Papers by The Aleppo Project
The Circassians are an ethnic group originally native to the Northwest Caucasus region until they... more The Circassians are an ethnic group originally native to the Northwest Caucasus region until they were driven out of their land by Russian conquest in the late 19 th century, after which the Circassians resettled in agricultural communities in parts of the Ottoman Empire. In Syria, their communities were concentrated in the Golan Heights in the southwestern parts of Syria, including Quneitra city and several surrounding villages. For many decades, the Circassians revived their heritage and lifestyle and became the largest ethnic minority group in southern Syria. In 1967, following the Six-Day War, the Circassians were yet again forcibly expelled from their homes; the Israeli Army bulldozed many villages and Quneitra city was never rebuilt, even after its return to Syrian control following the October 1973 war. Circassians became internally displaced people in Damascus or left abroad mainly to the United States following an offer by the United States government to move them to Paterson, New Jersey throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These periods of displacement made it difficult for the Circassians to maintain their traditions and sense of cohesiveness. In the Golan Heights, only two Circassian villages survived and were under Syrian control: Bir-Ajam and Breiqa. A minor attempt to reconstruct these communities took place at the end of the 1970s; however, it did not encourage many Circassians to return. By 2011, these two villages were home to around 5,000 inhabitants, as well as serving as a destination for Circassian cultural activities. These latest inhabitants were displaced after November 4, 2012, due to the Syrian Army's military operation against anti-government rebels. Many of these inhabitants and Syrian Circassians fled to neighbouring countries, Europe, and the Russian Federal Republics in the Caucasus (mainly The Karachay-Cherkess Republic, The Kabardino-Balkar Republic and The Republic of Adygea). This paper aims to explain the tangible and intangible cultural heritage of the Circassians in Syria within the historical and current contexts of displacement, integration, and diaspora. Additionally, it will examine internet-based initiatives by Syrian Circassians to preserve their rural architectural heritage in Bir-Ajam and Breiqa. This exploration will illustrate the importance of the Circassian heritage to the displaced society as well as the role of social media documentation in preserving this endangered heritage and people's memories.
The Aleppo Project, 2021
Executive Summary
Can and should the Syrian conflict be defined as genocide? This policy paper o... more Executive Summary
Can and should the Syrian conflict be defined as genocide? This policy paper outlines a new conceptual framework to define the concept of genocide. This new framework is based on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the different critiques it has received over the years. The framework gives an extended definition of the concept of genocide to fit the need of modern warfare. It is then applied it to the cases of the sieges of eastern Aleppo and Eastern Ghouta.
The report starts by outlining the conceptual framework, defining each element that determines the act of genocide: group, intent and scale. It then analyses the sieges of Aleppo and Ghouta based on the given definition. The report then concludes that the sieges should be defined as acts of genocide perpetrated by the regime. There are different actors that hold the power and the responsibility to make the regime accountable for its acts. The policy paper recommends that international organizations take a stand as they did for the Rwandan genocide. International organizations are key to reconstruction and they can apply pressure to the government. At the same time, international governments – being the donors of international aid – also have a part to play as they can put conditions into their funding. Finally, any element of the reconciliation and reconstruction process must be inclusive and allow for every member of the Syrian society, no matter who they support, to be consulted and heard.
To find the paper as published on The Aleppo Project website, click here: https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/the-barriers-and-limitations-of-the-modern-approach-to-recognizing-genocide-in-syria-a-case-study-of-the-sieges-of-eastern-aleppo-and-eastern-ghouta/
The Aleppo Project, 2017
Find the original blog article as published in January 2017 here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.co... more Find the original blog article as published in January 2017 here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/syrian-army-spearheads-mass-looting-spree-eastern-aleppo/
While the Syrian government and its Russian allies were claiming that eastern Aleppo had been liberated by its forces, its soldiers were engaged in widespread looting of private property. This adds to the long list of war crimes carried out by the Damascus government, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, deliberate starvation, and forced displacement. Government troops did not even spare those civilians supportive of the regime or people in the western half of the city that was always under state control. This has prompted a surge of anger, much of it expressed on social media in the past month.
