A Study of Working-Class in Korea

A Study of Working-Class in Korea 497 summary A Study of Working-Class in Korea Kim Dong-Choon 1. Preface Korea’s labor movement since the late 1980s in often brought to discussion as an exceptional case in comparison with those of advanced countries, because it showed uncommon energetic appearance in the trends of world-wide decline of organized labor. Like the cases of late developing countries such as Brazil, Philippines and South Africa, labor protest in Korea developed its vitality in the context of breakdown of the authoritarian regime, the Fifth Republic(1980∼1987). After the massive labor mobilization which continued for three months in the summer of 1987. some four thousand unions were newly organized initiating collective-bargaining at company level. Workers’ growing concern about their rights and active participation in union activity was noteworthy. However, it is still difficult to conclude Korea as that working-class power in Korea is gaining strength. Workers in Korea are in a weak power that they are still constrained by the existing fragmented system of union organization, continue to have serious difficulty in effectively defending their job security, in failing to dispatch their members to the National Assembly. The number of strikes and union density curved downward from 1990. Workers have failed in urging to build an effective institutional apparatus to defend their interests, while continuing to pronounce a need to find an alternative to the existing company-level bargaining system. The state-sponsored official union(Federation of Korean Trade Unions), which has been criticized and attacked as a traitor to the workers’ interest since 1970s, has not receded its exclusive status to newly constructed labor organization(The Korean 498 Trade Union Congress). The authorities not denied the legal status of this ’New Union’, but also have severely oppressed it by defining it illegal, or destructive and by regarding it an enemy of industrial peace. Some analysts have characterized this situation of Korea’s labor unions as "early decline just after late development", that have bypassed the period of class-oriented labor movement. Although I do not agree with this assessment wholeheartedly, I think it is an urgent task to explain the failure the Korea’s organized labor to build an effective institutional power base on the basis of its movements since 1987. Such an explanation is necessary to identify the implications for future of the labor relations and labor movements in Korea. This study focuses on the internal, or subjective base of union activity as the way of explaining the union weakness. 2. The Rise and Decline of Union Density The union membership in Korea has, in the process of industrialization, slowly increased. But union density in Korea has never reached 20% since the start of state-led industrialization in the early 1960s. Since ’the 1987 great strikes’, some four thousand of new unions have been organized and over sixty thousand workers were unionized. Most of them are employees of small and medium size companies. The rise in union membership was made possible by the revision of labor law undertaked passively by the ruling class directly after ’the strikes’, which has enlarged the space of union organization and the formation of workers’ solidarity. But these rising trends began to stall in 1990, when political and economic atmosphere transformed adversely for workers. Many unions with small membership found it difficult to survive under the changed condition. Accordingly union membership fell below the 17% of the total workforce in 1992. It may be assumed that the decline of union density was related to the sudden development of hard circumstances for union activity after 1990. But the decline of union density cannot be attributed wholly to the toughness of political circumstances and the end of economic boom after 1989. An examination of the composition of union membership and the tendency of decline by industry, region, company size, and sex has revealed that legislative and institutional hurdles were the major factors in the A Study of Working-Class in Korea 499 slowdown and decrease in the union density. Contrary to the popular belief, union decline in Korea was not mainly due to the changing composition of labor force(increased proportion of service workers) or the fundamental transformation of labor process and rationalization of managerial strategy. These factors had some influence on the union decline in some cases, but on the whole their contribution has been negligible until now. It can be conclude that some structural and institutional setting continue to be crucial factors in determining the low union density in Korea. The current labor law, which permits only company-level union organization, prevents large numbers of workers employed at small to medium size companies from organizing unions in the face of hostile attitudes of employers and threaten of dismissal. It is nearly impossible for workers in small size companies to organize union, because workers cannot effectively overcome the paternalistic or despotic control of the management. It would be difficult to expect a growth in the union density as long as workers efforts to organize union beyond the company level continue to be frustrated by labor law and the hostility of employers. 3. Worker’s Orientation and Union Solidarity Worker’s orientation or consciousness toward work, labor union and company is very important in understanding the pattern and character of union activity. Whether workers have a "instrumental orientation" or "socialistic orientation" toward their company and union may determine the strength of labor union as well as the general character and strategy of unions. But this orientation or consciousness must not be regarded as originating directly the intrinsic and psychological state of workers. Generally speaking. worker’s orientation toward work and union tends to be conditioned by social relations, distribution of power between "capital" and "labor" on the shop-floor and in the society and nation as a whole. Privatized and individualized workers would not have any concern about workplace problems, and committed workers would devote their energy to the company regarding it as a path to self-development like as in the cas of Japanese workers. So some hypotheses could be formulated on the question of the causal relationship between the decline of union density, maintenance of enterprise unionism and the 500 meaningful transformation of worker’s consciousness after 1987. It has been ofter assumed that a larger part of the Korean workers began to relinquish their loyalty to employers after the 1987’s "great striker". After the heavy-chemical industrialization of 1970s, highly educated workers became the major segment of the working class. They are usually firmly anchored in the life of working class, making them more sensitive to and critical of their existing working conditions and wage. Moreover, their bitter past experience of inhumane treatment by employers became an important catalyst for the development solidarity among themselves. Labor militancy that manifested in 1987-1989 period, could be attributed to their internal solidarity. But the rise of workers’ class-orientation did not curtail their attachment to company and loyalty to employers. How can this phenomena be explained? Workers’ major motivating for working in Korea is, as is the case of in other capitalist societies, the pursuit of economic well-fulfillment or career accumulation but a tool for a comfortable life. But their "instrumental orientation" to work is accompanied by high solidarity-orientation to union. It appears that instrumentalism to work and solidarity to union may not be mutually exclusive. It can be interpreted that instrumentalism and solidarity orientation have a contradictorily co-existence in workers’ mind. The appearance of instrumentalism may reflect their disadvantageous market situation. In some respects, their obedience to the superiors before 1987 may not have been based on an acceptance of the legitimacy of the existing labor regime or a voluntary reverence of capitalist, but inevitable compulsion of the ’bread and butter’ logic. So their abrupt discoloration was not far from understandable. Based on existing research data, it can be argued that important transformation in workers’ consciousness did not took place as it has been supposed, It is undeniable that class solidarity has progressed greatly, but it does to generally go beyond the boundary of the company. Loyalties both to the company and to the union still coexist in the minds of workers. We may characterize this phenomenon as the "dual loyalty of workers", similar to that found among the Japanese militant workers in the 1950s and 1960s. If we take into account of social conditions of Korean workers, it is not difficult to understand why they have a "dual loyalty". For several decades, most workers in Korea had no idea what unions was, or what rights workers could had. Workers are still unwilling to risk the wrath of their employers. So workers’ attachment to firm may not be due to their sincere devotion to work or employers, but due to the cost of "exit’ and "voice" which forbid them from A Study of Working-Class in Korea 501 taking risky actions. This situation makes it possible that "conflict consciousness" or hostility to hand in hand with cooperative attitudes to them. Worker’s passivity to union activity at the risk of employers’ denials can be attributed to the powerlessness of union, not due to their intrinsic personality, cultural tradition, or ignorance. Company-orientation of Korean labor leaders and rank-and files can be accountable in this respect. Both employers and employees acknowledge the social distance between them is too large to permit a mutual trust. From the workers’ standpoint, the fact that they have a sense of distance with regard to employers is equal to have a firm solidarity toward their fellow workers. So this strong solidarity among workers can go hand in hand with their ’loyalty’ to the employers. Thus, the maintenance of a company-union system can be explained when we take into consideration all of these facts. Labor relations at company level is very conflictual, or even antagonistic, but it can be sustained under the extreme depoliticalization of workers. 4. The Internal Politics and The Strategy of Enterprise Union. In order to understand the strategy of unions, it is necessary to take objective circumstances and organizational logic of unions into consideration. Economic and political circumstances constrain the range of negotiation between employees and employers. And internal logic of formal organization provides the initial setting in which important actors decide on some strategies. Korean labor unions, whose overall environment is shaped by the concrete politico-economic conditions of Korea, are constrained by the specific system of organization, company union. And developing countries like Korea always put more emphasis on ’goal of state’ than worker’s needs. In this situation, strikes have always been attacked as "selfish action" without a consideration for the hardship of the national economy. Authorities forbid workers from participating in political organization. Given such a situation, workers have choice but to attempt to extract ’cash wage’ as much as possible. It would, then, be reasonable to assume that economic militancy at company level stems from this unique circumstance. In spite of repeated emphasis on labor solidarity, labor leaders always put their priority on shop-floor collective negotiation and stabilization of company union. This strategy 502 may reflect a realistic and "rational choice" on the part of the union leaders. Of course, it is understandable that, under the existing system of interest-representation, enterprise collective bargaining, the labor leaders focus their efforts on the owners or managers of the firms. But, then, it is reasonable to assume that a severe limitation lies ahead of a successful shop-floor employer/employee negotiation. Workers would not be able to achieve anything other than what employers would be willing or can permit. Overemphasis on company-level negotiation and labor militancy on the wage issue may be repeated over and over again, at the great detriment to the long-term labor strength. Thus, it can be concluded that such a situation, in