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SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190632

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

CARPIO,*
Acting Chief Justice,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,** and
LEONEN, *** JJ.

MANOLITO LUCENA y Promulgated:

VELASQUEZ, alias "Machete,"
Accused-Appellant. FEB 2 6 2014
:x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -x:

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this appeal is the Decision 1 dated 24 August 2009 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03371 affirming the
Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parafiaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0763 to 03-0765,
finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias "Machete"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape, thereby sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering

* Per Special Order No. 1644 dated 25 February 2014.

** Per Raffle dated .13 January 2014.
Per Special Order No. 1636 dated 17 February 2014.
Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Estela M. Perlas-
Bernabe (now a member of this Court) and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-13.
Penned by Judge Jaime M. Guray. CA rollo, pp. 20-33.
Decision -2- G.R. No. 190632

him to pay AAA3 the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and

P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.

Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003

allege:

That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of

Parañaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who
took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime,
by means of force, threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against
her will and consent. (Emphasis and italics supplied).

The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to

all the charges against him.5 Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.

The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle
Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child Protection Unit, University of the Philippines –
Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH), who examined the victim.

The testimonies of the above-named prosecution witnesses established

that on 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17
years old, having been born on 10 July 1986, was walking and chatting with
her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2)
barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed
them that they were being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing
curfew against minors. AAA’s companions, however, managed to escape,

3
This is pursuant to the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703
(2006), wherein this Court resolved to withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and to use
fictitious initials instead to represent her in its decisions. Likewise, the personal circumstances of
the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities,
as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. The
names of such victims, and of their immediate family members other than the accused, shall
appear as “AAA,” “BBB,” “CCC,” and so on. Addresses shall appear as “XXX” as in “No. XXX
Street, XXX District, City of XXX.”
The Supreme Court took note of the legal mandate on the utmost confidentiality
of proceedings involving violence against women and children set forth in Sec. 29 of Republic Act
No. 7610, otherwise known as Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act; Sec. 44 of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as
Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children effective 15 November 2004.
4
Records, pp. 1-3.
5
Per Certificate of Arraignment and RTC Order both dated 24 September 2004. Id. at 34 and 36-
37.
Decision -3- G.R. No. 190632

thus, she alone was apprehended.6 AAA was then ordered by the barangay
tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail,
AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit any offense
as she was just chatting with her friends. AAA’s plea, however, remained
unheeded.7

AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the
vicinity of the San Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them
alighted from the tricycle and went inside the barangay hall. The appellant,
on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while, the
barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But,
the appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back
to her house.8

But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant

brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, Parañaque City. While on
their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once she
resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to
alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would do with
her but the former did not respond. The appellant then took out the backseat
of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a
gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes.
The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis
into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the
appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes,
the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter,
he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into
AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally
ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he
would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between them.9

The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then

brought AAA in front of a school in Parañaque City. But, before allowing
AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat to kill her should she tell
anyone about the incident.10

The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of
their barangay kagawad, who simply advised her to just proceed to the
6
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 3 March 2005, pp. 4-6.
7
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 6 May 2005, p. 7.
8
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 3 March 2005, pp. 6-7.
9
Testimony of AAA, id. at 7-10; Testimony of AAA, TSN, 6 May 2005, pp. 10-13.
10
Testimony of AAA, id. at 10.
Decision -4- G.R. No. 190632

barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the appellant. AAA and her
mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to physical
examination by Dr. Tan,11 which resulted in the following findings:

HYMEN Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 o’clock area

with petechiae, fresh laceration at 9 o’clock area with
eccymosi at 8-10 o’clock area, Type of Hymen: Crescentic

xxxx

ANAL EXAMINATION Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1

o’clock area. No evident injury at the time
of examination.

xxxx

IMPRESSIONS

Disclosure of sexual abuse.

Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or
Penetrating Trauma.12 (Emphasis supplied).

AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she
executed her sworn statement accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able
to identify the appellant as her assailant because the former was wearing a
jacket emblazoned with “Barangay Police,” as well as a Barangay
Identification Card, at the time of the incident.13

The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for
the defense.

