Strategic Defense Iniative
Strategic Defense Iniative
Strategic Defense Iniative
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Strategic ,
Defense
Initiative
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July 1992
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Strategic
Defense
Initiative
July 1992
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures ......................................................................................... iv
List of Tables ......................................................................................... v
Chapter 1
Ballistic Missile Defense Policy
1.1
1.2
1. 3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1. 7
Chapter 2
Defense Concepts and Architectures
2.1
2.2
2.3
Chapter 3
Description of Each SDI Project
3.1
3. 2
3. 3
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Chapter 5
Other Nation Participation
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
L ..................
!... ..............
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Chapter 6
ABM Treaty Compliance
6.1
6.2
6.3
Introduction
...............................;................... 6-2
Existing Compliance Process for SDI ....................................... ' ................. 6-3
SDI Experiments .............................................................. !.. ................. 6-3
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Chapter 7
Countermeasures
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
......................................................................................... 7-2
Chapter 8
Funding
Chapter 9
Relation of SDI Programs to Military Missions
9.1
9.2
9.3
Introduction
....................................................................................... 9-2
SDI Technologies and Critical Military Missions ............................................ 9-3
SDI Technologies and Significant Military Missions ........................................ 9-4
9. 3.1
9.3.2
9.3.3
9.3.4
9.4
9.5
iii
List of Figures
Figure 1-1
Figure 2-1
Figure 2-2
Figure 2-3
Figure 2-4
Figure 2-5
Figure 2-6
Composite Multi-Threat Defense Coverage: Single Site at Grand Forks, ND ... 2-13
Figure 2-7
Figure2-8
Figure 3-1
Figure 9-1
Figure 9-2
Potential SDI Technology Benefits to Other Significant Military Missions ....... 9-7
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List of Tables
Table 8-1
Table 8-2
j,
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Chapter 1
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Chapter 1
Ballistic Missile Defense Policy
This chapter describes the policy associated with ballistic missile defense, including the
implications of the evolving international security environment, the role that defenses can play in
responding to the threats we foresee in the 1990s and beyond, and recent decisions regarding
policy for the SDI Program. In addition, this chapter will discuss recent U.S. diplomatic initiatives
and developments and the implications of the Missile Defense Act (MDA) of 1991.
1.1
Introduction
The Department of Defense is developing for deployment a ballistic missile defense system
that will provide protection to the United States, its forward deployed forces, and allies and friends
against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source. The concept under which this
system is being developed is called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (OPALS). The
passage of the Missile Defense Act (MDA) of 1991 moved the Administration and Congress close
to a consensus on the role of ballistic missile defenses. The goal contained in the MDA is a
reflection of the determination of Congress to defend the U.S. against limited ballistic missile
attack and defend U.S. forward deployed forces and our friends and allies with highly effective
ballistic missile defenses.
Strategic Deterrence and Defense: The United States will continue to rely on its
strategic nuclear deterrent capability, including a survivable command, control, and
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Ballistic Missile Defense Policy
communications system and a modified version of the traditional Triad. Ballistic missile defenses-including space- and ground-based interceptors and sensors--will provide protection for the United
States against actions that are by definition undeterrable--accidental and unauthorized launches.
They also can provide protection against limited, deliberate ballistic missile strikes which may
threaten regional stability or the interests of U.S. allies and friends. Ballistic missile defenses
could extend protection to our forward deployed forces and allies. Defenses will become an
increasingly important indicator of American strategic capability and military strength-a tangible
indicator that we remain committed to providing security assistance to our friends and allies.
Forward Presence: The forward presence of U.S. forces can take many forms.
Stationing forces in selected forward bases or aboard naval vessels is perhaps the most visible
demonstration of U.S. commitment in key areas. Theater ballistic missile defense systems
operating in concert with U.S. early warning systems will provide point and wide area defense and
early warning to U.S. forward-based and expeditionary forces; space-based interceptors will
provide continuous, global coverage to those forces. U.S. defenses, in combination with those its
allies and coalition partners might deploy, would provide protection, on short notice, of U.S.
forces, host nation forces, and pons and airfields for arriving forces. These defenses would also
be capable of protecting population centers and would permit those at risk additional warning to
undertake civil defense measures.
Crisis Response: The need to respond to regional contingencies and crises, and do so
on very short notice, is one of the key elements of the new regional strategy. Defenses, in addition
to protecting targets, could also serve to defuse regional crises by deterring the employment of
ballistic missiles. This combination of defense and deterrent capabilities increases the likelihood
that, in regional crises, potential adversaries cannot use ballistic missile attacks to gain an
advantage or to deter the United States and its allies or coalition partners from pursuing political,
diplomatic, or military initiatives designed to resolve the crisis.
Active defenses also reduce pressures on U.S. military and political leaders involved in a
regional conflict to alter their campaign or war plans because of the threat (or actual use) of ballistic
missiles. In the absence of effective defenses, such carefully laid plans could be disrupted or
delayed. With an effective defense in place, our military leaders are better able to follow their well
constructed plans, thereby retaining the initiative in battle.
Force Reconstitution: The reconstitution concept is not simply to recreate or expand
existing forces, but to consider what new forces are most needed for a new or reemerging threat
consistent with our strategic concept A capability to protect against limited strikes represents an
appropriate level of defense within our strategic forces structure, based on our current planning
assumptions. Forces under consideration for deployment in the OPALS concept should provide
the base level of capability to carry us into the foreseeable future in support of our forward
presence and crisis response missions. If more ambitious missile defense capabilities are required
in the future as a result of changes in the international environment, the SDI program will have
developed the systems and technologies required to respond should a decision be made to do so in
the future.
A major implication for future regional contingencies that clearly emerged from the Gulf
War is the political and military importance of possessing a capability to counter defensively the
threatened or actual use of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States
cannot accept a situation in which these capabilities are allowed to constrain a U.S. president's
flexibility in employing military power when necessary to support U.S. national security objectives
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1-4
1.3.3
Ballistic missile defenses also will suppon our broader effons to discourage the spread of
ballistic missile technologies and weapons of mass destructions. We will redouble our effons to
control the spread of these capabilities. And we will pursue means to deter the use of such
weapons, and to destroy them if deterrence fails and they are used against the U.S., its forces, or
our friends and allies. But as we learned in the Gulf, active defenses have to be a part of the
solution to this urgent problem. Defenses would undennine the military and political utility of such
systems and should serve to dampen countries' incentives to acquire ballistic missiles. And where
proliferation controls fail, defenses provide an alternative means to respond to ballistic missile
threats.
The U.S. has been discussing the OPALS concept with its NATO allies and other allies
and friends for over a year, both bilaterally and in NATO fora. These discussions have included
the objectives of a limited deployment of ballistic missile defenses--including, in our view, that
such defenses would not threaten existing deterrents--and the willingness of the U.S. to extend
protection to allies. We have discussed the possibility of providing allies information from
OPALS sensors for both early warning of an attack and to improve the effectiveness of theater
based (U.S. or allied) ballistic missile defenses. Our discussions also included an invitation to
participate in the development and operation of those defenses. (See Chapter 5 for a description of
cooperative programs with allies.)
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1.4.3
President Bush's initiative for cooperation in the deployment of defenses was followed by
President Yeltsin's January 29, 1992 announcement that "We are ready jointly to work out and
subsequently to create and jointly operate a global system of defense in place of SDI." Two days
later, in a speech to the United Nations Security Council, President Yeltsin reiterated his proposal
for the "creation of a global system for protection of the world community" which "could make use
of high technologies developed in Russia's defense complex." President Yeltsin's remarks
represented a major breakthrough. For the first time, a Russian leader publicly acknowledged our
shared interest in developing defenses against ballistic missiles.
During their meeting at Camp David on February 1, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin had a
constructive discussion about the proposal on global defenses. They agreed to continue this
dialogue. When Secretary of State Baker met in Moscow in February with President Yeltsin and
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, he stated that the U.S. shared Yeltsin's bold vision on the need for a
global ballistic missile defense system, and that we were prepared to work together toward this
goal. Secretary Baker proposed that we begin this cooperation by concrete steps in three areas:
the discussion of areas for possible technology exchange, especially the acquisition
of former Soviet technology and hardware; and,
The United States is encouraged by these recent developments, and we will continue to pursue
these discussions with our allies, Russia, and others as we move forward.
At the June 16-17 Summit in Washington, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed a Joint
Statement on a Global Protection System:
"The Presidents continued their discussion of the pote.ttial benefits of a
Global Protection System (GPS) against ballistic missiles, agreeing that it is
important to explore the role for defenses in protecting against limited ballistic
missile attacks. The two Presidents agreed that their two nations should work
together with allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a
system as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction. Such cooperation would be a tangible
expression of the new relationship that exists between Russia and the United States
and would involve them in an important u.,dertaking with other nations of the world
community.
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Ballistic Missile Defense Policy
The two Presidents agreed it is necessary to start work without delay to develop the
concept of the GPS. For this purpose they agreed to establish a high-level working
group to explore on a priority basis the following practical steps:
Interceptors based in space, on the surface, and airborne, capable of providing high
confidence protection to areas under attack. Space-based interceptors could provide
continuous, global interdiction capability against missiles with ranges in excess of
approximately 500 kilometers (about 300 miles). The surface-based and airborne-launched
interceptors, located in the United States, deployed with U.S. forces and, potentially,
deployed by U.S. allies, would provide local point and wide-area defense.
Common to all the GPALS interceptors is the use of non-nuclear, hit-to-kill technology for
destruction of all types of warheads--nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional. These
interceptors are designed to permit destruction of both missiles and warheads well away from the
targets being defended. The employment of multi-layered defenses will ensure multiple
opportunities to engage hostile ballistic missiles, thereby providing a high level of defense
effectiveness.
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The current Theater/l'actical elements of GPALS will be able to be deployed globally by the
United States. These forward elements of our ballistic missile defense will be transportable and
could be deployed with ground-based or sea-based units. Friends or allies may also choose to
deploy theater defenses that could be interoperable with those of the United States. It is important
to note that the space-based ballistic missile defense sensors will suppon theater as well as strategic
defense operations.
(3)
provide highly effective theater missile defenses to forward-deployed and
expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and to friends and allies of
the United States.
The MDA states that the limited deployment of defenses should be "designed to protect the
United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches
or Third World attacks". Congress and the Administration agree on the need for a defensive
capability to protect against these threats .
. The MDA directed the Administration to take several measures to implement the Act's goal
of a highly effective defense against limited ballistic missile strikes. The Department is moving
forward on each of these. In panicular, the Department is developing for deployment an ABM
defense located at a single site, by the earliest date allowed by technological availability, (discussed
below). The Department plans to deploy advanced theater ballistic missile defenses by the mid1990s. The United States, as discussed above, is continuing its dialogue with Russia on the
deployment of highly effective defenses against limited missile strikes. These activities are
consistent with the MDA's suppon for discussions with the former Soviet Union on obtaining
relief from the current ABM Treaty regime in order to achieve the missile defense goals stated in
theMDA.
18
Deployment Planning
The Department has planned, programmed, and budgeted its resources to support the goals
of the MDA and established military requirements. In response to congressional direction, the
Department is developing for deployment a defense located at a single site. Depending on the
progress made towards agreement to modifying the ABM regime, the restrictions on the location
and number of ABM sites, including the number of interceptors, in the United States, as well as
the prohibition on the deployment of space-based ABM sensors and interceptors, would be relaxed
accordingly. In this eventuality, the site at Grand Forks would be redundant. However, as long
as the ABM Treaty remains in force, the single site it permits would remain at Grand Forks.
Because the capability provided by this single site is constrained by the ABM Treaty, it cannot
defend the continental United States against the full range of threats to the required level of
effectiveness. In addition, several Treaty issues have not yet been resolved. The capability of this
Treaty-limited deployment would be restricted to intercepting a few tens of RVs launched by
ICBMs or long-range SLBMs aimed at the center of the nation. Additional sites, prohibited by the
ABM Treaty, are needed to provide the required level of defense for the entire U.S. against the full
range of threats.
After ABM Treaty compliance issues are resolved, we can undertake, if appropriate, and
after consultation with our allies who would be affected, improvements to existing early warning
sensors to bridge the gap until the space-based Brilliant Eyes sensors become operational. We are
currently studying this issue.
Consistent with our objectives and expectations for a global defense system, the
Department is planning to complete deployment of the full ground-based ABM system, consisting
of additional sites and additional ground-based interceptors at the turn of the century. Space-based
sensors are planned for deployment by the late 1990s to support the national and theater
components of a global defense system. The United States also will deploy advanced, highly
effective theater ballistic missile defenses beginning in the mid-1990s. Space-based interceptors
(i.e., Brilliant Pebbles) could be available for deployment by the year 2000 to complete the
deployment of the overall OPALS system architecture.
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1-10
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Ballistic Missile Defense Policy
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Chapter 2
Strategic Defense Initiative Concepts and Architectures
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Chapter 2
Defense Concepts and Architectures
This chapter responds to subparagraphs (b)(1) and (b)(3) of Section 224 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189), which
request a statement of "the basic strategy for research and development being pursued by
the Department of Defense under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl), including the relaUve
priority being given, respectively, to the development of near-term deployment options and
research on longer-term technological approaches." Part (b)(3) requests "a clear definiUon of
the objectives of each planned deployment phase of the Strategic Defense lnitiaUve for
defense against strategic ballisUc missiles."
2.1
The technical problem of defending the United States against attack from long range
ballistic missiles has been studied since the mid-1950s. The principal defense concept in the 1960s
and 1970s was to equip a defensive missile with a nuclear warhead, shoot it at an attacking
warhead, and guide the defensive missile close enough to the attacking warhead so that detonation
of the defensive warhead would destroy the attacker. Despite some remarkable progress made in
ballistic missile defense technologies during the 1960s, with the technologies available at that time,
this engagement could only occur post-apogee when attacking warheads were beginning their
descent to targets. Intercepts outside the atmosphere were complicated by decoys so the most
reliable intercepts could occur only after attnospheric slowdown.
Development of a multi-site missile defense system based on this concept proceeded into
the 1970s. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty which eventually, following its amendment in 1974, limited each country to
building only one ABM system deployment area with 100 ABM interceptor missiles. The
American site was completed in 1975, but was rendered inactive shortly thereafter. With so few
interceptors, even with intercepts outside the atmosphere, a single site system using the technology
available at that time had only a very limited capability to defend a small pan of the U.S. against a
large Soviet attack. Therefore, the U.S. determined that the expense of maintaining this site did
not merit its continued activation. However, the Russians have maintained and improved over time
their ABM system deployed around Moscow.
Significant advances in technologies applicable to ballistic missile defense occurred after the
1970s. In 1983 President Reagan challenged the U.S. scientific community to investigate the
feasibility of developing a defensive system using these technologies to counter ballistic missiles.
In response to the President's challenge, the Department of Defense conducted an intensive
analysis of these advanced technologies.
This analysis, known as the Fletcher Study, concluded that new technologies made
possible the actual intercept of an attacking missile. This capability represented a significant
improvement over previous concepts and would permit destruction of an attacking missile without
need of a nuclear detonation. In addition, the Fletcher Study recognized the feasibility of
intercepting attacking missiles much earlier in their flight path, thus giving a defensive system more
opportunities to intercept an attacking missile. Based on these and other fmdings, the Fletcher
Study outlined an approach for designing a defensive system that remains the conceptual
cornerstone of modem ballistic missile defense, and noted that the technologies required to develop
such a system were either in hand or on the horizon. The Fletcher Study concluded that the most
effective ballistic missile defense system would be a muiJilayered system that could intercept
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missiles in any phase along the missile's flight path, thus increasing the probability that an
attacking missile would be destroyed.
Since its initiation in 1983, the SDI program has evolved through three distinct phases: 1)
a broad based technology exploration and demonstration program to identify those technologies
ready for development to support an initial multi-layer comprehensive defense system, and those
promising follow-on technologies that could provide resilience against a full range of responsive
countermeasures, 2) a focused development program called "Phase I", initiated in 1987, and aimed
toward a significant layered defense capability to augment and strengthen deterrence, and 3) the
1991 refocusing of the program by the President toward protection of the U.S., our forces
overseas, and friends and allies against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source. The
latter is the continuing focus of the current program.
In his 1991 State of the Union Address, the President stated:
"... Looking forward, I have directed that the SDI Program be refocused on
providing protection from limited missile strikes, whatever their source. Let us
pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to
our forces overseas, and to our friends and allies."
As a result, the program presented to Congress during 1991 was structured to provide by
the end of this decade many of the same space- and ground-based elements of the previous SDI
architecture--but in substantially reduced numbers. Rather than being sized to help deter a massive
Soviet attack (now judged to be substantially less likely) involving thousands of ballistic missile
weapons, a OPALS deployment, involving half the ground-based interceptors and one-fourth the
space-based interceptors previously planned in the Phase I Architecture, would protect the United
States against limited attacks involving up to 200 ballistic missile warheads.
Consistent with the mandate in the FY 91 Defense Appropriations Act, the Administration
also proposed an accelerated program to develop and deploy advanced theater ballistic missile
defense systems (potentially based in-theater or transported there when needed, or based on ships).
This capability would be significantly more effective than the Patriot defense demonstrated in the
Gulf War, and would be highly efficient against theater missiles with ranges longer than the Scud,
as well as shorter range missiles.
The Administration has integrated its plans for strategic and theater missile defenses
through a concept called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, or OPALS. Global means
protecting U.S. worldwide interests with theater defenses as well as defenses for the American
homeland. Protection means the objective is high confidence of extremely low or no leakage.
Wmited means up to 200 attacking ballistic missile warheads in a variety of scenarios.
.
The scale of limited strikes depends on their source. For Third World threats we might
expect one to a few tens of missiles launched simultaneously. For an accidental launch, we might
be concerned with the launch of a single ICBM or SLBM having 10 nuclear warheads or with the
launch of a few such missiles. For an unauthorized launch, it might involve a regiment of ICBMs
(e.g., 10 ICBMs with 10 warheads each) or of a full submarine of SLBMs (e.g., 20 SLBMs with
10 warheads each), launched within a short time. For advanced missiles, penetration aids could
accompany the nuclear warheads. Missiles from some Third World countries might have primitive
penetration aids, or none at all.
The Missile Defense Act of 1991, contained within the FY 1992 National Defense
Authorization Act and discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter, gave further direction to
the SDI program by accelerating the deployment of the first ground-based missile defense site for
the United States by three to four years. We view this deployment to be the initial step toward
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1990s.
