Islam, Politics and Government

This article was downloaded by:[Kirmanj, Sherko] On: 30 March 2008 Access Details: [subscription number 791552864] Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713636813 Islam, Politics and Government Sherko Kirmanj a a University of South Australia, Online Publication Date: 01 March 2008 To cite this Article: Kirmanj, Sherko (2008) 'Islam, Politics and Government', Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 9:1, 43 - 59 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/14690760701856382 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14690760701856382 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 9, No. 1, 43–59, March 2008 Islam, Politics and Government SHERKO KIRMANJ University of South Australia SherkoKirmanj [email protected] Taylor 1469-0764 Original 9102008 00000March & Article Francis (print)/1743-9647 2008Ltd and Political (online)Religions Totalitarian 10.1080/14690760701856382 FTMP_A_285802.sgm and Francis Movements ABSTRACT The relationship between Islam and politics has attracted considerable attention in recent years, and especially since the 11 September attacks. This paper examines this relationship and comprises an extensive review of the main sources of Islam. The principal aim is to assess arguments regarding the political nature of Islam, and it seeks to investigate whether or not Islam is inherently political. Islamists have used Islam as an ideological tool and also as a weapon to obtain power when they are in opposition. Additionally, they have given their authority a religious gloss when they are in government. Therefore, the second objective of the paper is to investigate the authenticity of their claims of the political nature of Islam. The paper asserts that the Koran and the Sunna are concerned mainly with ethical and moral issues and have little to say about politics and governance. Introduction Islam is the religion of over one billion people around the world. It is the main religion in 48 countries and it is extending through Europe, America and Australia. More importantly, among the four major religions – Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity – Islam seems to have the most pervasive role in contemporary politics. This fact, among others, has led many scholars in the Islamic World, and more recently in the West, to study Islam, and in particular the political aspects of Islam. Indeed, it is apparent that no development of the past 30 years has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of Islamism, or what it is called political Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. The significance of this particular research lies in the fact that it examines the popular argument among Islamists that Islam’s main sources – the Koran and the Sunna [the sayings acts of the Prophet Muhammad] – provide the basis for governance. In other words, Islamists employ Islam’s main documentary sources as the inspirational basis of both their political theory and ideology. The outcome has been the emergence of a totalitarian ideology, namely Islamism. The Islamists’ use of Islam is intended to give their ideology an aura of piety and sanctity.1 Therefore, to protect Islam from misuse and vilification it is very important to distinguish it from Islamism, in other words, to ensure that Islam is not equated with Islamism. For this reason, the Islamists’ claim that their religion is political in nature needs to be examined because they assert that ‘Islam is a religion of peace’. Correspondence Address: Sherko Kirmanj, School of International Studies, University of South Australia, Room A1-36, Magill Campus, St Bernards Road, Magill, SA 5070, Australia. Email: [email protected] ISSN 1469-0764 Print/ISSN 1743-9647 Online/08/010043-17 © 2008 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14690760701856382 Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 44 S. Kirmanj However, as pointed out by Tibi, their ‘jihadist internationalism is not a contribution to world peace, but a new variety of terrorist totalitarian movement, one that alienates Muslims from the rest of humanity’.2 In addition, any understanding of the current wave of terrorism requires a deeper understanding of the roots of Islamism, and it is also important to differentiate this movement from Islam as a faith. However, before investigating these claims, it is appropriate here to define ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamism’, and to shed light on the totalitarian nature of Islamism as a totalitarian ideology. Arkoun argues that, ‘The confusion between Islam as a religion and Islam as an historical framework for the development of a culture and a civilisation has been perpetuated and compounded right to the present day’.3 This paper identifies three kinds of Islam. First, there is Islam as described and represented in the original sources (the Koran and the Sunna), the features of which are open to different interpretations. Second, there is Islamic jurisprudence, which is Islam as seen and interpreted by early Muslims, and subsequently produced in what is now known as the Sharı̄ a [the Islamic Law]. Third is historical Islam, which refers to the history of Muslims and their rulers, their influence on the Sharı̄ a and its implementation, and the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout history. For the purpose of this study, only the first definition of Islam is seen to be appropriate because Islamic jurisprudence is the result of the deliberations of ulema [learned people] and fuqaha [jurists] at certain times and in certain circumstances in history. In addition, Islamic history is concerned primarily with events, people and processes rather than with the religion itself. Although Islam has had a great influence on the course of history in Muslim nations, Islam as a religion cannot be seen properly through the eyes of history. Therefore, if Islam is a divinely revealed religion (as its adherents assert), only the first kind (the Koran and the Sunna) of Islam can be seen as the true essence of this faith. As mentioned above, that is the Islam as expressed and embodied in the original sources, the Koran and the Sunna. The other primary concepts which abound in this topic are Islamism, political Islam, Islamic resurgence, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic radicalism and Islamic terrorism. They are all terms used, mostly, to describe one phenomenon. However, scholars and researchers of Islamic studies use different terms. This study employs the term ‘Islamism’ to refer to Muslim individuals, along with organisations and movements who use Islam’s main sources as the inspirational basis of their political theory and ideology, whether in the early phases of the religion’s history or in more contemporary times. This study rejects the term ‘political Islam’ because it promotes the notion that Islam is political in itself, and that therefore there is no distinction between Islamist political thought and Islam as a religion. Similarly, the term ‘Islamic resurgence’ is a misleading term because it fosters the idea that Islam has been dormant – even moribund – but has been revived by assertive Islamists. Another term requiring clarification is ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ which has caused confusion because it fails to distinguish between religious fundamentalism and political fundamentalism. It is misleading because a mainstream Muslim person can be a fundamentalist in terms of religious practices, while also being quite moderate in his/her political views. In regard to the term ‘Islamic radicalism’, this paper avoids generally applying this term to all Islamists because neither traditional Islamists nor neo-Islamists were/ are all radicals in their approach to political pursuits. However, it is more appropriate that the most extreme groups of radical Islamists be referred to as ‘terrorist m i][acr m i[]acr Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 Islam, Politics and Government 45 Islamists’, but not ‘Islamic terrorists’. Consequently, it is proposed that the most