In the course of Corpuz’s direct examination, however, the parties

made the following stipulations: (1) that the [herein appellant] was the
assigned barangay radio operator on that date, [28 April 2003], and he
stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2) that the
witness was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and
returned after two (2) hours, at 2:00 o’clock a.m.; and (3) that when he woke
up at 5:00 o’clock in the morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these
stipulations, Corpuz’s testimony was dispensed with.14

11
Testimony of AAA, id. at 11-12; Testimony of Dr. Merle Tan, TSN, 24 June 2005, p. 6.
12
Per Medico-Legal Report Number 2003-04-0078. Records, p. 11; Id. at 9-18.
13
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 3 March 2005, pp. 13-16; Court of Appeals Decision dated 24 August
2009. Rollo, p. 5.
14
RTC Order dated 13 September 2007. Records, pp. 119-120.
Decision -5- G.R. No. 190632

The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial
and alibi. He, thus, offered a different version of the story.

On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio

operator at the barangay hall. His task as such was to receive complaints
from the residents of the barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow
barangay officials who are in need of assistance. On the same day, he
received a call from his companion, who is also a barangay tanod. He
cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day.15

The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a
complaint against him but he denied that he knew her personally. He also
vehemently denied the following: (1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he was one
of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating the curfew
ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle
in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that after 12:00
midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was shocked
when he was arrested on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit any
crime.16

In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to
the categorical, straightforward and positive testimony of AAA, coupled
with the medical findings of sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three
(3) counts of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article
266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant]

MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266-a
par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266-B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353)
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count of Rape. In addition, the [appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA]
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count.17 (Emphasis and italics theirs).

The appellant appealed18 the trial court’s Decision to the Court of

Appeals with the following assignment of errors:

15
Testimony of the appellant, TSN, 7 September 2006, p. 5.
16
Id. at 3-4, 7-9 and 13-16.
17
CA rollo, p. 33.
18
Per Notice of Appeal dated 20 May 2008. Id. at 34.
Decision -6- G.R. No. 190632

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

[HEREIN APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S
FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION.

II.

GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED

THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HIM OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.19

After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered

its now assailed Decision dated 24 August 2009 sustaining appellant’s
conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as the damages awarded to
AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts revealed
that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina.
The said three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of
five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating his
lust and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly,
the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual
assault on AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is
irrefutable.20

Hence, this appeal.21

Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their

respective appeal briefs23 filed with the Court of Appeals in lieu of
Supplemental Briefs.

In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove
that force or intimidation attended the commission of rape. Records
revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances
over her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive throughout her
ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3) episodes of their sexual
intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape,
which she never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to human

19
Appellant’s Brief dated 16 December 2008. Id. at 48.
20
Rollo, p. 12.
21
Per Notice of Appeal dated 11 September 2009. Id. at 14-15.
22
Id. at 29-30 and 38-40.
23
CA rollo, pp. 46-61 and 88-113.
Decision -7- G.R. No. 190632

experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity of her testimony and on
her credibility as a witness.

The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAA’s medical

examination is quite disturbing as it appears that her anal orifice was also
penetrated by a hard object though nothing was said to this effect in her
testimony.

The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three

counts of rape. The intervening period of five (5) minutes between each
penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three
separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is of prime importance is that
he was motivated by a single criminal intent.

With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt; hence, his acquittal is inevitable.

This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus,

stands but the damages awarded in favor AAA must be modified.

Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three

settled principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and
while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the
person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic
nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.24

Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the

accused and the complainant. Following the above principles, this Court is
duty-bound to conduct a thorough and exhaustive evaluation of a judgment
of conviction for rape.25

After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds
no justifiable reason to reverse the rulings of the lower courts.

24
People v. Celocelo, G.R. No. 173798, 15 December 2010, 638 SCRA 576, 583-584.
25
Id. at 584.
Decision -8- G.R. No. 190632

All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under
paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These provisions specifically state:

ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is

committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman

under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or

otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse

of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years

of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.

xxxx

ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next

preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon

or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. (Emphasis supplied).

Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following

instances constitutes rape: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when
the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when
she is under twelve (12) years of age.26

The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not
be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not
necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as
could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force or intimidation
be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of
the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that
the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected

26
Id.
27
People v. Javier, 370 Phil. 128, 145 (1999).
Decision -9- G.R. No. 190632

and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces

fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.28

In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of

stenographic notes and as observed by the trial court, which the Court of
Appeals sustained, AAA’s categorical, straightforward and positive
testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same
was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her
clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal
safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not only once but thrice. This
happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust,
the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone
about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the
appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to
Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation
were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved
desires.

While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the
ground the moment he inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and was
actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same
does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been
instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the
gun was still within appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still make good of
his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil
desires. AAA’s lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and
would not in any way discredit her testimony.

