P-3 FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE

P-3 FLIGHT
INSTRUCTOR’S
GUIDE
THIS GUIDE SUPERSEDES ISD/WCP JAN 2007
2A-1102.IG1 VP-30 ISD FEB 2008 (rev. 2)

FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE
Blank Page
PREFACE
Scope Warnings, Cautions, And Notes
This Flight Instructors Guide (FIG) has been The following definitions apply to
prepared to assist the P-3 Instructor Pilot (IP) and “WARNINGs,” “CAUTIONs,” and “NOTEs” found
Instructor Flight Engineer (IFE) in their daily conduct of throughout the guide.
training flights (e.g., syllabus flights, IP Dedicated Field
Work flights (DFWs), instrument check flights, etc.). It
contains training and instructional techniques that WARNING
supplement material presented in the P-3 NATOPS Flight
Manual, the NATOPS Instrument Flight Manual, An operating procedure, practice, or condition,
OPNAVINST 3710.7 series, and the Flight Training Job etc., which may result in injury or death, if not
Aid. It is to be used in conjunction with these sources and carefully observed or followed.
does not supersede or contravene any requirements or
directives promulgated by NATOPS or other competent
authority. The FIG presents the user with proper set-up Caution
procedures for some of the “common” malfunctions and
predicaments. Nevertheless, instructors must ensure An operating procedure, practice, or condition,
proper aircrew coordination, conduct thorough research, etc., which may result in damage to the equipment.
and have a complete understanding of possible
consequences when designing a scenario. Note
An operating procedure, practice, or condition,
A vast majority of the information in this guide
etc., which is essential to emphasize.
was derived from instructor experience; however, some
discussions concerning instructor techniques were taken
from the FAA Flight Instructor’s Handbook (EA-AC61- Wording
16A). This publication may be used to learn more about
the fundamentals of teaching and learning in order to The concept of word usage and intended
improve the effectiveness of P-3 flight instruction. meaning which has been adhered to in preparing this
manual is as follows:
• “Shall” has been used when application of a

procedure is mandatory.
Updating The Guide
• “Should” has been used only when application of
If an instructor feels a particular item should be a procedure is recommended.
included in the guide, submit the item to Patrol Squadron • “May” and “Need not” have been used only when
Thirty for consideration using the enclosed form. The application of a procedure is optional.
address is:
• “Will” has been used only to indicate futurity,
never to indicate any degree of requirement for
Commanding Officer PATRON 30
application of a procedure.
Attention: FLEET NATOPS Officer
Box 24
NAS Jacksonville, Florida 32212-0024
Change Symbol
If you have any questions, please contact
VP-30’s FLEET NATOPS Officer, DSN 942- Revised text is indicated by a black vertical line
3935/8102/8103/8104, COMM. (904) 542- in either margin of the page, adjacent to the affected text,
3935/8102/8103/8104. FAX. (904) 542-1317. like the one printed next to this paragraph.
i (Reverse Blank)
P-3 Flight Instructor’s Guide

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INFORMATION...................................…...................................................... 1-1
CHAPTER 2 GENERAL FLIGHT TRAINING PROCEDURES............................................................... 2-1
CHAPTER 3 GROUND TRAINING PROCEDURES.............................................................................. 3-1
CHAPTER 4 TAKEOFF TRAINING PROCEDURES............................................................................. 4-1
CHAPTER 5 IN-FLIGHT TRAINING PROCEDURES............................................................................ 5-1
CHAPTER 6 LANDING TRAINING PROCEDURES.............................................................................. 6-1
CHAPTER 7 COUNTER THREAT TRAINING PROCEDURES.........…................................................ 7-1
CHAPTER 8 LEVEL D-EQUIVALENT SIMULATOR PROTOCOL......................................................... 8-1
CHAPTER 9 MALFUNCTION SET UP FOR AIRCRAFT.........…........................................................... 9-1
APPENDIX A INSTRUCTOR UNDER TRAINING SYLLABUS…............................................................ A-1
ii (Reverse Blank)
FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE Chapter 1
General Information
CHAPTER 1
General Information
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Flight Instructor......................................................1-1 Student Fatigue..............................................................1-3

Instructor Training Course.............................................1-2 Flight Instructor Fatigue ................................................1-3
The Six Principles of Learning ......................................1-2 Effective Instruction ......................................................1-3
The Student....................................................................1-3 Effective Questioning....................................................1-4
Student Anxiety .............................................................1-3
3. Encouragement of further study. Emphasize that

The Flight Instructor continued study is always required.
Flight instructors must be fully qualified as pilots or 4. Maintenance of specific notes on each flight while
flight engineers without deficiencies or faults in perform- being as unobtrusive as possible.
ance. Qualifications, however, must go beyond those re-
quired for Patrol Plane Commander (PPC) or crew holding 5. Identification of substandard or unsatisfactory
flight engineer. Instructors should be recognized for their performance. This is the most positive method of
professionalism, flight safety, and most importantly their drawing attention to weak areas. Failure to do so
ability to teach. Hard work, preparation, and consistent encourages acceptance of unsafe practices, is unfair
performance are key instructor attributes. to the student and reflects adversely on you as a
professional. Be patient and willing to work on
Flying habits both during flight instruction and substandard areas until the student reaches the level
related operations have a vital effect on safety. Students will, of proficiency required. Repetition is a good and
either consciously or subconsciously, imitate the instructor’s necessary learning process. The vast majority of
flying habits. An instructor who preaches strict compliance material presented will be forgotten several times
with OPNAVINST 3710.7, NATOPS Manuals, Maintenance before the students get it firmly in their minds.
Instruction Manuals (MIM), and squadron directives and yet
is seen violating those directives will have little credibility 6. Allowing the student as much leeway as possible in
with students. The adage “Do as I say, not as I do” has no getting the feel of the aircraft. Keep in mind, how-
place in flight instruction. ever, that it is the instructor’s responsibility to
ensure that an unsafe situation does not develop.
The effective instructor is considerate of the
student’s point of view and personal interests, carefully
7. The student needs to assume command of the
plans each period of instruction and is one who can organize
aircraft at all times unless otherwise directed.
the logic of teaching to fit the psychology of the student.
Knowledge of the aircraft is not enough when flying
The “best instructor” is one who encourages and increases
the P-3. Aircraft Commanders (AC) must be able to
self-confidence; is considerate and easy to talk to; has a
coordinate their crew and make “command”
good grasp of the subject matter and is able to explain it
decisions.
effectively; is willing to spend extra time when needed and
is always ready to compliment good performance. Emphasis
8. Do not “gouge” the students. Teach them to fly the
should be placed on the following:
aircraft safely, not to pass exams.
1. Punctuality.
The “worst instructor” is one who constantly screams,
and belittles the student with extreme sarcasm and personal
2. Confidence building. Recognize and reward superior
abuse; uses foul language; constantly rides the controls and
performance with praise and/or grades as appro-
emotionally upsets the students while flying and is
priate.
1-1
Chapter 1 FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE
General Information
inadequate in knowledge and presentation of syllabus In addition to the lectures and discussions given
material. The following apply: during the course, ITC is heavily based on the idea that
1. Do not harass or threaten the student. Confronted “Learning is Active” and “People learn by doing”. In
with a threat the student will direct all attention to the keeping with this idea, all new instructors are given
elimination of that threat. Statements like “We’ll stay opportunities to teach in front of their peers. From their
here till you get this right,” and “Miss it again and experiences, IUTs gain confidence in themselves, polish
it’s a down” will be interpreted as threats by the stu- areas of strength, and strengthen areas of weakness or
dent. These situations usually result in degraded deficiency. By the end of the course, the IUTs should have a
training and performance. A positive and mature clear understanding of what it takes to be an effective
approach yields outstanding results. instructor.
2. If the answer to a question is not known, then find the The Six Principles of Learning
answer. When the answer is known, ensure the
students are informed. Build your credibility. The Six principles of learning, although based on theory,
may be applied to any teaching situation encountered by
3. If a mistake is made, admit it freely. Failure to do so instructors. From the classroom to the aircraft, the ability to
can result in the loss of respect and credibility. maximize these principles will greatly enhance instructional
Valuable training can be accomplished by a student effectiveness.
observing the recovery process when correcting an
error. Readiness: It is about motivating the student not the
preparation of the instructor. It is the instructor’s
4. Avoid complacency. A second tour pilot or flight responsibility to ensure the student is presented a strong
engineer can be just as dangerous in the aircraft as a clear purpose, and a definite reason to learn. A properly
first tour. Gravity respects neither rank, experience, motivated student will meet the instructor halfway and is
service, nor friendship. eager to learn. Hazreps and sea stories are a couple of the
many techniques used to ready the students. Motivate!
5. Instructors who conduct both NATOPS checks and
Exercise: The principle of exercise states that those skills
pilot training flights must be able to differentiate
most often repeated are best remembered. It is difficult for
between evaluating and instructing.
the mind to retain, evaluate, and apply new concepts or
practices after a single exposure. Every time practice
occurs, learning occurs. “What I hear, I forget.” “What I
Instructor Training Course see, I remember.” “What I do, I understand.” Realizing this,
FIUT and VP-30 IUT both include an Instructor an instructor can see how important getting a student to
Training Course (ITC) whose terminal objective is to perform “skill” based tasks as early as possible is to
“promote effective learning through teaching.” For the effective learning. A student may be able to repeat the
purpose of the Instructor Training Course, learning is simply checkpoints around the landing pattern with all the
defined as a change in behavior as a result of experience. associated speeds and briefs, but until he or she actually gets
That change may be physical or overt, or it may involve into the aircraft or simulator and performs and practices
complex intellectual or attitudinal changes, which affect these tasks, learning will not occur.
behavior in more subtle ways. Instructors affect this
“change in behavior” through their ability to teach. The Effect: The principle of effect is based on the emotional
better an instructor is, the more a given student will “learn” reaction of the student. It states that learning is strengthened
from a classroom lesson, simulator, or aircraft evolution. when accompanied by a pleasant or satisfying feeling. From
The definition of teaching is quite complex and involves all the tone set during the brief, the malfunctions presented in-
the techniques used by instructors to promote effective flight, and throughout the debrief session, instructors must
learning. be mindful that the words and actions perceived as non-
At the heart of the Instructor Training Course constructive, negative, or harmful will hamper the learning
taught during Fleet IUT are the “Six Principles of Learning.” process. Admittedly, there will be times when an instructor
They form the foundation from which the rest of the briefs feels that negative effect is warranted, however this should
are derived. The Six Principles are Readiness, Exercise, be considered the exception rather than the rule. Positive
Effect, Primacy, Intensity, and Recency (REEPIR). Once constructive feedback strengthens the learning process.
defined, they weave themselves throughout the fabric of the
course. Primacy: Primacy, the state of being first, often creates a
strong, almost unshakable, impression. For the instructor
this means what is taught must be correct the first time. Un-
1-2
General Information
teaching is more difficult than teaching. From appearance to Student Fatigue

how to demonstrate a three-engine landing, the instructor
never gets a second chance to make a first impression. With An instructor must be alert to signs of student fatigue. This
that said, if a demonstration is done incorrectly or poorly, it is evidenced by disinterest, slow reactions, and un-
is the instructor’s job to “come clean,” admit the mistake, characteristic or random errors. When such a state is ob-
and re-demonstrate the proper procedure or techniques served, the flight should be terminated. Definite measures
correctly. A failure to do so reduces the instructors will minimize the incidence of fatigue during flight
credibility as well as reinforces the bad habit or incorrect instruction. The most important of these is to maintain the
procedure. Teaching correctly the first time sets the student’s interest. This may be accomplished by limiting
foundation for future learning. repetitive maneuvers and evolutions previously learned to a
reasonable level – taking the controls, shooting approaches,
Intensity: Exciting or dramatic experiences teach more than and full stop landings can be used to break the monotony
routine or boring experiences. A student is likely to gain and help maintain a student’s focus.
greater understanding of three engine landings and EFBRs
by performing them rather than merely reading about them. Flight Instructor Fatigue
For instructors, this means getting students into the airplane Instructor fatigue is potentially very dangerous. An
or simulator whenever possible. instructor must be mentally and physically alert at all times
and be aware of personal limitations. Extending the work
Recency: Items most recently learned are the best day excessively prior to flight duties is considered poor
remembered. Instructors must realize that key points must headwork.
be reemphasized time and time again if they are to be
remembered. In addition, instructors must be aware of when
a student last flew an event. This will certainly dictate the Effective Instruction
amount of proficiency one could expect early on during a A flight instructor must be clear on the training evolution’s
flight. objectives. Establish the primary objectives and organize the
teaching methods and activities to achieve these goals.
The Student
Effective instruction involves four basic steps:
When developing the Instructor-Student relationship,
instructors should never forget that they too were once a 1. Preparation.
student. Self-respect, peer pressure, and the student’s
environment all affect performance. The instructor’s 2. Explanation and demonstration/Presentation.
objective must be to assist the student toward the goal of
qualification. Several factors directly affect a student’s 3. Application. (Trial and performance)
ability to receive instruction. Recognize and then effectively
deal with these factors in order to maintain a safe and 4. Review and evaluation.
constructive training environment. Utilize the different
instructional techniques presented in the Fleet Instructor To accomplish the necessary training, the instructor must
Training Course (FITC) to teach various levels of students. draw a fine line between simulated and actual flight
Students have different learning habits, so have a set of conditions. Simulating the loss of warning devices, navi-
various instructional tools available to convey your teaching gational aids, and aircraft systems, while their full operation
points. is obvious to the student, is quite different from an actual
malfunction. The flight simulator is a valuable tool for
Student Anxiety presenting the majority of the malfunctions germane to the
Anxiety is probably the most significant psychological factor P-3. It also is a tremendous asset to bolster decision making
affecting flight instruction. Anxiety results from the fear of and headwork during challenging scenarios. Yet, due to its
something, real or imagined. Some students affected by low fidelity it does not provide a full substitute for flying the
anxiety will react appropriately and more rapidly than they aircraft. In a simulator, particularly in the ditching and
would in the absence of anxiety. Many on the other hand landing environments, the student’s knowledge that an
may be frozen in place and incapable of doing anything to unprofessional action will not truly jeopardize his life, or the
correct the situation that has caused their anxiety. Others lives of the crew, is a fact that cannot be eliminated from the
may act without rational thought. Both normal and abnormal student’s mind. To ignore this fact is to invite tragedy.
reactions to anxiety are of concern and should be discussed. These critical areas of flight should be the focus of training
Causes for anxiety are not always aviation related; however, conducted in the airplane.
anxiety will always affect a student’s performance.
1-3
General Information
A professional instructor, through a combination of better understanding of the topic while developing their
simulated and actual conditions, can achieve an effective critical thinking and decision-making skills.
training environment. Through initiative and theatrics, the
instructor can further develop the situation to approach “real Good instruction involves asking questions that focus a
world.” Caution must be taken when this simulated situation student’s thoughts on the objective and, which help teach
borders on becoming an actual problem. A distraction to rather than simply ask the student to recall bits of
either the student or the instructor can force it beyond this information. When properly planned and executed, effective
point. How far an instructor allows the situation to questioning can help tie together ideas or guide the student
deteriorate is purely a judgment call based on instructional to connect their learned knowledge to better understand a
training, experience, and the student’s ability. concept or situation. This understanding should lead to
better decision making during a mission.
Effective Questioning
Another important facet of effective questioning is:
The evaluation of the student’s learning is continual understanding that different people learn in different ways.
throughout each period of instruction and involves more Some comprehend ideas in very structured ways while
than simply presenting an instructional scenario. Direct others need analogies or less structured ways to understand a
questioning is necessary for determining the student’s concept. The goal is to get every student to the same point –
knowledge and understanding as well as judging the to do that, it often takes varying questioning tactics to help
effectiveness of instruction given. Furthermore, it aids in students connect a sequence of information/variables to form
planning the emphasis and pace of subsequent instruction. a plan of action.
Effective questioning requires preparation. Asking: “Do you understand?” or “Do you have any
Questions that are ambiguous or not clearly associated with questions?” has no place in effective quizzing. Few students
the subject at hand are of little value and can be confusing or will opt for further discussion when given this “out” by the
frustrating for the student. instructor.
Questions should be created to gauge a particular area, or Other typical types of questions that should be avoided
aspect, of the student’s knowledge. For example: are:
• Knowledge ⎯ “What brings on the FUEL PRESS • The puzzle ⎯ “What actions do you take, if during
LOW light?” an in-flight restart of the number one engine, the
paralleling light on the number four engine comes
• Procedural ⎯ “What procedures do you execute with on?”
an illumination of the FUEL PRESS LOW light?”
• The oversize ⎯ “What do you do before you ditch?”
• Understanding ⎯ “Why do we check for visible fuel
during the FUEL PRESS LOW procedures?” • The toss-up ⎯ “Should the red TIT over temperature
light come on at 1078 or 1080 degrees?”
• Thought Process ⎯ “What future aircraft
malfunctions might be expected following the • Bewilderment ⎯ “Since the fuel control gets 120
illumination of the FUEL PRESS LOW light?” percent of engine fuel requirements and 20 percent is
normally by-passed and since the TD system is
• Headwork/decision making ⎯ “While on station at capable of taking 50 percent of the fuel in the start
500 feet AGL, you gain radar contact, as you turn the limiting range, is the 50 percent that the TD system
aircraft inbound, the #4 FUEL PRESS LOW light takes 50 percent of 100 percent which is 50 percent
illuminates. What actions are you going to execute or 50 percent of 120 percent which is 60 percent or
and how do they affect your ASW mission?” 50 percent plus the 20 percent which is 70 percent?”
A common instructor error is asking far too many “Gotcha” questions only put the student on the defensive
knowledge, or “evaluation”, questions – i.e. “what and should be avoided at all times. The student might soon
temperature does that light come on at?” and not asking develop the feeling that (s)he is engaged in a battle of wits
more questions that gauge the student’s understanding of the with the instructor, and any meaningful training could be
system, procedure, situation, or how it may affect the lost.
mission. Effective questioning requires the instructor to
create objectives and devise a strategy that leads students to
1-4
General Flight Training Procedures
CHAPTER 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Planning a Training Flight and Scenario Writing ..........2-1 Technique versus NATOPS.......................................... 2-6
Flight Time Utilization ..................................................2-2 Use of Emergency Shutdown Handles ......................... 2-6
The Brief........................................................................2-2 Use of The HRD Buttons.............................................. 2-5
The Debrief....................................................................2-3 Opening of Exits In Flight ............................................ 2-5
Grading ..........................................................................2-3 Securing of Electrical Busses ....................................... 2-5
Crew Resource Management.........................................2-3 Pilot Training with a Tactical Crew Onboard............... 2-6
Safety Of Flight .............................................................2-4 Use of Command Bell .................................................. 2-6
Airmanship ....................................................................2-4 IP Vacating Seat ........................................................... 2-6
Use Of Demonstrations .................................................2-4 Power Control............................................................... 2-6
Simulating Emergencies and Malfunctions ...................2-4 Actual Malfunctions During Training .......................... 2-6
Simulated Malfunctions and Emergencies ....................2-5 Instructor Pilot Defensive Positioning During Takeoff
Compound Malfunctions ...............................................2-5 and Landing .................................................................. 2-6
2. Is the evolution being presented as realistically as

Planning a Training Flight and possible? Are the ICS calls realistic?
Scenario Writing 3. Does the scenario represent the proper degree of

Preparation is the key as spontaneous scenarios are difficulty and challenge for the experience level of
rarely successful. A good scenario can take several hours to both the TP and TFE?
prepare, especially the first few that an instructor compiles.
More unauthorized malfunctions are conducted when 4. What are the teaching points? Does this portion of
scenarios are planned at the last minute. The IP and IFE the scenario teach headwork and decision making,
must not make last minute changes unless they completely system operation and troubleshooting, CRM, system
and thoroughly understand all of the implications. For components, a local SOP or Stan Note, aircraft limits,
example, failing Bus B with TR 1 already pulled is a or reemphasize a NATOPS procedure?
completely different and a more compound emergency than
failing Bus A with TR 2 already pulled (aircraft flight Once the desired simulations have been selected, ensure
controls will become gust-locked). they are written down in a logical flow in the order of
occurrence. This list of malfunctions and emergencies will
Complete understanding of each event by all provide continuity throughout the scenario as well as ensure
instructors is absolutely essential. An event labeled “Fails- that each instructor understands completely what is to be
to-Feather number 4” is insufficient. Both instructors should simulated and to what extent. A well written scenario is key
know how far into the fails-to-feather procedure they intend to a successful training flight and is not just a list of
to proceed and what specifically caused the fails-to-feather. malfunctions.
This type of planning should occur before the evolution
begins. A well written scenario states the malfunction or
emergency to be simulated, the set-up procedures required,
To improve the quality of a training evolution the IP and clean-up procedures, and any particular notes to be covered
IFE must consider the following: during the simulation. Enough space should be left for the
instructor to track trends and notes to readdress during the
1. Has the malfunction ever actually happened to a P-3 debrief session. Each malfunction or emergency simulated
flight crew? Past hazard reports are an excellent should have a valid teaching point associated with it. In
source of material for training evolutions. addition, a section should be created to track trends at
various points of the landing pattern. Well-written scenarios
2-1
should be used during OFT training as well as training simulators should have a 30-70 split between low work and
events in the aircraft. Scenarios for OFT events include high work.
more complex malfunctions because of the reduced safety
concerns. A thoroughly planned scenario will aid in Allocate the flight training time equitably between
providing good instruction in a timely manner. The FITC the TP and TFE. Effective teamwork and CRM should be
scenario writing course provides numerous examples of both stressed and independent action discouraged. IPs who
well and poorly written scenarios. attempt to shortcut high work time in favor of more time in
the landing pattern in the simulator will jeopardize the future
level of expertise for both the TP and TFE. However,
WARNING extended high work time in the airplane focusing on systems
and procedures, unnecessarily curtails pilot training in basic
Deviation from the established plan of action, may airmanship. Expert system knowledge is of little interest to a
result in unintended situations that negatively affect TP attempting to land with a 15 knot crosswind in heavy
safety of flight. If a simulation is not proceeding as snow at night. High work systems simulations should be
previously planned, stop the scenario and discuss the conducted primarily in the simulator. Evolutions that can
discrepancy. If unforeseen modifications need to be not be effectively reproduced in the simulator, due to the
made to the scenario, it is mandatory that these lack of fidelity, should be the foundation for the training
changes be thoroughly discussed and understood by conducted in the aircraft. A vast majority of pilot and FE
each instructor before proceeding. systems and procedures training is accomplished during the
high work scenario in both the aircraft and simulator.
Prior to flying with a student for the first time, the
instructor should review the training jacket. This jacket The Brief
contains a wealth of useful information. Pay particular The instructor should conduct a brief prior to each
attention to personal history and trends on grades, noting evolution. Allow a minimum of 30 minutes for the brief and
areas of weakness including unsafe tendencies. If a jacket be prepared to discuss all aspects of the forthcoming
review is not possible, talk to other instructors who have evolution.
flown with the student. Any information gained prior to
briefing and flying with the student will be of benefit. The purpose of a brief is to:
Flight Time Utilization 1. Determine if the student’s knowledge is at the proper

The IP and IFE must make every effort to use level for the ensuing event.
scheduled syllabus time in the most efficient manner. It is
the instructor’s responsibility to ensure that all required 2. Check student’s motivation as it pertains to study
items on a gradesheet are completed and that each is allotted habits.
an appropriate portion of the scheduled time period. A
method to maximize time management is to utilize 3. Develop a good line of communication with the
combined malfunctions in a scenario. Combined student.
malfunctions, for example, a fuel system malfunction tied to
an inflight restart malfunction, are not compound 4. Impart knowledge by raising specific procedural and
malfunctions. Time should be allotted for a quick debrief systems questions and providing answers and
and instructional points following each portion of the explanations to those questions asked by the student.
scenario. These inflight debrief points provide the student
with immediate feedback and should be readdressed or 5. Expand system and procedural knowledge necessary
amplified after the flight. Items not covered should be so for the evolution.
indicated on the gradesheet to provide continuity during 6. Review syllabus items to be covered.
future training evolutions.
Time management is critical. Instructors must 7. Allow the student to “chair fly” the event prior to the
consider the amount of time each step in the scenario will event, correcting any mistakes to minimize the
require. To ensure both TPs receive all possible training, chance of reoccurrence during the flight.
compatible scheduling of different syllabus events should be
conducted. With proper use of the simulator for high work The Debrief
training, a 70-30 percent split between low and high work is Ensure each event presented has a detailed and
typically appropriate on a training flight. Conversely, comprehensive debrief. Feedback is essential to the training.
Students must understand where their mistakes were
2-2
committed and what action is needed to correct them. Just as requirements should be judged unqualified. Be alert to detect
important, ensure the debrief stresses the students strengths those individuals who do not measure up to the performance
and what they did well. A debrief that is all good or all bad standards required for P-3 operations. Examination grades,
is destructive and will hinder the students progress. An flight grades, and personal observations are the only means
effective debrief can only be achieved with thorough note of detecting substandard performance, which cannot be
taking by the instructor. Any trend detected must be accepted. Consistently unsatisfactory performers should be
discussed. Every effort must be made to debrief the event as evaluated as such and redirected to other areas more fitted to
soon as possible. Instructors should remain objective, their particular abilities.
flexible in presentation based on different student
personalities, organized, specific and constructive. Crew Resource Management
The IP and the IFE are encouraged to conduct a Coordination between instructors is absolutely es-
short debrief together with the students discussing areas of sential to eliminate confusion. When the IP and IFE are pur-
common interest, (i.e. crew coordination, safety of flight suing unrelated areas of instruction with their respective
issues, etc). students, they must keep each other advised of simulated
emergencies, induced equipment malfunctions, or actual
emergencies. Make every effort to promote teamwork
Grading between the TP and TFE.
Fill out a gradesheet for each event. Be as specific
as possible, since gradesheets are the best means of Occasionally, a disagreement may arise over the
documenting performance and trends. interpretation of a procedure. Argument between instructors
One of the most important but difficult functions an will do no more than thoroughly confuse the TP and TFE
instructor will encounter is judging the performance of and result in a loss of confidence in both instructors. If there
students. This evaluation must be based on the standards set is a difference of opinion, drop the subject and resolve it
for the minimum criteria for the average student at that stage after the flight. When the correct information is known,
in the syllabus. By observing other instructors and noting ensure the TP and TFE also have the correct information.
their evaluations, newly designated instructors can quickly
establish a valid basis for their own critiques. NATOPS During the course of instructional flights, the TFE
evaluation criteria is the baseline performance standard. will carry out the commands of the TP unless directed other-
There will be subjectivity inherent to each evaluation wise. Proper CRM is just as important as systems and
process, but the quantitative measures established by procedural knowledge and should be taught, evaluated, and
NATOPS are the standards instructors must train towards. debriefed during the event.
The experience and judgment of the instructor are the final
criteria. The following apply: Although conversation within the flight station is
not normally carried out over the ICS, the TFE shall have a
1. Do not grade items not observed. This introduces mike and headset available at all times.
errors into the training system and may adversely
affect the individual’s development if these items are Safety of Flight
not covered during a later event.
The instructor pilot is responsible for the safe
2. Do not use grades to motivate. Remember, significant conduct of the training evolution and shall ensure that no
improvement in a previously weak area does not in practice, maneuver, or simulated emergency is carried to the
itself constitute performance that exceeds the extent that safety of flight is jeopardized. The instructor pilot
standard criteria.. shall control the training evolution in accordance with the
scenario and in strict coordination with the instructor flight
3. Do not average out grades. Call them as you see engineer.
them.
Note
4. Compare co-pilot performance with co-pilot Use of HAZREPS is worthwhile, and should be the
standards and pilot performance with pilot standards. primary source for building realistic and challenging
Satisfactory performance for a co-pilot may not meet scenarios both in the aircraft and the simulator. This
the standards for a pilot. (CH 26 NATOPS) guide provides a foundation of malfunction set-up
procedures for scenario based training in the aircraft.
Marginal students should never be advanced to the next Any malfunction or emergency set-up not specifically
event with the hope that someone else will give them the outlined by this guide should be thoroughly briefed by
“down”. Any performance that does not meet the minimum
2-3
the IP and IFE prior to the planeside brief and scenario emergencies (i.e., those problems requiring immediate
execution. action) are much less common than malfunctions. The TP
and TFE should learn to differentiate between the immediate
Consideration should be given to not scheduling training responses required by emergencies and the timely analysis
flights in excess of 4 hours. Flights longer than 5 hours may appropriate for malfunctions. Do not force the TP and TFE
result in degraded training due to aircrew fatigue. to treat everything that happens as an emergency.
In order to avoid the possibility of degraded performance It cannot be overemphasized that the most critical
and safety awareness, consideration should be given to element involved when failing an aircraft system is the in-
canceling flights that are not airborne within 5 hours of the structor’s knowledge of what they lost, and what the
scheduled preflight time. ramifications are if the student reacts irrationally, or if an
actual system malfunction occurs.
There is a temptation on instructional flights for crew The IP and IFE must be fully alert and completely aware
members in the flight station to relax their outside scan. It is of what is occurring in the flight station at all times. During
the responsibility of the instructor pilot to use extra trainees simulated malfunctions, the IFE should be defensively
aboard as flight station lookouts and to ensure that other positioned in the flight station relative to switches, feather
crew members are occupying aft lookout stations. In this buttons, or emergency shutdown handles most likely to be
regard, instructors should avoid long systems discussions used by the TFE in response to the malfunction. Students
that detract from the normal responsibilities of the students under stress will not always react in a predictable manner, so
to see and avoid other traffic. be alert! It can be uncomfortable to have the TFE call out
“LOW POWER number 4” when the simulated malfunction
Airmanship is a low power on number 1. In this instance the IFE or IP
must be alert enough to determine if the TFE’s call was a
Basic Airmanship is a major teaching point that real “LOW POWER” or just a good case of TFE nerves.
needs to be stressed. IPs should allocate portions of their Each simulated malfunction must be completed and cleaned
training to bolster TP’s basic airmanship. Focus should be up prior to moving on to the next area of discussion.
on instrument procedures as well as tactically maneuvering
the aircraft. This can be accomplished on training flights
with more of the systems malfunctions being incorporated Simulated Malfunctions and
into the simulator without jeopardizing TFE training. Emergencies
It is imperative that all simulated malfunctions and
Use of Demonstrations emergencies are conducted within the limits of aircraft
Instructors introducing new items into the syllabus performance and the instructor’s own abilities. Coordination
are encouraged to demonstrate as well as talk about the new with the ITC or INAV prior to and during crew drills is
item in order for students to get the full benefit of their paramount to safe and realistic simulations.
knowledge and experience. Students should follow along on
the flight controls during these demonstrations in order to It must be realized that this guide cannot cover
receive the physiological feedback of manipulating the flight every malfunction that can be simulated in flight.
controls. Properly demonstrated maneuvers serve as an Consideration must be given to the instructor’s abilities
excellent instructional technique and also keep the IP and when selecting malfunctions to present to the TP and TFE.
IFE current and proficient. Background information such as
supporting performance data should be discussed during the Simulations that require engine shutdown or setting up
brief. Prior to conducting a demonstration, brief the required major system malfunctions:
items from the inflight job aid card, or brief the low work
item as discussed later in this document. Inform the 1. Shall have an IP and IFE on board.
upgrader of important teaching points you want them to take
away from the demonstration. During the actual maneuver
pick two to five teaching points to focus on, to include the
WARNING
physiological aspects of airmanship.
Safety of flight considerations dictate that major
Simulating Emergencies and systems or component malfunctions shall not be set
up by the IFE if he is occupying the FE seat.
Malfunctions
The TP and TFE are probably anxious about any
possible emergency or malfunction. The instructors should
attempt to reassure and reinforce them by emphasizing that
2-4
Note Compound Malfunctions

