Justitia Amplificata

En este trabajo me propongo analizar algunos de los argumentos de John Rawls en contra de un principio de diferencia internacional, tal como fueron presentados en Un derecho de gentes. Sostengo que estos argumentos son inconsistentes con el principio de diferencia doméstico. Si los aceptamos, entonces tendremos que afrontar el dilema de o bien tener que aceptar dicho principio distributivo en ambos ámbitos (el doméstico y el internacional) o bien tener que rechazarlo por completo. También sostengo que las posibles objeciones de Rawls a esta crítica se basan en la dudosa premisa empírica de que los países son exclusivamente responsables de su propio fracaso. Palabras clave: justicia global, derecho de gentes, igualdad económica, pobreza

The article compares two different interpretations of Kant's categorical imperative −the practical and the logical one− and defends the practical one, arguing that it is superior because it rejects cases of free riding without necessarily rejecting cases of coordination or timing. The logical interpretation, on the other hand, leads to the undesirable outcome that it does not reject immoral cases of free riding, and to the desired outcome that it does not reject maxims of coordination/timing. Given that neither of them rejects maxims of coordination/timing (they are similar in that sense) and only the practical interpretation rejects free riding, the logical interpretation should be rejected.

Resumen: En este artículo comparo y evalúo críticamente las concepciones sobre la justicia global de Sreenivasan y Pogge. Mientras Sreenivasan sostiene que todas las teorías sobre la justicia global actualmente existentes concuerdan en que los países ricos deberían transferir al menos una porción de sus riquezas a los pobres, Pogge reclama que todas las teorías sobre la justicia global concuerdan en que los países ricos deberían dejar de dañar a los pobres en primer lugar. En este artículo, trataré de mostrar (i) que la propuesta de Sreenivasan, como es presentada en sus artículos, es lo suficientemente amplia como para ser aceptable para algunas teorías de justicia internacional distributiva, pero no para todas ellas; (ii) que la propuesta de Pogge es más amplia que la de Sreenivasan, en el sentido de que aspira a obtener sustento en todas las diversas concepciones de justicia internacional distributiva, pero depende de la afirmación de que los países desarrollados dañan actualmente a la pobreza global -una afirmación que intentaré defender-; y (iii) que la visión de Pogge y Sreenivasan son compatibles. De hecho, si Sreenivasan asumiera la afirmación central del argumento de Pogge en su propia propuesta, el alcance de las teorías desde las que él podría ganar sustento sería mucho más amplio.

According to a popular view, defended by Pogge and other, trade agreements between wealthy and poor countries, as currently structured, are coercive and unfair for developing countries. Against this view, I argue that such agreements should be understood as exploitative instead of coercive. The difference between these two notions is a substantial one, as in the case of coercive proposals one of the parties is made worse off, while in the case of exploitative proposals both parties improve their situation. I rely on familiar accounts of coercion and exploitation, defended by Wertheimer, to make this point.

In this article I claim that states are in general morally responsible for repaying sovereign debts incurred by governments in the past. However, once we understand the reasons why they are morally responsible for repaying them, we should conclude that a portion of them are not binding. The steps of my argument are the following. In the first place, I reject the philosophical accounts that have been provided so far to explain why states should honour debts incurred by governments in the past. Second, I propose my own positive account, which relies on an analogy with private law. Third, I show that the strategy of relying on private law also leads to the conclusion that, under certain conditions, the general claim that debts ought to be honoured is not valid. When these conditions are satisfied, states are morally entitled to repudiate their debts.

In this article, I make the idea that poverty outcomes are not necessarily morally relevant for assessing policies as clear as possible by discussing a specific case within the global justice debate: sovereign debts. The outcome view that I attack has mainly been represented by Pogge, who has argued that the international lending system is unjust because, under it, there is massive and avoidable poverty. The competing view that I propose is deontological: the lending system is not unjust because of its consequences on poverty, but because it allows and promotes (morally) non-binding debts.

The article compares two different interpretations of Kant’s categorical imperative −the practical and the logical one− and defends the practical one, arguing that it is superior because it rejects cases of free riding without necessarily rejecting cases of coordination or timing. The logical interpretation, on the other hand, leads to the undesirable outcome that it does not reject immoral cases of free riding, and to the desired outcome that it does not reject maxims of coordination/timing. Given that neither of them rejects maxims of coordination/timing (they are similar in that sense) and only the practical interpretation rejects free riding, the logical interpre

The article compares two different interpretations of Kant's categorical imperative −the practical and the logical one− and defends the practical one, arguing that it is superior because it rejects cases of free riding without necessarily rejecting cases of coordination or timing. The logical interpretation, on the other hand, leads to the undesirable outcome that it does not reject immoral cases of free riding, and to the desired outcome that it does not reject maxims of coordination/timing. Given that neither of them rejects maxims of coordination/timing (they are similar in that sense) and only the practical interpretation rejects free riding, the logical interpretation should be rejected.

