Carey K Morewedge
Broadly, I study the cognitive and affective processes that are involved in judgment and decision making. My research is primarily focused on the psychological processes that are involved in hedonic experiences. How people determine how pleasurable or desirable experiences were, are, or will be. And how these judgments impact their decision making and behavior. For example, one research project examined how psychological processes alone can reduce our desire to eat a food and actual consumption of that food (Morewedge, Huh, & Vosgerau, 2010).
My secondary line of research examines the attribution of intentions—how we decide which entities are capable of intentional behavior, and what thoughts and events were intended. People, for example, are more likely to attribute negative events than similarly positive and neutral events to the intentions of an external agent such as another person (Morewedge, 2009). I also examine the implications of intentional attributions (e.g., Morewedge, Gilblin, & Norton, 2014). One paper examined how the apparently unintended nature of dreams leads people to attribute greater meaning to dreams than to conscious thoughts that have similar content (Morewedge & Norton, 2009).
My secondary line of research examines the attribution of intentions—how we decide which entities are capable of intentional behavior, and what thoughts and events were intended. People, for example, are more likely to attribute negative events than similarly positive and neutral events to the intentions of an external agent such as another person (Morewedge, 2009). I also examine the implications of intentional attributions (e.g., Morewedge, Gilblin, & Norton, 2014). One paper examined how the apparently unintended nature of dreams leads people to attribute greater meaning to dreams than to conscious thoughts that have similar content (Morewedge & Norton, 2009).
less
InterestsView All (9)
Uploads
Papers by Carey K Morewedge
to problems in policy, business, medicine, law, education, and private life. Early attempts to reduce decision biases with
training met with little success, leading scientists and policy makers to focus on debiasing by using incentives and changes
in the presentation and elicitation of decisions. We report the results of two longitudinal experiments that found medium
to large effects of one-shot debiasing training interventions. Participants received a single training intervention, played a
computer game or watched an instructional video, which addressed biases critical to intelligence analysis (in Experiment 1:
bias blind spot, confirmation bias, and fundamental attribution error; in Experiment 2: anchoring, representativeness, and
social projection). Both kinds of interventions produced medium to large debiasing effects immediately (games ≥ −31.94% and videos ≥ −18.60%) that persisted at least 2 months later (games ≥ −23.57% and videos ≥ −19.20%). Games that provided personalized feedback and practice produced larger effects than did videos. Debiasing effects were domain general: bias reduction occurred across problems in different contexts, and problem formats that were taught and not taught in the
interventions. The results suggest that a single training intervention can improve decision making. We suggest its use alongside improved incentives, information presentation, and nudges to reduce costly errors associated with biased judgments and decisions.
judgment to two failures: the automatic operations of
a ‘System 1’ generate a faulty intuition, which the controlled
operations of a ‘System 2’ fail to detect and
correct. We identify System 1 with the automatic operations
of associative memory and draw on research in
the priming paradigm to describe how it operates. We
explain how three features of associative memory –
associative coherence, attribute substitution and processing
fluency – give rise to major biases of intuitive
judgment. Our article highlights both the ability of System
1 to create complex and skilled judgments and the
role of the system as a source of judgment errors.
We demonstrated that habituation to a food item can occur even when its consumption is merely imagined. Five experiments showed that people who repeatedly imagined eating a food (such as cheese) many times subsequently consumed less of the imagined food than did people
who repeatedly imagined eating that food fewer times, imagined eating a different food (such as candy), or did not imagine eating a food. They did so because they desired to eat it less, not because they considered it less palatable. These results suggest that mental representation alone can engender habituation to a stimulus.
people make salient comparisons first, and then make satisfying comparisons only if salient comparisons leave them unsatisfied.
This hypothesis suggests an asymmetry between winning and losing. For winners, comparison with a salient alternative
(i.e., losing) brings satisfaction. Therefore, winners should be sensitive only to the relative value of their outcomes. For losers,
comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., winning) brings little satisfaction. Therefore, losers should be drawn to compare
outcomes with additional standards, which should make them sensitive to both relative and absolute values of their outcomes. In
Experiment 1, participants won one of two cash prizes on a scratch-off ticket. Winners were sensitive to the relative value of
their prizes, whereas losers were sensitive to both the relative and the absolute values of their prizes. In Experiment 2, losers
were sensitive to the absolute value of their prize only when they had sufficient cognitive resources to engage in effortful
comparison.
achievement goal pursued influences the propensity to engage in superstitious behavior. Across six studies, we found that
performance goals were more likely than learning goals to elicit superstitious behavior. Participants were more likely to
engage in superstitious behavior at high than at low levels of chronic performance orientation, but superstitious behavior
was not influenced by chronic learning orientation (Studies 1 and 2). Similarly, participants exhibited stronger preferences
for lucky items when primed to pursue performance goals rather than learning goals (Studies 3 and 4). As uncertainty of goal
achievement increased, superstitious behavior increased when participants pursued performance goals but not learning goals
(Study 5). Finally, assignment to use a lucky (vs. unlucky) item resulted in greater confidence of achieving performance goals
but not learning goals (Study 6).
about themselves or about their transgressions. The current investigation found support for a more recent representation of
guilt as an emotion designed to identify and correct specific social offenses. Across five experiments, guilt influenced behavior
in a targeted and strategic way. Guilt prompted participants to share resources more generously with others, but only did so
when those others were persons whom the participant had wronged and only when those wronged individuals could notice
the gesture. Rather than trigger broad reparative behaviors that remediate one’s general reputation or self-perception, guilt
triggers targeted behaviors intended to remediate specific social transgressions.
predictions. The present research examined one potential source of this bias, whether and why predictors overweight the atypical
past behavior of individuals. The results suggest that predictors do indeed overweight the atypical past behavior of an individual.
Atypical past behavior is more cognitively accessible than typical past behavior, which leads it to be overweighted in the
impressions that serve as the basis for their predictions. Predictions for group members appear less susceptible to this bias, presumably because predictors are less likely to form a coherent impression of a group than an individual before making their predictions.
which they endorsed the Christian theological God concept and an anthropomorphic God concept before rating the extent to which they considered actions prohibited by the Ten Commandments to be theologically and morally wrong. Endorsement of both God concepts influenced the extent to which those acts were perceived to violate the tenets of participants’ religion. Only endorsement of the anthropomorphic God concept, however, determined the extent to which those actions were considered morally wrong.
in four experiments perceived a unit of consumption to be smaller and consequently consumed more, when large resource accounts of money, calories, or time (e.g., the money in their savings account) were made temporarily accessible compared
with when small resource accounts were made temporarily accessible (e.g., the money in their wallet). Manipulating the cognitive accessibility of resources available for consumption influences both subjective judgment and behavior.
positive experiences that participants recalled at the time of judgment were more representative of their past experiences than of their present experiences.
to problems in policy, business, medicine, law, education, and private life. Early attempts to reduce decision biases with
training met with little success, leading scientists and policy makers to focus on debiasing by using incentives and changes
in the presentation and elicitation of decisions. We report the results of two longitudinal experiments that found medium
to large effects of one-shot debiasing training interventions. Participants received a single training intervention, played a
computer game or watched an instructional video, which addressed biases critical to intelligence analysis (in Experiment 1:
bias blind spot, confirmation bias, and fundamental attribution error; in Experiment 2: anchoring, representativeness, and
social projection). Both kinds of interventions produced medium to large debiasing effects immediately (games ≥ −31.94% and videos ≥ −18.60%) that persisted at least 2 months later (games ≥ −23.57% and videos ≥ −19.20%). Games that provided personalized feedback and practice produced larger effects than did videos. Debiasing effects were domain general: bias reduction occurred across problems in different contexts, and problem formats that were taught and not taught in the
interventions. The results suggest that a single training intervention can improve decision making. We suggest its use alongside improved incentives, information presentation, and nudges to reduce costly errors associated with biased judgments and decisions.
judgment to two failures: the automatic operations of
a ‘System 1’ generate a faulty intuition, which the controlled
operations of a ‘System 2’ fail to detect and
correct. We identify System 1 with the automatic operations
of associative memory and draw on research in
the priming paradigm to describe how it operates. We
explain how three features of associative memory –
associative coherence, attribute substitution and processing
fluency – give rise to major biases of intuitive
judgment. Our article highlights both the ability of System
1 to create complex and skilled judgments and the
role of the system as a source of judgment errors.
