Peer-Reviewed Articles by Luis L Schenoni
International Studies Quarterly, 2024
After the Napoleonic Wars interstate war regularly occurred throughout the Western Hemisphere-unt... more After the Napoleonic Wars interstate war regularly occurred throughout the Western Hemisphere-until in matter of decades it disappeared. After the 1930s even low-level militarized interstate conflict became less frequent, shorter, and less severe over time. What explains the change in this specific region and historical jucture? We argue that leaders in the Americas identified territorial disputes and foreign intervention as interrelated problems that frequently caused the interstate war. In response, they developed a unique regional norm-complex that bundled together the norms of territorial integrity and non-intervention with the principle of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm complex emerged via Latin American entrepreneurship shortly after independence, cascaded with Pan-Americanism, and crystallized around the signature of the Saavedra Lamas Treaty in the early 1930s. We explain how, why, and when norm complexes develop. We then investigate the evolution and effects of the Latin American norm complex via statistics and within-case counterfactuals. We conclude that interstate war disappeared from the Americas with the acceptance and codification of this norm-complex.
International Security, 2024
was plagued by rebellion. The French political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville remarked in 1835 t... more was plagued by rebellion. The French political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville remarked in 1835 that "the turmoil of revolution is. .. the most natural state of the South American Spaniards at the present time." 1 Two decades thereafter, Bolivian President Manuel Isidoro Belzú summarized the plight of most statesmen in the region when he complained about "successive revolutions, revolutions in the south, revolutions in the north, revolutions fomented by my enemies, headed by my friends, put together in my house, arising from my side; holy God!" 2 Although not all of these revolts escalated to full-scale civil wars, they collectively killed hundreds of thousands, generated continual political instability, devastated economies, and forestalled growth. By the turn of the century, however, South American countries began to experience signiªcantly fewer revolts. Indeed, the number of revolts dropped from an average of more than forty-ªve per decade in the nineteenth century to less than twenty-one per decade from 1900 to 1929. Revolts did not decline in all countries of the region: rebellions continued to occur frequently in Ecuador and Paraguay during the early twentieth century. Nor did all types of revolts diminish at the same rate. Whereas the number of revolts that originated outside the state apparatus were four times as frequent as military coups at the beginning of the nineteenth century, these two types of revolts occurred at roughly the same rate in the 1920s, owing to the sharp decline of the former. In addition, revolts in the ªrst few decades of the twentieth century
This paper integrates the scholarship on compliance with international human rights courts to ref... more This paper integrates the scholarship on compliance with international human rights courts to reflect upon how the literature approaches delays and compliance cycles. Building on this review, we propose a new analytical approach that helps distinguish between reparations prone to immediate or protracted implementation. We introduce two metrics to facilitate the interpretation of delays: the yearly probability of compliance and the expected time to compliance. We also show, using machine-learning tools, how scholars can reconstruct life cycles of compliance. The article illustrates the utility of this approach with an analysis of all cases decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) between 1989 and 2019. This analytical framework provides critical insights for courts and activists seeking to promote interventions at key moments when compliance is most likely. Moreover, the study underscores important lessons for the Inter-American Human Rights System. Current concerns about a compliance "crisis" at the IACtHR partly reflect a failure to distinguish between reparation types and the Court's preference for reparations requiring protracted implementation. By modeling compliance life cycles, our study opens a promising research avenue that can facilitate effectual and timely policy intervention.
International Politics, 2021
Recent trends demonstrate that states with sufficient capabilities to be granted regional power s... more Recent trends demonstrate that states with sufficient capabilities to be granted regional power status by its peers (primarily other states within their region) can nonetheless renounce regional leadership. This article analyzes the puzzling behavior of these detached or reluctant regional powers. We argue that resorting to an approach grounded in neoclassical realism is helpful to explain why regional powers might not exercise leadership. In this article regional leadership is conceptualized as an auxiliary goal within the grand strategy of a regional power. This goal will be pursued in the absence of certain structural and domestic constraints. Great power competition determines the incentives for regional leadership at the structural level. Capacity to extract and mobilize resources for foreign policy affects the decision to pursue leadership at the domestic level. We apply the analytical framework to analyze Brazil's detachment from South America after the Cardoso and Lula presidencies.