Flight Engineers in the IUT syllabus may set up
malfunctions provided the following: Compound simulated malfunctions (two or more
unrelated malfunctions concurrently for training purposes)
• A qualified IFE is in the FE seat. shall not be incorporated into scenarios.
Compound emergencies may jeopardize safety and

• The qualified IFE has reviewed the scenario with
have the effect of unnerving the TP and TFE, decreasing
the IP.
their capacity to absorb further instruction. Common sense
and good judgment must prevail at all times during training
• The IFE in the seat shall ensure proper malfunction operations. However, combined malfunctions (for example,
set-up prior to execution. a fuel system malfunction tied to your in-flight restart
malfunction) are not compound malfunctions.
Note
Pilot training/proficiency flights on which only the
rudder boost shutoff valve circuit breaker (K13) is
pulled or any engine simulated out/no-flap landing Technique versus NATOPS
practice require only an IP and a qualified FE. Instructors must ensure that in the course of instruc-
tion the students do not confuse technique or recommended
2. Shall not be given during hours of darkness or procedures with established NATOPS procedures. The
under actual instrument conditions. instructor must be explicit in the presentation, and clearly
delineate required procedures. Technique is okay to teach,
Note but allow for other styles as long as they comply with
Flight instrument malfunctions are not considered NATOPS.
“major systems malfunctions” but are subject to the
following restrictions, and apply to all IP’s and Use of Emergency Shutdown
designated Instrument Check Pilots:
Handles
• FDI circuit breakers shall not be pulled under IMC. No engine shall be secured in the landing or instru-
ment approach pattern, below 1500’, or on the active runway
• Pulling the HSI and/or FDI circuit breakers during unless an actual malfunction occurs and then only upon the
hours of darkness is approved. IP’s command.
• IFE’s are not required for Instrument Check flights Use of the HRD Buttons
requiring the pulling of HSI and/or FDI circuit
Occasionally the HRD button will stick behind the
breakers.
plastic shield adjacent to and surrounding the HRD button.
The IFE shall physically check the HRD button prior to
3. Should not be conducted in high density traffic areas
resetting the circuit breakers. If not checked the respective
when doing so would jeopardize the safe conduct of
HRD may discharge when the circuit breakers are reset.
the flight.
Note Opening of Exits In Flight

Consideration should be given to delaying NTS The main cabin door or the overwing exits shall not
checks, drills, simulated emergencies and be opened in flight for simulated malfunctions or demon-
malfunctions until clear of high density traffic areas. strations.
This does not preclude engine-out and no-flap work
in the landing pattern.
Securing Of Electrical Busses
4. Shall not be conducted in fuel pits. 1. The monitorable essential busses shall not be secured
in flight.
2. During in-flight fire of unknown origin drills, the

Fuselage Fire or Electrical Fire of Unknown Origin
checklist may be performed only through the
securing of Bus A. All subsequent steps shall be
simulated. During evolutions with a tactical crew
2-5
embarked, the IP shall coordinate with the ITC/INAV commence at the next simulation. Resuming training in a
prior to planeside as to the timing and effect of simulation that ceased due to an actual malfunction is not
planned bus losses. recommended due to inadvertent consequences, i.e. a
discharged HRD bottle after cleaning up from an engine fire
3. Bus A and Bus B shall not be turned off at the same simulation.
time.
Note
Instructors may allow the TP and TFE to be involved
in handling the malfunction but at all times the
Pilot Training with Tactical Crew instructors should make it clear to all participants that
Embarked the malfunction is actual.
Touch and go landing practice is authorized with a
tactical crew onboard at CO’s discretion. If a full low work Instructor Pilot Defensive
evolution is planned, the tactical crew should be
disembarked. Positioning During Takeoff and
Landing
Use of Command Bell The following describes the recommended defensive
The command bell may be used for all drills position techniques:
provided it is prefaced by announcing “This is a drill” and
no passengers are embarked. 1. Right hand around, but not riding, the yoke.
2. Feet on, but not riding, the rudders.

IP Vacating Seat
The IP or another qualified PPC shall occupy the 3. Left hand monitoring the power levers. On
pilot or copilot seat anytime the aircraft is operating below downwind and base, placing the left hand behind the
1000 feet AGL. All pilot in-flight seat swaps shall be power levers is sufficient. On final and in the flare,
accomplished at or above 1000 feet AGL. The IFE shall be the IP’s hand shall be on top of the power levers.
in the flight station with his headset on any time the IP has This is the safest way to ensure that:
left the flight station. FE’s may swap seats above 500’
AGL. a. All power levers stay together.
b. The power levers are not brought over the ramp

Power Control with the nose wheel still in the air.
The TP may request the TFE to make power
settings at any time during the flight. During training c. Simulated feathered engines’ power levers are
however, the TP should be encouraged to handle power closed out in the flare.
either after passing the final approach fix on a non-precision
instrument approach or on the glide path for a precision d. One power lever is not left in the flight range
approach. In the VFR landing pattern the TP shall, as a during simulated engine out landing reversal.
minimum, handle the power after the initial power reduction
at the 180 position. The TFE may be requested to maintain Note
any desired cruise power at altitude or to set power during Although always ready to take control of the aircraft,
actual or simulated foul weather approaches. the IP should not be so defensively oriented that he
interferes with the TP’s efforts to control the aircraft.
Actual Malfunctions During Training
Always be alert for actual malfunctions that may
occur when simulations are in progress (e.g. if securing the
Bus A monitoring switch results in the loss of MEAC, etc.).
If an actual malfunction occurs, the IP/IFE should inform the
crew that the malfunction is actual and direct the instructor
flight engineer to clean up from any ongoing simulated
malfunctions. The instructors should handle the malfunction
and evaluate if they can resume training after the situation
has been resolved. If training is resumed, it should
2-6
Ground Training Procedures
CHAPTER 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preflight Inspection........................................................3-1 Taxi Procedures ............................................................ 3-2

Planeside Brief...............................................................3-1 Brake Tapping .............................................................. 3-2
Engine Start Procedures and Malfunctions....................3-1 Right Seat Taxi Procedures........................................... 3-3
Motor Over Procedure ...................................................3-1 Propeller System Demonstration (Ground)................... 3-4
Engine Fire on the Ground Procedures..........................3-2
active runway unless an actual malfunction occurs and then

Preflight Inspection only upon the command of the instructor pilot. The
instructor pilot should also brief the crew of the plan of
It is the responsibility of the IP and the IFE to action if an actual malfunction occurs during simulated
ensure that a complete and proper preflight is performed. training. The students should be briefed on their expected
This is accomplished through coordination with other use of CRM, aircraft equipment, and training aids.
crewmembers, review of outstanding and previous
discrepancies, and a check of the aircraft preflight inspection
forms. In addition, the IP and IFE should ensure upgraders Engine Start Procedures and
understand the different components of the Aircraft Malfunctions
Discrepancy Book, how Maintenance Action Forms are The sequence of events for engine starts will be
processed, and how aircraft discrepancies may affect various conducted in accordance with NATOPS and the Pilot/FE
missions. Training Job Aid.
Note
During early stage flights, the IP and IFE should If performing the torch or engine fire procedure on
demonstrate proper preflight procedures. If more than one the aircraft, it is recommended to exclude the aft
TP and one TFE are available, the TP and TFE flying first observer or the lineperson in order to minimize
will normally preflight the inside of the aircraft and set up confusion with possible actual malfunctions.
the cockpit while the second TP and TFE preflight the
Common errors:
outside. Aircraft walkthrough and outside preflight teaching
points should focus on developing the upgrader’s knowledge
1. TP fails to back-up the TFE during engine starts, or
and situational awareness as well as promote system
fails to monitor rotation and the lineperson.
discussions. Inside walkthroughs should concentrate on
understanding of energized equipment during minimum
2. TFE secures APU without engine driven generator on
crew evolutions in order to execute the firebill and to quality
line.
check ADB gripes. Outside preflights should help the
TP/TFE begin to formulate their own database of expected
conditions and potential hazard areas. 3. TFE secures APU without checking the EGT.
4. TP fails to place hand on the nosewheel during

Plane Side Brief engine starts.
The plane side brief is normally given by the TP
first flying. A sample plane side brief is covered in the flight
training job aid. Motor Over Procedure
In addition to the items normally covered, the IP In case the engine needs to be “motored over,” do
shall ensure that all flight station personnel understand that the Abbreviated Before Start checklist to the step “Fuel and
there will be no engines actually shutdown in the landing or Ignition Switches.” Motor the engine, after rotation has
instrument approach pattern, below 1500’ AGL, or on the stopped, turn on the fuel and ignition switch and complete
3-1
the Abbreviated Before Start checklist. This procedure may CAUTION

be done only when the entire Before Start checklist has been
completed.
Do not use the inboard brake during a fully
deflected turn. This is a pivot on the strut,
Engine Fire On The Ground meaning one wheel will turn backward and the
Procedures other forward. Locking the brake at this time will
create a severe twisting moment in the area
The TP and TFE are required to know and perform
where the gear bolts onto the wing causing
the first two steps of the Engine Fire on the Ground checklist
possible fuel leaks.
and then complete the entire checklist beginning with step 1.
7. Using excessive reverse with engines in low rpm
Common errors:
causing excessive TIT and /or rpm decay.
1. TP calling for the Emergency Shutdown checklist.
Note
2. TP continuing taxi.
The IP should position his hand on the base of the
power levers during taxi. Check TIT when power
3. TFE not pushing the HRD button.
levers are retarded towards reverse. Block power
levers as necessary.
4. TFE not waiting for the pilot’s command to transfer
and discharge the alternate bottle. 8. Checking the HSI, turn and bank indicators in the
line area.
5. TFE opening the HRD transfer switch but not
moving the switch to alternate. 9. Failing to straighten the nose wheel before stopping
or parking the aircraft.
6. TFE actuating the APU HRD vice alternate switch
for engines 3 and 4. 10. Losing centerline control during briefs or control
checks.
7. TFE not fuel chopping the engine being started if the
fire occurs on another engine during start.
Brake Tapping
Taxi Procedures Tapping the aircraft brakes at high speeds is a
severe hazard and may result in a blown tire and tire
Taxiing should be done in accordance with the separation. IPs must be alert for brake tapping. In the
procedures in NATOPS and the Pilot/FE Training Job Aid. aircraft, the IP should follow the rudder pedals during the
flight controls check as an aid to recognizing this problem.
Common errors: In the OFT, the brake indicator hold function may be used.
Prior gradesheets should point out any trends.
1. Reversing as aircraft moves out of the chocks.
If brake tapping is suspected, stop the aircraft, set
2. Leaving power levers in the reverse range after the parking brake, and attempt to correct with seat and/or
stopping the aircraft. rudder pedal adjustment. If unable to correct, limit runway
malfunctions to four engines until a simulator period can be
3. Failing to set the parking brake properly whenever scheduled.
the aircraft is stopped.
Note
4. Leaving power levers too far forward, necessitating
excessive use of brakes. Habitual brake tapping should be corrected in the
simulator. Additionally, the IP shall ensure that all
5. Not using the brakes but using excessive reverse to gradesheets thoroughly reflect this problem along
maintain a safe taxi speed. with any suggested cures.
6. Using the inboard brake during a fully deflected turn.
3-2
4. Unfeather the number 1 propeller. TP observes blade

Right Seat Taxi Procedures angle decreasing and then cycling around 45 degrees
The IP should be proficient in taxiing the aircraft as the NTS INOP light flashes.
from the right seat. The recommended right seat taxi tech-
nique follows: CAUTION
1. Use differential power to control heading.
• Feather pump operation limits: Equal time on
and off, not to exceed 60 seconds continuous
Note operation. Maximum accumulated time during
Consideration should be given to shifting inboard any 30 minute period is not to exceed 2 minutes.
engines or, if needed, all engines, to normal rpm.
• Explain to the TP that if the feather button is
2. If differential power is insufficient to maintain released during the static unfeather cycle above
centerline, use occasional light braking, but do not 10 degrees blade angle, the propeller should be
ride the brakes. refeathered to prevent damage to the pitchlock
teeth.
3. Scan down the taxiway/runway. Concentrating on the
centerline immediately in front of the nose causes 5. Discuss overriding the 45 degrees protection and
over corrections. depress and hold the PCO. TP observes blade angle
decreasing to 22.5 degrees.
Propeller System Demonstration 6. Discuss the purpose of beta follow-up and the fact
(Ground) that it sets minimum blade angle as scheduled by
power lever position. Move the power lever to flight
This demonstration is designed to be performed on
idle. TP observes blade angle decreasing to 13
the ground and to show the functions of the autofeather
degrees. Discuss the low pitch stop relationship to
system, feather button, static unfeathering procedures,
minimum beta follow-up setting of 11 degrees.
airstart blade angle system, low pitch stops, and Beta
scheduling. During briefs, ensure that the TP has a basic 7. Move power lever to maximum reverse. TP observes
understanding of these systems. Prior to engine starts, blade angle decreasing to -13 degrees. Discuss how
perform the demo as follows: blade angle is scheduled by power lever position in
the beta range and reposition the power lever to the
CAUTION ground start position.
When ambient temperature is near or below 0 de- 8. Discuss what would happen if the PCO were released
grees centigrade, unnecessary static cycling of any time blade angle is below 45 degrees. Discuss
propeller blades should be avoided. In these cir- reasons for releasing feather button prior to releasing
cumstances this demo should be performed at the end PCO.
of the flight when oil temperature is sufficient to
prevent blade seal damage. 9. Discuss the importance of checking the FE when he
unfeathers a propeller in-flight and the result of
1. Visually clear the propellers. pulling out on the feather button of an operating
engine.
2. With the TP in the pilot’s seat, arm the autofeather
system and review its functions. Push the number 1
power lever to 90 degrees coordinator. Note the
number 1 propeller feathering and the number 1
autofeather light on. Deactivate the autofeather
system.
3. With blade angle at feather discuss what happens

when the feather button is pulled to the unfeather
position.
3-3
3-4
Takeoff Training Procedures
CHAPTER 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Takeoff Procedures........................................................4-1 EFAR Procedures ......................................................... 4-5

Takeoff Malfunctions Prior to Refusal ..........................4-1 Right Seat Takeoff Procedures ..................................... 4-8
Abort Procedures on a Back Taxi..................................4-2 Smoke Removal Hatch Open Below / Above Refusal.. 4-8
Abort-and-Go Takeoffs .................................................4-2 130 Knot Climb Demonstration.................................... 4-8
Abort Procedures ...........................................................4-2 Three-Engine Ferry Takeoff Demonstration................. 4-8
Takeoff Malfunctions After Refusal..............................4-4
Takeoff Procedures 8. TFE fails to set oil coolers for takeoff.

Normal takeoffs shall be in accordance with NATOPS.
The training syllabus gradesheets outline the types of 9. TFE advances power too rapidly or does not have
takeoffs required. power set by 80 knots.
Common errors: 10. TFE scans TIT when SHP limited or scans SHP when
TIT limited.
1. TP fails to adjust the rudder pedals properly. This is a
critical item especially as the TP progresses to 11. TFE pulls RAWS circuit breakers without pilot
takeoff malfunctions. Ensure the TP extends the leg concurrence or validation of an erroneous RAWS
during rudder application and that the natural indication.
extension of the foot does not result in a brake
application. Once the takeoff roll commences, only 12. TFE fails to secure autofeather system once gear is
the “ball” of the foot should be on the rudder pedal. safely up or prior to the initial level-off.
2. TP does not place “heels on the deck” prior to com-

mencing the takeoff roll resulting in an inadvertent Takeoff Malfunctions Prior To
brake application and possibly a blown tire. Refusal
One of the most critical and potentially dangerous
3. TP continues to use the nose wheel steering after the
syllabus evolutions is the takeoff malfunction. That the
rudder is effective resulting in undue stress on the
malfunction is simulated does not reduce the danger of the
nose gear.
situation. The necessity for an alert, proficient IP is even
more evident when one realizes that a problem can be
4. TP grips the power levers and does not allow the TFE
quickly complicated by an unexpected reaction on the part of
to set power.
the TP or an actual aircraft malfunction.
5. TP removes right hand from the power levers prior to During the brief, discuss the definition of and basis
simulated refusal speed or fails to remove hand at for refusal speed and utilize NATOPS performance charts
simulated refusal speed. for the determination of refusal speed. Understanding this
will help the TP realize the flight control, power lever and
6. TP does not apply sufficient yoke back pressure at wheel brake inputs required during an abort.
“rotate.”
The IP and IFE must mentally review the actions
7. TP over rotates. required throughout the evolution prior to commencing the
abort run. The following requirements should be met:
4-1
Chapter 4 FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE
Note
1. Runway length ⎯ 6,000 feet minimum.
The TP will gain little in learning to control the
aircraft if the engine is failed while he is still using
2. Runway width ⎯ 150 feet minimum. the nose wheel steering.
3. Consider the crosswind component ⎯ More than 5– The simulation of an engine/propeller malfunction may
10 knots could cause serious control problems if the be accomplished by any one of the following:
TP reacts adversely. The same holds true for the
tailwind component on back taxi abort runs. 1. Induce a power loss by use of the bleed system (see
chapter 7 for set-up), and/or announce: “Power loss”
4. Runway condition ⎯ Sufficiently dry to prevent
sometime after 80 knots but prior to VR.
skidding or hydroplaning.
2. Announce some type of engine/propeller or other
system malfunction prior to VR.
Abort Procedures on a Back Taxi
Takeoff malfunctions prior to refusal may be conducted on a
high speed back taxi, after coordinating with the Tower. WARNING
This practice allows for better time management during pilot
training evolutions. Takeoffs with tailwinds are not • IP’s should scan primarily down the runway but
commonplace but are conducted in real world operating must be alert for the possibility of an actual
environments (weapons departures, counter threat emergency occurring during all simulated engine-
departures, and takeoffs from runways in high density traffic out training.
flow areas). Tailwind components decrease aircraft refusal • Simulating power losses prior to refusal shall be
speed by 1.5 knots for each knot of tailwind component. induced using the engine bleed system only.
The distance to refusal increases 2% for each knot of Retarding a power lever is prohibited in the
tailwind. Example: Given the following parameters: 6,500 aircraft.
foot runway, 27 degrees C, PA = 0, 103,880 lbs GW, 10
knot tailwind, dry runway, 3500 SHP, refusal speed is 111
knots, the distance to refusal speed is 3200 feet. At all times • Simulated propeller malfunctions shall be
the IP needs to have an airspeed and runway remaining point announced by the IP.
where an abort should be initiated in the event the simulated
malfunction does not occur as planned. Consideration Note
should be given to not conducting an EFBR during a back For three-engine aborts, the discussion on three-
taxi with less than 7000 feet remaining with a tailwind engine reversal is applicable.
component greater than 10 knots.
Ensure the TP promptly calls for, and initiates, the abort
Abort-and-Go Takeoffs by smoothly retarding the power levers to flight idle. Stress
the use of rudder, forward yoke pressure, aileron into the
A minimum of 6,000 feet of usable runway failed engine and differential reverse power in maintaining
remaining is required after the aircraft has been brought to a directional control. If moderate wheel braking is used, allow
full stop. Ensure the trim, flaps, and oil coolers are set the brakes to cool prior to setting the parking brakes. It must
correctly prior to initiating the takeoff. be emphasized that centerline control is paramount and that
the TP must scan down the runway. The pace of the abort,
Abort Procedures the CRM involved, and the corresponding control inputs are
the main teaching points to stress to the TP and TFE. The
For training purposes, an engine/propeller malfunc- TP must first learn proper control inputs to maintain
tion, generator mechanical failure lights, chips light, centerline without inducing oscillations prior to focusing on
generator off light, etc. (see chapter 7 for additional minimizing runway utilized. Make sure the TP understands
warnings, cautions, and notes), may be given to the TP as the simulated scenario, i.e. are you runway limited simulated
abort criteria. As on all training flights, any command given with a refusal speed, or is the scenario based on a non
by the IP supersedes one given by the TP. runway critical situation. During an EFBR demonstration,
It is recommended that the first aborts be done with all four the IP should have the TP follow along on the controls to
engines so the TP gets the feel of reversing action. reinforce the physiological aspect of the abort. Stress CRM
behavioral skills, especially communication, during the
abort.
4-2
4-3
There is often discussion as to whether the proper

sequence is to abort-and-feather or feather-and-abort in the WARNING
event of a propeller malfunction. Delaying the power
reduction until the emergency shutdown handle has been • The IP should block the wrong rudder pedal with
pulled can result in more runway being used during a critical his foot and take the aircraft if the TP pushes the
evolution, aircraft control problems due to VMC GRD, or wrong rudder pedal.
continued acceleration through refusal speed. On the other
hand, a delay in pulling the emergency shutdown handle • It is important to first stop the aircraft’s
until the power levers have been retarded to flight idle can movement towards the side of the runway, then
result in severe control problems with flight idle power stop the movement toward the end of the runway.
being developed by the normally operating engines and the Trying to do both simultaneously may result in
pitchlocked powerplant/propeller combination producing, severe control difficulties.
under some circumstances, in excess of 1500–2000 SHP.
Obviously, further movement of the power lever into the 3. TP retards power levers too quickly, leaving a power
ground and reverse range will further aggravate control lever over the ramp during a propeller malfunction,
problems with the pitchlocked propeller producing positive or inducing control difficulties due to an inability to
thrust and the other power plants producing reverse thrust. react to changing power output.
The pace of control inputs and the standardized 4. TP attempts to use nose wheel steering at high speed.
terminology used during an abort are significant teaching
points to stress to upgraders. To standardize CRM during a 5. TP applies brakes during rudder application.
three-engine abort for a simulated propeller malfunction, the
RP and RFE shall perform the following after the 6. TP does not call for the emergency shutdown handle
malfunction is called out: prior to entering the ground operating range on a
propeller malfunction.
1. The TP calls out and initiates the abort, then calls for
the appropriate E-handle. 7. TP uses maximum reverse excessively, causing addi-
tional control problems as speed decreases.
2. The RFE shall say “Check me #______” but make
no hand movements towards the E-handles. Takeoff Malfunctions After Refusal
A discussion of refusal speed is appropriate for the
3. The IP will announce “Simulated” and a three- brief. With long runways and at training weights, refusal
engine reversal in accordance with Chapter 6 of this speed is normally the rotate speed in most cases. Since this
guide shall then be conducted. would not allow practice three-engine takeoffs, this figure is
artificially reduced to 100 knots. For training purposes only,
the takeoff should be continued if a simulated malfunction
WARNING
occurs above this speed. Explain to the TP that the IP still
has the option to abort the takeoff in the 100-115 knots range
Prior to practicing simulated takeoff malfunctions
in the event that an actual malfunction occurs.
below refusal, deenergize the autofeather system to
prevent inadvertent autofeather of an engine.
The IP and IFE must mentally review the actions re-
quired for the evolution prior to commencing the takeoff.
Always consider the wind direction. A significant
The following conditions should exist:
crosswind will cause the aircraft to weathercock into the
wind and could compound the power loss problem for the
TP.
2. Runway width ⎯ 150 feet minimum.
Common errors:
3. Consider the crosswind component. Caution should
1. TP slow in retarding the power levers with the
be exercised in simulating an upwind engine loss
aircraft below VMC GRD airspeed.
when crosswinds are present. Crosswinds may
increase VMC GRD 2 knots for every 3 knots of
2. TP uses incorrect rudder inputs.
crosswind component. More than 5–10 knots could
cause control problems if the TP reacts adversely.
4-4
Actual engine failures during takeoffs do not take The simulation of an engine/propeller malfunction
wind direction into account. The adverse effects on after refusal may be accomplished by any one of the
controllability should be stressed to more senior following:
upgraders and discussed during all pilot meetings.
1. Retard a power lever to simulate an engine failure.
4. Runway condition ⎯ Sufficiently dry to prevent
skidding or hydroplaning. 2. Retard power lever to about 60 degrees coordinator
to simulate fuel governing action and propeller drag
EFAR Procedures associated with overspeed.
Explain to the TP that a pilot’s first indication of an 3. IP announces some type of engine/propeller or other
engine failure is a swerve into the failed engine. The primary system malfunction.
concern at this time must be controlling the aircraft while
continuing down the runway. The TFE will determine the
nature of the malfunction and call it out. The key to keeping WARNING
the aircraft on runway centerline is coordinated aileron,
rudder, and forward pressure on the yoke. This aids in tricy- • Prior to practicing simulated takeoff malfunc-
cle gear directional stability. Emphasize in the brief that this tions above refusal, deenergize the autofeather
is an easy time to tap a brake if feet are improperly system to prevent inadvertent autofeather of an
positioned. The control inputs utilized to regain centerline engine.
control and maintain into the initial climb out attitude are
also important teaching points. • If a simulated engine failure occurs after Vr do
not fail a second engine until traffic pattern
The IP will call “rotate” and the TP should altitude is reached. Action other than this will
smoothly fly the aircraft off the runway raising the failed unnecessarily compound the malfunction, and
engine as necessary to fly straight (toward a maximum 5 more importantly, may cause VMC AIR to in-
degrees of bank in order to minimize VMC AIR and optimize crease above the aircraft airspeed.
climb out performance). The TP should continue to hold
some degree of rudder and aileron correction as the landing Note
gear break contact with the deck, or a skidding, unbalanced
It is recommended that prior warning be given to
attitude will occur. As the aircraft climbs, the TP calls for
the TP on the first few engine failures (not which
the gear to be raised. Once the aircraft has exited the VMC AIR
engine, but that one will be failed).
region, the TP can reduce the angle of bank used in order to
fly out on runway centerline/heading or climb out
If the TP has control problems on the runway, the IP may
instructions. Once safely airborne, the TP should ask the
delay calling rotate to ensure the aircraft is under control.
TFE what emergency has occurred, and then take the
appropriate action. Stress to the TP the importance of proper Note
CRM and adherence to the adage “Aviate, navigate,
communicate”. Proper coordination allows a complete Although additional power is available when using
analysis of cockpit indications once safely airborne (i.e., reduced power for takeoff, the TP should often be
even though a power loss was called by the TFE, the engine exposed to simulated malfunctions after refusal as if
may still be producing power), and ensures aircraft safety he had maximum power set, which would be the case
while performing corrective action. This coordination allows if an actual refusal speed existed. This should prompt
the TP to perform the primary duty of safely flying the the TP to make a decision regarding flap selection
aircraft and also allows for the pilot and copilot to backup or during climb out. The IP may use additional power on
observe the TFE perform the corrective action. any engine if he deems it necessary.
For training purposes, an engine/propeller malfunc- Common errors:

tion, chips light, generator off light, etc. (see chapter 7 for 1. TP places his hand back on the power levers and
additional warnings, cautions, and notes), may be given attempts to abort.
above VR to permit the TP to gain experience in controlling
the aircraft and to ensure that he understands the meaning Note
and importance of “Refusal” during the takeoff evolution.
• Prevent this by positioning the hand at the base
of the power lever, blocking any attempt to
reverse.
4-5
4-6
• If the TP is able to retard the power levers aft, the Right Seat Takeoff Procedures
IP shall take the aircraft and either abort the
takeoff or push the power back up and continue When demonstrating abort procedures and engine
the takeoff. This decision depends on airspeed, failures after refusal, the IP may make the takeoff from the
runway remaining, how far back the power levers right seat. Explain to the TP that this takeoff technique is
were retarded, etc. being used to eliminate the problems possibly encountered
with two people controlling the aircraft during this critical
2. TP fails to input correct aileron and rudder. evolution, and that it is not the normal takeoff procedure.
3. TP taps brake while applying rudder. The following is one recommended technique:
4. TP uses insufficient or opposite rudder. 1. Taxi the aircraft onto the runway centerline with the
nose wheel straight ahead and set the parking brake.
WARNING 2. Advance the power levers to 2500 SHP (which

should put the power levers above the 66 degrees
• If the TP uses the wrong rudder, the IP shall coordinator crossover point).
immediately take the aircraft and rotate while
simultaneously reestablishing power on all four Note
engines.
• With no crosswind, right rudder will normally be
• VRO airspeed is not a consideration during this required for the takeoff and may be applied at
predicament. The IP should not wait for 115 this time.
knots because if he does, the aircraft will likely
be off the runway. At training weights, the • If there is a significant left crosswind, setting
aircraft will have no problem flying with 2500 SHP on number 1 and 2000 SHP on the
airspeed in the 100–115 knot range. remaining engines will provide better centerline
control.
Note
3. Release the parking brake and smoothly release the
To prevent this, the IP should block the wrong brakes.
rudder with his foot.
Note
5. TP attempts to rotate early (before rotate).
Another technique is to do a rolling takeoff where
the IP smoothly advances the power levers from
Note
flight idle as the brakes are released.
• Try to prevent this by blocking the yoke, until
rotation is desirable. 4. As the rudder becomes effective, smoothly advance
the power levers.
• If the TP attempts to rotate early, stop rotation, if
possible, but once the nose wheel is airborne, Note
take control and continue the takeoff, using all
four power levers. Asymmetric power lever advancement may be
required to maintain centerline.
6. TP tries to determine problem instead of flying air-
craft. 5. As the speed increases and rudder authority is
established, call for briefed takeoff power.
7. TP forgets to raise the gear.
6. Call “80 knots”, “Refusal”, and “Rotate” as required
8. TP fails to raise the flaps (if necessary). for the demonstration.
Note
• The IP’s takeoff technique should allow
directional control to be gained early enough to
ensure that the briefed power is established by 80
knots.
4-7
• When performing a right seat takeoff, the left aircraft. A normal takeoff sequence is made for training pur-
poses. When clearance is a factor, maximum power should
hand should remain on the power levers at all
times. This is a precaution against any be applied with the brakes set.
malfunction (occurring after simulated refusal Do not rotate early. Maintain strict adherence to the
speed) which may require an abort. The IP speed schedule. After rotation, adjust the nose attitude
should move his hand to the base of the power (about 15 degrees nose high) to maintain climb airspeed.
levers to simulate refusal, and maintain that hand When airborne, raise the gear. Use maximum power until
position through rotation. level off.
Common errors:
WARNING
1. Not ensuring the nose wheel is straight when the Do not raise the flaps above takeoff until level off
parking brake is set. (airspeed greater than 140).
2. Applying brakes during takeoff roll, giving the TP Emphasize that normal takeoff speeds are used for this
the appearance that the IP is using brakes to steer the demonstration in order to provide a safe margin above stall
aircraft. and VMC airspeeds. Use of the minimum distance speed
schedule would result in less ground run distance but would
3. Retarding power levers versus advancing them in significantly reduce the safety margins above both stall and
order to maintain centerline. Retarding a power lever VMC airspeeds. Maximum performance takeoffs are usually
multiplies the number of corrections required and
made under conditions of some urgency when the results of
induces control problems. This also increases the
engine failure cannot be considered.
time required to establish SHP and the runway
required for takeoff.
Smoke Removal Hatch Open Below Three-Engine Ferrying Takeoff

and Above Refusal Demonstration
Although not normally performed during the training
This demonstration should be accomplished syllabus in the aircraft, the following steps and notes
sometime during the syllabus. IPs have the option of having supplement the current NATOPS procedures for training.
the IFE open the door upon a given signal (e.g., head nod) or Ensure the crew refers to the NATOPS for three-engine
at a certain speed. This malfunction may be given before or ferrying takeoff procedures prior to the takeoff.
after refusal, but is more dramatic after refusal due to
increased noise. If after VR, the takeoff must be completed This demonstration may only be performed with
and the door closed after safely airborne. Be alert to the authorization from unit commanders.
possibility of an unplanned abort after VR.
The minimum recommended runway dimensions are
8,000 feet long and 200 feet wide. Discuss minimum
130 Knot Climb Demonstration control speed ground (VMC GRD) and the three-engine
This demonstration is used as a confidence building performance charts available in NATOPS calculating the
maneuver. Consult the appropriate charts for a discussion of actual values.
stall speed, VMC AIR, V50 3 and 4-engine speeds. A general
Note
speed for climb out is 130 KIAS for aircraft weights of
90,000 to 108,000 lb. VRO is 130 knots for all weights up to and including
recommended maximum gross of 100,000 pounds.
Takeoff performance and ground roll distance should be
WARNING computed using appropriate NATOPS charts.
Rotate speeds from the charts are 115 knots and 1. During the takeoff brief, brief the copilot to call out
rotation should take place at that speed. VMC GRD and 115 knots, in addition to 80 knots and
rotate.
The crew must be briefed to be securely strapped in with
emphasis given to preventing gear from going adrift in the
4-8
2. At the hold short complete the NATOPS three-

engine ferrying procedures.
3. With brakes set, apply maximum power on the

symmetrical engines. Initially apply full rudder
toward the asymmetric engine.
4. Release the brakes and allow the aircraft to

accelerate before attempting to increase power.
WARNING
No attempt should be made to apply maximum

power on the asymmetric engine prior to reaching
VMC GRD.
If a three-engine ferry takeoff demonstration is

conducted in the aircraft, be prepared to use all four power
levers for the takeoff if directional control difficulties are
encountered. Slow power application will significantly
increase distance required to accelerate to 130 knots and the
aircraft may reach a point where aborting the takeoff would
not be advisable.
Only the two symmetrical engines will produce

forecasted SHP when passing 80 knots.
The power lever should be advanced in such a way so that
full rudder deflection is not required. There should be a
reserve of rudder travel (in both directions) available at all
times to make heading corrections.
Ensure maximum power is set by 115 knots.
4-9
4-10
In-flight Training Procedures
CHAPTER 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Climb Procedures ..........................................................5-1 45 Degree Airstart System Demonstration ................... 5-8

NTS Check Procedures..................................................5-1 Air Conditioning and Pressurization System Demo ..... 5-9
Governor Indexing.........................................................5-2 Emergency Depressurization Demonstration................ 5-9
Steep Turns....................................................................5-2 with Electrical Power ........................... 5-9
Control Boost-Out Airwork...........................................5-3 without Electrical Power.................................. 5-10
160 Knot Maneuver .......................................................5-3 Flight Idle Stop Demonstration....................................5-10
Loiter Procedures...........................................................5-4 Engine Fire and Emergency Shutdown Procedures .....5-10
Engine Restart During Flight.........................................5-4 Propeller Fails to Feather Procedures ..........................5-10
Stall Buffet Demonstration ............................................5-5 Inadvertent Engine Shutdown During Flight ...............5-11
Asymmetric Power Flying Qualities..............................5-6 Ditching Drill...............................................................5-11
VMC Air Demonstration ...................................................5-6 Engine Out Ditching .......................................... 5-12
Two-Engine Waveoff at Altitude ..................................5-6 Bailout Drill.................................................................5-13
Ram Effect Demonstration ............................................5-7 Fire of Unknown Origin Drill......................................5-13
Emergency Gear Extension ...........................................5-7 Emergency Descent .....................................................5-15
In-Flight Prop System Demonstration ...........................5-8
Climb Procedures NTS Check Procedures

The autofeather system will be secured after Emphasis should be placed on maintaining a visual
informing the pilot and when the aircraft is safely airborne. lookout for traffic while conducting the NTS check. If
One standardized technique taught to FRS TFEs is to secure possible, delay check until leaving high density area.
the autofeather as soon as the landing gear is raised and
should be done prior to the initial power reduction. The Common errors:
autofeather system can be secured prior to the climb
checklist. 1. TP displays poor basic airwork.
Note 2. TP fails to maintain an outside scan.

With the autofeathering system armed, rapid power
application initiated from a low power setting may be 3. TP/TFE does not consider minimum airspeed for
sufficient to feather an engine. current gross weight (1.52Vs).
Common errors: 4. TFE does not use fuselage bleed air valves to get
NTS action when required.
1. TP fails to account for P-factor after liftoff, dipping
the right wing vice using right rudder. 5. TFE opens engine bleed air valve with less than 800
SHP.
2. TP fails to make a crosswind correction after liftoff.
6. TFE does not observe SHP fluctuation or allow RPM
3. TP accelerates through 190 knots prior to retracting to stabilize during NTS action.
the flaps from the takeoff position.
7. TFE fixates on the feather valve light.
5-1
8. TFE forgets to reset the ice control panel/bleed air 2. G-loading required to maintain level flight.
panel after the check has been completed.
3. Aircraft weight and stall/stall buffet speeds for the
configuration.
Governor Indexing 4. Stall recovery techniques, emphasizing the
The TP should know and understand the governor importance of leveling wings.
indexing procedures even though they are carried out by the
TFE. 5. Duration of turns (i.e., 180 or 360 degrees).
Common errors: 6. Minimum maneuvering airspeed (gross weight +110

knots recommended) and the use of the AOA
1. TP moves power levers while indexing. indicator.
2. TP fails to ensure Climb checklist complete. 7. Minimum acceptable weather conditions. Steep turns
of 45 degrees angle of bank or greater shall be
3. TFE turns on a sync switch with a master selected. limited to daylight VMC with a clearly discernible
horizon.
4. TFE not alert for propeller malfunctions during
indexing. 8. Use of power and utilization of the flight engineer.
9. Figure 5-1 should be used to brief the effects of angle

Steep Turns of bank on the aircraft in balanced flight:
Steep turns on upgrade syllabus training flights
should normally be performed no lower than 4,000 feet Practice turns with sustained angles of bank over 60
AGL. To provide for familiarity with high angle of bank degrees are not recommended. A pull up from a 70 degrees
maneuvering (>45 degrees AOB) at lower altitude, angle of bank turn will exceed the airframe limits (3.0 g’s)
upgrading pilots should be provided the opportunity to of the aircraft.
conduct tactical maneuvering on training flights within
NATOPS altitude and angle of bank limits with a qualified Be alert for any abrupt control movements and
instructor pilot. This guidance does not restrict realistic use teach the student to smoothly apply force on the controls.
of “high angles of bank” (i.e., over 45 degrees) for short Control reversals should be avoided.
periods of time when needed on tactical missions. Use of
high angles of bank at low altitude must take into account Alert the crew, set Condition V, clear the area and
pilot experience, fatigue, time of day, weather, altitude, fuel begin with turns of 45 degrees angle of bank. Turn for 180
consumption and impact on aircrew performance. The degrees of heading change. Note that as the aircraft bank
objective of steep turn training is to prepare pilots to fly the angle increases, the lift vector tilts from the vertical and the
aircraft effectively in tactical situations while minimizing aircraft must increase AOA to maintain level flight. Note the
unnecessary risks in the performance of such training. increasing amount of control force required to maintain level
flight. After the student has mastered 45 degrees advance to
Practice steep turns should be conducted only after 60 degrees angle of bank.
extensive briefing between the IP and TP. The turns should
be taught as confidence maneuvers and closely monitored Note
throughout. Aircraft loading of 2 g’s is required for a level 60
degree angle of bank turn. Aircraft loading of 3 g’s is
The IP should brief as a minimum: required for a level 70 degree angle of bank turn (see
figure 5-1).
1. Anticipated angles of bank and NATOPS limitations.
5-2
Degrees AOB Approximate G Loading Percent Increase 0 Thrust Stall

Stall Speed 100,000 lb. Aircraft
0 1.00 0 114
15 1.04 2 116
30 1.15 8 123
45 1.41 19 136
60 2.00 40 162
70 2.94 70 195
Figure 5-1. Effects Of Angle Of Bank On G’s During Balanced Flight
the trim tabs. A turn at altitude can be made with the use
Control Boost-Out Airwork of asymmetric power rather than muscle on the yoke (i.e.,
left turn, increase power on number 3 and number 4
Booster shift control handles shall not be pulled to practice engines). When the desired angle of bank is reached,
boost-off airwork: reset the horsepower.
1. If one or more engines are actually shutdown.

WARNING
2. Below 4000 feet AGL.
Beware of large power changes at low speeds. To
3. During hours of darkness. demonstrate, slow to 140-150 knots, wings level,
flaps up, boost-out, 500 SHP. At typical training
4. Under IMC. weights of 80,000 to 110,000 lb., power off stall
buffet speeds range from approximately 111 knots to
Boost-out airwork is a condition that will occur 128 knots respectively. To simulate a waveoff, add
with either the loss of all hydraulic pumps, certain flight power to break the rate of descent, roll in some nose
control malfunctions, or the loss of all electrical power. down trim and add power slowly. Return the system
Point out that “gust lock” will result from failure of either to normal. Explain that the boost-out approach to a
hydraulic or electrical systems, or improper procedures landing is no longer performed as a training
while combating an electrical fire of unknown origin. maneuver in the aircraft. It is an emergency evolution
and will be accomplished only at that time. If this
emergency were to arise, consideration should be
WARNING given to proceeding to a satisfactory alternate when
adverse weather or high wind conditions exist at the
• In-flight, securing all hydraulic pumps prior to
destination.
boost-out training is prohibited.
160 Knot Maneuver
• The unable-to-shift boost controls scenario shall The primary purpose of this maneuver is to show
only be performed by simulating the hydraulic the TP the reason behind the P-3 waveoff procedures.
pumps are simulated secured. Additionally, the TP will gain an appreciation for power and
trim requirements in various configurations which will help
• Inform the crew and secure loose equipment
develop basic airwork skills. Ensure that the TP stabilizes at
each increment to properly note power and trim changes
prior to shifting.
before continuing. Begin by having the TP establish the
aircraft on an assigned altitude and heading in the clean
• It is possible to pull all axis boost handles past the configuration at 160 knots (trimmed hands-off). Reference
mechanical stops. your 1.52 Vs. Note the power (approximately 1000 SHP)
and trim required. Stress the importance of an instrument
Note and visual scan and the importance of the VSI in altitude
control.
Instruct the TFE to pull the boost handles one at a time.
Allow the TP to fly the aircraft in this condition.
Demonstrate how easily altitude can be maintained using
5-3
1. Select maneuver flaps and have the TP maintain 2. TFE fails to get checked prior to turning the fuel and
altitude and 160 knots, noting power and trim ignition switch off.
changes.
3. TP does not suggest the reposition of the propeller for
2. Select approach flaps and have the TP maintain alti- a bad “X” that is causing buffet.
tude and 160 knots, noting power and trim changes.
3. Leave approach flaps set and drop the gear main- Engine Restart During Flight
taining altitude and 160 knots, noting power and trim The TP and TFE should understand that proper
changes. crew coordination during an in-flight restart is paramount.
4. Raise the gear and set landing flaps. As airspeed Both should closely monitor cockpit indications, especially
bleeds off it will become apparent that the power RPM and the annunciator lights. A sample restart brief is
setting will not be sufficient to maintain 160 knots listed in the Pilot/FE Training Job Aid.
(Note the elevator trim required, 19–23 units up).
This serves as a good explanation for retracting the Common errors:
flaps to approach before raising the landing gear
during a waveoff. 1. TP allows a start with no brief or an inadequate brief.
5. (Optional). With land flaps set, lower the landing 2. TP and TFE do not post an aft observer prior to the
gear again and slow to 140 knots; execute a waveoff start.
climbing straight ahead. Although this is not an “in
close” type waveoff when speeds may be less than 3. TP does not watch the propeller during PCO.
1.3 VS, it will give the TP an appreciation for the trim
required once the flaps are raised past the 4. TP does not check the TFE unfeathering the correct
takeoff/approach position. propeller.
Common errors: 5. TP does not observe blade angle and rotation.
1. TP uses little or no rudder trim. 6. TP does not check the TFE on the correct fuel and
ignition switch.
2. TP does not stabilize at each configuration to note
power and trim changes. 7. TP or TFE does not call for continuation of the
checklist.
3. TP flies primarily by use of the trim vice the primary
flight controls.
Stall Buffet Demonstration
4. TP does not maintain a positive rate of climb while
executing waveoff procedures. Power-off approach to stalls may be carried out in any
configuration and must be conducted in accordance with
5. TP displays poor instrument scan. procedures given in the NATOPS. The stall buffet
demonstration shall be conducted in a power-off, zero
degrees AOB condition and shall not be conducted:
Loiter Procedures 1. If one or more engines are actually shutdown.
If a loiter shutdown is required by the syllabus,
discuss the requirements that must be met before loitering an 2. Below 10,000 feet AGL.
engine. Address the advantages of high altitude loiter and
restart, and review the use of the loiter operating tables in 3. During hours of darkness.
the NATOPS Flight Manual. A sample loiter brief is listed in
the Pilot/FE Training Job Aid. 4. Under IMC.
Common errors: This demonstration is designed to introduce the TP

to stall buffet and stall recovery techniques and is an excel-
1. TFE fails to get checked before pulling the emer- lent method of building confidence in P-3 performance
gency shutdown handle. characteristics. Instructors should brief the upgrader of the
most likely scenarios of entering stall buffet and the
5-4
performance charts that relate to those situations. Some 7. The aircraft should be kept in balanced flight
teaching points to focus on include: the feeling of airframe throughout the maneuver or a rolling tendency will
buffet, AOA, recovery procedures, and altitude loss. occur on stall buffet entry and/or recovery.
During the brief, determine actual stall speed and Note

stall buffet speed for the desired aircraft configuration.
• Maintaining a visual scan, especially during re-
covery, is extremely helpful in developing a
CAUTION smooth coordinated technique.
When conducting the stall buffet demo, the IP shall
recover the aircraft if the calculated stall buffet speed is • Wings level attitude is very important. If a wing
reached and the plane has not yet entered buffet. The is dropped there is a probability of stalling one
speeds shall be recomputed and if during the second wing.
attempt the plane still does not buffet at the calculated
speed, the airspeed may be allowed to decrease below the Common errors:
calculated value at the IP’s discretion. Good judgment
prevails as to how slow the aircraft should be allowed to 1. Decelerating too slowly resulting in excessive alti-
fly. tude loss and mushy stall buffet entry.
Note 2. Decelerating too rapidly causing abrupt or acceler-

ated stall buffet.
The IFE shall ensure that the TFE gives the correct
stall and stall buffet speeds. 3. Dropping a wing or not keeping the aircraft in
balanced flight.
When conducting the approach to stall series, brief
the TP to scan the AOA indicator. As the aircraft decelerates 4. Lowering the nose excessively during recovery,
toward stall buffet the AOA indicator will enter the hashed resulting in unnecessary altitude loss.
band and stall buffet will occur at 20 units AOA.
In addition to the procedures in the NATOPS the following 5. Applying insufficient power during recovery,
steps shall be performed: possibly resulting in accelerated stall.
1. Set Condition V, notify all crew members and
execute clearing turns. Asymmetric Power Flying Qualities
The P-3 has good engine-out handling qualities in
2. Initially set 300 SHP. This will allow SHP to remain all configurations. The published one and two engine out
positive as the aircraft decelerates. VMC AIR for 5 degrees angle of bank toward the operating
engines is rudder limited. At these airspeeds and power
3. Discontinue trimming 20 knots above the charted settings, aileron is effective in controlling angle of bank, and
stall buffet speed and gradually decrease the airspeed marginally effective to arrest roll rates following a sudden
at approximately 1 knot per second. This will require power loss or power addition. As the aircraft slows below
a loss of altitude, with typical rates of descent these speeds, the aileron available to stop rolling conditions
between 600 and 800 FPM. from power changes decreases, eventually resulting in
insufficient aileron to hold the desired angle of bank.
4. Do not make large attitude corrections in an attempt
to maintain altitude or an accelerated stall may occur. Establishing a 3–5 degree angle of bank into the op-
erating engines for straight flight results in the best climb
5. Initiate recovery as the aircraft enters the stall buffet performance (zero sideslip) and is a compromise between
region. Relax back pressure on the yoke, advance the engine thrust and sideslip generated drag. This attitude re-
power levers and call for normal rated power. Use sults in the balance ball deflecting toward the operating
rudder and aileron to maintain balanced flight and engines. Under these conditions a centered balance ball is
wings level. Stress a smooth recovery. not optimum and should not be used. If maximum climb
performance is required in a turn, this same ball deflection
6. Diving to accelerate is undesirable as this would not should be maintained.
be possible at low altitude. Show the RP that a
recovery can be made with a minimal loss of altitude.
5-5
VMC Air Demonstration (Sim only) Two-Engine Waveoff At Altitude

This demonstration is designed to show the aircraft 1. At an airspeed of 145 knots with gear down and flaps
yaw moments that can be expected during flight below at approach, simulate feather on number 1 and 2.
minimum control airspeed regime. The IP should discuss Reestablish power on number 3 and 4 required to fly
what may cause the aircraft to enter VMC AIR, and the a gradual descent of approximately 600 to 800 FPM.
techniques used to recover.
2. Initiate the waveoff by gradually applying 925
CAUTION degrees TIT or 3200 SHP while rolling in 5 degrees
right wing down and sufficient rudder to prevent
This demonstration shall only be performed in the yaw. Emphasize visual references and a frequent but
simulator. secondary instrument scan.
Procedures 4. Repeat the waveoff until the TP can use power,

aileron, and rudder simultaneously and instinctively,
* Perform maneuver at moderate to light gross weights
then add elevator for altitude adjustments.
(<100,000 lbs).
1. Ensure #1 and #2 are feathered and Rudder Boost Note

Shutoff Valve CB (K13) is pulled. The same points apply to three-engine waveoffs.
Directional control must be established before a
2. Gear down, flaps at approach. climb is attempted. A slight loss in altitude with
directional control is more desirable than a possible
3. Establish aircraft 8-10 NM from field at 2500-3000’ greater loss caused by improper action. This
AGL in VMC. Use runway as visual reference point. demonstration is conducted to either emphasize the
actual two-engine waveoff procedures and the pace
4. Maintain 145 KIAS, 600-800 FPM ROD on final. that it should be conducted or a step by step recovery
to emphasize the importance of reducing drag to
5. Reduce power on #3 and #4 and decelerate towards generate ROC.
120 KIAS to simulate getting slow on approach.
Common errors:
6. Rapidly set max power on #3 and #4 and enter Vmc
1. TP attempts waveoff without using visual reference.
Air. Demonstrate full control deflections with
nose tracking left for about 30-60 degrees of heading 2. TP attempts a climb before adequate directional
change. control is established.
7. Lower the nose and accelerate above VmcAir. (1st
way to get out of VmcAir- results in loss of approx Ram Effect Demonstration
500’) The IP should demonstrate acceleration and
deceleration characteristics and ram effect with the autopilot
8. Once re-established on course and glideslope, engaged and altitude hold selected. Ram effect is most viv-
smoothly re-apply max power again and raise the idly demonstrated by placing the power levers in the temp
nose to re-enter VmcAir. controlling range at an even horsepower setting (2,500 ± 500
SHP) and then observing both fuel flow and SHP increases
9. Once in VmcAir, rapidly reduce power on #4, raise as the aircraft accelerates. The demonstration may then be
the left wing and correct back to centerline. (2nd way reversed by retarding the power levers and observing both
to get out of VmcAir) fuel and SHP decrease as the aircraft slows.
10. Continue approach at 1.35 Vs + 5 knots (145 It is of academic interest to realize that ram effect is
minimum until landing is assured). a result of T-56 fuel scheduling processes. It is important,
however, for the TP to realize and understand that ram effect
11. At 300 feet AGL execute NATOPS 2 Engine displays itself in the form of a more sluggish initial response
Waveoff Procedures. with rather long term effects whenever the power levers are
repositioned for airspeed changes. The pilot should therefore
5-6
be aware of airspeed after making any significant power

change. 1. TP and TFE do not turn on the number 1B pump
during landing (simulator).
Emergency Gear Extension
2. TP and TFE do not refer to NATOPS.
Emphasize the fact that for all landing gear
emergencies, reference to the NATOPS is desirable. This 3. TP/TFE lack understanding of NATOPS procedures.
portion of the demonstration may be performed in the
aircraft. 4. TP and TFE lack knowledge of the number 1B pump
To demonstrate gear not extending because of operation.
electrical malfunction, pull the landing gear control circuit
breaker (E17). When the TP calls for gear down, announce 5. TP or TFE releases the selector valve while raising
that the gear is not coming down, but that hydraulic pressure the gear before they are fully retracted.
is normal. Ensure that the TP and TFE review the procedures
in NATOPS. Have the TP or TFE operate the selector valve
to the DOWN position. The selector valve may be used to
In-Flight Prop System
raise the gear if desired. Be sure that the TP and TFE under- Demonstration
stand that the valve must be held in the UP position until the
The purpose of this demonstration is to explain
gear is up and locked or else it will freefall down. Do not
various components in the propeller system and to observe
forget to reset the landing gear control circuit breaker when
their in-flight operation.
finished with the demonstration.
The next demonstration may be initiated by CAUTION

simulating a failed number 1 hydraulic system. Turn off
hydraulic pumps 1 and 1A and request gear down. The TP’s This demonstration shall only be performed in the
and TFE’s reaction should be to recognize a situation where simulator.
the gear must be dropped manually. Ensure that TP and TFE
review the procedures in NATOPS. Do not forget the 1. Number 1 sync servo off, eliminating possible sync
warning about holding the nose gear until the main mounts biasing of propellers during the demonstration.
are down and locked. The 1B hydraulic pump receives its
control and power from the GOB whenever its switch is 2. Secure Bus B to secure power to propeller feather
turned on and accumulator pressure is below 2200 PSI. pump. Discuss alternate power source for engines
Discuss methods available for energizing the GOB. number 1 and number 4.
Demonstrate use of the 1B pump on the deck. Turn 3. Airspeed 190 knots.
off the number 1 system and reduce system brake pressure
below 2200 PSI level by pumping the brakes. Discuss the 4. NTS feather valve switch to feather valve check.
purpose of the 1B pump and its source of electrical power.
Turn on the 1B pump and allow the brake accumulator to 5. Set normal rated power on number 1.
pressurize. Discuss time for normal number 1 system
pressure to replenish, and return system to normal. Note
Failure to set normal rated power may result in
Note engine–propeller decouple due to NTS values being
Expand this discussion to include brake check exceeded.
during Landing checklist with only the 1B pump
operative and unsafe landing gear procedures. 6. Fuel chop number 1 engine with the fuel and igni-
tion switch. Observe NTS operation, RPM 35–40
percent and note the flashing feather valve check
CAUTION
light and fluctuating SHP.
The landing gear must be cycled at least once
normally prior to landing. This will ensure that 7. Arm the autofeather system. Observe the feather
the landing gear selector valve has been properly button pull in, the autofeather light ON, and the
positioned down, enabling nose wheel steering. feather pump not running. The feather solenoid has
positioned the feather valve to the feather position.
Common errors:
5-7
At this time, the output of propeller pumps 1 and 2 Note

should bring RPM below 10 percent.
Discuss that normal NTS action has made this a
controlled situation. In the event of an NTS failure,
8. Place the feather transfer switch (number 1 and 4) to
the decrease in blade angle from the feather position
alternate. Note the light in the feather button on; the
would be considerably more rapid, and the resultant
propeller pump number 1 light out, and the propeller
cycling around the 45 degrees blade position would
feathers.
also be rougher. This can be demonstrated by
inserting the NTS INOP malfunction for the
9. Turn the autofeather switch off.
subsequent restart. Stress the importance of the FE’s
responsibility to hold out on the feather button until
10. Place the feather transfer switch to NORMAL. the emergency shutdown handle is fully pulled.
Discuss what would happen if the FE accidentally
11. Restore Bus B. pulled out on the wrong feather button while in a 2-
or 3-engine loiter configuration and the importance of
12. Review the functions of the feather button (AC always checking the FE during feather or unfeather
power to the feather motor, DC power to position operation.
the feather valve solenoid, DC power to the fuel
shutoff valve in the fuel control).
Air Conditioning And Pressurization
45 Degree Airstart System System Demonstration
Demonstration Demonstrate the air conditioning and pressurization
systems as follows:
CAUTION 1. During the planeside brief inquire if any crew

member has problems equalizing pressure in their
This demonstration shall only be performed in the ears.
simulator.
2. Prior to takeoff, place the outflow valve switch to
The airstart blade angle system is discussed in the OFF to keep the outflow valve in the OPEN position.
NATOPS manual. Review the components of the system (45 After takeoff, note that the cabin will climb at the
degrees blade angle switch on the beta shaft, feather button, same rate as the aircraft.
pressure cutout override switch).
3. Between 3,000 and 4,000 feet, position the outflow
Note valve switch to AUTO; the aircraft should start to
pressurize. Note the cabin rate of descent, the ability
Impress on the TP that this system is not actuated
to control this descent with the rate selector knob,
during a normal restart and that when it does actuate,
a malfunction exists. and the corresponding increase in differential
pressure.
1. Complete the Restart checklist through the item PCO.
4. Continue with automatic pressurization while
climbing the aircraft. Dump one EDC and note that
2. Brief the FE as follows: After the fuel and ignition
switch is placed on, continue to hold the feather the aircraft will still pressurize on the remaining
button. This will result in actuation of the airstart EDC. Place the dump switch back to NORMAL.
blade angle system, illuminating the NTS INOP light
as the blade angle goes to 45 degrees after light-off. 5. Level the aircraft at 17,000 feet or higher. Reduce
The FE will continue to hold out on the button while the cabin altitude slowly by use of the closed posit-
ion on the override switch noting the differential
announcing “NTS INOP”. Observe RPM stabilizing
at less than 100 percent, approximately 75–80 pressure to rise to 13.9–14.4" (11.7–12.2"). After the
percent, and TIT steady at 830 degrees. The FE will safety relief valve opens, place the override switch
in the CLOSED position to completely close the
then pull the emergency shutdown handle while
continuing to hold out on the feather button. outflow valve. The cabin altitude at this point will be
approximately 2000 feet below sea level. Restore
pressurization with outflow override switch. Climb
3. After the propeller has been refeathered, conduct a
normal restart, and complete the restart checklist. the aircraft approximately 1000 feet, noting the
5-8
constant differential pressure at the safety relief

valve setting and increasing cabin altitude. WARNING
Instructors shall ensure that engines are not secured

WARNING prior to obtaining a satisfactory NTS check.
Performing this procedure below 17,000 feet could After an engine has been secured for a simulated
expose the crew to hyperbaric conditions. malfunction, the IP and FE shall “clean up” from the
simulated malfunction, and initiate the first 9 steps of the
Emergency Depressurization restart checklist. Discussions concerning the simulated mal-
function shall only be conducted after the malfunction has
Demonstration been cleaned up and the first 9 steps of the restart checklist
have been completed.
WARNING CAUTION
Notify the crew before conducting any depressuri- If the oil tank shut off valve circuit breaker is
zation demo. For these demonstrations, aircraft inadvertently reset on a shutdown engine it shall be
altitude shall not exceed 10,000 feet. left in until the engine has been restarted. The circuit
breaker shall then be pulled so the valve will remain
With Electrical Power open.
The TP and TFE are required to have the checklist Emergency Engine Shutdown training shall only be
memorized. Explain that as long as FEAC is powered, the accomplished if:
aircraft can be depressurized with the outflow valve and 1. If no other engines are shutdown*
procedures for depressurization without electrical power do 2. During daylight hours
not apply. While discussing this procedure, conduct a review 3. Above 1500 FT AGL
of the pressurization system and component parts. 4. VMC
*Does not apply to IUT Events (See considerations
Without Electrical Power on page A-14)
Ensure the TP realizes that the aircraft can be Common errors:

depressurized pneumatically or using the free fall chute.
1. TP does not confirm that an engine fire exists before
calling for discharge of the second HRD.
Flight Idle Stop Demonstration
With all engines secured, pull the flight idle stop 2. TP/TFE do not utilize good CRM while conducting
control circuit breakers and allow the TP to become familiar the Emergency Shutdown Checklist.
with the force required to overcome the flight idle stop on
each power lever. 3. TFE does not get checked on the proper emergency
shutdown handle.
Engine Fire And Emergency 4. TFE does not secure crossfeed and boost pumps to
respective engine when shutdown for a fire or fuel
Shutdown Procedures leak.
Both the TP and the TFE are required to know the
first two memory items of the emergency shutdown Propeller Fails To Feather
checklist. The TFE is expected to execute them upon
command of the pilot when a malfunction requires an engine
Procedures
to be secured. Both students should have a thorough The IP and IFE should designate the step at which
knowledge of all electrical and mechanical functions of the the propeller feathers during this procedure. It is advisable to
emergency shutdown handle. use engines number 3 or 4, so the TP and TFE can be
informed that the propeller is still turning in the event the
propeller has to be feathered prior to the step desired.
5-9
CAUTION 5. Complete the Emergency Shutdown checklist

through propeller.
Do not let the propeller rotate for more than 45
seconds due to the possibility of damaging the 6. Restart an engine using the Restart checklist. The
propeller brake. restart checklist may be accomplished for two
engines simultaneously; however, the engines shall
Note be restarted individually.
• It is normal for oil to be vented overboard through Note
the lab seal vent during this malfunction. Lab seal
leaks are due to the reduction of fourteenth stage At the discretion of the IP and IFE, the TFE may be
bleed air and insufficient oil scavenge during put back in the seat after the engine that was
extremely low rpm operations, and because the unintentionally shutdown has been restarted. The
number 3 engine lab seal vent is more noticeable TFE should restart the original engine to complete
from inside the aircraft, this is often reported by this item in the training syllabus if the IP and IFE are
crewmen to the flight station. Unnecessary 3- confident in the safety of the evolution.
engine landings have been made because this was
treated as a malfunction. Ditching Drill
• Although the “Two Bottle Fire Fails-To-Feather”
scenario is unlikely in the P-3, it is a good WARNING
teaching tool for both pilots and engineers. Due to
the complexity and scenario variations, this The minimum ditching speed with a tactical crew
malfunction should be taught in the simulator. embarked is 125 knots. Minimum recovery altitude is
4000 feet AGL.
Inadvertent Engine Shutdown
Note
During Flight
Only the night or instrument technique for water
An engine can be inadvertently secured by mistakes
entry shall be used during simulated ditching. The
which include:
immediate ditch can be simulated to instruct
headwork and help develop a thought process of
1. Autofeather system is left on after takeoff and engine
executing ditching procedures in a timely manner.
feathers after level off and subsequent power
application.
Ditching drills evaluate basic airwork and
headwork. The success or failure of a ditch will depend
2. TFE unintentionally secures the wrong engine as a
largely on good headwork and the physical manner in which
result of an induced malfunction (e.g. pushes in the
the aircraft enters the water. The TP should enter the
wrong feather button while executing the propeller
simulated water with wings level, on ditch heading, at the
fails to feather procedure, turns off the wrong fuel
minimum rate of descent (100 FPM rate of descent
and ignition switch during the execution of the
optimum), and at the minimum airspeed commensurate with
Restart checklist, etc.).
the configuration and controllability. Ensure that the TP
fully understands the consequences of wings not level, fast
If an inadvertent engine shutdown occurs and the
or slow touchdown or an excessive rate of descent. Ensure
result is two engines shutdown, or if an inadvertent engine
Coordination with INAV or ITC is conducted during the
shutdown occurs prior to obtaining an NTS check:
planeside brief and prior to execution of this drill when a
tactical crew is embarked.
1. The IP shall take the airplane.
It is the TP’s responsibility to make the decision to
2. The IFE shall immediately ensure any simulated ditch or bailout. Therefore, make the simulated emergency
malfunctions are cleaned up. dictate the desired response.
3. The IFE shall ensure the APU is started, if applicable. Give an altitude for simulated water impact and the
ditch heading, or have the TP give you a sea and wind
4. The IFE shall get in the seat. evaluation for a ditch heading under existing conditions.
5-10
As a technique, the aircraft should be stabilized at the ditch

speed and properly configured with the checklist complete,
• Specific items on the Ditching checklist can be
performed at any time during the maneuver and
no later than 300 feet above the simulated water impact the TP should be encouraged to get ahead and
altitude. then use the checklist as a review. For instance,
the TP does not have to wait until JETTISON on
The TP should call water impact using the the checklist to jettison stores or fuel.
barometric altimeter with both hands on the yoke.
IFE defensive positioning is most effective to the left of the
2. Ditch preparation. Proper preparation for the TP and
RFE. If required for an emergency, the IFE can easily step in
TFE includes:
front of the FE seat as the RFE exits the seat.
a. Helmet on, visor down, chin strap tight (time
WARNING permitting).
The IP shall always recover from ditching drills using b. Gloves on.
all four engines. Failure to increase your airspeed or
with insufficient power addition prior to retracting c. Zippers zipped.
flaps to approach from land can lead to a settling
effect with a nose high attitude. Stall buffet may d. Flight station cleaned (e.g., charts, bottles, etc.).
result.
e. The landing gear warning circuit breaker may be
Note the TP’s and TFE’s execution of the following pulled by the TFE under the direction of the pilot
minimum procedures: at the controls.
1. Completing the Ditching checklist. Engine Out Ditching

Note A simulated three-engine ditch may be practiced in
later stage flights, but the IP should demonstrate the
• The importance of keeping the crew informed of difference in SHP and flight control requirements.
time until impact should be emphasized. In situations where one or more engines have
failed, it is possible that someone may try to ditch the
aircraft at an airspeed below VMC AIR for existing conditions.
• The IFE shall ensure that the TFE gives the With one or more engines out (which has been the case
correct ditch speed. The IP may approximate the during all ditches and training ditch crashes), most of the
land flap ditch speed using ½ gross weight + 63. factors affecting VMC AIR are no longer variables. The
relationship of ditching speeds to VMC AIR is critical. The
• Occasionally some discrepancy may exist accompanying figure (figure 5-2) compares VMC AIR (on
between the TP’s and IP’s airspeed indicator or three- and two-engines) to the NATOPS ditching speeds at
altimeter. Get an airspeed and altitude check various configurations. For the conditions stated, an
prior to simulated water impact. interesting relationship exists. A comparison of the
minimum ditch speed and VMC AIR at maximum power, 0
degrees bank angle, sea level, and the critical engine(s)
• Pull the auxiliary ventilation control circuit inoperative reveals the following:
breaker on MEDC (J21) or the auxiliary
ventilation actuator circuit breaker on MEAC 1. With both the number 1 and the number 2 engines
(J21), the EDC dump circuit breakers on MEDC failed, the ditching speed is below VMC AIR at all gross
(H23 and H24) and the outflow valve manual weights at both approach and land flaps.
override circuit breaker on FEAC if
depressurization is desired. 2. With only the number 1 engine failed, the ditching
speed is below VMC AIR for gross weights below
• If the jettison system is to be demonstrated, 118,000 lb. at land flaps; below 108,000 lb. for
ensure the bomb bay is empty prior to switch ac- approach flaps. Again, however, this would prob-
tuation. ably be only temporary to correct low airspeed/high
sink rate at a critically low altitude.
5-11
Common errors:
3. TP does not notify the crew.
1. TFE gives the wrong ditch speed.
4. TP forgets to instruct copilot to attempt communi-
2. TP selects incorrect flap position. cation contact or to transmit emergency code on the
IFF.
3. TP is unaware of correct ditching speed.
5. TP does not plan for the IP or TFE to get out of the
4. TP descends too slowly to ditching altitude (i.e., aircraft when their assistance is no longer needed.
trying to descend at 100 feet per minute from 1000
feet altitude). 6. TP does not set up the aircraft properly; does not
slow aircraft when possible.
5. TP flares before water impact to reduce excessive
rate of descent. 7. TP gives no thought to aircraft heading when bailing
out over land.
6. TP ditches with the wings not level; aircraft not in
balanced flight. 8. TP and TFE do not know the location of survival
gear.
7. For engine-out ditch, TP fails to consider aircraft
controllability. Fire Of Unknown Origin Drill
The Fire of Unknown Origin (FOUO) drill requires
Bailout Drill the utmost in prior planning because it is the most difficult
A bailout drill is a good opportunity to accomplish emergency to realistically simulate. Many headwork
a pilot swap. Ensure Coordination with INAV or ITC is decisions will face the crew. The speed at which you
conducted during the planeside brief and prior to execution progress through the checklist will depend on many factors
of this drill when a tactical crew is embarked. such as day or night flight, environmental conditions, nature
of the fire, fumes or smoke, and the amount of information
about the fire that the flight station is receiving. Ensure
coordination with INAV or ITC is conducted during the
WARNING planeside brief and prior to execution of this drill when a
tactical crew is embarked.
The main cabin door shall not be opened in-flight for
demonstration purposes. The following items shall be considered prior to
execution of the FOUO drill:
Common errors:
1. Determine ahead of time the exact point at which to
1. TP and TFE do not properly depressurize aircraft. stop the checklist.
2. TP or TFE do not wear or have the appropriate 2. Ensure that the drill moves at a realistic pace. An
survival gear. important aspect of a FOUO is the tempo at which
GROSS 80,000 90,000 100,000 110,000 120,000 130,000

WEIGHT
Land flaps 103 108 114 119 124 131
App flaps 108 113 119 124 129 136
Flaps up 123 128 134 139 144 151
3 engine VMC 123 123 123 123 123 123
2 engine VMC 141 141 141 141 141 141
Figure 5-2. Minimum Ditch Speed Versus VMC AIR
5-12
steps are accomplished as well as effective CRM

within the flight station and with aft crewmembers. WARNING
Control the pace at which the TP and TFE progress
through the checklist by realistically simulating crew During a simulated fire, the FOUO checklist may
actions and/or providing information about the fire, only be completed through BUS A – OFF.
to include the IP acting as a realistic copilot.
3. When the TP and TFE become reluctant to progress Note

through the checklist, add a new dimension (such as The IP may need to re-select UHF radios in order to
an extreme smoke problem) to compel their maintain external communications after Bus A is
continuation of the checklist. deenergized.
4. When giving the fire in a supervisory panel, be The TP and TFE shall be familiar with the use of
aware of the possibility of the TP or TFE feathering the smoke mask. Explain why the smoke masks should be
without power to the feather pump. Do not let the donned whether or not smoke is readily apparent in the flight
simulations create an emergency greater than the station. (i.e., burning electrical components produce toxic
one being simulated. In the airborne environment, gases or by-products such as carbon monoxide, which can be
keep it simple and safe, leaving the exotic for the colorless. These gases can quickly incapacitate crew
simulator. members.)
5. If a restart is to be made during the FOUO drill, plan If, after a FOUO, smoke or fumes are a significant
no restart malfunctions unless they relate to the problem, the TP and TFE must make a decision to either
FOUO, this eliminates student confusion. remove the smoke or restore electrical power. This will
depend on how bad the smoke in the aircraft is. It is a
6. The cabin exhaust fan may be turned back on, headwork decision, so give them information needed to
leaving the red guard open, to provide INU cooling. arrive at the desired conclusion and response.
The intent of this simulation is to check the TP’s

and TFE’s systematic use of the FOUO checklist as well WARNING
as effective CRM with other crewmembers. It allows
them to become aware of what they have available at any The over-wing exit shall not be removed during flight
given time in a progressive electrical power reduction for simulated malfunctions.
(i.e., radios, navaids, feather capability, etc.). The TP and
TFE should be aware that the checklist is designed to Note
secure electrical power in the most logical sequence. The
use of the PA system is recommended as long as ICS is Practice in removing the exit can be done on the
available. deck.
Note Electrical power shall be restored by use of the Restoring

Electrical Power checklist upon completion of the drill. The
Emphasize that when the source of the fire is de- sole purpose is the systematic restoration of power in the
termined, the FOUO checklist is no longer required. reverse order from which it was secured.
The TP must base his assessment of the emergency Common errors:

on information received from the IP and IFE. The student’s
mental picture of the simulated problem will therefore be 1. TP or TFE is unfamiliar with smoke mask operation.
only as vivid as the instructor’s ability to convey the in-
formation necessary to describe a realistic situation. 2. TP and TFE use an inappropriate pace while
Immediately after smoke, fumes, or fire have been detected, executing checklists.
the TP shall alert the crew and activate the firebill. The TFE
shall turn the cabin exhaust fan off and the FOUO checklist 3. TP and TFE continue the Fire of Unknown Origin
shall be started with item number 1. checklist after the source of the fire is determined.
5-13
4. TP and TFE are unaware of intentional equipment

degradation as the Fire of Unknown Origin checklist
progresses.
5. TP and TFE execute the Smoke or Fume Elimination

checklist prior to determining the source of the fire.
6. TP and TFE continue Smoke or Fume Elimination

checklist when not required.
7. TP and TFE fail to conduct a thorough flight station

positional inspection.
Emergency Descent
The emergency descent should be conducted as out-
lined in NATOPS. Before commencing the descent, conduct
a clearing turn and give the TP a minimum recovery altitude.
The minimum recovery altitude shall not be less than
4,000’AGL.
CAUTION
Ensure that the landing lights are retracted.

The Descent checklist should be initiated as you are
commencing the descent or as soon as practicable thereafter.
CAUTION
Ensure that IAS is below 190 knots before the

landing gear is retracted.
The effects of flaps on the rate of descent can be

graphically demonstrated by commencing the descent at a
nominal altitude of 17,500 feet with the aircraft in the land
flap configuration. Accelerate to 160 knots and note the rate
of descent on the VSI. Raise the flaps to approach,
accelerate to 180 knots and note the rate of descent. Now
bring the flaps up, accelerate to 300 knots (250 if restricted
by FAA below 10,000 feet) and again note the rate of
descent. The best rate of descent is with the flaps up; the
steepest angle of descent is in the land flap configuration.
5-14
Landing Training Procedures
CHAPTER 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ...................................................................6-1 Power Setting Selection.................................................6-5

VFR Landing Pattern.....................................................6-2 Stop-And-Go Landings .................................................6-7
Descent Procedures........................................................6-2 Touch-And-Go Landings...............................................6-7
Pattern Entry..................................................................6-2 Malfunctions During Touch-And-Go Landings ............6-7
Downwind Leg ..............................................................6-2 Engine Out Landing Training........................................6-8
Base Leg ........................................................................6-2 Simulated Three Engine Landing ..................................6-8
Final...............................................................................6-5 Simulated Two Engine Landing ....................................6-9
Land Flap Landing.........................................................6-5 No-Flap Landing .........................................................6-10
Approach Flap Landing .................................................6-6 No-Flap Touch-And-Go ..............................................6-12
Crosswind Landings ......................................................6-6 VFR Break...................................................................6-11
Right Seat Landings.......................................................6-6
Introduction simulated emergency landings. This will afford the

instructor more time to concentrate on weak areas.
Instructing the landing pattern is one of the TPs experiencing difficulty may require more time to
greatest challenges for the instructional team. It requires learn the techniques of a good landing but an excessive
not only personal proficiency and knowledge, but also an number of landings may endanger safety or reach a point
understanding of the landing pattern and the ability to of diminishing returns. One recommended technique
diagnose problems and offer corrective actions. Effective when training two pilots on the same flight is to alternate
instruction helps improve the TP’s understanding of how TPs in the landing pattern every 5 to 6 landings to reduce
the aircraft reacts under various situations as well as the fatigue and to allow the TP a chance to take a break and
“cause and effect” of various inputs or corrections. learn by observing the other TP. This would be especially
beneficial if one particular TP is having problems in the
Another challenging aspect of instructing in the pattern. IPs must be extremely vigilant to guard against
landing pattern is attempting to ascertain what complacency during extensive periods in the touch-and-
information a TP is seeing and processing in order to go pattern. IPs are encouraged to break monotony by
make corrections. Often TPs will fly based on diagnosis swapping TPs, departing the VFR pattern for an IFR
by the IP rather than seeing the deviation themselves and approach, or performing a landing for IP proficiency.
processing the information in order to make the required
change. One technique that can be effective is to ask the
TP how the aircraft is positioned at various checkpoints
VFR Landing Pattern
rather than telling them. The purpose of practicing VFR landings (see
figure 6-1) is to become proficient not only on the runway
The training syllabus gradesheets outline the but on the transition from an actual IFR approach.
types of landings required. The number of emergency Accordingly, the VFR “picture” should approximate that
landings should be at least one of each type. Ten to twelve seen on breakout from an IFR approach.
landings per student per flight is normally sufficient There are several keys to flying a consistently
considering the fatigue of the TP as well as that of the IP. good VFR approach and landing. The FRS teaches a
Do not belabor a point. If the TP has demonstrated descending–decelerating approach to a visual glide slope
satisfactory performance in normal landings, move on to and touchdown in a nose-high attitude with the power
levers at or near flight idle. Two of these keys are smooth
6-1
basic airwork and power lever/SHP control. Although Downwind Leg

smooth basic airwork generally comes with experience,
the TP should strive to make positive corrections and Upon entering downwind, the TP should give the
coordinated turns, using a combination instrument–visual touch-and-go brief. On subsequent VFR approaches the
scan to arrive on final looking at the same “picture” every TP can shorten the brief appropriately but should review
time. Small power adjustments in the P-3 may not be the SHP to be used on the “go” portion.
detected audibly, giving rise to the common tendency to
make rather large adjustments. The TP should be in- Note
structed to include the SHP gauges in his/her scan and to
allow each small power adjustment to take effect prior to • In the VFR pattern, the TP may use the TFE to
making an additional change. set power on takeoff, climb out, level off, and
The TP should be able to describe the VFR the initial power reduction off the 180 position.
landing pattern with correct altitudes and airspeed s. See During the remainder of the approach and
landing, the TP should make his own power
Figure 6-1, page 6-3.
While in the landing pattern, established airspeeds and adjustments. This requirement is a minimum
altitudes should be adhered to, this consisting of ± 5 knots and will enable the TP to learn the importance
of power control in developing smooth basic
and ± 100 feet of prescribed limits. Airspeed for the
approach is as published in the simplified schedule posted airwork. Additionally, the above requirement
in the cockpit, and the TFE shall call out the correct will allow the TFE to receive more practice in
setting SHP and scanning engine instruments.
airspeed associated with the type of landing being
executed.
• If extended on downwind, consideration should
be given to maintaining airspeed and pattern
Descent Procedures
altitude until intercepting a 3-degree
Discuss different types of descents. Check that glideslope.
the TP is using the checklists in a timely and correct
manner. The Descent and Approach checklists should be Base Leg
completed prior to entering the landing pattern. If the
Regardless of aircraft configuration, the landing
VFR pattern is entered immediately after the first takeoff
of the day, the climb checklist shall be completed to gear shall be lowered no later than abeam the intended
ensure the autofeather system is de-energized. The point of landing (first 1000 to 2000 feet of runway. The
Approach checklist shall be completed to obtain the TP should commence his turn off the 180 in order to fly a
proper landing speeds. consistent path over the ground, compensating for winds
as necessary. The use of VFR checkpoints is an excellent
way to promote a consistent path over the ground and
Pattern Entry
decrease the reliance on instruments. It also promotes a
better VFR scan for traffic and can help the TP ascertain
Every effort should be made to enter the VFR
pattern after an instrument approach has been completed. wind direction and its effect on the aircraft. A power
The use of VFR breaks or VFR downwind entries should reduction should be made off the 180 position so the
aircraft will decelerate in the descent. Various techniques
be kept to a minimum. If an instrument approach was not
previously executed, pattern entry is via the downwind are available as to the exact point at which a power
leg; at which point approach flaps need to be extended. reduction is made. Factors such as aircraft gross weight,
winds, pattern altitude, and extensions due to traffic
Premature flap extension will merely slow the aircraft
unnecessarily wasting fuel and instructional time. should be considered. Normally the power reduction is
made either just before or as the turn is initiated. The TP
should start a gradually descending, decelerating turn to
Note
reach the 90 degree position at roughly two-thirds pattern
When other aircraft are present in the VFR pattern, altitude. With a 1000 feet AGL pattern this will be the
notify the tower upon entering the pattern or when standard 600-700 feet AGL. However, with a higher
turning crosswind of the landing intentions, if pattern altitude (1200 or 1500 feet AGL) the downwind
other than a touch-and-go. This allows the follow- distance is slightly wider and the aircraft’s path over the
on interval to extend upwind for spacing and help ground is slightly longer. Thus, the 90-altitude checkpoint
maintain pattern integrity off the 180. needs to be a little higher (800 or 1000 feet AGL,
respectively). Emphasize use of the VSI in the base leg
turn and the importance of checking altitude and airspeed
6-2
Figure 1. Normal landing Pattern
6-3
before making a power adjustment. Minimum power Land Flap Landing