We demonstrated that habituation to a food item can occur even when its consumption is merely imagined. Five experiments showed that people who repeatedly imagined eating a food (such as cheese) many times subsequently consumed less of the imagined food than did people
who repeatedly imagined eating that food fewer times, imagined eating a different food (such as candy), or did not imagine eating a food. They did so because they desired to eat it less, not because they considered it less palatable. These results suggest that mental representation alone can engender habituation to a stimulus.
people make salient comparisons first, and then make satisfying comparisons only if salient comparisons leave them unsatisfied.
This hypothesis suggests an asymmetry between winning and losing. For winners, comparison with a salient alternative
(i.e., losing) brings satisfaction. Therefore, winners should be sensitive only to the relative value of their outcomes. For losers,
comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., winning) brings little satisfaction. Therefore, losers should be drawn to compare
outcomes with additional standards, which should make them sensitive to both relative and absolute values of their outcomes. In
Experiment 1, participants won one of two cash prizes on a scratch-off ticket. Winners were sensitive to the relative value of
their prizes, whereas losers were sensitive to both the relative and the absolute values of their prizes. In Experiment 2, losers
were sensitive to the absolute value of their prize only when they had sufficient cognitive resources to engage in effortful
comparison.
achievement goal pursued influences the propensity to engage in superstitious behavior. Across six studies, we found that
performance goals were more likely than learning goals to elicit superstitious behavior. Participants were more likely to
engage in superstitious behavior at high than at low levels of chronic performance orientation, but superstitious behavior
was not influenced by chronic learning orientation (Studies 1 and 2). Similarly, participants exhibited stronger preferences
for lucky items when primed to pursue performance goals rather than learning goals (Studies 3 and 4). As uncertainty of goal
achievement increased, superstitious behavior increased when participants pursued performance goals but not learning goals
(Study 5). Finally, assignment to use a lucky (vs. unlucky) item resulted in greater confidence of achieving performance goals
but not learning goals (Study 6).
about themselves or about their transgressions. The current investigation found support for a more recent representation of
guilt as an emotion designed to identify and correct specific social offenses. Across five experiments, guilt influenced behavior
in a targeted and strategic way. Guilt prompted participants to share resources more generously with others, but only did so
when those others were persons whom the participant had wronged and only when those wronged individuals could notice
the gesture. Rather than trigger broad reparative behaviors that remediate one’s general reputation or self-perception, guilt
triggers targeted behaviors intended to remediate specific social transgressions.
predictions. The present research examined one potential source of this bias, whether and why predictors overweight the atypical
past behavior of individuals. The results suggest that predictors do indeed overweight the atypical past behavior of an individual.
Atypical past behavior is more cognitively accessible than typical past behavior, which leads it to be overweighted in the
impressions that serve as the basis for their predictions. Predictions for group members appear less susceptible to this bias, presumably because predictors are less likely to form a coherent impression of a group than an individual before making their predictions.
which they endorsed the Christian theological God concept and an anthropomorphic God concept before rating the extent to which they considered actions prohibited by the Ten Commandments to be theologically and morally wrong. Endorsement of both God concepts influenced the extent to which those acts were perceived to violate the tenets of participants’ religion. Only endorsement of the anthropomorphic God concept, however, determined the extent to which those actions were considered morally wrong.
in four experiments perceived a unit of consumption to be smaller and consequently consumed more, when large resource accounts of money, calories, or time (e.g., the money in their savings account) were made temporarily accessible compared
with when small resource accounts were made temporarily accessible (e.g., the money in their wallet). Manipulating the cognitive accessibility of resources available for consumption influences both subjective judgment and behavior.
positive experiences that participants recalled at the time of judgment were more representative of their past experiences than of their present experiences.