It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed

with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently. Further, as has
been consistently held by this Court, physical resistance is not an essential
element of rape and need not be established when intimidation is exercised
upon the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to the
rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety. The
victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary
her submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears stressing that
not every rape victim can be expected to act with reason or in conformity
with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently.

28
People v. Cañada, G.R. No. 175317, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA 378, 392.
29
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 6 May 2005, p. 10.
Decision - 10 - G.R. No. 190632

Some may shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into
insensibility.30

In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility in order to exculpate himself

from all the charges, the appellant puts stress on the portion of the result of
AAA’s medical examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was also
penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her testimony.

To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally

misplaced. It would not even work to appellant’s advantage and would not
in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAA’s testimony. As this Court
has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit
corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a
successful prosecution for rape.31 Moreover, even though AAA made no
mention of any anal penetration, such omission would not change the fact
that she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. As succinctly found by both
lower courts, AAA categorically, straightforwardly, clearly and positively
narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant. She
recounted in detail how the appellant took advantage of her by bringing her
to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody was present; commanding her to lie down
and undress herself at a point of a gun; and successfully inserting his penis
into her vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated that after the first
penetration the appellant stopped. After about five minutes, however, the
appellant, once again, inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the
appellant stopped. For the third and last time, the appellant again inserted
his penis into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest of the
medical findings showing fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina,
which according to Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of “blunt force or penetrating
trauma” - a disclosure of sexual abuse.

For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi.
Notably, these defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that
the rape was committed without force or intimidation thereby implying that
the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was consensual.

Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently
weak defenses, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same
cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim who, in a simple
and straightforward manner, convincingly identified the appellant as the

30
People v. Alberio, G.R. No. 152584, 6 July 2004, 433 SCRA 469, 475.
31
People v. Linsie, G.R. No. 199494, 27 November 2013.
Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 190632

defiler of her chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he
raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial and alibi are
legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot
overcome the categorical testimony of the victim,33 as in this case.

Also, appellant’s alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he
was at the barangay hall doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00
midnight he already went home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony of defense witness
Corpuz that the appellant left at about past 12:00 midnight, almost the same
time the rape incident happened, and then returned after two (2) hours, even
bolster the possibility of the appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime.

This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill-motive
on the part of AAA to testify falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity
of AAA’s accusation since no woman would concoct a tale that would
tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and her
family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the
prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice for
the crime committed against her.34

In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the

appellant’s guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v.

Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts
of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by a
single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.

In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s
vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor
and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina;
the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the
headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his
penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions.
From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only

32
People v. Mercado, 419 Phil. 534, 543 (2001).
33
Id.
34
People v. Linsie, supra note 31.
35
438 Phil. 296 (2002).
Decision - 12 - G.R. No. 190632

one count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is
no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the accused
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other
than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the
crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations
occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was
obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.

The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from
the Aaron Case. Here, we quote with approval the observations of the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be
convicted of three (3) counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the
[appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of
[AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an
interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after
satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred
from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not
motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent.
Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36
(Emphasis supplied).

This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the
three insertions into AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct
criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for three counts of
rape is proper.

As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266-B of the Revised

Penal Code, as amended, provides that “[w]henever the rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.” As it was properly alleged and proved that the appellant
used a gun in order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts
correctly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
of rape.

As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of

rape is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages
which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in

36
Rollo, p. 12.
 Decision - 13 - G.R. No. 190632

the exercise of sound discretion. 37 The award of moral damages, on the

other hand, is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further
proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a
rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 38
Hence, this Court upholds the PS0,000.00 civil indemnity and PS0,000.00
moral damages, for each count of rape, that were awarded by both lower
courts in favor of AAA.

In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in

favor of AAA. The award of exemplary damages is justified under Article
2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying. 39 In this case, since the qualifying circumstance of
the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the crime,
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is
awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence, the
interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid. 40

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding
herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in
favor of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay AAA the interest on
all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

PEREZ

37
People v. Montemayor, 444 Phil. 169, 190 (2003).
38
People v. Dimaanao, 506 Phil. 630, 652 (2005).
39
People v. Montemayor, supra note 37 at 190.
40
People v. linsie, supra note 31.
 Decision - 14 - G.R. No. 190632

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CAR IO
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson

A~~~
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CA~1rENDOZA
Associate Justice A~JJ~~ 1~stice

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice