Papers by François Jaquet
In a central variant, moral fictionalism is the view that we should replace moral belief with mak... more In a central variant, moral fictionalism is the view that we should replace moral belief with make-believe, that is, be disposed to accept some moral propositions in everyday contexts and to reject all such propositions in more critical circumstances. It is said by its opponents to face three significant problems: in contrast with a real morality, a fictional morality would not allow for deductive inferences; moral make-believe would lack the motivational force that is typical of moral belief; and moral make-believers could not genuinely disagree with one another about ethical matters nor, consequently, articulate their practical conflicts in moral terms. This chapter argues that all three objections rest on a misconception of the kind of attitudes recommended by fictionalism. Once misleading analogies are dismissed and the nature of moral make-believe is clarified, it becomes clear that a fictional morality would preserve deductive inference, moral motivation, and ethical disagreement.
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Apr 20, 2015
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Mar 1, 2019
Routledge eBooks, Jul 19, 2023
Cognition, Apr 1, 2021
Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Gre... more Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene's dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence gathered in support of this model comes from the study of people's judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such as Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duties of assistance, and the appropriate justification for punishment? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums. In Study 1, participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants had to answer under a strict time constraint. In Studies 3 to 5, we sought to promote reflection through exposure to counter-intuitive reasoning problems or direct instruction. Overall, our results offer strong support to the extension of Greene's dual-process model to moral debates on the existence of harmless violations and partial support to its extension to moral debates on the extent of our duties of assistance.
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, Feb 15, 2023
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Nov 29, 2022
Dialectica, Jun 1, 2018
incorporated into semantics. Furthermore, it is argued that groups are "more than the mere additi... more incorporated into semantics. Furthermore, it is argued that groups are "more than the mere addition of their members" (p. 251), although it is difficult to properly evaluate the ontological novelty they bring about. As a semantic phenomenon, partial involvement occurs more frequently in the case of plural nouns that are "more intensional", viz., that allow for more failures of substitutivity. It may be worth noticing that Arapinis does not take into consideration pluralist approaches, considering pluralities to be sum-like or set-like entities. Pluralist approaches are occasionally neglected or rejected in contributions from linguistic semantics, as extensively discussed by Moltmann in the introduction and her chapter. All in all, there is much to be learned from Unity & Plurality. The specialist in any of the fields represented will find thought-provoking developments but will also catch a glimpse of other disciplines involved in the study of plurals. The book stimulates fascinating comparisons, too. For instance, that pluralist approaches have found their way more easily into philosophy and philosophical logicrather than natural language semanticsmay be in itself food for thought.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Apr 14, 2023
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Apr 25, 2015
article MAJ le 1/5/15-ajout de la figure 1 et corrections de coquilles. [learn_more state= »open ... more article MAJ le 1/5/15-ajout de la figure 1 et corrections de coquilles. [learn_more state= »open »] Résumé : Selon certains chercheurs en psychologie morale, la disposition à former des jugements moraux conséquentialistes serait positivement corrélée au degré de psychopathie: plus on est conséquentialiste, plus on a de tendances psychopathiques. Cette affirmation suppose que le conséquentialisme est un trait de caractère. Dans cet article, je présente des raisons de rejeter tant l'affirmation elle-même que ce présupposé, basées sur une recherche effectuée en collaboration avec Florian Cova.
Qu'ont de commun les énoncés « Brigitte Bardot est une sorcière », « Le père Noël mange des c... more Qu'ont de commun les énoncés « Brigitte Bardot est une sorcière », « Le père Noël mange des chaussettes » et « François Hollande est en pourparlers avec le Grand Schtroumpf » ? C'est simple : littéralement, ils sont faux parce qu'ils reposent sur des présupposés ontologiques erronés – respectivement, ils présupposent l'existence de pouvoirs magiques, du père Noël et des schtroumpfs. D'après la théorie de l'erreur, il en va de même des énoncés moraux : il est faux que la torture soit injuste, que la générosité soit une vertu et qu'il faille respecter son père. D'une part, ces énoncés présupposeraient l'existence de faits moraux non naturels. D'autre part, le monde ne contiendrait que des faits naturels. Les amis de la morale doivent rejeter l'une de ces deux thèses, et le moins que l'on puisse dire est qu'ils peinent à accorder leurs violons
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2019
has argued that speciesism is wrong by definition. In his view, there can be no more substantive ... more has argued that speciesism is wrong by definition. In his view, there can be no more substantive debate about the justification of speciesism than there can be about the legality of murder, for it stems from the definition of "speciesism" that speciesism is unjustified just as it stems from the definition of "murder" that murder is illegal. The present paper is a case against this conception. I distinguish two issues: one is descriptive (Is speciesism wrong by definition?) and the other normative (Should speciesism be wrong by definition?). Relying on philosophers' use of the term, I first answer the descriptive question negatively: speciesism is a purely descriptive concept. Then, based on both its main functions in the philosophical and public debates and an analogy with racism, I answer the normative question negatively: speciesism should remain a purely descriptive concept. If I am correct, then speciesism neither is nor should be wrong by definition.
