Marriage and Meaning

Marriage and Meaning Anthony McCarthy Even concubinage has been corrupted: - by marriage. Friedrich Nietzsche Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Classics, 1990) #123, p. 98. The degree and kind of a man’s sexuality reaches up into the topmost summit of his spirit. Friedrich Nietzsche Ibid., #75, p. 92. The anthropologist Mary Douglas, in her book Natural Symbols, boldly states: The social body constrains the way the physical body is perceived. The physical experience of the body, always modified by the social categories through which it is known, sustains a particular view of society. There is a continual exchange of meanings between the two kinds of bodily experience so that each reinforces the categories of the other. As a result of this interaction the body itself is a highly restricted medium of expression. The forms it adopts in movement and repose express social pressures in manifold ways. The care that is given to it, in grooming, feeding and therapy, the theories about what it needs in the way of sleep and exercise, about the stages it should go through, the pains it can stand, its span of life, all the cultural categories in which it is perceived, must correlate closely with the categories in which society is seen in so far as these also draw upon the same culturally processed idea of the body. Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (London: Routledge Classics, 1996), p.72. For reflections on the relationship between radical social changes in the West and the ‘reinvented body’, see Hervé Juvin, The Coming of the Body, translated by John Howe (London: Verso, 2010) and the review by Perry Anderson, “The World Made Flesh”, New Left Review 39 (May-June 2006), 132-137. I quote this at length because it is illuminative in its suggestion of the importance of social institutions in constraining or encouraging bodily expression and how the body and the functions of the body are viewed. For Douglas is interested in the feedback loop between social structures and beliefs about bodies and their functions/meanings. Douglas goes on approvingly to summarise Marcel Mauss, stating that, “Every kind of action carries the imprint of learning, from feeding to washing, from repose to movement and above all sex. Nothing is more essentially transmitted by a social process of learning than sexual behaviour and this, of course, is closely related to morality” (my emphasis). Ibid. This is presumably also true of transgressions which themselves presuppose a societal framework of understanding. Mauss did not give an argument for his claim that “nothing is more essentially transmitted by a social process of learning than sexual behaviour.” Whatever the truth of this, it is uncontroversially the case that the learning of bodily techniques, including sex, takes place within a general context of learning symbolic systems. Douglas gives the following plausible analysis of Mauss’s denial that there is no such thing as ‘natural’ behaviour: “It falsely poses the relation between nature and culture. Here I seek to identify a natural tendency to express situations of a certain kind in appropriate bodily style. Insofar as it is obeyed universally in all cultures, the tendency is natural. It is generated in response to a perceived social situation, but the latter always comes clothed in its local history and culture. Therefore the natural expression is culturally determined.”p.76. What Mauss importantly doesn’t say here is that some social norms with regard to the body are bad for people’s health, or their flourishing in general, while others are good. Social input to bodily behaviour can promote or combat flourishing outside as well as inside the sexual ambit - a point I will return to later. Suffice it to say that we learn to speak via society, but both the good of society and the good of our health dictate what are better and worse ways of using our voice-box, the proper use of which is about more than instinct. Thus we learn how to perform bodily actions, but hopefully we learn how to perform them right. Mauss is generally taken by Douglas as saying that there is no ‘natural’ behaviour, for all actions carry the imprint of some sort of learning (note that by ‘natural’ here is meant not what relates immediately to ‘natural law’ and human flourishing but something more akin to ‘instinctive’, in some very basic sense). While we might see certain ‘instincts’ as ‘drives’ towards the good, they are pre-rational - though their operation will in practice normally presuppose some learning. Roger Scruton in discussing homo faber notes, apparently in accordance with what Douglas and Mauss suppose regarding ‘nature’, that Sexual desire is a social artefact. Like language and like morality, it is born from social relations between human beings, and adds to those relations a structure and firmness of its own. It does not follow from this, however, that sexual desire is ‘merely conventional’, or not a part of human ‘nature’. For some artefacts are natural to human beings: in particular, all those which stem directly from social existence and which form the basis for the construction of personality. We could indeed imagine a human being ‘outside society’, but this homo faber would be, not a natural phenomenon, but a freak – a creature in whom the normal human potential had been frozen or destroyed…Sexual desire is as natural an artefact as the human person. There could, perhaps, be human beings without this response. But the collective endeavour which paints our face on the blank of nature also generates desire, as one of the fundamental links between embodied persons…There is no normal human sexual development which avoids the predicament of desire, and no normal development of a person which avoids the acquisition of ‘gender’. Persons are essentially desirous, and desire essentially personal. Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation (London: Continuum, 2006) pp. 348-9. Clearly Scruton in saying that desire is socially constructed is not just relying on the point that desire needs an object. For Scruton on desire (including what constitutes ‘normal’ desire) and intentional objects see pp. 59-138. His fascinating account (building on work by Thomas Nagel and Jean-Paul Sartre, though taking it in a very different direction) focuses attention not on the procreative and non-procreative distinction, but rather on the nuptial and non-nuptial (or the personal/impersonal) distinction. For Scruton emphasis on the reproductive nature of the act is a further point, not so much about the act as about its social context (he is dismissive of Anscombe’s arguments against contraception (p. 287)). But then, why not say that the social context, in ‘constructivist’ style (see below), informs the act itself, together with its biological meaning? In referring to how some artefacts are ‘natural’ to human beings what Scruton says here could be compatible with the view that the body itself bears signs of the ‘natural’ functions and flourishing which will involve learning and social interaction for their fruition. Moreover, social functions which truly ‘embody’ human flourishing are ‘natural’ in a way that goes beyond mere social convention, though not, of course, in a way that denies the importance of such conventions – any more than the idea of essence does. Meaning as social construct Gareth Moore, in making use of Douglas and Mauss, takes what they say about social structures to argue for a much more radical position. He writes initially: Sexual nature is a social and cultural matter, not merely biological; we can expect it to have all the variety we find in social matters. Gareth Moore, A Question of Truth: Christianity and Homosexuality (London: Continuum, 2003), p. 211. Later he extends the thought, claiming that: Sexual acts are indeed capable of bearing meaning. But meaning is a human affair, a result of human social structures and of human conventions. To try to ground the meaning of sexual activity in the creative activity of God is to make a fundamental mistake. Ibid., p. 280. Moore also writes, in criticising the work of Germain Grisez and Livio Melina, “For them, the putative objective meaning of sexual activity is supposed to be inherent in it, independent of the existence of any community which understands sexual activity to have that meaning…Meanings do not inhere in things, independently of communities. Meanings are about human understanding and human communication, and that depends on there being a community.” (p. 279). Here, Moore does not in any way anchor such community interpretations of meaning in anything other than the views of the community, thus making it impossible to assess the accuracy/veracity of any particular interpretation of meaning (e.g. a community which believed that the ‘real’ meaning of sexual activity was to express contempt for another could in no sense be said to be wrong about that meaning, and no reason concerning the nature and purpose of sexual activity could be given to rebut such a view). This kind of approach is also found in Stanley Fish’s writings on ‘interpretive communities’ in the context of literary criticism, which fail to answer the question of where such communities derive their meanings from, not least because the ‘text’ has effectively disappeared. This leads to the absurd idea, expressed by Fish, that “When you think a view wrong, you don’t see what is seen by those who think it right” so that “to say of an assertion that it is ‘not true’ is to say that you don’t understand it.” As J.L.A. Garcia points out, “Of course, doxastically to accept proposition P (e.g. to “think it right”) commits me to rejecting (as “not true”) its contradictory proposition not-P, even as understanding an assertion of P is impossible unless I would understand an assertion of not-P. So, Fish’s claim, if true, would render impossible all understanding and belief. I admit I do not see what Fish sees in his claim, but I think that is because what he sees is not there.” J.L.A. Garcia, “Liberal Theory, Human Freedom, and the Politics of Sexual Morality”, in Paul J. Weithman (ed.), Religion and Contemporary Liberalism (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), pp. 232-3 fn37. This a priori denial of natural meaning, for that is what it is, comes at a very high price. If human social structures and conventions are not in any way bound by ‘natural meanings’ (or the “creative activity of God”) and are more like words (a comparison Moore makes In making the comparison Moore observes, “Our own primitive sexual values, the values that we have absorbed from our infancy like our native language, can also seem natural, obvious, a matter of course. And so they are, to us. But since sense of the natural is again a result of socialization, nature is a social construct.” Op.cit., p. 211. This, however, does not follow: our sense of what is good or bad for our health is also a result of socialization, but responds nonetheless to a real, physically-grounded state of affairs which we ignore at our peril. Moreover, in choosing language as his example Moore would need to accommodate the findings of Noam Chomsky on Universal Grammar, suggestive of, at least, a highly ‘natural’ grounding for language itself, regardless of what particular form it takes (see e.g. Language and Mind 3rd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)). ) then it is difficult to see why Moore appears to take it as a given that sex has a biological meaning at all, even if not ‘merely’ so. Why assume that a particular society with particular social structures and human conventions could not dislodge this ‘imposed meaning’, so that bodily ‘functioning’ was seen as inapplicable to ‘sex’ in this new sense? If Moore were correct he would need to explain why he (presumably) takes it as a given that human organisms themselves with their overall function of coordinated life are not merely socially constructed, though any sub-functions or functioning(s) of the organism simply must be socially constructed. Moore’s denial of ‘natural meaning’ entails, he assumes, that all meaning is ‘socially constructed’. He would also need to show that there is no such thing as ‘fitness’ such that, for example, a social convention that women breast-feed their babies as an expression of maternal care and bonding was no more or less ‘fitted’ to the activity than a social convention that women breast-feed their babies as a completely alienating activity expressive of hatred toward the baby. For Douglas, the body and the social body interact, and while she stresses the social body’s ‘imprint’ of learning, she is not thereby denying the essentially symbiotic relationship. Indeed she says, “The physical body can have a universal meaning only as a system which responds to the social system, expressing it as a system…The two bodies are the self and society: sometimes they are so near as to be almost merged; sometimes they are far apart.” Douglas, p.91. For Moore it appears that the latter is entirely determinative of the ‘nature’ of the former. So he can say, with regard to the significance of sex, “Just as the meanings of words change over time in the same society, as people come to use words in changing ways, so the meanings of human acts can change with changing institutions and habits…Sometimes people who find certain words and symbols emblematic of a community they find oppressive or benighted deliberately set out to change the way they are used, or urge that they be abandoned altogether. Sex is no exception to this common phenomenon.” Moore, p.278. Instructive for thinking about this area is C.S. Peirce’s semiology, especially his distinction between ‘icons’ (which actually resemble the things they signify) and symbols (which are purely conventional). The terminology may sound slightly odd to modern ears because in general usage ‘symbol’ is often used to mean what Peirce calls ‘icon’, but the distinction is a potent one (the third in the trio is ‘index’ – smoke is an index of fire, the word ‘round’ is a symbol of circular things, without being circular, marriage is an icon of Christ and the Church in the belief of Christians). The semiology of sex is ‘iconic’ and thus different from the conventional semiology of language. On this account, the physical structure of a sexual act is irrelevant in helping to determine its goodness, at least insofar as goodness is bound up with what is ‘natural’ in some sense for human beings. The most Moore might say is that sex is ‘natural’ only insofar as it recognises certain social conventions, such that the word ‘natural’ is no longer connected to any fixed idea of human nature/essence. For convincing arguments against anti-essentialism see David S. Oderberg, Real Essentialism (New York: Routledge, 2007). For an example of a denial of the idea of a ‘fixed’ human nature see Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, translated by Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 1989). Alexander Pruss has pointed out that the view that there are no inherent meanings to sexual activity is more common than the view that physical objects are mere social constructs. The latter view is rare because it seems obvious that the physical provides our paradigm of objectivity. This remains true, I think, even if we follow Noam Chomsky in holding that, “There is no longer any definite conception of body. Rather, the material world is whatever we discover it to be, with whatever properties it must be assumed to have for the purposes of explanatory theory. Any intelligible theory that offers genuine explanations and that can be assimilated to the core notions of physics becomes part of the theory of the material world, part of our account of body. If we have such a theory in some domain, we seek to assimilate it to the core notions of physics, perhaps modifying these notions as we carry out this enterprise.” Language and Problems of Knowledge: The Managua Lectures (Cambridge MA.: The MIT Press, 1988), p.144. See also Chomsky’s “Language and Nature”, collected in Power and Prospects: Reflections on human nature and the social order (Boston, MA.: South End Press, 1996), pp.31-55. An Aristotelian conception of formal and final causes and a focus on immanent teleology may provide a way out of this problem (see for example Edward Feser, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism (South Bend, Indiana: St Augustine’s Press, 2008). Either way, Pruss’s point holds. In fact, the analogy put forward is not as close as it might be, as what needs to be compared is the social construction of the meaning of sexual activity with the social construction of the meaning of physical objects. Whatever one might say about this, when it comes to sex it is undeniable that it is, fundamentally, about the physical/bodily, the biological and teleological/functional, which is the basis for its real, objective importance. It is no accident that handshakes cannot function as sex and we cannot just decide to make them do so. Handshakes could, of course, become ‘sexual’ (if not ‘sex’ in any true unitive sense) if they were used as a source of sexual pleasure. However, this itself would involve fragments of sexual ‘function’ such as orgasm (see footnote 33). Species of act Perhaps one attraction of a more restricted version of Moore’s view (other than, for sexual revolutionaries, its utility in undermining traditional sexual morality Aldous Huxley reminisced, “The liberation we desired was simultaneously liberation from a certain political and economic system and liberation from a certain system of morality. We objected to the morality because it interfered with our sexual freedom; we objected to the political and economic system because it was unjust. The supporters of these systems claimed that in some way they embodied the meaning (a Christian meaning, they insisted) of the world. There was one admirably simple method of confuting these people and at the same time justifying ourselves in our political and erotic revolt: we could deny that the world had any meaning whatsoever.” Ends and Means: An Inquiry into the Nature of Ideals and into the Methods Employed for their Realization (London: Chatto and Windus, 1937), p. 273.) is that certain chosen physical actions (e.g. picking up a daisy) are morally indifferent as such. There is nothing about the physical structure here that helps us to judge whether the act of picking the daisy is morally good or bad. G.E.M. Anscombe makes the point, reflecting on marriage and its connection with the fact that human sex concerns the transmission of human life, that, “There is no such thing as a casual, non significant sexual act; everyone knows this. Contrast sex with eating – you’re strolling along a lane, you see a mushroom on a bank as you pass by, you know about mushrooms, you pick it and eat it quite casually – sex is never like that. That’s why virtue in connection with eating is basically a matter only of the pattern of one’s eating habits. But virtue in sex – chastity – is not only a matter of such a pattern, that is of its role in a pair of lives. A single sexual action can be bad even without regard to its context, its further intentions and motives.” “Contraception and Chastity”, in The Human World 2 (1972), 24. In responding to Anscombe’s article, Bernard Williams and Michael Tanner object that Anscombe “seems to endorse [the idea] that if you treat some activity lightly on certain occasions, then you are very likely to adopt a frivolous attitude towards it in general”. This, they add, is “simply absurd dogma” (Correspondence and Comments, The Human World 2 (1972), 47). The matter is, I would argue, best resolved by reflection on the meaning of marriage and its relation to the sexual act, a point Anscombe flags up which is not focussed on by Williams and Tanner in their reply. That judgement will depend upon much wider consideration of situations, of the actor’s further intentions, role in society etc. Moore might simply extend this to sexual acts and say that these acts in themselves have no ‘meaning’ and therefore the intrinsic physical structure of any particular sexual act The moral importance of certain chosen physical structures, and the ‘sexual’ nature of these structures in themselves, is seemingly denied by the Catholic philosopher/theologian Germain Grisez when he writes, “While self-stimulation to obtain a semen sample is physically the same as any other masturbation, it is morally different” (because the aim is not to experience orgasm). Grisez adds, however, that “obtaining a semen sample in this way is a grave matter, for it is a proximate occasion of grave sin (the more or less probable sexual fantasy and willing of the experienced sexual satisfaction”). The Way of the Lord Jesus Vol. 2: Living a Christian Life (Quincy, IL.: Franciscan Press, 1993) p. 648 fn187. This passage makes clear that Grisez does not locate the wrongness of certain kinds of solitary sexual activity in physical structures intended by the agent – whatever the further intention - but rather in what he presumes to be the likely willed experience of certain sexual fantasies and pleasures. Detaching this condemnation from any clear account of what is wrong ‘in the act itself’ makes it hard to see why anyone should accept it: if it is wrong to seek the function of sexual pleasure outside its proper holistic context, why would it not be wrong in principle to seek another sexual function such as ejaculation outside this context? In contrast, locating the wrong in the misuse of a natural faculty helps explain why taking deliberate pleasure in solitary activity might be part of the wrong of such ‘truncated’ activity, as well as accounting for the wrongness of sexual acts which have no accompanying pleasure or fantasy, but nonetheless share functional features in common with acts which do. is irrelevant, or at least indeterminative, in judging whether it is morally choice-worthy. In examining Aquinas’s discussions of sexual ethics and the moral objects of acts Stephen L. Brock makes the following point about the role of (chosen) physical structures in moral evaluation: [I]n some cases the condition of the object that constitutes an act’s natural or physical kind constitutes a determinate moral kind as well. Sometimes it is indeed sufficient to know that someone performed a certain kind of physical act voluntarily, in order to ascribe to him an action of a definite moral quality. A clear example, in Thomas, is that of sexual acts other than heterosexual copulation, the acts “contra naturam”. The relation of such acts to the sexual power differs from that of heterosexual copulation. They differ in physical kind. What gives them this difference also gives them a different relation to reason. According to reason, the good kind of sexual act is the marital act. There are also bad kinds of heterosexual copulation – for instance simple fornication – which is bad just because the object is not the agent’s spouse. This of course is not a physical condition. Stephen L. Brock, “Veritatis Splendor 78, St Thomas and (Not Merely) Physical Objects of Moral Acts”, Nova et Vetera, English Edition, 6.1 (2008), 61-62. One way in which acts that are contra naturam (e.g. sodomy) can be distinguished from normal fornication is described by the Thomist scholar Lawrence Dewan, O.P. “Thomas argues, on the basis of teleology, that every emission of seed that takes place in such a way that generation cannot result or suitably result is against a good of the human being. Thus, if this is purposely done, it is a sin. He notes first the case of sins against nature (such as contraception). He goes on to take the case of an emission of seed that takes place in such a fashion that generation can indeed follow, but suitable education is impeded.” Summa Contra Gentiles III, c. 122 (Pera, ed., 2955) makes it clear that “the inordinate emission of seed opposes [repugnat] the good of the nature, which is the preservation of the species.” Dewan comments on this, “the whole judgement is based on the justice involved in the common good of humanity and the particular good of individuals who may be born in unsuitable circumstances for wholesome human life”. The serious wrongness of sins against nature (as opposed to e.g. the sexual sin of normal fornication/adultery), is explained by Aquinas as follows: “It is to be said that in any domain the corruption of the principle on which all else depends is what is worst. Now, the principles of reason are those things which are in function of nature; for reason, those things being presupposed which are determined by nature, disposes the others in the way that agrees (with nature). And this is apparent both in speculative and in practical (matters). And thus, just as in speculative matters error concerning those things knowledge of which is naturally implanted in man is most serious and most unseemly, so also in matters of action to act against what is determined in function of nature is most serious and unseemly. Therefore, since in sins which are against nature a man transgresses that which is determined in function of nature regarding sexual activity, hence it is that in such matter this sin is most serious” (Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154, a. 12 (2185b12-30)), cit. Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes”, The Thomist 66 (2002), 304-306). One difficulty with the account of ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ acts in Aquinas is that it locates the perversion of the function of sexual activity primarily in the immediate physical/biological species of the act rather than in the telos of sexual activity insofar as it relates to the end of the proper nurturing and education of biological offspring. It is not immediately clear why the former should take priority over the latter. One way in which we might make sense of the distinction is to reflect on how a society which normalises sodomy is one which is far more likely (than, say, a merely heavily adulterous society) to lose sight of the fact that sexual organs/activity have any telos at all. Marriage as standard For Aquinas, it is marriage which is that standard with respect to which sexual activity is judged to be good or not, a standard that applies to all human beings by virtue of their rational nature. See the list of references to Aquinas on this in John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 143-154. See also the exposition of Aquinas (and to some extent Aristotle) in Kevin L. Flannery, “Marriage, Mental Handicap, and Sexuality”, Studies in Christian Ethics 17.2 (2004), 11-26. Marriage is a social institution, and it is this institution which makes sexual activity reasonable activity. While we can talk of a function at a physical level (the penis is ‘for’ ejaculating semen; the voice box is ‘for’ emitting sound) we can also talk of the social functions these serve in the context of human flourishing at both the personal and societal (common good) level, in order for them to be successfully used (e.g. the penis is ‘for’ ejaculating semen in the context of a sexual act celebrating the institution that is marriage for the good of the couple and offspring; the voice box is ‘for’ emitting sound in order that a person may communicate e.g. by making true statements about the world etc.). In other words, there is a chain or hierarchy of purposes, and the activity isn’t reasonable unless in ascending the hierarchy you reach the right kind of purpose to justify that kind of action. What is the institution of natural marriage and why is such an institution required by the common good? What is the relationship between the marital act and the institution of marriage? How can some (sexual) acts be said to ‘damage’ the institution of marriage? In exploring these questions, I hope to show why the achievement of certain goods depends upon a) restricting certain acts uniquely capable of realising those goods to the institution of natural marriage and b) recognising that marital acts occupy a privileged place within marriage. In order to go some way to achieving these goals it is appropriate to reflect on a theologically-grounded view of marriage which nevertheless makes room for a view about the natural goodness of marriage. Sacramental marriage   The Catholic Church holds that marriage, as an arrangement of nature, is of Divine origin. According to the Council of Trent, Christ brought marriage, ordained and blessed by God, to the original ideal of indissoluble monogamous marriage (Matthew 19. 3-11) and elevated it to the dignity of a sacrament. The essential properties of a sacramental marriage i.e. a marriage between two baptised persons are unity, monogamy, and indissolubility. Such properties serve the purpose of marriage, the generation and rearing of offspring and the mutual love and unity of the spouses. On this understanding, the rightness of monogamy is established as it and it alone guarantees the fulfilling of the purposes of marriage and is a faithful image of Christ’s everlasting union with His Church. Aquinas, supporting this understanding, adumbrates the requirements and goods of sacramental marriage. “Now the figure must correspond to the reality which it signifies. But the union of Christ with His Church is one of one bridegroom with one bride to be kept forever. For, of the Church it is said, One is my beloved, my perfect one. Nor ever shall Christ be parted from His Church for so He says Himself, ‘Lo, I am with you, even unto the end of the world.’ And so the Apostle, ‘We shall be forever with the Lord.’” Matrimony therefore, as a sacrament of the Church, must be of one husband with one wife to continue without separation. This is what Aquinas means by the faith whereby husband and wife are bound to one another. The Church holds that there are three goods of sacramental marriage: offspring (proles), to be reared and educated to the worship of God, faith (fides) whereby one husband is tied to one wife, and sacramental signification by the indivisible union of the matrimonial connection, making it a sacred sign of the union of Christ with His Church.   Natural marriage While these reflections apply to Christian marriage, it is also true that the Church has pronounced that natural marriage; that is, marriage between the baptised and unbaptised, or between two unbaptised persons, is intrinsically indissoluble due to God’s ordinance made at the institution of marriage. So even though natural marriage allows for extraordinary exceptions to indissolubility, it is not said to be dissoluble through civil law. On this understanding, the institution of marriage is seen qua institution as a direct creation of God and therefore as having a special moral status. The Church’s understanding of so-called natural marriage and the proposition that the institution is of directly Divine origin plays a definite role in normative reasoning about sexual ethics and marriage. Someone holding to the Divine Origin (DO) account is bound to hold that it cannot be right to alter fundamentally by mere human fiat an institution so founded. However, while the DO of the institution might only be known through Revelation perceived with the eyes of faith, it does not follow that the obligations flowing from marriage are obligations purely religious. As Joseph Boyle, to whom this analysis owes much, has pointed out, “the obligations of marriage are moral obligations, even if the DO can only be known by religious belief. For institutions generally create obligations, and they do so not primarily in virtue of their origins but in virtue of their function in social life. When institutions are morally legitimate, that is, compatible with relevant moral norms, the obligations they create are genuine moral obligations.” Joseph Boyle, “Marriage Is an Institution Created by God”, in Lawrence P. Schrenk (ed.), The Ethics of Having Children: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, LXIII (1990), 2-16.   On Boyle’s understanding, insofar as the institution has a morally legitimate role in society it can create moral obligations regardless of belief in the DO model. Those who do not accept the DO account will not see themselves as bound by additional religious obligations not to tamper with the institution but would still be bound from tampering with the institution by other moral norms governing marital relations and procreation. It is important to note here that marriage, in the understanding of the Church, as expressed in the Catechism of the Council of Trent and the Catechism of the Catholic Church and the 1983 Code of Canon Law, is broadly held as a covenant “by which a man and a woman establish between themselves a partnership of the whole of life.” Kevin Flannery, in discussing this passage in the context of mentally disabled people, tells us, “This mature joining of interests is what marriage is. This nature does not alter to conform to the condition of the potential spouses; rather, the potential spouses choose it as something that exists independently of whether they choose it – or are capable of choosing it – or not.” “Marriage, Mental Handicap, and Sexuality”, Studies in Christian Ethics 17. 2 (2004), 23. The literary critic Terry Eagleton, in discussing marriage in Shakespeare's comedies, describes sexual desire as finding its true (natural) form in that institution (a point argued for at great length by Roger Scruton in his Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation): “Marriage is not an arbitrary force which coercively hems in desire, but reveals its very inward structure - what desire, if only it had known, had wanted all the time. When you discover your appropriate marriage partner you can look back, rewrite your autobiography and recognize that all your previously coveted objects were in fact treacherous, displaced parodies of the real thing, shadows of the true substance...Marriage is natural, in the sense of being an outward sign or social role which expresses your authentic inward being, as opposed to those deceitful idioms which belie it. It is the true language of the erotic self, the point at which spontaneity of individual feeling and the stability of public institutions harmoniously interlock. It is at once a free personal choice and impersonal bond, ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ together, an exchange of bodies which becomes the medium of the fullest mutuality of minds.” William Shakespeare (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 20-21. Such thinking complements well what I have tried to argue in this paper, though my focus has been more on the procreative rationale for the institution.   Clearly, in the world in which we live, arrangements called marital are many and varied and, as a descriptive matter, it looks as though marriage is not an institution, but rather is a set of similar institutions which have Wittgenstein-style family resemblances to one another. As a descriptive matter it also seems that the institution, like other institutions, can be redefined, altered, tampered with.   However, with the DO picture it seems we are talking about an institution different from other institutions, and indeed, other quasi-marital institutions. The Catholic Church holds that that marriage is a natural institution This usage is generally taken to require indissolubility. However, it should be noted that writers such as Robert Bellarmine and Francisco Suarez held that the prohibition of divorce was a divine and not a natural precept., and insofar as it is a matter of morality, a matter of natural law as well as participation in Divine law. Boyle draws an analogy by citing the Ten Commandments (including those not related to marriage) which are naturally known as well as divinely handed down. Thus the DO interpretation of marriage appears to include a moral and not only religious prohibition of tampering with the form of marriage, such that the form cannot be tampered with without violating moral norms applicable to anyone.   If marriage is seen primarily as a matter of natural law, we need to identify the basis for criticising those forms of marriage which violate the set of moral norms which provide for a fixed form of marriage. On this view, theology is not most basic in understanding the foundational moral justification of natural marriage. Rather, there must be something about the very character of natural marriage which generates moral obligations which are themselves morally necessary.   Role of marriage What might be the philosophical justification for a moral prohibition on tampering with a particular form of marriage? Many will simply deny that marriage is an institution in any sense radically different from other human institutions – bearing in mind that institutions regardless of their origin can in certain circumstances impose moral obligations. An institution, including a conventionally-established institution, can have a telos, just as a natural substance does. Robert Sokolowski puts it well: “Artifacts and institutions, things brought about by human making and agreements, have essences and ends. It is not the case that only natural substances have a telos. Consider an institution such as an art museum. Its telos is to make works of art available for public viewing, and part of this activity will be the acquisition and preservation of such works…It is interesting and important to note that even though artifacts and institutions are brought about by human beings to serve our purposes and ends, we cannot change what they are…even as instrumental beings, they have their own nature or essence or ends…We may have brought them into being, but they do not become our purposes. They retain their own ends and we have to subordinate ourselves to them. To claim that institutions and artifacts have no definition, and they could be changed at will, would mean they could not be ruined or destroyed by us. Any change would just be a redefinition, carried out by us, who would have freely defined the thing in question in the first place.” Robert Sokolowski, “What is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural Ends?”, The Thomist 68 (2004), 510-511. Given that the essence is that which is the ‘reason for the existence’ of the institution, then if it is to remain the institution it is it must keep its essence. What is said here refers to ‘humanly created’ rather than ‘natural’ institutions, but applies a fortiori to the latter which are in some sense ‘basic’ as regards human flourishing. William Godwin, in his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, wrote, “The institution of marriage is a system of fraud…marriage is an affair of property, and the worst of all properties. So long as two human beings are forbidden by positive institutions to follow the dictates of their own mind, prejudice is alive and vigorous. So long as I seek to engross one woman to myself, and to prohibit my neighbour from proving his superior desert and reaping the fruits of it, I am guilty of the most odious of monopolies.” Quoted in Williams St Clair, The Godwins and the Shelleys: The Biography of a Family (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,1989), p. 81. Godwin supplies a whole battery of reasons as to why marriage fosters cowardice and unhappiness. But a central concern of his, and of others who take a less dim view of marriage, is the question why, if marriage is simply dealing with sexual activity among people, it requires any socially prominent institution at all?   One obvious answer is that sexual intercourse of a generative kind can cause, or help to cause, babies and, as Boyle points out, there are compelling moral arguments for establishing socially regulated institutions for the procreation and raising of children. It is this connection to having children which requires that there be marital institutions and that they be socially established and regulated. Furthermore, procreation and the raising of children are not a purely private concern of parents but part of the common good of society. Another way of putting it would be that there are specific human goods which can only be secured through (or in) certain institutions, and that there are requirements of practical reasonableness that only those institutions can satisfy.   So the claim of what might be called the ‘traditional moralist’ is that the institution of natural marriage is necessary in order to honour a natural moral precept. The Kantian philosopher Alan Donagan suggests the following general moral consideration; namely that “Those who voluntarily enter into sexual relations from which a child is born are reasonably held to fail to respect the child as a rational creature if they refuse to provide for its upbringing.” From this kind of consideration he tells us that the fundamental (Kantian) principle of morality yields a precept of responsibility: “It is impermissible for human beings to voluntarily become parents of a child and yet refuse to rear it to a stage of development at which it can independently take part in social life.” This precept presupposes that it is “impermissible for human beings voluntarily to become parents of a child they cannot rear.” Alan Donagan’s Theory of Morality (London: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p.102. Boyle (op.cit.) draws attention to this statement.   The rationale behind the precept is simply that in order for a child to lead a life befitting his or her dignity he or she will need protection, care, nourishment, education. On the traditional view, the form of marriage that is morally acceptable is one derived from a precept of parental responsibility by way of the specificatory premises about what is necessary for the rearing of a child until it can take part independently in social life. One of these premises is that a child’s upbringing and sense of security and identity is impaired unless the ultimate authorities in charge of him or her are the natural parents joined in a stable marital union. Certainly, where natural parents cannot assume this natural authority alternative arrangements, such as adoption, have to be made. But these are generally assumed to be unfortunate necessities, intrinsically inferior to a traditional family structure. They are also regarded this way by many adopted people themselves.   Quasi-marital arrangements On this basis some argue that there are institutional arrangements other than natural monogamous marriage which can fulfil the precept and not violate any moral norms. Both forms of polygamy – polygny and polyandry – might be suggested as alternative morally acceptable forms fulfilling the precept. However, when we reflect on our premises concerning what is necessary to raise a child well it appears that the upbringing of children will generally be impaired unless their parents, joined in stable marriage, are the ultimate authorities in charge of them. While two child-rearers are a ‘team’, three (or more) is an intrinsically unstable number, as there is always the likelihood that two will form a ‘team’ against the third. Moreover, the value of having important relationships that are fundamentally ‘given’ (i.e. not chosen at the relevant level) carries with it a social message about obligations to particular persons that do not rest entirely on our choice of those persons as they do in the often lesser obligations one might owe to ‘chosen’ friends and others.  It is good for people to have the security of ‘giveness’:  to begin this way is good for children and prepares them for later chosen relationships that may nonetheless be non-negotiable after they have been made. Even marriage is a ‘given’ once chosen, if it is seen as indissoluble.   Polyandry, by confusing the determination of paternity or making it difficult militates against the father carrying out a parental role and creates identity problems for the child. Polygyny, historically a much more common arrangement, as Aquinas suggests, reduces the position of wives to that of servants and more generally is incompatible with the basic moral equality of husbands and wives. Kant stresses this point when he writes, “the relation of the partners in a marriage is a relation of equality of possession, equality both in their possession of each other as persons (hence only in monogamy, since in polygamy the person who surrenders herself gains only a part of the man who gets her completely, and therefore makes herself into a mere thing), and also equality in their possession of material goods. As for these, the partners are still authorized to forgo the use of a part, though only by a separate contract.” Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) #26, p.63. Finally, ‘Wife-swapping’ is likely to undermine confidence in parentage, as it is more realistic to place a taboo on all non-monogamous activity than to confine such activity to specific periods in an attempt to make paternity clear. The benefits for the child in terms of security and identity in knowing who the parents are and that they have particular responsibility for him or her should not be underestimated. Scruton and others will further argue that such practices are ultimately not fulfilling of sexual desire (see footnote 22 above). D.H. Lawrence, a writer attuned to the mystery of sex, also sees sexual desire’s fulfilment in faithful marriage: “All the literature of the world shows how profound is the instinct for fidelity in both man and woman, how men and women hanker restlessly after the satisfaction of this instinct, and fret at their own inability to find the real mode of fidelity. The instinct of fidelity is perhaps the deepest instinct in the great complex we call sex. Where there is real sex there is the underlying passion for fidelity. And the prostitute knows this, because she is up against it. She can only keep men who have no real sex, the counterfeits: and these she despises. The men with real sex leave her inevitably, as unable to satisfy their real desire.” À Propos of Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Other Essays (Harmandsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961), pp.103-104.      Designing marriage The moral requirements for bringing new life into being clearly play a crucial role in determining what is or is not a desirable and morally upright family/sexual arrangement. I want to suggest a thought-experiment at this stage. Imagine trying to design an institution that would best protect the interests of children to be brought into the world. First, by making the conjugal/sexual/procreative act a necessary condition for a ‘complete’ marriage, a consummated marriage, one would tie the appropriate act for generating children to the appropriate institution for the upbringing of children. Secondly, by restricting that act to the institution one would protect children against the possibility of their coming to be outside of the appropriate institution for their upbringing. Such an institution would be justified on account of its potential relation to children, even if, by a natural accident, no children were ever born from a given marriage.   The question for a critic of this ‘designed’ institution would be, what is it that necessitates lifelong monogamy in marriage? Without the potential relationship to children it is difficult to see 1) why the arrangement should be life-long and 2) why the relationship should be restricted to two people. By privileging what I call the marital act within the institution such that the very definition and explanation for the institution depends upon it one protects the rationale for the institution. Substitutionary sex In the light of this understanding of the institution, what should we say of a couple who choose to engage in what are (at some level) experientially similar sexual experiences (e.g. oral sex, mutual masturbation, contracepted sex)? Here, the special connection between the conjugal act (if seen as a sexual act not relevantly morally dissimilar from other consensual sex acts) and the institution of marriage becomes difficult to sustain. Why, for example, ought a couple who choose these relevantly similar forms of sex get married?   We might formulate the thought in the following way: You ought to marry and/or favour the marriages of others because, among other things, you want, or should want, yourselves and/or others to engage in PS (consensual and intentional sex of a procreative and socially significant and valuable kind). Insofar as you engage in SS (substitutionary consensual sexual activity) you reduce the rationale for getting married in your own minds and in the minds of others. Of course the increased practice of SS may not lead to a decrease, in all cases, of PS. But the point here is that dispositions are affected in important ways such that the possible commitment to PS is rendered more difficult. While various kinds of non-sexual activity can undermine commitment to PS, SS is especially relevant and serious in undermining it because it is, like PS, sexual activity (see below). John Finnis has attempted to show how the practice of SS can undermine commitment to PS in terms of the effects of ‘conditional willing’ (“On Conditional Intention and Preparatory Intentions”, in Luke Gormally (ed.), Moral Truth and Moral Tradition: Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994), pp. 163-176 and “The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Historical Observations”, The American Journal of Jurisprudence 42 (1997), 97-134). There is, however, a need to distinguish what may be a ‘background’ willing of or liability to will morally impermissible actions – which certainly tells us something about the moral agent - and the question of how conditional or hypothetical willing affects the moral permissibility of the act intended here and now. Such conditional or hypothetical willing need not (though it might) affect the moral permissibility of the intended act, whereas it will always be relevant to assessing the moral character of the agent. So if a couple are intending to gain sexual experiences through a substitutionary ‘Substitutionary’ here encompasses activities which tend to engender in participants a lack of differentiation between that which needs to be distinguished (SS and PS) as well as activity which entirely ‘displaces’ PS both in terms of appreciation of its status and in the ability of practitioners to act upon that appreciation. form of sex they dilute or endanger their ability to appreciate the relevance of normal sexual intercourse (PS) to the institution of marriage. If the couple view their activity SS in a non-substitutionary way, i.e. as not relevantly similar to PS, James Alison, in his defence of the moral acceptability of homosexual activity, states that “if it were the case that the homosexual inclination is simply a thing that just is “like that”, and is not a disfiguration of anything, in that case the official characterisation [of the Catholic Church], and along with it the absolute prohibition, is false.” Alison does not make it clear here whether he is talking of homosexual inclination or of homosexual acts. If the former he clearly misrepresents the Church’s teaching. He later adds, “if it were the case that not all human beings are intrinsically heterosexual, then extending the opportunity to marry to same-sex couples would present no threat to the existence of heterosexual marriage, and there would be no logical reason why same-sex couples should be deprived of that opportunity.” Alison does, however, later add (footnote 4) that he does not “question that as a matter of common sense, human reproduction is intrinsically dependent on the biological complementarity of the sexes.” He says this despite the fact that he holds it possible that human beings are not ‘intrinsically heterosexual’. “Good-faith learning and the fear of God”, available at www.jamesalison.co.uk/pdf/eng17.pdf. The text originally appeared in a collection of essays edited by Julian Filichowski and Peter Stanford, Opening Up: Speaking Out in the Church (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2005). it becomes difficult to see why it should be restricted to the institution of marriage, any more than having a meal with someone not one’s spouse. But of course sexual pleasure is one of the things (along with structural features David S. Crawford has observed, of arguments similar to those of Alison (see previous footnote): “The identity of the person is no longer grounded in his or her masculinity or femininity; it is grounded in his or her “orientation”. This shift effectively demotes the meaning of sexual difference – the inescapable correspondence of the male and female bodies as such – to a sub-personal and purely material significance… In effect, it has placed the body outside of the person as such. In this way, the sexualised body has been drained of its intrinsic meaning and relationship to the person him-or herself. The person as such has been rendered essentially androgynous...Sexual acts in fact rely on the sexualized body for their very possibility. But the body is only sexual insofar as it is a male body or a female body. Moreover, the fact that a body is either male or female depends on the correlation of the male and female. After all, the structures of the male body would make little sense were it not for the concrete reality of the female body, and vice versa. The odd result is that under the liberal shift to orientations, sexual acts rely for their very being on that from which fully human and personal meaning has been drained by liberal androgyny. This paradox is particularly clear with regard to homosexual acts, which both depend on the facts of the body’s sexual polarity for their very possibility and also effectively deny any deep anthropological significance of that polarity. “Liberal Androgyny: “Gay Marriage” and the Meaning of Sexuality in Our Time”, Communio 33 (Summer 2006), 256-257. It should further be noted that the movement for ‘gay marriage’ necessarily suggests that gay sex (and gay partnership built around sex) are not just “like that” i.e. they are related in relevant ways to heterosexual sex and marriage.) that links SS to PS: it is not realistic to suppose that couples will treat SS as a completely different kind of activity. Moreover, a question arises as to whether there is some very important human/physiological good which this kind of pleasure exists to serve and encourage. It is relevant here that the sensation of orgasm is similar in SS and PS, which further supports the claim that couples are unlikely to treat SS and PS as completely separate kinds of activity. Indeed it is plausible to say that SS is an illusion of PS. But in order to say this one needs to support the claim that the sensation of pleasure is tied innately to PS. There is a plausible evolutionary story about this – namely that the pleasure is there to motivate PS (on the evolutionary story see Michael Levin, “Why Homosexuality is Abnormal”, in David Boonin and Graham Oddie (eds), What’s Wrong: Applied Ethicists and their Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 171-190). And while evolutionary stories aren’t conclusive teleologically (how could they be?), pleasure certainly does make sense teleologically if we think of it as something designed to motivate something as valuable as procreative activity. The orgasm, of course, distinguishes SS from handshakes (indeed, if a handshake were intended to produce the same pleasure as central cases of PS, the handshake would, on this account, be morally problematic).   It does not appear to be a matter of mere cultural conditioning that for one or other spouse to engage in SS with a third party is something deeply problematic for anyone committed to the institution of marriage. This, plausibly, is because such behaviour involves sexual activity of a type relevantly similar to PS, even if not intended as such. And this point in turn may suggest a built-in significance to sexual activity in general. For it would appear that the motives of people engaging in such activity, while morally relevant, are not most basic in identifying the damaging nature of such activity in relation to the institution of marriage.      The critic, at this stage, may simply agree and say that the couple who have a tendency to prefer SS to PS, insofar as they do, weaken, in their eyes, the rationale for marriage. And they might be quite happy to accept this eventuality, as many do. They might even follow Igor Primoratz Primoratz, like Gareth Moore, holds that sexual acts can have no inherent purpose or meaning. See Ethics and Sex (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 17. and argue that the structure of the kind of argument I am proposing amounts to, “A is much better than B. Therefore, B is no good at all.” Primoratz, p. 32. It should be noted that the concern here is with sex per se rather than marital/non-marital sex. Primoratz goes on to say, in his own example where A is ‘loving sex’ and B is ‘loveless sex’, “In addition to being logically flawed, this line of reasoning, if it were applied in areas other than sex, would prove quite difficult to follow…Of course, B can be good, even if it is much less good than A. Loveless sex is a case in point…To be sure, when adherents of the sex with love view reject casual sex, they also claim that other things are not equal: that a person who indulges in loveless sex thereby somehow damages, and ultimately destroys, his or her capacity for experiencing sex as an integral part of a loving relationship…to the best of my knowledge [this] is merely a popular piece of armchair psychology, rather than a claim established by research.” Primoratz, pp. 32-33. Later in the same passage Primoratz announces that he is open to the possibility that “sex without love is actually better, as sex, than sex as part of a loving relationship.” Quite how he would make this comparison, especially given his view that sex can have no inherent purpose or meaning (other than what its participants ‘decide’ upon) is left unresolved. Primoratz shows no concern over questions of moral character, virtue or human flourishing, speaking instead of what might or might not be learned from ‘psychological research’. Primoratz is talking about loving and loveless sex in this instance, but his point can just as easily be applied to what I am saying about SS and PS. A couple might argue that PS might be ‘better’ in some wide sense, and ‘better’ within marriage, but that they are quite happy with SS and see no strong reason to get married as they are more interested in SS than in PS.   Privileged acts It could also be objected that certain non-sexual behaviours might also be seen as restricted to, or at least to have some relation to, marriage. Might not such activities outside marriage also be condemned as ‘diluting’ the rationale of marriage? The significance of holding hands might be one example. However this point seems to rest on certain variable cultural conditions in ways in which activities of type SS do not. There are no societies in which handholding is seen as equivalent to sex: this is surely because of its lack of similarity both experientially and in terms of function. Even these essentially conventional and therefore semantically highly mutable signs carry a symbolic charge in our culture, where a man holding hands with someone else’s wife would not be morally neutral in many circumstances. However, holding hands is not, like intercourse (or not to the same extent) ‘iconic’ (in C.S. Peirce’s terms) as the ‘union’ created is considerably less than that of a joint natural function; holding hands could thus have a different meaning in other cultures/subcultures. An extreme but not uncommon case of a highly mutable sign being treated as not morally neutral (or at least treated in a highly ‘special’ and restrictive way) is kissing on the lips. Whereas Aquinas sees this as culturally variable in terms of symbolic charge, unlike sexual activity, the feminist and sexual liberationist JoAnn Wypijewski notes that kissing on the mouth is so intensely intimate that, “there is a reason that kissing on the mouth is often the line that workers who are paid for sex will not cross” (The Nation, 23 December 2008). It is not clear though whether Wypijewski is referring to mouth kisses intended to sexually arouse and in a highly sexualised context as opposed to brief mouth kisses of affectionate greeting. Whatever one might make of the conventionality of such signs this does not bear on the argument forwarded here concerning sexual acts per se. How about presumptive disclosure? Given their particular role, a spouse has a presumptive right to know certain things about the other partner that no-one else does. That is something we would often make sense of within a marriage, but the question is why are we treating it differently from SS or PS? Well, the presumptive right to know derives from a spouse's role within marriage and the importance of a special form of friendship being maintained. And this in turn is required ultimately because of the possibility of children coming from at least some such relationships, requiring in its turn a lifelong commitment - and that requires parents to have a special openness to one another in the interests of the child and in the couple’s own interest. As Kevin Flannery concisely put it when discussing marriage in relation to mental disability: “Marriage is something that exists apart from the question of whether these two persons are sterile or not – just as it exists apart from the question of whether a mentally capable couple are sterile or not. The bonum prolis which helps to define marriage refers not to the possible offspring of any particular couple but to what marriage is and to why it exists as a distinct, regulated human practice. This objective, institutional nature of marriage both makes it possible for mentally capable but sterile couples to marry and makes it impossible for those who are incapable of the appropriate consent to do the same. …moral analysis begins…with social norms.” p.24. Having said that, the exclusivity here may not be workable if interpreted too strictly, as others outside the marriage may also need certain private information. But it is interesting that even in cases where in practice we all agree we are talking about a mere presumptive right which can be overridden, those cases testify to the institution of which sexual exclusivity is a more workable and systematic witness - and one more closely related to the possibility of a child coming from at least some such relationships. We should bear in mind that the possibility of conception outside marriage, and therefore of the child being deprived of what he/she needs for a stable sense of identity, means that the taboo is particularly useful: a single violation could well have lifelong consequences (unlike many cases of non-disclosure).   Counterarguments Critics of the traditional position have generally attempted to argue in one or other of the following ways. Some have taken the line that the marital act is not an essential mark of marriage insofar as just about everybody has recognised the validity of naturally sterile marriages. A sterile marriage validly entered into cannot lead to the natural procreation of children, and therefore the natural procreation of children cannot be an essential mark of marriage.   Others, such as Gareth Moore, have sought to locate the significance of the marital act within the institution of marriage. For Moore, it is the institution of marriage that invests meaning in the marital act. Moore goes so far as to say, in his late work, that strictly it makes no sense to talk of the ‘natural meaning’ or built-in significance of any type of activity. The meaning of any kind of activity is for him entirely context-dependent. Of arguments relying on the idea of built-in significance Moore says, as we saw earlier, “that there are inherent meanings in human sexuality is no justification at all. Sexual acts are indeed capable of bearing meaning, but meaning is a human affair, the result of human social structures and human conventions.” Moore, A Question of Truth: Christianity and Homosexuality, p. 280 Similarly, writers like Michel Foucault see institutions in general (including marriage) as products of ideology which promote a particular social goal: they are part of a series of contingent social practices and, for Foucault, yet another mask worn by power (power being a crucial concept Foucault unfortunately never seems to have adequately analysed). Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, translated by Robert Hurley (3 Vols) (New York: Vintage Books, 1990). Foucault does offer the thought that “the basis of the relationship of power lies in the hostile engagement of forces” (Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, Colin Gordon (ed.), translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 91) and tries to apply this idea to sexual relationships. But ‘power’ is not defined in any enlightening way, nor is it explained why ‘power’ itself is something always to be ‘unmasked’ and uprooted (if such a notion is even coherent), as opposed to accommodated. Foucault, of course, famously talks of the ‘problematisation’ of sexual behaviour, as though this is the result of an ideology working through history. But Foucault tends to see sexual relations in ‘social’ terms more appropriate to the analysis of political and economic relations. Yet the biological nature of the sexual sphere and the fundamental problems bound up with sexual ethics suggest that this approach is misguided. The work in sexual phenomenology of Aurel Kolnai and Dietrich von Hildebrand (especially concerning notions of sexual purity and ‘dirt’) provides ample evidence for seeing such ‘problematisation’ as rooted in something far removed from social forces of the kind Foucault refers to. There is no ‘nature’ of sexuality, merely a struggle between differing social forces aiming to impose meanings upon e.g. sex or language. There is no ‘normal’, and the widely held idea that heterosexuality is ‘normal’ is a fiction. Categories such as heterosexuality (and with it institutions like marriage) and homosexuality are socially controlling constructions which should be ‘unmasked’.   In answer to Moore’s criticism, it needs to be pointed out that the final cause or foundational natural purpose of sex is procreation, just as the natural purpose of eating is nutrition. And procreation is inherently heterosexual. We are talking here of ‘nature’s purposes’ (for theists, ultimately, God's purposes), not what a couple may happen to have as their purpose in engaging in sex. Whether something is a procreative type of act is, at least in one basic respect, independent of an agent’s intention, for the significance of what he or she does in choosing to engage in intercourse of a procreative or even a non-procreative kind is determined by the central role that procreative activity plays in human life. And certain facts about human biology determine what that central role is (hence our talk of ‘genitals’ and ‘reproductive organs’). So, our biology is partly determinative of the significance of human sexual intercourse. With regard to physical structures it is useful to consider the following (unpleasant) thought-experiment, which was suggested to me by Tim Wilkinson: Imagine a woman is injured so that her vagina is blocked and could not provide access to the uterus, but her rectum now does provide such access. Would anal sex be OK in this circumstance? Surely not, because the vagina still has a proper sexual/reproductive function while the rectum has no such ‘function’. One could not say that the woman subsequently became ‘infertile’ if the rectum no longer provided passage to the uterus: her health would not be damaged by this but rather the reverse. As Luke Gormally has written, a couple “negate that significance in setting out to render infertile any sexual activity which might otherwise be fertile. They do not negate its significance as generative (its “procreative significance”) by having intercourse when they happen to be infertile, since fertility is not required for the act to be of the generative kind” http://www.linacre.org/contra.html Role of sex in marriage Quite generally, we need a ‘special’ activity to mark a fundamental new role - just as pregnancy does this with already-achieved parenthood. Take, for example, surrogacy. The physical ‘activity’ of gestation of a child seen as not one's own makes gestation no longer a unique relationship which marks a special bond between natural mother and child, a fundamental new role for the mother, and a new life and lifelong natural bond for the child. The surrogate intends not to adopt this role and does not, therefore, treat the state of pregnancy as bringing about a special role relating to a unique person, or enhancing a commitment to a spouse. Thus she dilutes the social meaning of pregnancy in an important and non-private way. But what of the unitive good of sex, bound up with the procreative? The unitive good is surely wholly dependent on the act being of a procreative type (or, as Pruss has it, one of ‘bodily striving’ for a procreative good even if that good is not in itself achievable). See the paper by Alexander Pruss in this volume. This ‘completed’ procreative good of new life is the primary good of both sex and marriage, but the primacy should be understood in terms of dependency. Just as procreative ‘striving’ is oriented to the ‘completed’ good of procreation, the same can be said of the unitive aspect of that procreative striving. The unitive good is ‘dependent’ on procreation, and in that sense secondary, but the term secondary should here carry no implication of ‘inessential’.   