The clouds of war started gathering after the fall of the Lavrov-Kerry agreement which aimed to c... more The clouds of war started gathering after the fall of the Lavrov-Kerry agreement which aimed to cease hostilities in Aleppo. The fall of the ceasefire agreement was followed by intensified bombing on eastern Aleppo and periodic attacks towards western Aleppo. Blame exchanged between Russian and U.S. diplomats for breaking the agreement highlighted the fragmentation and fragility of the agreement and the lack of leverage over their allies on the ground. The resumption of violence caused mass scale damage and deterioration of living conditions in Aleppo, and gave space to armed opposition forces, especially Jabhat al Nusra, to carry out further attacks. Although rebel groups managed to break the siege in eastern Aleppo earlier in August 2016, which allowed food and ammunitions to enter the eastern part, the humanitarian situation deteriorated, and the level of deprivation inflicted upon inhabitants of eastern Aleppo increased until the fall of the city in December 2016. In continuation of the regime’s strategy “Surrender or We Wipe You Out”, bids for an urgent intervention to stop the annihilation of eastern Aleppo and its people went in vain.
The Assad regime’s policy towards Aleppo hardened again, this time, as HNC member Basma al-Kodban... more The Assad regime’s policy towards Aleppo hardened again, this time, as HNC member Basma al-Kodbani said, “starve or surrender” became “surrender or we wipe you out.” With Russian backing, regime forces retook the al-Ramouseh military complex and adjacent areas by 6 September. This enhanced their positions significantly as the eastern half of the city came under ever more intensive Russian bombing.
The regime’s siege of Aleppo proved to be short-lived. On 6 August, the opposition, under the lea... more The regime’s siege of Aleppo proved to be short-lived. On 6 August, the opposition, under the leadership of Ahrar ash-Sham and Jabhet Fatah ash-Sham (formerly JN) broke through government positions in the southwest of the city. According to the spokesman of Ahrar ash-Sham, this took place in three phases, starting on 1 August and ending when opposition forces occupied the ar-Ramouseh Artillery complex and industrial district. In this way, the rebels successfully cut the east-west axis, the main supply line to western Aleppo. The attackers announced that the ultimate aim of the offensive was to liberate Aleppo from the regime, although since breaking the siege they have focused on keeping their gains against fierce government and loyalist attacks backed by Russian air support.
In July, the government put eastern Aleppo under siege. On 7 July, the second day of Eid al-Fitr ... more In July, the government put eastern Aleppo under siege. On 7 July, the second day of Eid al-Fitr celebrations, the Army and its allies took over a hilltop near al-Mallah Farms. This brought the Castello Road, the only route into rebel-held Aleppo, within range of artillery fire. In practice, this besieged the city because any moving vehicle on the road became an easy target. On 16 July, the regime tightened the siege by cutting off the Castello Road completely.
In June, ISIS positions in the eastern Aleppo countryside were seriously weakend. On 30-31 May, w... more In June, ISIS positions in the eastern Aleppo countryside were seriously weakend. On 30-31 May, with U.S.-led coalition air cover and the help of U.S., French and German special forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) marched westward towards Mnbej. Mnbej, along with al-Bab, are the two biggest cities in the Wilayet Halab (the Aleppo Province of ISIS caliphate). Before the Syrian conflict, about 120,000 people lived in the city. By the time ISIS had taken full control in early 2014, there were 20,000 left. With the SDF’s advance, even more left.
After violence claimed about 300 lives on both sides of the city, on 5 May the warring parties ag... more After violence claimed about 300 lives on both sides of the city, on 5 May the warring parties agreed to a 48-hour ceasefire. This halted a major rebel offensive on the western edges where Kataib Fajr al-Khilafa, part of Fatah Halab, detonated a tunnel bomb in al-Zahra district. The bomb destroyed a building near the new Justice Palace used by the regime and its allied foreign and local militias. It also temporarily ended the government’s shelling of Handarat Camp and Castello Road, the only ways into rebel-held Aleppo.
The partial ceasefire led to some slight optimism that the negotiations in Geneva on 14 April mig... more The partial ceasefire led to some slight optimism that the negotiations in Geneva on 14 April might make some progress. A slight change in a government position enhanced this optimism. President Assad, in an interview on 1 April, said that “in principle” he agreed to the idea of presidential elections where all Syrians, inside and outside the country, would have the right to vote. He also took a more flexible stand than the armed opposition, saying that the government would consider any group to be part of the political process if it agreed to join the truce and “engage in dialogue” with the Syrian state.
Despite some violations, the ceasefire not only reduced the level of violence, it also gave new l... more Despite some violations, the ceasefire not only reduced the level of violence, it also gave new life to the Geneva negotiation process. De Mistura said he was optimistic and knew that all ceasefires would have some violations. On March 14, negotiations resumed. De Mistura insisted that forming a transitional government would be the central issue.
Following UN Security Council Resolution 2254, De Mistura announced the next round of Geneva Talk... more Following UN Security Council Resolution 2254, De Mistura announced the next round of Geneva Talks for 25 January. These negotiations were to start as indirect ones, with De Mistura shuttling between the
delegations. His first priority was to stop the violence. Clause five of Resolution 2254 called for the International Syria Support Group, primarily the United States and Russia, to help implement an immediate “cessation of violence.” His second priority was to discuss the 18 month transitional period, which was still subject to various interpretations.
By early 2015, the regime was focused on relieving the towns of Nubbul and al-Zahra. They had bee... more By early 2015, the regime was focused on relieving the towns of Nubbul and al-Zahra. They had been under siege for three years. On 9 January, opposition forces advanced close to the towns under cover of bad weather that hindered air attacks.The importance of these towns derives from their location. If the towns could be freed from the siege, government forces could also cut the Kilis-Azaz-Aleppo corridor, which
was vital for the survival of the opposition. Throughout January and the first half of February, regime and opposition forces clashed along a semi circle shaped frontline starting from Tal Sayfat and extending to Handarat and al-Brej. On 17 February, the Syrian Army, with the support of Hezbollah, launched an offensive towards Bashkoy, Ratyan and Hardatnin, a major advance towards Nubbul and al-Zahra.
In August 2012, the experienced Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi took over Kofi Annan’s task of ... more In August 2012, the experienced Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi took over Kofi Annan’s task of getting Syrians to a peace agreement. After months of diplomatic efforts, Ministers Kerry and Lavrov, on 7 May 2013, jointly announced that “all sides” involved in Syria should come together for a conference. After several delays, mainly due to Russian-U.S. disagreements, the meeting was finally scheduled for 22 January 2014.
With the creation of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the rebel strategy shifted towards overr... more With the creation of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the rebel strategy shifted towards overrunning airports and military bases. It was now focused on expelling the regime from the Aleppo countryside, reducing its ability to supply its forces. Soon the regime would be left with only one supply route to the city
“We liberated the rural parts of [Aleppo] province. We waited and waited for Aleppo [city] to ris... more “We liberated the rural parts of [Aleppo] province. We waited and waited for Aleppo [city] to rise, and it didn’t. We couldn’t rely on them to do it for themselves so we had to bring the revolution to them.” This comment by a Free Syrian Army (FSA) commander with the nom-de-guerre of Abu Hashish highlights the urban-rural division in Aleppo. For decades the city, dominated by its upper middle class and bourgeois residents, became increasingly detached from its surroundings.The remark also describes the dynamics of the conflict which stretched north from the Idlib countryside, reached northern Aleppo province and then arrived in the city.
Syria is suffering the brutal winter that followed the Arab Spring. This popular outpouring for s... more Syria is suffering the brutal winter that followed the Arab Spring. This popular outpouring for social, economic and political change in the Middle East and North Africa started in Tunisia and has not ended yet despite the efforts of many governments to crush it. In February 2011, Damascene protestors began to defy the heavy hand of the repressive state, which had been exercising power since 1970. The torture of several children by the security forces prompted more protests in Deraa in March. For the first six months, the protesters were largely non-violent, but even peaceful protests met with intense brutality from the state. By September, armed rebel movements had emerged in response and Syria sank into what would become a catastrophic civil war.
This paper was written and designed by IMPACT and is published here in collaboration with the Ale... more This paper was written and designed by IMPACT and is published here in collaboration with the Aleppo Project. Jelnar Ahmad presented this paper at the keynote session of the 5th Lemkin Reunion, held in March 2019 and organized by the Shattuck Center at the School of Public Policy, Central European University in Budapest.
