Case Briefs
Case Briefs
Case Briefs
Facts/Issue: The central issue was the unlawful construction of residential buildings on land
marked as a recreational zone in the developmental plan. The case focused on whether this
act was an infringement of environmental laws and the constitutional right to life.
Ratio:
A. On Article 21
The court broadened the interpretation of Article 21 to encompass the right to a healthy
environment. They reasoned that the right to life includes the protection and preservation of
nature's gifts, and environmental pollution is a violation of this right.
B. On Stockholm Declaration
The court's decision aligns with the declaration's principles by acknowledging environmental
preservation as an obligation to ensure future generations' welfare. The court emphasized that
allowing the construction of residential buildings in a designated recreational area violated
this principle, leading to environmental imbalance.
Held:
Court blocked the construction, asserting that preserving environmental balance is a
matter of not just legal but constitutional importance too. The court, considering the
constitutional point of view, acknowledged that upsetting environmental balance
amounts to a violation of the right to life, thus supporting the environmental
complaints and resulting in the closure of the quarries.
The court stated that the purpose of development plans, which include designations
for recreational zones, is to maintain environmental balance. Allowing private
owners to build residential houses in such zones would disrupt this balance and
violate the law.
The court directed the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the Income-tax
Department, and the state entities to refrain from residential construction in the
designated land, and to remove any structures built during the case's pendency.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting a writ petition forbidding the
construction of residential structures on the specified land, thereby enforcing the
importance of environmental balance and developmental plan adherence.
Facts/Issue: The case revolves around allegations made by Subhash Kumar, a businessman,
claiming the river Bokaro was being polluted by the respondent-company's waste discharge.
The State Pollution Control Board, however, found no proof supporting Kumar's claims and
deemed its efforts to control pollution adequate. The case was further complicated by the fact
that Kumar had personal business interests involved.
Law:
Article 32 of the constitution – Writ Petition
Section 17 Water Act – Functions of State Board to inspect sewage in water
Section 24 Water Act – Prohibition on polluting/noxious matter in water
Ratio:
The court found that Kumar's primary motivation for filing the petition was not
public interest, but self-interest
The court regarded Kumar's actions as an attempt to use public interest litigation to
further his personal business interests. His actions were considered an abuse of
process, aimed more at satisfying personal grudges than serving the public good.
Article 32 provides a remedy for enforcement of fundamental rights. However, it
cannot be invoked to satisfy personal grudges
Held:
The court ruled that the slurry deposited on the company's land belongs to the
company, refuting Kumar's claim that he had a right to collect it.
The court dismissed the petition, stating it was filed for Kumar's personal interest, not
in public interest. Kumar was ordered to pay costs to the respondent.
Facts: Petition was filed in public interest by Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum against
pollution caused by enormous discharge of untreated effluents by the tanneries and other
industries in the State of Tamil Nadu. Environmental damage caused by the same included
non-availability of potable water to the residents near Palar River which included around 59
villages as well as causing nearly 35,000 hectares of agricultural land in the Tanneries Belt to
become partially or totally unfit for cultivation. Tanneries had already been sent a notice
either to construct common effluent treatment plants (CETPS) for a cluster of industries or to
set up individual pollution control devices and given substantial subsidies for the same but no
action was taken. Despite all possible assistance rendered by various expert bodies the
tanneries have failed to control the pollution generated by them.
Law:
Art 21,47, 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution for Polluter Pays and Precautionary
Principle
Principle 1, 3, 4, 13 and 15 of Rio Declaration
Ratio:
The Court mentioned the Rio summit and affirmed the principle of Sustainable
Development as well as its salient features like " Precautionary Principle" and
"Polluter Pays". It cited Art 21,47, 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution to include
these principals.
It interpreted the "Polluter Pays" principle as absolute liability for harm to the
environment extending not only to compensate the victims of pollution but also the
cost of restoring the environmental degradation.
Held:
The Court directed the Central Government to take immediate action to create an
authority or authorities under Section 3(3) of the Environment Act with adequate
powers to control pollution and protect the environment.
The authority was to implement the "precautionary principle" and the "polluter
pays" principle and to recover compensation under two heads namely, for reversing
the damage caused to the ecology and for payment to individuals affected by the
same.
It directed the Madras High Court to constitute a special Bench "Green Bench" to
deal with this case as well as any environmental matters and to pass any appropriate
order/orders in view of the court’s directions.
Facts: For a course of five months, the management of Span Resorts had been moving earth
movers and bulldozers for a second time to alter the Beas River’s course to save the Motel
from future floods by creating a new channel. Three private companies were engaged to
reclaim huge tracts of land around the Motel. The Supreme Court took notice of the news
item and the facts disclosed, in the view of the fact that it was a serious act of environmental
degradation on the part of the Motel.
Ratio: The Supreme Court, in this case, analyzed the construction activities and the
interference with the natural flow of the river and has declared that this activity, being
degrading to the environment, is illegal in nature. There was a direct breach of The Public
Trust Doctrine by the Himachal Pradesh Government due to the fact that the land granted
through lease was ecologically fragile and was for commercial purposes. The Court also
discussed the clash between the struggle between those members of the public who would
preserve out environment and those charged with administrative responsibilities find it
necessary to encroach upon the environment. They however, held that the aesthetic use and
the ecosystems of the country cannot be permitted to be eroded for private, commercial or
any other good use unless the courts find it necessary, in good faith, for the public good and
in public interest to encroach upon the said resources. They had stated that the resolution to
this conflict is for the legislature and not the courts.
Held: The Court quashed the lease- deed by which the forested land was leased to the
Moteland held that the construction activity carried out by the Motel was not justified. The
Motel was ordered to pay compensation by way of cost for the restitution of the environment
and ecology of the area. The Motel was ordered to construct a boundary wall at a distance of
not more than 4 meters for the building of the motel beyond which they were not allowed to
use the land of the river basin. The Court restricted the Motel from discharging untreated
effluent into the river. Himachal Pradesh Pollution Control Board was directed to inspect and
keep a check on the Motel.
Facts/Issue:
The case is about balancing the right to shelter and environmental protection. The Court had
to decide whether government orders permitting construction activities should be revoked to
protect two tanks, Peruru and Avilala. The main parties involved are Intellectuals Forum,
Tirupathi, the respondents, and the Government. The respondents wanted to develop
residential and institutional facilities, claiming the right to shelter.
The respondents argued that revoking the permits would violate the valuable right to shelter,
as they intended to build homes for high and middle-income families. The right to shelter is
considered a fundamental human right, but in this case, the Court determined that it does not
outweigh the need for environmental protection.
Law: Though not explicitly stated, the case likely involves environmental laws, land use
regulations, and potentially human rights provisions relating to shelter.
Ratio:
The Court stated that the decision could not be based solely on the financial investments
made by any party, as this would imply that investment legitimizes any activity. The Court
appointed an expert committee to assess the current state and feasibility of the revival of the
two tanks in question. The expert committee provided facts about the tanks' conditions and
suggested feasible methods for their revival, which the Court incorporated into its final
orders.
The CGWB is to be consulted for the design of various recharge and percolation structures,
emphasizing its role in sustainable groundwater management. Due to long-term
developmental activities, much of the natural resources of the tanks have been lost, making
environmental protection critical.
Held:
No further construction, removal of a small check dam, construction of a percolation tank,
and rainwater harvesting were among the directives for Peruru tank. For Avilala tank, no
further construction was permitted, and measures like rainwater harvesting and groundwater
recharge were ordered.
The Court ruled in favour of environmental protection, issuing directives for the revival of
the tanks based on expert committee recommendations. The verdict sets a precedent that
environmental considerations can outweigh the right to shelter and that financial investments
alone do not make a project legal.
Though not explicitly mentioned, there will be costs for the construction of percolation tanks,
rainwater harvesting systems, and other structures. The takeaway is the importance of
balancing developmental needs with environmental sustainability, supported by expert advice
and legal provisions.
Facts/Issue:
The primary concern revolves around the justifiability of writ petitions filed in the High
Court in 2007. This pertains to land use and development near the Yamuna river. Key points
include the reclassification of the land and the delay in filing petitions against these decisions.
The official respondents pointed out the significant delay in filing the petitions, emphasizing
that the decisions regarding the land had been taken much earlier and after considering public
opinions.
Initially, the site was categorized as "agricultural and water body." However, on 21.9.1999,
after seeking public opinions, it was reclassified to "public and semi-public." In 2003, it was
decided that the site would host the Commonwealth Games at the Commonwealth Games
Village. In 2007, a global tender process for Public Private Partnership (PPP) was completed,
marking the commencement of the residential portion of the Commonwealth Games project.
Environmental Clearance of 2006 highlighted the environmental significance of the area and
mandated due planning and clearance for future developments, a fact that the High Court
overlooked. A prior ruling, "Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India," indicated that PILs
presented after a project's initiation without reasonable delay explanation should be rejected.
The High Court felt that a new Expert Committee should determine if the construction was
on the "riverbed" or "floodplain" – a decision contested by the Court.
Ratio:
Given its proximity to the current site, the Court emphasized that the Akshardham temple
decision serves as a binding precedent. It was deemed unnecessary since an existing High
Powered Committee was already monitoring the work.
Evidence showed the site is neither on a "riverbed" nor "floodplain", contradicting the High
Court's observations. This change represents the official pivot from preserving the site for
natural uses to preparing it for public and semi-public purposes, including developmental
projects. Before any reclassification, the public's objections and suggestions were sought,
ensuring transparency and consideration of public interests.
The case impacts future developmental projects in proximity to rivers as it emphasizes the
need for proper environmental clearances and considerations, as well as public involvement
in decision-making processes. Delayed writ petitions, especially without reasonable
explanation, weaken their standing and can lead to their dismissal, as seen in this case.
The implications of the Delhi High Court's 03.11.2008 judgment being overturned are that it
allows the authorities to proceed with work at the site without the earlier restrictions. Public
opinion ensures democratic involvement, catering to collective interests and preventing
unilateral decisions that might harm public or environmental interests.
The Expert Committees’ findings and recommendations are given significant weight,
especially when making judgments on technical and specialized matters. The court
underscores the importance of due planning, clearances, and consultation with expert bodies
to ensure sustainable development without compromising environmental health.
The High Court viewed the site as being on a "riverbed," but the Court, based on expert
opinions, found it neither on a "riverbed" nor "floodplain." The NEERI reports, coupled with
other materials, played a critical role in establishing that the site was neither on a "riverbed"
nor a "floodplain."
Public notices ensured transparency and allowed citizens to voice objections or suggestions,
ensuring a democratic process. PILs concerning environmental issues should be filed
promptly with reasonable explanations for any delays. Delayed actions without proper
reasons might face dismissal.
The case underscores the importance of timely legal interventions, transparency in decision-
making, and the critical balance between development and environmental preservation.