Space- and surface-based sensors capable of providing global, continuous surveillance and
track, from launch to intercept or impact, of ballistic missiles of all ranges. The use of
space-based sensors would allow for a reduction in the size, cost, and number of the
surface-based weapons and sensors, while increasing their performance. 1n combination,
the sensors would provide information to U.S. forces, and, potentially, to those of our
allies.
2-4
Interceptors. based in space, on the surface, and airborne, capable of providing highconfidence protection to areas under attack. Space-based interceptors could provide
continuous, global interdiction capability against missiles with ranges in excess of
approximately 500 km (about 300 miles). The surface-based interceptors, located in the
United States, deployed with U.S. forces and, potentially, deployed by U.S. allies, would
provide local point and wide area defenses.
The Command Center infrastructure supports the centralized command and decentralized
execution of the ballistic missile defense system while maintaining human control of the
system at all times. These distributed facilities will be at the Cheyenne Mountain Air Force
Base and collocated with the various ground-based sensor and interceptor sites. The
command centers will link the GPALS elements through its command and control
structure, communications networks and battle management software, ensuring that proper
execution of a single coordinated defense exists. Additionally, the GPALS command and
control will include an integrated system with theater forces to ensure coordination and
information flow between theater ballistic missile defense assets.
A layered defense, including the combination of surface- and space-based interceptors and
sensors, would provide the highest level of confidence in the effectiveness of the defenses, and,
over the full range of GPALS missions. This is because a ground-only system does not have as
many shot opportunities against a missile as does a combined space and ground system. For
example, while a ground-based interceptor would only shoot at an incoming missile after it reaches
its apogee, the space-based interceptor can intercept a missile in its early to mid stages of flight.
The two systems combine to give the highest probability of engagement and kill.
2.3
The trajectory of a ballistic missile can be divided into several phases: boost, post-boost,
midcourse, and terminal. The boost phase refers to the early portion of missile flight when the
engines are burning and thrusting the vehicle out of the atmosphere. The post-boost phase refers
to the period immediately after booster engine burnout, usually after the missile has left the
atmosphere and initiates release of its warheads. The midcourse phase refers to the relatively long
period when the warheads coast in space along their trajectories. The terminal phase refers to the
last portion of flight when the warlleads reenter the atmosphere. For long-range missiles, the time
period of the boost and post-boost phases combined is a few minutes, the midcourse phase lasts
about twenty minutes, and the terminal phase is a minute or so.
The opportunities to intercept a ballistic missile vary for each phase of the missile's
trajectory. The architecture concept under development calls for a layered defense so that the
technological capabilities we have developed can be employed in discrete fashion in each phase of
the threat trajectory. This approach will result in the highest probability of engaging and
destroying the threat.
A key feature of a multilayered defense is the use of both space-based and ground-based
systems. For example, the most practical way with the widest coverage to detect the launch and
flight of a strategic missile in its boost phase is to use an orbiting platform that can observe the
launch from space. Destroying strategic missiles in their boost or post-boost phases, especially
before the missiles have released their loads of multiple warheads, is another function that can only
be performed practically from space. And in a battle that will only last about thirty minutes from
launch to warhead impact, this capability increases the time and opportunities available to conduct
intercepts throughout the battle space.
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2.3.1
The theater/tactical missile threat facing U.S. forces and those of our allies and friends is
complex in terms of the types of threats (tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-tosurface missiles), the technical sophistication, destructive potential and concept of operations.
These threats are addressed broadly in the JCS Mission Need Statement for Theater Missile
Defense. The required general capabilities are grouped into four areas: Attack operations
(counterforce); passive defense; active defense; and BMJC3L In combination with active defenses,
counterforce, passive defense and BM/C31, the United States is provided with a capability to
respond to the full range of theater missile threats using space- and surface-based interceptors. The
focus of the discussion in this repon is on the active defense ponion of the general theater missile
defense mission.
The active defense ponion of the Theater Missile Defense program has been expanded in
the past year to emphasize the transition from research and development to acquisition of a theater
ballistic missile defense system. As stated in the Report to Congress on the SDI Program last
year, we are aggressively pursuing the development of advanced, rapidly relocatable, groundbased wide area theater missile defenses for deployment in the mid-1990s. In parallel, we are
researching and developing space, maritime, and ground-based sensors, and space, maritime, and
air-launched interceptors, for deployment at a later time, which together with the theater ballistic
missile defense systems developed in the mid-1990s will provide a mutually supponing system.
In the near term (1995-98), our strategy is to upgrade the PATRiar system; add an uppertier, area defense called 1HAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense); upgrade the Homing-AllThe-Way-Killer (HAWK) air defense system; improve the Navy SPY-1 radar to give Aegis ATBM
capability to defend the fleet, pons, and landing sites; and improve the battle management and
command, control, and communications that support these elements.
PATRIOT is a mobile system consisting of a single radar, normally eight launchers with
four interceptor missiles each, and a command and control unit. This system was originally
designed to protect point or small area military targets (e.g., an airbase or artillery battery) against
anack from air-breathing threats such as cruise missiles or manned aircraft. PATRIOT was later
upgraded to protect a limited area against faster moving shon range ballistic missiles with a range
up to about 370 miles. This is the capability that was demonstrated against Scuds in the Gulf War.
Although this system is not designed to defend against very fast-moving threats such as long range
ballistic missiles, additional enhancements are planned that would enlarge the area PATRIOT can
defend. The planned PATRIOT Anti-Tactical Missile Capability Three (PAC-3) will be a major
system upgrade that will increase PATRIOTs range, firepower, and lethality against shon-range
ballistic missile threats with ranges of 1,000 km. The ERINT program provides a hit-to-kill
alternative interceptor technology that would be deployed with the PATRIOT system, enhancing
funher its firepower and lethality.
Recognizing the inherent limitations of a small-area defense system such as PATRial', the
Department is developing 1HAAD as a key element for active theater missile defense. 1HAAD
will provide wide area coverage and will engage tactical/theater ballistic missiles at high altitudes
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Figure 2-2 Notional Near Term Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture
2-8
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THMD-
Figure 2-3 Notional Far Term Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture
Other research efforts underway include Extended Range Interceptor (ERIN'l) technology,
and the Arrow/Arrow Continuation Experiments (ACES), a cooperative U.S./Israeli interceptor
technology program. Boost phase intercept technology for an airborne platform also is undergoing
research. Airborne interceptors in the vicinity of a missile launch could place an enemy's theater
ballistic missiles, regardless of their range, at risk.
The theater ballistic missile defense program involves all four Military Services and U.S.
friends and allies in the development of technology and the selection of systems to provide an antimissile defense. Additional information on the theater ballistic missile defense architecture and
programmatic specifics was provided to Congress in the 180-day report mandated by the Missile
Defense Act of 1991.
As noted in Chapter 6, although the objective of the ABM Treaty is to limit defenses against
strategic ballistic missiles, there may be conflicts between the Treaty and the development and
deployment of some of the theater/tactical missile defense systems under consideration. We are
currently studying this issue.
2.3.2
The Limited Defense System (LOS) architecture for the defense of the United States as set
forth in the MDA includes multiple sites with ground-based interceptors supported by both groundbased radars and space-based sensors. In programmatic terms, SDIO refers to the illS as the
National Missile Defense (NMD) segmenL This architecture is illustrated in Figure 2-4.
2-9
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2-10
to support the initial site capability. The initial site will consist of the local components of the
BMC3 system plus the initial deployment of ground-based interceptors (OBI) and the first
operational ground-based radar (GBR).
BE is being developed on a schedule that would permit deployment soon after the initial site
is operational. The BE space-based sensor system will be the primary midcourse optical sensor,
allowing tracking of post-boost vehicles and RVs as soon as they are dropped off. This provides
the maximum time for the OBI to fly, generating the maximum possible defended footprint from
each OBI site. During the deployment of the ground-based sites and before BE is available, cueing
of the OBI into the battle to provide maximum defended footprint could be provided by either
software upgrades to the early warning radars, construction on new radars, or by GSTS. Use of
any of these interim cueing approaches may require treaty relief. BE also provides critical support
to theater defense, cueing the radars and/or directly committing THAAD interceptors. Against
longer range theater ballistic missile threats, this increases the defended footprint area by up to a
factor of 10 from that provided by local radar support alone, greatly decreasing the ground assets
required in-theater for a given level of defense. BE also is capable of peacetime monitoring of
missile flights worldwide, providing the optical signature data base to allow all defense systems to
operate at peak performance when called on in wartime.
The primary role of the Ground-Based Surveillance and Tracking System (GSTS) is to
provide an option for interim cueing of OBis at the initial site, prior to deployment of Brilliant
Eyes. The current NMD architecture optical sensor requirements are met by the Brilliant Eyes (BE)
program.
2.3.2.1
While planning for the Limited Defense System architecture as described in the Missile
Defense Act, our first priority will be to deploy by the earliest date allowed by the availability of
appropriate technology, an ABM Treaty-compliant system at a single site.
The composition of the initial defense site is shown in Figure 2-5 with the Ground Based
Radar (GBR), Ground Based Interceptor (OBI), and associated BMC3.
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2-16
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Chapter 3
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Chapter 3
Description of Each SDI Project
This chapter responds to subparagraph (b) (2) of Sedion 224 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189), which requests
a detailed description of each program or projed which is included In the Strategic
Defense lnHiative or which otherwise relates to defense against strategic ballistic missiles,
including a technical evaluation of each such program or projed and an assessment as to
when each can be brought to the stage of full-scale engineering development (assuming
funding as requested or programmed).
3.1
Introduction
Section 3.3 of this chapter contains a description of each project within the SDI program.
For those projects which are developing systems to meet U.S. ballistic missile defense
requirements, the project descriptions include an estimate for when each system could be ready for
full scale engineering development (now called engineering and manufacturing development). The
acquisition strategy and test and evaluation program for all such systems are in accordance with
requirements specified in the DoD 5000 series documents.
Five major program elements are used to integrate all SDI projects. These program
elements were established by Congress during the FY 92 budget process, and partition the SDI
program into discrete mission areas. A description of these program elements is provided in
Section 3.2, and each project description identifies the associated program element(s).
In addition to establishing the five SDI program elements, Congress also passed the Missile
Defense Act (MDA) of 1991. This Act placed certain requirements on DoD which impact the pace
and focus of the projects described in this chapter.
Last year, the President's FY 92 budget request for SDI was based on a plan calling for a
deployment decision in the late 1990s, with the first ground-based site becoming operational by the
year 2000. The Missile Defense Act of 1991 accelerated this schedule by several years, requiring
deployment of the initial site by 1996, or as soon as the appropriate technology is available.
However, while accelerating the schedule, Congress also reduced the overall FY 92 budget request
for SDI by $1 billion, and that portion supporting the ground-based system by over $300 million.
These conflicting actions by Congress necessitated some modifications to the SDIO plan
for providing the U.S. with ballistic missile defenses under the OPALS concept, but did not
essentially change the long tenn program strategy. We are proposing program modifications
primarily involving reprogramming near- and mid-term resources from technology base, advanced
concepts, and space-based weapons research to support the accelerated schedule for near-tenn
U.S. ground-based systems. Additionally, several parallel development approaches had to be
surrendered to establish baseline technologies for initial site systems.
3-2
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after passage of the Missile Defense Act of 1991. Despite the $1 billii'o~~n:J~~~(~t
planned investments in ground-based programs are maintained. In the p
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investments in grbund based programs, particularly U.S.
substantially to support the accelerated initial U.S. site deployment.
supporting space-b~sed interceptors was reduced from last year's proposal
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FY 93 Amended
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3-3
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Last year, we planned to carry two interceptor concepts, the GBI and the exoendoatmospheric interceptor (E2I), through the demonstration and validation phase and
then decide, in the mid-1990s, which to carry into the Engineering Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase for deployment around the year 2000. We budgeted for
developing and deploying E2I, then judged to be the more expensive interceptor. We did
not budget to deploy both at the end of the decade--although a mix was possible if the
DEMYAL program succeeded in significantly reducing costs.
However that competition might have turned out, the GBI is more mature, and
prudence demands we select the most mature technology now if we are to begin
deployment in the mid-1990s as called for in the MDA.
At the same time, we continue to believe an endo-atmospheric interceptor option
will be desired in the future. Accordingly, our acquisition strategy has been modified to
develop the E2I technology as a technology insertion program which would lead to
deployment options at subsequent sites or as a retrofit pre-planned product improvement
(P3 I) option for improving the interceptors at the initial site. Thus, rather than a
competition between alternate concepts, we are now pursuing both concepts in a leaderfollower context, with the leader being that interceptor exploiting the currently more mature
technology, i.e., GBI.
This realignment will permit us to support earlier GBI deployment, as called for by
the MDA, without cost growth in our interceptor deployment program over the next five
years--and to preserve an option to deploy an E2I capability by the end of the decade.
However, there may be some growth in long-term total acquisition costs for OBI-something like $1 billion more for 5-7 sites.
We are moving ahead to implement this strategy. The formal request for proposals
(RFPs) for the first phase of the GBI program was released to industry by the Army in
early March, and contract awards are expected by the end of April. Pending approval of
the Defense Acquisition Executive, competition to select a single GBI contractor will follow
in the fall, with contractor selection early in 1993. This contractor may develop both the
GBI for the initial site and manage a parallel effort to infuse technology from the SDIO
technology programs into the development activities for subsequent sites in response to the
evolving threat-e.g., by providing the technology base for an E2I capability.
3-4
mm.
As discussed in our Report to Congress last year, we are developing x-band
ground-based radars under a "family-of-radars" acquisition strategy to address the
requirements for both theater and strategic missile defense systems. Such an integrated
acquisition strategy, with a single contractor, should reduce the total acquisition costs to
meet TMD and LDS requirements by 25% as compared to two distinct GBR programs for
theater and strategic defenses.
Since we were already seeking to provide advanced active TMD system capability
by the mid-1990s as reported to Congress last year, there was no need to accelerate our
development activities for the GBR. However, to be responsive to the MDA directions to
accelerate olir previous plans for deploying the initial LDS site, we have added the initial
LDS-GBR to the RFP that has now been in the contractors' hands for 2 months. Contract
award is expected by the end of the summer--again pending review by the Defense
Acquisition Executive.
Regrettably, the GBR program cost estimates have grown significantly--by about
$1.5 billion over the next 5 years. In part, this cost growth reflects the fact that the GBR
now being pursued for deployment at the initial site is about four times the size and has
almost three times the power of the GBR proposed last year--and its deployment is called
for several years sooner. Some of this increase is also due to conservatism introduced
during the exhausting Pentagon reviews of our GBR acquisition plan over the past 9
months; and, we believe that there will be substantial reductions when industry begins to
provide real data for our consideration.
In particular, full coverage for the continental United States (and most of Canada)
would be provided by Brilliant Eyes (beginning at the end of the decade, according to the
plan we presented to Congress last year). In addition, we are considering whether
affordable measures might be taken as an interim step along with deployment of the initial
site called for in the MDA to achieve earlier full coverage of the continental United States.
Three alternatives are available:
GBRs in the Northeastern and Northwestern United States at an additional
investment of about $800 million over the next five years--this would require relief from
ABM Treaty restraints.
Software improvements to existing early warning radars at an additional investment
of less than $400 million over the next five years-this may require relief from ABM Treaty
restraints and the agreement of the host nations for the early warning radars. We are
currently studying this issue.
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and the Navy's Aegis systems. Longer range plans include development of the Corps SAM and
deployment of other advanced TMD systems in the 1990s. For instance, the Theater High Altitude
Area Defense (TIIAAD) system will be available for deployment in a national emergency as a
Deployable Demonstration System by the mid-1990s. A fully developed TiiAAD system could be
ready neat the turn of the century.
The TMD program involves all three services in the development of technology and the
selection of systems to provide an anti-missile defense. For example, we intend to evaluate the
utility of the TiiAAD interceptor in a Navy role, while the Air Force is considering an active TMD
role for aircraft
The active defense role of theater systems like TilAAD and PATRIOT will be enhanced
when combined with other elements of U.S. defenses such as Brilliant Eyes, and potentially,
Brilliant Pebbles. Also, theater active defenses will complement and be integrated with theater
passive defense and counterforce operations.
3-8
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FY93. Note that several activities were transferred from the Other Follow-On and Research and
Support program elements.
The remaining one-third of the FY92 budget for the LDS element (Threat Evaluation.
PhenomenoloL:Y. and Other Support) is to help evaluate the threat; to improve our understanding of
key phenomenology; particularly with respect to the discrimination problem; and to provide other
critical support activities. In FY93, we anticipate these efforts will compose about one-fourth of
the LDS budget
Prowro Element:
The Space-Based Interceptors PE includes programs, projects, and activities that have as a
primary objective the conduct of research on space-based, kinetic-kill interceptors, such as Brilliant
Pebbles (BP) and associated sensors that could provide an overlay to ground-based ABM
interceptors.
Although Congress mandated that space-based interceptors, including Brilliant Pebbles, not
be included in the initial plan for deploying a Limited Defense System, the 1991 Missile Defense
Act states that:
"To effectively develop technologies relating to achieving the goal
specified in (the Act) and to provide future options for protecting the
security of the United Stales and the allies and friends of the United
States, robust funding for research and development for promising
follow-on anti-ballistic missile technologies, including Brilliant
Pebbles, is required."
Space-based interceptors offer a cost- and operationally effective means of providing highly
effective protection, on a global basis, against limited ballistic missile attacks. Accordingly, this
PE will include research and development to provide options to integrate a future deployment of
Brilliant Pebbles with other strategic and active theater missile defense systems.
Prowro Element:
The Other Follow-On Systems PE includes programs, projects, and activities that have as
a primary objective the development of technologies capable of supporting systems, components,
and architectures that could produce highly effective defenses in the future. SDI is pursuing these
promising technologies in order to support a possible future decision to increase ballistic missile
defense capabilities. Such a decision would be based on how the ballistic missile threat evolves.
Most notable among the areas being investigated are advanced sensor and interceptor,
directed energy, and hypervelocity gun technology. Advanced sensor technology efforts are
focusing on improving the speed and quality of acquisition, tracking, and discrimination
capabilities of sensor platforms. Advanced interceptor projects such as the Lightweight
Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP) program are developing lighter, lower cost interceptors with
improved guidance, tracking, and propulsion features. SDrs directed energy program is pursuing
high energy laser and particle beam technologies which will support the development of systems
capable of near speed-of-light intercept, interactive discrimination, and continuous worldwide
coverage. Finally, research in the field of hypervelocity technology is focusing on developing a
gun which will utilize electricity and magnetism to accelerate projectiles to very high speeds
sufficient to destroy an attacking missile or warhead on impact The hypervelocity gun's primary
advantages include multiple shot capability, a reusable launcher, and low-cost projectiles.
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The Research and Support Program Element contains three categories of activities:
"Research", "General Test and Evaluation", and "Support" for activities in one or more of the other
program elements. For example, some 80% of activities within this Program Element directly
support the l.DS and TMD Program Elements.
The research category was markedly reduced in response to the major Congressional cuts
last year. In those cases where the technology work was appropriately aligned to activities in other
program elements, funding was transferred to those program elements. Our Test and Evaluation
efforts are absolutely essential to executing a viable, accelerated program to deploy the initiall.DS
site. About 50% of the support for our Test and Evaluation efforts is provided in this program
element because the work is "common" to all of the elements of a complete global defense system.
Under our General Support activities, we supply the basic management support to SDIO and our
agents to accomplish the SDI program. Here we pay for salaries, buildings, and basic
management support within executing services and agencies.
J.JO
3.3
Project Descriptions
PROJECT TITLE;
1101 - Passive Sensors
PROGRAM ELEMENTS;
0603215C- Limited Defense System
0603214C- Space-Based Interceptors
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Umjted Defense System
This project develops and demonstrates the infrared sensor component technology
required for the performance, reliability, survivability, producibility, and affordability of
the Global Protection Against limited Strikes (OPALS) surveillance systems. The specific
infrared technology areas include: improving the producibility of high quality radiation
hardened beryllium mirrors, optical contamination, infrared detectors, readout devices, onarray signal processing techniques, optical test facilities for characterizing and calibrating
sensors, nuclear test capability, active cryocooler development and life testing, pilot line
production, "learning curve" manufacturing techniques out of lab and into industry,
demonstrations of focal plane components, cost-performance-yield models for accurate
system cost estimates, and integrated advanced sensor demonstrations.
Space-Based lnterc<:ptors
FY92-93 SBI program element funding will fund advancements to those projects
listed above that have applicability to Space-Based Interceptors element needs.
PROJECT TITLE;
1102 - Microwave Radar Technology
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This project addresses radar system design and component technology needed to
build long-range radar capable of multiple target detection, tracking and discrimination
functions. Targets are ballistic threats at both endo and exoatmospheric ranges. The
project provides the critical Ground-Based Radar (GBR) technology for all strategic
defense systems.
I ,arge Radar IecbnolQty
This task develops ground-based radar technologies for phased array systems
having large bandwidth and precision tracking for midcourse, early reentry, and near
exoatmospheric discrimination and fire control missions.
Innoyatiye Radar Technology
This task is developing high risk radar technologies which have direct benefit for
ground-based radar operation in electronic countermeasures and nuclear environments.
Innovative concepts which exploit neural network aperture controllers, resonant target
phenomenology features, and advanced beam-forming will be developed.
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PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
This project develops and demonstrates the laser radar technologies capable of
supporting SDS components and architectures. Laser radar technology includes
development of components, systems, data bases of target measurements, and supporting
analysis. Laser transmitters, receivers, mechanisms for steering and directing beams, and
signal processing are included in component development Data base development includes
both laboratory and field measurements, and developing simulations for calculating laser
radar cross sections and evaluating system performance.
For many missions, laser radars are preferred over microwave radars due to smaller
size and tighter beam divergence. Laser radars also provide the spatial and velocity
resolution for midcourse discrimination of RVs from other objects. This technology will
also be used in boost phase for active tracking of threat boosters and precision pointing of
boost-phase weapons, and in midcourse for designation. Specific technologies include
lasers with high temporal and frequency stability and wide bandwidth waveforms, wide
bandwidth detectors, optical beam steering and receiving systems for rapid retargeting, and
signal processing and analytical tools required for implementation. The Army Missile
Optical Range is utilized to make calibrated laboratory target measurements, and the
Firepond laser radar is used to make field measurements of deployment events for targets
launched from Wallops Island, VA.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENTS;
PRO.IECT DESCRIPTION;
~~:lf:~with
LDS a project that will produce two radiation hardened stateof-the-art 32 bit Reduced Instruction Set Computers (RISC) for space applications. The
two RH32 processors have special features that are required for space applications that are
not found in commercial processors. The level of testability, fault tolerance, and radiation
immunity built into the RH32 processors distinguish them from processors available or
3-12
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
II 05 - Discrimination
IJ09.
Limited Defense System
This task area is responsible for characterizing the optical and radar signatures of
threat objects (e.g. penaids and RVs) and backgrounds for development of effective target
acquisition and discrimination techniques for OPALS efforts related to systems funded
under the LPS Program Element Activities encompass all phases of ballistic missile flight.
Collection and analysis is done on celestial and atmospheric backgrounds, development of
phenomenology models, discrimination algorithms (Lexington Discrimination System
(LDS)), and integrated tools for a realistic assessment of surveillance, acquisition, tracking,
and discrimination techniques.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENTS;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This project includes a variety of experiments, studies, and support elements
designed to examine the interrelationships between sensors, discriminants, and other
information fusion considerations. Data collected within this project is critical to the design
of all surveillance and weapon sensors and sensor processing algorithms in the Strategic
Defense System. The Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) also supports OPALS
elements funded under Limited Defense System (PE No. 0603215C) and Advanced
Electn:K>ptics under Theater Missile Defenses (PE No. 0603216C).
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The Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) will provide the system functional
demonstration, target and background data, and the technology demonstrations necessary
for the midcourse sensor platforms to meet Milestone II. MSX is planned for CY93. The
principal sensor is a cryogenic MWlR/LWIR radiometer and spectrometer system with high
off axis rejection optics. MSX will provide data on real midcourse targets against real
backgrounds at realistic system ranges for use in system ground demonstrations; provide
high quality target and background phenomenology data for further development of robust
models of representative scenes; demonstrate key functions such as acquisition, tracking,
handoff and bulk filtering; provide multi-wavelength target phenomenology data for
assessing optical discrimination algorithms; and demonstrate the capability to integrate key
technologies into a working platform similar to proposed operational midcourse sensor
designs.
Unconventional Passive Discrimination is an evaluation and development task for
optical discrimination techniques that make use of target signature time history; information
to perform target classification/discrimination. The feasibility of these techniques was
demonstrated with previous optical target measurements (e.g., Malabar, Have Jeep,
Starmate). UPD techniques are potentially applicable to both surveillance system elements
and interceptor system elements.
Other Follow-On Systems
The Vehicles Interaction Program (VIP) is investigating the interactions of a space
vehicle with the space environment The work to be done consists of ground research and
flight experiments to investigate observed phenomena attributed to such interactions.
Ground research will include analysis and interpretation of previous experiments and
existing data, laboratory studies and experiments, and basic research and model
development Flight experiments include ballistic and orbital flights designed to obtain data
that will be used to validate and refme models developed in ground research and to better
characterize the phenomena.
Advanced discrimination techniques will be developed to counter new(mnovative
penetration aid developments, including the use of directed energy assets (lasers and neutral
particle beams), dust and debris, and infrared and ultraviolet emissions from space objects.
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This program consists of a sequence of flight tests planned to address critical
system level discrimination issues for active theater missile defense. The objective of the
program is to collect critical sensor data on potential countermeasures such that the active
TMD system discrimination performance against these threats can be assessed. The threats
considered for these flights are tank fragmentation, jamming, chaff, reduced cross-section,
RV modifications, and decoys.
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PBOGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This project is developing advanced components for lightweight, low-cost
interceptors for the Limited Defense System. The technologies provide a basis for highly
effective ground-based interceptor systems that are deployable as early as 1996, with the
OPALS LOC, and through the year 2000 and beyond, with follow-on efforts. Technology
development efforts focus on addressing the more stringent, follow-on requirements, such
as onboard discrimination, greater kinematic capability, enhanced autonomy, and increased
threat complexity. Component performance will be demonstrated through ground testing
of hardware and software at contractor's facilities, the KKV Hardware-in-the-Loop
Simulation (KHILS) facility, the National Hover Test Facility (NHTF), and through flight
testing. Propulsion components will be demonstrated through static test firings and flight
tests.
Seeker components that are being developed range from the UV through the
VLWIR. Early emphasis was placed on hardened focal plane array (FPA) and readout
development (128x128 Pixels) and fabrication at low cost (1000 FPA/Year Production
Rate) while maintaining required performance (11-14 urn Cutoff Wavelength). Recently
initiated efforts aim toward multicolor operation and neural network or optical processing
techniques to aid in discrimination. A solid state ladar with an agile beam director is also
being designed to improve discrimination capability.
The interceptor avionics technology development effort has produced a lightweight
(75 g), high throughput (400 MOPS) signal and data processor that is programmable and
very adaptable to a variety of interceptor applications. Current emphasis is on hardening of
this processor, development of neural networks for on-FPA signal processing, and creation
of advanced algorithms for multi-seeker data fusion, image processing, discrimination, and
autopilots.
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) development to date has focused on a lightweight
(30 g), low-cost ($500/Unit) micromechanical inertial guidance system providing a 3-axis
gyro and accelerometer on a single chip with performance parameters typical of those
associated with space-based systems (100/Hour Drift Rate). Programs were initiated in
1991 to address the more stringent performance requirements associated with the longer
flyout time of ground-based endoatmospheric interceptors (0.01-1.00/Hour Drift Rate).
Development of a stellar navigation system has also been initiated to enhance interceptor
performance.
Propulsion system technology development has been ongoing since 1988.
Advanced liquid axial stage technology has been developed and tested that provides 8X
weight reduction in stage weight over older interceptor propulsion systems while reducing
cost This particular component, known as ALAS, will be flight tested in the coming year
onboard one of the LEAP experiments. Solid axial stage components have also been
developed and will be tested in the near-term. These systems are primarily for space-based
applications.
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PROGRAM ELEMENT:
PROTECT DESCRIPTION:
LOS funding provides for the development, integration, and evaluation of
advanced, high performance, lightweight interceptor technologies for use in both theater
and strategic defense. These technologies will be used to support Ground Based
Interceptors (GBU and Theater High Altitude Area Defense (lHAAD).
Follow-on funding provides for the development, independent government testing,
and experimental integration of state-of-the-art component technology to provide risk
reduction for systems that could be deployed prior to the beginning of the twenty-first
century.
Develop miniaturized, advanced interceptor components to integrate into
Lightweight Exoaunospheric Projectiles (LEAP) with a hit to kill kinetic energy mission,
required for improved system cost-effectiveness. Develop and test a sensor package which
will fly along on and observe interceptor demonstration flights. Develop and test
lightweight seeker technologies and interceptor components. This project has the capability
of determining proper technology integration techniques; validating seekers and inertial
measurement units in hardware-in-the-loop facilities; performing free flight hover tests;
performing technology validation flights in suborbital, reduced mission scenarios; and
performing orbital technology validation flights in support of Engineering Manufacturing
Development decisions.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT:
PRO.IECT DESCRIPTION;
This project will demonstrate the launch of a guided projectile (D-2) from a
hypervelocity gun (HVG) with associated fire control to demonstrate the potential of a
HVG system as a candidate weapon system for active Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in
the near-term and other longer-range applications in the far-term. This involves the
development of the Gee-hardened D-2 projectile which is a command guided to terminal
homing interceptor. To launch the D-2 at required velocities greater than 3 km/sec, the
High Energy Railgun Integrated Demonstration (HERID) electromagnetic launcher and
Eglin battery upgrade supply (BUS) system is being developed as a test bed for preDEM/VAL demonstrations. A fire control effort is underway to determine what technology
is necessary to command guide the ground-launched D-2 to a hit-1(}-kill intercept at ranges
up to25 km.
HVGs feature very high acceleration and minimum dead zone intercepts, potential
for low marginal costs per round for large required inventories, practicality of quickly
switching loads, reduced weight and volume of ammunition, and potential for very high
velocities with very high acceleration.
Cooperative HVL experimental and applied research efforts will be conducted with
approved foreign organizations in accordance with SDIO memorandum of understandings.
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PROJECT TITLE:
PROGRAM ELEMENT:
PROJECT DESCRIP'fiON:
This project satisfies the mission requirement for interceptor studies and analyses
through systems engineering and technical assistance, special projects for advanced
technologies, program planning and analysis, and aerodynamic studies and analysis.
Additionally, trade studies are conducted to determine the best possible technologies in
which to invest, in order to give the highest payoff to GPALS element interceptors that
could be deployed after the beginning of the twenty-first century.
PROJECT TITLE:
PROGRAM EI.EMENT:
PRO.IECT DESCRIPIION:
The purpose of this project is to perform research on advanced active theater missile
defense (TMD) weapons components and subcomponents and associated technologies in
concert with active IMD architecture study results, other SDIO technology efforts (e.g.,
ground sensors for cueing weapons), and overall Strategic Defense Initiative GPALS
objectives. The project is structured with a near-term goal of supporting development of an
active IMD system to counter the current theater threats and a long-term goal of technology
advancement to support future theater defense as well as overall SDIO system development
under the GPALS program. The project objectives are being accomplished through a
number of technology demonstration programs and studies including Enhanced Kinetic
Energy (EKE) Warhead, Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) and Electrothermal Gun
(ETG).
Enhanced Kinetic EnerL~Y Warhead
The EKE Warhead Program, a follow-on to a joint USA/USAF technology
program (1986-89) that demonstrated the EKE concept, is developing and testing EKE
warheads to neutralize conventional, chemical, and biological threats. Full-scale fragment
and hit-to-kill (HTK) EKE warheads will be developed, and warhead performance will be
demonstrated through rocket sled tests. Testing against simulated chemical and biological
threats will be emphasized. Warhead designs, including level 2 drawings, and test
evaluation reports will be delivered. The EKE Fragment Warhead Program is jointly
conducted by the Joint Tactical Missile Defense Program Office and the Army Chemical
Research, Development, and Engineering Center. Explosive ejection of fragments without
initial fragment destruction will be demonstrated. Perforation of the threat target with the
surviving fragments and breakup/ injection of the EKE reactant material into the target will
also be demonstrated. Both are scheduled in early FY92. The EKE HTK Warhead will
provide the advantages of EKE when the HTK interceptor hits exactly where intended. It
also allows graceful degradation of the HTK interceptor when it achieves a near miss of the
uuget"sweetspoL"
Directed Ene(LlY WejijlOI!s
Included in this project is a concept developmental effort that will evaluate the
feasibility of developing directed energy weapons for active IMD application. The effort is
especially designed to develop weapons capable of achieving boost-phase intercept of
theater tactical ballistic missiles. However, the effort will evaluate ground-based, spacebased, and airplane-based laser system effectiveness in booster-, midcourse-, and terminalphase intercept of tactical ballistic missiles. Various candidate laser systems such as the
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PROJECT TITLE:
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPJION:
To achieve a high probability of kill of midcourse targets, interceptors must be
capable of discriminating between real targets, decoys, and debris during the
exoatmospheric portion of flight The interceptor must be lightweight, low cost, and must
be able to kinematically engage a full range of threats. To acquire midcourse targets and
perform discrimination at sufficient range to implement guidance commands requires broad
utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum and use of ladar to capitalize on available
discriminants. Processors able to support the large computational demand, while staying
within cost and weight constraints were once beyond the limit of technology, but recent
advances in interceptor signal and data processor development (PE No. 0603217C, Project
1201) have made a discriminating seeker and interceptor feasible.
Discriminating interceptors with increased autonomy will reduce communication
bandwidths and simplify the overall architecture. Discriminating seekers are now available
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...
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
This project will develop and demonstrate advanced components for miniaturized
endoatmospheric interceptors as part of a comprehensive program to coordinate the
development of endoatmospheric interceptor technology components. These technologies
provide the basis for intercept of strategic and tactical ballistic missiles within the
atmosphere.
The project consists of development and test of innovative seeker and apenure
(optical windows and RF radomes) concepts. These seeker and apenure concepts will be
tested in the Aero Optic Evaluation Center (AOEC) being developed by SDIO for this
purpose.
This project will develop and demonstrate miniaturized endoatmospheric
interceptors for strategic and tactical missile defense under the ENDO LEAP program. The
program will evaluate the seeker and apenure concepts developed under Follow-On
Systems, build and test atmospheric seekers, and build and flight test miniaturized
experimental kill vehicles. The ENDO LEAP seekers and experimental vehicles will be
tested in the AOEC facility under development The miniaturized experimental vehicle will
have self-contained autonomous guidance, jet l'eaction or aerodynamic control, optical or
radar seeker and will be capable of hit-to-kill accuracy, not requiring a warhead.
This project will provide the technologies to block upgrade current ERINT and
1HAAD pczformance capabilities for active TMD. Aimpoint selection and minimum seeker
response time will provide assured endoatmospheric Hit-to-Kill, making the interceptor
more responsive to advanced threats. RF technologies will eliminate current 1WT
technologies replacing them with higher power solid state devices, which significantly
reduces interceptor size and weight
This project will provide endoatmospheric technologies to block upgrade the
Ground-Based Interceptors which are to be deployed at the initial NMD site. The aerothermal and aero-optical issues associated with hypervelocity flight in the anoosphere will
be resolved. Advanced window materials and cooling techniques will be developed and
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PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Funding under this program provides for the planning and testing which could
provide a low-cost, low-risk, demonstrated technology insertion option, based on LEAP
interceptor technologies. This could provide a near-term, comprehensive demonstration of
the applicability of LEAP technology to a system more closely representative of a
deployable system than the current launch vehicles. The program will include a series of
suborbital flight tests of the Navy STANDARD missile, which will include LEAP
program-developed technology as part of the payloads. The flights will be increasingly
challenging, as is the current LEAP flight test program. A step-by-step approach will be
used to demonstrate the use of LEAP projectiles and technology with existing boosters,
sustainers, and shipboard launch and fire control systems. The program will culminate in a
series of realistic, fully-integrated high speed intercepts at sea. In order to minimize cost,
reduce risk, and enable early demonstration, maximum use will be made of existing
hardware, test facilities, test infrastructures, and procedures. Early tests will be perfonned
using deployed extended range missile systems (Terrier).
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Funding for this program provides for the development, independent government
testing, and experimental integration of state-of-the-art component technology to provide
risk reduction for Limited Defense systems that will be deployed prior to the beginning of
the twenty-first century. Prior to FY 1992, efforts in this project were funded in project
1202, and in FY 1993, funding will be provided within project 3310.
This task centers around developing independent government validation technology
to verify contractor material performance and exercise baseline interceptor models in
support of an Engineering and Management Development (EMD) decision. This project
has the capability of determining proper technology integration techniques, conducting
digital simulation of interceptor kill vehicles in real time, validating seekers and inertial
measurement units in hardware-in-the-loop facilities, performing free flight hover tests,
and, as required, performing technology validation flights in suborbital, reduced mission
scenarios.
The National Hover Test Facility has been developed to support the validation of
integrated KEW performance. Inexpensive, repeatable, and observable system level
demonstrations of advanced technology suites is the key technical issue of the program.
The facility has already demonstrated the ability to flight test, validate performance, and
identify and resolve flight anomalies in vehicle propulsion and guidance hardware and
software. The facility testing is an integral component of the overall SDIO ground and
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PROJECT TITLE;
1212- D-2 Program
PROGRAM EI.EMENT;
0603217C - Other Follow-On Systems
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This project will develop and integrate components for a guided projectile (D-2) for
a hypervelocity gun (HVG) with associated fire control to demonstrate the potential of a
HVG system as a candidate weapon system for active Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and
other longer range applications in the far term. This involves the development of the Geehardened D-2 projectile which is a command guided to terminal homing interceptor.
PROJECT TITLE;
1301- Radio Frequency Free Electron
Laser (RFFEL) Technology
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603217C- Other Follow-On Systems
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The goal of the RFFEL program is to demonstrate the capability of a high power
FEL to perform boost-phase and post-boost-phase intercept of ballistic missiles or theater
missiles from eanh orbiting platforms. Midcourse interactive discrimination can also be
performed by destroying simple decoys and thermally tagging or impaning velocity change
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PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603217C- Other Follow-On Systems
PROJECT DESCRIPIION;
Space-based chemical lasers (SBLs) will enhance an SDS consisting of kinetic
energy weapons by adding global (to the cloud tops), 24 hour, zero time-to-intercept hard
kill of strategic and tactical targets. This capability adds early boost-phase kill of strategic
and tactical ballistic missiles, increased capability for hard kill in the bus phase, additional
robust passive and active midcourse discrimination against simple decoys, interactive
discrimination against more sophisticated decoys, and intercept of long-range strategic
bombers and cruise missiles. Early boost-phase kill of strategic or tactical ballistic missiles
provides very high leverage to the defense by negating missiles before they can deploy
multiple warheads, decoys, chemicals, or submunitions. In all cases, debris will fall far
from protected territory and, in many cases, on the territory of the aggressor. Early boostphase kill also provides effective defense against threats which are most difficult for
conventional architectures, namely low apogee trajectory and high traffic threats.
Critical technical issues for the SBL element can be grouped into five areas: the
laser device; beam control; optics; acquisition, tracking, pointing, and fire control
(ATP/FC); and high power integration. The laser or beam generating device is a hydrogen
fluoride chemical laser which produces the high power laser beam by photon extraction
from excited HF molecules, generated by the energetic reaction of hydrogen and fluorine.
In 1990 and 1991, the Alpha program demonstrated near-weapon-level continuous-wave
operation. The Alpha design is space compatible and directly scalable to weapon-level
power requirements. Required beam control technology was demonstrated by the LODE
program in 1987. Required optical technology can be subdivided into two classes: small
high-incident-power optics for handling the high power beam within the SBL and large
moderate-incident-power optics for directing the expanded high power beam toward the
target. Required small high-power optics have been demonstrated in a number of SBL
programs, including Alpha. The LAMP program, completed in 1989, demonstrated a 4meter diameter beam director primary mirror whose design is space compatible and directly
scalable to weapon size. ATP/FC technology to meet SBL AIP/FC requirements is being
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PROJECT TITLE:
PROGRAM ELEMENT:
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
The Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) project exploits the capability of a stream of
atomic particles to penetrate into a target 1) to provide lethal energies and/or 2) to induce
signatures that permit discrimination. Such a beam is capable of effecting kill of ballistic
missiles in the boost, post-boost, and midcourse phases. The NPB project has a
technology development segment, a ground-based technology integration segment, and a
space experiments segment Together, these segments address the key technical and
system issues associated with the feasibility of deploying an NPB system capable of lethal
intercept as well as midcourse discrimination. The technology development segment
concentrates on developing enabling technologies for the ground and space experiments
and initially deployable NPB systems. In the ground-based integration experiments, the
Accelerator Test Stand (AIS) was used to integrate and test low energy components; the
Ground Test Accelerator (GTA) is the primary test bed for initial NPB system development
and also for advanced technologies such as high brightness ion sources, advanced
neutralizer development, and Acquisition, Tracking, Pointing and Fire Control (ATP/FC);
and the Continuous Wave Deuterium Demonstrator (CWDD) examines high duty factor and
deuterium operation at low energies. The NPB space experiments include Beam
Experiments Aboard Rocket (BEAR) flown in July 1989, which addressed basic space
operability issues, and Far-field Optics eXperiment (FOX), an orbital experiment which
will address key NPB issues that cannot be tested on the ground.
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PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603217C- Other Follow-On Systems
PROJECT TITLE;
1305 - Acquisition, Tracking, Pointing
and Fire Control Technology
PROGRAM ELEMENI;
0603217C - Other Follow-On Systems
PRO.IECT DESCRIP'fiON;
Acquisition, tracking, pointing, and fire control (ATP/FC) efforts will advance the
technologies required to perform critical functions for all candidate DEW concepts to be
used in GPALS follow-on architectures. These functions include acquiring, identifying,
and prioritizing the targets to be engaged, precision tracking of each target, selecting and
establishing the line-of-sight to the target airnpoint, holding the beam on the airnpoint,
assessing the results, and reinitiating the sequence to engage a new target. A TP/FC
technologies are required for both boost-phase destruction and midcourse interactive
discrimination missions. Efforts within the ATP/FC technology base address major
tracking/pointing component performance issues, and the development of technologies for
advanced A IP/FC experiments through the Advanced DEW Active Precision Tracker
(ADAPT) program. Studies are in progress to define experiments that integrate A TP/FC
with weapon concept experiments in both the space based laser and NPB projects. A series
of field experiments with payloads on high altitude balloon platforms will build upon the
RME pointing and stabilization achievements to demonstrate all the tracking and functional
integration needed to control single target engagements. The pace of ATP-FC development
is planned to support an advanced technology demonstration of a directed energy weapon
concept in the late 1990s, which could lead to an initial operational capability early in the
next decade.
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I] ,
Description of Each SDI Project
PROJECT TITI.E;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
1307 - DE Demonstrations
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Directed energy weapons will provide revolutionary capabilities for the next
decade's military systems. These "speed-of-light" weapons project lethal beams nearinstantaneously to distant targets, disabling and/or destroying them in seconds or less.
Examples of DE possibilities follow: (I) Worldwide full-time negation of strategic and
theater missiles early in boost phase with a constellation of space-based high-energy lasers.
This provides a hedge against the depressed trajectory; a solution for short timeline threats;
and, hard kill of chemical and biological threats -- even if delivered as clustered munitions - far from defended territory. Further, debris from the encounter does not attain orbit,
simplifying the acquisition and intercept problem for other layers of the defense.
(2) Robust interactive discrimination of warheads from decoys in midcourse using lasers
or neutral beams. The neutral beam offers the unique advantage of disrupting or disabling
electronics, resulting in mission failure and possibly devaluing salvage fusing.
(3) Worldwide full-time negation of strategic bombers and cruise missiles to the cloud
tops, and potentially complete air superiority, with space-based lasers. (4) Worldwide
full-time high resolution surveillance using the large telescopes and sophisticated sensors
aboard the DE weapon platforms. (5) Theater defense with surface-, air- and space-basing
of high-energy lasers. Proliferated mobile ground-based lasers can provide point or area
defense, and aircraft and space-based systems can negate missiles in the boost phase.
Within this project, directed energy weapon components are assembled to
demonstrate and assess their system performance in operational environments. The
objectives are to field near-term (3-4 year) experimental platforms at scales which can be
extrapolated with confidence to systems with operational capabilities.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This effort provides technologies required to develop a highly reliable space borne
multiprocessor computer architecture. This project consists of two technology tasks: An
Advanced Information Processing System (AlPS) able to meet reliability requirements; and
a Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (YHSIC) multiprocessor development effort. This
project results in a technology base for a radiation-hardened 32-bit computer, efficient
configuration of generic YHSIC Spaceborne Computer (GYSC), and other multiprocessor
computers.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Develop communications technology to support operational requirements for
defensive systems. Develop communications components, both radio frequency (RF) and
laser communications, for space-to-space, space-to-ground, and ground-to-space links.
Efforts to define requirements for space qualification and radiation hardness of extremely
high frequency (EHF) components needed for robust communications are included.
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PROGRAM ELEMENTS;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Theater Mjssi1e Pefenses
Develops and demonstrates survivabi1ity technologies to ensure that active TMD
elements can perform their mission in all expected environments. Approaches include:
studies/analyses, appropriate tests and demonstrations, and SEO development.
Technologies will be available for incorporation into active TMD elements at EMD.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENTS;
PRO.TECT DESCRIPTION;
The Lethality of SDI and active TMD weapons is part of the measure of
effectiveness of how well SDI and active TMD systems fulfill defense mission
requirements. The Lethality and Target Hardening program is developing a necessary and
sufficient understanding of physical principles involved in weapon/target interaction, target
response and kill modes, and resulting signatures needed for interactive discrimination and
kill assessmenL
Each of the following tasks are interdependent because of the common physical
principles involved in the lethality technology, but have been programmed separately to
align the major program tasks with the SDI and active TMD elements.
Theater Missile Defenses
The TMD lethality task has similar requirements to the other tasks but specifically
addresses active TMD interceptors and theater threats. Theater threats include
conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear warlieads. A common, validated lethality
criteria for a high confidence kill against any/all threat warheads is required. This lethality
criteria is developed in coordination with active TMD interceptor development, and the
lethality of the interceptors will be validated in cooperation with interceptor
demonstration/validation flight tests. Successful accomplishment of this task depends on
lethality technology development under the Other Follow-On Program ElemenL
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PROGRAM ELEMENT:
0603217C - Other Follow-On Systems
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
Other Follow-On Systems
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PROGRAM EI.EMENTS;
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM EI.EMENTS;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Othc:r Follow-On Systems
Past launch failures, an outdated space transponation technology base, diminished
launch capacity, and high space transportation costs have seriously undermined America's
ability to access space. To economically meet the growing space launch requirements of
the 1990s and beyond, a system is needed which will provide low cost, reliable, high
capacity, and operationally flexible access to space. The objective of the Advanced Launch
Development Program is to provide a technology basis for a launch vehicle program to
begin in the late 1990s. Previous cost goals established for the Advanced Launch System
(ALS) program are still valid: A ten-fold reduction in the cost to deliver cargo to low earth
orbit as compared to the present cost of the Titan IV. In 1991, the ALS program was
restructured to the National Launch System (NLS) program. Activities focus on defining
appropriate vehicle concepts and propulsion and nonpropulsion technology
demonstrations. Funding responsibility for this project has been transferred to the USAF
and NASA.
Phase I
The 1988 Strategic Defense System (SDS) Defense Acquisition Board Annual
Review directed that the OSD perform a study to determine the most cost-effective
approach to meeting SDS launch requirements in concert with other national security launch
requirements. The study included all aspects of SDS deployment, maintenance, and
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PROGRAM EI.EMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
Explore innovative science and technology for several technologies of interest to
SDIO.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Explore innovative concepts pursuant to PL97-219 which mandates a two-phase
R&S competition for small businesses with innovative technologies.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIP'[ION;
Special Projects
Develop and deploy flight hardware to support accelerated test programs for emerging
specialized application technologies associated with OPALS. Plan and execute test
programs; collect and analyze data; and issue final reports as appropriate. Plan for and
conduct orbital insertion missions in support of other special test activities.
I.aunch Services - Low Cost Bi~:ht Test Servjces CLCFIS>
Defme, develop, and conduct fast-response, ground-based, pre-flight verification
and ballistic or space flight testing of unique concepts and high yield approaches for SDI
weapons, seekers, and targeting applications that might be deployed beyond the tum of the
century. Provide experienced launch and flight test teams including: launch services,
payload processing, payload integration, mission operations/planning, range
operations{mtegration, mission analysis, and test operations.
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PROGRAM ELEMENT:
0603217C - Other Follow-On Systems
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
Develop accelerated test programs for emerging special application technologies.
Determine acquisition strategy. Acquire test systems and test equipment Plan and execute
test programs including on-orbit command, control, and validation of demonstration
payloads and resulting data collection.
Programs being accomplished under this effon include ZEST and the Single Stage
Rocket Technology Program (SSRTP), previously known as the Single Stage to Orbit
(SSTO). The SSRTP will focus on the development of technology for a reusable,
suborbital launch vehicle. The SSRTP program will design, develop, and validate a
reusable launch vehicle (either manned or unmanned) capable of airline-like operations to
augment existing space launch capability.
PROJECT TITLE;
2102- Space-Based Sensor (Brilliant Eyes)
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The Brilliant Eyes (BE) system is a distributed constellation of space-based
surveillance sensor satellites which suppon the battle managemenrJC3 and weapons of the
OPALS architecture. BE satellites carry a suite of passive sensors including shon,
medium, and long wavelength infrared (SWIR, MWIR, and LWIR) and visible sensors.
These sensors can acquire against small "hot spot" surface areas, track, and discriminate
strategic and longer-range tactical ballistic missiles. BE suppons National Missile Defense
(NMD) and active Theater Missile Defense (fMD).
BE target track and discrimination data suppon battle planning and execution for
midcourse intercepts. This data includes weapon target assignments, target updates,
discrimination target maps to the interceptors shortly before intercept, and kill assessments
of midcourse intercepts. In suppon of active TMD, BE provides launch point
determination for counterforce, impact point prediction for passive defense, and accurate
target track for active defense.
This constellation of satellites provides global access, both below-the-horizon
(BTH) and above-the-horizon (ATH), of tactical and strategic ballistic missiles in their
boost, post-boost, and midcourse phases.
The concept of operations for BE consists of two primary modes. The first is a
"hot spot" surveillance mode. The BE sensors constantly survey a predesigned, limited
area of the Earth's surface, such as a theater of operations or a missile field. In this mode,
BE sensors acquire the boosters and continue tracking through the midcourse phase with
internal handover among the different sensors. The second mode of operation is used in
the case of a ballistic missile launch that occurs outside the limited number of predesignated
surveillance areas. The BE sensors receive a track handover from Brilliant Pebbles or other
boost surveillance sensors, such as DSP or FEWS. BE sensors then acquire the boosters
and continue tracking through the midcourse phase.
J.Jo
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The primary role of the Ground-Based Surveillance and Tracking System (GSTS)
is to provide an option for interim cueing of GBis at the initial site, prior to deployment of
Brilliant Eyes. The current NMD architecture optical sensor requirements are met by the
Brilliant Eyes (BE) program
The GSTS concept is composed of ground equipment and a launchable, long
wavelength infrared (LWIR) sensor system. The sensor system is boosted into suborbital
flight by a ground-based, fast response rocket to provide above the horizon surveillance to
detect and track attacking ballistic missiles in the midcourse. Once in space, the GSTS
sensor will provide object data to the ground segment where engagement planning
operations will provide weapon tasking and inflight targeting support GSTS will provide
surveillance data to the Command and Control Element (C2E) for situation and kill
assessment
GSTS funding includes work being performed to develop SDIO sensor test
capabilities at Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC). Two existing sensor test
chambers at AEDC are being upgraded, the 7Y chamber and the lOY chamber. The 7Y
chamber will be used principally for seeker testing (such as GBI and BP seekers), and for
calibration of surveillance sensors (such as GSTS and BE). The lOY chamber will be used
to perform end-to-end functional and performance characterization and testing of
surveillance sensors. These ground test capabilities are required for GSTS and BE, as well
as providing support for other SDIO programs.
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PROGRAM ELEMENTS;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
NMD-GBR is the strategic member of the SDIO "Family of Radars" and consists of
deployed radars (NMD-GBR) and a single DEM/VAL radar (GBR-n. The other member
of the "Family" is the theater radar (IMD-GBR) described below.
Theater Mjssi!e Defenses- Ground-Based Radar CfMD-GBRl
The TMD-GBR meets an immediate requirement for a more capable active theater
missile defense radar. The TMD-GBR utilizes current GBR technology. Required
functions include attack early warning, threat type classification, launch/ impact point
estimation, threat classification against theater/tactical ballistic missiles. The TMD-GBR
will have fire control suppon capabilities against tactical ballistic missiles and residual
capability against cruise missiles and other air breathing threats.
The TMD-GBR project is expected to begin the Engineering Manufacturing
Development phase (formerly Full Scale Development) in 1996.
Limited Defense System- National Missile Defense Ground-Based Radar <NMD-QBR>
NMD-GBR is required to detect, acquire, and track RVs from accidental or
unauthorized limited strikes from ICBMS, SLBMs, or MRBMs. The NMD-GBR suppons
the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBO in exoatmospheric engagements. The NMD-GBR can
operate autonomously or can use range extending cueing suppon from other space and/or
ground based Early Warning Systems (EWS) sensors. The NMD-GBR will also provide
precision tracking, launch point prediction and signaV data processing for
exoatmospheric/endoatmospheric discrimination and classification in suppon of the Ground
Based Interceptor (OBI). The GBR-T DEMJVAL radar will provide the Functional Test
Validation (FTV) of the NMD-GBR at the USAKA national range.
The NMD-GBR project is expected to begin the Engineering, Manufacturing,
Development phase (formerly Full Scale Development) by CY 1996.
Family ofRadm Design Concent
The design and fabrication of the TMD-GBR and the NMD-GBR will be based
upon the family of modular X-Band radars concept derived from the GBR-X radar
program conducted 1986-1991. A common antenna module serves as the radar apenure
building block for the "family of radars". The radar transmitter, receiver, signal processor,
data processor, and software have significant commonality. The transmitter (power) and
apenure are sized to the radar range requirements.
PROJECT TIII.E;
2106 - Advanced Contingency Theater Sensor
PROGRAM ELEMENJS;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
0603214C- Space-Based Interceptors
Space-Based Interceptors
This project provides collateral spin-off technology from the RAPTOR program that
is applicable to the Brilliant Pebbles program.
PROJECT TITLE:
2201 - Space-Based Interceptor
PROGRAM ELEMENT:
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
The earlier Space-Based Interceptor program, under the old Phase I architecture,
was directed at resolving the technical issues for various space-based interceptor concepts.
Brilliant Pebbles has replaced SBI as the space-based tier of OPALS, and SBI will be
terminated when Martin Marietta completes its hardware development and integration and
hover testing. However, certain previously planned SBI tests have been continued because
they have the potential to provide components for the Ground-Based Interceptor (OBI)
reducing overall OBI risk.
PROJECT TITLE:
2202- Ground-Based Exoatrnospheric
Interceptor Development
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PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215C c Limited Defense System
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PRO.JECT DESCRIPTION:
The objective of the Ground-Based Interceptor (OBI) development effort is to
develop and deploy a ground-launched exoatmospheric interceptor designed for hit-to-kill
(non-nuclear) intercepts of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile reentry vehicles (RVs) in the midcourse of their trajectories.
Midcourse sensors will acquire, track, and pass threat cluster information to the Command
and Control Element, which will cue the interceptors and provide updates if they are
available. Using onboard sensors, the interceptors will acquire the threat cluster and select
the RV. The deployment will be as directed in the 1991 Missile Defense Act.
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OBI work is separated into four tasks: (1) ERIS Functional Technology Validation
(FTV), (2) Exoatmospheric Test Bed Payload Launch Vehicle (XTB/PLV), (3) OBI
DEMIYAL Activities, and (4) Initial NMD Interceptor.
Task 1. The ERIS FTV effort consists of a series of 2 exoatmospheric interceptor
experiments to validate the concept of intercept of an RV in the presence of decoys. The
first flight test mission was flown in FY91 and was highly successful. The second mission
was attempted in May 1991 but was aborted due to anomalous target trajectory data. It has
been rescheduled for FY92.
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PROGRAM ELEMENTS;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
Theater Missile Defenses
The Theater Missile Defenses program element is funding a portion of the KITE-2a
flight test, as the data collected in this test will be beneficial to active TMD interceptor
efforts, particularly to Arrow, 1HAAD and Navy far-term interceptor designs.
Limited Defense System
The concept for performing the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI)
mission is the Endo-Exoatmospheric Interceptor (E2I) which operates primarily during the
reentry phase of attacking ballistic missile trajectories. It is designed to engage
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and depressed Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missile (SLBM) attacks.
While previously a separate program, in the future the E21 effort will be developed
as a potential Block upgrade to the Ground Based Interceptor (OBI) for inclusion in the
ground based tier for OPALS. It was in competition with the OBI (midcourse option); the
decision was made to select OBI for the initial NMD interceptor. Therefore the E2I
DEM/Val contract awards will not be made. The endoatmospheric interceptor research
efforts will continue under SDIO technology.
The primary E2I activity is a technology demonstration effort called the Kinetic
Energy Kill Vehicle Integrated Technology Experiment (KITE) with the objective of
resolving key technical issues through intensive ground and flight testing of a 300kg kill
vehicle. KITE-I was an extremely successful flight in January 1990 at White Sands
Missile Range (WSMR). The second KITE flight in August 1991 at WSMR ended 0.2
seconds into flight when the self-destruct system engaged prematurely. In May 1992,
KITE-2a will provide critical aero-optic measurements of blur induced by the forebody and
window coolant flow and measurement of the refraction caused by the hypersonic shock
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PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIP'fiON;
DEWs are being developed as advanced weapons systems for possible integration
into a follow-on to the OPALS. DEW Concept Definition effons will establish and
maintain concept performance requirements and technical characteristics that are traceable to
the requirements of the evolving GPALS architecture. This work will include development
and analysis of alternate system designs, definition of weapon platform subsystem
performance requirements, critical technology issues identification, technology program
plan development, and theoretical analyses. A data base will also be developed to allow
timely preparation and revision of System Concept Papers (SCPs)/Decision Coordinating
Papers (DCPs) and Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMPs). The data base will provide
the basis for technology development and demonstration plans. H executed, these would
furnish the technology base and requisite demonstrations to resolve critical DEW issues on
a scale sufficient to establish confident extrapolation to weapons level performance.
fROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603214C- Space-Based Interceptors
PROJECT DESCRIPIION;
The Space-Based Interceptor (SBI) Program Element (PE) is a research effon to
develop promising follow-on anti-ballistic missile technologies. Project 2205 within this
PE funds the Brilliant Pebbles (BP) program. BP is an element of the Global Missile
Defense (GMD) program, which in tum, is one segment of the Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes (OPALS) ballistic missile defense system. The BP program is directed
toward demonstrating and validating a system concept that defeats both theater and strategic
ballistic missiles with ranges greater than approximately 500 kilometers in normal flight
trajectory--or about 800 km for depressed trajectories, whatever their source or destination
on the globe, in their boost, postboost, and midcourse phases of flighL The product of the
BP program will be a system that consists of space, ground, and launch components. The
space component is comprised of singlet interceptors and their associated "life jacket"
carrier vehicles.
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PRO.TECI TITLE;
22CJ7 - Patriot Multimode Missile
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
0604225C - Engineering Manufacturing
Development
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Patriot is a long-range, mobile, field Army and Corps air-defense system, which
uses guided missiles to simultaneously engage and destroy multiple targets at varying
ranges. Current threat theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) with significantly improved range
and accuracy have increased the threat against Patriot air-defense sites and defended assets.
This could result in the destruction of air-defense sites and provide the enemy air
superiority once an attack is initiated. The current Patriot missile requires improved
performance and increased accuracy to counter the evolving threat and to increase its
contribution to the lower tier of the theater segment of a Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (OPALS) system. The Multimode Missile Program will incorporate a multimode
seeker into the Patriot missile which will enable fuze/guidance integration and create the
potential for using directed or focused blast warheads. Repackaging the Patriot guidance
section with an active seeker will provide smaller miss distances at extended ranges and
eliminate a potential rate saturation problem. The multimode guidance capability will
provide the accuracy needed to counter the advanced, high-speed TBM threats as well as
the low RCS, long-range targets in all operational environments.
The cornerstone of US and allied air defense, the Patriot was fielded in 1983 as a
theater defense weapon system to counter the air-breathing threat In 1988, this all-altitude,
all-weather interceptor was improved to acquire, identify, track, engage, and destroy
incoming TBMs. The Patriot anti-tactical missile capability (PAC) consisted of
modifications to the system software (PAC-I) and to the missile warhead and fuse
assembly (PAC-2). These improvements provided Patriot with a self-defense capability
during Operation Desen Storm. The PAC-2 capability, deployed in January, 1991,
extended the fire unit corollary asset defense capability.
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Description of Each SDI Project
PROJECT TITLE:
2208 - Extended Range Interceptor (ERINl)
PBOGRAM ELEMENT;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
0604225C - Engineering Manufacturing
Development
PRO.IECT DESCRIPTION;
The purpose of this project is to fund both the DemonstrationN alidation
(DEM/VAL) and Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) of the Extended Range
Interceptor (ERINT-1) Technology Program. This technology program is being
considered as a potential adjunct to several systems in the theater segment of the Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system.
The ERINT-1 will demonstrate a small, agile, hit-to-kill missile that will provide an
asset defense against incoming maneuvering and non-maneuvering TBMs. A secondary
objective of the Program is to provide defense against the air-breathing threat The missile
combines several state-of-the-art technologies, including an onboard active millimeter wave
seeker that provides endgame guidance, advanced flight control technologies for agility in
terminal maneuvers, lethality enhancement technologies, and a lightweight composite case
solid rocket motor. The ERINT has been designed to integrate easily with existing air
defense capabilities such as Patriot, and is a technology capable of integration into the Navy
AEGIS weapon system.
The ERINT Program will undergo a series of eight flight tests during FY1992-93.
Results from these tests, from accompanying simulation and other analyses, and from
ongoing acquisition planning, analysis, and trade studies being performed by US Army
organizations will be used to establish the ERINT acquisition strategy. On the basis of
ERINT test results, high fidelity simulations, and cost and operational effectiveness, the
U.S. Army and SDIO will determine the future acquisition strategy.
PROJECT TITLE;
2209 - Arrow Continuation Experiments
(ACES)
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
PRO.IECT DESCRIPTION;
The ACES Program is a US-Israeli initiative designed to provide Israel with a basis
for an informed EMD decision for an area tactical ballistic missile defense capability. This
Program is a follow-on demonstration phase for Arrow interceptor development Critical
lethality tests will be conducted in the initial phase of this program using the Arrow-!
missile developed during the Arrow program. An Arrow-2 missile will be designed and
tested for an increased engagement envelope. If successful, the Arrow-2 will satisfy the
Israeli requirement for an interceptor for population defense and will support US
technology base requirements for new advanced anti-tactical ballistic missile technologies
that_could be incorporated into the GPALS layered defense system.
PROJECT TITLE;
2210-THAAD
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The THAAD system is a key element of the GPALS architecture and will provide
large area coverage in both mature and contingency theaters. THAAD will engage
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PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRifiiON;
Corps SAM is a OPALS MDAP program. The program will lead to the
development of a strategically deployable, tactically mobile, low- to medium-altitude air and
ballistic missile defense system that will support deployed Corps, contingency operations,
and rapid reinforcing missions. The near-term effort is focused on Concept Definition
activities directed towards establishment of a range of requirements for a Corps SAM
system and identification/evaluation of concepts that will most likely satisfy these
requirements. Corps SAM will be optimized for operation in the context of the Army's
AirLand Operations doctrine as it applies in both mature and contingency theaters. Its
distributed/netted architecture and module components will allow the unit to be taskorganized and the equipment configured according to the array of expected air and missile
threats, available strategies, and acceptable level of risk and cost The system will provide
area and point defense capabilities against both TBM and air-breathing threats compatible
with strategic deployability and tactical mobility. Corps SAM will be an integrated part of
the overall Air Defense/active Theater Missile Defense architecture. As such, it will be
compatible/interoperable with other Army air defense systems (i.e, TIIAAD, Patriot,
FAAD) and will interface with joint and allied sensors and BM/C3I networks. Concept
studies will include both Government and contractor efforts to perform cost, schedule, and
performance trade-<>ffs and evaluation of system level concepts. Operational analyses will
be conducted to evaluate the impact of various concepts/requirements on missions, force
structure, and system effectiveness. A program baseline will be established for Milestone I
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PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Global Protection Against Limited Strike (OPALS) system surveillance and
engagement activities are coordinated and controlled by the Command and Control Element
(C2E). C2E is a distributed system of facilities, equipment, software/algorithms,
communications, personnel, and procedures that support centralized command and control
and decentralized execution of Ballistic Missile Defense thus maintaining human control of
the system at all times. The C2E is comprised of five sub-elements: Ballistic Missile
Defense Operations Center and Cell (BMDOC and BMDC), RegionaVElement Operations
Centers (ROC/EOC), the Command and Control Network (C2N), the Communications
Network Management (CNM), and Battle Management (BM). Management of three
functional areas, Command and Control, Communications and Battle Management, will
implement the responsibilities of the C2E through an evolutionary acquisition approach.
Command and Control includes the specification, design, fabrication, and test of a
Command and Control capability to demonstrate OPALS system ballistic missile defense
requirements for human-in-control. This will be accomplished through a series of
hardware and software development blocks that incrementally increase system functionality
and performance. The development of decision aid hardware and software in conjunction
with command and control gaming to validate and refine the command and control
processes, procedures, and responsiveness is the initial focus.
Communications involves the development and integration of the C2N which
consists of the Terrestrial Communications Network (TCN) and the Space
Communications Network (SCN). This also involves evaluation of existing capabilities
and off-the-shelf components. The Communications Network Management (CNM)
capability will also be developed using a similar approach. Common Communications
Components (COM3) is a development action that will implement an inter-operable
communications network for OPALS.
Battle Manuement addresses the area of automated control. It includes the
automated functions that support inter-element interaction for control of weapons and
sensors and is resident on (and tailored to) every system element. The objective is to
establish battle management functional definitions to ensure that the multiple OPALS
elements execute a single, coordinated defense.
The technologies required for EMD are sufficiently mature to support the
implementation of Evolutionary Acquisition. Focusing on off-the-shelf capabilities reduces
schedule and technical risk, and allows hardware/software testing to begin earlier than
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PROJECT TITLE:
PROGRAM ELEMENT:
PROJECT PESCRIPTION:
OPALS will require adaptive, fault-tolerant, reliable, trusted software that must be
developed, integrated, and tested across multiple systems and developers. This project will
provide the capability to specify, develop, acquire, integrate, test, and maintain software
for SDIO. Research and development efforts underway to achieve these capabilities
include proof-of-concept demonstrations; tools and methods analysis; software code
prototyping; laboratory experiments; software contractor evaluations; and various analyses,
investigations, and reports. Proof-of-concept demonstrations of formal methods for
software development, demonstrating the production of code to Trust Level five, are
expected during FY96. Build One of the SDI Software Engineering Support Environment
(SESE) is scheduled for completion in FY93 with subsequent builds completed in FY94
and FY95. Efforts continue in the research and development of parallel processing
technologies. Standards, products, tools, and methodologies developed under this activity
apply to all SDI Element software development efforts and will provide the basis for
coordinated and successful SDI software development, integration, and testing efforts.
PROJECT TITLE:
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The Systems Engineering and Integration Contractor (SEIC) addresses architecture
definition requirements analysis and system defmition of the OPALS system and elements
that are within the system. The SEIC provides risk assessment and trade studies to
optimize and balance the system. Trade studies will be performed for mission analysis,
discrimination, technical performance, cost analyses, and technology insertion. The
systems engineering and integration task requires planning and participation in integrated
testing and identification and resolution of key Demonstration/Validation (DEMNAL)
issues. An important task of the SEIC is to ensure a rationale growth path exists for
incremental deployment of the OPALS capability.
The SEIC is responsible for examination and analysis of the Threat, as derived
from the Systems Threat Assessment Report (STAR), as a basis for system definition and
analysis. The SEIC identifies, defines, and decomposes the functions and interrelationships of OPALS. The definition and decomposition process is developed to a level
of detail permitting unique element function/performance requirements allocations and the
definition of the interfaces between individual elements. Key DEM/VAL issues identified
in the requirements definition process are allocated to data, demonstrations, and simulations
and are generated for areas identified as low confidence to facilitate an informed Milestone
II decision. As part of the demonstrations during DEMNAL, this project will support the
design and development of the Command Center ElemenL This includes designing the
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PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) project addresses the identification and
quantification of the essential elements of a Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
(OPALS) support system. It identifies the basic supportability costs, schedule,
performance, and support technology drivers in each SDI project to ensure the minimum
cost of ownership and maximum effectiveness of the GPALS system.
PROJECT TITLE;
3105 - Producibility and Manufacturing
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This project will identify producibility and manufacturing risks associated with the
new technologies and designs being proposed for Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (OPALS) and will coordinate and implement a structured, unified approach to risk
reduction and mitigation of common producibility and manufacturing issues.
The apJUPach jnyolyes the following four efforts:
1. Manufacturing Strategy Development This effort develops and implements a
capstone Strategic Defense System Manufacturing Strategy (based on the revised
DoDD 5000.1, DoDI 5000.2) providing leadership and direction as the Elements
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PROGRAM ELEMENT:
0603218C- Research and Support Activities
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
Provide environmental impact analysis documentation and facility acquisition
support for the SDIO systems and technical development projects. Plan, program, budget
and monitor facility acquisition of Military Construction projects. Provide guidance and
prepare Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact Statements, as applicable,
for SDIO technology demonstrations and test and evaluation activities. Develop guidance
for Executing Agents on facility acquisition and environmental matters.
PROJECT TITLE;
3108 - Operational Environments
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPJION:
The purpose of this project is to identify, integrate, coordinate, and resolve natural
and nuclear environmental issues. The program will focus on characterizing natural,
debris, and nuclear environments from a systems perspective. DoD and DoE programs
will be reviewed to identify specific areas where additional effort is needed to support
deployment/operation of a OPALS system, thus providing an adequate understanding of
natural, debris, and potential nuclear environments within which a missile defense system
must operate.
There are two main efforts ongoing within this project: (1) the KEW Space Debris
Modeling effort, in which the Debris Radiance (DEBRA) model and a long-term DoD
model of the space debris environment (Debris Analysis Workstation, or DAW) are being
developed; and (2) the Nuclear Effects Physics Modeling effort, in which first-principle
physics satellite nuclear radiation codes are being upgraded to provide higher-fidelity,
faster-running, trapped, radiation transport codes. Both DEBRA and the nuclear effects
codes, with associated documentation, will be delivered to SDIO's National Test Bed
(NIB) for use in assessing system survivability of OPALS space assets.
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PROGRAM ELEMENI;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The objective of the project is to ensure that Electronic Information Systems
Security (ELINFOSEC) is integrated into the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
(OPALS) system, including the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) programs. This objective will counter the existing and rapidly growing
threat arrayed against an electronic information system like the GPALS system.
Communications Security (COMSEC) and Computer Security (COMPUSEC) equipment,
technology, methodologies, and designs will be integrated with the development of
GPALS elements.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The system Survivability Program is responsible for oversight and management of
the GPALS Survivability Program. .This oversight activity includes coordination of the
SDIO's survivability-related activities to support the OPALS acquisition process, ensuring
that the proper interfaces are established and maintained within the system, element, and
component levels of the Program.
The Program provides for the generation of system and top-level element
survivability requirements that are direcdy traceable to SOlO-approved mission
requirements and threat scenario(s). Analyses are performed to support TMD, GMD, and
NMD. This analysis includes performance of system-level trade studies to assess the
ability of the system and elements to survive and operate in natural (e.g., debris) and
manmade hostile (e.g., nuclear, laser, ASATs) environments. Additionally, the System
Survivability Program supports the element programs by ensuring that the elements'
survivability design concepts are consistent with their survivability requirements and that
the segments/elements are prepared for DAB and other critical reviews. The Program is
also responsible for defining requirements for and performing system-level survivabilityrelated tests, namely through SDIO's test beds within the National Test Bed (NIB). This
includes identifying environment/response modeling requirements within the test beds and
defining system survivability test requirements as inputs to the SDI test and evaluation
planning process. .Finally, the Program is responsible for defining and assessing critical
survivability-related operational concepts that are consistent with system and element
survivability requirements, that enhance the system/elements' survivability, and that
provide maximum flexibility to the User.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENJ;
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PROJECT TITLE:
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
The systems engineering support will provide critically needed capability to develop
and use test beds and other models/simulations in support of the design and validation of
Limited Defense System (LOS) concepts. State-of-the-art test beds, models/simulations,
and analysis tools are being developed in support of studies and analyses conducted prior
to the Milestone II engineering and manufacturing development decision. These tools will
support the SDIO community in evaluation/ comparison of alternative architectures and
support element model development/integration. In general, system engineering support
will include: design, development, integration, test, and maintenance of Level One and
Level Two System Simulators (LISS/L2SS); design, development of Command and
Control simulators (C2 Sims) and component commands Concept of Operations; and
development of the Software Engineering, Test, and Integration Center (SWETIC).
