Climate Change Conflicts, Adaptation and Mitigation:

1. Introduction: Weather is the state of the atmosphere, its temperature, humidity, wind, rainfall
and so on over hours to weeks. Climate describes the weather conditions that are expected in a
region at a particular time of year. A region’s climate is determined by observing its weather over
a period of many years generally 30 years or more.

Climate change describes a change in the average conditions such as temperature and rainfall in a
region over a long period of time. For example, 20,000 years ago, much of the United States was
covered in glaciers. In the United States today, we have a warmer climate and fewer glaciers.
Global climate change refers to the average long-term changes over the entire Earth. These include
warming temperatures and changes in precipitation, as well as the effects of Earth’s warming, such
as:

 Rising sea levels

 Shrinking mountain glaciers
 Ice melting at a faster rate than usual in Greenland, Antarctica and the Arctic
 Changes in flower and plant blooming times.

Climate change driven extreme weather and related disasters can damage economies, lower
farming and livestock production and intensify inequality among social groups. These factors,
when combined with other drivers of conflict, may increase risks of violence.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) defines adaptation as "any adjustment in
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects which
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities".

2. Conflicts due to Climate Change:

There are two basic scenarios for climate change leading to conflict, with the first more likely:
Climate change could intensify environmental or resource problems that communities are facing
already, exacerbating grievances, overwhelming coping capacities, and at times spurring forced
migration. In this scenario, climate change places additional stress on pre-existing situations,
worsening the quantity, condition, and distribution of already scarce natural resources. Climate
change could create new environmental problems that lead to instability. If coping strategies are
unsuccessful or adaptation measures are not taken, the likelihood of conflict may increase as
human security is eroded and grievances intensify.

Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa is the title of a new research paper tabled in the
Proceedings of the United States National Academy of Sciences. The report claims that
temperature rises in Africa have coincided with significant increases in the likelihood of war. But
not everyone agrees that there is a direct link between climate change and increased conflict, in an
ongoing academic debate that goes all the way to the top of the United Nations.

In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon described the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region as
the world’s first climate change conflict. The assumption was that water scarcity from changed
rainfall patterns resulting from climate change contributed to this conflict. His thinking reflects
findings to date that the incidence of conflict is likely to be higher in years of lower precipitation.

Researchers Marshall B. Burke and his colleagues from several American universities have
published what they say is “the first comprehensive examination of the potential impact of global
climate change on armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa”.

2.1 Countries at risk:

Many of the world’s poorest countries and communities face climate change problem.
There are 46 countries – home to 2.7 billion people – in which the effects of climate change
interacting with economic, social and political problems will create a high risk of violent conflict.
There is a second group of 56 countries where the institutions of government will have great
difficulty taking the strain of climate change on top of all their other current challenges. In these
countries, though the risk of armed conflict may not be so immediate, the interaction of climate
change and other factors creates a high risk of political instability, with potential violent conflict a
distinct risk in the longer term. These 56 countries are home to 1.2 billion people. In most of the
conflict-threatened group of 46 states (many of them currently or recently affected by violent
conflict) and in many of the group of 56 that faces the risk of instability, it is too late to believe the
situation can be made safe solely by reducing carbon emissions worldwide and mitigating climate
change. Those measures are essential but their effects will only be felt with time. What is required
now is for states and communities to adapt to handle the challenges of climate change.

2.2 What Climate Change Consequences Might Be Linked To Conflict And In What Ways?
The German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) has tried to elaborate and schematize
the possible linkages between climate change and conflict through four scenarios:
1) climate-induced degradation of freshwater resources:
In the climate-induced water crisis scenario, a regional water crisis, resulting from a
combination of increased demand for agriculture, poor water management, and political
instability, sparks destabilization, and ultimately, violent conflict.
2) climate induced decline in food production:
In the food production scenario, violent crisis begins with a decline in food output in the context
of competing land-use needs, economic weaknesses, social and community instability, and
global market factors.
3) climate-induced increase in storm and flood disasters:
The disasters scenario is triggered by a significant storm or flood event that is exacerbated by a
political power vacuum, problems with emergency responses, and the creation or intensification
of ongoing conflicts.

4) environmentally induced migration:

The scenario of environmentally induced migration results in violent conflict through the low
capacity of relevant institutions and governance structures, shifts in ethnic composition, and
competition for resources.
Table-1: conflict constellations chart.

Table-1 above summarizes the key factors and interactions for these four scenarios. International
Alert views the threat of conflict as originating in four problem areas made worse by climate
change: political instability, economic weakness, food insecurity, and demographic change (Sida
2008). Where political instability reigns, “climate change will put increased pressure on basic state
functions such as the provision of basic health care and the guarantee of basic food security.”
Economic weakness produces a double-sided dilemma: “The impacts of climate change will hinder
economic development and the lack of economic development hinders the ability to adapt to
climate change. Climate change can thus increase obstacles to economic development, worsening
poverty and thereby increasing the risk of violent conflict in these states.” Climate threats to food
security are projected “to have a profound and destabilizing effect on ordinary people’s daily
lives.” With respect to demography, alterations in the number or location of population “always
entail a change in power systems and resource allocation. Climate change-related movements of
people will place strain on host communities that already have scarce resources, whether because
of population growth, government policy or as an effect of climate change itself” (Sida 2008).
With the addition of climate change to each of these four problems areas, the threat of violent
upheaval intensifies. Based on their research on vulnerability resulting from climate change,
CARE and Maplecroft (2008) are more circumspect in their analysis of potential conflict. Their
recent report simply notes that “we consider drought, with its implications for water shortages and
food insecurity, the most significant weather-related hazard contributing to conflict”. However,
three different scenarios— “expected,” “severe,” and “catastrophic”—developed by the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for a New American Security
(CNAS) suggest that conflict linked to climate change might be more pervasive (Campbell and
Parthemore 2008). These scenarios, informed by the IPCC Assessment Report 4, but modified by
other scientific sources and the expertise of the participants, all contain various elements of
violence and armed conflict. Migration, instability, and violent unrest are all considered plausible
consequences, worsening according to the severity of the expected climate changes. In the
“expected” scenario of a 1.3°C warming by 2040, also identified as the least that planners should
be prepared for, there are anticipated “internal and cross-border tensions caused by large-scale
migrations; conflict sparked by resource scarcity, particularly in the weak and failing states of
Africa; [and] increased disease proliferation, which will have economic consequences” (Campbell
and Weitz 2008). As a result of changing economic and social conditions, “countries with weak
or nondemocratic political foundations [face] a heightened risk of civil war or a toppling of the
government” (Podesta and Ogden 2008). In the “severe” scenario based on an increased average
temperature of 2.6°C by 2040, “internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress,” “protests,
civil unrest, and violent upheaval of governments are possible,” and “armed conflict between
nations over resources and even territory is likely, and even a rise in nuclear tensions is possible”
(Campbell and Weitz 2008). Significantly, the “nonlinear” changes in climate are expected to
produce “nonlinear” political and social repercussions (Fuerth 2008). The “catastrophic” scenario
is based on a 5.6°C rise in temperature by 2100 in which changes in climate will be massive and
sudden. It projects “rage at government’s inability to deal with abrupt and unpredictable crises,”
“hostility and violence toward migrants and minority groups,” and “electricity generation and
distribution highly vulnerable to attack by terrorists and rogue states” (Campbell and Weitz 2008).
Acute challenges will be faced in relation to temperature, water, food productivity, and health all
over the planet. There will be a dramatic increase in failing states, failed states, and intrastate wars.
The basic point underlying all of these scenarios is that the effects of climate change, whether
moderate or harsh, will intertwine in meaningful ways with economic, social, and political systems
in conflict-prone countries, with important specificities in each instance. For example, as Erika
Weinthal (2008) puts it with respect to Central Asia, “…these systems are all interlinked. If we
just focus on the snowmelt and what is happening with the glaciers, we will fail to see what is
happening downstream in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Here you find a system of cotton
farming, which in turn is linked to government and social control. If these countries find
themselves forced to restructure their entire economies so as to be able to deal with climate change,
they may find themselves facing increased social unrest.” A final consideration in relation to
climate change and conflict is the potential for heightened tensions between developed and
developing nations. At the international level, despite rising greenhouse gas emissions from China
and India, as well as the role of deforestation in places like Brazil and Indonesia, climate change
is viewed by many developing countries as a problem visited upon them by advanced
industrialized nations. These resentments may deepen over time, accompanied by growing
requests for climate-related donor assistance “over and above” traditional development assistance.
At the same time, given that response capacity is a crucial determinant of the impact of climate
change, the effects of climate incentive to mobilize resources for confrontation or conflict.

Map: Countries which are vulnerable to climate change. (Vulnerability Map).

Attempts by climate scientists to combine them with other factors to begin to map out vulnerability
to climate change across the globe. Based on the previous discussion of the postulated linkages
between climate change and conflict, a country’s likely vulnerability to climate change is a relevant
consideration in thinking about its vulnerability to conflict. Change could increase further the
development gap that exists between developed and developing nations.
2.3 The Impact of Climate Change: Two Possible Roads Ahead:
The effects of changing weather patterns will render previous lifestyles and habitats unviable in
many places. Some of these changes will be sudden, such as tropical storms and flash floods.
Others will be much slower in their onset, such as the steadily falling water levels in the Ganges
basin, lengthening droughts on the margins of the Sahel, glacial melting in Peru and Nepal, and
rising sea levels. This will lead to increased food insecurity – not just food shortages but
uncertainty of supply. Both sudden shocks and slow onset changes can increase the risk of violent
conflict in unstable states because they lack the capacity to respond, adapt and recover. It is likely
that the most common way of thinking about how to respond to these problems is through huge
humanitarian relief efforts, since such events and the response to them get a great deal of news
coverage. But there is a growing awareness that what is really needed is for communities and
countries to prepare against sudden shocks, to build their resilience and their adaptive capacity.

2.4 Conflicts in Bangladesh due to Climate Change (Farakka Barrage):

3 Adaptation to Climate Change:

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) defines adaptation as "any adjustment in
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects which
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities".

3.1 Perspectives on Climate Change Adaptation:

There are four different perspectives on adaptation for climate change. We examine these different
viewpoints more closely below. They are:
3.1.1 Adaptation as a technical challenge:
The focus should be on the management and conservation of water, soil, and biological
resources. In this manner, ecosystems should remain fully functional and resilient against
climate change. Adaptation processes should therefore not only focus on protecting physical
infrastructure, but also on the ability of nature to absorb the impact on urban and rural areas.
An example of this ‘Green Infrastructure’ is the ability of soil to store carbon and water,
conserving water in natural systems as a way of countering the effects of drought, floods, soil
erosion, and desertification.

3.1.2 Adaptation as socio-political transformation:

It also has a political dimension, particularly when it takes place in an area of conflict. It is therefore
necessary for adaptation measures to be conflict-sensitive, especially in fragile contexts. Many
developing countries are demanding the unconditional flow of resources as compensation for the
impacts of climate change, caused mostly by industrialized countries. Debates on adaptation can
become politically highly charged, depending on the degree to which such demands by
industrialized countries are seen as interference in domestic affairs or touching on questions of
sovereignty. This is especially true where climate change leads to a fundamental change in
individual living situations—as is the case with small island states that threaten to sink due to
rising sea levels, or the potential desertification of Brazil, one of the possible tipping points of the
global climate system. This is the main focus of the second perspective: adaptation as socio-
political transformation. In the aforementioned cases, adaptation means no less than the
fundamental redistribution of the chances and resources of an entire society. This kind of reform
also opens up opportunities to build a more sustainable society

3.1.3 Adaptation as the cause of conflicts:

In the third perspective adaptation, measures are potentially the direct cause of conflict. One
example of this is patterns of use of Trans boundary Rivers. The risk of conflict between up-river
and down-river states increases when the adaptation measures of an up-river country further reduce
water supply in the downriver country in addition to the impact of climate change. Such a scenario
is found in Central Asia and South Asia.

