Executive Summary

The DISEC is the first committee of the United Nations General Assembly; it debates high-priority
matters related to disarmament and threats against world security and peace. At this very moment,
one of the most urgently needed challenges that need to be discussed and acted upon are the risks
concerning the development of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Artificial Intelligence, and
other similar military technologies. While these new developments have enhanced operational
efficiency and alleviated risks to human soldiers, they raise ethical, legal, humanitarian, and
security concerns too. There is a great risk that LAWS might act unpredictably or make mistakes
that could cause casualties not intended by humans. If unhindered, these systems can be employed
by terrorists, criminal organizations, or rogue states.

Most of those technologies are wrapped in a host of ethical and legal questions besides
considerations pertinent to IHL. Current frameworks, such as the CCW, currently do not take into
consideration the effects of these AI military systems, which may not be in full compliance with
some of the basic principles of IHL, including proportionality and distinction, insofar as they
cannot make moral judgments or ensure accountability for actions taken. Last but not least, most
countries have yet to properly define and categorize these systems which is necessary to bring
them under proper regulation.

It is expected that the DISEC will attempt to bring these technologies under proper categorization,
discuss existing treaties and conventions, identify the gaps in their regulatory framework, and
recommend further action in order to address the security threats posed by these emerging
technologies. The Committee is to encourage international cooperation for establishment of new
standards in the use and development of AI and autonomous systems responsibly in warfare.

DISEC therefore, at the end of deliberations, seeks to lay a foundation toward a more
comprehensive legal framework that will better address the security threats posed by the Emerging
Autonomous and AI Technologies in Weapon Systems in pursuit of principles pertaining to
international humanitarianism and peace across the world.

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 Table of Content

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA 3

BACKGROUND OF THE AGENDA 6

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON THE AGENDA 8

EXAMPLES OF COUNTRIES 9

SCOPE OF DEBATE 10

NECESSARY DOCUMENTATIONS 11
 Introduction to the Committee

United Nations General Assembly

The United Nations General Assembly emerged in the year 1945, basing its establishment on the
UN Charter. It is one of six main bodies of the UN. It performs key functions to do with the UN
as a policy-making, deliberative, and representative body. UNGA is the only organ of the United
Nations in which all the member states, being 193 in total, have equal representation, and this
serves as a forum for discussing any international issue of great or small weight.

The United Nations General Assembly is a forum for multilateral deliberations on the main global
issues, which are determined by the UN Charter: international law, economic development, social
progress, peace, security, and the promotion and protection of human rights. The United Nations
General Assembly, situated in the heart of UN world diplomacy, makes decisions and resolutions
on these issues but, as a rule, they carry no binding force. The Assembly sets the UN Agenda for
the year, which includes, among others, international cooperation and helps to determine how the
world takes up pressing problems.

Disarmament and International Security Committee

The Disarmament and International Security Committee is the First Committee of the General
Assembly. This committee is one of the six big committees of the UNGA. DISEC was formed
back in 1945 when the UN Charter was adopted along with the UNGA. Besides, DISEC was the
very first Committee in the General Assembly. In this committee, it shall be competent to
deliberate on matters related to disarmament, and threats against world security and peace.

As an independent unit of the General Assembly, DISEC can recommend to the plenary session
of the Assembly on any matters that would be discussed. The recommendation for draft resolutions
and decisions are made and passed duly within the General Assembly. Much of the work done
within DISEC has significantly contributed toward the formulation of international treaties and
legal frameworks that would support stability and security at a global magnitude.
The UNGA and DISEC establish the basis of all actions toward finding solutions to global
problems through cooperation, communication, and diplomacy. For its part, DISEC tackled only
such issues on disarmament and security that would thus receive due attention and action in these
crucial aspects on the international plane. Only the UNGA provided the forum for multilateral
deliberation and decision-making.