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
Provide environmental impact analysis documentation and facility acquisition
support of the SDIO National Missile Defense (NMD) systems and technical development
projects. Plan, program, and budget Environmental Assessments and Environmental
Impact Statements, as applicable, for SDIO NMD facility design and construction activities.
Develop guidance for Executing Agents on facility acquisition and environmental matters.
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PROGRAM EI.EMENT:
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603218C - Research and Support Activities
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603218C - Research and Support Activities
PRO.IECT DESCRIPTION;
The mission of the SDI Organization is twofold: (a) to support national security
policy and strategy and (b) to manage the development and deployment of a ballistic missile
defense (BMD) system that meets the operational mission requirements of the designated
users of that system. For the first part, analyses and simulations focus on definition of the
GPALS concept, coordinating and refining the concept definition with other parts of DoD,
external agencies, and (indirectly) with Allies and friends who may cooperate in mutual
deployments of a BMD system. The Mission Analysis function provides direct support to
the Director, SDIO, and senior OSD policy officials on a variety of sensitive policy and
strategy issues, including implications of events in Russia and other members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for the SDIO/GPALS program; the status of
formerly-Soviet offensive ballistic missile capabilities; arms control; strategic stability and
deterrence; and proliferation of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile technology in the rest
of the world. For the second part, analyses and simulations address strategic and tactical
effectiveness, including offense-defense interaction of proposed GPALS system
architectures against offensive ballistic missile threats to the U.S., our allies and friends,
and deployed forces. Analytical results are then used to support activities required for the
Defense acquisition process, including preparation of Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analyses required by the Defense Acquisition Board. Funds are also provided from this
Project to operational users (USSPACECOM, ARSPACE, AFSPACE, NAVSPACE,
Marines, SAC/STRATCOM) to enable them to develop their concepts of operations for
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PROGRAM ELEMENTS:
0603216C -Theater Missile Defenses
0603218C- Research and Support Activities
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The purpose of the SDI Intelligence Threat Development project is to provide an upto-date threat description against which system-specific "design-to" threat specifications,
lethality designs, and target objects are developed. The primary vehicle for providing this
threat description is the System Threat Assessment Report (STAR), which is updated by
SDIO, reviewed by the services, and validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency annually
under this project The Intelligence Threat Development Program divides the threat into
two major categories--Delivery Vehicles and Payloads--and three levels of detail within
each category. The delivery vehicle category includes ballistic missile boosters and
aerodynamic missiles residing within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), CIS
post-boost vehicles (buses), and Rest-of-World (ROW) missiles (ballistic and
aerodynamic) with ranges greater than 30 kilometers. The payload category includes CIS
re-entry vehicles (warheads), penetration aids, and ROW missile warheads (both nuclear
and non-nuclear). The STAR addresses the threat faced by a Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes (OPALS) system from two points of view. First, the descriptions of CIS
threat vehicles, warheads, and penetration aids are equally applicable whether the U.S. is
under limited or all-out nuclear attack. Second, the ROW threat descriptions address the
threat both from the perspective of attack against CONUS (strategic) and overseas theater
(tactical) elements. The threats are described at the highest level in terms of country-oforigin (Level 0); fonn, fit, and function (Levell) necessary to produce the SDI "design-to"
threat specifications; and the very detailed Level 2, where actual materials and structures are
described for use in lethality studies and actual target designs. The analyses will evaluate
emission signatures, reflection signatures, trajectories, and vulnerabilities for strategic and
theater elements of OPALS. These analyses will provide detailed data for developing both
theater defense systems and other OPALS systems.
PRO.JECf TID.E:
3204 - Countermeasures Integration
PROGRAM EI.EMENT;
0603218C- Research and Support Activities
PROIECf DESCRIPTION;
PROJECT TITLE:
fROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The purpose of this project is to produce workable solutions to the critical issues
within Theater Missile Defense. The priorities are based upon input from theater
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), allies, and the US Services. The research and
development tasks contained in this program are centrally managed and directed by SDIO,
in close cooperation with the Executing Agents.
The objective is to defme technical and other systematic approaches to operational
requirements critical to an integrated active TMD complex of systems. The project spans
both Allied and the four Uniformed Services interests and concerns. Within the program
are: European and Northeast Asian Theater architecture studies; two Artificial Intelligence
software projects for Command and Control and Discrimination; an analysis to determine
the best interface between OPALS and TMD roles and systems; support of Israeli TMD
studies and analysis; U.S. Air Force studies, analysis, and experiments to examine sensor
and Command and Control support and improvement for active TMD; U.S. Marine Corps
studies and research into HAWK and supporting sensor system improvements to provide
point defense against ballistic missiles; U.S. Navy studies and analysis into local and
regional defense using existing and augmented Fleet assets to counter Ballistic Missiles;
and U.S. Air Force studies for other TMD pillars beside active defense (e.g, TPS-75
modifications, command and control integration, etc.)
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM EI.EMENI;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
With the changing world situation and the proliferation of ballistic missiles, it is
imperative that an accurate characterization of theater, national, and global threats be
developed. The accurate specification and characterization of ballistic missiles and the
appropriate development and integration of scenarios using these characterizations is critical
to: ( 1) the analysis of alternative ballistic missile defense architectures; (2) the performance
assessments of potential technology applications; and (3) the operational performance
evaluations of candidate designs. The threat specifications and characterizations must be
based on accepted intelligence community threat projections or realistic estimates of
technological/operational innovations; be traceable back to objective and quantifiable
analyses; and be supported by the using organizations. These threat projections, described
in engineering terms and parameters, must be used by all SDIO agencies to ensure that
results can be compared and contrasted.
The System Threat development project is an integral part of SOlO's three-part
Threat Program. The System Threat project uses as a baseline the System Threat
Assessment Report (STAR) developed under the Intelligence Threat Development project
(#3203) and incorporates likely adversary countermeasures identified in the
Countermeasures Integration project (#3204). The System Threat project adds systemspecific engineering characterization details described in the form of scenarios
characterizing particular timing, targets, and tactics.
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The System Threat Scenario Description Documents are presented to the SDIO
System Design Board (SOB) for endorsement and configuration control.
PROJECT TITLE;
3207 - System Architecture
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215 -Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The objective of this project is to defme an evolving architecture for the phased
deployment of the GPALS defense system. The emphasis will be on the Limited Defense
System including initial deployments. This project will also defme how Theater Missile
Defense (TMD), Space-Based Interceptors (SBI), and Other Follow-On Systems will be
integrated into OPALS. This project will provide recommendations on System Elements,
command and control, battle management, acquisition strategies, program management,
and site activation. This project will also provide inputs to reports to Congress, Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA), and other required acquisition documents.
PROJECT TITLE;
3208 - Integration and Balancing
PBOGRAM ELEMENT;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
348
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Support trade studies with cost models and estimates of risk assessments for alternative
TMD architectures and concepts.
PROGRAM ELEMENT:
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This project contains classified programs relating to technological advancements.
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PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PRO.IECT DESCRIPTION;
The purpose of this project is to undertake studies to develop and demonstrate the
means to counter tactical missiles (fMs) through a centrally managed, anti-TM research
program concentrating on operations to destroy TM launchers and supporting equipment.
This includes: command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) functions;
sensors and sensor fusion; and weapon systems. This effort will lead to materiel
requirements definitions and needs to counter TMs. The study and development program
will be a multi-service effort. The service executing agency will centrally manage its
service's efforts and report to the SDIO.
The project currently has three major areas of research. Research into promising
sensor technologies, with concentration on overhead assets, will yield technical design
requirements for both theater fire control and warning functions. Information and
intelligence fusing research to identify and strike critical mobile targets will be funded.
Research into weapon systems capabilities will determine design requirements for near term
product improvement programs and technical requirements for long-term acquisition items.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM EI.EMENT;
PRO.JECT DESCRIP'[ION;
This effort is a partial follow-on to FY 1991 Project 3208. C4I, in the context of
this project, is defined as all those Command, Control, and Intelligence functions, serviced
by computers and communications systems, beyond Weapon Control functions , which
will be integrated into the existing air defense function and structure. In 1992, this project
funding is apportioned 90% for US Army C4I concerns and 10% for Joint concerns. In
future, this project will contain those USMC, USAF, and USN specific tasks (now
contained within Project 3205) which contribute to the enhancement of C4I systems for
active TMD. A significant change in future funding profiles based on the task
reorganization is anticipated.
The portion of the project for Joint work is being geared to support the JCS's
JROC TMD Special Study Group on C3I. It is anticipated that studies and analysis of
Desert Storm, Just Cause, and Urgent Fury C4I will be consulted, as well as original work
initiated. The US Army effort includes developing and analyzing known and planned
Unified Theater Army Air Defense CONOPS and C3I Architectures to examine warflghting
stratagems plus weapons and sensor use; identifying information types and information
flows based on strategems and use; determining the optimum architecture via trade studies;
initiating work on SAMOC; demonstrating of current Intelligence networks to move
National Sensor information rapidly into and around Unified Theaters; initiating work on
ADTOC; initiating program to IV& V Air Defense software.
3-SO
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The purpose of this project is to undertake studies to develop and demonstrate the
means to minimize the effectiveness of Tactical Missiles (TMs) against high priority assets
within the theater. The program will apply technology developments to defeat, confuse, or
minimize the effectiveness of threat acquisition sensors and the technology related to
surviving TM attacks. The study and development program will be centrally managed and
directed by the U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command which will report to the SOlO.
The project is currently conducting research into sensor negation, asset hardening,
and other survivability measures for the following critical theater targets; GUARDRAIL
ground station, corps command posts, US Army aviation forward area rearm refuel points
(FARRPs), and the POMCUS sites. Future year work will address additional theater
assets and TM systemic issues.
PROJECT TITI.E;
3213- Active Defense Engineering
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
This project provides system engineering and mission analysis support to evaluate
alternative concepts and architectures for the active defense pillar of IMD. This project
consists of two objectives.
One project objective is to support the operational user with engineering analysis to
evaluate the system implications of various scenarios, threats, and operational
requirements. Balancing of threat allocation and time line/battle space between the upper
and lower tiers will be conducted. The analysis will also defme the key active defense
sensor trades and requirements. Data from trade studies will be used as analytical support
for Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses and operational requirements
development Products will support TIIAAD, Patriot, and Corps SAM.
Another objective of this project is to define the architecture and external interfaces
required to satisfy IMD mission needs. New active theater missile defense systems will be
integrated into the existing U.S. and allied battlefield C3I architectures. Timeliness and
quality of information have a direct effect on the required effectiveness of the overall TMD
system. This effort will recommend preferred alternatives to optimize TMD performance.
Focus will be on TMD internal and external information exchange and data distribution
requirements.
PRO IECI TITLE:
3301 - SOlO Test Data Centers
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603218C - Research and Support Activities
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
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PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION;
The mission of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) National Test Bed (NIB)
Program is to provide a comprehensive capability to experiment and evaluate alternative
SOl system concepts, architectures, including battle management/command, control and
communications (BMJC3), and key defensive technologies and integrate the ultimate SDS.
The NIB consists of a network of integrated, geographically distributed, simulation and
suppon facilities. The National Test Facility at Falcon AFB, CO, is the hub and central
experiment and simulation facility. The mission of this project has changed to identify only
the infrastructure suppon for tasks and projects previously identified as pan of Project
3302. Those projects/tasks now are identified separately under their respective projects.
This project consists of the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of computing and
communications networks, secure facilities, and technology required to suppon the NIB
mission. The network nodes include SDIO, Army Strategic Defense Command, Air Force
Space Systems Division, Air Force Electronic Systems Division, Strategic Air Command,
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Naval Research Laboratory, General Electric
Corporation- Blue Bell, PA., Army Space Command, and Riverside Research InstituteArlington, VA.
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
Provide independent T&E oversight and assessment of all (GPALS) element tests
to ensure that comprehensive T &E programs are implemented to suppon GPALS design,
development, construction, operational capability, and deploymenL This effon provides
GPALS wide T &E programmatic and technical management, verification and validation
(V& V), certification, status monitoring, and targets to support SOI test programs.
3S2
PROGRAM ELEMENTS;
0603216C - Theater Missile Defenses
0603215C- Limited Defense System
0603214C- Space-Based Interceptors
0603218C - Research and Support Activities
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This task provides for overall coordination of the targets development and
acquisition program to support Test and Evaluation target requirements throughout the SDI
Program and, as such, is funded across several Program Elements. Currently, three tasks
are included in this project: the SDIO Targets Program, Space Test Range, and Studies and
Analyses.
The objective of the Targets Program is to provide engineering and threat
representative test targets for experiments and for Developmental Test (DT) for the
OPALS/Phase I Program. These targets must meet SDS performance, engineering, and
threat characteristics requirements to provide test articles that will adequately emulate the
expected threat and support engineering and development tests. Test and Evaluation is the
staff function designated to provide for the design, development, characterization,
validation, production, acquisition, and support system tests. The targets of concern are
Boosters, Re-entry vehicles (RV), Post-Boost Vehicle (PBV), Decoys, and Penetration
aids (Penaids).
Targets will be designated and developed based on element and system level
development test/experiment requirements. Initial target design and development will
include an engineering and threat representative target set approved by the Test and
Evaluation Working Group (TEWG) and validated by the intelligence community. Testing
will be conducted on the test targets to ensure that they meet the characterization and
validation requirements of the standard/threat target set This characterization will ensure
the proper data is available, post test, for accurate and timely test evaluation.
Products resulting from this effort will include:
Pre-production prototypes (target booster, PBVs, RVs, Decoy/Penaids)
Flight-qualified hardware
Pre-production, validated test articles (PB V/RVs, Penaids/Decoys)
ERIS, KITE-3, GBI, MSX, AST targets, ARE-2H payload, GSTS, BP, Patriot,
ERINT
Launcher Boosters
Range Telemetry and Communication Equipment
PRO IECT TITLE;
3305 - Theater Test Bed
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603216C- Theater Missile Defenses
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The Theater Test Bed effon will develop computer-based analysis centers to
evaluate the component and overall system designs postulated for Theater Missile Defense.
The Theater Test Bed Program will provide the capability for operational, doctrine, and
materiel developers and systems engineers and analysts to address the issues associated
with Theater Missile Defense. This effon will develop a common base for simulation
software and the means to augment it with location-unique software for the specific, local
analysis and provide the capability for man-in-the-loop/hardware-in-the-loop experiments
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PROJECT TITLE:
3306 - Computer Resources and Engineering
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603218C- Research and Support Activities
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This project provides funding for the Advanced Research Center and Simulation
Center (ARC/SC) for ongoing operations and maintenance in support of Ground-Based
Elements (GBE). The ARC/SC is an advanced computation technology system providing
the operational test bed for resolving weapons, sensors, and battle management and
command, control and communications (BMJC3) issues for strategic and theater defense. It
also serves as a development and test capability for other USASDC programs, to include
the Surveillance Test Bed, Extended Air Defense Test Bed, and Ground-Based Radar Test
Facility. The ARC/SC is a major node in the National Test Bed (NIB).
Facilities at Huntsville (US Army Strategic Defense Command) support evolving
architecture analysis and represent the only operational, high-fidelity simulation capable of
providing end-to-end GBE issue resolution.
PROJECT TITLE;
3307 - Airborne Surveillance Test bed (AST)
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
3-54
PROJECT TITLE;
3308 - System Simulations
(Level I and Level
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The System Simulators are being developed to provide end-to-end analysis
capabilities which are based on current Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
architectural concepts and are traceable to the top-level system requirements. Level I is
fundamentally a stochastically driven model which captures the performance requirements
allocations of the system and its elements and will be the primary tool for the iteration and
validation of the requirements allocation process. Level II will be a more detailed, higher
fidelity, design specific representation of the system and, while retaining some architectural
configuration flexibility, will be parameterized to a much lesser extent than Level I. Level
II is, in addition, a critical exercise in the engineering and integration of the system and its
interfaces, in that the Level II development spans multiple development agencies and will
precede the availability of hardware components and subsystems by years. The cognizant
services and Element Program Offices are directly responsible for the development of their
models which will then be integrated into a common simulation framework at the National
Test Facility. Level II as an analysis tool is expected to play a crucial role in the formal
testing of the system.
PROJECT TITLE:
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603215C- Limited Defense System
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
The objective of this project is to provide "system-level" test planning and execution
for developmental test (DT) and operational test (OT) for the OPALS system and its
system-level segments. Element developmental, test, and evaluation (DT&E), however,
remains the responsibility of the element program manager as does element-to-element
interface testing. This project supports both the SDIO and service system-level planning
for DT and OT. This project will suppon system-level DT tests and will provide the
funding for OT tests conducted by the Operational Test Agencies within each Service.
System-level testing will consist of three related effms in DEMVAL: 1) Extraction
and augmentation of system data from element DT contractor and government tests to meet
system test objectives as defined in the System Test Plan; 2) augmentation of inter-element
live field integration tests to complete a series of System Integration Tests (SIT); and 3)
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PROGRAM ELEMENT:
0603218C- Research and Support Activities
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
This objective of this project is to provide adequate, common-user test and
evaluation (I&E) facilities to enable SDIO test and experiment programs to meet their
objectives. This is the first year these projects are consolidated for management purposes;
the plan is to further consolidate management for other multi-user facilities in future years.
Prudent consolidation can enhance efficiency and economy while satisfying user
requirements. Facilities requirements will be satisfied using existing resources whenever
possible. New and upgraded facilities will only be pursued when no existing capability
will meet basic requirements. This project includes the following facilities: the Center for
Research Support (CERES), Millstone Hill Radars Support, and range support for SDIO
programs at WSMR, USAKA, and ESMC LC20.
PROJECT TITLE:
PROGRAM ELEMENT:
PROJECT DESCRIPTION;
This project allocates resources to develop, operate, maintain, and upgrade SDIO
mobile test assets. SDIO test and technology experiment programs require adequate test
resources, ranges, monitoring, and data collection to accomplish their test objectives.
When existing ranges/launch locations and fixed facilities do not have sufficient capability
to support SDIO test and experiment requirements, mobile assets will be programmed
consistent with overall T &E requirements. In FY 1992, this project specifically addresses
the range support ship, USNS Redstone. In subsequent years, the plan is to consolidate
other common user mobile test assets under this projecL The USNS Redstone and her
electronic system, the M247 Flight Test Support System, were specifically designed and
developed by the Navy Strategic Systems Program for supporting TRIDENT flight test
activity. Prior to FY 1992, it has not been available nor used for support of SDIO
missions. During FY 1992 and in subsequent years, it will be used to perform the range
support mission for SDIO experiments for the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile
(LEAP) project, Brilliant Pebbles (BP) tests, and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) tests
where Wake Island serves as the target launch location. Wake Island has not traditionally
been used as a range asset and is not equipped for this mission. Relocating the Redstone to
the Western Pacific will satisfy this requirement in a cost-effective manner.
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Description of Each SDI Project
PRO IECT TITLE:
PROGRAM ELEMENTS:
PROJECT DESCRIP'fiON:
The System Test Environment Support project provides a critically needed
capability to the SDI community in special studies and analyses, dealing with Strategic
Defense System (SDS) architectures, elements, technologies, interfaces, strategies, testing,
and simulation/modeling to include time sensitive studies and analyses. Particular
programs supported include: Architecture Development--GPALS/NMD Requirements;
Element Support--Brilliant Eyes and Brilliant Pebbles; Technology Investigation-Communication/Neural Workshop; Interface Compatibility--United States/United
Kingdom, Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and Extended Air Defense Test Bed (EADTB);
Strategic Algorithms; Demonstration and Validation Testing--GPALS/NMD Experiment
Design. Provides the SDI community with an Institutionalized Model Set This will be a
"tool box" of models that the NIB has performed confidence assessment and/or validation
and verification on and that SDIO has accredited. Provides advanced hardware and
software environment initiatives to meet near-term requirements in Visualization, Software
Environment, Technology Insertion, Networking, Simulation Techniques, and Security.
PROJECT TITLE;
PROGRAM ELEMENTS;
PROJECT DESCRIP'fiON;
This project provides system engineering and program control support common to
all other projects within these PEs. Typical system engineering tasks include review and
analysis of technical project design, development and testing, test planning, assessment of
technology maturity, and technology integration across SDIO projects and support of
design reviews and technology interface meetings. Program control tasks include
assessment of schedule, cost, and performance, with attendant documentation of the many
related programmatic issues. This project supports funding for civilian personnel and
expenses for travel (TOY), training, rents, communications, information management,
utilities, printing, reproduction, supplies, and equipment.
PROGRAM ELEMENT;
0603218C- Research and Support Activities
PROJECT DESCRIP'fiON;
The Technology Applications Program was established in 1986 to make SDI
technology available to federal agencies, state and local governments, and U.S. business
and research interests. The objective of this program is to develop and support the transfer
of SOl-derived technology to Department of Defense applications as well as to other
federal, state, and local government agencies; federal laboratories; universities; and the
domestic private sector.
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PROGRAM ELEMENT:
0603217C- Other Follow-On Systems
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:
The Medical Free Electron Laser (MFEL) program seeks to develop and enhance
free electron laser technology and to assess how the unique characteristics of FELs may be
exploited for applications in medical, biophysical, and materials science research. After
FY90, SDIO transferred total responsibility for the MFEL program to
DDR&E/Environmental and Life Sciences.
The Positron Emission Tomography (PET) accelerator program, initiated in FY88
by Congressional direction, is a research project that will reduce the size, weight, and cost
of current particle accelerators used to develop radio-pharmaceuticals for Positron Emission
Tomography medical diagnoses.
J.ss
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Chapter 4
Relationship of SDI Projects and Activities to Possible Deployment Phases
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Chapter 4
Relationship of SDI Projects and Activities to Possible Deployment Phases
This chapter responds to subparagraph (b)(4) of Section 224 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189), which requests "an
explanation of the relationship between each such [deployment] phase and each program and
project associated with the proposed architecture for that phase."
The following charts display the relationships between the various SDI Projects, the mission functional
areas, the Program Element which funds each Project, and the phase of the deployment that is planned for the
project For a more complete description of each project, refer to Chapter 3.
Correlation of GPALS Functional Areas and SDI Program Support
Activities with Projects, Program Elements, and Possible Deployment Phases
Pro11ram Elements
GPALS Functional
Areas & Program
Suooort Activities
Sense an Auack
Control, Openue,
&Integrate
NOJ'E:
Projects
rrMD fL-DS
II 01
1102
1103
1104
11OS
1106
1601
2102
2103
2104
3109
3110
3111
3307
1403
1405
1601
2300
2304
1208
Tech
1209
2201
2202
2203
2205
Passive Sensors
Radar
Laser Radar
Signal Process
Discrimination
Sensa Swdies
IST
Brilliant Eyes
GSTS
GBR
System Security
Surv Engineering
Surveillance Eng
AOA/AST
SBI
FollowOn
Deployment Phase
~uearcb
"
~upport
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Computer Eng
Comm Eng
1ST
Command Center
srw Eng
0
0
Discrimination
Endo Tech
SBI
GBI
E2I
Brilliant Pebbles
Potential
!Follow-On
GPALS
0
0
The single site, initial limited defense oyotem io captured unde:- the GPALS portion of these charu.
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Relationship of SDI Projects and Activities to Possible Deployment Phases
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Correlation of GPALS Functional Areas and SDI Program Support Activities with Projects,
Program Elements, and Possible Deployment Phases
Program Elements
GPALS Functional
Areas & Program
Support Activities
Deolovment Phase
Research
Projects
follow-
TMD a..DS
SBI
pn
&
Support
GPALS
Potential
follow-On
1206
2106
2203
2208
2209
2207
2210
2212
Theater Intercept
ATS
E21
ERINT
ACES
PATRIOT
THAAD
CORPS SAM
1201
1202
1203
1204
1210
1301
1302
1303
1304
130S
1601
1602
2204
!I
il
:I
i
Support with Key
Technology
ISO!
IS02
IS03
IS04
1601
Survivability
Lethality
Power Cond
Mats & Structs
IST
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GPALS Functional
Areas & Program
Support Activities
Perform System
Analysis,
Engineering &
Testing
Manage
Projects
1501 Survivability
1502 Lethality
1504 Marerials &
SbUCtures
170 I Launch Services
1702 Spec Test Acts
2304 S/W Engineering
3102 Sys Engineering
3104 ILS
3105 Prod &
Manufacture
3107 Envbnnmen~
Siting & Facilities
3108 Ops Envbnnment
3109 Sys Sec Eng
3110 Surv Engineering
3111 Surveillance Eng
3112 Arch & Analysis
3202 Ops Interlace
3203 Threat Dev
3204 Countermeasures
3205 TMD Studies
3206 System Threat
3207 Arch Engineering
3208 TMDI lnregration
3209 Special Studies
3210 Counterlorce
3211 C"I
3212 Passive Defense
3213 Active Defense
3282 Ops Planning
3292 Off/Def Analysis
3301 Dala Center
3302 Sys Test Envir
3303 lnd TIE Ovecsight
3304 Targets
330S Theater 1B
3306ARC
3307 AOA/AST
3308 Sys Simulator
3309 Sys Test Plan/Exec
3310 Test Facility
3311 Mob Test Assets
3312 NI'B Support
4000 Management
Support
Proaram Elements
Deployment Phase
!Research
!Follow&
Potential
SBI OD
~upport GPALS
rrMD ILDS
!Follow-On
4-4
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Chapter 5
II
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, II I
. II
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Chapter 5
Other Nation Participation
This chapter responds to subparagraph (b)(5) of Section 224 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Rscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189), which requests
"(a statement addressing) the status of consultations with other member nations of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Japan, and other appropriate aiDes concerning
research being conducted in the Strategic Defense Initiative program."
Such cooperation would not be a new activity. Allied participation in SDI research predates
the refocus of the program toward OPALS. In fact, the United States has already developed a
considerable level of allied participation in SOl-related research since early in the program.
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Several in-depth presentations on the GPALS concept were provided to allied and friendly
governments during 199 I. These presentations provided detailed information on the conceptual
framework for achieving global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes, and offered
foreign participation in OPALS, with particular initial emphasis on the theater missile defense
segment of OPALS.
U.S. officials briefed the OPALS concept in the Pentagon to representatives from fifteen
nations on March 28, 1991. Following that introductory OPALS briefmg, DoD officials visited
the major capitals in Europe in April 1991, and the Far East in June 1991. In each capital,
discussions were held with senior foreign officials on the OPALS concept, and their views were
solicited on prospective participation in the development and acquisition of OPALS. During 1991,
several nations, as well as NATO, identified concerns for anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM)
defense and expressed a receptiveness to continuing the dialogue with the United States on the
OPALS concept and its development to assess how they might actively participate.
In addition, U.S. officials consulted with allied leaders, both bilaterally and in NATO fora,
on the results of high-level negotiations and meetings (outlined in Chapter 1) with the former
Soviet Union on U.S. objectives for ballistic missile defense. Furthermore, senior government
and industry personnel from several allied countries have visited the United States for detailed
technical discussions and updates on the SDI program.
SDIO sponsors annual advanced planning briefings to acquaint government and industry
representatives from selected allied nations, as well as U.S. industry, with SDI projects,
initiatives, and future acquisition plans. The SDIO also co-sponsors an annual classified
multinational conference on theater ballistic missile defense technologies and prospective
employment architectures. The last such conference was held in Tel Aviv, Israel, in March 1992.
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Long-standing laws and policies governing rights to research results developed under U.S.
contracts ensure that the U.S. technology base receives the benefits of all SDI research, whether
performed by a domestic or foreign contractor. In accordance with these laws and policies, the
U.S. Government will receive rights to use the technology developed under SDI contracts.
Contractor rights to use the results of their SDI research depend on security considerations and
specific conditions of each contract. These ground rules for cooperation are fully reflected in each
of the MOUs and Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) the United States has signed on participation
in SDI research. In order to fully exploit the technology development SDIO has funded abroad,
entries are being added to SOlO's Technology Applications Information System (TAIS) database
synopsizing the technology for potential spin-off applications to qualified United States industry
and government agency users. The status of significant ongoing projects is also provided.
The following section addresses cooperative projects between the U.S. and our friends and
allies throughout the history of the SDI Program.
Germany: $88.55 million. Pointing and tracking, optics, lethality and target hardening,
electron laser technology, theater defense architecture, infrared phenomenology, and SPAS
assembly.
S-4
Status: The Infrared Background Signature Survey (ffiSS), conducted aboard the U.S.
Space Shuttle Discovery, received a reusable Shuttle Pallet Satellite from MesserschmittBoelkow-Blohm (MBB). Other German firms including Linde, Kaiser Threde and AEG
Telefunken, along with the University of Berlin, contributed to the development of the
sensor suite.
A five-year lethality program headed by Diehl GmbH, along with MBB and the
Ernst Mach Institut (EMI), was funded by SDIO through the Defense Nuclear Agency.
EMI developed an innovative warhead fragment with unusual penetrating capabilities,
while MBB developed a technique for accelerating large masses at extremely high
velocities. Results from this work have already been transferred to the U.S. Theater
Missile Defense lethality program data base, the orbital debris breakup study, and the high
explosive initiation and weapon safety programs.
In June 1991, SDIO and the Israeli MOD concluded a Memorandum of Agreement
that implemented the Arrow Continuation Experiments (ACES), a cooperative, cost-share
program designed as a follow-on demonstration phase of the Arrow interceptor experiment.
ACES will provide for the development of a tactical ballistic missile interceptor that will be
smaller, lighter, and have a greater engagement envelope than the original Arrow design.
This interceptor will support Israel's requirement for tactical ballistic missile defense and it
will benefit U.S. technology base requirements for advanced ATBM technologies.
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United Kingdom: $129.09 million. Optical and electron computing, thyratrons, ion
sources and power conditioning for particle beams, electromagnetic rail gun technology,
optical logic arrays, countermeasures and penetration aids, UK Test Bed, and theater
defense architecture analyses.
Status: The United Kingdom (UK) MOD and SDIO signed a cooperative agreement in
January 1989 to develop a prototype artificial intelligence framework. The framework is
based on the principle of comparing a priori information about offensive missile objects to
real time sensor data. The prototype is based on a blackboard architecture where signal
processing, clustering, and raid assessment rules are partitioned. The framework control
module manages tasking and data sharing to maximize the timeliness and accuracy of the
discrimination process. Two of the three programs are near completion.
S-6
Belgium: $0.52 million. Theater defense architecture, laser algorithms, and mosaic array
data compression and processing module.
Canada: $8.00 million. Power system materials, particle accelerators, platforms, theater
defense architecture, and sounding rockets.
The above descriptions indicate that SDIO is conducting an active program of cooperation
with our friends and allies. The annual SDI funding dedicated to cooperative research activities
with friends and allies, normally constitutes 2-3% of SOlO's fiscal appropriations. The SDIO is
engaged in a number of exploratory discussions with friends and allies to determine other areas of
mutual research interest in GPALS to be pursued via similar types of arrangements.
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Chapter 6
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Chapter 6
ABM Treaty Compliance
6.1
Introduction
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty addresses the development, testing, and
deployment of ABM systems and components. It should be noted that nowhere does the ABM
Treaty use the word "research." Neither the United States nor the Soviet delegation to the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) negotiations chose to place limitations on research, and the ABM
Treaty makes no attempt to do so. The United States made it clear during the ABM Treaty
negotiations that development commences with the initiation of field testing of a prototype ABM
system or component. The United States had traditionally distinguished "research" from
"development" as outlined by then-U.S. delegate Dr. Harold Brown in a 1971 statement to the
Soviet SALT I delegation. Research includes, but is not limited to, conceptual design and
laboratory testing. Development follows research and precedes full-scale testing of systems and
components designed for actual deployment. Development of a weapon system is usually
associated with the construction and field testing of one or more prototypes of the system or its
major components. However, the construction of a prototype cannot necessarily be verified by
national technical means of verification. Therefore, in large part because of these verification
difficulties, the ABM Treaty prohibition on the development of sea-, air-, space-, or mobile landbased ABM systems, or components for such systems, applies when a prototype of such a system
or its components enters the field-testing stage.
The ABM Treaty regulates the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems
whose components were defined in the 1972 Treaty as consisting of ABM interceptor missiles,
ABM launchers, and ABM radars. ABM systems based on other physical principles and including
components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars
are addressed only in Agreed Statement D. In order to fulfill the basic Treaty obligation not to
deploy ABM systems or components except as provided in Article m, this agreed statement
provides that in the event that ABM systems based on other physical principles and including
components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars
are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be
subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV
of the Treaty. The Agreed Statement does not proscribe the development and testing of such
systems, regardless of basing mode. The SDI Program will continue to be conducted in a manner
that fully complies with all U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.
Research and certain development and testing of defensive systems are not only permitted
by the ABM Treaty but were anticipated at the time the Treaty was negotiated and signed. Both the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics supported this position in testimony to
their respective legislative bodies. When the Treaty was before the Senate for advice and consent
to ratification, then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird advocated, in his testimony, that the United
States "vigorously pursue a comprehensive ABM technology program." In a statement before the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Marshall Grechko said the ABM Treaty "places no limitations
whatsoever on the conducting of research and experimental work directed toward solving the
problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes."
6.2
The Department of Defense (DoD) has in place an effective compliance process (established
with the SALT I agreements in 1972) under which key offices in DoD are responsible for
overseeing SDI compliance with all United States arms control commitments. Under this process,
the SDI organization (SDIO) and DoD components ensure that the implementing program offices
6-2
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Other NaJion ParticipaJion
adhere to DoD compliance directives and seek guidance from offices charged with oversight
responsibility.
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Chapter 7
Countermeasures
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Chapter 7
Countermeasures
This chapter responds to part (b)(7) of Section 224 of the November 7, 1989
Conference Report authorizing appropriations for FY 1990. This part requests "a
review of possible countermeasures of the Soviet Union to specific SDI programs,
an estimate of the time and cost required for the Soviet Union to develop each such
countermeasure, and an evaluation of the adequacy of the SDI programs described
in the report to respond to such countermeasures."
7.1
Introduction
1991 has been a year of transition for the SDI Countermeasures effort. In recognition of the
changing international security environment, the Countermeasures program has intensified its
focus on the Third World while continuing to investigate potential Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) responses to the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) architecture. As part of this
effort, the Countermeasures program has placed a greater emphasis on the evaluation and
verification of simpler counters which are more likely to be employed by a resource-constrained
CIS and technologically unsophisticated Third World nations.
7-2
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Sophisticated counters to the U.S. BMD system are not likely to be employed before
well in~ the first decade of the next century, if then.
The most likely supplier of advanced ballistic missiles, and perhaps defense
countermeasures, to the Third World will likely be the People's Republic of China.
I
Another 1991 study analyzed the motivation driving Third World nations' desire to acquire
ballistic missiles. The study concluded that missiles are becoming the long-range weapon of choice
in regional conflicts; and that missiles are acquired for technological prestige, autonomy of action,
and warfJghting capability. However, ballistic missile use is hampered by effective long-range
guidance and reconnaissance capability, which in turn limits missile targets to large static areas
such as cities, industrial facilities, and military bases.
7.5
,,,
The Countermeasures program's evaluation and verification effort begins with the
identification of potential countermeasures by Red/Blue exercises. In Red/Blue efforts, the Red
Team adopts an adversary mindset and develops countermeasure concepts; the Blue Team develops
concepts to negate the potential countermeasure. Potential countermeasures are then subjected to
laboratory and flight tests to determine technological feasibility and availability and the timing of
appearance. Analyses are also conducted to evaluate the role that political factors play in
development and deployment of countermeasures. Countermeasure concepts under investigation
include RV replica and decoy discrimination, RV signature masking, and other techniques to
confuse the defense.
After consultation with Congress, an agreement was reached on the establishment of a
Defense Science Boani (DSB) Task Force to review the SDI Countermeasures Program. As noted
in the Report of the Committee on Appropriations (Report 102-95), the ''DOD Independent Review
of SDIO Countermeasures- Action Plan" was developed to address Committee concerns. The
Action Plan directs the DSB Task Force to examine past and ongoing studies in the
Countermeasures program, assess the conduct, results and adequacy of the program, and develop
fmdings and recommendations regarding its future efforts. The Task Force will provide its report
in the summer of 1992.
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Chapter 8
Funding
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Chapter 8
Funding
This chapter responds to subparagraph (b)(B) of Section 224 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189), which requests "details regarding funding of
programs and projects for the Strategic Defense Initiative (including the amounts authorized,
appropriated, and made available for obligation alter undistributed reductions or other offsetting
reductions were carried out), as follows:
(A)"The level of requested and appropriated funding provided for the current fiscal year for each
program and project in the Strategic Defense Initiative budgetary presentation materials provided to
Congress.