Eight years after peaceful protests started in Syria, approximately half of the country’s population have had to flee from violence. An estimated 6.2 million people are internally displaced, with over 1.6 million population movements recorded between January and December 2018 alone. Meanwhile Syria remains fragmented under multiple areas of control. This has a direct effect on the daily lives of local communities, which often varies across specific sub-regions and towns.
Against this backdrop, this report represents a case study on the effects of mass displacement and change of control on host communities and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) living in host communities in northern Syria. More specifically, the report focuses on the local situation in five main locations: Azaz, Albab and Afrin district (Afrin, Rajo and Jenderes). The findings of this case study indicate that a clear distinction can be made between the situation in the towns of Albab and Azaz on the one hand, and the situation in Afrin district (Afrin, Jenderes and Rajo) on the other. Albab and Azaz have been under de facto Turkish control since the latter conducted operation “Euphrates Shield” that was concluded in early 2017, and are gradually enjoying a relative degree of stability. Residents (both locals and IDPs) are however still faced with harsh financial conditions and limited access to services.
In stark contrast, the situation in Afrin district, which came under de facto Turkish control after operation “Olive Branch” (January-March 2018), is characterized by high levels of instability. There, the displacement of local residents and the resettlement of IDPs have exacerbated pre-existing ethnic tensions. The situation is characterised by high discrepancies between local residents and IDPs in terms of access to personal security, livelihood, freedom of movement and the ability to practice one’s own traditions. Local residents in Afrin district have also been the victims of serious human rights violations and discriminatory practices imposed by armed opposition groups (AOGs), who are also seen as giving privileges to IDPs with connections to AOGs. The combination of these factors have created a sense of alienation among the original residents of Afrin district, which has resulted in a general sense of distrust and even hostility against IDPs. As the latter are also feeling disintegrated in their new host communities, the district’s social fabric is being torn apart.
Aside from the divergences between the situation in Afrin district and in that in Albab and Azaz, the growing Turkish influence is evident across both areas. Through providing official backup to military factions, significant investments in infrastructure rehabilitation, and direct administrative and financial support to local governance structures, Turkey has become the de facto ruler in the whole area. Therefore recommendations provided in this report are partially directed to Turkish authorities, in addition to a set of recommendations offered to international policy makers, donors and civil society organisations.
To view this paper as published on the Aleppo Project website, click here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/socioeconomic-impact-of-displacement-waves-in-northern-syria/
This paper was presented at the 5th Lemkin Reunion, held in March 2019 and organized by the Shatt... more This paper was presented at the 5th Lemkin Reunion, held in March 2019 and organized by the Shattuck Center at the School of Public Policy, Central European University in Budapest. Each year the Shattuck Center hosts the Lemkin Reunion, a gathering named in honor of Raphael Lemkin, the Polish lawyer who lost his family in the Holocaust and first coined the word genocide. He campaigned tirelessly during his life to ensure that the crime of genocide was enshrined in international law. The Lemkin Reunion gathers policymakers involved in responding to atrocity crimes and assess the lessons they learned.
Recent reports of Syrian refugees returning to their home country after several years of civil war raise important issues, one of which being the status of their properties in the country. A recently enacted law called Law No. 10 of 2018 – ostensibly part of benign reconstruction legislation – has proven to be problematic for the millions of Syrians who are refugees, internally displaced or living abroad. This is happening on a scale that affects conflict settlement and the emerging post-war social order, as it shapes the framework for reconstruction and reintegration into the economy and social life. Although several articles have addressed the potential problems raised by this law, there are no analyses that explicitly tackle Law no. 10 from a rule-of-law perspective.
In this paper, I argue that Law No. 10 will permanently exclude displaced residents especially from having a voice in reconstruction in their home areas. In the first instance, the paper expounds on the different historical and socio-political aspects of the issue, which is necessary for a better understanding of the current state of affairs. The paper then analyses the specific parts of Law No. 10 that provide grounds for rule of law violations in its practice. In the third section, based on the aforementioned analysis, I propose a series of measures – consistent with international standards and best practices – that must be taken in order to effectively guarantee property rights for returnees and contribute to an equitable reconstruction process, both in the immediate term (e.g. including returnee property rights in peace talks) and in the longer term (e.g. establishing an independent adjudication body).