Foreign Policy Analysis, 2022
In this article, we provide a framework to analyze the foreign policy overstretch of middle power... more In this article, we provide a framework to analyze the foreign policy overstretch of middle powers, that is, their recent tendency to expand foreign policy goals and ambitions beyond their capabilities. We propose that overstretch results from the interaction of permissive international environments and the collusion of domestic actors to produce foreign policy myths. These myths, in turn, justify unsustainable swelling of foreign policy expenditures until they are shattered. After laying out our theory, we test it against the case of twenty-first-century Brazil. First, we document how interest groups logrolled to foster and capitalize on a "myth of multipolarity," which, once entrenched in elite discourse and public opinion, resulted in a tangible overgrowth of foreign policy. Second, we show the extent of overstretch across four indicators-number of embassies, participation in peacekeeping operations, membership in international organizations, and aid projects overseas-using the synthetic control method to compare Brazil with a plausible counterfactual.
American Journal of Political Science , 2021
Scholars have often dismissed the effect of war on state formation in regions like Latin America,... more Scholars have often dismissed the effect of war on state formation in regions like Latin America, where mobilization for war is deemed insufficiently intense and international conflict fails to out-select weaker states. Against this conventional wisdom, I contend that wars can affect state-building trajectories in a postwar period through the different state institutions that result from victory and defeat. After reconsidering the role of war outcomes in classical bellicist theory I use difference-indifferences analysis to identify the effect of losing vis-à-vis winning a war on levels of state capacity in a panel of Latin America (1865-1913). I then illustrate my causal mechanisms in case studies of the Paraguayan War (1864-1870) and the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and apply the synthetic control method to these cases. Although out-selection of losers obscures the effect of war outcomes in European history, Latin America illuminates their long-term consequences.
International Studies Quarterly, 2020
Why do some territorial disputes defy settlement? Through what mechanism might these resistant te... more Why do some territorial disputes defy settlement? Through what mechanism might these resistant territorial disputes be settled? We propose that the answer involves three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, the dispute must receive attention—i.e., be (re)placed and (re)prioritized on the dyad's agenda. Second, governments need altered preferences that expand the bargaining range so they can break deadlock and pursue settlement. Finally, disputing states need third-party assistance to facilitate, locate, incentivize, and support a settlement of their protracted dispute. We test this “AAA Model” in post–World War II Latin America. To do this, we first theorize the particular form of the general model; in post–1945 Latin America, attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance operate through the mechanisms of militarization, democratization, and mediation respectively. We then identify resistant territorial disputes and advance a novel, multimethod research design to evaluate our hypotheses—one that relies more heavily on within-case counterfactual analysis. An extensive series of these counterfactual analyses, along with a statistical analysis, produce consistent, significant support for our model. When resistant territorial disputes in post–1945 Latin America have attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance simultaneously, they always settle; when they lack any one factor, however, settlement never occurs.
Security Studies, 2020
Why did Argentina risk seizing the Malvinas/Falkland Islands by force in 1982, provoking a war ag... more Why did Argentina risk seizing the Malvinas/Falkland Islands by force in 1982, provoking a war against Great Britain, and what are the larger implications of this case? We revisit this influential episode using counterfactual analysis to interpret newly declassified declarations of high-ranking state officials involved in the decision to occupy the islands. These sources cast doubt on the diversionary-war and miscalculation theses of the Malvinas/Falklands War, among other extant interpretations. Evidence suggests long-term power dynamics and prospect theory better explain Argentine foreign policy behavior leading to the war. Due to aversion to tangible losses, the leadership of waning states like Argentina might favor risky military strategies despite their low expected utility. These biases may provoke a war if decision-making groups are small and isolated from de-biasing influences. Our explanation illustrates the value of prospect theory to understand why certain declining states behave aggressively and more plausibly explains the Malvinas/Falklands War when confronted to set-theoretic counterfactual analysis.
Latin American Research Review, 2020
This article examines patterns of change and continuity in Latin American foreign policies. It as... more This article examines patterns of change and continuity in Latin American foreign policies. It asks two interrelated questions: How can we conceptually and empirically account for foreign policy change? And why do states change their foreign policies in Latin America? To answer these questions, we used the results of a new expert survey on foreign policy preferences in the region between 1980 and 2014. The results we obtained using both linear and nonparametric specifications are very clear and consistent: presidential ideology is what matters the most. Simply put, a change in the ideology of the president produces a change in foreign policy that is almost equivalent in magnitude, all other theoretically relevant factors set to their means. En este artículo, examinamos los patrones de cambio y continuidad en las políticas exteriores de América Latina. Lo hacemos planteando dos preguntas relacionadas: ¿Cómo podemos dar cuenta conceptual y empíricamente del cambio en la política exterior? ¿Por qué los estados en América Latina cambian su política exterior? Para contestar estas preguntas, utilizamos los resultados de una nueva encuesta a expertos sobre las preferencias de política exterior entre 1980 y 2014. Los resultados obtenidos utilizando especificaciones lineales y no-paramétricas son claros y consistentes: la ideología presidencial es lo que más importa. Puesto de manera simple, un cambio en la ideología del presidente produce un cambio en la política exterior que es casi equivalente en su magnitud, ajustando todos los demás factores teóricamente relevantes a sus promedios.
Democratization, 2019
We contribute to the extensive literature on international influences on democratization and demo... more We contribute to the extensive literature on international influences on democratization and democratic breakdowns by conceptualizing hegemonic mechanisms of regime change and offering empirical assessments of hegemonic influences. Our findings are based on a multi-methods approach and highlight the varying importance of hegemonic mechanisms in post-1945 Latin America. We argue that US support for democratization was consistent in the wave of transitions to democracy that began in Latin America in 1978 and that it was decisive in many of these transitions. While some past work has attributed responsibility to the US for the waves of democratic breakdowns from 1948 to 1956 and 1964 to 1976, an examination of the 27 breakdowns from 1945 to 2010 gives reason to doubt this interpretation. Future research could use these conceptual and methodological tools to explore the role of other powers in waves of democracy and authoritarianism.
America Latina Hoy, 2019
Este trabajo busca contribuir a la literatura sobre los factores internacionales que afectan el s... more Este trabajo busca contribuir a la literatura sobre los factores internacionales que afectan el surgimiento y ruptura de la democracia a través de la conceptualización y análisis empírico de diversos mecanismos por los cuales una potencia internacional puede provocar cambios de régimen en su área de influencia. A través de múltiples métodos, analizamos el rol de Estados Unidos en 64 episodios (27 quiebres y 37 transiciones democráticas) que tuvieron lugar en América Latina entre 1945 y 2010. Primero, utilizamos la técnica de análisis cualitativo comparado (qca) para examinar el papel que desempeñaron las embajadas estadounidenses en estos episodios. Segundo, estudiamos casos específicos (las primeas transiciones y quiebres en olas de cambio de régimen) donde la influencia de Washington es claramente discernible de los efectos de la difusión. Tercero, analizamos estadísticamente el impacto de los flujos de ayuda externa de Estados Unidos sobre las probabilidades de supervivencia de los regímenes políticos de la región. Nuestros resultados sugieren que el apoyo a la democracia por parte de los Estados Unidos fue consistente durante la ola de transiciones democráticas que comenzó en la región en 1978, y que fue decisivo en muchas de estas transiciones. En comparación, la importancia de estos mecanismos hegemónicos en las olas autoritarias que tuvieron lugar entre 1948 y 1956 y entre 1964 y 1976 es menos evidente. Futuras investigaciones podrían utilizar las herramientas conceptuales y metodológicas aquí propuestas para explorar el rol de esta y otras potencias regionales en procesos similares de expansión y retracción internacional de la democracia.
Foreign Policy Analysis, 2018
Almost four decades have passed since the Argentina-Brazil balance of power gave way to a Brazili... more Almost four decades have passed since the Argentina-Brazil balance of power gave way to a Brazilian uncontested primacy in the Southern Cone. The peaceful and cooperative nature of this regional power transition poses an interesting puzzle for structural theories and those concerned with the US-China transition. Why do certain countries accept accommodation more leniently, like Argentina did? I offer an explanatory model and use process tracing to show that key cooperative turns in this bilateral relationship—during the late 1970s and early 1990s—required concurrent structural changes, both at the international and domestic levels. My conclusions suggest, against the prevalent narrative, that cooperation between Argentina and Brazil was not a product of democracy. Instead, peaceful power transitions take place when the costs of confrontation are high and social coalitions are largely redefined in the declining state.
Desarrollo Económico, 2020
Resumen Cuatro décadas han pasado desde que el equilibrio de poder argentino-brasileño en el Cono... more Resumen Cuatro décadas han pasado desde que el equilibrio de poder argentino-brasileño en el Cono Sur dio paso a una primacía indisputada de Brasil. La naturaleza pacífica y cooperativa de esta transición de poder regional plantea un interesante puzle para las teorías estructuralistas en boga que vaticinan crecientes tenciones entre Estados Unidos y China. ¿Por qué ciertos países aceptan su declinación de forma más indulgente, como lo hizo Argentina en aquella coyuntura? En este artículo ofrezco un modelo formal y utilizo la técnica de rastreo de procesos para demostrar que el giro cooperativo clave en esta relación se produjo entre finales de los años setenta y principios de los noventa. Mis conclusiones sugieren, en contra de la narrativa prevalente, que la cooperación entre Argentina y Brasil no fue producto de la democratización. En cambio, el caso Sudamericano sugiere que las transiciones de poder pacíficas tienen lugar cuando los costos de confrontar son altos y las coaliciones de política exterior son redefinidas en el estado declinante.
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 2019
Somewhere in between unipolar and imperial orders, hegemonies divide the continuum from anarchy t... more Somewhere in between unipolar and imperial orders, hegemonies divide the continuum from anarchy to hierarchy in world politics, connoting interstate systems of the highest concentration of authority. However, depending on the author, hegemony might denote the concentration of relative capabilities in a single state, the presence of a state that seeks international leadership, general consent in the international society regarding subordination to a central order, or a combination of these phenomena. Similarly, scholars debate the extent to which the relation of authority entailed by hegemony should encompass the economic, military, and/or ideational domains. Given this multiplicity of meanings, this review of extant definitions illuminates some issues that must be addressed explicitly when dealing with this concept. Although hegemony might mean different things for different intellectual traditions, these understandings are interconnected in a family resemblance structure that has facilitated mutual intelligibility. A mapping of this network of meanings suggests that special attention needs to be paid to how scholars have thought about the capabilities that would-be hegemons have, the roles they play, and the type of response they elicit from subordinate states. It also suggests the economic, military, and ideational dimensions of hegemony should be explicitly considered in theoretical discussions. Finally, it highlights the importance of avoiding ambiguity by connecting theory with empirics and providing clear measurement strategies. Measurement is essential to delineate the geographical and temporal scope of hegemonies with more precision, to compare them, and to evaluate their effects on certain outcomes. Debates about hegemony have undergone important empirical progress throughout the decades rendering this a promising area for future research.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2017
The idea of an integrated Latin American region goes back to the early postindependence period, a... more The idea of an integrated Latin American region goes back to the early postindependence period, and yet, in substance, Latin American regionalism has remained far behind its stated aims. The perceived implementation gap has raised the question why policymakers continued to talk about something they appeared to avoid in practice. This article contributes to the debate on Latin America’s integration gap by exploring the phenomenon of declaratory regionalism – the practice of referring to the region and its institutions in political speeches. Based on quantitative text analysis of the speeches presidents delivered annually at the UN’s General Assembly between 1994 and 2014, we show that this practice has not been uniform. Presidents distinguish between different forms of regionalism, integration and cooperation, and frame the geographical region they refer to accordingly. In motivating presidents to speak about integration as opposed to cooperation, ideology and democratic performance stand out as crucial factors.
If one interprets China's sizable rise in Latin America as an unprecedented phenomenon , it follo... more If one interprets China's sizable rise in Latin America as an unprecedented phenomenon , it follows that the concurrent story of declining U.S. influence in the region is an event hastily acknowledged at best and ignored at worst. In this article, we ask whether Chinese economic statecraft in Latin America is related to the declining U.S. hegemonic influence in the region and explore how. To do so we analyze foreign direct investments, bank loans, and international trade from 2003 to 2014, when China became a major player in the region. We use data from 21 Latin American countries, and find that an inversely proportional relationship exists between the investments made by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), bank loans, manufacturing exports, and the U.S. hegemonic influence exerted in the region. In other words, Beijing has filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the latter's own backyard.
In this article, we examine patterns of change and continuity in Latin American foreign policies.... more In this article, we examine patterns of change and continuity in Latin American foreign policies. We do so by asking two interrelated questions: How can we conceptually and empirically account for foreign policy change? And why do states change their foreign policies in Latin America? To answer these questions, we used the results of a new expert survey on foreign policy preferences in the region between 1980 and 2014. The results we obtained using both linear and non-parametric regression models are very clear and consistent: presidential ideology and institutions matter the most.