Mandate of the Committee

The problems of disarmament, general global concerns, and threats to international peace besetting
the entire international community would be guided through the Disarmament and International

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Security Committee-also quite popularly referred to as the First Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly. DISEC is vested with the responsibility of formulating and promoting solutions
to questions posed within the context of international security.
Following the UN Charter, or depending on particular subjects of the competencies of other UN
organs, the items on disarmament and international security fall within the DISEC mandate. For
instance, the conceptual approach of the committee includes the more general cooperative methods
of doing international peace and security, besides the issues of disarmament and armaments
control. The second objective of the committee is to promote cooperative measures and pacts
facilitating international stability through weapons limitation. It does this in concert with the
Geneva Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission, in pursuance of its
objectives.
The DISEC, being a General Assembly committee, has no authority to make resolutions that are
legally binding or to create new laws over the international horizon. It can give recommendations
and approve discussions on matters of disarmament and questions of international security. DISEC
cannot order any military action, or send any peacekeeping force. Besides, DISEC would not be
heard calling out the states for sanctions or interfering with national defense policies or
sovereignty.
Since it enjoys the privilege of being the only Main Committee of the General Assembly to have
unabridged records coverage, the activity of DISEC in the area of international security and
disarmament is significant and transparent.

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 Introduction to the Agenda

“Agenda: Addressing the Security Threats of Emerging Autonomous and AI

Technologies in Weapon Systems”

Agenda Understanding
This agenda is concerned with the risks that come with autonomous systems and artificial
intelligence integrated into modern weapons. Governments increasingly use technologies such as
robots, drones, and missiles powered by AI. These devices can make independent decisions on
target identification, firing, and mission completion without direct human supervision. In the
development of these systems, there has been considerable interest in the moral, legal, and safety
issues related to warfare.

While these technologies may reduce risks to soldiers and increase operational efficiency, they
also carry grave threats. There is a great risk that LAWS might act unpredictably or make mistakes
that could cause casualties not intended by humans. If unhindered, these systems can be employed
by terrorists, criminal organizations, or rogue states. Think, for instance, of a fully autonomous
weapon that accidentally attacks civilian populations or AI-controlled drones that, after being
hacked, reach targets other than those intended.

More worrying, autonomous systems may unleash very destructive weapons, such as chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons, without proper human oversight. If a LAWS unit autonomously
deploys some sort of chemical weapons-a war crime under international law-the resulting
destruction could be widespread and irreversible, posing serious global security threats. One of the
most concerning aspects of AI-powered warfare is the ability to automate decisions involving
WMDs. The biggest problem is, there is no convention stopping them, nor the existing conventions
addressing them.

To address this agenda, the DISEC has to use its mandate to analyze the existing treaties,
conventions, and international law for any gaps in the regulation of emerging technologies. The
focus shall be on how far the current frameworks are from addressing the risks of autonomous and
AI-powered weapons and also finding ways to strengthen the globe from a security perspective.

Keywords
I. Autonomous Weapons: 'Autonomous weapons' are those capable of carrying out military
missions without human guidance and can describe themselves from target searching to
the very point of determining actions and even performing a fighting task. Yet one of the
applications is an unmanned aerial vehicle or drone with high-level software enabling it to

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 conduct its mission independently. Other evidence of how these technologies are impacting
modern warfare is the invention of self-governing land and marine vehicles.

II. Artificial Intelligence (AI): AI in this context refers to systems containing processing
capacity of large amounts of data, which learn from the data, and are accompanied by
decision-making capabilities without continuous human supervision. Many modern
weapon systems incorporate artificial intelligence into their structure for adding precision
and functionality. Examples are robotic sentinels and missile defense systems. But, of
course, if all these systems act in certain surroundings that are changing in an unpredictable
way, the problem of unforeseen consequences arises.

III. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS): Fully automated Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems, on the other hand, are weapon systems designed to search, select, and
attack a target without direct human control. Therefore, lethal autonomous weapons are
one of the most controversial military technologies with regard to the ethical, legal, and
security implications of AI. In fact, an illustration of a point of concern is that under
extreme conditions in heavy combat, LAWS may act in uncontrollable ways by humans.
For example, autonomous drones attack with airstrikes without the need for a real-time
human operator to give input.

IV. Security Threats: the uptake of AI and autonomous weapon systems is expected to
introduce a myriad of risks. Among these- the risk of failure and mistaken targeting, and
cyber vulnerabilities that might allow non-state actors to hack or otherwise exploit such
systems. The second great problem consists in the lack of responsibility of those who make
a wrong decision or if a breach of international law is made since the decisions are taken
by an algorithm. With these technologies that lessen the direct risk to human soldiers, it
comes with an increasing suspicion that it could lower the threshold for conflict.

V. International Humanitarian Law (IHL): IHL, for instance, is a body of law that governs
attitudes during armed conflict toward non-combatants and civilians. By now, such
principles as distinction or proportionality are too basic to be followed by any AI-driven
system. How would an autonomous drone know not to fly towards civilians? So, the main
themes of the debates about ensuring global security concern the following: how
autonomous weapons are made to do so.