suitable term to describe Muslim political activists who do not distinguish between the sacred and the profane, between the spiritual and the temporal, and between politics and religion, is the term ‘Islamist’, and this will be adopted by this paper. Today Islamism is both an ideology and a movement that seeks to establish a specific form of government.4 Indeed, whether as a political ideology, political movement or form of government, Islamism has all the features of a totalitarian system and/or an ideology. Although it is not within the scope of this paper to establish this claim, it is nonetheless relevant to shed some light on the totalitarian characteristics of Islamism. A central element of Islamist ideology is the differentiation between self and others; that is, between Muslims and non-Muslims [dhimmis], between the ‘House of Islam’ and the ‘House of War’ [dār al-Islām wa d ār al-harb]. ˙ For example Mawdudi (1903–79), who could be considered as the father of neoIslamism, argues that Islam seeks to eliminate discrimination based on colour, race, nationality, blood and lineage, but on the question of religion he divides human beings into two parties: ‘the party of God’, who are Muslims, and ‘the other party’, who are non-Muslims.5 In addition, he goes on to argue that Islam proscribes two types of citizenship: Muslims and non-Muslim.6 Islamists believe that their ideology will inevitably triumph in the end and that, from their perspective, Islam is universal in character and will ultimately rule over the entire world. This notion was repeatedly emphasised in Sayyid Qutb’s influential book Milestones in which he also stresses another aspect of totalitarian ideology, the use of violence as a justifiable means of asserting Islamic domination. Qutb (1906–66), a well-known Islamist, suggests that jihad, ‘is a means of establishing the Divine authority within it so that it becomes the headquarters for the movement of Islam, which is then to be carried throughout the earth to the whole of mankind, as the object of this religion is all humanity and its sphere of action is the whole earth’. He adds that, ‘jihad in Islam is simply a name for striving to make this system of life dominant in the world’.7 In fact, the aims of world domination and annihilation of all other systems, as stressed by Qutb,8 were familiar elements of the two western forms of totalitarianism, communism and Nazism.9 It is well known that Islamists pursue the universal establishment of a form of universal government which they refer to as the ‘Islamic system’ [Nidham Islami], this being an absolute totalitarian political form of Islamism.10 In brief, Islamism embodies the foremost totalitarian movement of the twenty-first century, a movement based on politicised religion.11 In addition to the already mentioned aspects, the common features of the Islamists’ totalitarian ideology are a rejection of any separation between the private and the public sphere, the imposition of certain norms of belief and behaviour on all aspects of life, and the subordination of civil society to comprehensive state machinery.12 For this reason, and others mentioned above, it is critical for scholars in the West, and in the Islamic world as a whole, to distinguish Islamism from Islam. Moreover, it is profoundly important for politicians and civic leaders to make such a distinction as a starting point for what is called ‘the dialogue of civilisations’, if there is, after all, a genuine intention to avoid ‘the clash of civilisations’. Accordingly, the primary aim of this paper is to deconstruct the main claim of Islamists that Islam is, ‘a religion that sees its duty and commitment to form an Islamic state. Islam came to reform society and to form a nation and government. Its mandate is the reform of the whole world’.13 Similarly, this study examines the am []rac am []rac am []rac Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 46 S. Kirmanj Islamist claim that Islam is both din [religion] and dawla [state], this being a key point for separating Islam from Islamism. To do this the paper reviews the main documentary sources of the Islamic faith (the Koran and the Sunna), so as to evaluate and assess the Islamists’ claims. The first issue to confront Muslims immediately after the death of Prophet Muhammad was the problem of succession, or what is referred to as the ‘caliphate’. At that time followers had to innovate and improvise with regard to the form and nature of government, and since then scholars and academics in the Muslim world have been divided into two groups on this matter. Firstly, there are those who believe that Islam had been politicised in an historical process,14 and in this study these are referred to as contemporary thinkers. Secondly, there are those who believe that politics and religion are inseparable,15 and those who assert this view are referred to as neo-Islamists. The early Muslim thinkers – including ulema [learned people] and fuqaha [jurists] – who believed in the indivisibility of religion and politics, and who contributed to the production of what is known as Islamic political thought, will be referred to as traditional Islamists. The Koran and Politics The Koranic Verses and the Issue of Governance Most Islamists have used selected verses of the Koran to support the argument that the Koran embraces politics.16 In this section the use of those verses will be discussed to examine their claims. The first set of verses are called ‘Ayat al-Hakimiyya’ [the Verses of Governance], and comprise verses 44–7 of the Sūra [Chapter] al-Maidah. These verses were revealed in order to address an adultery case involving two Jewish persons. The Prophet told them: ‘I judge them by what is in the Torah’.17 Islamists use an analogy to apply this case to Muslims, stating that the significance of the verses is in their purpose not in the people to whom they were addressed (Jews and Christians). For example, al-Qaradāwi (1926–) claims that the lesson is in the ‘commonness of the meanings’ and not in the reasons for the revelation.18 In the same book al-Qarad āwi argues against other Islamists (perhaps even more radical than he) who reject the participation of women in government on the basis of a saying of the Prophet Muhammad who stated, ‘Verily, that nation would not prosper which hands over the reins of its government to a woman’. al-Qaradāwi argues that it is not possible to discern the lesson from the ‘commonness of the meanings’, instead it is essential to place it in context; in this instance, alQaradāwi says, it related to events in the Iranian empire.19 Consequently, alQaradāwi insists that the saying should not be adopted as a directive to Muslims. This example highlights the contradiction of al-Qaradāwi’s argument and the danger of interpreting the Koranic texts and the Sunna out of context, and without regard to the historical circumstances of the time. Equally importantly, it should be noted that the Koran was revealed from time to time over 23 years, and in accordance with prevailing circumstances and conditions. Another verse in the Koran states that, ‘Verily! Allah commands that you should render back the trusts to those to whom they are due; and that when you judge between men, you judge with justice’.20 On the basis of this verse, al-Qaradāwi argues that the Koran commands the establishment of a political order,21 but in order to accept this interpretation a few factors must first be clarified. It is quite u][mrac am []acr am []acr am []arc am ][ arc am []arc am []acr am []arc Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 Islam, Politics and Government 47 clear that these verses constitute only broad guidance and recommendation. Second, the main theme of these verses is justice, and so the essential issue is the implementation of justice, regardless of the type of government, whether Islamic or secular. Justice is a concept, and the meaning of justice changes and evolves in response to social conditions. Basically, in Islam, justice does not have the same contemporary or modern meanings that revolve around human rights. Broadly speaking, within