To view this paper as published on the Aleppo Project website, click here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/law-no-10-property-rights-violations-in-syria-against-sustainable-solutions-for-returnees/
Sawsan Abou Zainedin presented this paper at the keynote session of the 5th Lemkin Reunion, held ... more Sawsan Abou Zainedin presented this paper at the keynote session of the 5th Lemkin Reunion, held in March 2019 and organized by the Shattuck Center at the School of Public Policy, Central European University in Budapest.
The Syrian regime has been significantly tampering with the built environment in Syria over the past years in order to realise and sustain political achievements. This paper explores this dimension of the Syrian conflict through the lens of urbicide. It argues that different violent urban arrangements – both destructive and constructive – have been enforced in the Syrian context to consolidate the regime’s authoritarian power and eradicate socio-political diversity. These arrangements include:
• the indiscriminate, systematic destruction of residential areas and vital civilian facilities in opposition areas;
• the deliberate post-battle demolitions of residential neighbourhoods;
• systematic prolonged sieges and the weaponisation of aid delivery to besieged areas;
• forced eviction and population transfer;
• blocking return to recaptured opposition areas; and
• discriminatory reconstruction frameworks that favour regime cronies.
The paper concludes that this violent configuration of Syria’s built environment is an attempt to eradicate the populations of opposition areas, hence, instating political homogeneity. It further serves economic interests, as it transforms the general conditions for capital accumulation in a way that fortifies the despotic character of the regime. Finally, this strategy also runs along sectarian lines, building on and sustaining Syria’s socio-economic and political hierarchies.
To view this paper as published on the Aleppo Project website, click here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/syrias-urbicide-the-built-environment-as-a-means-to-consolidate-homogeneity/
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Papers by The Aleppo Project
Can and should the Syrian conflict be defined as genocide? This policy paper outlines a new conceptual framework to define the concept of genocide. This new framework is based on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the different critiques it has received over the years. The framework gives an extended definition of the concept of genocide to fit the need of modern warfare. It is then applied it to the cases of the sieges of eastern Aleppo and Eastern Ghouta.
The report starts by outlining the conceptual framework, defining each element that determines the act of genocide: group, intent and scale. It then analyses the sieges of Aleppo and Ghouta based on the given definition. The report then concludes that the sieges should be defined as acts of genocide perpetrated by the regime. There are different actors that hold the power and the responsibility to make the regime accountable for its acts. The policy paper recommends that international organizations take a stand as they did for the Rwandan genocide. International organizations are key to reconstruction and they can apply pressure to the government. At the same time, international governments – being the donors of international aid – also have a part to play as they can put conditions into their funding. Finally, any element of the reconciliation and reconstruction process must be inclusive and allow for every member of the Syrian society, no matter who they support, to be consulted and heard.
To find the paper as published on The Aleppo Project website, click here: https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/the-barriers-and-limitations-of-the-modern-approach-to-recognizing-genocide-in-syria-a-case-study-of-the-sieges-of-eastern-aleppo-and-eastern-ghouta/
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/syrian-army-spearheads-mass-looting-spree-eastern-aleppo/
While the Syrian government and its Russian allies were claiming that eastern Aleppo had been liberated by its forces, its soldiers were engaged in widespread looting of private property. This adds to the long list of war crimes carried out by the Damascus government, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, deliberate starvation, and forced displacement. Government troops did not even spare those civilians supportive of the regime or people in the western half of the city that was always under state control. This has prompted a surge of anger, much of it expressed on social media in the past month.
delegations. His first priority was to stop the violence. Clause five of Resolution 2254 called for the International Syria Support Group, primarily the United States and Russia, to help implement an immediate “cessation of violence.” His second priority was to discuss the 18 month transitional period, which was still subject to various interpretations.
was vital for the survival of the opposition. Throughout January and the first half of February, regime and opposition forces clashed along a semi circle shaped frontline starting from Tal Sayfat and extending to Handarat and al-Brej. On 17 February, the Syrian Army, with the support of Hezbollah, launched an offensive towards Bashkoy, Ratyan and Hardatnin, a major advance towards Nubbul and al-Zahra.