VI. Regulation: The world community cannot agree on how to regulate AI and self-governing
armaments. A number of countries support their responsible application under strict
guidelines, while others are in favor of a complete ban on the use of such fully autonomous
lethal arms. This is the dicey part where doing something to make those kinds of laws
enforceable globally, yet aligned with national rules of engagement and capable of keeping

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 up with today's fast-changing technologies, might prove quite a challenge. Some of these
new issues will require changes in existing treaties, such as the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW).

VII. Disarmament: That is, the process of reduction or control in the use of specific weapons
with the aim of increasing international security. In this view, disarmament is meant to
limit the development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems, particularly those
that make independent attack decisions. Only recently has the international community
begun considering the question of whether LAWS and other autonomous weapons should
be covered by specific agreements on disarmament, or otherwise be regulated.

VIII. Proliferation: This means the availability of weapons, especially those advanced systems
like autonomous and artificial intelligence-based systems, to certain nations, non-state
actors, or groups. The proliferation of weapons is a huge concern in that this places at risk
acquiring powerful systems from unstable or dangerous regimes. Now, it is the
proliferation of drones and AI-enhanced missile systems that drew attention to global
security concerns with the potential for illegal arms trading. It is a significant challenge to
control this matter through international agreements and stricter regulations.

IX. Free Zones: These are areas in which certain weapons are not allowed. The most well-
known is the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone, where such weapons as nuclear,
chemical, and biological ones are forbidden in defined areas. These zones are among the
means which help to prevent the proliferation and use of dangerous weapons by inhibiting
regional crises. Such zones established through international treaties, including:
A. Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America)
B. Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa)
C. Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia)
D. WMDFZ in the Middle East is still being discussed, with regional political
tensions affecting progress. These zones have constituted both a
disarmament and a non-proliferation mainstay. But could these treaties be
inclusive of regulation upon newly emergent autonomous weapons and AI
technologies?

X. High Contracting Parties: These are states which have signed in or acceded to an
international treaty or convention like the CCW. High Contracting Parties are mandated
with responsibility in which they have to comply with the terms of the treaty and inclusive
of involvement in decision-making processes, which also involve adapting amendments or
new protocols. For example, modifications or amendments to the convention, any time,
can be made upon consensus by all High Contracting Parties so that the changes would be

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 acceptable to all those concerned. It acted as an essential instrument in bringing coherence
and coordination to international efforts on disarmament.

Background of the Agenda

Historical Background
The development of LAWS can be seen as part of a broader trend in warfare towards increased
precision and reduced collateral damage. This evolution began with early attempts to regulate
warfare, such as the St. Petersburg Declaration, and continued through the banning of
indiscriminate weapons like biological and chemical agents. The introduction of precision-guided
munitions marked a significant step towards greater compliance with International Humanitarian
Law (IHL), particularly regarding distinction and proportionality.

LAWS represents a potential further advancement in this direction, offering the promise of even
greater accuracy and faster information processing than human operators. However, their opacity
and unpredictability in unforeseen situations introduce new risks.

What made LAWS a security threat?

➢ The Aegis Combat System, the first instance of a semi-autonomous weapon system,
infamously shot down Iran Air Flight 655 in March 1988, mistaking it for an Iranian F-15
fighter plane. While initially attributed to human error in misinterpreting signals from the
machine, this incident remains relevant today, underscoring the potential consequences of
machine-driven decision-making processes rather than human involvement.

➢ Similarly, military drones have long been employed for remote surveillance and strike
operations. Contemporary drones, armed with explosives and equipped with target
identification technology, possess the ability to detect and engage targets without relying
on human controllers. Recent reports indicate the first documented use of autonomous
drones occurred in Libya in March 2020. According to a UN report documenting the
incident, the Turkish-made Kargu-2 drone autonomously hunted down members of the
Libyan National Army. These weapons were programmed with a “fire, forget, and find”
capability, functioning independently without requiring continuous data connectivity

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 between the operator and the munition. While the specifics of the Turkish drones’ fully
autonomous utilization in this operation remain unclear, the fact remains that the Kargu-2
drone demonstrates the potential for complete autonomous operation through machine
learning. They have proven to be a force multiplier and a game changer, positioning
themselves as potential weapons of choice in future operations.