Islam justice means sharing and responding to the welfare of the community. Nevertheless, what was considered ‘just’ 14 centuries ago may be seen as unjust by today’s standards. For example, although Islam calls for equality and justice, it did not abolish slavery, which was practised before and after the emergence of the faith, and it did not consider it unjust. However, slavery is considered unjust by modern standards. Therefore, it is believed that slavery should not be practised today, even though Islam has not specifically abolished it. Some particular verses have been used to provide the Koran with a political gloss, and to justify religious involvement in government. For example, the following lines are often quoted: O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger [Muhammad] and those of you who are in authority. And if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you believe in Allah and the Last Day.22 Close scrutiny of this verse reveals some key points. It distinguishes between the religious authorities ‘Allah’ and ‘the Messenger’, and the worldly authority ‘those of you in authority’. This undermines the claim of those who say that the Prophet Muhammad was a Head of State.23 In addition, it could be said that when the Prophet was alive it was then possible to refer things to Allah, but since then it has been impossible because the direct link between human beings and their creator – in this case, Muslims – no longer exists. However, Islamists might argue that the link continues through the revealed books, for example the Koran. The response to this claim is that the Koran does not speak by itself, but as Imam Ali (the fourth Caliph, r. 656–61) stated, rather it communicates through human beings.24 The other relevant point is that the verse does not ask people to refer their differences to those in authority, and it specifically states that it needs to be referred to Allah and his Messenger, which is now impossible. Another key point to be clarified in respect to this verse – and indeed most other verses – concerns the ‘calls’ for al-hukm [arbitration or judgement]. Basically, the word al-hukm refers to arbitration on judgment day, this meaning being quite clear in the following line: ‘and on the Day of Resurrection, He will certainly make clear to you that wherein you used to differ’.25 More importantly, this is related purely to religious discrepancies, and not to political or ideological differences, and most of the arguments and debates of the time revolved around a few fundamental issues. For example, the Oneness of God was a point of dispute between believers who proclaimed the Oneness of God, and disbelievers who denied this notion of Oneness. Another fiercely debated subject during the formative years concerned whether the Prophet was a genuine messenger of God – as claimed by Muslims and their Prophet – or a self-declared apostle as asserted by pagan people in Mecca. A third question examined whether Islam is, in fact, a revealed religion as Muslims alleged, or, rather, a contrived religion as widely debated by some Jewish and Christian tribes in Mecca and Medina at the time. Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 48 S. Kirmanj The Koran sought to address these and other religious differences, which had nothing to do with either government or politics. Furthermore, all would agree that judgement should be done with justice (as stated in the verse), and that there should be obedience to authority. However, it is argued here that based on such recommendations in the Koran it cannot validly be claimed that it calls for political order. Neither can it be claimed that Muhammad was a ‘Head of State’. The Comprehensiveness of the Koran The other argument used by Islamists to politicise the sacred texts is their claim of the comprehensive nature of the Koran. Islamists claim that the Koran provides guiding principles for all aspects of life, including politics and government.26 This argument is based on a line which states ‘and We have revealed the Book to you explaining clearly everything, and a guidance and mercy and good news for those who submit’.27 It is important to examine the validity of such a claim. First of all, chronologically this verse belongs to the late Mecca period,28 though most Islamists base their arguments upon verses revealed in the Medina period which, they believe, was the formative phase of the establishment of the umma (the Community of believers).29 More importantly, the Sharı̄ a has been derived mainly from the verses revealed in Medina and not Mecca. So it is erroneous to claim that the Koran revealed everything at such an early stage of its formation. Another critical point in relation to the derivation of Sharı̄ a is that Islamic jurists have divided Koranic injunctions into three areas, qat i [certainty], dhani [uncertainty] and free areas. They acknowledge that the certainty area is very limited. According to al-Qaradāwi the Book contains only about ten definite injunctions.30 Besides, of the Koran’s 6666 verses, only 80 deal with legal matters, and these are mainly concerned with issues on which decisions were required by the then community of Medina. Those issues included ethical, moral, family, inheritance, defecation, menstruation, dietary, sexual behaviour and marriage matters.31 The areas of uncertainty are subject to personal interpretation and speculation, and the last area is self evident. Therefore, based on the time when this verse was revealed, and given the limited scope and form of the Koranic injunctions, it is difficult to claim that the Koran has revealed everything and covers every aspect of life. m i][acr m i][acr am []acr The Sunna and Politics The Sunna [the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and acts] is the second main source of Muslim theology, and is used to provide some justification for political activity. The Prophet’s sayings (or reports) were widely subjected to the dialectic of oral transmission, and consequently lack the certainty of a written record. Furthermore, its accuracy becomes an ijtihād [exertion].32 Another problem with using this source is that much of the old wisdom of Arabia and the Middle East was attributed to the Prophet in the form of sayings. Therefore, this paper avoids examining them in any detail for the above-mentioned reasons, and because they were collected two to three centuries after the Prophet’s death, and at a time when their use for political and ideological purposes was at its peak. The Sunnis, Shias and Khawarijis (the three major Islamic sects at the time of the collection of the sayings), used every opportunity to support their arguments with unauthentic quotations, and they created countless sayings in this process. In addition, the am []arc Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 Islam, Politics and Government 49 Abbasids also developed various sayings to both justify the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty, and to Islamicise the theory of the Caliphate. It is apparent that the Sunna is not a definitive religious reference but should be seen to comprise guiding principles of ‘approval and permission’, a view propounded by a leading Islamist, al-Qaradāwi.33 Moreover, in neither the 93 areas covered in alSahih al-Bukhari’s, nor in the sayings in al-Ahadith al-Qudsiyya, are there any lines dealing with the issues of government or politics.34 Islamists such as al-Bannā (1906–49) and al-Qaradāwi suggest that the Prophet Muhammad established the first Muslim state. However, while they have mentioned aspects of the Islamic state during the reigns of the first four caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, Othman and Ali), they are unable to identify any example from the years of the Prophet’s lifetime to justify their argument.35 al-Qaradāwi claims that there are, ‘tens of sayings on the caliphate, state, judiciary and Imams and their characters’.36 However, he cites only the following: ‘who dies and does not have bay a [promise] on his throat, he dies Jāhili [ignorantly]’. The political significance of these lines is open to question, but al Qaradāwi insists that Muslims are prohibited from giving allegiance to any ruler who does not adhere to Islam, and that they have to obey only a state based on Sharı̄ a, and ruled by a Muslim person. In response to this claim it is noted that this Saying is not one of al-Sahih al-Bukhari’s collection,37 even though reliance on non-authentic sources is a common practice of Islamists. When unable to substantiate their arguments with verses from the Koran or the Sunna, Islamists often refer to other historical records and texts, which for most neo-Islamists are the traditional Islamists writings. When comparing Islam with other religions, especially Judaism and Christianity, Islamists assert that Islam is the only religion that deals with every issue in life, and more, that that it is a way of life. They also draw attention to a verse in the Bible which states, ‘Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s’, and this, they claim, explains the separation of state and church in western nations.38 Yet the Prophet is reported to have made similar statements such as, ‘You are more knowledgeable of your worldly affairs’ and also, ‘what is of your religion’s affair is for me, and what is in your worldly affairs you know better’.39 Let us assume that these two sayings are authentic, as cited by al-Qaradāwi himself. This means, as in the case with Christianity, that the sayings could be used as a base for separating Islam and state powers, a process rejected by Islamists. As noted above, one can hardly find any sayings attributable to the Prophet that overtly deal with politics. Therefore, an examination of political references in the Sunna tends to emphasise aspects of the Prophet’s life, his death and other significant events which have been used by Islamists to politicise the faith. am []acr am []acr am []acr am []arc am ][rac am []acr m i[]acr am []acr The Death of the Prophet Muhammad and the Issue of Succession As regards the matter of governing the community, there is no clear evidence that the Prophet had seriously considered what arrangements should be made for the transfer of authority following his death.40 However, the Shia do not endorse this view, instead believing that the Prophet appointed Ali (the fourth Caliph) as his successor.41 The process of political argumentation within the Muslim community commenced after the Prophet’s death, and both al-Bannā and al-Qaradāwi, the leading voices in contemporary Islamism, suggested that the Prophet’s companions delay his burial because it was more important for Muslims to select am []arc am []acr Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 50 S. Kirmanj a successor, rather than bury the Prophet’s body!42 However, this argument is unacceptable to those familiar with Islamic burial tradition, a tradition which requires the body to be interred as soon as possible, so that an ‘obsession’ for mourning for the individual does not arise.43 The timing of the Prophet’s burial is a key issue in Muslim history and merits further discussion. Before the death of the Prophet, the Muslim community had grown rapidly in number, and its land extended to most of what is now known as the Arabian Peninsula. Therefore, it was very important for the elite of the Quraysh tribe to defend the status quo. Quraysh was the most powerful tribe of Mecca, and Muhammad and most of the Muslim elite at the time were descended from that group. The key figures of the Quraysh realised that to keep their dominant status they had to select one among themselves as the successor of the Prophet, but the selection proceedings caused great harm to the community and to its unity. The process eventually led to a major rift within the Islamic world; a hostile division that continues to this day. One group (Sunnis) approved the succession of Abu Bakr as the first Caliph, while the other (Shias) thought that Muhammad had appointed Ali (his cousin and son-in-law) as his successor. The selection process was not as easy or as definitive as Islamists claim, but it most certainly divided the community on sectarian, ideological and political lines. Furthermore, the disagreement about the succession was not a religious matter but rather a political one, for on the outcome rested the fate of the growing community. The main debate was, on the one hand, between two major clans of the tribe of the Quraysh: the Hashimis (the Prophet’s clan) and the Umayyad (the most powerful clan of the tribe). On the other hand, there was also a disagreement between the Muslims from Medina (Ansar) and their counterparts from Mecca (Muhajirun). In fact the delay in the burial was not because of the significance of selecting a successor, but because of the lack of guidance in Islam’s main sources in relation to governance. Neither the Koran nor the Sunna dealt with the business of governing, most probably because the Koran was revealed to the Prophet who lived in a stateless community. The Prophet never mentioned who would succeed him, though there is reference to one incident. The episode in question concerned religious events, not politics, and it is recorded that on one occasion the Prophet was sick and he appointed Abu Bakr to lead the prayers. This event is cited by Sunnis as evidence of Abu Bakr’s right to succeed, and indeed Abu Bakr then became the first Caliph following Muhammad’s death. However, according to Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), the reason the Prophet did not suggest a succession mechanism, or even appoint a successor, was that such a tradition was seen as ‘worthless and the privilege of unbelievers’.44 The Prophet in the Koran As mentioned earlier, Islamists consider Muhammad as the Head of the first Islamic state. al-Qaradāwi has stated that in the Islamic tradition the ruler is ‘wakil’ [vice-regent in charge] of the umma [Islamic nation].45 However, this is contrary to many verses in the Koran. For instance, one verse records how God warns the Prophet, ‘We have not appointed you a keeper over them, and you are not placed wakil [vice-regent] in charge of them’. Another declares, ‘I [the Prophet] am not a wakil custodian over you’.46 Over 50 verses in the Koran refer to Muhammad in various terms, such as ‘a witness’, ‘a warner’ (somebody who warns), ‘a preacher’, ‘a messenger (deliverer of the message)’, ‘a guide’, ‘announcer [bearer] of good am []arc Islam, Politics and Government 51 news’, ‘a reminder’, and the Prophet was explicitly warned by God that, ‘you are not a ‘custodian’, ‘guardian’ and warder over them (see note 73). The Koran comprises 114 Sūra, with a total of 6666 verses. In almost each Sūra there is at least one line where the Prophet is described as one who warned his people. Here, two points need to be made. In the first instance many of these verses were revealed when the Prophet was accused by opposition groups of having political aspirations. It was then that God instructed him to reply that he was only a ‘warner’ (one who warns). Second, many of these verses were revealed in Medina, and so Islamists claim that it was in Medina, and not Mecca, that the Prophet gained power and became ‘Head of State’. On this basis it could be argued that the Prophet had no worldly authority over his followers. However, as far as the Prophet’s political role within his community was concerned, it is suggested that he set out to replace the tribally organised community with another, which was slightly more complex and which was founded on religion, though one with deep traditional and cultural roots in pre-Islamic culture. Also, as pointed out by Antony Black, the Prophet was able to relate individuals to the Islamic community through a unique combination of rites and ethics, one reason why Islamic communities tend to be strong on communal values while concomitantly having weak and/or transient political structures.47 Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 u[m ]rac u[m ]rac The Pact of Medina The Medina Pact,48 or what Islamists refer to as ‘the Constitution of Medina’, was an agreement between the Muhajirun [Muslim emigrants from Mecca], the Ansar (indigenous Muslims of Medina) and the Jews of Medina. It is not clear whether this document was a written text or an oral agreement between the interested parties, however the latter seems most likely because the Prophet Muhammad was illiterate; moreover, it is questionable whether the Medina Pact was ever a written document, while at that time the Koran had not yet been documented. Therefore, it is quite possible that the original version of the Pact was subjected to the dialectic of oral transmission which affected the authenticity of its original version. There are numerous translations and versions of the Pact, and none are similar. They all differ in several respects, especially in articles 47–57, and the language used can vary between soft terms and strong terms. It is appropriate here to assess whether the Pact could be considered a constitution of ‘the Islamic state’ in Medina, as proposed by Islamists, or whether it was another attempt by the Prophet to organise the religious and tribal affairs of the Medina community. Islamists believe that the legitimacy of the Prophet’s control over Medina was based on his status as the Prophet of Islam as well as on the basis of the Pact of Medina,49 so it is important to clarify some issues in relation to the Medina Pact. First of all, the Pact was ‘written’ for the Medina Community in 622 before the expansion of Islam during the Prophet’s era, and there is no evidence of a similar agreement following the conquest of Mecca, which marks a turning point in Islam’s history. It appears, therefore, that the Pact was an isolated event; otherwise it would be unrealistic to say that the Muslim community and others in Medina needed a constitution, and that such a thing was not required after the expansion of Islam, the conquest of Mecca for example. Second, the word umma [community or Islamic nation], which is used in the Pact, has been interpreted by Islamists in order to broaden the political significance of the document. No such organisational contract between two parties can Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 52 S. Kirmanj be totally free from political elements, but that does not mean that the document can be considered as a constitution or as a programme for governing a society. According to articles 1 and 2 in the Pact, the Muslim emigrants, the Muslims of Medina and the Jews were considered to be one umma, although to understand them, two things need to be pointed out. First, the Koran separates communities according to their religion; for example, ‘for every umma there is a Messenger’.50 But considering Muslims and non-Muslims as one umma in the Pact contradicts the above-mentioned verse, as the term umma in the Pact is ‘clearly not synonymous with religion’.51 Second, although all religious groups in Medina at that time were considered one umma, there was not a centralised power to regulate the affairs of the umma. For example, according to Articles 3–11, each individual tribe (actually individuals within each tribe of both Jews and Muslims) was responsible for paying its blood-wit and redemption money, but this was according ‘to their present custom’ not according to any particular regulation in the Pact or in Islamic law. More importantly, the articles do not cover complex political issues. Rather, they merely address some specific matters such as ‘blood-wit and redemption money’, and these are dealt with according to traditionally formal tribal customs and practices. Article 17 of the Pact could be considered as having a political connotation when it says, ‘the peace of the believers is indivisible’, but this seems to be conditional and applies only during ‘fighting in the way of God’. Similarly, Article 19 states that believers must ‘avenge the blood of one another’, but does not identify any central power to execute such actions. Such directives must be seen in context, for it is an Arabian tribal tradition to revenge the killing of a tribal member, and was based on the old Arabian concept of ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’, itself a precept adopted by Islam. Article 21 also deals with revenge if a believer is killed, but again the executive power has not been identified, though it does call Muslims to be ‘one man and they were bound to take action’, also a tribal concept. However, for internal issues within the believer’s community the authority is not given to the Prophet. For example, Article 22 states that, if a believer helps an evil-doer or shelters him, the ‘curse of God and His anger on the day of resurrection will be upon him’.52 It is apparent from this article that the Prophet did not have authority over the community because it declares that evil acts will be dealt with on the day of resurrection, and it acknowledges God as the only arbitrator. However, Article 23 (and probably 36 and 42) confuse the situation because they call for matters to be referred to God and to the Prophet. Even though they seem to contradict the previous article, it could nevertheless be understood that it calls for matters to be referred to the Prophet to refer them to God, given that the Prophet in Islam was the contact point with God. To determine whether or not the Prophet exercised his authority, it is helpful to review an event of the final days of Muhammad’s prophethood. During the Tabuk expedition, the Prophet insisted on the participation of all able believers. He punished three whose excuses were inadequate, their punishment ending after this revelation: And to the three who were left behind, until the earth became strait to them notwithstanding its spaciousness and their souls were also straitened to them; and they knew it for certain that there was no refuge from Allah but in Him; then He turned to them [mercifully] that they might turn [to Him]; surely Allah is the Oft-returning [to mercy], the Merciful.53 Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 Islam, Politics and Government 53 This plainly illustrates that, although the Prophet handled some administrative matters, he was not the final authority. However, this then raises the question of whether God participated directly in the worldly affairs of the community after the death of their prophet. To this the answer must be no, because the direct linkage between God and the community was severed on Muhammad’s death. Therefore, any authority exerted over Muslims after the death of their Prophet could not be considered a divine authority, and it is considered as a normal worldly authority whether it calls itself Islamic or not. The other articles in the Pact deal with the defence of the city of Medina, which was the probable reason it was endorsed by all parties. After the migration of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, the tribes of Medina felt that they were facing danger from their rival, the Quraysh, who intended to exterminate the emigrants and their supporters in Medina.54 As a result the people of Medina had to unite to confront the threat. This might be viewed by some as a political feature of the Pact. However, it is argued here that Islam did not add anything to an ageold tradition in the Arabian Peninsula, for it was usual for tribes to combine forces if facing a common foe. Such pacts comprised pledges to help each other against rivals, especially during conflict.55 Sometimes the alliance was between unequal parties, and in such cases the strongest tribe provided protection for the others. Another example of such a practice was the Hilf al-Fudul [League of the Virtuous], which was an agreement among several pre-Islamic Arab tribes to support the wronged, and to maintain close relations and care for their relatives. The immediate reason for forming this alliance was an injustice suffered by a merchant from the Yemen. A clan from the Quraysh tribe had taken his goods, but in vain the Yemeni sought the help of the Quraysh leaders. When Banu Hashim (the clan of the Prophet) heard this, a meeting was convened which resulted in the formation of the Hilf al-Fudul. Muhammad was present at the meeting, but this predated his prophethood. Later, he