Aristotle on dialectic

‫ۺۣۣۜۤۧ۠۝ۜێ‬ ‫ٲٱێ‪ۛҖ‬ۦۣ‪ۘۛۙғ‬۝ۦۖۡٷۗ‪۠ۧғ‬ٷۢۦ۩ۣ۞‪ҖҖ‬ۃۤۨۨۜ‬ ‫‪ẳẴặẺẾẺẻẳỄ‬ڷۦۣۚڷۧۙۗ۝۪ۦۙۧڷ۠ٷۣۢ۝ۨ۝ۘۘۆ‬ ‫ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۝۠‪Ө‬ڷۃۧۨۦۙ۠ٷڷ۠۝ٷۡٮ‬ ‫ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۝۠‪Ө‬ڷۃۣۧۢ۝ۨۤ۝ۦۗۧۖ۩ۑ‬ ‫ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۝۠‪Ө‬ڷۃۧۨۢ۝ۦۤۙۦڷ۠ٷ۝ۗۦۣۙۡۡ‪Ө‬‬ ‫ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۝۠‪Ө‬ڷۃڷۙۧ۩ڷۣۚڷۧۡۦۙے‬ ‫ۗ۝ۨۗۙ۠ٷ۝‪ө‬ڷۣۢڷۣۙ۠ۨۨۧ۝ۦۆ‬ ‫ۤۧ۝ۦ‪Ө‬ڷۦۣۙۛې‬ ‫ۀھ‪Ң‬ڷ‪Ғ‬ڷھھ‪Ң‬ڷۤۤڷۃڽۂۂڽڷۦۣۙۖۨۗۍڷ‪Җ‬ڷہ‪Ң‬ھڷۙ۩ۧۧٲڷ‪Җ‬ڷڿڿڷۙۡ۩ۣ۠۔ڷ‪Җ‬ڷۺۣۣۜۤۧ۠۝ۜێ‬ ‫ۂڼڼھڷۺۦٷ۩ۢٷ‪Ђ‬ڷڼڿڷۃۙۢ۝ۣ۠ۢڷۘۙۜۧ۝۠ۖ۩ێڷۃۀۀڽ‪Ң‬ڿڼڼڼڽۂڽہڽڿڼڼۑ‪Җ‬ۀڽڼڽ‪ғ‬ڼڽڷۃٲۍ‪ө‬‬ ‫‪ۛҖ‬ۦۣ‪ۘۛۙғ‬۝ۦۖۡٷۗ‪۠ۧғ‬ٷۢۦ۩ۣ۞‪ҖҖ‬ۃۤۨۨۜڷۃۙ۠ۗ۝ۨۦٷڷۧ۝ۜۨڷۣۨڷ۟ۢ۝ۋ‬ ‫ۀۀڽ‪Ң‬ڿڼڼڼڽۂڽہڽڿڼڼۑٵۨۗٷۦۨۧۖٷ‬ ‫ۃۙ۠ۗ۝ۨۦٷڷۧ۝ۜۨڷۙۨ۝ۗڷۣۨڷۣ۫ٱ‬ ‫ۀھ‪ҒҢ‬ھھ‪Ң‬ڷۤۤڷۃڿڿڷۃۺۣۣۜۤۧ۠۝ۜێڷ‪ۗғ‬۝ۨۗۙ۠ٷ۝‪ө‬ڷۣۢڷۣۙ۠ۨۨۧ۝ۦۆڷ‪ғ‬ۀڽۂۂڽڿڷۤۧ۝ۦ‪Ө‬ڷۦۣۙۛې‬ ‫ۀۀڽ‪Ң‬ڿڼڼڼڽۂڽہڽڿڼڼۑ‪Җ‬ۀڽڼڽ‪ғ‬ڼڽۃ۝ۣۘ‬ ‫ۙۦۙۜڷ۟ۗ۝۠‪Ө‬ڷۃڷۣۧۢ۝ۧۧ۝ۡۦۙێڷۨۧۙ۩ۥۙې‬ ‫ڿڽڼھڷۖۙٯڷۂڽڷۣۢڷہڿ‪ғ‬ڿۀڽ‪ғ‬ۀڿ‪ғ‬ۂھڽڷۃۧۧۙۦۘۘٷڷێٲڷۃٲٱێ‪ۛҖ‬ۦۣ‪ۘۛۙғ‬۝ۦۖۡٷۗ‪۠ۧғ‬ٷۢۦ۩ۣ۞‪ҖҖ‬ۃۤۨۨۜڷۣۡۦۚڷۘۙۘٷۣۣ۠ۢ۫‪ө‬‬ Aristotle on Dialectic ROGER CRISP In his recent paper on Aristotelian dialectic,1 Professor Hamlyn claims that 'what may be important for Aristotle's purposes is not the truth but the acceptance of the truth' (p. 474). Dialectic is protreptic, and not strictly philosophical, spadework: '[t]he appeal toendoxa is, as it were, a setting of the scene, providing the context for argument out of which, it is hoped, will emerge the insights from which demonstration and thus further understanding can follow' (p. 475). Endoxa, Hamlyn suggests, are not 'presented as evidence for the truth' (p. 475). Now this does not appear to be the case in Aristotle's Ethics. In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle follows the method outlined in the passage in N.E. Book VII, Chapter 1 (1145b2-7) which Hamlyn accepts provides the basis for generalizations about dialectic (p. 468). Aristotle (i) sets out the phainomena (1.4-5; the phainomena here include the views of the wise), (ii) works through the puzzles (diaporein), which involves him in substantive philosophical argument (1.5; 1.7; cf. the substantive argument in VII.3 on akrasia), and (iii) proves the endoxa (1.8). Aristotle introduces stage (iii) thus: 'But we should examine [the first principle] on the basis not only of the conclusion and the premises [of the argument in 1.7], but also of what is said about it; for all the facts harmonize with a true account, and soon clash with a false one'. 2 Here, then, Aristotle is advocating reference to 'what is said' (the legomena; cf. 1145b20) in order to test the truth of a claim about an alleged first principle. Indeed, in his enthusiasm for dialectic, Aristotle implies that the evidential status of the legomena is not even prima facie. Aristotle goes on to say that the features people require of happiness are all found in what he has described, since to some people it seems to be virtue, to others practical wisdom, to yet others theoretical wisdom, and so on (1098b22-26). And, he continues, 'some of these claims have been made of old by many men, others by a few reputable men; and it is reasonable that neither of these groups is entirely mistaken, but that each is correct at least in one respect or even in many' (1098b27-29). The mention of the many and the reputable (i.e. the [practically as well as intellectually] wise) is further evidence that Aristotle sees 1 2 'Aristotle on Dialectic', Philosophy 65 (1990), 465-76. Omitting t'alethes at 1098b 12 (Rassow). 