Eight years after peaceful protests started in Syria, approximately half of the country’s population have had to flee from violence. An estimated 6.2 million people are internally displaced, with over 1.6 million population movements recorded between January and December 2018 alone. Meanwhile Syria remains fragmented under multiple areas of control. This has a direct effect on the daily lives of local communities, which often varies across specific sub-regions and towns.
Against this backdrop, this report represents a case study on the effects of mass displacement and change of control on host communities and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) living in host communities in northern Syria. More specifically, the report focuses on the local situation in five main locations: Azaz, Albab and Afrin district (Afrin, Rajo and Jenderes). The findings of this case study indicate that a clear distinction can be made between the situation in the towns of Albab and Azaz on the one hand, and the situation in Afrin district (Afrin, Jenderes and Rajo) on the other. Albab and Azaz have been under de facto Turkish control since the latter conducted operation “Euphrates Shield” that was concluded in early 2017, and are gradually enjoying a relative degree of stability. Residents (both locals and IDPs) are however still faced with harsh financial conditions and limited access to services.
In stark contrast, the situation in Afrin district, which came under de facto Turkish control after operation “Olive Branch” (January-March 2018), is characterized by high levels of instability. There, the displacement of local residents and the resettlement of IDPs have exacerbated pre-existing ethnic tensions. The situation is characterised by high discrepancies between local residents and IDPs in terms of access to personal security, livelihood, freedom of movement and the ability to practice one’s own traditions. Local residents in Afrin district have also been the victims of serious human rights violations and discriminatory practices imposed by armed opposition groups (AOGs), who are also seen as giving privileges to IDPs with connections to AOGs. The combination of these factors have created a sense of alienation among the original residents of Afrin district, which has resulted in a general sense of distrust and even hostility against IDPs. As the latter are also feeling disintegrated in their new host communities, the district’s social fabric is being torn apart.
Aside from the divergences between the situation in Afrin district and in that in Albab and Azaz, the growing Turkish influence is evident across both areas. Through providing official backup to military factions, significant investments in infrastructure rehabilitation, and direct administrative and financial support to local governance structures, Turkey has become the de facto ruler in the whole area. Therefore recommendations provided in this report are partially directed to Turkish authorities, in addition to a set of recommendations offered to international policy makers, donors and civil society organisations.
To view this paper as published on the Aleppo Project website, click here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/socioeconomic-impact-of-displacement-waves-in-northern-syria/
Recent reports of Syrian refugees returning to their home country after several years of civil war raise important issues, one of which being the status of their properties in the country. A recently enacted law called Law No. 10 of 2018 – ostensibly part of benign reconstruction legislation – has proven to be problematic for the millions of Syrians who are refugees, internally displaced or living abroad. This is happening on a scale that affects conflict settlement and the emerging post-war social order, as it shapes the framework for reconstruction and reintegration into the economy and social life. Although several articles have addressed the potential problems raised by this law, there are no analyses that explicitly tackle Law no. 10 from a rule-of-law perspective.
In this paper, I argue that Law No. 10 will permanently exclude displaced residents especially from having a voice in reconstruction in their home areas. In the first instance, the paper expounds on the different historical and socio-political aspects of the issue, which is necessary for a better understanding of the current state of affairs. The paper then analyses the specific parts of Law No. 10 that provide grounds for rule of law violations in its practice. In the third section, based on the aforementioned analysis, I propose a series of measures – consistent with international standards and best practices – that must be taken in order to effectively guarantee property rights for returnees and contribute to an equitable reconstruction process, both in the immediate term (e.g. including returnee property rights in peace talks) and in the longer term (e.g. establishing an independent adjudication body).
To view this paper as published on the Aleppo Project website, click here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/law-no-10-property-rights-violations-in-syria-against-sustainable-solutions-for-returnees/
The Syrian regime has been significantly tampering with the built environment in Syria over the past years in order to realise and sustain political achievements. This paper explores this dimension of the Syrian conflict through the lens of urbicide. It argues that different violent urban arrangements – both destructive and constructive – have been enforced in the Syrian context to consolidate the regime’s authoritarian power and eradicate socio-political diversity. These arrangements include:
• the indiscriminate, systematic destruction of residential areas and vital civilian facilities in opposition areas;
• the deliberate post-battle demolitions of residential neighbourhoods;
• systematic prolonged sieges and the weaponisation of aid delivery to besieged areas;
• forced eviction and population transfer;
• blocking return to recaptured opposition areas; and
• discriminatory reconstruction frameworks that favour regime cronies.