Facts/Issue: On January19, 2004, a ruling was handed down in the matter of Essar Oil Ltd.
vs. Halar Utkarsh Samiti and Ors. in India's highest court. This case involved requests by
Essar Oil Limited, Bharat Oman Refineries Ltd., and Gujarat Positra Port to construct
pipelines in Marine National Park and Marine Sanctuary in order to transport crude oil to
their oil refineries in Jamnagar District. Objections were submitted in the name of the public
interest to these applications. Because Section 29 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act does not
exclude granting permission subject to certain restrictions, the High Court allowed Bharat
Oman Refineries Ltd. (BORL) to lay its pipelines while restraining others. The appeal stated
that whether or not pipeline construction causes wildlife deaths was an issue of fact that
should be decided by specialists. The question at hand was whether or not the damage to the
environment could be undone. No approval should be granted if it is irreversible unless it is
demonstrated to be good for wildlife.
Law: The Wild Life (Protection) Act of 1972, the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980, the
Environment (Protection) Act of 1986, and other relevant acts were discussed as they
pertained to environmental protection.
Ratio: Taking into account expert opinion and efforts to guarantee minimal impact, the
Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the permit under the Wild Life (Protection)
Act and ruled in favour of the appeal. The High Court was wrong to disregard the advice of
experts when there was no proof that wildlife habitats had been irreparably damaged or
destroyed. The State Government was ordered to provide permission to the appellants, and
the court overturned the High Court's decision.
This decision emphasised the value of expert testimony and the need to base decisions on
evidence under environmental law. It struck a compromise between the two competing goals
of industrial development and the conservation of animals and the environment, with an
emphasis on reversible damage as a primary condition for allowing such operations within
ecologically sensitive areas.
Facts/Issue: The T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad case dealt with broad issues concerning
forest conservation and environmental protection in India. The Supreme Court took a holistic
approach to interpret the legal provisions for forest and environmental preservation. The case
began as a plea against illegal logging in the Nilgiris, but it evolved to address the larger issue
of forest conservation and the rights and responsibilities of the state and central governments.
Initially centered on timber smuggling in Tamil Nadu, the case expanded its ambit to cover
forest conservation across India, transforming it into a landmark judgment for environmental
jurisprudence. The case emphasized forests as vital for ecological stability and the
preservation of the nation's natural heritage, underlining their significance beyond timber
resources.
Law:
The case reiterated the importance of Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, which regulates the
diversion of forest areas for non-forest purposes and ensures conservation and sustainable
use. The case affirmed that environmental degradation infringes upon the right to life under
Article 21, which includes the right to a wholesome environment.
Ratio:
The judgment emphasized that the central government had an overarching responsibility for
forest conservation, transcending state boundaries. The judgment underlined the symbiotic
relationship between tribal people and forests, urging their close association in forest
management and conservation. Compensatory afforestation is the act of afforesting an area as
a compensation for the diversion of forested land, ensuring no net loss of forest cover.
NGOs and environmentalists played a crucial part in highlighting the importance of forests
for ecological balance and presenting the environmental perspective. The court recognized
the alarming rate of forest depletion and stressed the urgent need for rigorous conservation
measures. The judgment reiterated the National Forest Policy, 1988 objectives, emphasizing
environmental stability, conserving biodiversity, and maintaining a significant forest cover.
The Public Trust Doctrine asserts certain resources, like forests, are preserved for public use,
and the government must protect them for the public's benefit. The judgment imposed
stringent regulations on forest-based industries to ensure sustainable practices and no
compromise on forest cover. The case recognized India's rich biodiversity and highlighted the
urgent need for its conservation, emphasizing protected areas like national parks and
sanctuaries.
The judgment stressed scientific management to enhance forest productivity, density, and
health, and to rejuvenate natural forests. The Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management
and Planning Authority (CAMPA) was emphasized for proper fund allocation towards
afforestation and conservation activities.
Facts/Issues: This decision related to an earlier decision by the Supreme Court on the same
matter, relating to noise pollution vis-a-vis the right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the
Constitution. The appellant submitted that this Court in its judgment dated July 18, 2005 had
held that freedom from noise pollution was a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Noise interfered with the fundamental right of the citizens to live in peace and
to protect themselves against forced audience. The Court had also held that as between 10
p.m. and 6 a.m. no noise pollution could be permitted. The appellant submitted that that a
regulation passed by the Government permitting the State Government to grant exemption
from noise restrictions between 10 p.m. and 12 midnight was violative of Article 21 of the
Constitution.
The Solicitor General submitted that the power to grant exemption was a reasonable
restriction placed in public interest. The relaxation was for a period of 2 hours only and that
too for a maximum of 15 days in all during a calendar year confined to cultural or religious
occasions. The power would be exercised by the State Government by keeping in view the
interest of the entire State population.
Ratio: The Supreme Court quoted a newspaper passage arguing that the use of loudspeakers
could not be a must for performing any religious act. However, looking at the diversity of
cultures and religions in India, it was of the view that a limited power of exemption from the
operation of the Noise Rules granted by the Central Government in exercise of its statutory
power could not be held to be unreasonable. The power to grant exemption was conferred on
the State Government. It could not be further delegated. It could be reasonably expected that
the State Government would exercise the power with due care and caution and in public
interest. However, the court made it clear that the scope of the exemption could not be
widened either by increasing the number of days or by increasing the duration beyond two
hours.
10. M.C. MEHTA VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS, AIR 1997 SC 734 (TTZ CASE)
Background:
Report by World Monuments Fund (1996), American Express Company
inadequacy of its urban infrastructure for transportation, water and electricity
densest pollution near the Taj mahal is caused by residential fuel combustion
diesel trains and buses, and back-up generators
the estimated daily 6,50,000 tons of trans-India truck traffic
Moreover, Taj Mahal is World Heritage Site
Facts/Issues:
Petitioner on Acid Rain and pollution
the foundries, chemical/hazardous industries and the refinery at Mathura are the major
sources of damage to the Taj.
The sulphur dioxide emitted by the Mathura Refinery and the industries when
combined with Oxygen-with the aid of moisture-in the atmosphere forms sulphuric
acid called "Acid rain" which has a corroding effect on the gleaming white marble.
Industrial/Refinery emissions, brick-kilns, vehicular traffic and generator-sets are
primarily responsible for polluting the ambient air around Taj Trapezium (TTZ).
Petitioner Prayer
a monument of international repute-is on its way to degradation due to atmospheric
pollution;
Praying to issues directions to the authorities concerned to take immediate steps to
stop air pollution in the TTZ and save the Taj.
Law:
Constitution of India - Articles 21, 47, 48A and 51A;
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 25B, and 25F;
The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974;
Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981;
Environment Protection Act, 1986
Ratio:
The Taj, apart from being cultural heritage, is an industry by itself. More than two
million tourists visit the Taj every year. (1997)
It cannot be disputed that the use of coke/coal by the industries emit pollution in the
ambient air. The old concept that development and ecology cannot go together is no
longer acceptable.
Sustainable development is the answer.
Held:
292 industries shall apply for grant of industrial gas-connection from GAIL
industries not applying for gas connections apply to the UPSIDC for allotment of
alternative plots
industries neither apply for gas connection nor for alternative industrial plot shall stop
functioning
The relocating industries shall set up their industrial estates outside TTZ
In order to facilitate shifting of industries from TTZ, the State Government and all
other authorities shall set up single window consisting of all the departments
The workmen employed in the above-mentioned 292 industries shall be entitled to the
following benefits
the closure of the industry in Agra and its restart at the place of relocation shall be
treated as active employment
one year's wages as 'shifting bonus' to workmen who agree to shift
workmen shall also be paid six years' wages as additional compensation in addition to
compensation in terms of Section 25-F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act for those
industries closed down
gratuity amount shall payable to all workman.
Facts:
The Tail Smelter located in British Columbia since 1906, was owned and operated by a
Canadian corporation. The resultant effect of from the sulfur dioxide from Trail Smelter
resulted in the damage of the state of Washington between 1925 and 1937. This led to the
United States (P) suit against the Canada (D) with an injunction against further air pollution
by Trail Smelter.
The United States (P) sought damages from Canada by suing them to court and also prayed
for an injunction for air pollution in the state of Washington, by the Trail Smelter, a Canadian
corporation which is domiciled in Canada (D).
Issue:
Is it the responsibility of the State to protect to protect other states against harmful acts by
individuals from within its jurisdiction at all times?
Held:
Yes. It is the responsibility of the State to protect other states against harmful act by
individuals from within its jurisdiction at all times. No state has the right to use or permit the
use of the territory in a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties or persons therein as stipulated under the United States (P) laws and the
principles of international law.
By looking at the facts contained in this case, the arbitration held that Canada (D) is
responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter Company. Hence, the
onus lies on the Canadian government (D) to see to it that Trail Smelter’s conduct should be
in line with the obligations of Canada (D) as it has been confirmed by International law. The
Trail Smelter Company will therefore be required from causing any damage through fumes as
long as the present conditions of air pollution exist in Washington. So, in pursuant of the
Article III of the convention existing between the two nations, the indemnity for damages
should be determined by both governments. Finally, a regime or measure of control shall be
applied to the operations of the smelter since it is probable in the opinion of the tribunal that
damage may occur in the future from the operations of the smelter unless they are curtailed.
12. M.C. MEHTA VS. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS., AIR 1988 SC 1037
(CALCUTTA TANNERIES)
Facts/Issues:
The observations by the NEERI team, regarding the Calcutta tanneries in the report are as
under:
Tannery units are located in highly congested habitations, offering little or no scope
for future expansion, modernization or installation of ETP(s)
Tannery units are located in thickly populated residential areas
Surroundings of the tanneries are extremely unhygienic due to discharge of untreated
effluents in open drains, stagnation of wastewater in low lying areas around the
tannery units, and accumulation of solid waste in tanneries.
Needless to say that the State of West Bengal and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board
(the Board) are wholly re-miss in the performance of their statutory obligations to control
pollution and stop environmental degradation.
The State of West Bengal has moved an application for extension of time for the shifting of
over 500 tanneries functioning on the bank of the river Ganges. This Court by its order dated
February 19, 1993 gave three months’ time to the State of West Bengal to take appropriate
steps.
It reveals from the inspection that adequate space is not available in Tiljala, Tangra and
Topsia area for construction of Common Effluent Treatment Plant. In this connection it can
be mentioned that Tanneries situated at Tiljala, Tangra and Topsia area are operating for a
considerable period of time with no regard to environment pollution control.
After the enactment of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 in the State
of West Bengal, tanneries of the said locality never applied for consent to the State Pollution
Control Board. Only in the year 1989, more than one hundred tanneries applied for consent
to the State Board after long persuasion.
Considering their practical problem, State Board issued consent under the Water (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, to tanneries for six months only in the year 1989 with a
condition that within the validity period of consent i.e. within 6 (six) months, the said
tanneries will construct primary effluent treatment plant and submit a scheme of secondary
effluent treatment plant. But, none of the tanneries situated in the said area constructed or
have taken any steps for construction of effluent treatment plant.
Therefore, State Board issued legal notice to the tanneries in the year 1992. Show cause
notices were also issued by the State Board asking why their factory may not be directed to
be closed for not putting up right type of effluent treatment plant as per the order of Hon'ble
Supreme Court dated 1st December, 1992.
Subsequently more than 275 nos. of tanneries applied for consent to the State Board but in
view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's order dated 19th February, 1993, "Consent" was not
granted to any of the tanneries. Moreover tanneries of the said area were directed to submit
an undertaking in the court stamp paper that they are willing to move to any place as fixed up
by the Government of West Bengal.