Democracy and Security , 2018
What is the effect of foreign aid on the survival of autocratic regimes? Extant work about the ef... more What is the effect of foreign aid on the survival of autocratic regimes? Extant work about the effect of foreign aid on the recipient’s political regime has come to contradictory conclusions. Current findings display the full spectrum of possibilities from a democratizing effect to the enhancement of authoritarian survival. While some studies suggest that foreign aid strengthen autocrats and their incentives to cling to power, others have focused on specific periods and donors, thus finding a democratizing effect of foreign aid. In this article, we argue that the effect of foreign aid on autocratic survival does not operate in a direct way, but it is conditional on the levels of political leverage exerted by democratic donors vis-à-vis the autocratic leaders. This leverage, we find, is defined by the capability of democratic donors to back conditionality with effective political pressure. More specifically, we find that given similar levels of aid, autocratic recipients that are highly dependent on the United States—a quintessential democratic donor with extensive political influence—have a shorter survival rate when compared to those with which the United States has weaker ties and thus lower leverage.
This article explores the possibility of conceiving South America and Southern Africa as subsyste... more This article explores the possibility of conceiving South America and Southern Africa as subsystemic unipolarities under Brazilian and South African primacy, respectively. It argues that this concept, when applied to these regions, sheds light not only on the long-term strategies behind the Brazilian and South African foreign policies towards their neighbourhood, but also on the behaviour of secondary regional powers and small states. This hypothesis questions the maxim that considerations related to polarity affect great powers only. After examining the Brazilian and South African cases, the author undertakes a comparative analysis of 17 countries in these regions, showing that the behaviour of politically stable countries is as predicted by theories of unipolarity.
In this article we summarize the precepts of Peripheral Realism, its place in the intellectual hi... more In this article we summarize the precepts of Peripheral Realism, its place in the intellectual history of International Relations Theory, its contributions to interpreting Latin American international politics and its insights for the future. After revising the intellectual merits and tenets of the theory in the four initial sections, we show how it predicted the behavior of Latin American states under unipolarity. Finally, we review its implications for a world where China may hold economic primacy.
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Peer-Reviewed Articles by Luis L Schenoni
The article addresses the main question related to South American unipolarity (1985–2014): Why have most countries in the region not implemented any consistent balancing or bandwagoning strategies vis‐à‐vis Brazil? Drawing on neoclassical realism, the article proposes that certain domestic variables – government instability, limited party‐system institutionalization, and powerful presidents – have diverted the attention of political elites and foreign policy executives from the challenges generated by a rising Brazil. Crisp‐set qualitative comparative analysis is used to test this hypothesis and other alternative explanations for the regional imbalance.
a los hacedores de pronósticos.
Por estos mismos motivos, en este artículo hablaré de cuatro escenarios posibles. Tres de ellos habrán sido descartados en unos pocos meses y solo alguno (siendo optimista) prevalecerá. Para identificarlos, propongo analizar (a) el perfil ideológico y las propuestas del flamante presidente argentino, (b) las instituciones
que pueden moldear sus decisiones en materia de política exterior, y (c) los cambios de contexto que pueden afectar
sus capacidades y/o sus preferencias. En particular, pondré el foco en dos factores contextuales que parecen ser de especial importancia para definir los rumbos de la política exterior: la suerte de la izquierda latinoamericana (incluido el kirchnerismo en repliegue) y el apoyo que Macri reciba de occidente y los mercados.
gelang der UNASUR, einige nationale wie regionale Konflikte zu entschärfen beziehungsweise zu lösen. Damit wurde die Erwartung geweckt, sie werde auch künftig südamerikanische
Probleme souverän und autonom bewältigen. In der aktuellen venezolanischen Krise stößt die UNASUR jedoch an ihre Grenzen. Ihre Legitimität wird auf die Probe gestellt.
Cet article tente de dépasser l’interprétation des cycles d'euphorie et de déception à travers une analyse de trente années d’uni polarité sud-américaine. Pour cela, il situe l’Amérique du Sud dans une transition entre l’historique bipolarité Argentine-Brésilienne et la prédominance régionale actuelle de ce dernier. Par la suite, il relate les éléments quantitatifs et qualitatifs qui distinguent le Brésil de ses voisins et aux voisins entre eux. En finalité, il considère les relations avec ces voisins depuis ces trois dernières décennies et découvre la logique régional par derrière la montée du Brésil.
covers 79 different countries at risk for conflict over the period 1989–2019. Data are available on a yearly basis for these countries, and there are 2,432 individual data points. Short narratives are matched with barometer scores for three illustrative cases: Haiti, Venezuela, and Mozambique.