The paper concludes that this violent configuration of Syria’s built environment is an attempt to eradicate the populations of opposition areas, hence, instating political homogeneity. It further serves economic interests, as it transforms the general conditions for capital accumulation in a way that fortifies the despotic character of the regime. Finally, this strategy also runs along sectarian lines, building on and sustaining Syria’s socio-economic and political hierarchies.
To view this paper as published on the Aleppo Project website, click here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/syrias-urbicide-the-built-environment-as-a-means-to-consolidate-homogeneity/
Can and should the Syrian conflict be defined as genocide? This policy paper outlines a new conceptual framework to define the concept of genocide. This new framework is based on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the different critiques it has received over the years. The framework gives an extended definition of the concept of genocide to fit the need of modern warfare. It is then applied it to the cases of the sieges of eastern Aleppo and Eastern Ghouta.
The report starts by outlining the conceptual framework, defining each element that determines the act of genocide: group, intent and scale. It then analyses the sieges of Aleppo and Ghouta based on the given definition. The report then concludes that the sieges should be defined as acts of genocide perpetrated by the regime. There are different actors that hold the power and the responsibility to make the regime accountable for its acts. The policy paper recommends that international organizations take a stand as they did for the Rwandan genocide. International organizations are key to reconstruction and they can apply pressure to the government. At the same time, international governments – being the donors of international aid – also have a part to play as they can put conditions into their funding. Finally, any element of the reconciliation and reconstruction process must be inclusive and allow for every member of the Syrian society, no matter who they support, to be consulted and heard.
To find the paper as published on The Aleppo Project website, click here: https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/the-barriers-and-limitations-of-the-modern-approach-to-recognizing-genocide-in-syria-a-case-study-of-the-sieges-of-eastern-aleppo-and-eastern-ghouta/
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/syrian-army-spearheads-mass-looting-spree-eastern-aleppo/
While the Syrian government and its Russian allies were claiming that eastern Aleppo had been liberated by its forces, its soldiers were engaged in widespread looting of private property. This adds to the long list of war crimes carried out by the Damascus government, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, deliberate starvation, and forced displacement. Government troops did not even spare those civilians supportive of the regime or people in the western half of the city that was always under state control. This has prompted a surge of anger, much of it expressed on social media in the past month.
delegations. His first priority was to stop the violence. Clause five of Resolution 2254 called for the International Syria Support Group, primarily the United States and Russia, to help implement an immediate “cessation of violence.” His second priority was to discuss the 18 month transitional period, which was still subject to various interpretations.
was vital for the survival of the opposition. Throughout January and the first half of February, regime and opposition forces clashed along a semi circle shaped frontline starting from Tal Sayfat and extending to Handarat and al-Brej. On 17 February, the Syrian Army, with the support of Hezbollah, launched an offensive towards Bashkoy, Ratyan and Hardatnin, a major advance towards Nubbul and al-Zahra.
Eight years after peaceful protests started in Syria, approximately half of the country’s population have had to flee from violence. An estimated 6.2 million people are internally displaced, with over 1.6 million population movements recorded between January and December 2018 alone. Meanwhile Syria remains fragmented under multiple areas of control. This has a direct effect on the daily lives of local communities, which often varies across specific sub-regions and towns.
Against this backdrop, this report represents a case study on the effects of mass displacement and change of control on host communities and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) living in host communities in northern Syria. More specifically, the report focuses on the local situation in five main locations: Azaz, Albab and Afrin district (Afrin, Rajo and Jenderes). The findings of this case study indicate that a clear distinction can be made between the situation in the towns of Albab and Azaz on the one hand, and the situation in Afrin district (Afrin, Jenderes and Rajo) on the other. Albab and Azaz have been under de facto Turkish control since the latter conducted operation “Euphrates Shield” that was concluded in early 2017, and are gradually enjoying a relative degree of stability. Residents (both locals and IDPs) are however still faced with harsh financial conditions and limited access to services.
