School of Public Policy (SPP)

This research aims to examine the role of social network in the 2014 anticoup protest in Thailand. It employs two frameworks to help analyse the relationship - Gene Sharp’s nonviolent action theory and Martin and Varney’s nonviolence and the communication. Comparing the consequences of two anti-coup protests in 2006 and 2014, it was found that social network helps communicating the protest as nonviolent movement by creating dialogue, equalizing power between protesters and the government, as well as mobilizing the support from the third parties such as international press, rights organization and intergovernmental organizations. Furthermore, social network helps empowering the movement as it creates solidarity among the opposition as collective and individual. While Internet plays important role in mobilizing and providing discussion platform for both 2006 and 2014 anti-coup protests, social network plays a more distinct role in helping the 2014 protest achieve its goal as the nonviolent movement. At the same time, backlash from the state to crackdown dissents via social media is also harsher in the latter case.

In this paper, I will employ the theories of narrative and social action to examine the alternative news outlet Prachatai, based in Bangkok, Thailand. My research question will focus on the theory of narrative and social change, and how it can be used by the organization to even improve the social impact of its work, the public perception of the organization, and the internal learning processes.

The paper elaborates how the organization functions as a producer of the resistant narratives that could bring about changes in particular social institutions. In turn, Prachatai also uses narratives it created to justify the organizational stance and its work, partially perceived by the public as controversial, as a part of widely accepted and international framework such as human rights and freedom of speech. I will also examine how these narratives enhance learning process within the organization, and how it can improve further than the existing measures.

Although the fighting between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) finished six years ago, the conflict is far from over. The failure of the government to provide meaningful rehabilitation to the ex-combatants has led to continuous socio-economic marginalization. Long under the state of emergency, the army often employed torture and sexual violence on the former fighters to gain information, and as a warning to prevent them from ever again rebelling. High levels of militarization in the north and east to prevent future radicalization among the Tamils has proven to be more harmful than good for the ex-combatants and the Tamil community. It allows harassment, threats and violence to the mostly female-headed households that have no representation in the local governance. High level of control and monitoring also creates distrust and alienation of the ex-combatants from their own communities. Instead of integrating and de-radicalizing these traumatized ex-combatants, the government reduce the chance for preventing conflicts with the implementation of these problematic policies.

This paper will examine the differences of the economic development path that South Korea took and was overlooked by Thailand. It will begin by examining the origins of the institutions that enabled South Korea to maximize its resources and bring sustainable economic development, while for Thailand its institutions are less competent. The systematic vulnerability has pressured Korea to expand and improve its human capital, at the same time constituted a strong public-private partnership that encourages innovation and technology transfer. Whereas in Thailand, the fairly abundance of land and agriculture has put less pressure on the Thai elites to improve its institutional performance. As a result, it remain quite lagged behind the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East Asia such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Fyodor Bondarchuk's 2013 Stalingrad was both the Russian Federation's first IMAX production and its highest grossing domestic blockbuster. And Stalingrad was also steeped in controversy-particularly over its Nazi character Peter Kahn, who was labeled by some as "an enemy with a face" and by others as a glorification of Nazism. Though similar depictions of Nazis developed in Hollywood and other Western cinema nearly 50 years ago and represent shifting understandings of the Second World War, a recent surge in literature on present-day representations of Nazism in world media has largely overlooked the former Soviet Union. The thesis attempts to fill this gap by attempting to explain why the representation of the Nazi figure in Stalingrad generated the divided discourse it did by conducting a thematic analysis of a corpus of film reviews published online between September and November 2013. In doing so, this thesis identifies a "memory war," in which three major meta-themes relied upon by Russian film critics in discussing Stalingrad's Nazi are revealed. These meta-themes suggest certain societal anxieties with the present-day narrative and memory of the Great Patriotic War, including worry over foreign interference in Russia's national mythology and whether or not the memory of the war can be successfully transferred to and instilled in the youngest generation.

This essay will look at the trajectory of “boom and bust” market cycle and social movement history from the period of the Great Depression to the post 2008 global financial crisis to illustrate why agency matters over the long durée. I argue that the market has indeed evolved based on the global historical events and the intellectual discourse of the time. I will look at how the works of Keynes and Hayek have influenced the current economic system which led to further globalisation, and contrast it with Karl Polanyi’s caution that the market society that is built on the concept of land, labour and money as fictitious commodities had caused negative outcomes, such as the arrival of fascism, social dislocation and environmental degradation.

Karl Polanyi, in his book, “The Great Transformation,” suggested that the fascist movement that triggered the World War II, emerged “as an alternative solution to the problem of an industrial society” (1944, 234) and culminated during the collapse of the economy in the great downturn of the 1930. Interestingly, we are seeing a similar historical pattern occurring today, 70 years after the book was published. The extremist movements like the Islamic State (ISIS) militant groups in the Middle East and neo-Nazis in Europe are on the rise, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, which is the worst economic meltdown since The Great Depression. Despite this, I argue that there is a possibility for positive change. On the other end of the line, the Occupy Movement and the Localisation movement give hope that positive change is not impossible. This essay will analyse the conditions that allow these two movements to emerge, thrive and sustain.

