, and b.vi) self-referential inconsistency (H.Skjervheim), which is a different way of formulating the ultimate challenge of immanent critique above, where positions, cultures, practices, or whatever is being criticized explicitly deny something tacitly presupposed in its own work. Dialogical development of work life in Scandinavia My other field of work has been as a researcher in Norwegian work life research. Since time is running short, I can only give a coarse outline of this. Like the Dutch approach mentioned above, this has been a prolonged effort – since the middle of the 1980s – at embedding dialogue systematically and permanently in work life. Inspired by how Aristotle describes the tasks of dialectical gatherings – or dialektikai sunodoi – as places for doing dialogical philosophy, we have t iedàtoào ga izeà f eeàspa es à or skholai for reflection as part of the organizational structure in public and private enterprises (cf. e.g. Eikeland, 2008b, 2012). After having said all of this, my hope was to be able to say something about how it connects to Ho khei e ’sà o igi alà fo ulatio à ofà iti alà theo , to the oleà ofà á to ioà G a s i’sà o ga i à i telle tual ,àa dàtheà o eptàofà ou te -pu li àsphe es ài spi edà àOska àNegtàa dàále a de àKluge, but time is up, and I have to stop. Thank you for listening! 7 EIKELAND_Olav_ First International Biennale of Practical Philosophy_ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique, 27-29. April 2018, Rhodos / http://practphil-biennale.aegean.gr/ https://www.facebook.com/events/1385299531519336/ / https://signedevents.net/greece/rodos/1st-international-biennale-on-practical-philosophy/ References Achenbach, G.B. (1984). Philosophische Praxis. Köln : Verlag für Philosophie Jürgen Dinter Buchwalter, A. (1991). Hegel, Marx, and the Concept of Immanent Critique. Journal of the history of philosophy. Vol.29(2) 253-279. Burckhart, H. and J. Sikora (Hrsg.) (2005). Praktische Philosophie – Philosophische Praxis. Darmstadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft de Boer, K. and R. Sonderegger (2012). Conceptions of Critique in Moderne and Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan de Boer, K (2012). Hegel’s Co ceptio of I a e t C iti ue: Its Sources, Extent, and Limit. pp.83-100 in de Boer and Sonderegger (2012) Eikeland, Olav (1997). Erfaring, dialogikk og politikk - Den antikke dialogfilosofiens betydning for rekonstruksjonen av moderne empirisk samfunnsvitenskap. Et begrepshistorisk og filosofisk bidra. 3.utgave. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget Eikeland, O. (1998). Anamnesis - dialogisk erindringsarbeid som empirisk forskningsmetode, s.95-136 i Eikeland & Fossestøl (red.) (1998). Kunnskapsproduksjon i endring - nye erfarings- og organisasjonsformer. AFIs skriftserie nr.4. Oslo: Arbeidsforskningsinstituttet. Eikeland, O. (2008). The Ways of Aristotle – Aristotelian Phrónêsis, Aristotelian Philosophy of Dialogue, and Action Research, Bern: Peter Lang Publishers Eikeland, O (2008b). Beyond the Oikos – Pólis Divide? Historical Transformations of the Private–Public Relationship, and Current Work Life Developments, pp. 23-60 in Berg, Anne Marie and Eikeland, Olav (eds.): Action Research and Organization Theory, Frankfurt a.M., Peter Lang Publishers Eikeland, O. (2012a). Action Research and Organisational Learning – A Norwegian Approach to Doing Action Research in Complex Organisations, Educational Action Research Journal, Vol 20 (2), 267-290. Eikeland, O. (2016a). Cosmópolis or Koinópolis? pp. 21-46 in M.Papastephanou (ed.): Cosmopolitanism: educational, philosophical and historical perspectives. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing Eikeland, O. (2016b). If phrónêsis does not develop and define virtue as its own deliberative goal — what does? Labyrinth – an international journal for philosophy, value theory, and sociocultural hermeneutics. Vol 18 (2) 27-49. Finlayson, J.G. (2014). Hegel, adorno and the Origins of Immanent Critique. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 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Kessinger Publishing Plato in Twelve Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, UK: Harvard University Press & W. Heinemann Ltd. Raabe, P.R. (2001). Philosophical Counseling. Theory and Practice. Westport & London: Praeger Romero, J.M. (Hrsg.) (2014). Immanente Kritik heute – Grundlagen und Aktualität eies sozialphilosophischen Begriffs. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag Sabia, D. (2010). Defending Immanent Critique. Political Theory. Vol.38(5) 684-711. Schuster, S.C. (1999). Philosophy Practice – An Alternative to Counselling and Psychotherapy. Westport & London: Praeger “ huste ,à“.C.à .àMa i off’sàThe ap : A Critique of his Books on Philosophical Practice. Stahl, T. (2013). Immanente Kritik – Elemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken. Frankfurt a.M. / New York : Campus Verlag Stahl, T. (2013b). What is Immanent Critique? SSRN Working Papers. DOI: 10.2139/ssm.2357957 Stahl, T. (2013c). Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique. Constellations. Vol.20(4) 533-552 Vaki, F. (2005). Adorno contra Habermas and the Claims of Critical Theory as immanent Critique. Historical Materialism. Vol.13(4) 79-120. Wieland, W. (1989). Aporien der praktischen Vernunft. Frankfurt a.M. : Vittorio Klostermann 9 EIKELAND_Olav_ First International Biennale of Practical Philosophy_ Practising Socratic-Aristotelian Philosophy as Immanent Critique, 27-29. April 2018, Rhodos / http://practphil-biennale.aegean.gr/ https://www.facebook.com/events/1385299531519336/ / https://signedevents.net/greece/rodos/1st-international-biennale-on-practical-philosophy/ 10