Adrian Cadbury

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Sir George Adrian Hayhurst Cadbury (born 1929) is a former British Olympic rower and Chairman of Cadbury and

Cadbury Schweppes for 24 years. He has been a pioneer in raising the awareness and stimulating the debate on corporate governance and produced the Cadbury Code, a code of best practice which served as a basis for reform of corporate governance around the world. Cadbury was born in 1929, a member of the Cadbury family which is known for their Quaker philosophy and the chocolate conglomerate which they founded. He was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge. At Cambridge, he rowed in the losing Cambridge boat in the 1952 Boat Race. He also rowed in the Great Britain coxless four in the 1952 Summer Olympics in Helsinki[1]. He joined the Cadbury business in 1952 and became Chairman of Cadbury Ltd in 1965. He retired as Chairman of Cadbury Schweppes in 1989. He was a Director of the Bank of England from 1970-1994 and of IBM from 1975-1994. He was Chairman of the UK Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance which published its Report and Code of Best Practice ("Cadbury Report and Code") in December 1992. He was member of the OECD Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance. His publications include: Ethical Managers Make Their Own Rules; The Company Chairman; Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View. Cadbury is a Steward of Henley Royal Regatta. He was also Chancellor of Aston University until 2004.

Publications

Cadbury, A. (1992) The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, London: Gee and Company Cadbury, Adrian (1995) The Company Chairman (2nd Ed), NJ: Prentice Hall [ISBN 0-13-434150-3] Cadbury, Adrian (2002) Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View, Oxford: Oxford University Press [ISBN 0-19-925200-9]

According to one recent survey, leading institutional investors noted serious deficiencies in the disclosure practices of 170 of the worlds largest companies; corporate accounts are failing to inform investors.

Role of Auditors
There is also a considerable groundswell of opinion regarding the role of the auditor and the audit report in terms of corporate governance, with a suggestion that the auditor should be named as an individual when he presents his report on the company. Furthermore, there is a case to be argued that for public companies, the appointment of an auditor should be for a maximum period and thereafter a change should be required under legislation. The accountancy profession will, of course, argue against this on the grounds that the longer the firm acts as an auditor for a particular client, the more it becomes au fait with the nuances of that business. The auditor is then able, it is claimed, to prepare a more effective report to the shareholders. This argument is, perhaps, countermanded by some of the more spectacular collapses of recent times, shortly after a routine endorsement of the Annual Report by the auditors. There is no doubt that the accountancy profession is becoming more aware of its obligations and involvement with corporate governance per se and the move towards incorporation by the profession suggests a concern in respect of personal liability. It is very much a case of watch this space.

Representing Shareholders Another major area of concern regarding the report on corporate governance must be
that it has been sponsored by a number of bodies, with the exception of one truly representing shareholders, for whom the whole subject ought to be the prime motivation.

The German Experience


The UK debate surrounding corporate governance and the protection of shareholder interests is progressive and responsible. In Germany, a similar dialogue is under way, following criticism of the dual board structure (where shareholders and labour representatives act, effectively, as Non Executive Directors on Supervisory Boards). The debate in Germany has been fuelled by a spate of domestic corporate disasters; Metallgesellschaft, an industrial and trading operation, suffered heavy losses in US oil futures trading and had to be rescued by the banks to the tune of 1.45bn. Germanys biggest bank, Deutsche Bank, had a stake in the business and a director headed up the Supervisory Board. This led to considerable criticism of the banks failure to be aware of the impending crisis. A senior bank official has now publicly proclaimed that the bank is taking a more detached view on Supervisory Boards and that representation should come from industrialists who have the more appropriate experience. In Germany, the banks take a far more direct and pro-active role in shareholdings than their UK counterparts and their resolution of corporate governance policy is some way off. An integrate European approach to this vital area is even less likely to take place.

The General Motors Guidelines


The United States has, of course, been at the forefront of developments and General Motors recently introduced new guidelines for the role and composition of its Board of Directors. Throughout the 1980s, GM was headed by Roger Smith as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. Ros Perot, the former US Presidential candidate and one time GM Board member, described other members of the Board as pet rocks because of what he saw as their lack of involvement. In 1992, the Non-Executive Directors of GM forced the removal of the then Chairman and Chief Executive, Roger Stempel, and replaced him with John Smale in the role of Chairman Smale had led the battle from his position as a NonExecutive Director. The power shift in General Motors has hailed a new era in corporate governance with a majority of Non-Executives on the board. The guidelines published by GM do not resolve the argument between separating the role of Chairman and Chief Executive, arguing that the Board should be free to exercise choice in this matter in the best interests of the company. The GM guidelines do, however, require Non-Executive Directors to evaluate the performance of the CEO and this assessment is to be taken into account by the compensation committee in settling pay for the position.

Independent Judgement
The economic climate in 1995 has been less inclined to produce the spectacular corporate collapses, which characterised the late 1980s and early 1990s, and it is therefore difficult to quantify the results of the report at this stage. On a positive note, more and more companies provide testimony to the split between the role of Chairman and Chief Executive becoming an accepted principle in practice a move proposed, but not required, by the Cadbury Report. Corporate governance has become an issue of great significance throughout the world. The effectiveness of the first Cadbury Report is still open to debate, but what it has achieved is to open a forum for dialogue on the proper issues of corporate governance. The raised profile of Non-Executive Directors and their spirit of independent judgement are positive but the broader aspects need to be addressed. The archetypal comments of the archetypal chairman Will all those who disagree with the proposal indicate by saying I resign are hopefully, banished from boardrooms for good.

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