This research note looks at the radical influencers of Bosnian foreign fighters. This group is important, as the Balkan region has been seen as a spot of jihadist activism and recruitment for the IS and Al-Nusra Front. Previous research on foreign fighters emphasized that a small number of individuals (religious leaders, former combatants, and others) at the local level play a significant role in this recruitment. The influence of such figures results in hotspots of radical activism, which are called “power centers” here. This research note argues that such dynamics are likely to be even more evident in postwar societies due to state weaknesses, which create more power for social actors and inhibit counterterrorism. The paper also analyses the role of leader-led radical “institutions” that have appeared after the Bosnian War. By doing so, it stresses the significance of local radical influencers in the recruitment of Bosnian foreign fighters. The research note shows that radical influencers in postwar radical milieus manage to “institutionalize” their authority by filling the void left by domestic war(s) with life guidance and religious values. The paper provides insights into the social relations, authority and decision-making connected with foreign fighter departures to Syria and Iraq (2012-2016).

Border control was introduced in Europe as an emergency response to the pandemic between March and May 2020. Following a process of re-opening, countries apply restrictions depending on national risk analyses, as well as individual political and economic interests. Quarantine and testing rules have been adopted across member states in various combinations. However, the rapidly changing situation and the lack of adequate risk assessments have proven these measures to be irrational in some cases. This policy paper evaluates the implementation of travel restrictions in Europe due to COVID-19 to provide an understanding of the relevance of the new border regimes. The analysis seeks to answer the question of whether border restrictions are an effective measure to tackle the pandemic in case of ongoing and future outbreaks. The recommendations provided in this paper address national government officials and security experts. Among the discussed options, closing borders shall be the option least preferred by policy makers due to its negative consequences for the freedom of movement of individuals, goods and services.

Local and international media continuously tell stories about people who, after having joined the Islamic State (IS) a few years ago, cannot return home from Syrian camps. These stories display the security dilemma that European governments have to deal with: how to manage the risk? By banning IS nationals from coming back home and not taking any responsibility for them, or by repatriating and prosecuting them? Balkan countries have also faced this dilemma in recent years. More than 1000 men, women and children from this region travelled to Iraq and Syria between 2012 and 2016. 1/3 of them were killed, 1/3 have returned, while 1/3 of them are still there. In February 2021, UN human rights experts made a new call for states to repatriate their citizens from the camps in northeastern Syria. 3 Two years after the IS “caliphate” was defeated in Syria and more than three years after the fall of the last IS territory in Iraq, 13,500 foreign women and children remain in camps held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). There are also 2,000 male foreign fighters in prisons in Syria. It is hard to estimate the exact number of foreign terrorist  fighters (FTFs), as some of them have dual citizenship and others have already had their citizenship revoked deprived of their nationality.4 They represent around 60 different nationalities.5 The prosecution of Balkan FTFs has been seen as problematic for several reasons. The first is the governments’ reluctance to repatriate their citizens. As there is no international framework stipulating how states should tackle the issue, countries in the region have taken individual approaches. In addition, governments in Europe show no political interest in repatriating their citizens, which has made Balkan countries more reluctant.

Disinformation campaigns have become a considerable threat to domestic political processes across Europe. The 2017 French and German elections testified to Russian efforts to meddle in domestic political affairs. The Visegrad states have also been targets of extensive disinformation campaigns following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The pro-Kremlin disinformation strategy in Central Europe weakens the West while strengthening the Russian political influence on the region. This policy brief discusses information warfare threats to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and evaluates their state-level strategic responses. The paper specifically focuses on pro-Russian disinformation activities as a form of cyber-threat. It argues that while some Visegrad states securitize the issue at the political level, other offer an environment conducive to online propaganda simply because they do not consider it a problem. At least three factors contribute to the cyber-security behaviour of the Visegrad states: 1) Capacity to react, 2) Political regime change and 3) Relationship with Russia. This analysis aims to provide local governments with a comprehensive overview of the V4 cyber-security landscape, help them improve their national policies and deepen regional cooperation.

The threat of jihadi terrorism in Europe remains a security concern at the end of 2020. Following the 2020 Vienna attack, governments across Central Europe responded with both political statements and security checks. Although Czechia has never been a primary target of a major jihadi attack, there is a need to understand the nature of the threat that is about cross-border radicalization and challenges related to European citizens who returned to the region after joining jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq. This policy paper assesses the external and internal threat of jihadi terrorism to Czechia. The analysis makes two recommendations to policy makers: first, invest in capacity building to track online activities related to preparation of terrorist violence, including propaganda dissemination, recruitment into radical groups, coordinated actions intended to cause casualties; second, enhance intelligence sharing with countries in the region concerning individuals who have returned from Syria and Iraq, were released after terrorism-related offences; were prevented from becoming foreign fighters but belonged to radical networks; have gone through rehabilitation programmes.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF contributes research and analysis and convenes leaders on transatlantic issues relevant to policymakers. GMF offers rising leaders opportunities to develop their skills and networks through transatlantic exchange, and supports civil society in the Balkans and Black Sea regions by fostering democratic initiatives, rule of law, and regional cooperation. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin,

Education in Aleppo has been as divided as the city. Divisions in education are likely to exacerbate tensions if the conflict comes to an end as children have spent some time growing up under different systems.

Consideration needs to be given to how to bring the educational systems together and how to avoid some of the post-conflict tensions experienced in other war-torn countries over education.