(B) "The aggregate amount of funding provided for previous fiscal years (including the current
fiscal year) for each such program and project
(C) "The amount requested to be appropriated for each such program and project for the next
fiscal year.
(D) "The amount programmed to be requested for each such program and project for the
following fiscal year.
(E) "The amount required to reach the next significant milestone for each demonstration program
and each major technology program.
8-2
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Funding
Table 81
Project Funding Profile
(In Millions of Tben-Year Dollars)
Funds Expended
Tbrougb FY
1991
416
103
431
503
1007
792
0
0
FY 1992
Appropriation
34
12
13
30
89
184
10
21
FY 1993
Request
494
466
149
651
40
285
0
0
0
0
0
31
126
6
63
79
II
18
0
14
50
63
35
0
19
1020
770
650
23
104
80
127
1392
67
24
175
76
0
47
24
1
12
1
II
1
24
486
431
462
134
68
135
51
50
6
24
284
47
58
0
583
146
70
40
83
41
25
23
71
17
68
36
362
112
116
118
278
112
284
0
82
28
212
90
UNCLASSIFIED
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
Survivability Technology
15
0
18
7
57
8
17
6
56
18
13
45
126
208
II
54
Demonslration
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Funding
Table 8-1 (continued)
Project Funding Profile
(In Millions or Tben-Year Dollars)
Funds Expended
Tbrougb FY
1991
FY 1992
Appropriation
FY 1993
Reauest
0
160
599
669
173
558
137
525
45
103
42
20
0
0
66
2
390
160
160
60
100
25
30
0
5
450
171
129
58
243
25
655
5
74
8
1204
8
3102
3103
3104
3105
3107
3108
3109
3110
3111
3112
3113
3114
System Engineering
SOlO Metrology
Integrated Logistics Support
Producibility & Manufacturing
Environment, Siting & Facilities
Operational Environments
System Security Engineering
Survivability Engineering
Surveillance Engineering
System Engineering Support
Ground Communications
Launch Communications
191
0
44
29
51
2
7
2
7
0
0
0
74
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199
0
7
20
16
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12
8
11
29
13
0
320 I
3202
3203
3204
3205
3206
3207
3208
3209
3210
3211
3212
3213
3282
3292
191
29
65
109
138
7
14
28
0
0
0
0
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10
17
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Offense-Defense Analysis
11
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10
27
15
3
26
5
6
10
22
32
7
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3
19
3
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UNCLASSlFIED
8-4
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Funding
Funds Expended
Through FY
1991
FY 1992
Aooroorlation
FY 1993
Reouest
11
83
6
147
0
0
29
38
9
24
49
22
116
6
217
37
29
45
7
133
57
0
550
15
276
101
39
625
0
0
12
15
14
15
1190
407
351
8
59
2
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UNCLASSIFlED
3301
3302
3303
3304
3305
3306
3307
3308
3309
3310
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Funding
Table 8-l
Estimated Funding Required to Meet Next Milestone
(In Millions or Tben-Year Dollars)
ProRram/Project
2104 Theater Missile DefenseGrowld Based Radar
2207 PA1RIOT
2210 THAAD
2212 CORPS SAM
2102 Brilliant Eyes
2104 National Missile DefenseGround Based Radar
2202 Ground Based lnlercepla
2205 Brilliant Pebbles
2300 Command Center
1301 Free Electtcn Laser
1302 Chemical Laser
1303 Neutral Particle Beam
1305 Acquisition, Tracking,
Pointing/Fire Control
Required
Arter FY 1993
Date
434
Milestone II
1996
722
1188
547
1043
1545
1995
1996
1997
1998
1998
915
.1715
707
288
1064
Milestone II
Milestone II
Milestone II
Megawau Class FEL Dernonslration
Capstone Technology Integration
Experiment
Far Field Optics Experiment
Integrated ATP DemonstnUion
1998
1997
1997
1998
1997
360
190
1997
1997
UNCLASSIFIED
8-6
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Chapter 9
Relation of SDI Technologies to Military Missions
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Chapter 9
Relation of SDI Programs to Military Missions
This chapter responds to subparagraphs (b) (9) and (b) (1 0) of Section 224 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189), which requests "details on what
Strategic Defense Initiative technologies can be developed or deployed within the next 5 to 10 years to
defend against significant military threats and help accomplish critical military missions. The missions to be
considered include the following:
(A)
"Defending elements of the Armed Forces abroad and United States allies against tactical
bal6stic missiles. particularly new and highly accurate shorter-range baiDstic missiles of the Soviet
Union armed with conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads.
(B)
"Defending against an accidental launch of strategic baJUstic missiles against the United
States.
(C)
"Defending against a Umited but miUtarily effective attack by the Soviet Union aimed at
disrupting the National Command Authority or other valuable miUtary assets.
(D)
"Providing sufficient warning and tracking information to defend or effectively evade
possible attacks by the Soviet Union against military satellites, including those in high orbits.
(E)
"Providing early warning and attack assessment information and the necessary survivable
command, control, and communications to facilitate the use of United States military forces in
defense against possible conventional or strategic attacks by the Soviet Union.
(F)
"Providing protection of the United States population from a nuclear attack by the Soviet
Union.
(G)
Any other significant near-term military mission that the application of SDI technologies
might help to accomplish."
Subparagraph (b) (10) requests ,or each of the near-term military missions listed in paragraph (9), the
report shall include the following:
(A)
"A list of specific program elements of the Strategic Defense Initiative that are pertinent to
such missions.
(B)
"The Secretary's estimate of the initial operating capability dates for the architectures or
systems to accompUsh such missions.
(C)
"The Secretary's estimate of the level of funding necessary for each program to reach
those initial operating capability dates.
(D)
"The Secretary's estimate of the survivabiUty and cost-effectiveness at the margin of such
architectures or systems against current and projected threats from the Soviet Union.
9.1
Introduction
This chapter discusses the application of SDI technologies to critical and/or significant
military missions. The chapter also addresses the issue of cost effectiveness at the margin within
the context of the changing international security environment, and the survivability of proposed
defensive systems.
9-2
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9.2
For' SDI systems associated with missions (A) through (F) in subparagraph (b) (9),
information on the schedule and cost to achieve initial operating capability (IOC) will be provided
in the 180-day repon on the deployment of Theater/Tactical missile defenses and a single-site,
initial National Missile Defense system, as requested by Congress. IOC schedule and cost
estimates related to the potential application of SDI technology to other significant military missions
is not provided because such information would be speculative at this time.
Figure 9-1 lists the critical military missions (A) through (F) specified by Congress in
subparagraph (b) (9), and identifies the SDI systems which incorporate the near term technologies
which could accomplish these missions. The six missions are addressed wholly, or in pan, by the
GPALS concept of protection against limited ballistic missile attack. Details on these systems are
found in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report
Mission
A. Defending elemen!S of the Anned Fon:es abroad and United StaleS
allies against tactical ballistic missiles (fBMs), particularly new and
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9.3
This section addresses significant military missions that SDI technologies might help to
accomplish. Significant military missions include air, maritime, ground, and space defense.
9.3.1
Air Defense
The Nonh American air defense mission encompasses surveillance, warning, interception,
and identification or negation of unknown aircraft that penetrate the air defense identification zone.
Systems that contribute to the air defense mission in the Nonh American continent include the Joint
Surveillance System network of Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration radars, the Distant
Early Warning Line/Nonh Warning system radars across Alaska and Canada, Over-the-Horizon
Backscatter radar, Airborne Warning and Control System (A WACS) aircraft, and fighterinterceptors on continuous alert. SDI technologies could significantly improve air defense mission
efficiency and effectiveness, especially against future threats.
Nonh American air defense assets operate as a system, with one type of surveillance asset
compensating for the deficiencies of others. Interceptor aircraft assist fixed surveillance sensors in
identifying all tracks of incoming aircraft. In some cases, A WACS aircraft and interceptors
perform surveillance when transient gaps occur in radar coverage. If fixed or aircraft-based
sensors had greater capability, interceptors could perform more critical missions. Improvements in
sensor range, data processing, and operating efficiency would greatly facilitate the air defense
mission.
Because aircraft can be divened to many possible targets, discerning the objectives of an
air-breathing attack is difficult. However, broad patterns of mass raids can be revealed if
information from multiple sensors can be assimilated simultaneously. SDI's advances in
survivable communications and distributed computation could significantly improve raid
recognition, attack assessment, and efficient assignment of interceptors.
The Nonh American air defense surveillance mission could obtain substantial benefit from
a variety of SDI effons. SDI electrical power projects could provide long-term energy sources for
unattended ground-based radar systems. Battle management and communications systems within
the SDI Program could facilitate sensor data fusion and attack assessment. Improvements in
aircraft-based compact data processing and sensor operations could greatly enhance airborne
surveillance of air-breathing threats. Survivable, high-data-rate communication systems could help
maintain connectivity among the air defense regions and improve the allocation of interceptors and
sensors within and among regions.
Tactical air defense in a theater of operations is closely integrated with Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) and includes sensors such as the A WACS and other (non-TMD) mobile groundbased radars. These sensors provide early warning and engagement control of Air Force air
defense and Army antiaircraft surface-to-air missile systems such as the PATRIOT (in its antiaircraft role), HAWK, Stinger, and Chaparral, as well as Vulcan gun systems. The current air
defense sensor/weapon configuration results in a highly decentralized command and control
environment, which is further constrained by limitations in battle management/command, control
and communications (BM/C3) technology.
Theater air defense operations depend on limited sensor and BM/C3 architectures, which
are in turn affected by electronic countermeasures and raid size. Sensors incorporating
sophisticated SDI technology would ensure sustained theater air defense operation and would
preclude the operation's being hampered by countermeasures.
9-4
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At the global level, SDI computer technologies and simulation display advances could help
integrate air-breathing and missile threat information necessary to respond to combined attacks.
SDI kinetic energy interceptor technologies may allow more intercepts with fewer aircraft. Sensor,
kinetic energy interceptor, and battle management technologies pursued by the SDI Program could
all be applicable to the strategic air defense missions.
The utility of space lasers for worldwide air defense has been studied since the 1970s.
Lethal beams can be projected to the cloudtops, destroying strategic bombers in seconds. Theater
aircraft are similarly vulnerable. SDI progress in hydrogen fluoride chemical laser technology, and
in the pointing and control of the high power beam makes a militarily useful system possible.
9.3.2
.I
Maritime Operations
The global maritime operations of U.S. naval units and fleets in peacetime and wartime are
critically dependent on surveillance, communications, and the ability to intercept hostile forces
beyond the range at which the forces can actively threaten fleet units.
Advances in communications, multiprocessors, intelligence interfacing, and software, from
projects now under development in the SDI Program, should greatly benefit U.S. fleet operations.
For example, the SDI battle management software developed to track and intercept hundreds of
ballistic missiles and reentry vehicles (RVs) should be readily adaptable to the Navy's requirements
to perform similar operations involving seaborne and airborne friendly and hostile objects.
Furthermore, SDI software development tools employing artificial intelligence and knowledgebased technology should markedly reduce the cost and time required to develop and manufacture
secure and fault-tolerant software for tactical use in maritime operations.
The SDI advanced infrared sensor technology, if applied in naval aircraft and air defense
missiles, could help fleet defenses keep pace with advances in the anti-ship missile (ASM) threat.
Space-based radar, employing major advances in high-frequency and sophisticated signal
processing techniques for extending sensor performance, will offer a valuable mix for confronting
hostile forces with a multispectral surveillance, tracking, and targeting capability.
Spinoffs from HVG and laser technology could result in highly effective ship-based
weapons for close-in defense. For example, a rapid-fire electromagnetic gun (rail gun) that propels
a low-cost guided projectile could be very effective for defending against ASMs launched from
bombers, ships, or submarines. Additionally, electromagnetic coil launchers, with the potential to
launch much heavier aircraft from an aircraft carrier than currently is possible, offer a replacement
for steam catapults.
Applications of SDI laser weapon technology could provide the quick-kill defense
capability needed to counter even the most advanced AS Ms. Advances in developing high-power
microwave technologies for strategic defense may be applied to seaborne tactical weapons in
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defense against missiles and targeting satellites, and may be applied to suppression of enemy shipand land-based defensive radars and command, control, and communication systems.
9.3.3
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Ground Forces
For conventional ground force operations enemy forces most likely will deploy a vast array
of weapons, including tanks, mobile artillery, armored personnel carriers, and attack helicopters.
These weapons are designed to provide the mobility and firepower necessary to defeat allied
forces. To counter this capability, U.S. forces require a continued infusion of new technologies
to provide improved capabilities in the areas of firepower, fl!'e control, and command control, and
communications, as well as improved power supplies to enhance the mobile operations of
advanced weapons.
The SDI Program is developing a range of advanced technologies that could be used to
develop advanced weapons, suppon systems, and control systems for conventional forces. For
example, HVG technologies could provide significant improvements in anti-armor operations. The
HVG could be capable of long-range, rapid, lethal response to conventional attack. In addition,
the ability to engage more than one target at a time is being developed through advances in
computer-aided and controlled multitarget fl!'e control systems. This ability would enhance the
battle management functions of all forces and enhance their efficiency in the use of resources.
The development of high-power-density power supplies could provide a significant benefit
to the modern ground force, especially command and control and suppon elements. Improvements
in power technology have led to the development of systems that can provide suffiCient power with
low noise and/or thermal signatures. Lightweight, quiet power systems would reduce the
signature of critical units, thus enhancing survivability while meeting power needs.
The SDI Program also is developing technologies to automate the collection, fusion, and
processing of massive amounts of intelligence data on a near-real-time basis. These technologies
can help ensure the timeliness and availability of reliable intelligence required to suppon mobile
forces on a battlefield
9.3.4
Space Defense
U.S. space defense requirements include space surveillance and tracking, space defense
weapons, and space system survivability. Particularly relevant are SDI systems (Brilliant Eyes,
Brilliant Pebbles technology, Ground-Based Interceptor) and technologies for maneuvering and
hardening space platforms.
Additionally, multispectral focal plane arrays and on-board processing are being developed
to provide global coverage and multiple track me maintenance. Shon-wavelength lasers have
direct potential for tracking and providing rapid images of satellites. In the long term, interceptors
or other means of active self-defense are likely to be required (e.g., ground-launched interceptors
could be used against the co-orbital ASAT).
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Figure 9-2
Potential SDI Technology Benefits to Other Significant Military Missions
SDI TECHNOLOGIES
Electrical Power
Battle management and communications
systems
Computational techniques and simulation
deploy
CHAPTER 3/
PROJECT
NUMBERS
1503
1405, 2300, 3102 and 3306
3102, 1405
2300,3302,and3306
Hypervelocity gun
Kinetic-kill vehicle
Survivability
1203
1301 and 1302
1201 and 1202
1501
Missile lethality
1502
1302
1201,1202, 1206,2202,and
2203
Laser
Maritime Operations
Long-mnge intercept
Secure, survivable communications
networlc and advanced processing
Close-in defense
Ground forces
Anti-armor and antiaircraft
Hypervelocity gun
1203
1503
2300,3102,and3306
Space survci11ancc and engagement and satellite 1301, 1302, 1303, 1501,
survivability
2102, 2103, 2205, and 3307
Space SCDSOIS
Ground-lmed radar
board processing
Ground-lmed radar
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Soviet missile strike. In the former U.S.-Soviet relationship, U.S. planners evaluated prospective
defenses using the Nitze Criteria of military effectiveness, survivability, and cost effectiveness at
the margin (CEATM).
Public Law 99-145, Section 222 (dated November 8, 1985) stated that
"
(B) the system is cost effective at the margin to the extent that the system is
able to maintain its effectiveness against the offense at less cost than it would take to
develop offensive countermeasures and proliferate the ballistic missiles necessary to
overcome it; ... "
In the context of the previous U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, to prevent the Soviets from
adding systems to overcome a deployed defense, the defense had to be less expensive to upgrade
than the offensive weapons the Soviets deployed. In this context, the Soviets would have a
reduced incentive to deploy extra systems, since the U.S. could counter these additions at less
expense.
CEATM, while a key criterion for considering the possible deployment of a defense against
a massive Soviet attack, is not relevant when applied to Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
(OPALS). Additionally, the CEATM criterion was originally applied to avoid an unfavorable
long-term, offense-defense, cost competition with the Soviet Union. Since a massive strike from
the ex-Soviet, nuclear-capable republics is considered extremely unlikely, ensuring favorable
CEATM is no longer an appropriate or relevant criteria.
Nor is CEATM a useful criteria in the context of accidental or unauthorized launches from
former Soviet Union republics, or limited intentional strikes from other nations. The former Soviet
Union has no incentive to modify its forces to ensure the success of accidental or unauthorized
launches--this would be contradictory. And, with regard to intentional or other attacks by other
nations, the defensive capabilities envisioned under the OPALS concept should be sufficient to
handle the limited inventory of ballistic missiles these nations are likely to have in the near future.
A cost tradeoff more applicable to the mission of defending against limited strikes is the
cost of the defense relative to value of the protected assets. For a strike against the continental
United States (CONUS), this means weighing the cost of OPALS against the value destroyed by
an attack in the absence of a defense--potentially tens of millions of lives and hundreds of billions
or trillions of dollars.
In addition, in several important ways, OPALS may reduce the incentives of smaller
nations to pursue ballistic missile capabilities. First, the presence of missile defense would
increase potential attackers' cost of successfully delivering a weapon on target, thereby making it
difficult for many economically constrained nations to pursue a ballistic missile development
program capable of real strategic utility. Second, a space-based global defense could significantly
reduce the effective range of a threat missile, thereby reducing the geographic scope of influence of
the attacker and enhancing regional stability. Finally, the presence of a defense may require an
attacker to alter his targeting, selecting less valuable but undefended targets, thereby reducing the
strategic utility associated with ballistic missiles and providing a further disincentive for
proliferation. The combination of these effects could do much to slow the spread of ballistic
missiles, thereby aiding othec nonproliferation efforts and reducing the possibility of an accidental,
unauthorized or limited strike ever taking place. Criteria related to such anti-proliferation and
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Relation of SDI Programs to Military Missions
regional-stability measures are much more germane to the GPALS mission than is the Nitl:e
criterion of CEATM.
9.5
Survivability
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The survivability of potential ballistic missile defense systems is ensured through a twofold approach. First, broad-based SDI survivability programs are maintained to suppon the
development of all potential BMD systems. These efforts include:
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9-10
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