Augustine and the Stoic Tradition

Augustine and The Stoic Tradition JOHN SELLARS The philosophy of Stoicism was first articulated by Zeno of Citium, some time around 300 BC in Athens, and developed by his immediate successors, Cleanthes of Assos and Chrysippus of Soli. These early Stoics outlined a materialist ontology in which God permeates Nature as a material force (Sellars 91-5). They claimed that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness, with the corollary that external goods and circumstances should have no bearing on the happy life (ibid. 110-14). They held an intellectualist account of the emotions, dismissing them as the by-product of mistaken judgements (ibid. 114-20). These various elements they brought together in an idealized image of the perfectly rational sage living in harmony with Nature, completely free, autonomous, emotionless, and – infamously – happy even when being tortured on the rack (ibid. 36-41). The school flourished in Athens until the first century BC, when the focus of philosophical attention shifted to Rome. Key Stoic ideas were presented to the Latin-speaking world by Cicero, who had studied with the leading Greek Stoics of the day Panaetius and Posidonius. The most famous Stoics of the first two centuries AD were Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, whose works have proved to be the most influential Stoic texts to survive from antiquity. Stoicism appears still to have been a vital element of philosophical culture at the end of the second century AD but not much later. It played its part in the development of the then rising star of Neoplatonism, albeit often negatively. Via the readily available Latin works of Cicero and Seneca, Stoicism continued to assert its influence in the West, although it is difficult to refer to a clearly-defined post-antique Stoic tradition analogous to the way in which one might more legitimately refer to an Aristotelian tradition. 2 Augustine and Stoicism Aug.’s relationship with Stoicism was highly complex. A traditional view suggests that Aug. was influenced by Stoic ethics in his early works but later became increasingly hostile (cf. esp. s. 150 and retr. 1.1-2). A more nuanced view holds that Aug. drew upon not only Stoic ethics but also on Stoic logic and physics, and did so to varying degrees throughout his work. Although it is impossible to capture Aug.’s debt to or attitude towards Stoicism in a brief summary, it is possible to note those key doctrines where the mature Aug. disagreed with the Stoa, disagreements that shaped the interaction between the reception of Aug. and that of Stoicism in subsequent centuries. Three points of philosophical dispute stand out. The first concerned the possibility of moral perfectionism. While the early Aug., following the Stoa, thought perfect virtue possible in this life (cf. Acad. 1.2.5), the mature Aug. came to doubt this. Only in the next life can we achieve perfect virtue (retr. 1.2; 1.6.5). The second centred on the autonomy of virtue. Again, the early Aug. followed the Stoa in holding that virtue (and so happiness) is solely dependent upon the state of our soul and consequently something completely within our own power, but the mature Aug. later dismissed this (retr. 1.2; 1.6.5; s. 150.8). Aug. continues to agree with the Stoics that virtue is a necessary condition for happiness, but denies that it is a sufficient condition. Happiness, for Aug., ultimately requires immortality (s. 150.10; trin. 13.8.11). The third concerned the nature and value of emotions. Aug. agreed with the Stoa in holding an intellectualist account of the emotions, conceiving 3 them as mistaken judgements of the mind rather than elements of the body (imm. an. 5.7), but he rejected the Stoic notion of apatheia in favour of Aristotelian (and Neoplatonic) metriopatheia or moderation of the emotions, not only doubting the possibility of completely escaping emotions but also coming to see some emotions (such as love) in a more positive light (civ. 14.9). The Stoic ideal of complete freedom from emotions would rule out the love of God. These three points are clearly interrelated and all point to the mature Aug.’s rejection of Stoic moral autonomy. Aug. dismisses the Stoic claim that through the power of individual reason alone one may become completely virtuous, free, and happy. For the mature Aug. this is the height of arrogance and in sharp contrast to his own emphasis on our dependence on God for our virtue and happiness (retr. 1.1.2; 1.8.4; s. 150.8). It is this Stoic-Augustinian division over autonomy that appears time and again when the two philosophies were brought into dialogue by later authors, although it was by no means the only topic to shape their subsequent encounters. The Middle Ages Before the translation of Aristotelian texts into Latin in the twelfth century, both Augustinianism and Stoicism coexisted as important influences on early medieval thought, although the influence of Stoicism was far more diffuse. The interaction of the two can be seen most clearly in the work of → Peter Abelard (1079-1142) and especially in his ethical works Scito te ipsum (or Ethica) and Collationes (or Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum, et Christianum). In the first of these works Abelard argues that moral