changes, coordinated turns, and proper use of trim are all
essential for a smooth base leg turn. If land flaps are used, they should be selected at
Minimize system quizzing once the Landing a comfortable distance from the landing threshold. Ideal
checklist has been initiated. land flap selection for a visual 3 degrees glide path will
occur at 200-300 feet AGL with airspeed tapering to 1.35
Common errors by the TP: VS. Elevator trim will be required (normally 15-20
degrees up) so that the nose will not feel unnecessarily
1. Fails to compensate at the abeam position for “heavy” when the flare is established. Without the proper
strong cross or axial winds. trim, the common tendency is to land flat. Caution the TP
that when land flaps are selected, the nose must remain
2. Climbs when the gear comes down. pointed down toward the intended point of landing to
prevent the rapid deceleration associated with level flight
3. Too much or too little power reduction at the 180. and land flaps. Once the flaps are full down, taper the
airspeed so as to enter the flare at 1.3 VS. The approach
4. Flat turn from 180 to 90 or too steep a turn from indexer (12 units AOA or doughnut) may be used as a
180. cross check when passing over the end of the runway. The
power should be reduced gradually as the nose is rotated
5. Inadequate crosswind correction. for the flare. The power–nose coordination in the flare is
critical to achieve a desirable rate of descent at
6. Drops land flaps too early, requiring excessive touchdown.
power to reach the runway.
Note
7. Fails to keep nose down after selecting land flaps • The touchdown point may be in the first third
causing airspeed to dissipate rapidly. of the runway. The TP should, however, strive
to land in the first 1000–2000 feet. This will
8. Power back to flight idle approaching the end of become increasingly important during adverse
the runway. weather conditions.
9. Fails to use instrument scan to backup visual • The importance of smooth power reduction and
references (i.e., airspeed, altitude, and VSI). nose attitude change while looking down the
runway to detect and control sink rate to
10. Fails to scan SHP gauges when making power touchdown cannot be overstressed.
changes in the base leg turn, resulting in too many
power adjustments. • Emphasize that the landing evolution is not a
mechanical process resulting in touchdown
Final with a predetermined power setting and nose
attitude.
At approximately 1/2 to 3/4 mile, 300-400 feet
AGL, the runway centerline and final glideslope should As the main gear touch down, retard the power
be intercepted. Alignment at this time is quite important levers to flight idle, if not already there, and lower the
since it will enable the TP to detect and correct for a nose gear gently to the runway. Once the nose wheel is on
crosswind. Lineup can most easily be achieved by having the runway, check speed below 135 knots and bring the
the TP “straddle” the centerline. The normal tendency is power levers over the ramp to the ground start position.
for the TP to line up left. The target airspeed range rolling After the Beta lights illuminate, reverse as necessary.
final should not fall below 1.35 VS with approach flaps Point out that reverse is most effective at high airspeeds
(1.3 VS with land flaps). Stress that it is not desirable to and that brakes are most effective at low speeds.
arrive at these speeds early on final approach and that Directional control should be maintained by rudder,
airspeed should be slowly tapered to the final flap aileron, and asymmetric power, then shifting to nose
configuration speed as the flare is established. wheel steering below 60 knots. Teach the TP the proper
Touchdown normally occurs 6-8 knots below this speed. use of the brakes by giving them an opportunity to use the
brakes to varying degrees.
6-4
Note
• Stress the importance of centerline control on
8. Overly cautious coming into ground range.
landing rollout.
9. Places hand on nose wheel too early on rollout, or
• In the FRS, the TP is taught to use normal re-
fails to use nose wheel steering.
versing techniques (i.e., use reverse power as
10. Releases crosswind control inputs at touchdown.
necessary to stop the aircraft in the available
field length) for all normal and emergency
11. TP attempts to reverse above 135 KIAS.
landings. They are also introduced to the criti-
cal field length reversal technique for normal
and emergency landings. Approach Flap Landing
This maneuver is a good warm-up for a no-flap
Common errors: landing as rate of descent and airspeed must be controlled
more closely. The approach flap landing is a normal
1. TP flares too high, floats, and/or lands long. maneuver that should be considered when high
crosswinds are present or during periods of low visibility
Note when touchdown point and ground roll distance is not a
• It is recommended that the aircraft not be problem. Touch-and-go landings can be made in an ap-
allowed to touchdown past the first third of proach flap configuration, but because of higher rollout
the runway. airspeeds, be careful not to allow the TP to rotate if the
• Although the IP may elect to allow TP to land
SHP is low (minimum 2500), regardless of speed attained.
Consideration should be given to calculating your ground
the aircraft past the first third of the runway,
roll distance and brief the co-pilot on calling airspeed
he must be mindful of remaining runway
below 135 knots for reversal on full stop approach flap
length (especially less than 5000 feet
landings.
remaining) if a touch and go is going to be
attempted.
Crosswind Landings
2. TP spots the deck and does not flare. The TP should already know the proper
crosswind landing procedures. The wing-down/top-rudder
3. TP chops power in the flare. method is best unless the component is severe, when a
combination of crab/wing-down is better, as described in
WARNING NATOPS.
This is one of the more dangerous situations and Right Seat Landings
could result in severe damage to the aircraft should
Landing from the right seat is introduced in the
it be allowed to impact the ground. The IP should
PPP syllabus and is a main focal point during PPC
take the aircraft, immediately apply power and
upgrading. All landing patterns and procedures remain
execute a waveoff. Do not try to salvage a bad
the same with the exception of the pilot at controls (PAC)
landing.
is manipulating the flaps, plus both the flaps and trim
during the touch-and-go. The upgrading flight engineer
Note should also gain valuable experience of operating the
The IP shall have his hands on top of the power opposite set of power levers during touch-and-go
levers to prevent excessive movement. landings. A common trend is to land right of centerline in
a slight skid.
4. Flares too late.
Power Setting Selection
5. Lands left of centerline.
Reduced power takeoffs should be performed
6. Lands in a skid (usually left or into a crosswind). whenever possible to preserve turbine life. Power settings
should be based on gross weight, runway length and
7. Fails to close-out power levers when main mounts environmental conditions. TIT should be reduced as
are on the runway. gross weight permits to produce a minimum of 3000 SHP
while not exceeding 1010 TIT provided aircraft
6-5
performance does not result in runway length or climb this area, an OFT session should be scheduled to reinforce
performance becoming critical. It is recommended that the importance of runway SA.
takeoff or touch-and-go power be reduced from 3500 to
3000 SHP when aircraft weight has decreased to 95,000
or 90,000 lbs. depending on runway length. Power shall WARNING
not be reduced to less than 3000 SHP for takeoffs or
touch-and-go's. • Simulated emergencies or malfunctions prior to
rotate shall not be given on touch-and-go landings
Stop-And-Go Landings except during the PPC Defensive Flying event,
PPC check rides, or IUT events.
The stop-and-go landing is a time saving
evolution and may be used whenever practicable. A • EFARs during a touch-and-go landing are
minimum of 6,000 feet of usable runway remaining is prohibited.
required for the “go” portion. Simulated emergencies may
be practiced on the “go” portion. • Simulated malfunctions shall not be given during a
While executing stop-and-go landings, it is not no-flap touch-and-go or landing.
desirable to conduct the entire abbreviated Takeoff
checklist while on the runway. Before initiating the “go” Note
portion, the IP and IFE shall ensure the following are
completed: Failing the flap indicator during co-pilot duties for an
upgrading pilot while the IP is at the controls is valid
1. Flaps ⎯ Takeoff. training and is authorized.
2. Trim (rudder and elevator) ⎯ Reset.
Any emergency or malfunction given during a
3. Rudder boost shutoff valve circuit breaker (K13)
touch-and-go shall be simple and specific with an obvious
⎯ Reset.
course of action. (Example: IP call “EDC Press Low LT #
4. Oil coolers ⎯ Set. 3” with power levers at flight idle.) These emergencies
should evaluate the upgrader’s situational awareness
Touch-And-Go Landings during a critical stage of flight. It is strongly
recommended that an IUT IP be scheduled for the PPC
Four-engine land flap, approach flap, and no-flap
Defensive Flying event. The IP giving a malfunction
are the only authorized configurations for performing
during a touch-and-go should be prepared to take the
touch-and-go landings. Under normal situations all other
controls should the upgrader delay his/her decision or
configurations will be made to a full stop. No-flap touch-
proceed with a decision that could jeopardize flight
and-go landings should only be conducted during
safety.
remedial training, IP DFWs, or on annual NATOPS
events for qualified pilots. Syllabus events that call for a
Note
no-flap landing shall be done to a full stop. Prior to
rotating off any type of touch-and-go, flaps and trim shall • Instructors are encouraged to use runway
be reset as necessary with a minimum of 2500 SHP set markers to determine actual VR capabilities as
prior to initiating rotation. governed by environmental conditions.
Malfunctions During Touch-And- • Any time the IP determines the aircraft cannot
be stopped with the available runway remaining
Go Landings a “refusal” call should be made to alleviate any
Should an actual malfunction occur prior to confusion on the part of the other pilot.
rotate, an abort may cause more of a hazard than
reestablishing flight. The IP must immediately evaluate Engine Out Landing Training
the nature of the malfunction, aircraft’s speed, current
power setting, and runway remaining in order to make the Simulated engine-out training and no-flap
decision to abort or continue the takeoff. Each IP should training is prohibited during hours of darkness. Simulated
have a well thought out plan for the safest course of two-engine approaches and landings shall be conducted
action. Hangar flying discussions are crucial to during day, VMC only.
developing a pilot’s runway SA and decision making. If
an upgrading pilot displays sub-standard performance in
6-6
Three-engine and no-flap approach training is the Beta range and releasing a power lever at the IP’s
permissible during daylight hours provided the ceiling is command. Ensure the TP knows the difference between a
1,000 feet and the visibility is 3 miles or better. favorable and an unfavorable wind with respect to landing
and rollout. If necessary a turn may be made at pattern
For both three-engine landings and two-engine altitude to give the TP time to set up for the approach.
landings the following requirements exist:
Note
1. Runway length ⎯ 6,000 feet minimum. If the TP is trimming properly throughout a three
engine approach, the rudder trim setting should be
2. Runway width ⎯ 150 feet minimum. relatively neutral prior to touchdown.
3. Consider crosswind ⎯ More than 5 to 10 knots Once the aircraft is on the runway, the TP should
crosswind component requires extra caution. bring all power levers over the ramp. After scanning for
all four beta lights, the IP may call for the power lever on
4. Runway condition ⎯ Sufficiently dry to prevent the “failed engine.” The TP should then release the power
skidding or hydroplaning. lever and continue to reverse with the “operating”
engines, counteracting the tendency to swerve with
Simulated Three Engine Landing rudder, aileron into the failed engine, and forward yoke
pressure. When the speed has decreased to the point
The IP should initiate a simulated emergency where directional control cannot be maintained with the
situation which normally requires an engine to be flight controls, but the speed is still too high to use nose
shutdown. The student shall initiate the Emergency wheel steering, ease the asymmetric engine out of reverse
Shutdown checklist by performing the memory items and to maintain centerline. Another technique at this speed is
then call for the checklist. The IP will retard the power to bring the power levers out of maximum reverse
lever to 175 SHP to simulate a feathered engine and will towards ground idle. This creates renewed airflow over
report: “Emergency Shutdown checklist simulated the rudder, extending its effectiveness. After the aircraft
complete down to APU”. The students will then report has slowed further, a combination of reverse, brakes, and
whether or not the APU is required. nose wheel steering can be used to complete the landing
rollout.
Explain to the TP that the pattern and airspeeds Centerline control is extremely important
for the three engine landing do not differ from those for a throughout final and during the landing ground roll. The
normal approach and landing. The aircraft responds to IP should scan primarily down the runway, but be alert
total power and with one engine out, the horsepower lost for an actual emergency. Being off centerline will only
must be added to the three operating engines. Stress the put the IP further behind the aircraft. Additionally, the TP
importance of being ahead of the aircraft on power calls learns little about directional control if “transiting” (as
and concentrating on flying the aircraft first, then opposed to established on) centerline.
handling the emergency and briefing the copilot.
Common errors:
Note
Stress that practice normal and emergency 1. TP does not bring failed engine power lever into
landings (three-engine, two-engine, and no-flap) the BETA range, or is reluctant to use asymmetric
are conducted in the VFR pattern from a 180 posi- reverse once in the ground range.
tion in order to maximize available training time, Note
and in most cases the preferred method would be
to accomplish an emergency landing from an • IP should use a hand position that maintains
extended final position. Practice engine-out and contact with all four power levers during the
no-flap GCAs are considered excellent training entire landing evolution.
techniques.
• IP must ensure the “dropped” power lever is
A brief by the TP should be given on the in the ground range.
downwind leg to include all of the NATOPS required
brief items. The TP’s brief should cover anticipated use of 2. TP uses nose wheel steering and/or brakes at high
the flight controls, power levers, nose wheel steering, and speed.
brakes based on existing wind and runway conditions.
The TP should brief bringing all four power levers into 3. TP reverses with the wrong engine.
6-7
Simulated Two Engine Landing needed on the remaining engines. Touchdown as in a

normal landing. After the nose wheel is on the runway,
The requirements, procedures and general briefs listed for the TP should bring all power levers over the ramp. After
three engine landings also apply for two-engine landings. scanning for all four beta lights, the IP may call for the
The two-engine landing is normally started from a power lever on the “failed engines.” The TP should then
position downwind. release those power levers and continue to reverse with
the “operating” engines, counteracting any tendency to
swerve with rudder, aileron, and forward yoke pressure.
WARNING Stress the importance of anticipating and coordinating
aileron and rudder application to maintain centerline
The second engine should not be failed until throughout final/landing ground roll evolution. The flight
established at pattern altitude. Downwind control/power lever technique during reverse is essentially
speed should be maintained above 160 knots the same as on a three engine landing (i.e., use the flight
with approach flaps or l.52 VS in the clean controls for directional control, then asymmetric power
configuration. once the flight controls begin to lose their effectiveness).
The discussion will arise regarding when to taper Note

airspeed below 1.35VS/145 knots or exactly when the
Emphasize to the TP that the outboard operating
“landing is assured”. The 1.35 VS/145 knot airspeed
engine will be the primary cause of control
should be maintained to ensure an adequate margin above
problems.
VMC AIR in the event of a waveoff. Tapering the airspeed
below 1.35 VS/145 knots essentially eliminates the
The IP may introduce symmetrical two-engine
waveoff option unless altitude can be traded for airspeed.
out failures prior to asymmetrical engine out training, if
The need for an actual two engine waveoff is perhaps
dictated by the environment or if desiring power control
overemphasized in the training environment and would
training for the TP. When practicing these types of sym-
probably be attempted only if the approach was too high
metric landings, the additional points of waveoff capa-
and too fast. If the opposite situation occurred, the pilot
bilities and non-applicability of the 145 knot minimum
should be committed to land and hopefully, close enough
airspeed need to be addressed. If at any time a waveoff is
to add some power and make the runway. The point at
required, the IP should take the aircraft and climb using
which the landing is assured is the product of sound
all four power levers.
judgment. The pilot should consider the following:
1. Is the Landing checklist complete? No-Flap Landing

A flap asymmetry, elevator boost out, flap
2. Is the existing SHP commensurate to a two engine
control cable problem, or loss of both hydraulic systems
landing?
may make the no-flap landing necessary. The TP should
give the no-flap landing brief when on downwind. The IP
3. Am I on or near normal visual glideslope? shall ensure that the rudder boost shutoff valve circuit
breaker is pulled and the TFE shall compute landing
4. Am I in a position to intercept the extended run- ground roll distance prior to commencing approach phase.
way centerline without using excessive angle of
bank? For no flap landings for training, the following
requirements exist:
5. Have I obtained landing clearance?
Note
TPs may assume that in an actual two-engine 2. Runway width ⎯ 150 feet minimum.
approach there would be no conflicting VFR
traffic. Consequently, they should not delay their 3. Consider crosswind ⎯ More than 5 to 10 knots
deceleration to landing speeds because of another crosswind component requires extra caution.
VFR interval (e.g., “cleared to follow, cleared
number 2, continue”). 4. Runway condition ⎯ Sufficiently dry to prevent
On final and assuming the landing can be made,
select land flaps at the pilot’s discretion and reset SHP as
6-8
Note causes high sink rates. Waveoff in this

situation.
Sound judgment should prevail when the TP briefs
a go-around point for this landing. Even though
Watch for the TP who flies a beautiful approach
the ground roll distance may be less than 4000
and then drops the nose wheel to the deck. Fly the nose
feet, few pilots would consider the “four board” an
wheel gently to the deck and check the airspeed. The TP
appropriate waveoff point for a 12,000 feet
should brief the copilot to call the airspeed “below 135
runway. Pilots should strive to land in the first
knots.” This restriction reduces the possibility of decouple
1000 to 2000 feet, and certainly within the first
or pitchlock.
third of the runway.
No-flap landings will be conducted in the aircraft for WARNING
training purposes in accordance with the following:
Guard against the TP who tries to reverse or even
1. During scheduled upgrade syllabus flights which pick up the power levers above 135 knots. With
call for no-flap landing. hands on top of the power levers and a slight
downward pressure, the IP can easily prevent
2. On NATOPS evaluation flights. upward movement.
3. IPs should maintain proficiency in accordance Extreme caution should be used to ensure that
with current guidance, to include no-flap landing pitchlock or decouple does not occur while going into the
demonstrations as required on the above flights. Beta range. The TFE should scan fuel flow, RPM and
SHP for proper indications. Comment on the excessive
4. No-flap landings will not be practiced above amount of runway used while landing at high speeds.
103,880 lb. (or above 91,320 lb. on lightweight Stress smooth application and the effectiveness of reverse
aircraft). at high speeds as compared to brakes. Brakes may be
applied as the aircraft slows. Syllabus events that call for
The approach may be slightly wider throughout. a no-flap landing shall be done to a full stop. Figure 6-2
Altitude checkpoints in the pattern are the same as for is provided to indicate the landing ground roll distance for
normal patterns though the approach may be flatter due to a no-flap landing. Values are based on moderate wheel
a deeper track flown over the ground. Review the pattern braking, zero wind and zero slope.
airspeeds with the TP. Because of reduced drag less SHP
will be required to fly this particular pattern and approach. Airspeeds in excess of 135 knots on touchdown
Taper the speed in the base leg turn to arrive on final at will significantly increase the runway required. For
1.2 VS (minimum 135 knots). instance a touchdown speed of 145 knots may require an
Use power as necessary and fly the aircraft to additional 1000-1500 feet of runway to allow airspeed to
touchdown. Ensure the TP understands the relationship decrease below 135 knots and initiate reversal. Airspeed
between nose attitude and airspeed, plus power settings in excess of 1.2Vs at the landing ground roll distance
and rate of decent. A normal flare is not used. remaining is to fast and a waveoff should be executed. If
a no-flap approach is continued to a landing past the
WARNING maximum intended touchdown point, a normal reversal
may be insufficient to stop the aircraft on the runway
unless hard wheel braking is used. The preferred
• Beware of the TP who arrives at the 90 low alternative would be to execute a touch and go. In either
and slow. An abrupt pull on the yoke may put of the above cases, if the aircraft touches down, the IP
the aircraft close to stall buffet speed. Power- should take the controls.
off stall buffet speed for 100,000 lb., 30
degrees AOB, and flaps up is approximately
132 knots. WARNING
• Emphasize that a no-flap landing is a deferred

emergency and there is no commitment to If a waveoff is warranted from a no-flap approach, be
land on the first pass. Beware of larger power aware of a substantial nose-up pitch with the addition of
changes on final, especially from the TP waveoff power, in close proximity to the runway, a
correcting from a high and fast final.. tailstrike could occurs.
Retarding the power levers rapidly on final
6-9
OAT 80000 LB. 85000 LB. 90000 LB. 95000 LB. 103880 LB.
300 C 3760 feet 4010 feet 4260 feet 4600 feet 5420 feet
Figure 6-2. No-Flap Landing Ground Roll Distance
Common TP errors: 4. Runway condition ⎯ Sufficiently dry to prevent

1. Not referencing or flying 1.52Vs or 1.2 Vs
minimum speeds. Until the point of reverse or go, all no-flap
landings shall be conducted in the same manner.
2. Slow (below 135) close to runway with insufficient
NATOPS 16-1 shall be briefed, landing ground roll
correction.
distance calculated, and K-13 pulled. [In the event of
3. Landing long or fast. multiple touch-and-go’s, 16-1 need not be briefed each
time as long as no major changes occur between
4. Not flying the nosewheel to the deck.
approaches (i.e. Runway change)] and the approaches are
done consecutively. The IP shall hold the student to the
No-Flap Touch-and-Go same standards for touch-and-go’s and full stops. (i.e. do
not allow touch-and-go’s to be landed if a full stop would
The purpose of No-Flap touch and go’s is to
be waved-off.)
provide extra training to upgrading students that exhibit
difficulty with the profile of a no-flap approach, while
For the touch-and-go, the student shall land,
reducing full stops for aircraft fatigue life purposes. They
close-out the power levers and fly the nosewheel to the
may also be used to supplement training to ensure
deck. The IP should roll in “1 – 2 handfuls” of nose-down
qualified pilots have proficiency in the maneuver.
trim, wait until below 135 kts and then call “go”. The
However, it is important to note that students must have
student will then call for 3000 SHP. Once the aircraft has
adequate training for no-flap full stops. To this end, if a
reached 1.2Vs speed, the IP will call rotate. The student
gradesheet calls for a no-flap landing the student should
and IP should be aware of the tendency for the nose to
perform at least one no-flap to a full stop. Annual (not
pitch towards 8 to 10 degrees up, and fly the aircraft
Initial) NATOPS checks may use a touch-and-go in lieu
smoothly off the deck.
of a full stop. If an upgrading pilot has no deficiencies
with the no-flap approach, they should only perform the
Reset K-13 once safely established on the climb
specified number of no-flap landings in the syllabus, all to
out. Be alert for possible valid RAWS warnings after
a full stop. The following paragraphs will discuss the
gear retraction.
procedures, cautions and notes associated with the
maneuver. The teaching points discussed for a no flap
In the case of a waveoff / go around, execute
landing are still pertinent as well as the added notes.
procedures as normal (just like an approach flap waveoff),
without the addition of trim, being cognizant of the
For no-flap touch-and-go training the following
increased nose-up pitch. This should be accomplished as
requirements exist:
soon as it is realized the aircraft cannot remain within safe
no-flap parameters prior to touchdown.
2. Runway width ⎯ 150 feet minimum. WARNING

3. Consider crosswind ⎯ More than 5 to 10 knots If a waveoff is warranted from a no-flap approach, be
crosswind component requires extra caution. aware of a substantial nose-up pitch with the addition
of waveoff power, in close proximity to the runway, a
tailstrike could occur.
6-10
altitude is usually higher than normal pattern altitude.

Having to execute a “go” after placing the While proceeding inbound to the field, locate other traffic
aircraft on deck due to insufficient runway remaining is a in the pattern to ensure separation since visual contact
likely situation a pilot would encounter on a no-flap may likely be lost during the break. The break may be
landing should be taught on PPC F5 defensive flying performed power-on or power-off.
event
Power On Break
Cautions:
When in position and cleared for the break, the
1. The nose will have a tendency to pitch up at rotate. pilot should make a coordinated roll into a 60 degrees
The student and IP shall guard against over- AOB (less AOB may be used) turn. The power which was
rotation, IAW the no-flap brief in the JOB AID. set prior to the break should be maintained through 180
degrees of turn. The pilot should maintain altitude;
however, his or her primary scan should be outside of the
2. The IP shall be cognizant of landing ground-roll
distance and airspeed at all times when on the aircraft keeping the nose on the horizon. As the TP rolls
approach and runway. In the event of an actual wings level on downwind, the power levers should be
reduced to flight idle and maneuver flaps selected. When
malfunction or student error, the IP shall be
prepared to take the controls and abort or go established on downwind, start the descent while selecting
depending on the situation. gear down (at 1 G) and complete the landing checklist.
With gear down and airspeed less than 190 KIAS the
flaps should be selected to approach. The remainder of the
Note
approach is conducted just as a normal VFR landing.
This is not a DFW practice maneuver, but may be
used during non-initial NATOPS checks, IPDFWs, Power Off Break
or dedicated syllabus events. Rotate at the 1.2 Vs
speed. When in position and cleared for the break, the
pilot should make a coordinated roll into a 60 degrees
AOB turn and simultaneously retard the power levers to
WARNING flight idle. The pilot should maintain altitude through 180
degrees of turn; however, his or her primary scan should
Simulated malfunctions shall not be given during a be outside of the aircraft keeping the nose on the horizon.
no-flap touch-and-go or landing. As the TP rolls wings level on downwind, select
maneuver flaps and start the descent while selecting gear
Common student errors: down (at 1 G). Complete the Landing checklist. With
gear down and airspeed less than 190 KIAS the flaps
1. Landing long and/or fast should be selected to approach. The remainder of the
approach is conducted just as a normal VFR landing.
2. Not closing out the power levers.
WARNING
3. Calling for flaps and trim.
Instructor pilots need to be aware of the increase in
4. Not flying the nosewheel to the deck.
stall speed associated with high angle of bank and high
5. Over-rotation. G turns. Zero thrust stall speed for a 100,000 LB
aircraft is 162 knots at 60 degrees AOB (2 G’s) and
198 knots at 70 degrees AOB (3 G’s). Refer to figure
VFR BREAK 5-1.
It is strongly encouraged that an instrument
approach be utilized for pattern entry in order to provide CAUTION
valuable instrument training for pilots. However, the
VFR break usually provides the most expeditious means Remember the restriction of 190 KIAS to extend the
of entering the landing pattern, and is an excellent basic gear at greater than 1 G.
air work drill and confidence building maneuver. The
VFR break is a standardized maneuver not to exceed 60
degrees AOB or 250 knots. If a break is to be conducted,
the altitude should conform to local directives. Break
6-11
6-12
6-13
6-14
6-15
6-16
Counter Threat Training
CHAPTER 7
Counter Threat Training Procedures

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ...................................................................7-1 Spiraling Departure.................................................. 7-3

CTT Basics ....................................................................7-1 Counter Threat Maneuvering........................................ 7-3
Definitions and Equipment Limitations....................7-1 Combat Arrivals............................................................ 7-4
Permissible Flight Envelope & Applicable Limits ...7-1 Steep Arrival............................................................ 7-4
ORM Considerations .....................................................7-2 Spiral Arrival ........................................................... 7-5
Combat Departure..........................................................7-2
Low-Level Departure................................................7-2
overstress. It is therefore imperative that the operator in

Introduction: normal circumstances make control inputs that are smooth
and conservative (i.e. 2 seconds or greater to complete the
The purpose of this chapter is to standardize instruction input).
for conducting Counter Threat Training (CTT) during in-
flight and OFT evolutions. It contains training and The cockpit g meter has limitations: it does not indicate
instructional techniques that support actual maneuvers the Gs occurring at critical aircraft structure points, and it
delineated in the P-3 NTTP. The dynamic and does not indicate accurately during short duration or
challenging maneuvers require the instructor to ensure the highly dynamic Gs. Based upon observed performance, it
aircraft remains within the flight envelope at all times. does not accurately mirror data reported by the SDRS.
CTT is a training evolution not to exceed the limits of Because of these limitations, it is, at best, only a cross-
NATOPS/NAVAIR restrictions. The aim is to provide reference tool. Illumination of the flight station SDRS
proper procedures to train pilots to safely and confidently “tattletale” light is the only accurate means of determining
operate the P-3 aircraft in a threat environment, while not whether 2.5 G has been exceeded. Pending the
exceeding the aircraft envelope. This training installation of more advanced equipment (a flight station
encompasses not only basic airwork, but also Operational digital SDRS repeater) the operator must rely on proper
Risk Management (ORM) and Crew Resource control inputs to avoid exceeding aircraft flight envelope
Management (CRM). It is imperative both during this limitations. Reference CPRG INST 4790.9 for guidance
training and in the operational environment that the on utilization of the SDRS.
operator be concerned with its impact on P-3 Fleet Life
Expectancy (FLE). While Tactics, Techniques, and Note
Procedures are presented for discussion and exposure,
actual operational maneuvers are classified and can be 2.5Gs is max. If the SDRS “tattletale” illuminates in
referenced either in NTTP 3-22.5, Chapter 9, or by the flight station, CTT shall cease and the mission
consulting the appropriate CTG SIPR website. should be aborted. Sound ORM and aircrew
judgement should apply to the same scenario during
an operational mission.
CTT Basics
1) Definitions and equipment limitations: 2) Permissible flight envelope & applicable
limits:
Control Inputs at High Airspeed- As per NATOPS Ch.
10.3.3.1, abrupt pitch inputs at high airspeeds (above 300 Practice of steep turns (i.e., greater than 45° AOB in
KIAS) should be avoided. This discussion was based accordance with CTM) should be conducted at a moderate
upon a 3.0 G airframe limitation, not the current more aircraft weight and at a minimum altitude of 4,000’ AGL.
restrictive limits. Due to the 2.5 G limitation, abrupt Practice steep turns shall never be attempted unless
inputs even at speeds at or below 300 KIAS will cause an
7-1
Condition V has been set and the practice maneuvers have 1. Request a low-altitude departure with ATC.
been thoroughly briefed. 2. Complete Takeoff checklist, Takeoff Brief, and
Combat Departure brief. Reference 1.52Vs.
Note
All CTT maneuvers in the aircraft shall be conducted TIP: Mark the GPS when on the runway prior to takeoff
only during daylight, VMC conditions. Simulated for reference during arrival.
malfunctions shall not be given in the aircraft during
CTT maneuvers. An example of a combat departure brief:
“Copilot, ensure Auto Feather is secured and landing
BOTTOM LINE: Absent a serious emergency (i.e. lights are retracted when you select gear up. Arm CMDS
aircraft under imminent or actual enemy fire) once airborne. I’ll call for flaps to maneuver, then up as
exceeding 2.5 Gs / 300 KIAS is not acceptable! we accelerate and level at 500’ AGL, I’ll maneuver to
sector ___. When clean, call airspeed every 10 knots on
ORM Considerations acceleration and on the climb out. At 250 knots smoothly
pitch 15º nose up, and relax to 10º when 10 knots above
Example teaching/discussing points (not all- 1.52Vs. Once stabilized in the climb, I’ll call for Climb
inclusive) : Checklist. We’ll set Condition IV once established in the
1. Current airfield diagrams (USAF TACARDs) can be climb.”
found on the CAOC website. These are very useful
to familiarize crews with the actual procedures in use Note
for their respective AOR. In an operational setting, all speeds may be used
2. Utilize squadron / wing intel resources- Have there within NATOPS limitations. 250 KIAS is set as the
been any recent SAFIRE reports? What is the nature limit for training to comply with FAR airspeed
and engagement envelope of the anti-aircraft threat in restrictions and to provide a margin of safety for
the area? overstress during the climb transition.
3. Maneuvering below threat envelope? In threat
envelope/beneath MOSA? At what point does the 3. After rotate, disarm autofeather, retract the landing
risk of performing a given maneuver outweigh the gear and flaps climb to 500’ AGL and accelerate to
anti-aircraft threat? 250 KIAS. While transiting to “safe area” turns no
4. Equipment/tool familiarity and application: CMDS, greater than 45˚ AOB may be executed to simulate
MWS, TACAN/VOR, engine run-up/darken low-level maneuvering.
ship/strobes/windows, mark the numbers for NAV
(GPS coordinates for referencing 1nm from the
approach runway threshold) WARNING
5. Discuss potential emergencies (supplement with
HAZREPs): Failure to secure autofeather after takeoff may lead to
a. Fire warning in the descent: 18k’, 6000fpm inadvertant engine shutdown if power levers are
ROD? retarded and then re-advanced.
b. Single or Dual EDC failure overland?
c. Incoming missile and CRM. 4. When appropriate point is reached, announce
“Standby tactical climb” to crew. Then smoothly (2˚-
Combat Departure 3˚ per second of pitch rate) transition the nose to 15˚
nose up. Set power as desired (950 TIT
Combat departures are challenging and dynamic
recommended at training weights). When 10 knots
maneuvers that require thorough coordination and
above desired speed (1.52 Vs or climb scheduled),
training. The two techniques that will be presented here
lower the nose to 10˚ nose up, and then set pitch
are the low-level departure and the spiraling departure.
attitude as required to maintain desired speed while
Tactical Priority:
climbing to desired altitude. It is important to
1. Minimize time in threat envelope
emphasize that it is NOT desirable to target 2.0 G in
2. Randomize departure sector
the climb transition. The above outlined gentle
transition will not result in appreciably decreased
Low-Level Departure- This departure allows the climb performance from a 2 G pull-up. An
aircraft to quickly transit through a possible threat area overaggressive pull-up will result in increased G-
enroute to onstation. induced drag, actually decreasing climb
7-2
performance, as well as bringing aircraft G-loading Counter Threat Maneuvering

close to the 2.5 G overstress limit.
Practice Counter Threat Manevuers should be performed
Note on upgrade syllabus flights to teach proper execution of
basic P-3 defensive tactics. All maneuvers should be
Climb airspeed is at aircrew discretion. 1.52 Vs (12 thoroughly briefed prior to the flight with reference to the
units AOA) will result in a faster climb to any NATOPS, Chapter 10, and the NTTP, Chapter 9. Stall
altitude, whereas climb scheduled airspeed allows speeds shall be computed IAW Chapter 27 and stall
greater margin above stall in case evasive recovery procedures briefed.
maneuvering is required. In no cases should a climb
at speeds less than 1.52 Vs be attempted, because of The specifics of each manuever are classified SECRET
small margin above stall and the possibility of and are discussed in detail in the NTTP. However, certain
inducing an engine fire warning. teaching points apply to all of these maneuvers:
5. Inspect SDRS for overstress indications. 1. Random altitude changes present the greatest risk for
aircraft damage and injury to personnel. Limit pitch
Teaching points: CRM, air work, smooth climb inputs to 2 seconds for full yoke deflection. During
transition. Stress ICS discipline. slow inputs, the yoke forces resisting elevator
movement will remain sufficient and the G buildup
TIP: Climb to an altitude that will allow immediate will appear to follow the pilot’s inputs.
commencement of a steep arrival. 2. The flight station G meter does not provide adequate
warning of high G loading. It should be referenced
Common errors: as a cross-check. Proper teaching of control inputs
1. Abrupt nose pull-up leading to overstress and the SDRS tattletale light are the most accurate
2. Autofeather not secured ways of protecting the aircraft from overstress.
3. TP allows airspeed to decrease excessively during the 3. At manuevering speed (GW +110), it is possible to
climb reach 2.5 G before the onset of stall buffet.
4. Poor airwork at low altitude 4. All manuevers shall be conducted during daylight
5. Failing to notify crew prior to climb VMC, with minimum altitude of 4000’ AGL.
5. During maneuvers that call for a descent in
Spiraling Departure- This techinque is designed conjunction with steep AOB turns, the operator must
to allow the aircraft to safely climb within a notional be alert to both the possibilty of a rolling pull-out, as
sanitized area. well exceeding 300 KIAS and 2.5 G as the aircraft
transitions back to level flight.
Coordinate with tower for a spiraling departure Set 6. During level altitude maneuvers, it is important to
reduced power to simulate heavy weight takeoff impress upon the TP that during an actual combat
conditions and provide a good VFR sight picture. Rotate engagement, it may be desirable in some cases to
on normal takeoff speed schedule, raise the landing gear, sacrifice altitude for rate of turn. This unloading of
and allow the aircraft to accelerate. At 160 KIAS, roll the aircraft will further prevent both entering stall
into a 45˚ AOB turn and climb to briefed altitude. Secure buffet and excursions above 2.5 G. However, an
autofeather, and simulate CMDS arming. When altitude excessive altitude loss may put the aircraft in greater
is reached execute climb checklist and depart as danger due to entering the envelope for different
necessary. weapons, or by increasing the effectiveness of the
weapon being countered. Operational Flight Crews
will have to weigh these conflicting requirements.
WARNING Climb back above appropriate minimum altitude after
threat has been defeated.
Failure to secure autofeather after takeoff may lead to
inadvertant engine shutdown if power levers are Any crewmember may call “knock-it-off” for any of the
retarded and then re-advanced. following reasons:
Common Errors
1. Not maintaining aircraft over safe area due to poor 1. Airsickness
airwork or outside scan 2. SDRS “tattletale” light illuminates.
2. Autofeather not secured 3. Gear becomes adrift
3. Exceeding takeoff / approach flaps speed at top of 4. Condition V is broken
climb
7-3
in the OFT to specific operational fields, utilizing various

WARNING daylight and visibility conditions. This time is a great
opportunity to introduce various emergencies during
Aircrew have been severely injured by not setting or arrivals and departures (i.e. engine failure, FOUO, loss of
maintaining Condition V during maneuvers. pressurization, incoming enemy fire).
4. To begin the descent, configure and pitch about 25°-

Note 30° nose down. At about 255 KIAS transition to
2.5Gs is max. If the SDRS “tattletale” illuminates in approximately 10˚ nose down. The VSI should be
the flight station, CTT shall cease and the mission pegged. With maneuver flaps the recommended
should be aborted. Sound ORM and aircrew airspeed is 250 KIAS – this gives a margin below
judgement should apply to the same scenario during maximum flap speed.
an operational mission.
5. Copilot duties are important- the arrival is not a
single-piloted evolution, and should not be trained to
Combat Arrival as such. The copilot must back up the pilot on
Combat arrivals are dynamic, demanding maneuvers that airspeed, altitude, altimeter settings, and whether or
require thorough training and coordination. Both steep not the aircraft is ahead/behind of the desired descent
arrivals and spiraling arrivals are presented here as valid profile.
techniques.
6. Early analysis of the descent is important- If the
Tactical Priority: aircraft is high, S-turns (limited to 45°AOB) or a slip
1. Maneuver to a safe position to land the aircraft (limited to 15°of sideslip) can be attempted to lose
2. Minimize time in threat envelope altitude. If this is unsuccessful, it is imperative for
the flight crew to recognize it and proceed with an
Steep Arrival: alternate plan. Examples include:
1. Request tactical arrival with appropriate ATC.
a. Power-off break
b. Enter a downwind for opposite runway (traffic
2. Complete the Descent, Approach, and Landing
permitting)
checklist before commencing descent. Brief
c. A 360˚ turn
configuration (gear down/ maneuver flaps
recommended).
If the aircraft is ahead on profile 300-400 SHP on each
engine may be added as necessary to arrest the rate of
3. Coordinate MOSA with NAVCOM and SS3.
descent. It is generally undesirable to arrive at altitude far
from the runway as this causes the aircraft to spend longer
Profile:
in a possible threat envelope.
1000’ to 1 + 5 nm is recommended for initial training.
1 to 1 requires multiple S-turns, unless the headwind is TIP: It takes 3-4 miles to slow the airspeed 100 knots
significant. with power at flight idle. Keep this in mind when
crosschecking DME/altitude/VSI/groundspeed. Use the
Recommend slowing initially to 1.52 Vs to allow for GPS to give an accurate distance from the runway
greater rate of descent initially. If slowing is undesirable threshold (often more accurate than TACAN DME)
due to possible threat, recommend maintaining at least
GW +110 KIAS. 7. If a safe approach cannot be made- WAVEOFF.
Recommend using Gear down/maneuver flaps 8. Inspect SDRS for overstress indications.
configuration.
Checkpoints are helpful and should be used to ensure that WARNING

the aircraft is remaining on profile: Use the GPS mark
from the departure and reference 1 nm from the approach Rates of descent in excess of 3000 fpm are normal
end of the active runway for the arrival. Ultimately the and allow the aircraft to exit the threat envelope as
aircraft should be at normal approach speeds and on a soon as possible. Failure to transition to a normal
normal glideslope 2 miles from the end of the runway. landing profile can result in excessively hard
Prior to deployment aircrews should practice the arrivals landings. Execute a waveoff in this situation.
7-4
Common errors:
1. Overspeeding the gear or flaps
2. Not aggressive enough with initial nose-down
maneuver
3. Improper distance and altitude calculation
4. Incomplete checklists, briefs, etc.
5. Excessive speed on final leading to float down
runway or excessive touchdown speed
6. Not recognizing an unsafe situation
Spiral arrival- this technique allows the aircraft to

descend over a given sanitized area, minimizing exposure
to enemy ground fire.
1. Coordinate a spiraling arrival with ATC. Complete

all Descent, Approach and Landing checklists.
2. Select approach or land flaps and roll into a 45 ˚

AOB turn (recommend 145 KIAS and land flaps for
training). Maneuver aircraft to arrive on short final
in normal landing configuration (airspeed and rate of
descent), and make normal landing or touch and go
as applicable. Usually this will result in a rate of
descent of approximately 4000 fpm (useful in
determining altitude from which to begin descent).
WARNING
Rates of descent in excess of 3000 fpm are normal

and allow the aircraft to exit the threat envelope as
soon as possible. Failure to transition to a normal
landing profile can result in excessively hard
landings. Execute a waveoff in this situation.
Common Errors
1. Not maintaining aircraft over “safe area”
2. No wind corrections
3. Poor outside scan, referencing of VFR checkpoints
4. Excessive speed on final
5. Incomplete checklists, briefs, etc.
7-5
7-6
Level D Simulator Protocol
CHAPTER 8
Level D-equivalent Simulator Protocol

TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Level D-e Simulator…………………8-1 Protocol for NATOPS Checks in the Level D-e
Effective Use of the Level D-e OFT...…...8-1 OFT…………………………………………..8-2
Logging of Level D-e Time……………....8-1 Simulator Sickness…………………………...8-2
Effective Instruction……………..……….8-2
The Level D-e Simulator Effective Use of the Level D-e OFT
The Level D-equivalent high fidelity flight Instructors must use all resources at their
trainer is comprised of various upgraded and legacy disposal to make the quality of the training commensurate
components from the previous 2F87 simulator model. with the high fidelity technology. IPs and IFEs shall use
Upgraded components include a high resolution visual the following items to the maximum extent practical:
package, control loading, motion, the aerodynamic model
and the systems model. Legacy components consist of • Donning of flight gloves, mock survival vests
most hardware, the Instructor Operating System (IOS) and harnesses by students in the seat
software and the communications suite, which is over 30
years old in most flight trainers. • Use of smoke masks during FOUO drills
The visual package contains 156 properly • Computer Aided Debrief System (CADS)
modeled airfields, 16 of which have one-foot high
resolution imagery. The worldwide database is comprised • Record/Replay function
of 10-meter imagery.
• Aural cue volume level 3-5
The Level D-e physics based systems model
allows the operator to stimulate aircraft systems as a • Communications suite
means of presenting emergencies and malfunctions. For
example, the malfunction labeled “Cross Ship Manifold
• The VFR landing pattern and engine-out runway
Leak” does not automatically bring on the FUS DUCT
maneuvers
HOT Light, but rather triggers a leak that gradually
increases the temperature in the cross ship manifold. The
• Enhanced environmental features
light then illuminates once the temperature in the
manifold reaches a sufficient value. Instructor pilots and
Logging of Level D-e Time
flight engineers must therefore possess precise systems
The flight trainer must be on motion in order to
knowledge and have a solid grasp on Level D-e operating
log Level D-e time. Flight time in the Level D-e shall be
principles in order to provide effective instruction in the
logged at the back of the aviator’s logbook under its own
device.
classification of flight time.
Instructors shall use the communications suite to
Effective Instruction
the maximum extent practicable, but must remember it is
Instructors must have a firm grasp of how to
an aging component. ICS and radio sustainability relies
employ the training device. All Level D-e OFT operators
heavily on the instructors’ willingness to
must have completed the Level D-e Operator Course and
exercise and gripe the system, and the technicians’ ability
should reference the Instructor Utilization Handbook
to tune it.
(IUH) before and during simulator events. Operators
should note the following items during training events:
8-1
Level D Simulator Protocol
• Several malfunction codes trigger fluid or bleed NATOPS flight evaluations in the OFT and avoid giving
air leaks that eventually cause an annunciator an unfair advantage to pilots who receive their evaluation
light to illuminate. The following table is flight in the aircraft, the following protocol shall be
provided for scenario planning purposes: followed during NATOPS check flights in the Level D-e:
Malfunction Label Time for Light • A qualified NATOPS instructor shall occupy the
to Illuminate right seat.
(Approximate)
Left/Right EDC Duct Leak 1:15 • Visual parameters must be set to daylight hours
Cross Ship Manifold Leak 1:05 under visual meteorological conditions in the
Left/Right Wing Manifold Leak 0:25 VFR landing pattern and high work area.
Massive Engine Bleed Air Leak 1:00
Nacelle Over-heat 0:55 • Crosswind components and other environmental
Anti-ice Failed On 1:10 settings shall be set to reasonable values
Prop Fluid Leak 20 gal./min. PP1—3:00 throughout the evolution.
PP2—6:00
• Ditching drills may be conducted to water
• The malfunction labeled “Eng. X Off Speed Prop impact.
Gov” presents a gradual propeller off speed
condition. The most effective off speed • Evaluations in the simulator shall adhere to the
malfunction to present during an EFBR criteria outlined in Chapter 26 of NATOPS.
maneuver is the one labeled “Eng. X Sync
Induced Off Speed.” • The instructor shall avoid scenarios that are
unrealistically difficult. The focus should be on
• There are two different coupler failures in the the student’s basic ability to safely operate the
model. The one labeled “Engine X Coupler aircraft.
Fail” is an isolated coupler failure that causes
RPM to decrease and then stabilize at 100%. Simulator Sickness
The one labeled “Eng. X Decouple Overspeed” Simulator sickness is a medical phenomenon that
triggers an over speed condition followed by a is addressed in the OPNAV 3710 series. It is not unusual
decouple. to experience nausea or disorientation during or after a
simulator event. Data suggests that more experienced
• More realistic power lever alignment may be aviators and individuals who are new to the simulator are
accomplished through use of the four most susceptible to these symptoms. In accordance with
malfunctions labeled “Eng. X Efficiency.” OPNAV 3710.7, “flight personnel exhibiting symptoms
of simulator exposure should abstain from same day
• In order to freeze an engine bleed air valve a flying duties. Individuals who have experienced
given number of degrees open, one must use simulator sickness in the past have a greater probability of
malfunctions 236-241. Proper placement of the recurrence and should not be scheduled to fly for 24 hours
valve is difficult to accomplish when pulling the following simulator exposure.”
respective circuit breaker.
• The high fidelity visual package allows the

operator to insert very realistic weather
conditions, but each weather variable is
independent of the others.
Protocol for NATOPS Checks in the Level D-e OFT

The Level D-e OFT is an ideal platform from
which to administer annual NATOPS evaluation flights.
However, although some capabilities provide more
realistic training during certain flight maneuvers and
aircraft emergencies, others have the propensity to create
a nearly impossible scenario for even the most seasoned
aviator. In an effort to create a reasonable setting for
8-2
Malfunction Set-up
CHAPTER 9
Malfunction Set Up For Aircraft

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Auxiliary Power Unit Malfunctions ..............................8-2 Air Conditioning & Press. System Malfunctions.......... 8-7
Electrical Power Supply System Malfunctions..............8-2 Hydraulic & Flight Control System Malfunctions........ 8-9
Flight Instrument Malfunctions .....................................8-3 Engine Start Malfunctions ...........................................8-10
Propeller System Malfunctions......................................8-4 Takeoff Malfunctions ..................................................8-13
Propulsion System Malfunctions...................................8-5 NTS Check Malfunctions ............................................8-15
Engine & Aircraft Fuel System Malfunctions ...............8-7 In-Flight Restart Malfunctions.....................................8-16
Engine & Aircraft Foul Weather System Malfunct. ......8-7
Note
Any simulated malfunctions (i.e., propeller pump
lights, press low lights, etc.) that must be
announced by the IP or IFE are not included in this
malfunction index. This does not prevent
instructors from presenting these malfunctions in
the aircraft.
Indicator circuit breakers may be pulled for scan

checks at the discretion of the IP/IFE.
The following set-up matrix cannot cover all

simulated malfunctions possible. Consideration should be
given to the predicted outcome of the malfunction and the
instructor’s abilities.
To the maximum extent practical, training in the

aircraft should encompass only items that are not
adequately reproduced in the simulator. Leverage the
simulator to conduct as much high work and system
training as possible in order to provide more realistic
training and maximize aircraft utilization efficiencies.
9-1
Malfunction Setup
Auxiliary Power Unit Malfunctions

MALFUNCTIONS SET-UP NOTES-CAUTIONS-WARNINGS
A1 APU flameout. 1. Pull APU start control circuit

breaker (F32).
Electrical Power Supply System

Malfunctions
B1 Generator failure. 1. Turn off respective generator Note

switch. Reset procedures can be simulated in
flight by using the APU generator
switch.
B2 APU generator fails. 1. Pull generator control circuit Note

breaker (G29). Pull prior to shifting down the last
engine driven generator.
B3 Loss of a main AC bus. 1. Turn off respective bus monitor

switch.
or
1. Pull Bus A or B control circuit
breaker (J1, J2).
2. Turn off associated generator or

downshift the engine.
or
1. Pull generator 4 transfer circuit
breaker prior to downshifting an
inboard engine or securing the
APU.
B4 Loss of Main DC. 1. Pull TR number 1 and TR num-

ber 2 circuit breakers. CAUTION
or
1. TR 2 circuit breaker out on a fire Loss of MDC will fail ground/air
of unknown origin. sensing, shifting engines up and
failing power to ground air con-
ditioning. EDCs will have to be
dumped manually to prevent
overheated air cycle cooling units.
Do not try this with TR 1 out and

failing Bus B in-flight or gustlock will
occur.
9-2
Malfunction Set-up
B5 Loss of FEAC. 1. Pull phase A and/or phase B

circuit breaker(s). Note
Total loss of Flight AC shall not be
performed in aircraft. Transponder
will be lost if phase C is pulled.
B6 Loss of MEAC/MEDC.
WARNING
Shall not be performed in aircraft; loss
of MEDC would cause failure of
warning lights, ICS, communications,
and may result in sheared EDC drive
shafts.
B7 Loss of SEDC during restart. Pull essential DC Feeder number 3. Note

Pull the circuit breaker prior to fuel
and ignition switch being turned on.
CAUTION
Cycle temperature datum switches
prior to restart.
B8 Inverter failure. 1. Pull inverter power circuit Note
breaker (C36). Pull prior to TFE selecting an engine
or turning on inverter–battery test
2. Pull power sensing circuit switch.
breaker (J3).
CAUTION
Null TDs if this malfunction is
conducted with malfunction J5 on an
in-flight restart.
B9 Loss of SEAC. Pull start essential AC circuit breaker Note

(C4). Digital TIT indicators will blank.
Flight Instrument Malfunctions

C1 Pilot’s HSI failure (TP-3A). 1. Pull pilot’s HSI circuit breaker Note
(26V AC and 115V AC on FWD Pull circuit breaker at discretion of the
navigation interconnection box). IP.
Pilot’s HSI failure (P-3C). 1. Turn on NAV Simulator. On EFDS aircraft, the EHSI will go
or blank and the EFDI will go to split
1. Pull pilot’s HSI control circuit screen mode, if the EHSI CB is
breaker. pulled.
9-3
Malfunction Setup
C2 Pilot’s turn needle failure. 1. Pull pilot’s turn rate gyro circuit Note
breaker (H13). Pull circuit breaker at discretion of the
IP.
Not available on EFDS aircraft.
Propeller System Malfunctions

D1 Fluctuating rpm. 1. Call out malfunction. Note

Or Cycling anti-ice circuit breaker will
1. Cycle respective engine anti-ice also cause slight SHP/TIT fluctuation.
circuit breaker (H9-12).
D2 Decouple. 1. Retard power lever.
2. Call out indication, i.e., TIT, rpm,

fuel flow, for desired type
decouple.
D3 Tach generator failure. 1. Call out indication. Note

If sync is not turned off, power lever
2. IP move power lever. movement simulates fluctuation in
TIT, SHP, and fuel flow.
D4 Emergency shutdown with a propel- 1. Pull propeller feather control cir- Note
ler fails to feather. cuit breaker (E22, E23, J26, J27). Pull propeller feather control cir-
cuit breaker prior to inducing a
2. Reset propeller control circuit malfunction requiring shutdown.
breaker.
Or Reset at IP/IFE discretion de-
1. Pull left and right wiper switch pending on intent of demonstra-
circuit breakers. (H5-8,J5-8). tion, i.e. alternate bus, PCO, etc.
Be aware of normal lab seal vent

leakage.
CAUTION
Do not allow the propeller to ro-
tate for an extended period of time
(45 second maximum) due to the
possibility of damaging the
propeller brake.
If this malfunction is conducted in

conjunction with an engine fire see
malfunction E5 for set-up
instructions.
9-4
Malfunction Set-up
D5 Sync system INOP. 1. Pull sync control circuit breaker Note

(G22). Pull circuit breaker prior to FE syn-
Or chronizing the propellers.
1. Pull sync power on Bus A circuit
breaker. CAUTION
Ensure sync switches are off prior to
resetting circuit breaker.
D6 No NTS light on shutdown. 1. Pull NTS check circuit breaker

immediately after light illumi-
nates, then reset it.
Propulsion System Malfunctions

E1 Engine fire on the ground. 1. Pull all engine fire extinguisher

C/B’s (E5-E8 and K9-Kl2).
2. Pull APU manual fire Note

extinguisher C/B’s (F25, F26) if Before resetting the HRD circuit
simulated fire is on engine breakers check that the HRD
number 3 or 4. button is out.
3. Pull propeller feather control C/B Before pushing in the emergency

(E22, 23, J26, J27). shutdown handle, allow propeller
to feather.
4. Pull oil tank shutoff valve C/B
(H17-20). Do not reset the oil tank shutoff
valve circuit breaker after the Af-
5. Actuate fire detector test switch. ter Start checklist complete.
CLEAN-UP
1. Reset HRD circuit breakers.
2. Reset propeller control C/B.
3. Push in E handle.
4. Reset oil tank shutoff valve cir-

cuit breaker.
E2 Oil cooler inducer malfunction. 1. Pull respective flight idle stop
circuit breaker (H25-H28). CAUTION
Or
1. Pull oil cooler act. circuit breaker IFE monitor engine oil temp closely.
(A-13, 14, B-13, 14).
E3 Autofeather system malfunction. 1. Pull respective autofeather circuit Note
breaker (F21-F24). Pull circuit breaker prior to TFE
arming system.
9-5
Malfunction Setup
E4 Low oil pressure in normal rpm. 1. Pull oil pressure indicator circuit Note
breaker (26V INST. BUS number Pull circuit breaker prior to engine
1 or 2) (J31, 32, 37, 38). being shifted to normal RPM.
E5 Engine Fire. 1. Pull all engine fire extinguisher

circuit breaker’s (E5-E8 and CAUTION
K9-K12)
Do not allow the oil tank shutoff
2. Pull APU manual fire valve circuit breaker to be set.
extinguisher circuit breakers If this malfunction is done with a
(F25, F26) if simulated fire is on propeller fails to feather, see
engines 3 or 4. malfunction D4.
3. Actuate fire detector test switch.
E6 Engine anti-ice light on, switch off. 1. Pull respective torquemeter cir- Note
cuit breaker (D7-10). Engine anti-ice light will illumi-
nate in approximately 90 seconds.
2. Pull respective engine ice control
circuit breaker (H9-12). Reset engine ice control circuit
breaker prior to TFE trouble-
3. Reset engine ice circuit breaker. shooting.
4. Reset torquemeter circuit Reset torquemeter circuit breaker

immediately after resetting ice
breaker.
control circuit breaker.
E7 Fluctuating SHP. 1. Cycle respective engine anti-ice
circuit breaker (H9-12). CAUTION
or
1. Cycle TD control circuit breaker Cycle TD control circuit breaker
(A36-39). only if power lever is below 66
degrees coordinator.
E8 Engine fails to shutdown. 1. Pull propeller feather control cir- Note
cuit breaker (E22, E23, J26, 27). Pull circuit breakers prior to TFE
shutting down the engine.
2. Pull oil tank shutoff valve circuit
breaker (H17-20). CAUTION
3. Pull respective fuel and ignition Allow engine to terminate feather
circuit breaker (A32-A35). before pushing in emergency
shutdown handle.
CLEAN-UP
1. Reset propeller control circuit

breaker.
2. Push in emergency shutdown

handle.

cuit breaker.
9-6
Malfunction Set-up
Engine and Aircraft Fuel System

Malfunctions
F1 Boost pump failure. 1. Pull fuel boost pump control cir-

cuit breaker (E9-E12). CAUTION
During the climb, be aware for
possible engine power loss due to
aeration.
F2 Crossfeed valve failure. 1. Pull crossfeed valve circuit
breaker (B7-10).
Engine and Aircraft Foul Weather System

Malfunctions
G1 Wing deice check malfunction. 1. Pull wing deice modulation valve Note
circuit breaker (F13-F15). Pull wing deice modulation valve
or circuit breaker prior to TFE turning on
1. Cycle respective engine anti-ice wing deice switches
circuit breaker (H9-12).
Pull and reset respective engine anti-
ice circuit breaker as wing deice
turned on/off.
G2 Engine anti-ice light on with control 1. Pull engine anti-ice circuit
switch off. breaker (H9-12).
Air Conditioning And Pressurization

System Malfunctions
H1 No, or loss of ground air 1. Pull start control circuit breaker

conditioning. (B31). CAUTION
or
1. Pull air multiplier valve circuit Pulling the Aux-vent control circuit
breaker (J24). breaker (J21) with either inboard
or engine operating undumps the EDCs
1. Pull APU load and shutoff valve without operating heat exchanger
circuit breaker (G31). fans.
or EDC’s will have to be manually
1. Pull Aux-vent control circuit dumped to prevent overheating of the
breaker (J21). air-cycle cooling units.
9-7
Malfunction Setup
H2 Scissors switch failure on the 1. Pull ground–air sensing circuit

ground. breaker on MDC (No. 1 upper, CAUTION
on main load center).
Loss of ground–air sensing shifts up
the engines and fails power to ground
air conditioning. EDCs have to be
manually dumped to prevent
overheating of the air cycle cooling
units.
H3 EDC PRESS LOW, TEMP HIGH, 1. Simulated in the aircraft by call- Note
etc. ing out malfunction. Pull EDC disconnect circuit breakers
(H21-22).
H4 Quill shaft failure. 1. Pull disconnect circuit breakers Note

(H21, 22). Recommend set up on number 3
EDC so TP and TFE do not detect
2. Dump EDC, pull EDC air press EDC not dumping.
indicator circuit breaker (K29,
K35). EDC will indicate loss of spread,
no press low light.
3. Undump EDC.
or
1. Fail the indicator circuit breaker
on a touch-and-go before the
spread comes back. CAUTION
or
1. Fail the indicator circuit breaker With EDC dumped, do not pull EDC
before in-flight restart. dump circuit breakers (H23, H24).
This can cause an inadvertent sheared
EDC driveshaft.
H5 Scissor switch failure during flight. 1. Utilize a small enough differen-

tial to minimize discomfort, then
open the auxiliary ventilation. WARNING
Aircraft will depressurize rapidly.
Ensure crew is notified prior and
aircraft is below 10,000 feet.
9-8
Malfunction Set-up
H6 No or partial pressurization. 1. Pull outflow valve circuit breaker Pull outflow valve circuit breaker,
(FEAC). position switch, or open chute
or prior to takeoff.
1. Place outflow switch to off.
or Pull aux. vent circuit breaker
1. Place aux. vent switch to open. during starts when ground air
or conditioning is off.
1. Open free fall chute.
or CAUTION
1. Pull aux. vent actuator circuit
breaker (B21) on MEAC. Pulling the Aux-vent control circuit
breaker (J21) with either inboard
engine operating undumps the EDCs
without operating heat exchanger
fans.
H7 Cabin exhaust FAN OUT light. 1. Pull cabin exhaust fan control Note
circuit breaker (E1). If airflow across the outflow valve
is still sufficient, the FAN OUT
light may not illuminate.
INS warning horn may startle aft

observer. (LTN-72 Only)
CAUTION
Do not allow avionics equipment to
overheat.
Hydraulic And Flight Control System

Malfunctions
I1 Control surface binding during taxi. 1. Block rudder. Note

or Have AFCS on or foot positioned
1. Engage Autopilot. prior to controls check on Takeoff
checklist.
I2 Landing gear fails to retract. 1. Pull landing gear control circuit Note
breaker (E17) Pull circuit breaker prior to or just
after selecting gear up.
I3 Hydraulic pump failure. 1. Pull respective hydraulic system Note

pump control circuit breaker Expect approximately 5-10 second
(E13, K14, E15) delay before annunciator light
illuminates.
Reset circuit breaker after FE turns

the respective pump switch off to
ensure pump is available if needed.
9-9
Malfunction Setup
I4 Single hydraulic system failure. 1. Pull #2 hydraulic pump control

circuit breaker (E15). CAUTION
2. Pull hydraulic system quantity Ensure the TFE has uncovered the
circuit breaker (E16). boost handles.
Note
Reset circuit breaker after FE turns
the respective pump switch off to
ensure the pump is available if
needed.
I5 Rudder power light. 1. Pull rudder boost circuit breaker Note

(K13). Pull circuit breaker with flaps above
60 percent.
I6 Unsafe gear up or down. 1. Pull landing position indicator

circuit breaker (E18).
I7 Flap asymmetry. 1. Set flaps at desired position, i.e., Note

up, maneuver or approach. Do not set flaps at an intermediate
position.
2. Call out malfunction.
Call out as flaps are extended or
retracted.
I8 Binding flight control/unable to shift. 1. IP hold affected control.
WARNING
Inducing a gustlock during flight in

any channel is prohibited, except
rudder above 4000 feet on IUT
events.
After clean-up, the IFE shall ensure

boost handles are in and locked.
Engine Start Malfunctions

J1 Bleed air valve partially open or un- 1. Pull bleed air valve circuit Note
able to open. breaker (B36-B39). Pull circuit breaker immediately after
the bleed air valve light comes on, or
pull circuit breaker prior to opening
valve.
9-10
Malfunction Set-up
J2 No bleed air pressure or loss of bleed 1. Pull bleed air start valve circuit Note
air. breaker (G32). Pull circuit breakers prior to se-
or lecting an engine. When using
1. Pull APU load and shutoff valve APU bleed air, pull circuit breaker
circuit breaker (G31). after turning off ground air
or conditioning.
1. Pull start control circuit breaker
(B31). Position the in-flight arm switch to
or arm prior to selecting an engine.
1. Place in-flight arm switch to arm.
or Pulling the bleed air manifold
1. Pull bleed air manifold pressure pressure indicator circuit breaker
indicator circuit breaker (H29). or the instrument bus 1 circuit
or breaker also works with an exter-
1. Pull instrument bus 1 transformer nal air source. Pull circuit breaker
circuit breaker on MEAC (B4). prior to connecting huffer.
To indicate a loss of bleed air, pull

Bleed air shutoff valve circuit
breaker or APU load and shutoff
circuit breaker after engine
selected.
J3 Starter button will not stay in. 1. Pull Start control circuit breaker Note
(B31). Pull circuit breaker prior to actuation
Or of the starter button.
1. Pull essential DC feeder #3 circuit
breaker behind co-pilot seat. CAUTION
Cycle TD switches for a minimum of
5 seconds prior to engine start.
J4 Torch. 1. Call out malfunction. Note

Pull fire extinguisher circuit breakers.
J5 Loss of SEDC. 1. Pull essential DC feeder number

3 circuit breaker behind copilot CAUTION
seat.
Do not pull the essential DC
feeder number 3 circuit breaker
any time after the 16% RPM or
fuel flow has been initiated.
Cycle TD switches for a minimum

of 5 seconds prior to engine start.
J6 No fuel flow, no light off. 1. Pull fuel shutoff valve circuit Note
breaker (B32-B35). Pull circuit breaker prior to 16 per-
cent.
CAUTION
Do not reset circuit breaker during
start to simulate late fuel flow and
lightoff.
9-11
Malfunction Setup
J7 Fuel flow, no lightoff. 1. Pull fuel shutoff valve circuit Note

breaker (B32-35). Pull circuit breaker immediately after
fuel flow has initiated.
2. Reset circuit breaker after FE
discontinues start with the fuel CAUTION
and ignition switch.
Motor engine prior to next start.
J8 Premature starter disengagement. 1. Pull start control circuit breaker

(B31). CAUTION
Pull start control circuit breaker at
or above 50 percent and positive
SHP to prevent engine stagnation
or stall.
Do not use the essential DC feeder

number 3 for this malfunction.
J9 Low oil pressure. 1. Pull oil pressure indicator circuit Note

breaker (26V INST. BUS No. 1 Pull circuit breaker after FE checks
or No. 2) (J31, 32, 37, 38). rising pressure at 35 percent RPM.
J10 No oil pressure at 35 %. 1. Pull oil pressure indicator circuit Note

breaker (26V instrument bus Pull circuit breaker prior to rotation.
number 1 or 2) (J31, 32, 37, 38).
CAUTION
IP and IFE shall ensure start is se-
cured prior to 35 percent.
J11 No air rise due to a failure of 1. Pull propeller feather control cir-
instrument bus No. 1 while starting cuit breaker (J26 or 27).
engine No. 1 or 4.
breaker (H17 or 20).
3. Pull instrument bus 1 circuit

breaker (B4 on MEAC).
CLEAN-UP
1. Reset propeller control circuit

breaker.
2. Push in emergency shutdown

handle.

cuit breaker.
9-12
Malfunction Set-up
J12 SHP gauge failure. 1. Pull torquemeter circuit breaker Note

(D7-D10). Pull circuit breaker when SHP cycles
through zero.
Digital SHP gauge blanks with CB

pulled.
J13 No air rise when starter button pops. 1. Pull propeller feather control Note
circuit breaker (E22, E23, J26 or Pull bleed air manifold indicator
J27). circuit breaker after checking air
pressure at 16 percent.
breaker (H17 - H20). Push in bleed air manifold circuit
breaker after bleed air valve closes
3. Pull bleed air manifold indicator if bad start control valve, leave it
circuit breaker (H29). out if failed gage.
4. Push in bleed air manifold

indicator circuit breaker (H29). WARNING
Monitor start valve light and TIT for
closure of start valve.
Note
CLEAN-UP Before pushing in the emergency
shutdown handle, allow propeller
1. Reset propeller control circuit to feather.
breaker.
Do not reset the oil tank shutoff valve
2. Push in emergency shutdown circuit breaker after the after start
handle. checklist complete.
3. Reset oil tank shutoff valve
circuit breaker.
Takeoff Malfunctions
Aborted takeoff due to a malfunction 1. Pull circuit breaker or turn off Note
before refusal. equipment which will immedi- IP consider pattern traffic.
K1 ately activate a caution light;
such as pitot heater, generator Pull circuit breaker or turn off
off, etc. equipment after calling 80 knots and
or prior to VR.
1. IP call out any simulated mal-
function. Do not use time delay malfunction
such as hydraulic pump or cabin
exhaust fan.
9-13
Malfunction Setup
K2 Aborted takeoff due to low power or 1. Open bleed air valve. Note
power loss. IP consider pattern traffic.
2. Turn on any or all wing deice
modulation valves and anti-ice To simulate a low power, open
valve. modulation valves as takeoff
power is being set. For a power
CLEAN-UP loss, open modulation valves after
power has been set. Close valves
1. Close bleed air valve and turn off when abort initiated.
wing deice modulation and anti-
ice valves. IP be prepared to call the mal-
function prior to VR if TFE fails to
recognize it.
WARNING
IFE monitor power on other engines
in event the TFE calls another one.
K3 Aborted takeoff due to a propeller 1. IP call out the indication (i.e., Note
malfunction. overspeed number 1 engine, pro- IP consider pattern traffic.
peller pump light number 3, etc.).
May be done in conjunction with a
power loss.
WARNING
Do not simulate partial power loss by
retarding power lever due to VMC GRD
K4 Malfunctions after refusal. 1. IP discretion. Note

IP call out or induce malfunction after
refusal.
K5 Sheared speed sense control. 1. IP reduce power to approxi-

mately 830 TIT on one engine.
9-14
Malfunction Set-up
NTS Check Malfunctions

L1 Stuck NTS plunger during NTS 1. Push in respective feather button.

check. CAUTION
Ensure NTS system is operating prior
to pushing in feather button. Ensure
clean up from NTS check after
malfunction.
If set up to a propeller fails to feather,

the feather pump AC circuit breaker
shall be pulled and not the DC circuit
breaker. Pulling the DC circuit
breaker may result in a propeller
decouple.
L2 Misrigged alpha shaft and/or stuck 1. IP hold power lever at flight idle. Note
power lever during NTS check. 2. IP call overspeed for misrigged Release power lever when SHP goes
alpha shaft. positive.
If SHP gauge CB pulled to simulate
negative SHP, the gauge will go blank
with digital SHP gauges installed.
WARNING
If scenario includes shutting down the
motor to a fails to feather via the
feather button, the feather pump AC
circuit breaker shall be pulled and not
the DC circuit breaker. Pulling the DC
circuit breaker may result in a
propeller decouple.
CAUTION
Ensure NTS system is operating be-
fore allowing TFE to shutdown en-
gine.
L3 Not enough air bled off during NTS 1. Pull bleed air valve circuit breaker
check. as soon as BAV light comes on
(B36-39).
or
1. Fail wing mod valve (F13-15).
L4 No SHP fluctuation, or SHP in 1. Pull torquemeter circuit breaker Note
excess of 500 during NTS check. (D7-10). Pull circuit breaker as SHP cycles in
negative range after NTS action is
observed, or pull circuit breaker as
SHP needle is moving in negative
direction after NTS is observed.
With digital SHP gauges they will go
blank with the torquemeter CB pulled.
9-15
Malfunction Setup
In-Flight Restart Malfunctions

M1 Steady feather light. 1. Place the NTS feather valve Note

switch to the NTS position. Position switch while TFE is watching
for indicated rotation.
M2 Loss of power to the propeller 1. Pull propeller control circuit Note
feather pump during PCO. breaker (E22, E23, J26, J27). Pull circuit breaker prior to or during
TFE pushing PCO.
CAUTION
Do not pull circuit breaker while
unfeathering propeller as the airstart
switch protection is lost.
M3 Light remains on in feather button 1. Depress PCO after FE releases the
after PCO is released. feather button.
2. Release PCO when emergency

shutdown handle is pulled out.
M4 No fuel flow, no light off. 1. Pull fuel shutoff circuit breaker Note
(B32-35). Pull circuit breaker prior to unfeathe-
or ring propeller.
2. Pull essential DC feeder number 3 CAUTION
behind copilot.
Cycle TD switches for a minimum of
5 seconds prior to engine start if the
essential DC feeder #3 is pulled.
M5 No fuel flow but light off. 1. Pull fuel flow power supply circuit Note
breaker on Main AC Bus A. Pull circuit breaker prior to unfeathe-
ring propeller.
M6 Fuel flow, no light off. 1. Pull fuel shutoff valve circuit Note
breaker (B32-35). Pull circuit breaker immediately after
2. Reset after feather button pushed fuel flow.
in.
M7 Oil pressure failure. 1. Pull oil pressure indicator circuit Note
breaker (26V instrument bus Pull circuit breaker prior to rotation.
number 1 or 2) (J31, 32, 37, 38).
CAUTION
IP and IFE shall ensure start is se-
cured prior to 35 percent.
M8 Instrument bus 1 failure while start- 1. Pull instrument bus 1 circuit Note
ing engine number 1 or 4). breaker (B4 on MEAC). Pull Instrument Bus 1 circuit breaker
before unfeathering the propeller.
M9 Premature lightoff. 1. Pull fuel and ignition circuit Note
breaker (A32-35). • Pull fuel and ignition circuit brea-
ker prior to unfeathering.
• Guard circuit breaker in case TFE
refeathers propeller.
Do not reset until fuel and ignition
switch has been turned back on.
9-16
FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE Appendix A
Instructor Under Training Syllabus
APPENDIX A
INSTRUCTOR UNDER TRAINING (IUT)

SYLLABUS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Scope………………………………………A-1 Preflight…………………………………...A-9
Terminology……………………………….A-1 Planeside Brief…………………………….A-9
The Fleet Squadron Instructor…………….A-2 In-Flight……...……………………………A-9
FIG Applicability………………….………A-2 Instructor Predicament List………………A-11
Crew Makeup…………………….………..A-3 Takeoff Predicaments……………………A-12
Role Playing…………………………….…A-3 In-Flight Predicaments………...…………A-14
Event Scenarios……………………..……. A-4 Landing Pattern Predicaments…………...A-16
Student Pilot/FE Mistakes……….….…….A-8 General Predicaments……………………A-20
Event Preparation…………………..……..A-9
SCOPE
This appendix has been prepared to assist squadrons and their designated IUT instructors in the
conduct of ACTC Level 4 IUT syllabus events. It presents the user with information designed to
standardize the IUT instructional process, reduce risks associated with IUT training and maximize the
effectiveness of instructor training. Additionally, it contains training and instructional technique
guidance that supplements material presented in the P-3 NATOPS Flight Manual, the NATOPS
Instrument Flight Manual, OPNAV 3710.7 Series, Pilot/FE Training Job Aid and elsewhere in this
Guide. Its purpose is to govern the conduct of IUT flights in conjunction with the sources listed above
and is not intended to supersede any requirements or directives promulgated by NATOPS, OPNAV or
other competent authority. This appendix should be used as a guide while drafting a squadron Instructor
Pilot Training Program (1525.1).
IUT syllabus guidance is not to be utilized for other than formally scheduled ACTC Level 4 IUT
training events. Where this appendix contradicts guidance contained in the rest of the FIG, this guidance
applies to IUT events only. It is critical that IUT instructors ensure proper crew coordination and
effective event preparation. IUT instructors must have a complete understanding of all possible
outcomes when designing and delivering IUT training and take all necessary steps to ensure the safe
completion of IUT events. All ACTC 4 IUT events should be conducted by a designated IUT Instructor.
The IUT syllabus, at the Commanding Officer’s discretion, may be modified for pilots and flight
engineers with prior instructor designation. Recommended factors to consider: amount of previous P-3
instructional experience, time out of the P-3 and the nature of recent duty (flying/non-flying).
A-1
Appendix A FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE
TERMINOLOGY
To clarify discussion terminology for the purposes of this appendix, the following terminology
definitions apply:
- IUT = Prospective Instructor Pilot

- IUT FE = Prospective Instructor Flight Engineer
- IP = IUT Instructor Pilot (generally in role as a student pilot)
- IFE = IUT Instructor Flight Engineer (generally in role as a student Flight Engineer)
- IUT Team = IUT and IUT FE
- IUT Instructors = IP and IFE
THE FLEET SQUADRON IUT INSTRUCTOR

Due to the demanding nature of the instructor training process, IUT Instructors must be
eminently qualified to conduct IUT training. Qualification requirements must be more stringent than
those used for IP or IFE designation. IUT instructors are the cornerstone of an effective squadron
upgrade syllabus and standardization among individual squadron instructors. The IP or IFE should be
recognized for their instructional experience, teaching ability, professionalism and attention to flight
safety. In addition to the key instructor attributes identified elsewhere in the FIG, the IP or IFE should
possess significant P-3 instructional experience, a significant number of total flight hours and
exceptional proficiency in the aircraft. Experience as an FRS IP/IFE or NATOPS Instructor can be
beneficial, however, neither is crucial to the effectiveness as an IUT Instructor. Most critical to the
safety and success of the IUT instructor are overall proficiency, currency, situational awareness and
teaching ability. IUT instructors should have completed their squadron IUT instructor syllabus. This
syllabus could consist of observations of IUT events and an interview with senior IUT IPs.
Commanding Officers should carefully consider the presence of the above listed attributes prior to
designating an IUT Instructor.
FIG APPLICABILITY
Guidance promulgated by the P-3 NATOPS Flight Manual, the NATOPS Instrument Flight
Manual and the OPNAV 3710.7 Series cannot be waived under the auspices of this appendix. IUT
Instructors are responsible for ensuring that safety of flight is not compromised and NATOPS/OPNAV
guidance is not violated. FIG guidance for normal training flights contained in the previous chapters of
this document may not apply to IUT training events.
A-2
CREW MAKEUP
In general, crew make up for an IUT event is as depicted below:
FLIGHT STATION
LEFT SEAT FE SEAT RIGHT SEAT

IP (IUT INST PILOT) IFE (IUT INST FE) IUT (UPGRADING PILOT*)
CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL

IUT IFE (UPGRADING FE*)
SAFETY OBSERVER
ADDITIONAL IP** OR IFE**
* On occasion, it may become necessary to fly an IUT or IUT FE without a flight partner. In that
case, the missing IUT or IUT FE may only be replaced with a positionally qualified instructor.
** When feasible, the use of a Safety Observer (an additional IP or IFE or an upgrading IUT
instructor) should be used on IUT-2, 4, 5 and 6X to increase safety and training efficiency. If the Safety
Observer is a Pilot, he may only pull circuit breakers for scan items. Only qualified IUT Instructor
Pilots or IFE’s may fail systems using circuit breakers for the purpose of presenting simulated actual
malfunctions.
OPNAV 3710.7T authorizes the aircraft commander to be out of the seat during IUT landing
pattern work, if a qualified IUT instructor pilot is occupying one of the flight control stations. Each
squadron’s Commanding Officer retains the option to require that the individual who signed the "A
Sheet" shall occupy one of the pilot seats during all landing pattern evolutions.
ROLE PLAYING
The use of appropriate role-playing during the IUT is critical to the development of an effective
IP or IFE. The goal of role-playing should not be to confuse, overwhelm, or intimidate the IUT Team;
instead, the "role" should seek to expose the IUT Team to various levels of student performance in a
controlled environment. Role-playing normally involves the portrayal of a typical “student” with a
specific, generally recognized set of training deficiencies. An IUT or IUT FE should be exposed to
numerous roles as part of the IUT process in order for him/her to develop the skills necessary to
effectively train fleet students. Each characteristic the IUT instructor emulates should have a distinct
teaching point associated with it. The IUT instructor should portray the minimal amount of “role-
playing” to convey the teaching point. Once the IUT has produced an adequate solution to the
characteristic portrayed, the IUT instructor should discontinue that portion of the “Role.” Some of the
most common roles include:
1. Below Average First Tour

a. Primary subtypes could include early or late stage of training (i.e. PPP Fly 1 or PPC
stage), secondary subtypes could include Meek (shy, retiring personality) or Aggressive
(i.e. significant non-P-3 aviation experience)
A-3
b. First tour FEs should have basic operating skills and systems knowledge.
2. Average First Tour (same subtypes apply)
3. Above Average First Tour (same subtypes as Below Average First Tour apply)
4. Recent upgraders with distinct deficiencies
5. Second Tour
a. As with first tour, experience portrayed could include highly experienced (i.e. former
FRS instructor or TPS grad) or relatively inexperienced (i.e. low hours, eight years out of
the cockpit). Personality subtypes could include meek or aggressive.
It is imperative that the IP and IFE maintain clear control of instructor “roles” in order to avoid
confusion during scenario execution. More specifically, the IP and IFE must clearly delineate when “in
role” and when “out of role.” While “in role”, the IP or IFE is expected to play his/her part fully,
avoiding instructing the IUT Team so that they have the opportunity to fully develop their instructional
skills. Only while “out of role” should the IP or IFE provide instruction. The IUT instructors will be
“out of role” only if a safety of flight issue arises, or if there is a significant instructional point that needs
to be debriefed. The IP shall announce “I have the controls” if he/she feels that he/she must take control
of the aircraft in the event that a safety of flight concern arises. While “out of role”, the IP and IFE
should remain out of role until all safety of flight concerns have been resolved and all necessary
instruction has been given. Only after confirming all outstanding issues are resolved should the IP and
IFE clearly announce that they are “back in role” and training resumed.
EVENT SCENARIOS
The P-3 Instructor P3QS is designed for the squadrons’ use in training IUTs and IUT FEs. The
program consists of P3QS and Aircrew Evolutions. The overall theme throughout all the Aircrew
Evolutions fall under the following three categories in order of importance:
1. Safety of Flight
2. Effective Instruction with Accurate Evaluation
3. Crew Resource Management
The specific focus of the Aircrew Evolutions are as follows:
PPIP/IFE OFT-1:
IUT Emphasis - The development of right seat proficiency while conducting high and low work
demonstrations. Focus on FIG/NATOPS knowledge, standardization, basic instructional skills and
defensive positioning IAW the FIG. The IUT will be in a single pilot environment to practice radio /
checklist management and overall IP situational awareness (scan).
IUT FE Emphasis - The IUT FE should practice basic malfunction setup, OFT operation,
developing an IFE scan / defensive position and be challenged with NATOPS discussions.
Scenario - None. However, IUT and IUT FE will control the flow and pace of the event to begin
practicing time management.
IP Role - None.
A-4
IFE Role - None.

Note - This event is best taught by a senior squadron IUT IP and IUT IFE to ensure the correct
habit patterns and safety envelopes are formed early in the IUT.
PPIP/IFE OFT-2:
IUT Emphasis - The further development of right seat proficiency, the introduction of scenario
presentation and an introduction to trend recognition and correction. IUT Team crew coordination skills
should be emphasized.
IUT FE Emphasis - The introduction of scenario presentation and an introduction to trend
recognition and correction. IUT Team crew coordination skills should be emphasized.
Scenario - A basic scenario should be written by the IUT based on the PPIP/IFE OFT-2
gradesheet (no OFT codes maybe used by the IUTs to setup their malfunctions).
IP Role - No personality. IP will demonstrate common student mistakes, trends and
predicaments.
IFE Role - No personality. IFE will demonstrate common student mistakes, trends and
predicaments.
Note - Critical predicament demos include (but are not limited to) incorrect rudder on EFAR,
early rotate, unplanned engine shutdown, “actual” malfunction during scenario, etc. Time shall be
allotted for the IUT to practice right seat demonstrations.
PPIP OFT-3:
IUT Emphasis - The development of right seat proficiency while conducting Combat Threat
Training (CTT). Focus on instructing Combat Threat Maneuvering (CTM) safely within the operating
envelope of the aircraft.
IUT FE Emphasis – IUT FE does not participate in PPIP OFT-3.
Scenario - None. However, IUT will control the flow and pace of the event to practice time
management.
IP Role - None.
IFE Role - None.
Note - None
PPIP OFT-4 (FIUT):

IUT Emphasis - The further development of right seat proficiency while conducting high and
low work demonstrations. Focus on FIG/NATOPS knowledge, standardization, basic instructional skills
and defensive positioning IAW the FIG. The IUT will be in a single pilot environment to practice radio /
checklist management and overall IP situational awareness (scan).
IUT FE Emphasis – IUT FE does not participate in PPIP OFT-4.
Scenario - None. However, IUT will control the flow and pace of the event to practice time
management.
IP Role - None.
IFE Role - None.
Note - FIUT will discuss current fleet trends, ensure fleet standardization and polish the IUT’s
presentation of right seat demonstrations.
A-5
PPIP OFT-5 and PPIFE OFT-3 (FIUT):

IUT Emphasis – This event will stress instruction, scenario presentation, trend
recognition/correction and develop the IUT’s ability to maintain SOF when both the aircraft and
RP/RFE team are not operating to their maximum potential. IUT Team crew coordination skills will be
emphasized.
IUT FE Emphasis - This event will stress instruction, scenario presentation, trend
recognition/correction and develop the IUT FE’s ability to maintain SOF when both the aircraft and
emphasized.
Scenario - A scenario should be written by the IUT based on the PPIP/IFE OFT-5 gradesheet (no
OFT codes maybe used by the IUTs to setup their malfunctions).
IP Role - Early PPP syllabus pilot. IP will demonstrate common student mistakes, trends and
predicaments as well as force the IUT to deal with a malfunctioning aircraft.
IFE Role - Multiple tour FE that is new to the squadron after finishing a non flying shore tour.
IFE will demonstrate common student mistakes, trends and predicaments as well as force the IUT FE to
deal with a malfunctioning aircraft.
Note - None.
PPIP/PPIFE Fly-1:
IUT Emphasis - The first IUT flight should be used to refine the basic skills developed in the
OFT. The event should focus on developing complete comfort for the IUT in all types of right seat
landings, right seat demos, other runway work, defensive positioning, radio / checklist management in
the pattern and overall IP situational awareness (scan).
IUT FE Emphasis - The IUT FE should practice basic malfunction setup, OFT operation,
developing an IFE scan / defensive position and be challenged with NATOPS discussions.
Scenario - None. However, IUT and IUT FE will control the flow and pace of the event to
practice time management.
IP Role - None.
IFE Role - None.
Note - This event is best taught by a senior squadron IUT IP and IUT IFE to ensure the correct
habit patterns and safety envelopes are formed early in the IUT.
PPIP/PPIFE Fly-2:
IUT Emphasis - The further development of right seat proficiency, the introduction of scenario
presentation and an introduction to trend recognition and correction. IUT Team crew coordination skills
should be emphasized.
IUT FE Emphasis - The introduction of scenario presentation and an introduction to trend
recognition and correction. IUT Team crew coordination skills should be emphasized.
Scenario - A basic scenario should be written by the IUT based on the PPIP/IFE FLY-2
gradesheet.
IP Role - No personality. IP will demonstrate common student mistakes, trends and
predicaments.
IFE Role - No personality. IFE will demonstrate common student mistakes, trends and
predicaments.
A-6
Note - Critical predicament demos include (but are not limited to) incorrect rudder on EFAR,
early rotate, unplanned engine shutdown, “actual” malfunction during scenario, etc. Time shall be
allotted for the IUT to practice right seat demonstrations.
PPIP/PPIFE Fly-3 (FIUT):

IUT Emphasis - The event will focus on standardizing and refining the IUT’s right seat
demonstrations. The IUT shall maintain safety of flight at all times while demonstrating proficient right
seat BAW.
IUT FE Emphasis - The IUT FE should practice basic malfunction setup, developing an IFE scan
/ defensive position and be challenged with NATOPS discussions.
Scenario - None. However, IUT and IUT FE will control the flow and pace of the event to
practice time management.
IP Role - None.
IFE Role - None.
Note - None.
PPIP/PPIFE Fly-4 (FIUT):
recognition/correction and further develop the IUT’s ability to maintain SOF when both the aircraft and
emphasized.
recognition/correction and further develop the IUT FE’s ability to maintain SOF when both the aircraft
and RP/RFE team are not operating to their maximum potential. IUT Team crew coordination skills
will be emphasized.
Scenario - A scenario should be written by the IUT based on the PPIP/IFE Fly-4 gradesheet.
IP Role - Late PPP syllabus pilot. IP will demonstrate common student mistakes, trends and
predicaments as well as force the IUT to deal with a malfunctioning aircraft.
IFE Role – Early PPFE syllabus FE. IFE will demonstrate common student mistakes, trends and
predicaments as well as force the IUT FE to deal with a malfunctioning aircraft.
Note - This event will involve in-depth role playing, presentation of “simulated actual
malfunction” scenarios by the IP and IFE (scenarios that require safety of flight decisions to be made by
the IUT Team) and refinement of IUT Team defensive positioning skills through predicaments.
PPIP/PPIFE Fly-5:
recognition/correction and further develop the IUT’s ability to maintain SOF when both the aircraft and
emphasized.
recognition/correction and further develop the IUT FE’s ability to maintain SOF when both the aircraft
and RP/RFE team are not operating to their maximum potential. IUT Team crew coordination skills
will be emphasized.
Scenario - A scenario should be written by the IUT based on the PPIP/IFE Fly-5 gradesheet.
IP Role - IP discretion.
A-7
IFE Role - IFE discretion.

