Papers by Sara Rachel Chant
Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, 2013
The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, 2017
The Cambridge History of Atheism, 2021
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2019
New Waves in Metaphysics, 2010
Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single ... more Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single object, we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of actions composes a single action. Peter van Inwagen calls the problem concerning material objects the ‘special composition question’ (van Inwagen 1985). I have argued elsewhere (Chant 2006) that van Inwagen’s question may be applied to actions to pose what I have called ‘the special composition question in action.’
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2015
In this paper, I advance a counterexample to the collective agency thesis.
Selbstbeobachtung der modernen Gesellschaft und die neuen Grenzen des Sozialen, 2012
When action theory is applied to the study of groups rather than individuals, it is a common assu... more When action theory is applied to the study of groups rather than individuals, it is a common assumption that concepts relating to the group can be analyzed in analogy to those of the individual. For instance, we typically explain an individual’s actions by citing (among other factors) the beliefs and desires of that individual. So when we explain why Bob went for a walk, we might do so by noting that Bob had the desire to get some fresh air, and that he believed he could accomplish this by going for a walk.
New Waves in Philosophy of Action, 2011
Most analyses of collective action proceed by citing a set of rationalizing reasons why each indi... more Most analyses of collective action proceed by citing a set of rationalizing reasons why each individual agent in the group would participate in the action. This explanatory strategy is appropriate for an important class of collective actions, deserving detailed study. However, there is another important class of collective actions that is necessarily overlooked by what I shall call “rational choice accounts.” These are cases in which a collective action is performed despite the fact that there are structural reasons why the individuals cannot rationally justify their contributory actions. In this paper, I discuss varieties of collective action, focusing on those which cannot be explained by appealing to the rationality of the individuals involved. I go on to suggest some ways in which we might profitably study this important class.
ABSTRACT Includes essays that challenge the need for a theory of collective intentionality as wel... more ABSTRACT Includes essays that challenge the need for a theory of collective intentionality as well as essays that extend and enrich existing theories of collective intentionality The essays concerning collective rationality (part II) break new ground in that they challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it has become increasingly popular to analyze such collective actions in terms of collective intentions. This volume brings together ten new philosophical essays that address issues such as how individuals succeed in maintaining coordination throughout the performance of a collective action, whether groups can actually believe propositions or whether they merely accept them, and what kind of evidence, if any, disciplines such as cognitive science and semantics provide in support of irreducibly collective states. The theories of the Big Four of collective intentionality - Michael Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, John Searle, and Margaret Gilbert - and the Big Five of Social Ontology - which in addition to the Big Four includes Philip Pettit - play a central role in almost all of these essays. Drawing on insights from a wide range of disciplines including dynamical systems theory, economics, and psychology, the contributors develop existing theories, criticize them, or provide alternatives to them. Several essays challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality, and explore the interplay between these levels in order to shed new light on the alleged discontinuities between them. These contributions make abundantly clear that it is no longer an option simply to juxtapose analyses of individual and collective level phenomena and maintain that there is a discrepancy. Some go as far as arguing that on closer inspection the alleged discontinuities dissolve Readership: The primary audience consists of scholars working on collective intentionality and collective rationality. This includes scholars working in philosophy - in particular, social ontology, philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of action, and philosophy of mind - as well as scholars in disciplines as diverse as cognitive science, economics, psychology, and sociology. Edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia, Frank Hindriks, Assistant Professor, University of Groningen, and Gerhard Preyer, Adjunct Professor, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University SRC: Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia; FH: Assistant Professor, University of Grogingen; GP: Adjunct Professor, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University and co-editor of CONTEXTUALISM IN PHILOSOPHY (0UP, 2005). Contributors: Melinda Bonnie Fagan, Rice University Kaarlo Miller, University of Helsinki Kirk Ludwig, Indiana University-Bloomington Julian Nida-Rumelin, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munchen Abe Roth, Ohio State University Robert D. Rupert, University of Colorado-Boulder Frederick F. Schmitt, Indiana University-Bloomington Deborah Tollefsen, University of Memphis Raimo Tuomela, University of Helsinki Paul Weirich, University of Missouri-Columbia
Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents, 2013
In this paper, I offer an argument for the existence of ‘real collective responsibility’ and the ... more In this paper, I offer an argument for the existence of ‘real collective responsibility’ and the beginnings of an analysis of it. ‘Real collective responsibility’ refers to the responsibility that is borne by a group of individuals, but which is not reducible to the responsibility of each individual in the group. The approach I take is to draw an analogy between the uncontroversial way in which an individual’s moral responsibility may be mitigated when her behavior is coerced, and the way in which group dynamics may exert pressure constraining the behavior of each member of a group. This sort of consideration suggests that real collective responsibility may occur when a group finds itself in a highly stable, accessible Nash equilibrium, which I refer to as the SANE condition for real collective responsibility.
The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Jun 1, 2016
I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality:... more I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
According to the collective agency thesis:
(CA) If collective moral responsibility attaches to... more According to the collective agency thesis:
(CA) If collective moral responsibility attaches to a collective as such, and not simply to the individuals who compose it, then the collective must be a distinct agent.
In this paper, I advance a counterexample to the collective agency thesis.
Mind, 2008
Writers on collective action are in broad agreement that in order for a group of agents to form a... more Writers on collective action are in broad agreement that in order for a group of agents to form a collective intention, the members of that group must have beliefs about the beliefs of the other members. But in spite of the fact that this so-called 'interactive knowledge' is central to virtually every account of collective intention, writers on this subject have not offered a detailed account of the nature of interactive knowledge. In this paper, we argue that such an account is necessary for any adequate analysis of collective intention. Furthermore, we argue that an application of Robert Aumann's theory of interactive knowledge may be used to address several puzzling features of collective intention.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2006
Abstract: Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects compose... more Abstract: Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single object, we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of actions composes a single action. In the material objects literature, this question is known as the “special composition question,” and I take it that there is a similar question to be asked of collections of actions. I will call that question the “special composition question in action,” and argue that the correct answer to this question depends on a particular kind of consequence produced by the individual constituent actions.
Philosophical Studies, 2007
In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions shou... more In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
In this paper, I offer an argument for the existence of 'real collective responsibility' and the ... more In this paper, I offer an argument for the existence of 'real collective responsibility' and the beginnings of an analysis of it. 'Real collective responsibility' refers to the responsibility that is borne by a group of individuals, but which is not reducible to the responsibility of each individual in the group. The approach I take is to draw an analogy between the uncontroversial way in which an individual's moral responsibility may be mitigated when her behavior is coerced, and the way in which group dynamics may exert pressure constraining the behavior of each member of a group. This sort of consideration suggests that real collective responsibility may occur when a group finds itself in a highly stable, accessible Nash equilibrium, which I refer to as the SANE condition for real collective responsibility.
Philosophical Explorations, 2007
In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pr... more In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called 'aggregate action'. Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I shall call) 'unintentional collective actions'.
New Waves in Metaphysics
This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proo... more This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Please contact [email protected] if you have any queries regarding use of the file.
Studia Logica - An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 2007
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Papers by Sara Rachel Chant
(CA) If collective moral responsibility attaches to a collective as such, and not simply to the individuals who compose it, then the collective must be a distinct agent.
In this paper, I advance a counterexample to the collective agency thesis.
(CA) If collective moral responsibility attaches to a collective as such, and not simply to the individuals who compose it, then the collective must be a distinct agent.
In this paper, I advance a counterexample to the collective agency thesis.