Resumen: En este artículo comparo y evalúo críticamente las concepciones sobre la justicia global de Sreenivasan y Pogge. Mientras Sreenivasan sostiene que todas las teorías sobre la justicia global actualmente existentes concuerdan en que los países ricos deberían transferir al menos una porción de sus riquezas a los pobres, Pogge reclama que todas las teorías sobre la justicia global concuerdan en que los países ricos deberían dejar de dañar a los pobres en primer lugar. En este artículo, trataré de mostrar (i) que la propuesta de Sreenivasan, como es presentada en sus artículos, es lo suficientemente amplia como para ser aceptable para algunas teorías de justicia internacional distributiva, pero no para todas ellas; (ii) que la propuesta de Pogge es más amplia que la de Sreenivasan, en el sentido de que aspira a obtener sustento en todas las diversas concepciones de justicia internacional distributiva, pero depende de la afirmación de que los países desarrollados dañan actualmente a la pobreza global-una afirmación que intentaré defender-; y (iii) que la visión de Pogge y Sreenivasan son compatibles. De hecho, si Sreenivasan asumiera la afirmación central del argumento de Pogge en su propia propuesta, el alcance de las teorías desde las que él podría ganar sustento sería mucho más amplio.

There is a puzzling fact about recent discussions on global justice. The debate, as of today, is fairly sophisticated and advanced, and all kinds of views have been defended. However, this debate has often ignored some of the most flagrant injustices of the real world, or is useless to asses them. Consider the following example: currently, the international financial system is set up in such a way that it forces countries (usually poor ones) to repay their sovereign debts, even if these debts are not morally binding for them. Thus, entire generations end up burdened with debts that were fraudulently incurred in their name. Despite the fact that this problem is massive, global justice scholars have either neglected it, or have not addressed it adequately. In this paper, I attempt to solve the puzzle. That is, I try to explain why there is such a gap in the global justice literature. Also, I propose a new approach to global justice which, in my view, fills this gap.

I argue that one of the most important reasons why international trade has been unfair is that weaker parties in trading negotiations have been illegitimately forced to accept terms of trade that they would not otherwise accept under normal circumstances, and these terms of trade have been harmful for them. Odious debts are at the center of this kind of injustice. Odious debts are debts that are not binding for the citizens of a country, as they were incurred by illegitimate rulers in the name of all the citizens, but used for private purposes, such as personal benefit, or to oppress the population. Despite the fact that these debts are not binding—that is, that they should not be repaid—creditor countries have coerced debtor countries to repay them and, more importantly for the purposes of this article, they have taken advantage of the fact that countries are burdened with these debts by tailoring trade agreements in their favor. They have done so by telling debtor countries that, ...

En este artículo sostengo que muchos países deudores tienen el derecho moral de incurrir en cesación de pagos de sus deudas soberanas. Muestro que deben hacerse excepciones a la afirmación general de que los gobiernos tienen la obligación de devolver préstamos contraídos por gobiernos que le antecedieron.

In this dissertation, I attempt to clarify the concept of odious debts and its relationship with global justice theory. Odious debts are debts that are not binding for the citizens of a country, as they were incurred by an illegitimate government in their name but were used for private purposes. I approach the problem of odious debts from two different perspectives. First, I explore the possible connections between odious debts and the contemporary debate on global justice. I argue that current debates on global justice have focused on the extremely important question of whether the international order is harmful or coercive, but have sometimes reached wrong conclusions about this issue. While some scholars have argued that the international order is not coercive at all, others have argued that it is, but did not find a persuasive way of making the point. Odious debts become relevant in this context, because they show a different way in which the global order could be said to be coe...

In this article I argue that many debtor countries are morally entitled to default on a big portion of their sovereign debts. I will do this by showing that exceptions to the general claim that governments have the obligation to repay debts incurred by past governments should be made.

The article compares two different interpretations of Kant's categorical imperative −the practical and the logical one− and defends the practical one, arguing that it is superior because it rejects cases of free riding without necessarily rejecting cases of coordination or timing. The logical interpretation, on the other hand, leads to the undesirable outcome that it does not reject immoral cases of free riding, and to the desired outcome that it does not reject maxims of coordination/timing. Given that neither of them rejects maxims of coordination/timing (they are similar in that sense) and only the practical interpretation rejects free riding, the logical interpretation should be rejected.El artículo compara dos interpretaciones diferentes del imperativo categórico kantiano −la práctica y la lógica− y defiende la superioridad de la práctica debido a que rechaza los casos de free riding, sin rechazar necesariamente los casos de coordinación/tiempo. La interpretación lógica, en...

According to a popular view, defended by Pogge and other, trade agreements between wealthy and poor countries, as currently structured, are coercive and unfair for developing countries. Against this view, I argue that such agreements should be understood as exploitative instead of coercive. The difference between these two notions is a substantial one, as in the case of coercive proposals one of the parties is made worse off, while in the case of exploitative proposals both parties improve their situation. I rely on familiar accounts of coercion and exploitation, defended by Wertheimer, to make this point.