which union solidarity and political action require a high participation cast, it would be natural to expect the labor leaders to opt for a possible and attainable path instead of pursuing "idealistic goals". Strategies adopted by union leaders cannot be regarded as having designed with a consideration for the prospect of national labor relations or the future effects. The pioneering strike efforts by the large-company workers may give confidence to small-medium scale company workers. But on the other hand, labor militancy at company level may widen the wage gap between the large and small companied, raising a barrier for the formation of a joint action by all workers and eventually weakening the class solidarity. the growth of organizational capacity of large company unions may give rises to an unintended consequence for the nation-wide labor movements, because it may accelerate the differentiation of wage levels and working conditions of workers. Under a regime of enterprise unionism, marrowness of leader’s vision and segmentation of workers may be inevitable. These are the paradoxical effect of economic militancy at company. 5. Limitation of Union Solidarity New labor leaders have made every effort to strengthen union solidarity. Their concern focused on the question of the ways to overcome the constraints of the enterprise unionsim. Union leaders are convinced that the very form of organization constrain the development of consciousness and class capacity of workers. Union leaders since 1988, confronted with the hostile attitude and reaction of A Study of Working-Class in Korea 503 employers and government. instinctively searched for help from other neighboring unions. These "first-stand solidarity" among unit unions led to the establishment of several ’Association of Regional Unions’ from 1987 to 1989, in various industrial cities in Korea. The members of these organizations were new unions organized following ’th 1987’s great strikes’. They adopted ’autonomous, democratic unionism’ as their strategy for future movement. Chonnohyup (Korean Trade Union Congress), which declared the transformation of labor movement from cooperative unionism to "democratic unionsim", was built on the basis of these Associations of Regional Unions. Chonnohyup identifies itself as the transitional organization to the way of centralized industrial-level union. But hurdles of labor law and differentiation in the working conditions among the companies, and the ’free rider’ strategy of large company unions have been the main barrier to their efforts. 6. Conclusion. It can be concluded that the power imbalance between workers and employers, initiated in the building of the "divided-state" and state-led industrialization in the 1960s, is still the most crucial barrier for the growth of the union organization. Disadvantageous institutional settings, such as the existing power relations and labor law, have given rise to a "culture of submission" among workers. On the other side, it conditions union leaders to adopt uncompromising strategy. The existing labor law, the form of union organization, the structure of collective bargaining, the current form of wage, the levels of social welfare and party system constitute the institutional factors. This leads to a conclusion that Korean workers have very a very narrow space, within the given institutional constraints, to pursue their goals independent of the benevolence of the employers. 1) The worker’s role in the 1987’s liberalization and the pattern of their opposition against the old labor relations is a very important in understanding the development of the labor movement thereafter. Their initial action during the process of political liberalization was nothing more than the effect of the past history of industrialization and the systems of labor relations. The very fact that workers did not take any active 504 role in the breakdown of the authoritarian rule and their massive protest movements in 1987 was nothin but a loyal opposition within the space provided by the existing labor laws greatly affected their ensuing action. This produced a vicious-cycle of workplace labor disputes and constraint of worker’s need within the boundary of company. 2) Korean working class has internalized the historical experience of "failed revolution" of 1945-1953 as all other Koreans have. It was the result of this collective acculturation that most of Korean workers accepted the unjust and harsh labor situation under the Fifth republic, 1980-1987. We can understand the pattern of worker’s adaptation, such as this, when we take into consideration their past experience as ’the underprivileged’ and current socio-political situation which demands high cost participating in any organized movements. The large portion of rewards workers obtain is still cash wage provided by the employers. Under the circumstance, their ’dual loyalty’ to union and company is unavoidable. And worker’s high commitment to labor unions does not lead to the development of solidarity as s ’class’. 3) When we regard union as an actor, weakness of working-class solidarity can be explained by strategies adopted by individual unions. It is necessary to analyze the trajectory of the unions’ of large companies which led the national labor movements. The unions have become overburdened, in such a situation, as all of workers’ needs were centralized into the company union because of the absence of any other route for the realization of their interests. I would like to emphasize here that consolidation of union organization under the system of enterprise unionism does not necessarily lead to the growth of working-class strength at the national level. Though worker’s immediate interests can be met by strengthening the company union, the varing level of union bargaining power accelerates the wage differences between companies and deepens the labor segmentation. The low union density and the weakness of union cannot be attributed to the sudden changes in the economic structure or the intensification of state repression after 1987. It is rater the institutional settings established during the authoritarial rule before 1987, which compel the workers or unions to submit and adapt to the existing labor relations.