was reported to have said that if he were to be invited to a similar alliance in Islam he would accept without reservation.56 The Medina Pact was also an agreement between several tribes in Medina just as the Hilf al-Fudul had been an alliance among tribes in Mecca. It is essential to note that there was no significant religious aspect to either pact and so, in the case of the Medina Pact, it would be incorrect to refer to it as the constitution of the first Islamic state. As further evidence, it must be pointed out that no Islamist has ever argued that the Hilf al-Fudul should be considered as the constitution of Mecca. In the light of the above discussion it could be said that the Medina Pact was a simple, tribal way of organising community affairs in the framework of that time, and had nothing to do with the ‘political’ aspects of Islam. Such alliances were practised before Islam and continued to be practised after the emergence of the Faith. Hence, the Medina agreement could not be considered as anything more than a federation of a few tribes in the face of an imminent attack from the Quraysh tribe of Mecca, and their allies. What the prophet Muhammad had established in Medina was neither state nor empire, but what could be called a ‘supertribe’, as described by Bertram Thomas.57 The super-tribe is an alliance, to an extent, of several tribes under the umbrella of single leadership, where individual tribes enjoyed reasonable autonomy but respected the overarching leadership of the Prophet Muhammad as a religious community leader. However, in regard to the above point, the political aspects of the Prophet’s activities had little to do with his religion but were concerned with the survival of the people of Medina. 54 S. Kirmanj Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 Political Jurisprudence During the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad there was little that could be called Sharı̄ a. After the killing of the third Caliph (Othman bin Affan in 656) and the subsequent civil war, the first serious religious deliberations emerged. At the time, it was difficult for Arab-Muslims to discuss any matters without the use of religious terms because the system of values found in the Koran had come to dominate the community’s thoughts of the world.58 Both traditional and neo-Islamists admit that early Islamic jurisprudence rarely mentioned issues of politics and governance, or what is termed political jurisprudence. Ibn Qayyim (1292–1350) complained of the stagnancy of jurists in his time, and this, he suggested, led the rulers to invent and/or introduce new laws away from Sharı̄ a.59 The stagnancy in Islamic political jurisprudence contributed to the absence of written sources on themes of government and politics. For example, in relation to hdud [punishment], Koranic injunctions proscribe only ten penalties. The political pattern of Islam makes some sense if we identify it as one which has recently emerged from tribalism, and this explains why it never developed formal state structures or a constitution. Furthermore, the great majority of Arabs had no experience of any political body other than the tribe. However, the Islamic expansion and response to the political and socio-economic changes led jurists and ulema to look into the main sources of Islam in order to develop laws to regulate their society. Although the Koran is mostly concerned with religion and ethics and has little to say about government, nevertheless, ‘it expresses a mood from which inferences can be taken’.60 As mentioned above, to explain the origins of Sharı̄ a, Jurists have divided Koranic injunctions into three areas: certainty, uncertainty and free areas. However, according to Islamists, no scholar, no conference and no authority is able to alter or modify – in full or in part – any laws under the section of certainties.61 This is based on an approach used by the founders of the four Islamic schools of law in Sunni; Hanafi (699–767), Maliki (716–95), Shafi i (767–820) and Hanbali (780–855), and other ulema who had employed the same methodology to interpret Koranic texts. The work on Sharı̄ a started at the beginning of the second century of Hijra (corresponds to 719–816 A.D.). It is apparent that the main lines of the Sharı̄ a had been formalised by the year 850, and Islamists acknowledge that details of all the rules and regulations were deduced from religious texts in order to organise a complex social system.62 The Sharı̄ a came into being in an informal and personal process. It depended on oral transmission, and ultimately it was implemented with an apparent absence of formality.63 In early Islam there was no political institution to legislate or implement laws, and this is evident in the fact that neither the Koran nor the Sunna was compiled as an official, formal document. To understand this it must be remembered that the early Islamic community was a tribal, stateless society where neither written constitutions nor executive powers were conceivable. After the expansion of the faith into other lands and the establishment of state institutions (during, and after, the period of Umar, the second Caliph, r. 634–44), and to protect the security and stability of the emerging state institutions, jurists and ulema demanded absolute obedience to the rulers as a religious obligation. To justify strict obedience and thwart dissent, civic obligations were defined in religious terms by reference to such verses as the following: ‘Obey Allah and obey the Messenger [Muhammad] and those of you who are in authority’.64 It was then that Islamic political theory m i[]acr m i[]acr m i[]acr m i[]acr m i[]acr m i[]acr Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 Islam, Politics and Government 55 (or Islamic political jurisprudence) emerged. For example, in his book al-Ahkam alSultaniyya [The Ordinances of Government], al-Mawardi (974–1058), one of the most important of the early writers on Muslim political thought, stated that ‘God makes it an obligatory duty upon us to obey those in authorities’.65 Another wellknown traditional Islamist scholar, al-Ghazali (1058–1111), stated that God has singled out two groups of men and given them preference over others: one prophets, and the other kings, and he (God) gave kings a high status.66 To elevate rulers to sacred status, jurists and ulema attempted to equate their role to that of the Prophets, asserting that the rulers were appointed by God. al-Ghazali declares, ‘God sent prophets to His servants to guide them to Him and … He chose kings to whose wisdom He relegated the welfare of His servant’, Similarly, he insisted that ‘kingship is given by God’.67 Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), a prominent traditional Islamist, also believed in the piety of authority and, as he stated in al-Siyasa al-Shar iyya [Sharı̄ a Governance], ‘all who were invested with authority (wulat) were the representatives (nuwwab) of God over his creature and were at the same time the agents or proxies (wukala) of the latter’.68 It is argued here that the implementation of Sharı̄ a (including political jurisprudence, as demanded by Islamists) does not refer to the Koran itself, because Sharı̄ a was compiled by jurists from interpretations of the Koran, and relies heavily on the acquired meaning of the terms in traditional religious thought. Therefore, the implementation of the Sharı̄ a is the implementation of the Islamist socio-political thought, and not a so-called Divine Law.69 Also, Sharı̄ a is based primarily on the Sunna, whereas in Islam only the Koran is considered to have been divinely revealed. Thus, as suggested by Sardar, Sharı̄ a was a socially constructed body of thought and regulations in Islamic history compiled during the Abbasid era, and subsequently, the construction of Sharı̄ a was integral to the dynamics of Muslim imperial powers.70 m i[]acr m i[]acr m i][acr m i[]acr m i[]acr m ]i[acr m i[]acr Conclusion The key issue addressed in this paper is whether the main documentary sources in Islam, the Koran and the Sunna, provide guidelines and parameters about government and