Accordingly, more than 280 tanneries submitted their undertaking in 'Court Stamp Paper' that
they are willing to move to any place as fixed up by the Government of West Bengal from
their present location.
The Committee shall be appointed who will entrust the job of project design to NEERI; The
procedure for acquiring the land measuring 507.27 acres under the Act shall be commenced
within one month. The State Government shall get the land developed within three months;
The project of setting up of Common Effluent Treatment Plant for about 540 tanneries, to be
re-located, be included under Ganga Action Plan Phase II. Its total cost of Rs. 65 crores shall
be met 50% by the Ganga Project Directorate and the remaining 50% by the State
Government
The proposed schemes are neither scientifically sound, nor can be constructed on the
existing locations without interfering with the normal life of the residents in above
mentioned areas
The proposed CETP schemes are not capable of treating the wastewater laden with
high total dissolved solids, chromium, and nitrogenous constituents. Thus the
proposed CETP designs cannot control pollution and odour in totality at the tannery
clusters at Tangra, Tiljola, Topsia, and Pagla Danga.
The proposed designs have little scientific basis, and do not consider the industry - specific
requirements of effective wastewater treatment in tannery clusters at Tangra Tiljola, Topsia
and Pagla Danga.
In view of categoric findings of the NEERI and also several reports by the Board there is no
possibility of setting up of common effluent treatment plants at the existing locations of the
Calcutta tanneries.
1. The State Government has acquired and taken possession of the land for setting up of the
new tanneries complex.
2. The State Government has repeatedly offered plots to the Calcutta tanneries in the new
complex but they have not as yet accepted the offers.
3. 25% of the land-price in the new complex was to be deposited by May 15, 1995 but despite
extension asked by the Calcutta tanneries and granted by this Court the money has not been
deposited.
4. The price of land in the new complex was fixed at Rs. 860 per sq. meter. At ,the asking of
the tanneries the price has been reduced to Rs. 600 per sq. meter by High Court.
5. The State Government is ready and willing to extend all the concessions and benefit
necessary in the process of relocation.
6. A very large number of Calcutta tanneries are operating without setting up of the pollution
control devices. Highly noxious and poisonous effluents are being discharged on the
surrounding areas and in the river.
Ratio:
The Calcutta tanneries are even otherwise operating in violation of the provisions of
the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (the Water Act). Sections
2(dd), (e), (J), (k) 24(l)(a) 25(1), (2) and 26 of the water Act are as under:
2(dd) "outlet" includes any conduit pipe or channel, open or closed, carrying sewage
or trade effluent or any other holding arrangement which causes or is likely to cause,
pollution.
The Calcutta tanneries are also violating the mandatory provisions of the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986. We direct the Board to examine individual cases and take
necessary action against the defaulting tanneries in accordance with law.
We are, however, of the view that "The Precautionary Principle" and "The Polluter Pays"
principle are essential features of "Sustainable Development".
Held:
1. The Calcutta tanneries operating in Tangra, Tiljola, Topsia and Pagla Danga areas in the
eastern fringe city of the Calcutta (about 550 in number) shall relocate themselves
2. The Calcutta tanneries shall deposit 25% of the price of the land
3. The tanneries who failed to deposit 25% of the price of the land as directed by us above
shall be closed
4. The authority established by the State Govt shall further determine the compensation to be
recovered from the polluter - tanneries as cost of reversing the damaged environment.
5. The compensation amount recovered from the polluting tanneries and the amount of fine
recovered from the tanneries shall be deposited , under a separate head called "Environment
Protection Fund" and shall be utilised for restoring the damaged environment and ecology.
6. The workmen employed in the Calcutta tanneries shall be entitled to the right and benefits
as indicated hereunder:
a. The workmen shall have continuity of employment at the new place where the tannery is
shifted.
b. The period between the closure of the tannery at the present site and its restart at the place
of relocation shall be treated as active employment and the workmen shall be paid their full
wages with continuity of service.
c. All those workmen who agree to shift with the tanneries shall be given one years wages as
"shifting bonus" to help them settle at the new location.
d. The workmen employed in the tanneries which fail to relocate shall be deemed to have
been retrenched provided they were in continuous service for a period of one year as defined
in Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. These workmen shall also be paid in
addition six years wages as additional compensation.
e. not willing to shift along with the relocated industries shall be deemed to have been
retrenched under similarly circumstances as the workmen in (d) above but they shall be paid
only one years wages as additional compensation.
f.……………………….
Facts/Issue:
The petitioner, a registered trust constituted with the object of imparting education,
approached the state government for issuance of essentiality certificate for establishing a
medical college. In pursuance of the sanction from Bangalore Metropolitan Development
Authority (BMRDA), the petitioner had begun construction of the hospital and college.
When the construction was half way through and an amount of rupees five crores spent
already, a news item appeared in the press that the construction is likely to pollute
Kumudavathi river which is located near the proposed construction. The river flows in to
Thippagondanahalli reservoir, and there is every likelihood of pollution of the said reservoir
which is one of the major sources of drinking water to Bangalore city. As a result of the news
item, a public interest writ petition was filed.
The petitioner claimed that there was 'deemed consent' based on the provision in sub-s (7) of
s 25 of the Water Act which runs:
(7) The consent referred to in sub-section (1) shall, unless given or refused earlier, be deemed
to have been given unconditionally on the expiry of the period of four months of the making
of an application in this behalf complete in all respects of the Board.
Under the provision, an applicant has to only satisfy the following three factors (i) the
consent referred to in sub-s (1) shall not have been given or refused earlier; (li) a period of
four months ought to have expired after making of the application; and (iii) his application
should be complete in all respects. It was contended that on establishing that these three
factors do exist in his favour, consent would be deemed to have been given, 'without much
ado, unconditionally immediately on the expiry of four months period.
Ratio:
Every provision of a statute is brought into being by Legislature with a particular object in
mind and when a provision requires a thing to be done in a particular manner and charge the
executive with the task of getting it done in that fashion alone, the power under the provision
has to be exercised responsibly to ensure proper governance of matters which have a direct
bearing on the welfare of each and every citizen individually and the society as a whole.
In the present case the Board having acted contrary to the provision contained in sub-section
(7) of Section 25, in that it had neither refused nor granted the permission within the time
prescribed under the statute it cannot be allowed to impregnate the impugned order with fresh
reasons which did not form part of its order when it was originally made.
Facts/Issues:
The primary concern of petitioner was to protect the health of thousands of innocent people
living in Cuttack and adjacent areas, who were suffering from pollution as several acts of the
public authorities were alleged to be in violation of Art 21 of Constitution, and laws relating
to protection of environment. Talahandi River used for bathing and drinking purposes was a
recipient of untreated wastewater not only from the medical college hospital close-by, but
also from other parts of die city. The sewage treatment which required upgradation was left
unattended. People were suffering from water borne diseases.
However, the medical college and the government denied that they were negligent. It was
pointed out that there existed a central sewerage system in the hospital campus, and that the
toilets were connected to it. The Health Department of the government tried to pass the buck
to the Department of Urban Development which was responsible for the supply of drinking
water.
The municipality also denied any responsibility. However, the State Board had made a study,
and concluded that the measures taken by the municipality and the health authorities were
inadequate.
Ratio:
The results of the survey undertaken clearly show that the water is unfit for human
consumption and drinking water particularly in respect of Biochemical Oxygen Demand
(BOD), Coliform and Turbidity. The report further reveals that the canal water is unfit for use
as drinking water sources even with treatment. With respect to BOD, the entire canal and
with respect to Coliform, most part of it was unsustainable for bathing. In conclusion the
report shows that it is the biological pollution of Taladanda canal as reflected by the BOD
and Coliform levels which is responsible for the down grading quality of water, in the
following words:
"A survey along with the banks of the canal would clearly reveal that the most horrendous
aspect of the present status of the canal is its use as a refuse for sewage and garbage.
In its stretch within the municipal limits of Cuttack, one can observe at least half a dozen
major sewage/domestic waste outlets to the canal. We have not; however, ascertained
whether they are with the permission of the competent authority or the discharges are let out
surreptitiously.
There is no denial of the assertion that reports were sent to them and requests were made for
compliance with statutory mandates. like the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Ratlam v
Shri Vardhichand (AIR 1980 SC 1622) we are left wondering whether our municipal bodies
and Government departments are functional irrelevances, banes, rather than boons, and
'Lawless' by long neglect.
A responsible Municipal Council is constituted for the precise purpose of preserving public
health. Provision of proper drainage system in working condition cannot be avoided by
pleading financial inability. Article 51-A(g) mandates compassion for living creatures. Why
is it lacking in them whose primary function is to protect?
Held:
We direct the State Government to immediately act on the reports relating to pollution load in
Taladanda Canal and water pollution from Mass Bathing in Mahanadi during Kartik Pumima.
We also direct constitution of a committee consisting of the Executive Engineer, Public
Health, Cuttack; the Chairman, Cuttack Municipality, who will take necessary steps to
prevent and control water pollution and to maintain wholesomeness of water which is
supplied for human consumption.
Facts/Issues:
Urbanization is a process which causes environmental pollution. Reasons for causing river
water pollution:
First, discharge of untreated influence carried away by city drainage system into River
Ganga
First, discharge of untreated influence carried away by city drainage system into River
Ganga 274.50 million litres a day of sewage water is being discharged into the river
Ganga from the city of Kanpur, which is the highest in the State of Uttar Pradesh and
next only to the city of Calcutta which discharges 580.17 million litres a day of
sewage water into the river Ganga.
Second, the presence of cowshed at the bank of River Ganga for serving the milk or
dairy purpose this sector is not very properly organised in most of the cities and the
people maintaining the cow or cowshed is poor people and unaware of the fact that
what kind of environmental problem may be associated with unplanned maintenance
of cowshed.
Third, the unscientific disposal of night soil responsible for causing River water
pollution. In urban area, this is one of the major regions for water pollution that there
will be many slum areas, where most of the places will be un-sewage area and the
night soil collected shall be directly disposed of and dumped in the open drainage
system
Fourth, untreated wastewater from tanneries industries are polluting the River water
of Ganga. Kanpur tannery is the example.
Fifth, water supply to Kanpur city also causes River water pollution. For daily need in
the Kanpur city almost 55 gallons of water is supplied.
Sixth, dry and wet cleaning service of clothes also cause pollution to River water of
Ganga. In this process harmful detergent and chemicals are used with the fresh water
to clean the dirty clothes
Seventh, the defecation and the slum area. Since, these people belong to economically
weaker section, therefore, they have somehow a place to stay without proper system
of toilets.
Law:
Constitution of India - Article 51A;
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 - Sections 2, 3, 4, 16, 17, 20,
21, 23, 24 and 32;
Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 - Sections 114, 251, 388, 396, 397,
398, 405 and 407;
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 - Section 17;
Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), - Section 482
Ratio:
In the 1986-87 the Ganga water samples were collected and tested in the laboratories by the
Industrial Toxicology Research Centre, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.
The availability in the sample of River water of iron and manganese are 29.2 mg/mL,
whereas ISI, that is, Indian statistical Institute, recommends for 0.3 and 0.9 mg/mL
respectively for iron and manganese. Whereas, World Health Organisation prescribes a limit
as 0.5 of manganese in the drinking water.