wrongdoing resides not in actions but rather in the intentions that stand behind actions. These 4 intentions should be identified not with desires that may afflict us but rather with our consent or acceptance (consensus). It is neither a lustful action nor the mental experience of lust that is sinful; it is with our consent to a lust that we morally go wrong (cf. Luscombe 12-14). Here Abelard echoes the Stoic theory of assent (sunkatathesis) although it has been suggested that Abelard’s source of this idea may have been Aug. (ibid. 12 n. 1). Indeed, Abelard himself cites Aug.’s view that action adds nothing to the sin of intention (cf. lib. arb. 1.3). Here, then, Abelard embraces a Stoic idea supporting it with the authority of Aug. In the Collationes we also find themes from Aug. and Stoicism in contact with one another. This work takes the form of a pair of dialogues, one between a Philosopher and a Jew and then another between the same Philosopher and a Christian. Abelard’s Philosopher argues for a number of Stoic-inspired ethical claims and is explicit about his debt to the Stoa, calling Seneca the greatest of all moralists (Marenbon and Orlandi 102). He is presented as someone who believes in a single God, though not the same God as either the Jew or the Christian, and as one who is content with natural law rather than the laws recorded in sacred texts (ibid. 2, 144). He also takes up the Stoic doctrines of the unity of virtue, that virtue is the highest good, and the claim that there are no degrees in virtue, drawing on Cicero’s accounts of Stoic ethics in De Officiis and Paradoxa Stoicorum (ibid. 116). At the same time Abelard draws on Aug.’s civ., both as an authority (second only to the Bible) and as a source for ancient philosophy, and it has been suggested that the same work’s contrast between pagan and Christian views may well have formed the inspiration for Abelard’s project in the Collationes, even if his conclusions are more equivocal (see ibid. xliii). Abelard’s Philosopher has little sympathy for his two opponents and no desire to effect a reconciliation with either of them. On the contrary, he 5 dismisses the Jew as stupid and the Christian as mad (ibid. 4). But by selectively quoting from Aug., including those early works more sympathetic to pagan philosophy and later repudiated, Abelard is able to present his own version of Stoic-inspired ethics in the best possible light for his contemporary audience. The Renaissance Probably the most important admirer of Aug. during the Renaissance was → Francesco Petrarca (1304-74), widely known under the name Petrarch, whose works are said to contain over a thousand references to the Church Father. Petrarch was also a great admirer of Stoicism and this is most evident in his De remediis utriusque fortunae, a work that borrows both its title and central themes from works attributed to Seneca. These two influences come together most strikingly in his Secretum, written in 1347. This work takes the form of a dialogue between a young Petrarch, depressed and unhappy, and Aug. himself, in the role of older and wiser teacher. Aug. is made to offer Petrarch advice on how to overcome his depression and that advice takes the form of a heavy dose of Stoic psychotherapy. Aug. becomes the mouthpiece for Petrarch’s own brand of Christianized Stoicism, in which Augustinian and Stoic themes are carefully interwoven. In the dialogue Aug.’s aim is to show the young Petrarch that his unhappiness is ultimately his own fault, with the corollary that it is within his own control to escape it. In order to do this he draws heavily on Seneca and Cicero (especially the Tusculanae Disputationes), as well as a wide variety of Latin authors including Virgil, Horace, Ovid, and Terence. It is ‘virtue alone that can make us happy’ Aug. says (Secr. 1.3.1), and so we should not be disturbed by external events and objects, echoing standard Stoic doctrine. He goes on to castigate Petrarch for having dismissed Stoic 6 doctrine too quickly in the past, simply for conflicting with popular opinion. Aug. proposes that only a Stoic life according to reason will cure Petrarch and, like the Stoics, he says that only those who manage to follow such a life deserve to be called men (Secr. 1.10.6; see also Secr. 2.8.4, where the virtuous are called kings, another Stoic trope). In order to achieve this, the pair embark upon a Stoic analysis of the emotions, the principal impediment to the rational life, drawing on Cicero’s account in Tusculanae Disputationes 3.24-5. There are, however, a number of un-Stoic remarks along the way where Petrarch Christianizes Stoicism: the soul, for instance, is contaminated by the body (Secr. 1.15.1), and must escape its grossness in order to rise to heaven (Secr. 1.8.3). At the beginning of the second dialogue, there is a nod towards Aug.’s own doctrine of grace, when the young Petrarch says that he can hope for nothing from himself, only from God. While Aug. is made to agree, the discussion nevertheless continues in a thoroughly Stoic fashion, restating the opening claim that Petrarch’s troubles are entirely within his own control (Secr. 2.1.1), although the importance of God’s grace remains in the background (see Secr. 2.11.7). The culmination of the work, in the third dialogue, is Aug.’s attempt to show Petrarch that his obsessional love for Laura is central to his present unhappiness. The diagnosis follows typical Stoic lines but the cure owes more to Augustinianism. The way in which Petrarch might overcome his love for this woman is not through rational psychotherapy but rather by replacing that passion with a healthier one, namely the love of God (Secr. 3.5.2). 