politics. Special attention has been given to the Koran, because this writer believes that the Prophet’s sayings are mostly apocryphal; that is, they are difficult to authenticate. It is concluded from this investigation that the main Islamic sources have only few references to government or politics. However, to conclude that Islam has no political characteristics is an oversimplification. Similarly, to argue that Islam is both a religion and a political system with a combination of spiritual and profane features, and to suggest that Islam is a total way of life, is a proposition that cannot be substantiated. It is asserted here that Islam incorporates some beliefs, values and ethics which have political significance because even purely religious teachings may have political relevance. Moreover, throughout history it has been normal for religion to be closely linked to politics, and most social phenomena have political implications.71 However, Islam cannot be considered a political ideology because it fails to address the most fundamental aspects of any political ideology, namely the nature and role of government, and the relationship between people and authority.72 As mentioned above, it is difficult to authenticate the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad because they were collected two to three centuries after his death. Besides, there are only a few references that deal with politics. In regard to the Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 56 S. Kirmanj Sunna, this study has focused on the Prophet’s role as described in the Koran, and on his role in the Medina Pact. Islamists argue that the Prophet Muhammad was the first to establish an Islamic state and they claim that he was the ‘Head of State’. Although, Muhammad did play a leadership role in preaching and spreading Islam, he was essentially a religious and community leader, although his role as a community leader can only be understood within the context of Arabian tribal cultural practices. Perhaps he can best be described as the head of a supertribe, or leader of a federation of tribes. It is helpful to mention that in more than 50 verses of the Koran God reminded the Prophet, with messages broadly identical to the following one, that: ‘We have not appointed you a keeper [hafidhan] over them, and you are not placed in charge [wakil] of them’.73 Such lines were mainly revealed when the Prophet was accused of having political aspirations. One of the Prophet’s biographers narrates the story of a man who asked the Prophet to take care of a particular matter. As he stood before him, an intense shiver and fear overtook him and the Prophet said, ‘be calm, for I am no king nor a subduer [jabar], I am the son of a woman of Quraysh who used to eat dried meat in Mecca’.74 In short, if the Prophet had played any political role at all, it should not be confused with his prophetic role, because nowhere in the Koran had he been authorised to do so. In regard to the ‘Medina Pact’, this paper argues that it was merely a temporary alliance, and one of many between tribes in Arabia. Therefore, to claim that the Pact amounted to the constitution of the first Islamic state is to exaggerate its importance. Such alliances were commonplace among Arab tribes before and after the emergence of Islam, their purpose being to protect each other in the face of a common enemy. Based on ‘the articles of the document’, the Alliance incorporated many tribal values and beliefs, such as revenge, blood-wit and kinship. Another relevant point is that the Alliance did not centralise the authority of the Prophet. This point is indicated in the document which states that each tribe and religious group had to regulate itself, ‘according to their present customs’.75 This enquiry does not argue that the Prophet Muhammad did not play any political role within the Islamic community, because even his marriages had political motives and were arranged to protect the unity of the Islamic community. However, to claim that the Prophet’s intention was to establish an Islamic state, or to say that he was a Head of State, are claims that cannot be supported. In conclusion, it is evident that Islamic sources, especially the Koran and the Sunna, did not prescribe any specific form of government. They are concerned primarily with the ethics, morals and values of a simple and undeveloped society. Furthermore, Islamic sources do not provide a political theory with which to develop a form of government. This leads to several important questions. If the main Islamic sources did not provide the foundations or the concepts for a political theory for conducting government, then on what principles is Islamic political theory based? What are they, and how did they come into Islam and its history? In brief, the swift and widespread expansion of Islamic territory (during and after the time of Umar – the second Caliph, r. 634–44) throughout non-Arab lands, can be considered the main reason for the emergence of the process of politicisation of Islam. In addition to this, internal and/or sectarian power struggles, as well as the political arguments and debates, were key factors that contributed to the politicisation of Islam during the first centuries of Muslim history. Furthermore, Islam became politicised because Arab leaders found religion to be a force for uniting the disparate people over whom they ruled. Having said this, further research in this area is suggested. Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 Islam, Politics and Government 57 It is also concluded that the documentary sources of Islam did not proscribe any specific form of government, nor provide a political ideology, and that consequently Islam cannot be described as a totalitarian ideology. Islam is a religion that provides the basis of a social structure. However, Islamism is more. It is both a social movement and an ideology that has all the features of a totalitarian system. This is evident in the Islamists’ belief that Islamic principles and practices are capable of solving all of the problems of human life. They argue that the Islamic system extends into all aspects of life given that it touches upon all minor and major affairs of mankind. It provides order to human affairs. It is not only comprehensive and perfect, but also realistic and constructive.76 Hence, Islam should not be equated with Islamism. Notes 1. Mehdi Mozaffari, “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8/1 (2007), p.22. 2. Bassam Tibi, “The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8/1 (2007), p.50. 3. Muhammad Arkoun, “History as an Ideology of Legitimation: a Comparative Approach in Islamic and European Contexts”, in Gema Martin Munza (ed.), Islam, Modernism and the West: Cultural and Political Relations of the End of the Millennium (London: Tauris, 1999), p.127. 4. Mozaffari (note 1), p.17. 5. Sayyid Abul A la la Mawdudi, al-Islam wa al- J āhiliyya (Beirut: Mu’asasat al-Risala, 1975) pp.40–41. 6. Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, trans. Khurshid Ahmed (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1969), pp.235–6. 7. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, trans. Abdul Naeem (New Delhi: Islamic Book Services, 1998), p.72. 8. Ibid., p.75. 9. Hendrik Hansen and Peter Kainz, “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8/1 (2007), p.62. 10. Tibi (note 2), p.45. 11. Ibid, p.48. 12. Ibid, p, 37. 13. Ayatullah Morteza Mutahhari, “Jihad: The Holy War of Islam and its Legitimacy in the Quran”, trans. Mohammad Salman Tawhidi (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organisation, 1985), available at: http://www.al-islam.org/short/jihad/ (last accessed 15 July 2007). 14. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Principles of Governance) (Damascus: Dar al-Madā lil-Thaqafa wa al-Nashr, 2004, originally published in 1925); Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991); Basam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism; Political Islam and the New World Order (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002). 