Moreover, the report suggests that the applicability of total coliform bacteria including fecal
coliform bacteria are very high which provides a situation to leave the River water outside the
purview of human use the values of biochemical demand and bio oxygen demand are very
high from that of prescribed limit of ISI. This situation also compels that the River water is
unfit for human use.
The Ganga action plan was for the first time established in the year 1986. National
Commission for Clean Ganga was registered in the year 2011 to implement the functions of
the National Ganga River Basin Authority. However, this Ganga River Basin Authority has
been discontinued from the year 2016 and National Ganga Council has taken its place from
the year 2016.
Held:
The Kanpur Nagar Nahapalika may either direct the dairies to be shifted to a place outside the
city so that the waste accumulated at the dairies does not ultimately reach the river Ganga or
in the alternative it may arrange for the removal of such waste by employing motor vehicles
to transport such waste from the existing dairies in which event the owners of the dairies
cannot claim any compensation
Increase the size of the sewers in the labour colonies so that the sewage may be carried
smoothly through the sewerage system. Wherever sewerage line is not yet constructed steps
should be taken to lay it
High Courts should not ordinarily grant orders of stay of criminal proceedings u/s 482 CrPC.
We are, however, of the view that since the problem of pollution of the water in the river
Ganga has become very acute the High Courts should not ordinarily grant orders of stay of
criminal proceedings in such cases and even if such an order of stay is made in any extra-
ordinary case the High Courts should dispose of the case within a short period, say about two
months, from the date of the institution of such case. We request the High Courts to take up
for hearing all the cases where such orders have been issued under Sections 482 of the CrPC,
1973 staying prosecutions under the Water Act within two months.
Dead bodies or half burnt bodies are not thrown into the river Ganga. One other aspect to
which our attention has been drawn is the practice of throwing corpses and semi-burnt
corpses into the river Ganga
Industrial applications shall be refused unless adequate provision has been made for the
treatment of trade effluents flowing out of the factories
Environmental education - it is the duty of the Central Government to direct all the
educational institutions throughout India to teach at least for one hour in a week lessons
relating to the protection and the improvement of the natural environment including forests,
lakes, rivers and wild life in the first ten classes. The Central Government shall get text books
written for the said purpose and distribute them to the educational institutions free of cost.
'Keep the city clean & Keep the village clean’- of organising 'Keep the city clean' week
(Nagar Nirmalikarana Saptaha), and 'Keep the village clean' week (Grama Nirainlikarana
Saptaha) in every city, town and village throughout India at least once a year
Judgment applies mutatis mutandis to all other Mahapalikas and Municipalities- What we
have stated above applies mutatis mutandis to all other Mahapalikas and Municipalities
which have jurisdiction over the areas through which the river Ganga Flows.
16. CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENT LAW, WWF-I V. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS.
(2013) 8 SCC 234
Facts/Issues:
In this case, the Supreme Court had to judge whether or not there was a necessity for the
reintroduction of the Asiatic lion, an endangered species which is threatened of extinction.
The plaintiffs seek from the Supreme Court an order that would force the State of Gujarat to
create a second home for Asiatic lions at Kuno. The defendant, the State of Gujarat,
motivated it refusal by explaining that there are already Asiatic lion sanctuaries in the forest
of Gir and that there was no need to create a new one in Kuno. Also the State of Gujarat
pointed out that the reintroduction of the Asiatic lions in Kuno would create some conflict
with the local communities, especially with the farmers. Finally, the defendant justified its
position by explaining that fighting poaching should be a priority instead of creating new
sanctuaries.
Ratio:
The supreme Court held that re-introduction of the Asiatic lion in Kuno was a priority that
cannot be delayed if we want to protect this species from extinction. The court considered
that the fact that the Asiatic lion had been historically present in Kuno and that there was an
important prey ratio is a guarantee that the re-introduction should take place there. As a
result, the court requested the Ministry of Environment and Forest to issue an order to re-
introduce the Asiatic lion in Kuno within a six month period.
Facts/Issues:
This case dealt with the ecological and social implications of commercial shrimp farming in
India. The traditional rice/shrimp rotating acqua culture system previously used by Indian
fishermen had began to give way to more intensive methods of shrimp culture which could
produce thousands of kilograms per hectare. A large number of private companies and multi-
national corporations had started investing in shrimp farms. Within a few years more than
eighty thousand hectares of land had been converted to shrimp farming. A high investment
return and expanding market was expected by replacing the environmentally benign
traditional mode of culture by semi-intensive and intensive methods.
The petitioner sought the enforcement of a coastal zone regulation notification issued by the
Government of India, stoppage of intensive and semi-intensive type of prawn farming in the
ecologically fragile coastal areas, prohibition to use wet lands for Prawn farming and the
constitution of a National Coastal Management Authority to safeguard the marine life and
coastal areas.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court analyzed several national and international studies on the ecological and
social implications of commercial shrimp farming. It took into account the issues of loss of
agricultural land and mangroves, obstruction of natural drains, salinisation, destruction of
natural seed resources, use of drugs and chemicals, extraction of groundwater and loss of
biodiversity, among others. The court emphasized that the new trend of more intensified
shrimp farming - without much control of feeds, seeds and other inputs and water
management practices - had brought to the fore a serious threat to the environment and
ecology. Agricultural lands were being converted into commercial aquaculture farms, which
had caused unemployment to the landless labourers and also loss of cultivable land.
Sustainable development should be the guiding principle for the shrimp aquaculture. The
industry had to develop under the unified motto of environment and development. There had
to be an environmental impact assessment also taking into account the social impact on
different population strata in the area before permission was granted to install commercial
shrimp farms. It also had to take into consideration the inter-generational equity and the
compensation for those who were affected and prejudiced.
Held:
The court therefore directed, inter alia, that the Central Government had to constitute an
authority with all the powers necessary to protect the ecologically fragile coastal areas. The
authority had to implement "the Precautionary Principle" and "the Polluter Pays" principles.
No shrimp culture pond as defined in the coastal zone regulation notification could be
constructed or set up within the coastal regulation zone. This direction did not apply to
traditional types of technologies. All shrimp culture industries operating in the coastal
regulation zone as defined under the notification had to be demolished. The agricultural
lands, salt pan lands, mangroves, wet lands, forest lands, could not be converted for
construction of shrimp culture ponds. Shrimp culture industry other than traditional and
improved traditional could be set up outside the coastal regulation zone as defined by the
notification with the prior approval of the authority mentioned above. The authority had to
assess the loss to the ecology and had to assess the compensation to individuals/families who
had suffered because of the pollution.
Facts/Issues:
The lease was granted on 8.11.1971 for a period of 10 years.
The concerned Assistant Collector rejected the application on the ground that the land
is a part of the reserved forest and in terms of the 1980 Act.
In that case it was found by the SC that while the digging for purposes of winning
mica can go on, the lessee would be deprived of collecting felspar or quartz which he
may come across while he is carrying on mining operations for winning mica. That is
unreasonable.
Ratio:
Moreover, fact of the case will decide whether earlier judgment should be applicable
or not.
Petition was dismissed on the ground that in the instant appeals the situation is
entirely different.
The primary purpose of the Act which must subserve the interpretation in order to
implement the Act is to prevent further deforestation
Facts/Issues:
The questions which arise for determination in this appeal filed against the order of the Full
Bench of the Kerala High Court are whether Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980
is prospective in operation and whether the Government of Kerala could, without obtaining
prior approval of the Central Government grant pattas/lease hold rights to the unauthorised
occupants/encroachers of forest land.
With a view to make provision for better protection and management of forests in the State,
Maharaja of Travancore enacted "The Travancore Forest Regulations of 1068" providing that
Diwan of the State could, with the sanction of Maharaja constitute any land at the disposal of
Government a reserved forest. Notwithstanding the enactment of afore-mentioned
Regulations, parts of reserved forests in the erstwhile State of Travancore were
unauthorisedly occupied by landless persons who undertook agricultural operations for their
survival. After formation of the new State, the Government took a serious view of the
unauthorised occupation/encroachment of forest land and decided that encroachments made
after 1.4.1957 will be removed. In order to find out a permanent solution to this perennial
problem, the State Government changed to 1.1.1968 the cut off date fixed for regularization
of unauthorised occupation/encroachment of forest land. Even this did not deter people from
making further encroachment on forest land and use the same for non forest purposes and due
to lack, therefore it was decided that all encroachments of forest land made prior to 1.1.1977
will be regularized by framing a policy and those made on or after 1.1.1977 will be removed.
However, before that decision could be implemented, the 1980 Act was enacted by
Parliament and in view of the non obstante clause contained in Section 2 thereof, the State
Government could not pass any order for regularizing unauthorised
occupation/encroachments of forest land. The Central Government on 31.1.1995 accorded
final approval under Section 2 of the 1980 Act for diversion of 28,588.159 hectares forest
land for regularization of pre-1.1.1977 unauthorised occupation/encroachments.
The appellant challenged this decision filing writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution. It prayed for grant of a declaration that the Government of Kerala is not entitled
to dereserve the reserved forest or permit use of forest land for any non-forest purpose
without obtaining approval of the Central Government in terms of Section 2(iii) of the 1980
Act. The appellant further prayed that pattayams (title deeds) issued in respect of forest land
without obtaining approval of the Central Government should be quashed. By the impugned
judgment, the High Court held: the decision of the State Government to grant pattas/lease
hold rights to pre-1.1.1977 unauthorised occupants/encroachers of forest land did not involve
violation of any constitutional or legal provision, as the 1980 Act is prospective in operation.
Ratio:
In the present case it is not in dispute that before the enactment of the 1980 Act, the
Government of Kerala had taken a policy decision to regularize the illegal/unauthorised
occupation and encroachments of forest land made prior to 1.1.1977 and also to remove all
unauthorised occupation/encroachments made on and after 1.1.1977. For implementation of
that decision, the State Government approached and succeeded in persuading the Central
Government to grant approval for diversion of 28,588.159 hectares of land by way of
assignment to the unauthorized occupants/encroachers. The approval granted by the Central
Government was in consonance with the guidelines framed by it for regularization of
encroachments on forest land.
Therefore, the apex opinion is that the policy decision taken by the Government of Kerala to
assign 28,588.159 hectares of forest land to unauthorized occupants/ encroachers after
seeking approval from the Central Government does not suffer from any legal infirmity and
the High Court rightly declined to interfere with the said decision. As and when the State
Government decides to assign 10,000 hectares of forest land to unauthorised
occupants/encroachers, it shall do so only after obtaining prior approval of the Central
Government and the latter shall take appropriate decision keeping in view the object of the
1980 Act and the guidelines framed for regularization of encroachments on forest land.
20. A.P. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD VS. PROF. M.V. NAYADU (RETD.), AIR 1999
SC 812.
Facts/Issues:
According to the Pollution Control Board, under the notification No. J.20011/15/88-iA,
Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India dated 27.9.1988, ‘vegetable oils
including solved extracted oils’ were listed in the ‘RED’ hazardous category. On 31.3.1994,
the Municipal Administration and Urban Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh
prohibited various types of development within 10 km radius of two lakes, Himayat Sagar
and Osman Sagar, in order to monitor the quality of water in these reservoirs which supplied
water to the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.