➢ During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, a notable LAWS incident came to light.
Open-source analysts reported the presence of the Russian KUB-BLA loitering munition
system, a collaborative production of Kalashnikov and ZALA Aero group, in the Podil
neighborhood of Kyiv in March 2022. Although there is yet to be confirmed evidence of
the drone being deployed in its fully autonomous mode, capable of selecting and killing
targets, it is evident that this technology has made its way onto the battlefield and is here
to stay.

➢ The employment of LAWS and other AI/machine learning systems will transform the
nature of war. Increased reliance on machine learning and AI-based systems may lead to
policymakers’ “AI overconfidence” if they assume that these systems generate accurate
data and superior analysis compared to human sources. In such scenarios, even when
employing semi-autonomous weapons systems with human involvement in decision-
making, the ability or willingness to challenge information provided by AI-based systems
or verify it through other means may be significantly diminished. This can result in
dangerous situations and a higher risk of unintended escalation, particularly in a nuclear
environment.

➢ Furthermore, the lack of meaningful international control over the acquisition and adoption
of these technologies incentivizes non-state actors to utilize LAWS for terrorist purposes.
Non-state organizations such as Hezbollah and ISIS have already demonstrated their ability
to operate drones in various attacks. Without regulations in place for dual-use technology
necessary for LAWS, more nonstate actors will venture into this field.

Relevant Discussions
International humanitarian law (IHL) regulates relations between States, international
organizations, and other subjects of international law. It is a matter of debate whether international
humanitarian law (IHL) in its current form, as the most relevant body of law concerning warfare,
sufficiently covers the challenges of LAWS. The IHL principles of proportionality and distinction
are the main focus while considering the implication of LAWS. Under IHL, human commanders
are expected to demonstrate the rationality of their attack decisions to explain and justify their
conduct. The opaqueness of modern machine learning algorithms, which prevents any human from
understanding their decision-making process, poses severe ethical problems in this regard, as one
cannot predict how an AI would pursue its task. The lack of ‘intent’ of AI systems contributes to

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this dilemma, as it cannot be proven that an opaque and indifferent AI system would act in good
faith, as required by the proportionality principle.

Additionally, The relevant intergovernmental forum for the negotiation of norms that could place
limits on the development or use of LAWS is the group of governmental experts on lethal
autonomous weapon systems (GGE LAWS) that operates in the framework of the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The CCW itself is an international treaty and a set of
additional protocols that set out norms and limitations on certain kinds of conventional weapons.
The GGE LAWS started operating in 2014, with a majority of state parties participating. A pivotal
development was the adoption of 11 guiding principles that were proposed in the conclusions of a
2018 report of the GGE LAWS and adopted by consensus by participating state parties at the
group’s November 2019 meeting.

However, the 11 principles do not constitute new legally binding obligations but a consensus
among state parties regarding what they each commit to uphold in their national practices. The
principles also do not open up any prospects for an international monitoring or verification regime
for LAWS. As agreements among state parties are by consensus, the maximum extent of agreed
limitations on LAWS is the lowest common denominator between national positions.

International Conventions on the Agenda

I. GGE LAWS (the 11 guiding principles)( Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging

Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems)
II. CCW (the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects)
III. International Humanitarian Law (The Law of The Hague, The Law of Geneva)
IV. CWC (the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction)
V. Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008) - a treaty banning certain weapons
VI. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 1997 (Ottawa Treaty)

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VII. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
VIII. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

Examples of Countries

Addressing the security threats posed by emerging autonomous and AI technologies in weapon
systems, it’s evident that countries are approaching the issue with varying degrees of acceptance,
caution, and ethical consideration. Nations such as the United States, Russia, Israel, and Germany
have already begun integrating these systems into their defense infrastructure. Notable examples
include the US Phalanx Close-In Weapon System, Israel's HARPY Loitering Munition, and Iron
Dome, Russia's Arena, and Germany’s AMAP Active Defence System. However, beyond
deployment, each country navigates this evolving technological landscape differently.

The United States, for instance, is at the forefront of AI integration but takes a measured approach,
grounding its defense AI strategy in principles of equity, traceability, and accountability. This
reflects a broader trend in US defense policy, emphasizing responsible development in line with
ethical standards. On the other hand, Russia argues that no new legal instruments are required for
lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), asserting that International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
already provides sufficient safeguards. Interestingly, Moscow contends that LAWS could even
improve compliance with IHL by reducing human error during conflict.