3.1.4 Adaptation as conflict transformation:

The fourth perspective is based on two observations. On the one hand, joint resource management
by potential conflict parties can act as a trust-building measure and create interdependencies. On
the other hand, climate change adaptation processes and conflict transformation processes share a
desire to create change. By adapting to a changing environment, socio-economic conditions should
be further developed in such a way as to avoid negative effects such as water or food scarcity and
consequently also circumvent social and political tensions. Similarly, conflict transformation
processes aim to create a society in which conflicts are solved non-violently. Non-violent conflict
resolution skills may well be crucial to easing the implementation of necessary but unpopular
adaptation measures such as unavoidable resettlement programs or the negotiation of suitable
compensation. At the same time, it is quite probable that as the ability to adapt to climate change
increases, so does the potential for peaceful conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Both
thus aim to strengthen social resilience, that is to say the ability to with stand social and economic
stress factors without societal structures being fundamentally destabilized.

3.2 Levels of Adaptation:

Climate change adaptation strategies will be necessary at all levels, from internationally funded
projects and national government policy responses to community-level projects and household
coping strategies. To the extent that these initiatives build resilience and response capacity, bolster
human security, and reduce grievances, they can be instrumental in avoiding climate change-
induced conflict.
3.2.1 Internationally Funded Adaptation:
In 2007, USAID produced a guidance manual for development planning, “Adapting to Climate
Variability and Change,” whose aim is to help “Missions and other partners to understand how
climate change may affect their project outcomes and identify adaptation options” (USAID 2007).
The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development
(DfID), the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
(SIDA), among other bilateral donors, also have begun addressing climate change issues and have
started mainstreaming climate concerns into forthcoming and existing project designs. Similarly,
among multilateral donors, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the G8 have major initiatives on climate change.
All provide funds to support adaptation projects of various types (see Appendix 1 for short
summaries of some of these bilateral and multilateral initiatives). However, pilot programs and
projects are yet to appear that are designed explicitly to test the links between climate change and
conflict.
3.2.2 Government-Level Adaptation:
Policies implemented by governments can help strengthen community adaptation and significantly
increase resilience. The development of such policies is being encouraged through the creation of
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) under the auspices of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). According to the UNFCCC secretariat,
“NAPAs provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority activities
that respond to their urgent and immediate needs with regard to adaptation to climate change”.

3.2.2.1 NAPAs:
NAPAs are a way for developing countries to address climate change priorities for which delay
could “increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a later stage” (UNFCC n.d.). To date, 41
countries have submitted a NAPA.2 Included in each is a list of prioritized activities that respond
to the issues presented in the report. Examples of the proposed projects include country-wide
surveys of available water resources, improving weather monitoring systems, restoring critical
ecosystems, and investing in sustainable agricultural development. Upon completion, the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) works with countries to develop project concepts, provides monetary
support for selected projects, and assists countries in implementation. Although the NAPAs are a
good point of departure for developing countries to begin thinking about and responding to the
challenges of climate change, their effectiveness as adaptation tools remains to be seen. Moving
from analysis to implementation will be difficult. LDCs are by definition countries that have
limited budgetary resources and weak institutional capacities. Implementing climate change action
plans alongside pre-existing development initiatives will mean overcoming or negotiating
competing demands for funding and other program needs.