In January 1995, the respondent company was incorporated as public limited company with
the object of setting up an industry for production of B.S.S. Castor oil derivatives and
purchased 12 acres of land in Peddashpur village. The application of the industry was
rejected by the A.P. Pollution Control Board since the proposed site fell within the 10 km
radius and such a location was not permissible. The unit was a polluting industry and fell
under the red category of polluting industry. The Board opined that it would not be desirable
to locate such industry in the catchment area of Himayatsagar.
Ratio:
The court examined whether the proposed project would indeed be polluting, and thereby
pointed out the difficulties faced by environmental courts in dealing with technological or
scientific matters. The Courts did not possess the expertise in all technical and scientific
matters of extreme complexity. The Tribunals or the appellate authorities dealing with such
matters had to be manned by technical personnel well versed in environmental laws in
addition to judicial members. Such defects in the constitution of these bodies could
undermine the very purpose of the legislations.
It emphasized that widespread toxic pollution was a major threat to essential ecological
processes. In this connection it pointed out the importance of the precautionary principle in
environmental law. It was appropriate to place the burden of proof on the person or entity
proposing the activity that was potentially harmful to the environment. This person was to
discharge this burden by showing the absence of a reasonable ecological or medical concern.
The result would be that if insufficient evidence was presented by it to alleviate concern
about the level of uncertainty, then the presumption should operate in favor of environmental
protection.
Held:
It held that when dealing with environmental matters the Supreme Court and the High Courts
could make a reference to the expert bodies/Tribunals having expertise in scientific and
technical aspects for investigation and opinion. Any opinion rendered by such bodies would
be subject to the approval of the Court.
Therefore the Supreme Court referred the following questions to the Appellate Authority
under the National Environmental Appellate Authority Act, 1997:
(a) Is the respondent industry a hazardous one and what is its pollution potentiality, taking
into account, the nature of the product, the effluents and its location?
(b) Whether the operation of the industry is likely to affect the sensitive catchment area
resulting in pollution of the Himayat Sagar and Osman Sagar lakes supplying drinking water
to the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad?
The court, therefore, referred the above issues to the above-said Appellate Authority for its
opinion and requested the Authority to give its opinion, as far as possible, within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of this order.
Facts/Issues:
Lafarge Surma Cement Ltd. ('LSCL' for short) is a company incorporated under the laws of
Bangladesh. It has set up a cross-border cement manufacturing project in Bangladesh. A
captive limestone mine of 100Ha located at East Khasi Hills District in the State of
Meghalaya was leased out in favour of Lafarge Umium Mining Pvt. Ltd. ('LUMPL' for
short), which is an incorporated company which is a wholly owned subsidiary of LSCL.
Lafarge started commercially operating a 100-hectare limestone mine in October 2006 at the
East Khasi Hills district in Meghalaya. It sent the limestone across the India-Bangladesh
border on a conveyor belt as raw material for its 2-million-tonne a year capacity cement plant
in Bangaldesh.
Lafarge made representations that the limestone mines did not involve the diversion of forest
land and in support provided letters from the Khasi Hills Autonomous District
Council (“the KHADC”), the local authority with jurisdiction over the Khasi division, and a
certificate from the Divisional Forest Officer (“the DFO”) of the Khasi Hills Division stating
that the mining site was not in the forest area. Lafarge also stated that limestone mines had
existed in Nongtrai since the 1850s and that several unorganised small players were already
exploiting the limestone reserves. After several rounds of queries from the MoEF and
consequent responses from Lafarge, the MoEF finally gave environmental clearance for the
mines in 2001 and Lafarge commenced mining operations in Nongtrai
Trouble started in 2006 when the Chief Conservator of Forests (“the CCF”) for Meghalaya
wrote to the MoEF stating that he had visited the mining area and noted that the mining site
was surrounded by thick natural vegetation. The CCF expressed the view that the land where
the mine was located was forest land and accordingly Lafarge could not carry out operations
without the necessary forest clearance. The matter reached the Supreme Court when a group
of 21 tribal activists under the banner of the Shella Action Committee filed a petition alleging
that Lafarge was mining on forest land, and did not have the required clearances. Later, the
court stayed Lafarge’s mining operations. Against this, a writ was filed and thus, it came
before the SC.
The crucial questions in the case were whether Lafarge had willfully subverted the process of
getting clearance to mine on forest land, and whether it was aware of the fact that the land
was classified as forest as per law.
Ratio:
The Court held that the constitutional doctrine of proportionality should apply to
environmental matters as well. Therefore, decisions relating to utilisation should be judged on
the well-established principles of natural justice, such as whether all relevant factors were
taken into account at the time of coming to the decision, whether the decision was influenced
by extraneous circumstances, and whether the decision was in accordance with the legislative
policy underlying the laws that governs the field. If these circumstances were satisfied, the
decision of a government authority (in this case the MoEF) would not be questioned by
the Court.
The SC held that Lafarge had gone about getting its approvals in a bona fide manner, and that
the company believed the land was not a forest land. The court reasoned that the area was
part of a traditional limestone mining belt which had become deforested. The situation before
the bench was finally that Lafarge had done all that it could have on the regulatory front, but
it turned out that the mining site was in a forested area. It also emerged that the state
government had failed in certain respects—to notify the environment ministry, among other
things.
The court said the company had taken the consent of the real custodians of the land—the
Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council before it started mining in the area. It also reasoned
that the existence of the mining operations had brought jobs, schools, healthcare and other
benefits to the local communities. SC held that it was satisfied that limestone mining has been
going on for centuries in the area and it was intertwined with the culture and the unique land
holding and tenure system of the Nongtrai village. SC held that it was satisfied with the due
diligence exercise of the MoEF before it gave a clearance.
Held:
More importantly, the Court has enumerated certain directives to be followed by judicial
authorities as well as the MoEF in similar cases. It has promoted the need for a regulator to
uphold the principles outlined in the National Forest Policy, 1988, when read together with
both the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980
it is also suggested that the number of such Regional Offices in the country be increased.
Corporate entities have also been directed to evolve Corporate Environment Policies to
guarantee compliance with the clearances granted to them. Public consultation has also been
made a requisite for the process of obtaining environment clearance. This guarantees those
among the indigenous population who are aggrieved by ideas of upcoming projects to voice
their opinions and seek remedial measures, if necessary. The Court has made it mandatory for
these guidelines to operate in all cases of forest and environment clearances, until a
regulatory mechanism is instated.
Overall, this judgment finds a balance between economic growth and environmental
protection. (Sustainable Development). It lays down the specific scenarios in which a court
can interfere with the decision of the MoEF. It also lays down guidelines which suggest that
approval process must be improved. But, how it should be done is missing.
22. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE VS UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS., AIR 2001
GUJ 71
Facts/Issues:
The petitioner challenged the manner in which notifications issued by the Government of
India under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, in the matter of granting of
environmental clearances were not followed in letter and spirit. Besides the petition was also
directed against the environmental clearance given by the State Government to the Thermal
Power Plant of the Gujarat Electricity Board, on the ground that no public hearing was held.
The petitioner also prays for certain directions to the respondent authorities about the manner
in which the public hearing should be conducted and public hearing should be made effective
and meaningful so as to achieve the object of the EP Act, 1986.
Ratio:
The Court having considered in detail the Environment Impact Assessment Notification of
the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, laid down the important
guidelines to be followed in the Public hearing procedure of the Environment Impact
Assessment:
1. The venue of the public hearing has to be as near as possible to the site of the
proposed project and no further than the sub district (taluka) headquarters and the
period of public notice regarding public hearing should be at least three months;
2. The state pollution control board should publish notice of the public hearing in at least
two newspaper widely circulated in the region, one of which should be in the
vernacular language;
3. The first public hearing should be held at least 30 days after the newspaper notice;
4. There should be a summary of the EIA Report in the local language and the EIA
report be made available to the concerned citizen;
5. The quorum of the committee conducting the public hearing would be half its
membership and the representatives of the Pollution Control Board, state department
of environment and one of the three senior citizens nominated by the Collector, would
have to be present for a valid public hearing (at least one of the three senior citizens
nominated should have some credentials on the issues of environmental concerns);
7. The gist of the environmental clearance has to be published in the newspaper in which
notice of the public hearing is given.
Held:
In this manner, if the persons who have participated at the public hearing or other persons
who are aggrieved by action of any other authorities of the Central Government are desirous
of filing an appeal before the National Environmental Appellate Authority Act, 1997, they
would be in a position to file such appeal, as the authorities make them aware that a particular
unit is granted the environmental clearance certificate.
23. B.K. SHARMA V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 2005 GUJ 203
Facts/Issues:
In 2004, the petitioner filed a Special Civil Application before the Court seeking directions
against the construction of a blast furnace and ductile iron casting pipe near Mundra, Kutch
as the necessary Environmental Clearance was not procured. On representation to the Central
Government, the same held that the petitioners’ objection to establishing a mini blast furnace
was not justified. The respondent was granted the environmental clearance subject to strict
compliance with the Environmental Clearance Letter and the same was allowed to construct
the blast furnace.
The respondent was granted the environmental clearance subject to strict compliance with the
Environmental Clearance Letter and the same was allowed to construct the blast furnace. The
order of the Central Government granting this clearance was challenged by the petitioners in
the present matter.
The petitioners have asked for a writ in the nature of mandamus to destroy/ demolish the
project in question as well to declare the environmental clearance for the blast furnace null
and void as the blast furnace constructed was an independent unit of the manufacturing units
is a separate foundry.
Moreover, the respondents have prayed that the Court appoint NEERI or any other similar
organization to assess whether the requirements of the two EIAs were adhered to for a
seismic zone, along with any further directions given by the Court.
Ratio:
The present petition seems to be a sponsored petition and, pursuant to Ashok Kumar Pandey
v. State of West Bengal AIR 2004 SC 280, the SC has clearly stated that such camouflaged
PILs cannot be entertained. There exists no real and genuine public interest in this case.
While construction had commenced on the blast furnace after receiving only an NOC, the
respondents were under the belief that this was all that was required. Moreover, they had
subsequently received the appropriate clearance under the EPA and hence, the same cannot be
treated as ex post clearance.
The pipe manufacturing plant did not require additional clearance under the Notification. The
word “individual” cannot mean clearance for each and every foundry and while granting the
permission for the Blast Furnace, numerous other safeguards have been put in place for the
protection of the environment.
The Court cannot overrule the decision of a competent judicial authority and in this regard,
the Central Government has opined that the project falls under Entry 13(a) and not under
Entry 28 (Foundries (Individual)) of Schedule 1.
A fair hearing does not mean the opportunity to be orally heard. It may also include the
opportunity to make written submissions that are taken into account and in the present matter,
the UOI had given the petitioners the opportunity to be heard.
24. NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS AIR 2000 SC
3751
Facts/Issues:
There was a water dispute regarding the river Narmada between the states of Rajasthan, Mad
hya Pradesh and Gujarat. The dispute was regarding the control of the waters, use and distrib
ution. By applying section 4 of the interstate disputes act 1956 the government of India consti
tuted a tribunal for that purpose and the matter was referred to it. This tribunal determined the
height of the dam. It directed the state of Gujarat to construct the dam. The tribunal gave the a
ward for constituting the interstate administrative authority i.e. Narmada control authority an
d the review committee that would review the decisions of the NCA. Independent machinery
of environment subgroup was also created by NCA. On 23 April 1994 under the decision of t
he ministry of water resources there was the closure of ten construction sluices. The petitione
rsof the writ petition requested for the independent judicial authority should review the entire
project. The major contention given by the petitioners was of article 21 of the Indian constitut
ion and ILO convention no 107. They also contended the catchment area treatment programm
e and rehabilitation needed to be done well before the reservoir filling.
Law:
Ratio:
The court emphasized that for something as crucial as this project, completion should be
swift and compliance with the stipulations and directives, based on which clearance was
granted, should be maintained.
The Supreme Court issued instructions allowing the dam's construction up to 90 meters, as
the designated Subgroup had approved clearance up to that height. Any additional
construction would require the Environment Group's endorsement for further environmental
clearance. The Narmada Control Authority (NCA) should grant additional permissions for
dam construction. Priority should be given to the reports of the Grievance Redressal
Authorities. For any additional suitable orders, the Grievance Redressal Authority should
approach the Review Authority.
One significant reason for granting clearance might be the fact that, even after seven decades
of independence, not all Indian citizens have access to sufficient water, clearly violating
Article 21 and the United Nations Human Rights Resolution. Indian rivers have the potential
to alleviate the dire conditions prevalent in arid areas of the country where adequate rainfall
is scarce.
Regarding policy decisions, the government has the discretion to establish policies, and the
court should not review these decisions anew unless they conflict with existing laws. The use
of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) should be limited to certain scopes and should not be
leveraged as a weapon in public interest litigation.
There is a need to bridge the diversity in India so that those marginalized by society are also
integrated into the social fabric. The government should also provide essential modern
facilities such as drinking water, sufficient electricity, irrigation services, and rehabilitation
amenities. Therefore, in the absence of any adverse circumstances or studies that demonstrate
that the dam is harmful to the ecosystem, the court provided direction.
The dam's construction was expected to affect various elements including monuments,
habitats, flora, fauna, and cultural practices. Undoubtedly, it would displace tribal
communities from lands they had inhabited for generations. Despite these potential impacts,
clearance for the dam's construction was granted considering its positive aspects. The
environmental clearance granted by the Prime Minister was questioned due to the absence of
sufficient studies and surveys, which was deemed an inadequate justification.
In a democratic setup, the government's decisions should reflect the perspectives of all
societal sections. Policy-making should be primarily a governmental responsibility, and the
judiciary should refrain from interference unless the policy is in violation of constitutional
provisions.
25. N.D. JAYAL AND ANR. VS. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS., (2004) 9 SCC 362
Facts/Issues:
A writ petition was filed under Article 32 of The Constitution of India before the Supreme
Court with respect to Tehri Dam’s safety. The Appellants in its submission raised contention
on the conditional clearance granted by The MoEF to the Respondents when the Expert
Committee in the year 1986 had recommended abandoning the project. Further in
October1994, where the Additional Director of the MoEF on a report stated that there was
huge lagging in the implementation of the clearance conditions pari passu to the construction
then on which basis the project is continued. The contention also extended to the structure of
the dam stating that the construction will increase seismic vulnerability in the Himalayan
region which will, prove catastrophic to the upstream and the downstream population.
Conducting of3-D non- linear analysis and the dam break analysis as
recommended by the Experts Committee Chaired by Shri Sunderlal Bahuguna
was also in question. The scope of Sustainable development was also to be
interpreted in nexus with Article 21 of The Constitution of India and Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986.
Ratio:
The Supreme
Court in the present case considered the right to health under Article 21. It further continued
to state that, “The protection of health is linked with clean environment which in itself is a
fundamental right and cannot be ignored”. The Court relied on M.C Mehta v. Union
of“Right to clean environment and development is a component of Article 21.
Right to
development includes civil, cultural, economic, political, social development and cannot only
be confined to economic betterment”. The right of the ousted is also considered in the present
case to fall under Article 21 stating that, “The displaced have a right to lead a decent life, earn
livelihood in rehabilitated location and to be adequately compensated by minimum possible
disturbance to life source and lifestyle”.
The Supreme Court in the present case considered the right to health under Article 21. It
further continued to state that, “The protection of health is linked with clean environment
which in itself is a fundamental right and cannot be ignored”. The Court relied on M.C
Mehta v. Union ofIndia2 and Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India3,where it
was stated that, “Right to clean environment and development is a component of
Article 21. Right to development includes civil, cultural, economic, political, social
development and cannot only be confined to economic betterment”. The right of the ousted is
also considered in the present case to fall under Article 21 stating that, “The displaced have a
right to lead a decent life, earn livelihood in rehabilitated location and to be adequately
compensated by minimum possible disturbance to life source and lifestyle”.
The Supreme Court, on the matter of policy decisions taken by the Government regarding
there habilitation and the safety tests, has clarified that the planning of the project, its
execution are part of the policy. The Court cannot interfere except in the case of arbitrariness
of the policies. The Court needs to ensure on these lines that no law, Fundamental
Rights are violated. It relied on the cases, Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and
Balco Employees Union v. Union of India wherein it was held that, “When there are two or
more options available and the Government takes policy decision, it is not the function of the
Court to re-examine or interfere in the matter by way of appeal”. Thus the distribution of
powers between the executive and judiciary wing is well explained in various matters by the
Court.
It was held that, "The directions mentioned in the notification dated January 21, 1994,
have to be applied and strict monitoring is to be done by Central Government
through The MoEF. Proper Environment Impact Assessment and ameliorative measures
should be carried out so that the adverse effects of the project can be mitigated. Also, a
Committee of Experts shall be formed in exercise of power under Section 3, Rule 5 to report
the fulfilment of pari passu condition of environmental clearance to The Central
Government every three months and recommend correctible actions where the condition is
not fulfilled.
The Supreme Court in this matter observed the importance of sustainable development and
the nexus between environment jurisprudence and constitutional resolve. It held
that, "Sustainable development is a strategy which caters to the needs of the present
generation without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to satisfy their needs. Only
by following sustainable development, a balance between environment protection
and development activities can be achieved”.
It was directed to follow the precautionary principle and on that basis the 3-D non-linear test
was to be conducted by the Respondents. Further, the impoundment of the dam was to be
allowed only after the analysis was taken up and the report was sought by the experts on the
safety aspects. It was observed by the Court that, “When the authorities have the power to
grant conditional clearance, it is coupled with the obligation to ensure the fulfillment of the
conditions based on which environment clearance was given. To carry out the obligation, a
strict vigil was required by The MoEF on fulfillment of conditions of environment clearance
and stringent action to be taken against the authorities for not adhering to pari
passu
conditions of clearance”
It was directed to follow the precautionary principle and on that basis the 3-D non-linear test
was to be conducted by the Respondents. Further, the impoundment of the dam was to be
allowed only after the analysis was taken up and the report was sought by the experts on the
safety aspects. It was observed by the Court that, “When the authorities have the power to
grant conditional clearance, it is coupled with the obligation to ensure the fulfilment of the
conditions based on which environment clearance was given. To carry out the obligation, a
strict vigil was required by The MoEF on fulfilment of conditions of environment clearance
and stringent action to be taken against the authorities for not adhering to pari
passu conditions of clearance”
26. THE GOA FOUNDATION AND ANOTHER VS. THE KONKAN RAILWAY CORPORATION
AND OTHERS, AIR 1992 BOM 471
Facts/Issues:
A writ petition was filed in the Bombay High Court by a Society asking the Court to compel
the Railway Corporation to procure environmental clearance from the Ministry of
Environment and Forest under the EPA, 1986 for the part of alignment passing through Goa.
The petitioner claimed that the proposed alignment is wholly destructive of the environment
and the ecosystem and violates Art. 21 of the Constitution. The grievance of the petitioners
was that the proposed alignment was planned and undertaken without an adequate
Environment Impact Assessment and Environment Management Plan. The petitioner also
claimed that the Corporation had violated the the coastal regulation zone CRZ notification.
According to the petitioner, although the ecological damage due to the proposed project will
not be immediately visible, the damage will be gradual and will lead to the deterioration of
the land quality effecting a large number of people. In particular the project would have a
disastrous consequence on the low lying Khazan paddy fields. The Khazan fields lie below
the sea level and have a unique natural biological eco-system of mangroves and fish life, and
are among the most fertile nurseries of fish life.
Ratio:
The Court after review the argument and the facts presented before it, refused to exercise its
writ jurisdiction over a matter of national importance and significance. The extent of damage
is negligible and public project of this kind will fulfil the long standing aspirations of the
people on the west coast. According to the Court "no development is possible without some
adverse effect on the ecology and environment." Further the Court interpreted the meaning of
Central Government in the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 in an extended way: since the
project is approved by the Central Government and the Railway Ministry is carrying out the
project, the Corporation can use forest land for non-forest purpose. But Central Government
as mentioned in Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 means the Ministry of Environment &
Forest and not any other Ministry. The Court also held out that the project cannot be
challenged on the ground that it violated the provisions of the EPA. The reason being that
Section 11 of the Railway Act, 1989 allows the Railway Administration to construct over any
lands, hill, valley stream etc. According to the Court the wide ambit of the provision of
Section 11 and the non obstante clause makes it extremely clear that the provisions of the
environment acts do not bind the construction or maintenance of a railway line.
27. ARUNA RODRIGUES AND ORS. VS. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS., (2012) 5 SCC
331
Facts/Issues:
The Petitioners, stated that a grave and hazardous situation, raising bio safety concerns, is
developing in our country due to release of Genetically Modified Organisms (for short
'GMOs'). The GMOs are allowed to be released in the environment without proper scientific
examination of bio safety concerns and affecting both the environment and human health.
This Court, vide its order dated 1st May, 2006, directed that till further orders, field trials of
GMOs shall be conducted only with the approval of the Genetic Engineering Approval
Committee (for short 'GEAC'). I.A. No. 4 was filed, in which the prayer was for issuance of
directions to stop all field trials for all genetically modified products anywhere and
everywhere. The Court, however, declined to direct stoppage of field trials.
Ratio:
On 8 May 2007, the Supreme Court laid out a series of guidelines for the GEAC to
ensure that neighbouring fields were not contaminated due to GM crops field trials:
There should be a distance of at least 200 meters between the trial fields and
aspects of the trials, along with their other details, should be reported to the
Before bringing out the GM material from the greenhouse for conducting field
trials, the approved institution should submit validated event specific test
Held:
The Supreme Court added that GM crops that were already commercially approved must
not be further modified to create new species. Due to the commercial nature of these
existing crops, the Court also mentioned that the GEAC must also account for their
toxicity and potential to induce allergy in organic crops.
Facts/Issues:
Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika permitting M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. to construct underground
shopping complex in the Jhandewala Park (also known as Aminuddaula Park) situated at
Aminabad Market. Radhey Shyam Sahu filed case before Allahabad HC claiming that the
permission was illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional.
High Court set aside and quashed the relevant resolutions of the Mahapalika permitting such
construction and also the agreement dated November 4, 1993 entered into between the
Mahapalika and the appellant for the purpose. Writ of mandamus was issued to the
Mahapalika to restore back the park in its original position within a period of three months
from the date of the judgment.
Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court, appellant has come to this Court.
Mahapalika also felt aggrieved and filed appeals (Civil Appeal Nos. 9326-28 of 1994) but
these appeals by the Mahapalika were subsequently allowed to be withdrawn by order dated
February 6, 1997.
Law:
Ratio:
With respect to Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973
Under Section 95 of the Act, the Mahapalika may from time to time by special
resolution constitute a special committee to enquire into and report upon any matter
connected with its powers, duties or functions.
Section 114 of the Act provides for obligatory duties of the Mahapalika and one such
obligatory functions is to maintain public places, parks and to plant trees. This cannot now be
done as the park has been dug and construction made underground. By allowing underground
construction Mahapalika has deprived itself to its obligatory duties which cannot be permitted
In M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and Ors. (1997)1SCC388 , the case, which is also known as
that of 'Span Resorts case', owned by Span Motels Pvt. Ltd., this Court observed, that public
trust doctrine, as discussed in the judgment, is a part of the law of land. The classic struggle
between those members of the public who would preserve our rivers, forests, parks and open
lands in their pristine purity and those charged with administrative responsibilities who,
under the pressures of the changing needs of an increasingly complex society, find it
necessary to encroach to some extent upon open* lands heretofore considered inviolate to
change.
In the treatise "Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and Society" by Plater Abrams
Goldfarb (American Casebook series - 1992) under the Chapter on Fundamental
Environmental Rights, in Section 1 (The Modem Rediscovery of the Public Trust Doctrine) it
has been noticed that "long ago there developed in the law of the Roman Empire a legal
theory known as the "Doctrine of the public trust." In America Public Trust doctrine was
applied to public properties, such as shore-lands and parks.
This public trust doctrine in our country, it would appear, has grown from Article 21 of the
Constitution.
Held:
Thus, by allowing construction of underground shopping complex in the park Mahapalika has
violated not only Section 114 of the Act but also the public trust doctrine.
To repeat, the agreement is completely one sided favoring the builder. The land of immense
value has been handed over to it to construct underground shopping complex in violation of
the public trust doctrine and the Master Plan for the city of Lucknow. Appeals not allowed.
29. INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION AND ORS. VS. UNION OF INDIA
(UOI) AND ORS. AIR1996SC1446
Facts/Issues:
Bichhri is a small village in Udaipur district of Rajasthan, and to its north a major industrial
public establishment, Hindustan Zinc Limited was situated. That did not much affect Bichhri.
The problem began in 1987 when Hindustan Agro Chemicals Limited (Respondent no. 4)
started producing chemicals like oleum and single super phosphate. It’s sister concern, Silver
Chemicals (Respondent no. 5) commenced production of ‘H’ acid in the same complex. H
acid was meant for export whose manufacture gave rise to toxic effluents such as iron based
and gypsum based sludge, posing a threat to the nature. Jyoti Chemicals (Respondent no. 8),
another unit to produce H acid, besides some other chemicals. Respondent nos. 6 and 7 were
units, established to produce fertilizers and a few other products. All the units of Respondent
nos. 4 to 8 are situated in the same complex, controlled by same group of individuals and are
to called “chemical industries”.
The units Silver & Jyoti chemicals have given birth to around 2500 MT of highly toxic
sludge. Since the toxic untreated waste waters were allowed to flow out freely and toxic
sludge was dumped in the open, these substances have percolated deep into the Earth,
polluting the aquifers and ground water making it unfit for human and animal consumption.
The soil was rendered unfit for cultivation, which spread disease and death in the village and
surrounding areas. Villagers rose to action for the shutting down of these units, to which they
averred that they have stopped manufacturing chemicals. However, the consequences of their
action had long lasting effect. The present social action was initiated in August 1989
complaining about the above situation and requesting for appropriate remedial action. The
petitioner enclosed a number of photographs illustrating the enormous damage caused.
Ratio:
The court after hearing the parties requested the National Environmental Engineering
Research Institute (NEERI) to study the situation in and around Bichhri village and submit
their report on available remedies. NEERI was requested to submit both short and long term
measures to combat the hazard already caused. RPCB was also directed to submit the report
concerning the village. The Respondents submitted before the Court that they have stopped
the manufacturing process and will undertake the de-watering of wells.
On failure to handle the waste management, they spread the wastes which heightened the
problem of removal of sludge. The court directed the MoEF and Govt of India to inspect the
area, direct the respondents for entombing the sludge and recover costs from them.
The Court in 1993 directed that samples should be taken from entombed sludge and affected
wells and sent for analysis and it was found that the water was contaminated due to the
effluents of H acid. The Court ordered for closure of industries and the grievance of the
respondents was that they were not even allowed to submit a report for the show cause notice.
Held:
Various environmental legislations were referred to by the Court and reference was made to
Directive Principles of State Policy and Constitutional provisions. NEERI Report played an
important role in highlighting the hazards caused to the environment of Bichhri village along
with providing remedies. Polluter pays principle (Absolute Liabilty) as established in the
Oleum Gas Leak Case was relied upon. A successful collective action was achieved.
Facts/Issues:
The Respondents (Sri Kenchappa and ors.) who were agriculturists affected by land
acquisition in favour of Gee India Technology Centre Pvt. Ltd., filed a writ petition to restrain
the petitioners (Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board aka KIADB) from acquiring
their gomal (grazing) and residential lands. They said that parts of the land acquired were
grazing lands and such acquisition would adversely effect the environment.
They also said that the gomal and residential lands within green belt should not be acquired
for non-agricutural purposes, including industries.
The case went to the Division Bench. The Division bench quashed the notification of
acquisition to the extent of the lands reserved for agriculture, grazing and residing. The bench
directed the KIADB to leave certain amount of peripheral land to ensure balance between
development and ecology. The appellant preferred a special leave petition contending the
judgement and directions thereto to be outside the jurisdiction of High Court under art. 226.
The appellant also stated: The lands in question were already converted, Construction had
already started on the land. The Court had issued a stay order. Amicus curae was appointed to
proceed with the case.
Ratio:
The appellant must carry out environmental impact assessment while aspiring for
development. Obtaining necessary clearance from pollution control board must be made
mandatory. Referring to art(s). 21, 48A, and 51(g) of the Constitution, the Court said that they
express concern for the protection of environment. Sustainable development was considered
the answer to environmental problems weighing against development. Stockholm Conference
and the Rio de Janeiro Declaration was considered for guiding principles of the same.
The Court referred to a number of cases where conservation of environment and associated
rights were upheld and concluded that a sense of urgency in mandating protection of
environment must be inculcated in order to attain sustainable development and resolve
environmental problems. The Court discussed the Stockholm Conference, 1972 (“Magna
Carta of our environment”). It emphasizes the need for attaining balance in development and
environment.
It referred to the follow up report where it was concluded that though the present
developmental trend was detrimental to the environment and poverty was a major cause of
the same, a new development sustaining human progress over a long term must be adopted by
all nations. The Rio Declaration, 1992 of Environment and Development laid down the
principles of sustainable development considering environment as an integral part of the
developmental process with equitable treatment of both World Conservation Union and
WWF states that caring for earth, limited resourcing, and respecting nature and its limits
should be the path to sustainable development.
Held:
The judgement upheld sustainable development as the need of the hour. Sustainable
development or “a development which can be sustained by nature with or without mitigation”
is essential to maintain a balance between industrialization and ecology in order to solve the
problem of environmental degradation. Hence, it may be said that the Court went in favour of
mandatory environmental impact assessment in cases of land acquisition and other
developmental ventures potentially affecting the ecology in order to maintain balance
between development and environment.
The court also, by referring to international conferences and environmental conventions and
reports, have tried to introduce an international standard of treating sustainable development
in consonance with the provisions of the Constitution. By declaring clearance from the
Pollution Control Board to be compulsory, the Court has taken a firm stance in favour of
environmental protection in keeping with the developing policy of the nation.
Facts/Issues:
This case was decided by a bench consisting of 7 judges on a reference made by a Bench of
three judges. The Supreme Court was dealing with claims arising from the leakage of Oleum
gas on 4th and 6th December, 1985 from one of the unites of Shriram Foods and Fertilizers
Industries, in the city of Delhi, belonging to Delhi Cloth Mills Ltd. As a consequence of this
leakage, it was alleged that one advocate practicing in the Tis Hazari Court had died and the
same affected several other.
The action was brought through a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by way of
public interest litigation (PIL). The court had in mind that within a period of one year this
was a second case of large-scale leakage of delay gas in India, a year earlier due to leakage of
MIC gas from the Union Carbide Plant in Bhopal more than 3000 persons had died and lacs
of theirs were subjected to serious diseases of various kinds.
Ratio:
If the rule of strict liability laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher was applied to such like
situations then those who had established ‘hazardous and inherently dangerous’ industries in
and around thickly populated areas could escape the liability for the havoc caused thereby
pleading some exception to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. For instance, when the escape of
the escape of the substance causing damage was due to the act of a stranger, say due to
sabotage, there was no liability under that rule.
The Supreme Court took a bold decision holding that it was not bound to follow the 19th
century rule of English law and it could evolve a rule suitable to the social and economic
conditions prevailing in India at the present day. It evolved the rule of ‘absolute liability’ as
part of Indian Law in preference to the rule of strict liability laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher.
It expressly declared that the new rule was not subject to any of the exceptions under the rule
in Rylands v. Fletcher. After laying down the above mentioned rule the court directed that the
organizations who had filed the petition may file actions in appropriate court writhing a
period of 2 months to claim compensation on behalf of the victim of the gas leak. Bhagwati,
C.J. observed in this context:
The Supreme Court thus evolved a new rule creating absolute liability for the harm caused by
dangerous substances as was hitherto not there. The following statement of Bhagwati, C. J.
that laid down the new principle may be noted:
“We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently
dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons
working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-
delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which it has undertaken.
The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest
standard of safety if any harm results on account of such activity the enterprise must be
absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to
say that it taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its
part.”
The rule was summed up in the following words, with the assertion that this rule will not be
subjected to any of the exceptions recognised under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.
“We would therefore hold that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of
such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting for example, in the escape of toxic
gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by
the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis
the tortuous principle of strict liability under the rule Rylands v. Fletcher.
Held:
The court also laid down that the measure of compensation payable should be correlated to
the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise, so that the same can have the deterrent effect.
The position was thus stated:
“We would also like to point out that the measure of cooperation in the kind of cases referred
to must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such
compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise,
greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of
an accident in the carrying on o the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the
enterprise.”
Facts/Issues:
The defendant got a reservoir constructed, through independent contractors, over his land for
providing water to his mill. There were old disused shafts under the site of the reservoir,
which the contractors failed to observe and so did not block them. When the water was filled
in the reservoir, it burst through the shafts and flooded the plaintiff’s coal-mines on the
adjoining land. The defendant did not know of the shafts and had not been negligent although
the independent contractors had been. Even though the defendent had not been negligent, he
was held liable.
Ratio:
The rule was formulated by Blackburn J. in Exchequer Chamber in Fletcher v Rylands (1866)
L.R. 1 Ex 265 and the same was approved by the House of Lord in Rylands v Flectcher,
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. For the application of the rule, therefore, the following three
essentials should be there:
A person on his land must have brought some dangerous thing.