Note - This event will involve in-depth role playing, presentation of “simulated actual
malfunction” scenarios by the IP and IFE (scenarios that require safety of flight decisions to be made by
the IUT Team) and refinement of IUT Team defensive positioning skills through predicaments. Due to
the challenging nature of this event, the Commanding Officer should use the utmost care in selection of
the IP and IFE team. Only the most seasoned and experienced instructors should be chosen.
Assignment of a senior second tour IP and IFE would be the normal expectation.
PPIP/PPIFE Fly-6X:
IUT Emphasis - An overall evaluation of the IUT’s instructor abilities. The IUT shall
demonstrate an ability to mentor and train student while maintaining a safe training environment.
IUT FE Emphasis - An overall evaluation of the IUT’s instructor abilities. The IUT shall
demonstrate an ability to mentor and train student while maintaining a safe training environment.
Scenario - A scenario should be written by the IUT based on the PPIP/IFE Fly-6X gradesheet.
IP Role - Senior squadron IP’s discretion.
IFE Role – Senior squadron IFE’s discretion.
Note - This event is normally flown with the senior squadron IP and IFE and will also serve as a
standardization check for basic squadron instructional technique. The IUT/IUTFE shall be designated
only after successfully completing this flight.
IUT Syllabus Notes

1. IUT events are demanding on all participants. In light of this fact, excluding IUT-1 and 3, flight
events should be scheduled as “stand alone” events (i.e. should not be scheduled in conjunction with
other pilot training syllabus events). The fatigue level of both the IP/IFE and IUT Team should be
constantly evaluated and the event terminated if fatigue levels begin to affect performance and
safety.
2. To avoid the possibility that a non-IUT upgrader could misunderstand specific IUT training points
or role-playing, observation of IUT events by non-instructors is discouraged.
3. The use of IDFW events to develop right seat skills prior to IUT Fly-1 is encouraged. It is critical
that right seat proficiency be confirmed prior to the IUT beginning VP-30 FIUT training.
4. Role-playing and safety of flight should be thoroughly briefed and adhered to by the IP and IFE.
Ideally, an IUT scenario should be available to the IP and IFE the day prior to the IUT event and
used to develop role-play scenarios. Changes to the briefed plan should be avoided to limit
confusion during the IUT event.
5. The post-flight debrief is a critical component of IUT training. Intentional errors made by the IP /
IFE while in-role are often missed and often appeared unrealistic to the IUTs. These errors must be
fully debriefed and the teaching points clarified prior to concluding the training evolution. It is
recommended that as many as possible of these intentional errors be debriefed with all cockpit
crewmembers present.
STUDENT PILOT/FE MISTAKES

A critical part of the IUT/IUT FE training process is the development of the ability to react
appropriately to student mistakes. The IP and IFE must allow the IUT Team to make mistakes in
scenario and demo presentations, thereby developing their instructional skills while maintaining an
A-8
acceptable safety of flight envelope. As long as safety of flight is not compromised, the IP and IFE
should not be too quick to rescue the IUT Team from a poorly set up malfunction or below average
demo. The IP and IFE should use their experience and scan to remain within an acceptable safety of
flight envelope while allowing the IUT Team to learn from their own mistakes.
The IP and IFE must also impart to the IUT Team the ability to recognize and react to mistakes
in their own students. Student mistakes can be separated into categories of instructive (i.e. failing to
open bleed air valves for engine start) and compromising (i.e. power chop in the flare). It is incumbent
upon the IP and IFE to instill a sense of what defines an instructive mistake (and is therefore allowable
as part of the learning process) and what student mistakes may compromise safety of flight. The IUT
Team ultimately must learn to react quickly to contain compromising mistakes, and more slowly to
correct instructive mistakes. This sense can only be imparted through adequate role playing
performance and a credible IUT training process.
EVENT PREPARATION
Preparation for an IUT event should begin well prior to the walk to Maintenance Control to read
the ADB. It is critical that time is allowed for an adequate preflight brief. The preflight briefing not
only covers information critical to the conduct of the upcoming flight, it also sets the tone for the new
instructor as he or she develops his or her own briefing routines. During the brief, PQS completion for
the respective IUT event should be verified, the planned role should be discussed, flight planning
conducted and areas of focus should be identified for the flight. The day prior to the brief, a written
scenario should be presented to the IP and IFE by the IUT Team.
The IP and IFE shall thoroughly brief the scenario, planned predicaments and any simulated
actual malfunctions planned.
PREFLIGHT
During preflight, the entire crew’s focus should be on safely preparing the aircraft for flight.
Although role-playing is acceptable, it should not interfere with attention to flight safety. The IP and
IFE should ensure preflight duties are clearly established by the IUT Team. During early stage flights
when role playing is not an issue, the preflight can be used to review preflight items with the goal of
standardizing presentation and imparting “evaluator level” NATOPS knowledge. The IP and IFE should
always conduct a thorough pre-flight walk around regardless of assigned duties.
PLANESIDE BRIEF
The completion of a proper Planeside Brief is critical to the safety of an IUT event. Planeside
brief is normally completed in role for later stage IUT flights to give the IUT the opportunity to practice
critique of the “students” brief as well as the opportunity to practice a normal IP brief. The IP should
follow the IUT brief critique with a clear “out of role” and “I have the controls” brief that covers crew
coordination, handling of actual emergencies and in/out of role distinctions.
A-9
IN-FLIGHT
The in-flight portion of an IUT event can be broken down into the distinct phases of taxi, takeoff,
climb/NTS check, high work and low work. The three general objectives common to all phases of in-
flight IUT instruction are:
1. Validation by the IP and IFE of IUT Team’s ability to safely conduct flight operations in the
instructional environment.
2. Instruction of the IUT Team in techniques and procedures for the safe presentation of aircraft
malfunctions in the instructional environment, to include time management.
3. Presentation, instruction and practice with specific student “Predicaments” for the IUT Team.
A-10
INSTRUCTOR PREDICAMENT LIST

The following is a detailed description of the predicaments that, over the years, have been
found to correspond to some of the more common errors made by upgrading pilots on familiarization
flights. Each predicament is described, explaining how the IP shall perform it, ways the IUT can prevent
the predicament from happening, and finally, what the IUT Team shall do to get out of the predicament
should it happen. Some predicaments have additional maneuvers that will be shown to the IUT Team in
the OFT. While this list is thorough, it is not meant to be all-inclusive. The IP may present additional
predicaments, malfunctions, and emergencies as long as they do not contradict any requirements or
directives contained in this supplement or promulgated by competent authority. The importance of
hangar flying discussions between IUT instructors cannot be stressed enough. Emphasis on such
discussions promotes instructors covering as many predicaments as possible and devising a plan of
action for when these predicaments arise.
WARNING
The following predicaments shall not be performed in the aircraft:
1. Actual engine shutdown by any means while on the runway or below 1500’ AGL.
2. Early rotate below 100 KIAS.
3. Autofeather or intentional shutdown of an engine prior to an in-flight NTS check.
4. Incomplete extension of the Emergency Shutdown Handle (soft E-handle).
5. Intentional gust lock of flight control, except rudder above 4000’ AGL on IUT events.
Note
HRD buttons shall not be pushed unless proper set-up has been verified by the IFE
in the seat or a qualified flight station observer.
A-11
TAKEOFF PREDICAMENTS
WRONG RUDDER ON ENGINE FAILURE BEFORE REFUSAL (SIMULATOR ONLY)
WARNING
This predicament shall not be performed in the aircraft because of the limited
recovery margin.
Execution - In this predicament the IP will use the wrong rudder during the three engine abort.
Prevention - IUT should block the wrong rudder pedal with his/her foot.
Response - IUT should take the aircraft and correct back to centerline using the following technique:
A. Power to flight idle to alleviate the effects of VMC ground.

B. Establish directional control of the aircraft.
C. Stop the aircraft.
Wrong Rudder On Engine Failure After Refusal (CO APPROVAL)
WARNING
The Wrong Rudder on Engine Failure After Refusal requires Commanding Officer
approval prior to conducting in the aircraft.
The IP shall use minimal wrong rudder and shall not 'push through' the IUT's block.
Execution - IP initiates wrong rudder application during EFAR. Minimal wrong rudder will result in no-
ticeable centerline deviation.
Response - This must be purely reactionary. The IUT does not have the time to assess the situation prior
to the aircraft departing the side of the runway. The IUT must immediately take the aircraft and rotate
while simultaneously reestablishing power on all four engines.
WARNING
Vro airspeed is not a consideration during this predicament. The IUT should not
wait for 115 knots because the aircraft will more than likely depart the runway. At
training weights, the aircraft will have no problem flying with airspeed in the 100–
115 knot range.
A-12
Note
During an IUT SIM, the IUT should be shown the ramifications of a slow response to this
predicament.
No Rudder On Engine Failure Before Refusal

Execution – IP will not use rudder during the three-engine abort.
Response - - IUT should assess the speed at which the aircraft is moving toward the side of the runway.
If the IP makes no correction toward centerline, IUT should take the aircraft and correct back to
centerline using rudder and asymmetric power and, as a last resort, brakes.
No Rudder On Engine Failure After Refusal

Execution - IP will not use rudder during the EFAR.
Prevention – IUT should be aware of insufficient use of rudder by RP.
Response - IUT should assess the speed at which the aircraft is moving toward the side of the runway.
If the IP makes no correction toward centerline, the IUT must immediately take the aircraft and rotate
while simultaneously reestablishing power on all four engines.
Abort After Refusal

Execution - IP attempts to abort after the simulated refusal speed of 100 knots when given a
malfunction.
Prevention - IUT’s hands at the base of the power levers should prevent IP from retarding power levers
too much.
Response - If IP is able to retard power levers aft then IUT shall take the aircraft and either abort the
takeoff him/herself or push the power back up and continue the takeoff.
Note
The decision whether to continue the abort or push the power back up and continue the
takeoff is a judgment call the IUT will have to make at the time depending on the
airspeed, runway remaining, how far back the power levers were retarded, etc.
EARLY ROTATE
Execution - Vro is confused with Vr. Rotate occurs at 100 knots. This can occur on a takeoff or touch
and go.
Prevention - Arm and hand position should be such that the yoke is blocked until the IUT wants rotate to
occur.
Response - The IUT should first consider not calling refusal if IP brings hand to yoke early. However, if
nosewheel does leave runway, the IUT should take controls, hold nosewheel off the deck and continue
with the takeoff.
Note
Rotate at less than 100 knots shall only be demonstrated during the IUT simulator phase.
A-13
IN-FLIGHT PREDICAMENTS
Two Engines Inadvertently Shutdown On The Same Side (CO APPROVAL)
WARNING
The Two-Engine Inadvertently Shutdown on the Same Side scenario may only be
performed in the aircraft with Commanding Officer approval.
IAW NATOPS, conducting emergency maneuvers with two engines shutdown is prohibited. Maintain
straight and level flight, and limit the duration in this configuration.
If two engine-driven generators are to be shutdown, the APU shall be started prior to executing this
predicament.
This scenario may be performed in the aircraft with the following precautions:
• Single-engine performance shall be evaluated by the IP and IFE prior to execution. A 100,000 lb.
aircraft will have a 420 FPM rate-of-descent (standard day, normal-rated power, three propellers
feathered).
• Minimum airspeed shall be loiter speed.
• Minimum altitude for execution shall be 4000 feet AGL. Given the above single-engine conditions,
this altitude will provide over eight minutes to restart engines.
• No additional malfunctions or predicaments shall be presented while in a two-engine configuration.
The following items pertain to presenting the predicament in either the simulator or the aircraft:
Note
During the IUT SIM, single engine flight characteristics should be discussed and
practiced.
Execution – Two engines inadvertently shutdown usually occurs when the IFE pushes in the wrong
feather button during a prop-fails-to-feather scenario.
Prevention – This is very difficult to prevent. The IUT and or IUT FE may try to stop the IFE by raising
their voices or through physical contact.
Response – If two engines are inadvertently shutdown, the IUT shall take the aircraft, get the IUT FE in
the FE seat and complete the Emergency Shutdown and Restart checklists IAW Chapter 5. The inboard
engine should be restarted first. The IUT Team should then determine if training is to be continued.
A-14
Engine Is Autofeathered (SIMULATOR ONLY)
Execution - The autofeather is inadvertently left on and an engine is autofeathered. This can occur with
rapid power lever movement during level-off and subsequent climb.
Prevention – The IUT should get in the habit of utilizing the Climb checklist as soon as practical after
takeoff to ensure the autofeather is OFF. Many flight engineers routinely turn autofeather off when
safely airborne but the IUT should not count on this technique. The IUTFE should ensure the
autofeather is secured when safely airborne.
Response - The IUT and IUT FE should halt all training until the situation is resolved. If an engine
autofeathers, the IUT should take the aircraft, have the IUTFE get in the seat and restart the engine using
the Restart checklist.
Note
During an IUT SIM, discuss the ramifications of restarting an engine that has not had an
NTS check performed.
SIMULATED Actual Malfunction During High Work
The IUT and IUT FE must develop the ability to interrupt training to deal with unexpected events.
Presentation of malfunctions to the IUT and IUT FE during IUT events (we will call these “simulated
actual malfunctions”) by the IP and IFE team allows the IUT and IUT FE to develop necessary skills to
react to situations that might occur during a typical student training event. Simulated actual
malfunctions should be realistic (i.e. resolvable using existing NATOPS procedures) to provide effective
training (an example could be prop fails to feather during a normal shutdown). The IP and IFE should
remain in role during presentation of a simulated actual malfunction unless safety of flight becomes an
issue.
Execution - Any number of malfunctions or emergencies can occur during training.

Prevention - Maintaining situational awareness and an active scan will alert the instructor to potentially
dangerous situations.
Response – The IUT and IUT FE should halt all training until the situation is resolved. Once cleaned up
from all simulated malfunctions, the IUT should handle the emergency or malfunction and evaluate if
he/she can resume training after the situation has been resolved. IUT may request IP and IFE
involvement in role in handling the malfunction but at all times should make it clear to all participants
that this is an actual malfunction. If necessary, the IP and IFE should come out of role and work
together with the IUT Team to resolve the situation.
The use of a second IUT Instructor Pilot as a “Safety Pilot” can increase the safety and efficiency
of the IUT event. The Safety Pilot, if used, should not be directly involved in instruction or role-
playing. The Safety Pilot should participate in the event as an observer; taking notes as required and
providing a back up to the IP and IFE on safety of flight issues. The Safety Pilot may pull circuit
breakers for scan items. The Safety pilot shall not set up major system malfunctions (e.g. engine fire).
A-15
LANDING PATTERN PREDICAMENTS
Simulated Actual Malfunction During Touch-And-Go
WARNING
An EFAR shall not be conducted during a touch-and-go.
Execution – Simulated malfunction given during touch-and-go.

Prevention - None
Response - IUT should make decision whether or not to abort the touch-and-go, taking into account the
runway remaining and aircraft speed.
WARNING
During a no-flap touch and go, simulated malfunctions shall not be conducted.
Abort During Touch and Go

Execution – IP aborts during Touch and Go.
Prevention - IUT should guard against the student bringing the power levers into the ground range.
Response - IUT should make decision whether or not to abort the Touch and Go, taking into account the
runway remaining and aircraft speed.
Low Or High On Final

WARNING
If the IUT does not recognize an unsafe situation, the IP shall immediately execute a
waveoff.
Execution - Aircraft deviates from a three degree glideslope.

Prevention - IUT should stress a three degree glideslope and the visual cues that can be used to learn
how a three degree approach looks (i.e. “the ball”, ILS, VASI, etc.).
Response - IUT should alert the IP to this deviation if corrective action is not being taken and take
control of the aircraft as required to maintain safety of flight limits.
A-16
Power Chop In Flare
WARNING
IP should be aware of IUT not recognizing power chop. If the IUT does not
recognize an unsafe situation, the IP shall immediately execute a waveoff.
Execution - Power levers are rapidly retarded to flight idle. Additional airspeed should be utilized when
performing this predicament. Airspeed shall not be less than 1.3 or 1.35 Vs. Typically a pilot will take
this action when he / she is high and fast or when he / she has yet to establish a “feel” for power lever
movement.
Prevention - The IUT shall have his/her hands on top of the power levers and prevent excessive
movement.
Response - This is one of the most dangerous situations and could result in severe damage to the aircraft
should it be allowed to impact the ground. The IUT should take the aircraft, immediately apply power
and execute a waveoff.
Aircraft Floats In Flare
WARNING
If the IUT does not recognize an unsafe situation, the IP shall immediately execute a
waveoff.
Execution - IP is fast on final and aircraft touchdown is past the first third of the runway.
Prevention - It is not recommended that the aircraft be allowed to touchdown past the first third of the
runway.
Response - Although the IUT may elect to allow an IP to land the aircraft past the first third of the
runway, he/she must be mindful of remaining runway length (especially less than 5000 feet remaining)
if a touch-and-go is going to be attempted.
Note
In an IUT SIM, the IUT shall be shown various touch-and-go scenarios with touchdowns
at various runway remaining distances (i.e. touchdown at “4” board). This demonstration
should reemphasize the concept of an actual refusal point on touch-and-go’s.
A-17
Land Aircraft Off Centerline
WARNING
IUT should not allow IP to land with mainmounts outside of centerline. If the IUT
does not recognize an unsafe situation, the IP shall immediately execute a waveoff.
Execution - Aircraft touches down with centerline outside of mainmounts.

Prevention - IUT should constantly stress centerline control. In addition the IUT should be aware of
runway width (exercise caution with 150 feet or less) and obstructions that are close to the
runway might be impacted by a prop or wing.
Response - IUT must determine if it is advantageous to allow aircraft to continue or to waveoff.
Reversing With The Wrong Engine During A Simulated Engine Out Landing
Execution - The IP will forget which engine has been simulated shutdown especially when all four
power levers are very close to being married up.
Prevention - IUT should maintain scenario awareness.
Response - If briefed incorrectly, the IUT should correct the IP. Consideration should be given if the
crosswind component is more than 5 to 10 knots. Extra caution is required. If this occurs during
touchdown and reversal allow the IP to continue with the wrong engine and discuss the “mix-up”
afterwards. The resulting runway airwork will still call for proper use of rudder, aileron and asymmetric
power.
On ENGINE OUT REVERSAL All Four Power Levers Not Brought into the Ground Range
Execution - IP leaves a power lever in the flight range, or leaves the power lever just over the ramp.
Prevention - IUT should utilize a hand position that maintains contact with all four power levers during
the entire landing evolution.
Response - IUT should bring the “dropped” power lever into the ground range.
ATTEMPTED REVERSAL above 135 knots
WARNING
The IP shall not bring the power levers into the ground range, as pitchlock may occur.
A-18
Execution - IP lifts the power levers at the flight idle position as if bringing them into the ground range.
Prevention - IUT should position hand on the power levers to prevent inadvertent movement into the
ground range.
Response - IUT should block the power levers until the airspeed has decreased to below 135 knots.
LONG OR FAST ON No Flap (LEADS TO Touch-And-Go)
Execution - IP may land with less than the no-flap ground roll distance remaining.
Prevention - IUT should recognize that insufficient runway remains and not allow the aircraft to touch-
down.
Response - If the aircraft does touchdown the IUT should add power, accelerate to and rotate at 1.2 Vs
or 135 knots, whichever is greater. IUT should be mindful of the aircraft tendency to pitch up with
power application.
Aircraft Takeoff With Flaps At Land
Execution - Either on a touch-and-go, stop-and-go, or a normal takeoff the flaps are positioned at land
with the flap position indicator failed at approach.
Prevention - None. This predicament is conducted strictly for IUT exposure.
Response - IUT should notice the difference in aircraft angle of attack, the greater power required, the
LGWS alert, etc.
No Flap Landing With The Flaps At Approach
Execution - Off the “180” and after the Landing checklist has been completed, the flaps should be
lowered to “approach” with the flap position indicator failed in the “up” position.
Prevention - None. This predicament is conducted strictly for IUT exposure.
Response - IUT should notice the lower angle of attack and the higher power setting required to fly the same
pattern/approach.
Approach Flap Landing With Flaps Up
WARNING
If the IUT is flying the aircraft, this predicament shall only be flown to a low
approach. The IP/IFE shall ensure that the aircraft is not flown below the
appropriate 1.52/1.2 speeds.
Execution - The flap position indicator should be failed and the flaps should slowly be brought to the
“up” position.
Prevention - None. This predicament is strictly for IUT exposure.
Response - IUT should notice the higher angle of attack and the lower power setting required to fly the
same pattern/approach.
A-19
GENERAL PREDICAMENTS
Scan Items
The IUT flights are also the time to emphasize the importance of a good scan, both outside and
inside. It is very important for the IUT to be observant and maintain the highest degree of situational
awareness, especially considering that he/she may be the only qualified crewmember occupying a flight
station seat. In order to improve IUT cockpit awareness and inside scan various items will be randomly
failed throughout the IUT syllabus.
Note
When feasible, the use of a Safety Observer (an IUT Instructor Pilot or qualified IFE)
should be used on IUT-2, 5, and 6X to increase safety and training efficiency. The Safety
Pilot can participate in the event as an observer, taking notes as required and providing a
back up to the IP and IFE on safety of flight issues. If the Safety Observer is a pilot, he
may only pull circuit breakers for scan items. Only qualified IFE’s may fail systems
using circuit breakers for the purpose of presenting simulated actual malfunctions.
Incorrect checklists
WARNING
The IP shall not commence the takeoff roll or descend below 500 feet AGL on an
approach until all checklists are completed correctly and in their entirety.
Execution - IP does not call for the checklists or gives the wrong checklist response. IUT should also be
wary of those times when the IP might read the checklists (i.e. copilot duties) and the possibility of
skipping an item.
Prevention - IUT should have a technique for ensuring all checklists are completed (i.e. physically
holding the checklist or positioning the checklist in the glareshield). The IUT should be knowledgeable
enough about the checklists such that he/she recognizes when an item has been skipped.
Response – IUT should complete the correct checklist in a timely and thorough manner.
A-20

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P-3 FLIGHT

THIS GUIDE SUPERSEDES ISD/WCP JAN 2007

2A-1102.IG1 VP-30 ISD FEB 2008 (rev. 2)

• “Shall” has been used when application of a

P-3 Flight Instructor’s Guide

CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INFORMATION...................................…...................................................... 1-1

CHAPTER 2 GENERAL FLIGHT TRAINING PROCEDURES............................................................... 2-1

CHAPTER 3 GROUND TRAINING PROCEDURES.............................................................................. 3-1

CHAPTER 4 TAKEOFF TRAINING PROCEDURES............................................................................. 4-1

CHAPTER 5 IN-FLIGHT TRAINING PROCEDURES............................................................................ 5-1

CHAPTER 6 LANDING TRAINING PROCEDURES.............................................................................. 6-1

CHAPTER 7 COUNTER THREAT TRAINING PROCEDURES.........…................................................ 7-1

CHAPTER 8 LEVEL D-EQUIVALENT SIMULATOR PROTOCOL......................................................... 8-1

CHAPTER 9 MALFUNCTION SET UP FOR AIRCRAFT.........…........................................................... 9-1

APPENDIX A INSTRUCTOR UNDER TRAINING SYLLABUS…............................................................ A-1

The Flight Instructor......................................................1-1 Student Fatigue..............................................................1-3

3. Encouragement of further study. Emphasize that

teaching is more difficult than teaching. From appearance to Student Fatigue

General Flight Training Procedures

2. Is the evolution being presented as realistically as

Scenario Writing 3. Does the scenario represent the proper degree of

Flight Time Utilization 1. Determine if the student’s knowledge is at the proper

Note Compound Malfunctions

Compound emergencies may jeopardize safety and

Note Opening of Exits In Flight

2. During in-flight fire of unknown origin drills, the

2. Feet on, but not riding, the rudders.

b. The power levers are not brought over the ramp

Ground Training Procedures

Preflight Inspection........................................................3-1 Taxi Procedures ............................................................ 3-2

active runway unless an actual malfunction occurs and then

4. TP fails to place hand on the nosewheel during

the Abbreviated Before Start checklist. This procedure may CAUTION

6. Using the inboard brake during a fully deflected turn.

4. Unfeather the number 1 propeller. TP observes blade

3. With blade angle at feather discuss what happens

Takeoff Training Procedures

Takeoff Procedures........................................................4-1 EFAR Procedures ......................................................... 4-5

Takeoff Procedures 8. TFE fails to set oil coolers for takeoff.

2. TP does not place “heels on the deck” prior to com-

There is often discussion as to whether the proper

For training purposes, an engine/propeller malfunc- Common errors:

WARNING 2. Advance the power levers to 2500 SHP (which

Smoke Removal Hatch Open Below Three-Engine Ferrying Takeoff

2. At the hold short complete the NATOPS three-

3. With brakes set, apply maximum power on the

4. Release the brakes and allow the aircraft to

No attempt should be made to apply maximum

If a three-engine ferry takeoff demonstration is

Only the two symmetrical engines will produce

Ensure maximum power is set by 115 knots.

In-flight Training Procedures

Climb Procedures ..........................................................5-1 45 Degree Airstart System Demonstration ................... 5-8

Climb Procedures NTS Check Procedures

Note 2. TP fails to maintain an outside scan.

Common errors: 6. Minimum maneuvering airspeed (gross weight +110

9. Figure 5-1 should be used to brief the effects of angle

Degrees AOB Approximate G Loading Percent Increase 0 Thrust Stall

Figure 5-1. Effects Of Angle Of Bank On G’s During Balanced Flight

1. If one or more engines are actually shutdown.