7 Early Modern The late sixteenth century saw a marked revival of interest in Stoicism (often labelled Neostoicism) and the most prominent figure associated with this was → Justus Lipsius (1547-1606). Lipsius attempted to revive Stoicism in a form that would be palatable to his Christian audience. There were, however, two central points of conflict: determinism and pantheism. In his early work De Constantia (1584), Lipsius argued that there were four points where the Stoic theory of determinism must be modified in order to rescue it from heresy. These are the claims that God is submitted to fate, that there is a natural order of causes (and thus no miracles), that there is no contingency, and that there is no free will (Const. 1.20). However, in his later work Physiologia Stoicorum (1604), Lipsius suggests that the Stoic theory of fate can in fact be reconciled with Christian doctrine without modification (Phys. Stoic. 1.12). In order to do this, he draws upon Aug.’s discussion of Stoic definitions of fate in civ. 5.8 where it is argued that fate does not impinge upon the power of God but rather is the expression of the will of God. Lipsius also draws upon arguments in Aug. in order to reconcile Stoic materialist pantheism with Christianity (Phys. Stoic. 1.8, citing civ. 7.6). God cannot be identified with the world; rather He is the soul of the world, immanent to matter, which constitutes His body. He is, for Lipsius, the reason within matter, but not material Himself. However, the Stoics call the world ‘God’, just as one might identify a person with the whole human being even though their identity and character resides only in their soul and not in the matter that constitutes their body. Lipsius quotes Aug.’s solution: ‘But just as a wise man, although he consists of body and soul, is called “wise” in virtue of his soul; so the world is called “God” in virtue of its soul, although consisting both of soul and body’ (civ. 7.6). Lipsius thus 8 uses the authority of Aug. to underwrite his reconciliation of Stoicism with Christianity. In the seventeenth century, in the wake of Lipsius, fascination with Stoicism reached its highest point since antiquity. Stoic and Augustianian ideas were brought into contact by a variety of authors. One of these, JeanFrançois Senault (1601-72), author of De l’usage des Passions (1641), is a particularly complex example. Scholarly opinion is divided as to whether Senault should be read as attempting to reconcile Stoic and Augustinian accounts of the emotions or whether he should be seen as the first of a number of authors to mount an Augustinian attack on Stoicism for its intellectual arrogance and pride (cf. Levi 214 and Lagrée 166). Senault’s own view is made fairly plain at the outset of the work, in the Preface, where he sets up the Stoics as opponents of Aug. In an Augustinian vein, Senault affirms the necessity of grace for all things, for without it all our actions are at fault. Quoting Aug. directly (s. 150.8), Senault insists that the key difference between Stoicism and Christianity is that while the Stoic thinks virtue alone can bring happiness, the Christian knows that only through grace may this come about. Moreover the Stoic suffers from arrogance and pride, while only the Christian is humble enough to acknowledge the necessity of human weakness. For Senault, then, Aug. stands clearly opposed to Stoicism. Having said that, Senault is also prepared to engage in some syncretism, once more following Aug., suggesting that in some respects the Stoics differ from other philosophers more in words than in ideas. He is also prepared to acknowledge the role of reason in the development of virtue alongside grace. However, his general attitude towards Stoicism is one of suspicion, a suspicion nourished by both his reading of Aug.’s own comments about the Stoics and his commitment to Augustinian ideas about grace. 9 Senault was not alone in this view. A similar attitude towards Stoicism can be found in the work of → Blaise Pascal (1623-62). Pascal, an associate of the → Jansenists, developed his own neo-Augustinian theory of grace via an encounter with Stoic ideas as he found them in the works of Epictetus. While there are a number of brief discussions of Stoicism in his Pensées, Pascal’s most sustained engagement with Stoicism is to be found in the Entretien de Pascal avec M. de Sacy. This short text is the record of a discussion between Pascal and the confessor at Port-Royal, Isaac de Sacy (1613-84), probably dating to 1655, but reported by Sacy’s secretary Nicolas Fontaine long after the death of both participants. Pascal’s aim is to examine critically both the ideas of Epictetus and Montaigne, presented as two extremes, using one to attack the other, thereby clearing both away in order to make way for Pascal’s own neo-Augustinian view. During the course of the discussion Sacy calls into question the orthodoxy of Pascal’s engagement with