Synthese, 2019
Many people believe that human interests matter much more than the like interests of nonhuman ani... more Many people believe that human interests matter much more than the like interests of nonhuman animals, and this "speciesist belief" plays a crucial role in the philosophical debate over the moral status of animals. In this paper, I develop a debunking argument against it. My
Dialectica, 2018
incorporated into semantics. Furthermore, it is argued that groups are "more than the mere additi... more incorporated into semantics. Furthermore, it is argued that groups are "more than the mere addition of their members" (p. 251), although it is difficult to properly evaluate the ontological novelty they bring about. As a semantic phenomenon, partial involvement occurs more frequently in the case of plural nouns that are "more intensional", viz., that allow for more failures of substitutivity. It may be worth noticing that Arapinis does not take into consideration pluralist approaches, considering pluralities to be sum-like or set-like entities. Pluralist approaches are occasionally neglected or rejected in contributions from linguistic semantics, as extensively discussed by Moltmann in the introduction and her chapter. All in all, there is much to be learned from Unity & Plurality. The specialist in any of the fields represented will find thought-provoking developments but will also catch a glimpse of other disciplines involved in the study of plurals. The book stimulates fascinating comparisons, too. For instance, that pluralist approaches have found their way more easily into philosophy and philosophical logicrather than natural language semanticsmay be in itself food for thought.
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theo... more According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theorists were local error theorists; they targeted moral judgments specifically and were less skeptical of other normative areas. These error theorists now face so-called “prudential parity objections”, according to which whatever evidence there is in favor of the moral error theory is also evidence for a prudential error theory. The present paper rejects three prudential parity objections: one based on the alleged irreducible normativity of prudential reasons; another on the lack of a story about the normativity of hypothetical reasons; yet another on the very nature of reasons generally. I argue that these objections leave an important variant of a local moral error theory intact.
In this study, our goal is to validate a short version (5*5 = 25 items) of the Geneva Utilitarian... more In this study, our goal is to validate a short version (5*5 = 25 items) of the Geneva Utilitarianism Inventory. We then explore the relationship between utilitarianism in five domains and a series of individual differences (cognitive style, psychopathy, empathic concern). Additionally, we investigate the relationship between utilitarianism in the five domains measured by the Geneva Utilitarianism Inventory and participants' attitudes towards animals (as measured through three different scales).
In this study, we investigate the effect of a cognitive load on utilitarian judgment. Participant... more In this study, we investigate the effect of a cognitive load on utilitarian judgment. Participants are presented with scenarios from our six categories of stimuli, and asked either (i) to simply read a sequence of random characters, or (ii) to memorize this sequence and restitute it after reacting to the moral scenario.
In the past 15 years, a lot of research in moral psychology has focused on the opposition between... more In the past 15 years, a lot of research in moral psychology has focused on the opposition between deontological and utilitarian moral judgment, often concluding that deontological judgments are emotion-driven while utilitarian judgments come from higher-order reasoning. However, these research have only investigated the deontological/utilitarian divide by focusing on sacrificial dilemmas (e.g. trolley problems) in which one person is sacrificed to save many. In this project, our aim is twofold. First, we want to create a list of scenarios that will pit deontological and utilitarian moral judgments against each other in contexts that are not sacrificial dilemmas. Second, using this list of scenarios, we want to determine whether some key findings about the deontological/utiltiarian divide extend and generalize beyond the mere case of sacrificial dilemmas.
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Papers by François Jaquet
Dans le style argumentatif sobre et précis qui caractérise la philosophie analytique, ce manuel de métaéthique – le premier en langue française – entreprend d’évaluer minutieusement un ensemble de théories sur la morale. Bien que destiné en premier lieu aux enseignants de philosophie et à leurs étudiants, il se veut accessible à tous ceux qu’intéresse l’éthique.