3.2.2.2 Technological Adaptation

Investing in technological adaptations such as water harvesting and irrigation works, sanitation
systems, and early warning meteorological systems may help developing countries better cope
with climate change. Reliable water for irrigation can help blunt the effects of drought, sanitation
systems can make available safe water for consumption, and a country-wide network of weather
monitoring stations can give policymakers data about climate change that increases their capacity
to make informed interventions. Measures for technological adaptation may be expensive and
involve a high degree of coordination in order to be developed and maintained effectively.
However, they also promise a high return on investment by mitigating some of the most serious
effects of climate change.

3.2.2.3 Facilitating Distribution Networks:

Improving the road system and other transportation links between rural communities and urban
centers will facilitate the development of distribution networks and increase human security by
reducing the amount of time necessary to transfer food and other goods. In times when food
security is threatened by natural disasters, a well-maintained and resilient transportation network
is essential for delivering supplies to affected communities. Urban centers also benefit when
transportation infrastructure has the capacity to adjust to regional variations in food production,
ensuring that surplus food production in one area is not wasted, especially while residents in
another area may be experiencing shortages.

3.2.3 Community-Level Adaptation:

At the community level, adaptation responses are likely to focus on ways to increase livelihood
and food security. Strategies may include: Seed banks/food storage. Establishing seed banks and
facilities for food storage can provide livelihood support for farmers and provide a buffer in times
of food shortages. Small irrigation projects. While largescale irrigation projects are only feasible
for governments, communities can develop local irrigation schemes that they implement and
maintain. Diverting local water sources by channels or small generators can provide a buffer
against total crop loss in the case of extreme weather. Water management initiatives. Communities
can adopt rain harvesting techniques that will allow them to collect water during downpours,
allowing them to release water as necessary during dry periods. Pesticides and fertilizer use.
Climate change is likely to exacerbate land degradation and increase the prevalence of pests. In
the past, communities abandoned cultivated areas in order to allow land fertility to return. Today,
however, better access to agricultural inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers may sustain harvests
and lengthen the time that people can remain on their land. Training in the proper use of these
inputs is essential, however.
3.2.4 Household-Level Adaptation:
Climate change also will require adaptation measures at the household level. Individuals will have
to adjust livelihood strategies that are no longer viable and coping mechanisms that no longer work
or may even increase insecurity.

3.2.4.1 Crop Choices:

Farmers may address declining agricultural yields by re-evaluating longstanding choices about
which crops to plant and at what time. In places where water scarcity is a problem, farmers may
need to invest in drought resistant versions of traditional crops or shift cultivation to different
plants altogether. In areas subject to intense rainfall or frequent flooding, farmers may have to shift
to crops that can withstand periods of water logging. Dependence on livestock may no longer be a
viable strategy in places where dry conditions and a lack of water and pasture are likely to worsen.

3.2.4.2 Reduction in Consumption:

There also is the possibility that households will be unable to adapt their livelihood strategies
sufficiently to stave off threats to their food security. During these times, many families simply
will be forced to reduce consumption. This may be manifested in reduced caloric intake or
elimination of non-essential spending. In the short-term, this is unlikely to lead to conflict.
However, if climate change significantly alters either the duration or frequency of the lean season,
households may be caught in downward spirals of deepening poverty and insecurity.