15. Sayyid Abul A la Mawdudi, Essential Features of the Islamic Political System (1948), available at: http://www.islam101.com/politics/politicalsystem.htm (last accessed 21 July 2007); Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, “Political Theory of Islam”, in Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (eds), Contemporary Debates in Islam: an Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000); Hassan al-Bannā, Selected Writings of Hassan al-Bannā Shaheed, trans. S. A. Qureshi (New Delhi: Millat Book Centre, 1999); Qutb (note 7); Yūsuf al-Qaradāwi, Min Fiqih alDawlah fi al-Islam (The Governance Jurisprudence in Islam) (Cairo: Dar al-Shruq, 1996); Abdul Karim Zedan, al-Fard wa al-Dawlah fi al- Shar ı̄ a al-Islamiya (Individual and the State in the Islamic Law) (Beirut: Mua’sasat al-Risalah, 1990); Muqtedar Khan “The Compact of Medina: a Constitutional Theory of the Islamic State” in the Mirror International, 30 May 2001, available at: http:// www.ijtihad.org/compact.htm (last accessed 21 July 2007). 16. Mawdudi (note 6) p.208; Sayyid Qutb, al-Mustaqbal li hadha al-Din [the Future is for this Religion] (place of publication not stated: Dar al-Shruq, n.d.), p.20; al-Qarad āwi (note 15), pp.33,101. 17. al-Wahidi an-Naisaburi and Abu al-Hassan Ali Ibn Ahmad, Reasons and Occasions of Revelation of the Holy Koran, trans. Adnan Salloum (Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al- Ilmiya, 1999), p.110. 18. al-Qaradāwi (note 15), p.108. am []arc am []arc am ][rac am []acr u[m ]arc m i[]acr am []arc am []arc am []arc Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 58 S. Kirmanj 19. Ibid., p.174. 20. Koran (4:58–9), the translated version of the Koran used in this paper is by Muhammad Habib Shakir, available at: http://www.islamonline.net/surah/english/index.asp (last accessed 23 July 2007). 21. al-Qaradāwi (note 15), p.15 22. Koran (4:59). 23. Mawdudi (note 6), p.223; al-Qaradāwi (note 15), p.9; Zedan (note 15), p.14. 24. Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, “Islam can Promote Human Rights Across the Globe”, Islamic Voices, 1509/189, September 2002, available at: http://www.islamicvoice.com/september.2002/ view.htm#icp (last accessed 23 July 2007). 25. Koran (16:92). 26. Yūsuf al-Qaradāwi, al-Islam wal al- Ilmaniyya wajhan li-wajih (Islam and Secularism: Face to Face) (Cairo: Dar al-Sahwa Lil-Nashir, 1987), p.81. 27. Koran (16:89). 28. Sayyid Abul A la Mawdudi interpretation of the Koran available at: http://www.islamonline.net/surah/english/quran1.shtml (last accessed 15 June 2007). 29. See Qutb (note 7), pp.68–73. 30. al-Qaradāwi (note 26), p.154,128. 31. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought; the Basic Concepts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), p.66; Mehran Tamadonfar, “Islam, Law, and Political Control”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40/2 (2001), pp.205–19. 32. Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Naqid al-Khitab al-Dini (Critic of the Religious Discourse) (Cairo: Seena lilNashir, 1992), p.84. 33. al-Qaradāwi (note 15), p.83. 34. Ahadith al-Qudsiyyah (Divine Narratives), trans. Abdul Khaliq Kazi and Alan B. Day (USA: Dar alKitab al-Arabi, n.d.). 35. al-Bannā (note 15), pp.143–4; al-Qaradāwi (note 15), pp.9, 99. 36. al-Qaradāwi (note 15), pp.15–16. 37. al-Bukhari (810–70) is a compiler of the most famous of the collections of the Prophetic Sayings. It is a careful selection of about 7000 Sayings out of 600,000 Sayings. 38. Y ūsuf al-Qaradāwi, al-Hukuma fi al-Islam: Diniyya am Madaniya [Government in Islam: Religious or Civil] (2003), available at: http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnlineArabic-Ask_Scholar/FatwaA/FatwaA&cid=1122528621758 (last accessed 20 July 2007). 39. al-Qaradāwi (note 26), p.137. 40. Watt (note 31), p.31. 41. Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, ‘The necessity of Islamic government’, in Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (eds) Contemporary Debates in Islam: an Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), p.252. 42. al-Bannā (note 15), p.207; al-Qaradāwi (note 15), p.17. 43. Dr Abu Ameenah Bilal Philips, Janaiz (Death), available at: http://www.bilalphilips.com/ bilal_pages.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=325 (last accessed 24 July 2007). 44. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah; An Introduction to History, 2nd edn, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp.161–2. 45. al-Qaradāwi (note 15), p.35. 46. Koran (6:107); Koran (10:108). 47. Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought from the Prophet to the Present (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), pp.13–4. 48. For the full version of the Medina Pact see I. Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad, trans. A. Guillaume (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp.231–3. Numbering added, available at: http:// www.constitution.org/cons/medina/con_medina.txt (last accessed 24 July 2007). 49. Khan (note 15); Zedan (note 15); al-Qaradāwi (note 15). 50. Koran (10:47). 51. John L. Esposito, The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, Vol. 4 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.268. 52. Italics by the author. 53. Koran (9:118). 54. See (note 48) articles 37, 38, 39, 43 and 44. 55. Watt (note 31), p.8. 56. Rachid Ghannouchi, “Participation in non-Islamic Government”, in Charles Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam; A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.93. am []arc am []arc u[m ]arc am []acr am []arc am []arc am []arc am []arc am []arc u[m ]arc am []arc am []arc am []arc am []arc am []arc am []arc Downloaded By: [Kirmanj, Sherko] At: 23:24 30 March 2008 Islam, Politics and Government 59 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. Watt (note 31), p.13–14. Ibid., p.64. al-Qarad āwi (note 15), p.7. Black (note 47), p.13. al-Qaradāwi (note 26), p.154. Sayyid Abul A la Mawdudi, A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam, trans. al-Ash ari (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2002), p.42. Black (note 47), p.12. Koran (4:59). al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya [The Ordinances of Government], available at: http:// 216.176.51.23/ver2/library/BooksCategory.php?idfrom=&idto=&bk_no=40&ID=1&lang=A (last accessed 14 July 2007); also see Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.86. Black (note 47), p.94–5. Lambton (note 65), p.120. Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyasa al-Shar iyya fi Islah al-Ra i wa al-Ra iyya [Shar ı̄ a Governance in Reformation of the Ruler and the Subject], available at: http://arabic.islamicweb.com/Books/ taimiya.asp?book=8 p.14; see also Lambton (note 65), p.150. Tibi (note 2), p.171. Ziauddin Sardar, Islam in the Modern World (2003), available at: http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/ 8.30/relrpt/stories/s928258.htm (last accessed 10 June 2007). See Mahmood Ramiz Gailan, The Political Process and the Future of the Muslim World (Kuala Lumpur: al-Hilal Publishing, 2000), p.19. Lyman Tower Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies, 11 edn (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace, 1999), pp.222–9) For all verses see Koranic Verses revealed in Medina: (2:143), (2:151), (3:20), (3:144), (3:159), (4:64), (4:105), (5:42), (5:67), (5:92), (5:99), (13:7), (13:40), (22:49), (22:68–9), (24:51), (24:54), (46:9), (48:8) and (64:12), and Verses revealed in Mecca: (6:48), (6:66), (6:90), (6:107), (7:2), (7:188), (10:108), (11:2), (11:12), (15:89), (16:35), (16:82), (17:54), (17:105), (18:56), (21:107), (25:56–7), (27:92), (29:18), (29:50), (34:28), (35:24), (36:3-6), (36:17), (39:41), (42:6), (42:48), (46:9), (50:45), (51:50–51), (67:26) and (88:21–6). al-Raziq (note 14), p.61. See the Medina Pact (note 48). Yūsuf al-Qaradāwi, al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya: wa Hmum al-Watan al-Arabi wal Islami, (the place of publishing and the publisher are not stated, 1988), p.68; Mawdudi (note 62) p.16; Qutb, (7), p.32. am []acr am []arc m i[]acr u[m ]acr am ][ arc