Review: Darren G Lilleker, Against the Cold War

Paul Flewers Review: Darren G Lilleker, Against the Cold War This review appeared in New Interventions, Volume 12, no 4, Autumn 2008, signed Cheney Longville. The author of this review thanks Ron Heisler for background details in respect of some of the Labour MPs mentioned in the book. Key words — Labour Party, Stalinism, Soviet Union, Cold War. Note on the author — Paul Flewers is a socialist historian and a member of the Editorial Boards of New Interventions and Revolutionary History. His book The New Civilisation? Understanding Stalin’s Soviet Union, 1929-1941, was recently published by Francis Boutle. *** Darren G Lilleker, Against the Cold War: The History and Political Traditions of Pro-Sovietism in the British Labour Party 1945-89, IB Tauris, London, 2005, pp 294 When I first became involved in left-wing politics some 30 years back, the Soviet Union was well on its downward slide, and those who promoted a rosy picture of it seemed a little quaint, a hangover from another era. Nonetheless, even by that time one could still encounter some people in the Labour Party and trade unions who demonstrated a touching faith in the Soviet regime, and were ever willing to praise what they saw as its social and political achievements. This book, based upon a PhD thesis at Sheffield University, is a substantial investigation into the various Labour MPs over the half-century from 1945 whose attitude towards the Soviet Union and the other Stalinist states was considerably more appreciative than that of their fellow MPs on the left of the party, and who were often criticised as being, at best, apologists for Stalinism and, at worst, de facto or even direct agents of the Soviet regime. Dr Lilleker describes their political history, their justifications for their outlook, and their myriad affiliations to pro-Soviet organisations, such as the World Peace Council, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the British-Soviet Friendship Society and other bodies with close links with Soviet bloc states. Konni Zilliacus was drawn into the pro-Soviet arena during the Popular Front period. Some, such as Stephen Swingler, Lester Hutchinson, John Platts-Mills and Frank Allaun, came from a Stalinist background prior to the Second World War, and they maintained their fondness for the Soviet Union when they subsequently moved into the Labour Party. Others, such as Ron Brown, James Lamond, Stan Newens, Renee Short and William Wilson, came to prominence later on, and came from a variety of political backgrounds (oddly enough, Newens had been in a Trotskyist group, and, I might add, not one of the Pabloite variety that demonstrated a decided softness towards Stalinism). They were always viewed with suspicion by the right-wingers in 1 the party leadership, particularly when the Cold War was at its hottest during the late 1940s, and Zilliacus, Hutchinson, Platts-Mills and Leslie Solley found themselves expelled from the party, and, along with the arch-Stalinist DN Pritt, himself expelled in 1940, unsuccessfully stood as Labour Independents in the 1950 general election. When investigating the motives for their appreciative attitude towards the Soviet bloc regimes, Lilleker notes the common factor in their rejection of the policies promoted by the right wing of the Labour Party — moderation in respect of domestic affairs, Atlanticism in foreign affairs — and their acceptance of the official image promoted by Moscow: the central role of the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler’s Germany, the Soviet Union as a steadfast proponent of peace, staunch opponent of Western imperialist interventions and stalwart supporter of progressive causes around the world, and the domestic social welfare, education and employment policies in the Eastern bloc which favoured and benefited the working class. Those who did have criticisms of the undemocratic nature of Stalinist rule considered that such blemishes were the result of the Soviet Union’s existence within a hostile environment, and that the easing of East-West tensions would lead to a democratic revival. There were also perquisites available to them: they could — and some certainly did — take full advantage of the free trips on offer to Eastern bloc countries, and the discussions with important officials and the attention lavished on them could help compensate for their lowly positions within parliament and their party at home. Lilleker is critical of the ‘espionage narrative’ of many Western writers who claimed that Britain’s institutions were under constant threat from communist intrigue, in which the pro-Soviet Labour MPs played a key role, and for whom any sympathy for the Soviet Union or contact with Soviet bloc officials ipso facto rendered such a person a Soviet agent and a traitor to Britain. Such writing was ‘shrouded in sensationalism’ and relied upon ‘a degree of innuendo’ (p 5). For example, Chapman Pincher claimed that there were powerful undisclosed Soviet agents within the Labour Party’s leadership, then added that the laws of libel prevented him from elucidating further. More recently, former Soviet bloc intelligence officers have made enthusiastic additions to this dubious œuvre, and Oleg Gordievsky did himself no favours when he branded Michael Foot as a Soviet agent and was forced to retract his allegation. Lilleker’s explanation views the pro-Soviet MPs more as ‘change agents’: Their role was to highlight the progressive nature of the Soviet world view, the advanced nature of the socialist society and the desire for rapprochement and understanding among the Soviet leadership and people. In advancing these claims these individuals attempted to alter the anti-communist rationale which dominated the Western perception of the Eastern bloc. In putting themselves forward as a conduit for pro-Soviet ideas they acted as the agency through which these ideas could be disseminated, gain a broader audience and alter public perception and thus governmental policy. The ultimate aim was to end the Cold War and establish peace and global security, this would increase national prosperity for all nations following the end of the arms race and enable socialist ideas to spread across Western society. (p 13) It is clear to me that the pro-Soviet MPs made no secret about their allegiance to Moscow: they were public advocates of the Soviet Union. This is a key factor that the 2 conspiracy-seekers overlook; no doubt not accidentally, as this would undermine the essence of their entire œuvre. The pro-Soviet