In Europe, there is a notable divergence in attitudes. While the United Kingdom invests in military
AI, it has expressed no ambitions to pursue fully autonomous weapons. France and Germany stand
firm against fully autonomous systems on ethical grounds, although they allow limited autonomy
when under direct human control. Germany, particularly, advocates for nonbinding agreements
that ensure humans remain in the decision-making loop when lethal force is in question, reflecting
a cautious but pragmatic stance on AI weaponization in conflict zones.

In the Middle East, views on LAWS and AI weapons vary widely. Egypt remains one of the
staunchest opponents of fully autonomous weapons, calling for their outright ban. Iran, conversely,
sees AI as a "strategic balancer" in the region and has been rapidly developing autonomous military
systems. Meanwhile, Turkey has focused on AI’s potential through its national defense strategy,
prioritizing the development of unmanned drones and vehicles over recent years.

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Asia presents a similarly complex landscape. China, despite publicly criticizing LAWS as
"indiscriminate and dangerous," continues to invest heavily in military AI, reflecting its strategic
ambition in both AI leadership and military modernization. India, like Russia, believes existing
IHL principles are adequate, advocating for political declarations rather than legally binding
restrictions to shape national policy on autonomous weapons.

The global picture reflects a fragmented yet rapidly evolving landscape, where ethical concerns,
technological ambition, and military necessity are in constant tension. As AI and autonomous
systems become increasingly central to defense strategies, the international community must
grapple with balancing innovation with regulation—ensuring that these powerful technologies are
deployed in ways that enhance security without undermining humanitarian principles.

Scope of Debate

I. Understanding Autonomous and AI Technologies in Weapon Systems: A precise definition

and categorization of autonomous weapons and artificial intelligence systems;
Differentiating between human-in-the-loop, human-on-the-loop, and fully autonomous
systems.
II. International Security Implications: The prospect of autonomous weapons systems
igniting arms races and destabilizing global security is a pressing concern; Impacts on
military strategy and the balance of power between nations.
III. Technological Gaps Between Nations: Mitigating disparities in the development and
deployment of artificial intelligence and autonomous weaponry to ensure equitable access
and distribution; Ensuring the inclusiveness of every nation in international governance
discussions to avoid power imbalances.
IV. Arms Control and Disarmament Initiatives: Proposing new/updated arms control
agreements that specifically target autonomous and AI-driven weapons; Evaluating the
practicality of controlling artificial intelligence-powered weaponry through pre-existing
treaties.
V. Proliferation of AI Technologies in Weapons Systems: The potential for the dissemination
of these technologies to entities outside of established international norms, including non-
governmental organizations, states with disregard for international law, and groups
engaged in violent acts of terrorism; Methods to mitigate the illicit movement and
clandestine distribution of autonomous weapons systems and their underlying components.
VI. Weapons Systems and Civilian Protection: Discussing the assurance of compliance with
IHL regarding civilian protection and the principles of distinction, proportionality, and
necessity in warfare.

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VII. Legal and Ethical Frameworks for Autonomous Weapons: Investigating the shortcomings
of current international agreements and conventions; Creating standards for civilian
industries and research organizations to ensure that artificial intelligence is not utilized for
military applications in a harmful manner.

Necessary Documentations

Position Paper
A position paper is a formal document regarding the agenda/s of the committee to be discussed, in
which delegates present their country’s arguments in support of their positions.

Structure of a Position Paper:

I. First Para (Introduction): Start with a representative and impartial summary of the agenda/s
given to the committee. It should therefore provide specific background information, the
global context for why this topic is important now, and why it matters to international
peace, security, or development.

II. Second Para (National and Foreign Policy): This section should outline the current policies
of the country, relying on history as well as the present policies in place today. Delegates
are required to know in detail the foreign relations of their country and present the extent
to which it meets the expectations of the committee.

III. Third Para (International Frameworks and Existing Solutions): For this part of the paper,
delegates are expected to be well-informed about the UN resolutions, conventions, treaties,
etc regarding the agenda/s. Consider these frameworks and resolutions in-depth and
explain how they have both strengths and gaps (According to your country).

IV. Fourth Para (Proposed Solutions/Policies): This is perhaps the most important aspect of a
position paper. Delegates should present constructive solutions in line with the country’s
foremost strategic objectives and global diplomatic needs. These solutions should be
elaborate and include both the immediate and the protracted consequences. Proposed
solutions must be feasible, realizable, and comply with the tenets of international law.
Delegates are being urged to come up with proposals that incorporate analysis of real
instead of abstract ideas about the problem.