3.3 Twelve recommendations for addressing/ adapting climate change in fragile

states:
1. Move the issue of conflict and climate change higher up the international political agenda:
New initiatives are needed to gain agreement on the importance of adaptation, especially in fragile
states, and to develop international guidelines and make available adequate funding.
2. Research the indirect local consequences of climate change:
Research is urgently needed on how the social and political consequences of climate change are
likely to play out in specific regions, countries and localities.
3. Develop and spread research competence:
University and research networks need mobilising and strengthening to develop and spread
competence on these issues, especially where consequences of climate change will hit hardest.
4. Improve knowledge and generate policy through dialogue:
International cooperation needs to promote dialogue on adaptation among local communities,
national governments and regional organisations.
5. Prioritise adaptation over mitigation in fragile states:
In fragile states, priority should be given to understanding and addressing the consequences of the
consequences of climate change to prevent violent conflict.
6. Develop the right institutional context: good governance for climate change:
Developing competence on adaptation needs to be treated as part of good governance everywhere.
7. Prepare to manage migration:
Research identifying likely migration flows can help identify both migrant and host communities
where dialogue should be started early to prepare to manage the process.
8. Ensure National Adaptation Plans of Action are conflict-sensitive:
National Adaptation Plans of Action should take account of a state’s socio-political and economic
context and conflict dynamics.
9. Climate-proof peacebuilding and development:
Peacebuilding and development strategies should include adaptation to climate change and make
explicit how activities on these three interconnected strands strengthen one another.
10. Engage the private sector:
Guidelines are needed to help companies identify how their core commercial operations can
support adaptation.
11. Link together international frameworks of action:
Greater efforts are needed to link the variety of separate international approaches with the related
issues of peacebuilding, development, adaptation and disaster management.
12. Promote regional cooperation on adaptation:
International cooperation on adaptation is for regional bodies as well as for the UN.

4. Climate Change Mitigation:

 Involves reducing the flow of heat-trapping greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.
 Reducing sources of Green House Gas (GHG).
 Long-term focus on avoiding future impacts.
4.1 Emission:
 Carbon dioxide is the largest contributor
 Mitigation = Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, mainly CO2.

Source: INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC)

4.2Key mitigation technologies (2030):
4.2.1Energy supply:
Sector Key selected mitigation Key selected
technologies and practices mitigation
currently commercially technologies and
available. practices projected
to be commercialized
before 2030.
Energy efficiency; fuel switching; Biomass and coal-fired
Supply nuclear power; renewable electricity generating
energy (hydropower, solar, facilities; advanced
wind, geothermal and bio- nuclear power;
energy); combined heat and advanced renewable
power; early applications of energy (tidal and
CO2 capture and storage waves energy,
(CCS) concentrating
solar)

4.2.2 Transportation:
Sector Selected Key mitigation technologies Key mitigation technologies and
and practices currently commercially practices projected to be
available. commercialized before 2030.

Transport More fuel efficient vehicles; hybrid Second generation biofuels; higher
vehicles; biofuels; modal shifts from efficiency aircraft; advanced
road transport to rail and public transport electric and hybrid vehicles with
systems; cycling, walking; land-use more powerful and reliable batteries
planning.
4.2.3 Residential/commercial buildings:

Sector Key mitigation technologies and Key mitigation technologies and

practices currently commercially practices projected to be
available. commercialized before 2030.

Buildings Efficient lighting; efficient Integrated design of commercial buildings

appliances and air conditioners; including technologies, such as intelligent
improved insulation ; solar heating meters that provide feedback and control;
and cooling; alternatives for solar PV integrated in buildings
fluorinated gases in insulation and
appliances

4.2.4 Industry:
Sector Key mitigation technologies and Key mitigation technologies
practices currently commercially and practices projected to be
available. commercialized before
2030.

Industry More efficient electrical equipment; Advanced energy efficiency;

heat and power recovery; material CCS for cement, ammonia, and
recycling; control of non-CO2 gas iron manufacture; inert electrodes
emissions for aluminium manufacture
4.2.5 Agriculture and Forestry:
Sector Key mitigation technologies Key mitigation technologies and
and practices currently practices projected to be
commercially available. commercialized before 2030.

Agriculture Land management to increase Crop yield improvement

soil carbon storage; restoration
of degraded lands; improved
rice cultivation techniques;
improved nitrogen fertilizer
application; dedicated energy
crops

Forests Afforestation; reforestation; Improved species and

forest management; reduced productivity; remote sensing
deforestation; use of forestry systems
products for bioenergy.