MPs did not hide their views, and politically-aware people knew their opinions on the subject. This very openness rendered it almost irrelevant whether they met KGB agents or took a few pieces of Moscow gold. They could provide political information and personal gossip that might add useful colour to what Soviet agents gleaned from the British press, but their obvious pro-Soviet sympathies meant that it was unlikely that they would have appointments that might enable them to be privy to really sensitive information. Lilleker alludes to this when discussing the links that the Soviet Embassy established with Brown, Wilson and Will Owen (who was tried for supplying information, but found not guilty), but unfortunately he does not develop this important point. He also overlooks the intriguing matter of Bernard Floud, a Labour MP who had been accused of being a Soviet agent and who committed suicide in 1967 after being questioned by MI5. He had once been a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain, but in the Labour Party and in parliament he kept his sympathies for the Soviet Union to himself; he was never associated with the pro-Soviet MPs or even with the broader group of left-wing MPs. Lilleker notes that the actual allegiance of the pro-Soviet MPs to the Soviet Union varied in intensity. Zilliacus veered from defending Stalin’s regime in 1948 against Viktor Kravchenko’s insistence that labour camps existed in the Soviet Union, through being excommunicated in 1949 for supporting Tito, to being readopted, as it were, after Stalin’s death, albeit without his being uncritical of every aspect of Soviet policies. Short, Lamond and Brown were undeviating in their uncritical support for Moscow. Swingler’s fondness faded after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, whilst Platts-Mills came around to consider that the rot set in once Stalin had died. Allaun was by no means uncritical of Moscow’s actions; neither was Newens, although the latter sadly blotted his copybook by providing a couple of glowing accounts of Romania’s Nicolas Ceauşescu, indubitably the most grotesque East European leader this side of Enver Hoxha. Lilleker recognises the important fact that the manner in which the pro-Soviet MPs backed or excused the manoeuvrings of the Soviet regime brought the left-wing cause as a whole into disrepute, and played into the hands of its opponents. Looking at Zilliacus but with much relevance to the others, he notes that ‘the Soviet Union was allowed almost complete latitude of action’, and that ‘in hinging his opposition upon an apology for Soviet foreign policy’, he ‘devalued the main tenets of his argument and thus his alternative foreign policy programme’ (p 75). Furthermore, certain key actions of the Soviet Union — such as its invasions of neighbouring countries — contradicted the tenets of, for example, the World Peace Council, one of the more important international pro-Soviet bodies, thus giving substance to the charges of hypocrisy made by its critics. Lilleker points out that the pro-Soviet MPs provided the Pinchers of this world with real ammunition with which to back up their scare-mongering. Whilst they were not agents in the sense that Pincher & Co declared or insinuated, they did promote the idea that Stalinism was a beneficial political factor. Lilleker mentions that there was common ground between the broader politics of the pro-Soviet MPs and those of the left wing of the labour movement. They all held an interest in ‘progressive’ foreign policy questions — anti-apartheid, anticolonialism, nuclear disarmament, anti-Atlanticism and the reduction of East-West tensions — and also agreed upon the need for radical reforms at home. The standard 3 left-wing Labour position that considered that the USA was the predominant belligerent force in the world, and that Labour governments should dissociate Britain from Washington’s policies, meant that left-wing Labour MPs maintained a less antagonistic standpoint towards the Soviet Union than their right-wing colleagues, but, unlike what the conspiracy-seekers implied, this did not mean that they necessarily were apologists for Moscow. Opposition to Atlanticism could engender a drift into adopting a pro-Soviet attitude, but I think that it is important to emphasise that this was by no means an automatic, ineluctable process. Whilst hoping for a democratic socialist renewal in the Soviet bloc, the majority of left-wing Labour MPs were very critical of, for example, the invasion of Hungary in 1956 and the crushing of the ‘Prague Spring’ in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was one thing to oppose the Cold War commonplace that the Soviet Union posed a totalitarian threat to the West; it was quite another to say that Stalinism represented a positive alternative to pro-Western social democracy. Lilleker’s study shows that the proSoviet MPs were but a small proportion of the left wing of the Parliamentary Labour Party, and that most left-wing Labour MPs maintained a respectable distance from Stalinism. There are some minor errors in this book. The Communist Party of Great Britain was formed in 1920, not 1922 (p 43); 27 Old Gloucester Street in London is not a sorting house for radical organisations (p 37), but the address of a commercial post-box and mail-forwarding company; it is unlikely that the Cominform wanted ‘a British MP to produce pro-Ceauşescu propaganda’ (p 144), as it was dissolved in 1956 and Ceauşescu did not take the reins of power until 1965; and although Gordon Schaffer was a loyal Stalinist, he was never a member of the CPGB and thus could not have been on its Executive Committee (p 155), and was a member of the Labour Party until 1969. Daniel Ortega would be surprised to learn that he headed El Salvador (p 169). Did Allaun, born in 1913, really join the Union of Democratic Control in 1922 (p 129), and did the left-wing Labour MP Ian Mikado really call for ‘greater privatisation’ (p 157)? Some names are spelt incorrectly: it’s James Klugmann, not ‘Klugman’, and Theodore Dreiser, not ‘Drieser’; and the accents are missing from Brüning, Ceauşescu, Münzenberg, Slánský and Wałęsa. Finally, I have to criticise IB Tauris for the poor standard of production of this book. There are quite a few basic typesetting errors, the titles of nearly all the books in the notes to the Introduction have been deleted, and the normal practice of setting book and journal titles in italics has been ignored practically throughout the book. One expects a little better than this in a book that costs £57.50. 4