If we talk abstractly about the immediate physical unity of the sexual act we are simply talking about procreative striving. We are talking about the same thing. However, if we are talking about the unitive in the richest and widest human sense, the unity experienced by a good spousal coupling, we are talking about something of which the purely physical procreative striving is a necessary aspect. This necessary aspect of the couple’s unity, in the richer wider sense, is not necessarily superior to it even though this unity is dependent upon procreative physical striving. My body’s overall good health is dependent upon the good health of my stomach, but it does not follow that my stomach is more important than my body’s overall health. This point is ignored by Donagan who writes, summarising Aquinas, “since sexual gratification is obtained from procreative acts, the natural end of which is to produce children, and since it is impermissible to produce children except in a monogamous family, anybody who seeks sexual gratification except in nondeviant intercourse as husband or wife in such a family violates the fundamental human good of procreation.” Yet this characterisation mentions nothing of the unitive aspect of procreative intercourse and goods. By not attending to these elements of Aquinas’ thought Donagan too hastily concludes that “with regard to deviant sexual acts which do not lead to procreation, it does not seem to follow, merely because sexual gratification is obtained from them as well as from nondeviant intercourse, that to seek sexual gratification in them eo ipso violates the human good of procreation.”The Theory of Morality, pp.105-106.   If we understand the procreative good of sex in the rich human sense, as something conducive to the ‘completed’ procreative good of bearing, rearing and educating a child, then we are also talking about something identical to the unitive good in the rich sense (i.e. creating the right environment for child-rearing). So, the social function of the act, which is what we are discussing at this level, isn’t something entirely relative to certain cultural practices, but is rather bound up with what is truly good for children – for the flourishing of new human beings. One way of envisaging this is set forth by Romano Amerio in Iota Unum: A Study of the Changes in the Catholic Church in the XXth Century translated by Fr John P. Parsons (Kansas, MA: Sarto House, 1996): “Pius XI teaches [Casti connubii 24 and 25] that the mutual perfecting of the spouses ‘can be called the primary reason and motive for marriage’, but it must be remembered that in his teaching, the mutual integration of lives that perfects the spouses includes the mutual gift of their bodies, which in the natural course of things is the source of offspring; and he regards offspring as the highest good marriage can produce. Without believing in the myths of the ancient world, we can still say that in their act of love, the spouses are their offspring: ‘the marriage bed upon which’ as Penelope says to Odysseus ‘we were together in our son Telemachus’”, p. 661. Such a view must not be confused with Schopenhauer’s quite alien idea that an individual’s sexual behaviour is essentially in the grip of a determinative impersonal force such that the ‘will to life’ of unconceived offspring draws the sexual partners together, and couples are deluded if they think they act out of their own interests (see The World as Will and Representation, Vol. II, translated by E.F.J. Payne (New York: Courier Dover Publications, 1969), p. 538.   What then of the case of the sterile marriage where marital acts, though of a procreative kind, will never result in conception? People continue to argue why the commitment conditions for marriage exist in a case such this. However, following our earlier thought experiment, it would appear that if no marriage ever had a connection with children it would be difficult to make sense of the institution. The sterile marriage is ‘derivative’ from the fertile marriage in the order of rationale - which is not to denigrate but merely to explain it. And in the sterile marriage, engaging in PS does nothing to override or thwart the meaning of the procreative act, which is the mark of marriage. The sterile couple are still engaged in PS and not SS and the rights of exclusivity they enjoy have an important social function as well as giving them security.   Substitutionary sex and society Activities such as homosexual sex or condomistic sex On condomistic sex to prevent AIDS or other sexually transmitted infections, see the paper later in this volume.  are per se inapt for procreation on this understanding, and therefore fall into the category of SS. Insofar as they do, what might be said of choices to engage in SS outside (or inside) of marriage? We saw earlier that marriage qua institution generates certain moral obligations. Insofar as SS becomes widely practised in a society whether outside or inside the institution it will inevitably become much harder for the moral obligations generated by marriage to be honoured in general. This is because of the close connection between SS and PS both in relation to pleasure and other emotions and in relation to bodily structure. The couple engaging in SS are, on the view of inherent meanings put forward here, failing to respect the inherent meaning of a particular type of act, which meaning is the mark of a valuable and socially important institution. The enacted existence of SS thereby encourages PS to be seen in inappropriately subjectivist terms i.e. as though PS were not possessed of an inherent meaning, thereby weakening the ability to properly commit to PS. It has been recognized by defenders of sexual liberation that the increased practice of SS (including contracepted sex) has, as matter of fact, undermined the traditional place in society held by PS, and subsequently its place in the minds of those who practise it. David R. Crawford writes, making use of The Invention of Heterosexuality (New York: Penguin, 1993), the work of radical historian and admirer of Foucault Jonathan Ned Katz, “The strict division between what is heterosexual and what is homosexual becomes increasingly artificial as heterosexual patterns of behaviour begin to resemble those of homosexuals. In part this is due to the almost universal acceptance and use of birth control (‘pleasure enhancers’, as Katz calls them). But it is due also to the underlying systemization of pleasure on which the duality is based. As Katz astutely observes, ‘The commercial stimulation of eroticism lifts the veil off the old sex mysteries. The marketing of pleasure-sex to all-comers with cash helps to demolish old rationales for heterosexual supremacy – even old rationales for the hetero-homo difference. For, as pleasure pursuits, heterosexuality and homosexuality have little to distinguish them. Heterosexuals are more and more like homosexuals, except for the sex of their partners.’ (pp. 186-187).” Crawford 2006, pp. 253-254. Failure to respect that significance causes clear problems for the good of an institution needed by society for the good and protection of children. The telos of sex can, therefore, be obstructed both in terms of the destruction of the social institution needed for it to flourish and in the individual’s pursuit of ends contrary to the telos which makes sex a rational and morally good activity. Such connections are hinted at by the journalist and supporter of gay liberation Matthew Parris, when he writes, No man is an island...There are ultimately no “private” acts.  Everything we think, everything we say and do, however privately, shapes and influences us, our families and friends, and so touches the world outside.  It is just fatuous to pretend that if a great many men are unashamedly making love to other men, however privately, that is without impact on the whole of society.... Quoted by Piers Paul Read, in response to an imagined objection to his own pro-marriage position: “You may think that the link between people’s sex lives and the suffering of children is tenuous”, “Can Catholicism save Christian England?”, The Spectator, 31 March 2010. Dignity of sex in marriage The Church is often accused of taking too ‘pronatalist’ a view of sex and marriage, whether natural or sacramental. I will end with a quotation which may help illuminate the dignity in the Church’s eyes of natural marriage, let alone the sacramental marriage which perfects it. It should be noted that the Catechism of the Council of Trent, in talking of the indissolubility of marriage, states, “Although it belongs to marriage as a natural contract to be indissoluble, yet its indissolubility arises principally from its nature as a Sacrament, as it is the sacramental character that, in all its natural relations, elevates marriage to the highest perfection. In any event, dissolubility is at once opposed to the proper education of children, and to the other advantages of marriage” (P. II. C. 8, qu. 11) The Catechism of the Council of Trent (Rockford IL.: TAN, 1982), p. 343. We should note both the exalted view of sex in marriage offered, and the recognition that sex in marriage retains this dignity even when it is not fruitful, despite the purpose of the institution which St John Chrysostom did not question when he wrote: And how become they one flesh? As if you should take the purest part of gold, and mingle it with the other gold; so in truth here also the woman as it were receiving the richest part fused by pleasure, nourishes it and cherishes it, and throughout contributing her own share, restores it back to the man. And the child is a sort of bridge so that the three become one flesh, the child connecting, on either side, each to each… What then? When there is not child, will they not be two? Not so, for their coming together has this effect; it diffuses and commingles the bodies of both. And as one who has poured ointment into oil has made the whole one; so in truth is it also here. (Homily 12 on Colossians) 22