In stark contrast, the situation in Afrin district, which came under de facto Turkish control after operation “Olive Branch” (January-March 2018), is characterized by high levels of instability. There, the displacement of local residents and the resettlement of IDPs have exacerbated pre-existing ethnic tensions. The situation is characterised by high discrepancies between local residents and IDPs in terms of access to personal security, livelihood, freedom of movement and the ability to practice one’s own traditions. Local residents in Afrin district have also been the victims of serious human rights violations and discriminatory practices imposed by armed opposition groups (AOGs), who are also seen as giving privileges to IDPs with connections to AOGs. The combination of these factors have created a sense of alienation among the original residents of Afrin district, which has resulted in a general sense of distrust and even hostility against IDPs. As the latter are also feeling disintegrated in their new host communities, the district’s social fabric is being torn apart.
Aside from the divergences between the situation in Afrin district and in that in Albab and Azaz, the growing Turkish influence is evident across both areas. Through providing official backup to military factions, significant investments in infrastructure rehabilitation, and direct administrative and financial support to local governance structures, Turkey has become the de facto ruler in the whole area. Therefore recommendations provided in this report are partially directed to Turkish authorities, in addition to a set of recommendations offered to international policy makers, donors and civil society organisations.
To view this paper as published on the Aleppo Project website, click here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/socioeconomic-impact-of-displacement-waves-in-northern-syria/
Recent reports of Syrian refugees returning to their home country after several years of civil war raise important issues, one of which being the status of their properties in the country. A recently enacted law called Law No. 10 of 2018 – ostensibly part of benign reconstruction legislation – has proven to be problematic for the millions of Syrians who are refugees, internally displaced or living abroad. This is happening on a scale that affects conflict settlement and the emerging post-war social order, as it shapes the framework for reconstruction and reintegration into the economy and social life. Although several articles have addressed the potential problems raised by this law, there are no analyses that explicitly tackle Law no. 10 from a rule-of-law perspective.
In this paper, I argue that Law No. 10 will permanently exclude displaced residents especially from having a voice in reconstruction in their home areas. In the first instance, the paper expounds on the different historical and socio-political aspects of the issue, which is necessary for a better understanding of the current state of affairs. The paper then analyses the specific parts of Law No. 10 that provide grounds for rule of law violations in its practice. In the third section, based on the aforementioned analysis, I propose a series of measures – consistent with international standards and best practices – that must be taken in order to effectively guarantee property rights for returnees and contribute to an equitable reconstruction process, both in the immediate term (e.g. including returnee property rights in peace talks) and in the longer term (e.g. establishing an independent adjudication body).
To view this paper as published on the Aleppo Project website, click here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/law-no-10-property-rights-violations-in-syria-against-sustainable-solutions-for-returnees/
The Syrian regime has been significantly tampering with the built environment in Syria over the past years in order to realise and sustain political achievements. This paper explores this dimension of the Syrian conflict through the lens of urbicide. It argues that different violent urban arrangements – both destructive and constructive – have been enforced in the Syrian context to consolidate the regime’s authoritarian power and eradicate socio-political diversity. These arrangements include:
• the indiscriminate, systematic destruction of residential areas and vital civilian facilities in opposition areas;
• the deliberate post-battle demolitions of residential neighbourhoods;
• systematic prolonged sieges and the weaponisation of aid delivery to besieged areas;
• forced eviction and population transfer;
• blocking return to recaptured opposition areas; and
• discriminatory reconstruction frameworks that favour regime cronies.
The paper concludes that this violent configuration of Syria’s built environment is an attempt to eradicate the populations of opposition areas, hence, instating political homogeneity. It further serves economic interests, as it transforms the general conditions for capital accumulation in a way that fortifies the despotic character of the regime. Finally, this strategy also runs along sectarian lines, building on and sustaining Syria’s socio-economic and political hierarchies.
To view this paper as published on the Aleppo Project website, click here:
https://www.thealeppoproject.com/papers/syrias-urbicide-the-built-environment-as-a-means-to-consolidate-homogeneity/