Epictetus, reminding him of Aug.’s rejection of his own youthful fascination with pagan philosophy (cf. conf. 4.16.28; 7.20.26). However, Pascal continues and goes on to acknowledge that Epictetus is in fact a pious thinker who wants sincerely to be obedient to his God who governs the cosmos. Where Epictetus falls short is in his refusal to accept the powerlessness of the individual. His commitment to Stoic autonomy and in particular his claim that we may become free and happy through our own rational powers alone make him, for Pascal, ‘wickedly proud’, just as he would have been for Aug. (cf. s. 150.10). If Epictetus is too proud, Montaigne is too despondent; for Pascal we must follow a middle path in which we embrace the use of reason alongside Christian faith. Pascal’s project shares something in common with Aug.’s own attempt to try to reconcile pagan philosophy with faith. For Sacy, however, Pascal’s refusal simply to submit to the authority of Aug. betrays his own intellectual pride. 10 The confrontational interaction between Augustinian and Stoic ideas in the seventeenth century continued in the work of → Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715). In his Recherche de la vérité, Malebrance mounted an Augustinian-inspired attack on the Stoic Seneca (Recherche 2.3.4). Seneca’s image of the Stoic sage is both pompous and vain, while the sage’s supposed invulnerability to fortune is simply a myth. We are, Malebranche claims, destined to be miserable and wretched in this life, even if we do manage to attain virtue. In this, our fate is no different than St Paul’s. In opposition to Stoic rational autonomy, Malebranche claims that if we do possess virtue it is only through God’s grace and likewise happiness can only be granted by God, which He chooses to withhold from all in this life (cf. retr. 1.2; trin. 13.8.11). Although Malebranche does not cite Aug. explicitly in his polemic against Seneca, he deploys broadly Augustinian arguments against Stoic autonomy and, alongside Senault and Pascal, illustrates the ways in which Stoicism and Augustinianism came into conflict in the early modern period. Summary Throughout his works, Aug. says so many things about Stoicism, both positive and negative, that it is impossible to summarize neatly his own attitude towards Stoicism. This also means that it has been possible for subsequent thinkers to draw selectively from those comments in their own attempts either to reconcile or to counterpoise Stoicism and Christianity. Aug.’s preeminent authority among Christian writers has meant that his views have constantly been sought out by those wishing to seek support for their own interpretative agendas. The more we come to appreciate the complexity of Aug.’s own relationship with Stoicism, the more we shall come to see the inevitable limitations in any attempt to use his texts to adjudicate between Christian doctrine and Stoicism. 11 Bibliography PRIMARY LITERATURE Peter Abelard, Ethics, ed. & trans. D. E. Luscombe (Oxford, 1971). —, Collationes, ed. & trans. J. Marenbon & G. Orlandi (Oxford, 2001). Francesco Petrarca, Secretum, ed. & Ital. trl. U. Dotti (Rome, 1993). Justus Lipsius, De Constantia (Leiden, 1584). —, Physiologia Stoicorum (Antwerp, 1604). Jean-François Senault, De l’usage des Passions (Paris, 1641). Blaise Pascal, ‘Entretien avec M. de Saci’, in Oeuvres complètes, ed. J. Chevalier (Paris, 1954) 560-574. Nicolas Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, ed. G. Rodis-Lewis, 2 vols, Oeuvres complètes III (Paris, 1962-63). SECONDARY LITERATURE Cole, John R., Pascal: The Man and his Two Loves (New York, 1995). Colish, Marcia, L., The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages: II. Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century (Leiden, 1990). Courcelle, Pierre, L’Entretien de Pascal et Sacy, ses sources et ses engimes (Paris, 1960). Gill, Meredith J., Augustine in the Italian Renaissance: Art and Philosophy from Petrarch to Montaigne (Cambridge, 2005). Lagrée, Jacqueline, ‘Constancy and Coherence’, in S. K. Strange & J. Kupko, eds, Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (Cambridge, 2004) 148-76. Lapidge, Michael, ‘The Stoic Inheritance’, in P. Dronke, ed., A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy (Cambridge, 1988) 81-112. Levi, Anthony, French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions 1585 to 1649 (Oxford, 1964). Normore, Calvin, ‘Abelard’s Stoicism and its Consequences’, in S. K. Strange & J. Kupko, eds, Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (Cambridge, 2004) 132-47. Panizza, Letizia A., ‘Stoic Psychotherapy in the Middle Ages and Renaissance: Petrarch’s De remediis’, in M. J. Osler, ed., Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought (Cambridge, 1991) 39-65. Saunders, Jason Lewis, Justus Lipsius: The Philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism (New York, 1955). 12 Sellars, John, Stoicism (Chesham / Berkeley, 2006). Sellier, Philippe, Pascal et Saint Augustin (Paris, 1970). Spanneut, Michel, Le Stoïcisme des Pères de l’Église: De Clément de Rome à Clément d’Alexandrie (Paris, 1957). Spanneut, Michel, Permanence du Stoïcisme: De Zénon à Malraux (Gembloux, 1973). Verbeke, Gerard, The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought (Washington DC, 1983).