522 Philosophy 66 1991 Discussion himself here as engaging in dialectic (see Topics I.I, 100b21-3).3 At stage (iii), then, unless Aristotle is being disingenuous, the reason for considering the legomena is that they are likely to be correct—that is, presumably, true. He is not merely looking for a basis of agreement, but supporting the conclusion of his own previous argument (itself, I would argue, part of dialectic at an earlier stage). And this reason also justifies the role assigned to the legomena at stages (i) and (ii). But why should the views of the many and the wise not amount to mere 'old wives' tales' (p. 470)? Aristotle would, of course, have to accept that this is possible. But he also has reasons for thinking it highly unlikely and therefore unreasonable so to believe: human beings have a natural inclination towards the truth and in most cases do happen upon it {Rhetoric I.I, 1155al5—18); and we must listen to what people of experience, age and practical wisdom say, since they naturally see correctly (N.E. VI. 11, 1143b6-14).4 Hamlyn points out that Gilbert Ryle, in 'Dialectic in the Academy', seems to presuppose a dichotomy of 'either winning or the discovery of truth'. Hamlyn suggests a third possibility, that the aim of dialectic is 'to bring about the acceptance of what is presumed by the arguer [for reasons independent of dialectic] to be the truth' (p. 466). If my interpolation in this passage is acceptable to Hamlyn, then there is a fourth possibility: winning and (or even through) the discovery of truth. My account of dialectic relates to the Ethics, whereas Hamlyn is concerned primarily with Aristotelian science. Hamlyn might suggest, then, that dialectic is intended to serve different purposes in science and ethics. But as far as I know there is no textual backing for this suggestion. So we must accept that Aristotle held dialectic to be con3 On the relation in general between the account of dialectic in the Topics and its practice in the Ethics, see, in addition to the relevant chapters of his book discussed by Hamlyn, T. H. Irwin, 'First Principles in Aristotle's Ethics', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3, 1978, 257; 269, n. 19. Irwin's overall interpretation is persuasively criticized by T. D. Roche, 'On the alleged metaphysical foundation of Aristotle's Ethics', Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988), 51-62. 4 See also Eudemian Ethics 1.6, 1216b26-36; Metaphysics II.1, 993a30b4. These passages among others are discussed illuminatingly in Jonathan Barnes, 'Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics', Revue Internationale de Philosophic 34 (1981), 490-511. Hamlyn criticizes Martha Nussbaum for failing to provide an account of dialectical method (p. 467). Barnes is not open to this criticism. Hamlyn also bemoans the lack of 'principles and criteria' for the use of endoxic evidence, if such there be, in Aristotelian science (p. 475). An extension of Barnes's systematization of Aristotle's ethical thought might meet any such lack. 523 Discussion cerned with the discovery of truth in science also (see Topics 1.2, 101a34-6; 1.11, 104b 1-2). Hamlyn's discussion arises partly from the fact that Aristotle held the view that scientific first principles can be known through intuition (nous) (pp. 471-3; see especially the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics). Rather than play down the role of dialectic in science, however, it might be better to conclude with John Cooper that 'it is possible that Aristotle's position on this point is not in the end entirely coherent'.5 University College, Oxford 5 Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 68. I am grateful to the British Academy for support provided during the writing of this note, in the form of a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship. 524