Things thus brought or kept by a person on his land must escape.
It must be non-natural use of land.
Exceptions to the rule:
The following exceptions to the rule have been recognized by Rylands v. Fletcher and some
later cases:
(i) Plaintiff’s own default
(ii) Act of God;
(iii) Consent of the plaintiff;
(iv) Act of third party;
(v) Statutory Authority.
33. K.M. CHINNAPPA, T.N. GODAVARMAN THIRUMALPAD V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS
AIR 2003 SC 724
Facts/Issues:
The case revolves around the environmental concerns and legal aspects of mining activities in
the Kudremukh region of Karnataka. The petitioner, K.M. Chinnappa, challenged the mining
lease renewal for Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd (KIOCL), highlighting the adverse
ecological impact on the Western Ghats.
The EIA reports from the two named institutes were not obtained, which complicated the
situation and questioned the legality of the lease renewal and mining continuation.
Law:
Key provisions included Section 2, which mandated Central Government approval for forest-
related activities, and Section 3, which dealt with the constitution of the Advisory Committee.
Ratio:
The mining lease was subject to extensive debate. The Court finally accepted the Forest
Advisory Committee's recommendation to allow mining until the end of 2005, subject to
ecological considerations.
The Government requested temporary working permission for KIOCL and the renewal of the
lease for forest land for mining activities, emphasizing the need for environmental studies to
decide further actions. The Court noted that the State and Central Government were
inconsistent regarding the period for which mining could be permitted, leading to criticism of
their approach.
Article 21 casts a duty upon the Government to protect the environment, and this
constitutional provision underscored the government's obligation to ensure environmental
sustainability in the case. The sustainable development principle, governing environmental
law, emphasized that growth should occur without harming future generations' ability to meet
their needs. This principle influenced the judgment.
The precautionary principle requires measures to prevent potential harm even if causation is
not established. This guided the Court in weighing the ecological considerations in the case.
Rule 24B of the Minerals Rules emphasized that non-forest activities could not proceed
without Central Government approval. This reinforced the need for legal compliance in the
KIOCL's activities. There were other proceedings against KIOCL for alleged violations of
various statutes. These were considered separately and were unaffected by the judgment in
this case.
Held:
The Court allowed mining until the end of 2005, following the Forest Advisory Committee's
recommendation. It also emphasized the need for the government to maintain a consistent
stance.
The Court stressed that further actions should adhere to the Committee's recommendations on
ecological aspects and that proper Environment Impact Assessment reports must be
considered for any future decisions.
The case represents a landmark decision in environmental law in India, emphasizing the
importance of legal compliance, the role of environmental principles, and the need for a
consistent government approach in protecting ecology.
34. M/S. IVORY TRADERS AND VS UNION OF INDIA [AIR 1997 DELHI 267]
Facts/Issues:
The petitioners are dealers and artisans in ivory carry on the and trade in ivory
including the manufacture of articles which are derived from ivory lawfully imported
in India prior to be ban.
They import the parts of his stock of mammoth ivory from Russia and parts of it from
Hong Kong for the purposes of the business.
Ivory derived from mammoth, extinct species of wild animal and ivory derived from
elephants. As the mammoth and elephants both are different from each other.
This case is totally based on environment and safeguarding of forests and wildlife.
The State shall protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and
wildlife of the country.
Four countries are involved in this trading these are India, Russia, Hong Kong and
china.
The court reasoned that the amendment act explicitly bans the use of ivory for
commercial use: “no person can commence or carry on business as a dealer in ivory
imported into India or articles made, there from, or as manufacturers of such articles”.
The court puts special emphasis on the words ivory imported into India as being
designed deliberately. The intention is to cover all descriptions of ivory, including
from mammoth.
Therefore, they plead that they are persons affected by amendment act.
The cannot even retain the possession and control of the ivory lawfully imported by
them and articles made or derived there from as the same has been made an offence
U/S 51 of act read with section 49 c (2). They say that the ban is unreasonable, unfair
and arbitrary.
Ratio:
It needs to be noticed that the Amendment Act 44 of 1991 has been enacted to carry out the
mandate of the directive principles as enshrined in Article 48-A. The State has the power to
completely prohibit a trade or business which has an adverse impact on the preservation of
species of wild life which are on the verge of extinction both because it is inherently
dangerous practice to destroy such animals in terms of ecology and also because of the
directive principles contained in Article 48A of the Constitution.
The respondent in its affidavit has also expressed the same difficulty in distinguishing. Also
when a buyer intends to buy a curio, he is not interested to know whether it was created from
elephant ivory or mammoth ivory as an average buyer also does not have the expertise or the
knowledge to distinguish between article made from mammoth ivory and Indian ivory and
buys it purely on aesthetic considerations or as a statue symbol. To give permission to trade
in Articles made from mammoth ivory would result in laundering of Indian ivory — a result
which the legislation wants to prevent for the reasons already explained above.
Facts/Issues:
In this landmark environmental case, petitioner M.C. Mehta, an active social worker,
approached the Supreme Court of India, raising concerns about the pollution of the river
Ganga, the lifeblood of a significant portion of northern India. The primary cause of pollution
was the discharge of trade effluents by industries and sewage by towns and cities situated
along the riverbanks.
The case revolved around the sections of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 1974, and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The petitioner sought a writ of
mandamus to restrain respondents, excluding Respondents 1 and 7 to 9, from releasing trade
effluents into the river until appropriate treatment plants were in place.
Ratio:
The court recognized the historical and cultural significance of the river Ganga. Originating
from ancient civilizations, cities like Varanasi, located on its banks, are among the world's
oldest human settlements. Yet, the river faced severe pollution, endangering the health and
ecology of the vast Indo-Gangetic Plain. Drawing from the Indian Constitution's Articles 48-
A and 51-A, the court emphasized the state and citizen's duty to protect the environment.
Additionally, the judgment referred to the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human
Environment, underscoring the global understanding of man's responsibility towards his
environment and the need to act cautiously to prevent irreversible damage.
Responding to the court's notice, several industrialists and local bodies appeared before the
court, with some detailing the steps they'd taken to treat effluents before releasing them. The
tanneries near Kanpur, specifically respondents 14 to 87 and 89, were the initial focus.
In conclusion, due to the gravity of the situation and the paramount importance of
safeguarding the river Ganga, the Supreme Court directed the closure of industries that did
not adhere to minimum standards for effluent treatment.
Despite acknowledging the severe pollution of the Ganga by tanneries, only some have
initiated primary treatment plants. The Hindustan Chamber of Commerce admitted that
tanneries release effluents into the sewage system, leading to the Ganga. A few have set up
primary treatment plants, while others sought more time. The court opined that tanneries
incapable of setting up primary treatment plants should not operate, given the public health
risks. Tanneries in Jajmau were given the mandate to establish primary treatment plants or
face closure.
Held:
In a crucial directive concerning the health and purity of the river Ganga, multiple tanneries,
including M/s. Vikash Tannery, M/s. New Golden Tannery, and others up to M/s. Awadh
Tannery, have been ordered to halt operations and abstain from releasing effluents into the
Ganga without prior treatment. This mandate, effective from 1-10-1987, requires these
tanneries to set up primary treatment plants as approved by the State Board. Meanwhile,
seven tanneries, such as M/s. Indian Tanning Industry and M/s. Super Tannery India Ltd.,
who have already established primary treatment facilities, can continue operations, provided
they maintain their treatment plants in good working condition.
Counsel Shri S. K. Dholakia, representing other tanneries, has pledged that they will establish
primary treatment plants within six months. Failing this, they commit to ceasing their
business operations. The court has set a deadline of 31-3-1988 for these tanneries, post which
any non-compliant tanneries must halt their business from 1-4-1988.
The Central Government, the Uttar Pradesh Board, and the District Magistrate, Kanpur, have
been directed to ensure the strict enforcement of these orders. Further hearings on the case
against municipal bodies in Uttar Pradesh, through which the Ganga flows, are scheduled for
27th October, 1987.
The significance of the river Ganga in India's cultural, spiritual, and historical tapestry is
emphasized. Esteemed as a purifier of sins and a lifeline for millions, the Ganga has
unfortunately faced severe pollution, primarily due to man-made activities, including effluent
discharge from tanneries. The court acknowledges the economic implications of closing
tanneries but emphasizes the paramount importance of life, health, and ecology.
Facts/Issues:
A writ petition was filed by a prominent attorney M.C. Mehta before the Supreme Court of
India for the closure or removal and relocation of Shriram Food and Fertilizers Limited,
which was established in the densely populated area of Kirti Nagar in Delhi with a population
of around 200,000 residents, was involved in the production of hazardous chemicals like
caustic soda, chlorine, oleum, and some other chemicals and fertilizers, the production of
such harmful chemical lead to the emission of toxic gases which was hazardous for the
people residing in the particular vicinity.
The industry which was in the question was Shriram Food and Fertilizers Ltd which was a
Caustic Chlorine plant operated by Delhi Cloth Mill Ltd constituted in 1949. While the
petition was still pending in the court of law, oleum gas leaked on the 4th and 6th of
December, 1985 from one of the units of the plant and resulted in the death of an advocate of
Tis Hazari Court and also caused harm to the resident of the vicinity because of the inhalation
of the leaked gas. After this incident, the Delhi Legal Aid & Advice Board and the Delhi Bar
Association applied an application for claiming compensation for the victims who had
suffered damages.
A Bench of three Hon'ble Judges who allowed functioning of Shriram Food and Fertilizers
and its other plant under some guidelines, invoke the applications for compensation to a
Bench of five Judges as the issue was related to great constitutional importance relating to the
interpretation of Article 21 as well as Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. In order to assess
whether a writ in conjunction with compensation could be awarded, the court had to interpret
Article 32. In relation to the private companies Article 21, which establishes the right to
protect life and freedom, was also to be interpreted as being essential in the public interest.
Ratio:
Justice P.N Bhagwati stated that seeking closure of such hazardous industries is not a solution
as it will do no good to the society as well as the nation. It will impact the growth and
development of the country and the closure of such industries would bring unemployment to
thousands of workers. Closure of Shriram individually would bring unemployment to 4000+
workers. Though these industries are disastrous to the public, complete closure of such
industries is next to impossible.
So to minimize the risk factor, the court gave directions to two expert teams, one was
appointed by the court: Nilay Chaudhary Committee and the other was appointed by the
petitioner, Agarwal Committee to check that whether the recommendations which were given
in the Manmohan Singh Committee. Several provisions were enacted by the government
which allowed the company to operate under 11 conditions as suggested by the committee.
Held:
It was held by the court that all the exceptions set out to the rule laid down in Rylands v.
Fletcher cannot be applicable to hazardous industries and therefore adopted the principle of
absolute or no-fault liability. The only exception which was available was either a natural
calamity or an act by a third party but since in this case, the act was due to human
accompanied by mechanical errors, the principle of absolute liability prevailed.
This particular case propounded the principle of absolute liability and also highlighted the
concept of deep pocket in law. Here, article 21 of the Indian Constitution is interpreted as a
right to a dignified life- with healthy environment clean air and surroundings.