Style and Expression of the Position Paper:

➢ The position paper needs to be written in a formal, diplomatic manner.

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 ➢ The standpoint and proposals of the country must be articulated in a clear, brief, and
unambiguous manner.
➢ Adequate literature such as the country's national news agencies, journals, and reports as
well as documents like treaties and case studies should be used in the arguments wherever
applicable. They should not just state this, but they should endeavor to demonstrate depth
in their research.

Instructions to Write Down a Position Paper:

➢ The paper should use “Times New Roman” as the font, with a font size of 12.
➢ The text should be aligned in a “Justified” format, and the line spacing should be set to
1.15, with a single space between paragraphs.
➢ There is no specific word count requirement, but the position paper must be contained
within two pages, including references.
➢ It is not mandatory to include the country flag, emblem, or the committee logo on the
position paper.

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Draft Resolution
Resolutions are formal texts that are adopted by the United Nations. In general, each entity within
the UN is eligible to write Resolutions, in practice however, since the Trusteeship Council
suspended operation on 1 November 1994, only three adopt resolutions: the GA, the SC, and
ECOSOC. Most importantly, the Security Council frequently issues resolutions, whose operative
decisions are binding to all UN member states (Article 25 of UN Charter). Within Model UN,
resolutions are the ultimate goal of all conference committees and should usually gather the most
important points that were discussed. A good resolution is made up of several things:
• The required format is implemented correctly.
• It has a good and precise English language style.
• It is logical in its arguments, but also defines a comprehensive position along the lines of the
prior debates. Good resolutions are flexible and can adapt, but are still enough precise to allow
proper implementation.

Resolution Format
Heading
On the left margin should be indicated:
• The Resolution Number (filled in by the Chair)
• The Committee Name
• The Agenda addressed by the resolution
• The list of the Sponsors and Signatories

Body
The resolution is written in the format of one long sentence. Just as grammatical rules make a
language more uniform in its usage, so is the resolution in its format.
1. The resolution begins with “The General Assembly” for all GA committees and with “The
Economic and Social Council” for all ECOSOC committees. The Specialized Agencies (like the
Security Council) use their own names as the introductory line.
2. The next section, consisting of Preambulatory Clauses, describes the problem being addressed,
recalls past actions taken, explains the purpose of the resolution, and offers support for the
operative clauses that follow.
3. Operative Clauses are numbered and state the action to be taken by the body. Operative Clauses
all begin with present tense active verbs, which are generally stronger words than those used in
the preamble.

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 Sample Draft Resolution

UNITED NATIONS RES/DRAFT RESOLUTION 1.1.0

General Assembly District: Limited

24 February, 2024

Committee: Disarmament and International Security Committee

(The General Assembly First Committee)
Agenda: Curtailing Arm Race Threats in Outer Space to Confront Future Proliferation of Armaments for Space
Security and Sustainability
Sponsors: French Republic, United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Signatories: Commonwealth of Australia, Republic of Albania, Republic of Argentina, Federative Republic of Brazil,
Canada, Republic of Chile, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of India, State of Israel, Japan, Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

The General Assembly,

Emphasizing the significance of keeping space peaceful, safe, stable, and secure for everyone's benefit as well as the
important role that space activities play in the advancement of science, technology, society, and international peace
and security,
Recalling its resolutions 68/50 of 5 December 2013,74/32 of 12 December 2019, and 75/36 of 7 December 2020,
Welcoming the adoption of the Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities by the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at its sixty-second session, the application of which could improve
global peace and security,

Reaffirming that preventing an arms race in space would prevent a serious threat to global security and peace,
1) Requests the establishment of a Multilateral Space Transparency Initiative (MSTI) by the United Nations First
Committee:
a) The aim is to foster openness, information-sharing, and confidence-building measures to promote
transparency and confidence among spacefaring nations,
b) Suggests the establishment of a centralized database accessible to all participating nations, containing
information on satellite launches, orbital parameters, and planned maneuvers
c) The participation in the MSTI is open and voluntary to all spacefaring nations;

2) Expresses the hope that countries concerned with space security and sustainability will build rapport by:
a) Subsidizing space-based services and technologies by the existing framework of the Outer Space Treaty,
b) Aiding the developing and least-developed countries with operational satellite services to enhance the
individual country’s capacity to eradicate poverty, hunger and disaster threats,
c) Initiating exchange programs for outer space research under the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS) research segment.

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